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Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces (As of March 31, 2011)

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Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces (As of March 31, 2011) Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces (As of March 31, 2011) Minister of Defense Chief of Staff Joint Staff Office Chief of Staff, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, ASDF Ground Staff Office Maritime Staff Office Air Staff Office Northern Army 2nd Division (Asahikawa) Self-Defense Fleet Fleet Escort Force 1st Escort Flotilla (Yokosuka) Air Defense Northern Air 2nd Air Wing (Chitose) 5th Brigade (Obihiro) 2nd Escort Flotilla (Sasebo) Command Defense Force 3rd Air Wing (Misawa) 7th Division (Higashi Chitose) Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Misawa) 3rd Escort Flotilla (Maizuru) 11th Brigade (Makomanai) 3rd Air Defense Missile Group (Chitose) 1st Tank Group (Kita Eniwa) 4th Escort Flotilla (Kure) 6th Air Defense Missile Group (Misawa) 1st Field Artillery Brigade (Kita Chitose) Others Others 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Higashi Chitose) Central Air Fleet Air Force 1st Fleet Air Wing (Kanoya) 6th Air Wing (Komatsu) Northern Engineer Unit (Minami Eniwa) Defense Force Others 2nd Fleet Air Wing (Hachinohe) 7th Air Wing (Hyakuri) Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Iruma) 4th Fleet Air Wing (Atsugi) Northeastern Army 6th Division (Jinmachi) 1st Air Defense Missile Group (Iruma) 9th Division (Aomori) 5th Fleet Air Wing (Naha) 4th Air Defense Missile Group (Gifu) Northeastern Combined Brigade (Sendai) 21st Fleet Air Wing (Tateyama) Others 2nd Field Artillery Group (Sendai) Western Air 22nd Fleet Air Wing (Omura) 5th Air Wing (Nyutabaru) 5th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Hachinohe) Defense Force 2nd Engineer Brigade (Funaoka) 31st Fleet Air Wing (Iwakuni) 8th Air Wing (Tsuiki) Others Others Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Kasuga) 2nd Air Defense Missile Group (Kasuga) Fleet Submarine Force 1st Submarine Flotilla (Kure) Eastern Army 1st Division (Nerima) Others 2nd Submarine Flotilla (Yokosuka) Southwestern 12th Brigade (Somagahara) 83rd Air Wing (Naha) Composite Air Division 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Matsudo) Others Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Naha) 1st Engineer Brigade (Koga) 5th Air Defense Missile Group (Naha) Mine Warfare Force (Yokosuka) 1st Training Brigade (Takeyama) Others Others Fleet Research Development Command (Yokosuka) Others Oceanographic Command (Yokosuka) Middle Army 3rd Division (Senzo) 10th Division (Moriyama) Fleet Intelligence Command (Yokosuka) Air Support Command Air Rescue Wing (Iruma) 13th Brigade (Kaitaichi) Others 1st Tactical Airlift Group (Komaki) 14th Brigade (Zentsuji) 2nd Tactical Airlift Group (Iruma) 8th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Aonogahara) Yokosuka District 3rd Tactical Airlift Group (Miho) 4th Engineer Brigade (Okubo) Air Traffic Control Service Group (Iruma) Middle Combined Brigade (Otsu) Kure District Air Weather Service Group (Fuchu) Others Others Sasebo District Western Army 4th Division (Fukuoka) Air Training Command 1st Air Wing (Hamamatsu) 8th Division (Kita Kumamoto) Maizuru District 4th Air Wing (Matsushima) 15th Brigade (Naha) 11th Flying Training Wing (Shizuhama) Western Field Artillery Unit (Yufuin) Ominato District 12th Flying Training Wing (Hofu-kita) 2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Iizuka) 13th Flying Training Wing (Ashiya) 5th Engineer Brigade (Ogori) Air Basic Training Wing (Hofu-minami) 3rd Training Brigade (Ainoura) Air Training Command (Shimofusa) Others Others Training Squadron (Kure) Air Development and Test Command Air Development and Test Wing (Gifu) Central Readiness Force 1st Airborne Brigade (Narashino) Communications Command (Ichigaya) Electronics Development and Test Group (Iruma) 1st Helicopter Brigade (Kisarazu) MSDF Maritime Materiel Command (Jujo) Aero-Medical Laboratory (Tachikawa, Iruma) Central Readiness Regiment (Utsunomiya) Other units and organizations Central NBC Weapon Defense Unit (Omiya) Air Communications and System Wing (Ichigaya) Special Operation Group (Narashino) Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Komaki) Others Air Material Command (Jujo) Other units and organizations Signal Brigade (Ichigaya) Ground Research & Development Command (Asaka) Ground Material Control Command (Jujo) Other units and organizations.
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