DOCSLIB.ORG

Reference 1. Major Nuclear Forces

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Reference Reference 1. Major Nuclear Forces U.S. Russia U.K. France China 550 508 46 Intercontinental Minuteman III: 500 SS-18: 80 DF-5 (CSS-4): 20 ballistic missiles Peacekeeper: 50 SS-19: 126 — — DF-31 (CSS-9): 6 (ICBMs) SS-25: 254 DF-4 (CSS-3): 20 SS-27: 48 35 IRBMs — — — — DF-3 (CSS-2): 2 MRBMs DF-21 (CSS-5): 33 SRBMs — — — — 725 Missiles 432 252 48 64 12 Trident C-4: 120 SS-N-18: 96 Trident D-5: 48 M-45: 64 JL-1 (CSS-N-3): 12 Submarine Trident D-5: 312 SS-N-19: 60 (SSBN [Nuclear- (SSBN [Nuclear- (SSBN [Nuclear- launched (SSBN [Nuclear- SS-N-23: 96 powered submarines powered submarines powered submarines ballistic missiles powered submarines (SSBN [Nuclear- with ballistic missile with ballistic missile with ballistic missile (SLBMs) with ballistic missile powered submarines payloads]: 4) payloads]: 4) payloads]: 1) payloads]: 14) with ballistic missile payloads]: 15) 114 79 Long-distance B-2: 19 Tu-95 (Bear): 64 — — — (strategic) bombers B-52: 94 Tu-160 (Blackjack): 15 Note: Sources: Military Balance 2008, etc. — 391 — Reference 2. Performance of Major Ballistic and Cruise Missiles Maximum Item Country Name Warhead (yield) Guidance System Remarks range MIRV (170 KT, 335-350 KT or Minuteman III 13,000 Inertial Three-stage solid U.S. 300-475 KT × 3) Peacekeeper 9,600 MIRV (300–475 KT × 10) Inertial Three-stage solid MIRV (1.3 MT × 8, 500 -550 KT × 10 or SS-18 10,500-16,000 Inertial Two-stage liquid 500-750KT × 10) or Single (24MT) Russia MIRV (550 KT × 6 or 500-750 ICBM SS-19 9,000-10,000 Inertial Two-stage liquid KT × 6) SS-25 10,500 Single (550 KT) Inertial + Computer control Three-stage solid SS-27 10,500 Single (550 KT) Inertial + GLONASS Three-stage solid Single (4 MT) or DF-5 (CSS-4) 12,000-13,000 Inertial Two-stage liquid MIRV (150-350 KT × 4-6) China Single (1 MT) or DF-31 (CSS-9) 8,000-14,000 Inertial + Stellar reference Three-stage solid MIRV (20–150 KT × 3–5) Trident C-4 7,400 MIRV (100 KT × 8) Inertial + Stellar reference Three-stage solid U.S. Trident D-5 12,000 MIRV (100 KT or 475 KT × 8) Inertial + Stellar reference Three-stage solid Single (450 KT) or SS-N-18 6,500-8,000 Inertial + Stellar reference Two-stage liquid MIRV (500 KT × 3 or 100 KT × 7) Russia SS-N-20 8,300 MIRV (200 KT × 10) Inertial + Stellar reference Three-stage solid SLBM Inertial + Stellar reference + SS-N-23 8,300 MIRV (100 KT × 4) Three-stage liquid Computer Controlled PBV U.K. Trident D-5 12,000 MIRV (100-120 KT × 8) Inertial + Stellar reference Three-stage solid France M-45 5,300 MRV (100 KT × 6) Inertial + computer control Three-stage solid China JL-1 (CSS-N-3) 2,150 – 2,500 Single (20–500 KT) Inertial + GPS + radar Two-stage solid DF-3 (CSS-2) 2,400 – 2,800 Single (3 MT) Inertial One-stage liquid IRBM DF-4 (CSS-3) 4,750 Single (3 MT) Inertial Two-stage liquid China MRBM Single (20–500 KT) DF-21 (CSS-5) 2,150 – 2,500 Inertial + GPS + radar Two-stage solid HE, chemical, EMP, sub munition Inertial + GPS + Terminal DF-11 (CSS-7) 280 – 530 Single (2–20 KT) One-stage solid SRBM China guidance DF-15 (CSS-6) 600 Single (90 KT) Inertial + Terminal guidance One-stage solid Tomahawk Inertial + Terrain Sea surface and Cruise 2,500 Single (200 KT) missile (TLAM-N) contour matching underwater launched U.S. (long- Inertial + Terrain AGM-86B 2,500 Single (200 KT) Air launched range) contour matching Inertial + Terrain Cruise SS-N-21 2,400 Single (200 KT) Underwater launched missile contour matching Russia (long- Inertial + Terrain AS-15 2,500 – 3,500 Single (200–250 KT) Air launched range) contour matching Note: Sources: Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, etc. — 392 — Reference Reference 3. Outline of Major Countries and Regional Military Power (Approximate Numbers) Ground Forces Naval Forces Air Forces Ground forces Tonnage Number of Number of Country or region Country or region Country or region (10,000 persons) (10,000 tons) vessels combat aircraft China 160 United States 556.2 950 United States 3,940 India 110 Russia 201.9 1,030 China 2,820 North Korea 100 China 117.1 860 Russia 2,170 Pakistan 55 United Kingdom 89.6 240 Republic of Korea 620 Republic of Korea 54 France 42.5 260 North Korea 590 United States 52 India 35.5 150 Syria 580 Viet Nam 41 Indonesia 23.4 180 India 570 Turkey 40 Turkey 21.9 200 Egypt 550 Russia 40 Taiwan 20.7 330 Taiwan 530 Myanmar 38 Germany 20.3 130 Turkey 500 Iran 35 Spain 19.1 100 France 500 Egypt 34 Italy 17.4 170 Israel 400 Brazil 24 Australia 15.6 80 Pakistan 380 Indonesia 23 Brazil 15.6 90 Libya 380 Colombia 22 Republic of Korea 15.3 180 United Kingdom 370 Japan 13.8 Japan 43.7 150 Japan 440 Notes: 1. Data on ground forces and air forces is taken from Military Balance 2008 and other sources, and data on naval forces is taken from Jane’s Fighting Ships 2007–2008 and other sources. 2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Self-Defense Forces as of the end of FY 2007, and combat aircraft include ASDF combat aircraft (excluding transports) and MSDF combat aircraft (only those with fixed wings). 3. Arrangement is in order of the scale of armed strength. Reference 4. Outline of Regular and Reserve Forces of Major Countries and Regions (Approximate Numbers) Country or Region Military Service System Regulars (10,000 persons) Reserves (10,000 persons) United States Volunteer 150 108 Russia Conscription 103 2,000 United Kingdom Volunteer 18 20 France Conscription 25 3 Germany Conscription 25 16 Italy Volunteer 19 4 India Volunteer 129 116 China Conscription 211 80 North Korea Conscription 110 65 Republic of Korea Conscription 69 450 Egypt Conscription 47 48 Israel Conscription 18 57 Army 13.8 3.2 (0.6) Japan Volunteer Navy 4.4 0.09 Air Force 4.5 0.08 Notes: 1. Data taken from Military Balance 2008 and other sources. 2. Figures for Japan show the actual strength of its Ground Self-Defense Force, the Maritime Self-Defense Force, and the Air Self-Defense Force as of the end of FY 2007. The figure in brackets shows the number of SDF Ready Reserve Personnel, and is not included in the total figure. 3. Russia has made the shift from a conscription to voluntary system a top priority issue. — 393 — 350 300 250 350 200 300 150 250 100 200 50 150 0 100 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 Far East China North 50 Japan Russia Korea 0 Year 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 Far East China North Japan Russia Korea Year Reference 5. Outline of Changes in Military Power in Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan 180 Outline of Changes in Ground Military Strength160 in Outline of Changes in Maritime Military Strength in Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan 140 350 120 180 300 100 160 80 140 250 10,000 10,000 personnel 60 120 200 tons 40 100 150 20 80 100 0 60 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 401965 1985 2007 50 Far East China North Japan Russia Korea 20 0 0 Year 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 Far East China North Japan Far East China North Japan Russia Korea Russia Korea Year Year Outline of Changes in Air Military Strength in Countries and Regions Surrounding Japan 6,000 180 5,000 160 Number of 4,000 140 6,000 combat aircraft 120 3,000 5,000 100 2,000 4,000 80 60 1,000 3,000 40 0 2,000 20 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 0 Far East China North 1,000Japan Russia Korea 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 0 Far East China North Japan Year Russia Korea 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 Far East China North Japan Note: Data taken from Military Balance, etc.,Year of the respective years (Figures for Japan represent actual Russia Korea strength as of the end of the respective fiscal years.) Year 6,000 5,000 — 394 — 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 1965 1985 2007 Far East China North Japan Russia Korea Year Reference Reference 6. Basic Policy for National Defense (Adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet on May 20, 1957) The aim of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of protecting Japan’s independence and peace, which are founded on democracy. In order to achieve this, the Basic Policy states as follows: (1) To support the U.N. activities and promote international cooperation to achieve world peace. (2) To stabilize the livelihood of the people, promote their patriotism, and establish the foundations required for national security. (3) Within the limits required for self-defense, to progressively establish efficient defense capabilities in accordance with the nation’s strength and situation.
Recommended publications
  • The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Crisis Management

    The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Crisis Management

    e Fukushima Nuclearand Crisis Accident Management e Fukushima The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Crisis Management — Lessons for Japan-U.S. Alliance Cooperation — — Lessons for Japan-U.S. Alliance Cooperation — — Lessons for Japan-U.S. September, 2012 e Sasakawa Peace Foundation Foreword This report is the culmination of a research project titled ”Assessment: Japan-US Response to the Fukushima Crisis,” which the Sasakawa Peace Foundation launched in July 2011. The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant that resulted from the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011, involved the dispersion and spread of radioactive materials, and thus from both the political and economic perspectives, the accident became not only an issue for Japan itself but also an issue requiring international crisis management. Because nuclear plants can become the target of nuclear terrorism, problems related to such facilities are directly connected to security issues. However, the policymaking of the Japanese government and Japan-US coordination in response to the Fukushima crisis was not implemented smoothly. This research project was premised upon the belief that it is extremely important for the future of the Japan-US relationship to draw lessons from the recent crisis and use that to deepen bilateral cooperation. The objective of this project was thus to review and analyze the lessons that can be drawn from US and Japanese responses to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, and on the basis of these assessments, to contribute to enhancing the Japan-US alliance’s nuclear crisis management capabilities, including its ability to respond to nuclear terrorism.

  • Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-48194-6 — Japan's Castles Oleg Benesch , Ran Zwigenberg Index More Information

    Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-48194-6 — Japan's Castles Oleg Benesch , Ran Zwigenberg Index More Information Index 10th Division, 101, 117, 123, 174 Aichi Prefecture, 77, 83, 86, 90, 124, 149, 10th Infantry Brigade, 72 171, 179, 304, 327 10th Infantry Regiment, 101, 108, 323 Aizu, Battle of, 28 11th Infantry Regiment, 173 Aizu-Wakamatsu, 37, 38, 53, 74, 92, 108, 12th Division, 104 161, 163, 167, 268, 270, 276, 277, 12th Infantry Regiment, 71 278, 279, 281, 282, 296, 299, 300, 14th Infantry Regiment, 104, 108, 223 307, 313, 317, 327 15th Division, 125 Aizu-Wakamatsu Castle, 9, 28, 38, 62, 75, 17th Infantry Regiment, 109 77, 81, 277, 282, 286, 290, 311 18th Infantry Regiment, 124, 324 Akamatsu Miyokichi, 64 19th Infantry Regiment, 35 Akasaka Detached Palace, 33, 194, 1st Cavalry Division (US Army), 189, 190 195, 204 1st Infantry Regiment, 110 Akashi Castle, 52, 69, 78 22nd Infantry Regiment, 72, 123 Akechi Mitsuhide, 93 23rd Infantry Regiment, 124 Alnwick Castle, 52 29th Infantry Regiment, 161 Alsace, 58, 309 2nd Division, 35, 117, 324 Amakasu Masahiko, 110 2nd General Army, 2 Amakusa Shirō , 163 33rd Division, 199 Amanuma Shun’ichi, 151 39th Infantry Regiment, 101 American Civil War, 26, 105 3rd Cavalry Regiment, 125 anarchists, 110 3rd Division, 102, 108, 125 Ansei Purge, 56 3rd Infantry Battalion, 101 anti-military feeling, 121, 126, 133 47th Infantry Regiment, 104 Aoba Castle (Sendai), 35, 117, 124, 224 4th Division, 77, 108, 111, 112, 114, 121, Aomori, 30, 34 129, 131, 133–136, 166, 180, 324, Aoyama family, 159 325, 326 Arakawa
  • Japan's New Defense Establishment

    Japan's New Defense Establishment

    JAPAN’S NEW DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT: INSTITUTIONS, CAPABILITIES, AND IMPLICATIONS Yuki Tatsumi and Andrew L. Oros Editors March 2007 ii | JAPAN’S NEW DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT Copyright ©2007 The Henry L. Stimson Center ISBN: 0-9770023-5-7 Photos by US Government and Ministry of Defense in Japan. Cover design by Rock Creek Creative. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from The Henry L. Stimson Center. The Henry L. Stimson Center 1111 19th Street, NW 12th Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone: 202-223-5956 fax: 202-238-9604 www.stimson.org YUKI TATSUMI AND ANDREW L. OROS | iii TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Abbreviations .......................................................................................... v Preface ............................................................................................................... vii Acknowledgements...........................................................................................viii INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1: JAPAN’S EVOLVING DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT .......................... 9 CHAPTER 2: SELF DEFENSE FORCES TODAY— BEYOND AN EXCLUSIVELY DEFENSE –ORIENTED POSTURE? ........................... 23 CHAPTER 3: THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT SURROUNDING THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES’ OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS ......................................... 47 CHAPTER 4: THE UNITED STATES AND “ALLIANCE” ROLE IN JAPAN’S
  • Strategic Yet Strained

    Strategic Yet Strained

    INTRODUCTION | i STRATEGIC YET STRAINED US FORCE REALIGNMENT IN JAPAN AND ITS EFFECTS ON OKINAWA Yuki Tatsumi, Editor September 2008 ii | STRATEGIC YET STRAINED Copyright ©2008 The Henry L. Stimson Center ISBN: 0-9770023-8-1 Photos from the US Government Cover design by Rock Creek Creative All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from The Henry L. Stimson Center. The Henry L. Stimson Center 1111 19th Street, NW 12th Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone: 202-223-5956 fax: 202-238-9604 www.stimson.org TABLE OF CONTENTS Acronyms............................................................................................................. v Preface ..............................................................................................................viii Acknowledgements............................................................................................. ix INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1 Yuki Tatsumi and Arthur Lord SECTION I: THE CONTEXT CHAPTER 1: THE GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES: “REDUCE, MAINTAIN, AND ENHANCE”............................................................... 13 Derek J. Mitchell CHAPTER 2: THE US STRATEGY BEYOND THE GLOBAL POSTURE REVIEW ...... 25 Tsuneo “Nabe” Watanabe CHAPTER 3: THE LEGACY OF PRIME MINISTER KOIZUMI’S JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY: AN ASSESSMENT ...................................................................
  • 460 Reference

    460 Reference

    Reference 1 Number of Nuclear Warheads Arsenals and Their Major Means of Delivery by Country United States Russia United Kingdom France China 400 334 60 Minuteman III 400 SS-18 46 DF-5 CSS-4 20 ICBM （ ） SS-19 30 DF-31（CSS-10） 40 (Intercontinental ― ― SS-25 63 Ballistic Missiles) SS-27 78 RS-24 117 Missiles 148 IRBM DF-4（CSS-3） 10 ― ― ― ― MRBM DF-21（CSS-5） 122 DF-26 30 Reference 336 192 48 64 48 SLBM (Submarine Trident D-5 336 SS-N-18 48 Trident D-5 48 M-45 16 JL-2 CSS-NX-14 48 Launched （ ） SS-N-23 96 M-51 48 Ballistic Missiles) SS-N-32 48 Submarines equipped with nuclear ballistic 14 13 4 4 4 missiles 66 76 40 100 Aircraft B-2 20 Tu-95 (Bear) 60 ― Rafale 40 H-6K 100 B-52 46 Tu-160 (Blackjack) 16 Approx. 3,800 Approx. 4,350 (including 215 300 Approx. 280 Number of warheads Approx. 1,830 tactical nuclear warheads) Notes: 1. Data is based on “The Military Balance 2019,” the SIPRI Yearbook 2018, etc. 2. In March 2019, the United States released the following figures based on the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia as of March 1, 2019: the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for the United States was 1,365 and the delivery vehicles involved 656 missiles/aircraft; the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads for Russia was 1,461 and the delivery vehicles involved 524 missiles/aircraft. However, according to the SIPRI database, as of January 2018, the number of deployed U.S.
  • Japan's Preventive Strategy: Secure the World—The National Defense Program Guidelines in and After FY 2010

    Japan's Preventive Strategy: Secure the World—The National Defense Program Guidelines in and After FY 2010

    University of Denver Digital Commons @ DU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 1-1-2009 Japan's Preventive Strategy: Secure the World—the National Defense Program Guidelines in and After FY 2010 Tadashi Watanabe University of Denver Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd Part of the International and Intercultural Communication Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons Recommended Citation Watanabe, Tadashi, "Japan's Preventive Strategy: Secure the World—the National Defense Program Guidelines in and After FY 2010" (2009). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 690. https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/690 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. Japan’s Preventive Strategy: Secure the World – The National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY 2010 – A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of Arts and Humanities University of Denver In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in International Security by Tadashi Watanabe June 2009 Advisors: Paul R. Viotti, Ph.D. Anthony Hayter, Ph.D. Col. Thomas A. Drohan, Ph.D. i ©Copyright by Tadashi Watanabe 2009 All Right Reserved ii Author: Tadashi Watanabe Title: Japan’s Preventive Strategy: Secure the World – The National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY 2010 – Advisors: Paul R. Viotti, Ph.D. Anthony Hayter, Ph.D. Col. Thomas A.
  • U.S.-Japan Alliance Conference: Meeting the Challenge Of

    U.S.-Japan Alliance Conference: Meeting the Challenge Of

    NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE U.S.-Japan Alliance Conference Meeting the Challenge of Amphibious Operations Scott W. Harold, Koichiro Bansho, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Koichi Isobe, Richard L. Simcock II Sponsored by the Government of Japan For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/CF387 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface In order to explore the origins, development, and implications of Japan’s decision to establish an Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) within the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF), the RAND Corporation convened a public conference on March 6, 2018, at its offices in Santa Monica, California, that brought together leading U.S.
  • Chapter 8 CBRN Defense: Responding to Growing Threats

    Chapter 8 CBRN Defense: Responding to Growing Threats

    Chapter 8 CBRN Defense: Responding to Growing Threats n the wake of the Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attacks in Japan in 1994 and 1995, Iand the 9/11 and anthrax mail attacks in the United States in 2001, threats involving the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials/ agents have come to be collectively referred to as CBRN threats. This term broadly encompasses not only the traditional concept of NBC attacks—those by nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons—but also terrorist attacks, accidents, or natural disasters. Given these intricacies, this chapter proposes using the term “CBRN defense” to collectively refer to the governance of all domestic agencies involved in CBRN incident response, and to the spectrum of activities tied to that response. In some countries and regional organizations, CBRN response is positioned as defense that spans traditional and nontraditional security challenges, and the capacity to deal with CBRN threats is being raised based on coordination among related agencies, nationally and regionally. In more concrete terms, with regard to chemical threats, there has been growing concern in recent years regarding the use of chemical weapons in civil wars and acts of terrorism, or by state authorities against their own citizens in order to preserve public order or political stability. The key issues pertaining to biological threats are suspected development of biological weapons by certain states, global pandemics, and the risk of misuse or abuse of evolving knowledge and technologies in the life sciences. The main areas of concern surrounding radiological and nuclear threats are risks such as theft and detonation of nuclear weapons, use of improvised nuclear devices (INDs), sabotage and destruction of nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities, and terrorist use of radiological dispersion devices (RDDs).
  • Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure

    Japan's National Security Policy Infrastructure

    INTRODUCTION | i JAPAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY INFRASTRUCTURE CAN TOKYO MEET WASHINGTON’S EXPECTATION? Yuki Tatsumi November 2008 ii | JAPAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY INFRASTRUCTURE Copyright ©2008 The Henry L. Stimson Center ISBN: 0-9770023-9-X Photos by the Ministry of Defense in Japan and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Cover design by Rock Creek Creative. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without prior written consent from The Henry L. Stimson Center. The Henry L. Stimson Center 1111 19th Street, NW 12th Floor Washington, DC 20036 phone: 202-223-5956 fax: 202-238-9604 www.stimson.org YUKI TATSUMI | iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Acronyms............................................................................................................ iv Preface ................................................................................................................ vi Acknowledgements............................................................................................ vii INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1: EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY .............. 11 CHAPTER 2: CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS ................................................................ 33 CHAPTER 3: UNIFORM INSTITUTIONS................................................................ 65 CHAPTER 4: THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.................................................. 97 CHAPTER
  • World War II Operations Reports 1940-1948

    World War II Operations Reports 1940-1948

    Records of the Adjutant General's Office (RG407) World War II Operations Reports 1940-1948 陸軍省高級副官部文書 第二次世界大戦作戦記録 I Corps 第 1 軍団 Box 3017 – Box 3112 国立国会図書館憲政資料室 2007 年 11 月 PDF ファイル作成 2008 年 2 月書式改訂 Records of the Adjutant General's Office; World War II Operations Reports 1940-1948 （陸軍省高級副官部文書／第二次世界大戦作戦記録） Series： I Corps Box no. (Folder no.): 3017（1） Folder title: 201-0: History - Biak Operation - I Corps (15 - 27 Jun 1944) Date: 1944/?-?/? Item description: Title: "History of the Biak Operation: Beach Defense Cave, Biak Island". Includes Standard Photo. Includes Map. Note: Microfiche no.: WOR 21272-21274 Box no. (Folder no.): 3017（2） Folder title: 201-0.1: History - I Corps (1918 - 1945) Date: 1945/06-?/? Item description: Note: Microfiche no.: WOR 21275 Box no. (Folder no.): 3017（3） Folder title: 201-0.1: History - I Corps (1862 - 1948) Date: 1948/01-1948/01 Item description: 愛知 京都 兵庫 和歌山 広島 Note: Microfiche no.: WOR 21276 Box no. (Folder no.): 3017（4） Folder title: 201-0.2: History - Luzon Campaign - I Corps (9 Jan - 4 Jul 1945) Date: 1945/?-?/? Item description: [336 p.] Includes Standard Photo. Includes Map. Note: Microfiche no.: WOR 21276-21279 Box no. (Folder no.): 3017（5） Folder title: 201-0.2: (21451) I Corps - Occupation of Japan (25 Sep - 30 Nov 1945) Date: 1945/?-?/? Item description: Title: "History of the Occupation of Japan, 1945" / [200 p.] / Includes Map. / 富山 石 川 福井 岐阜 静岡 愛知 三重 Note: Microfiche no.: WOR 21279-21282 Box no. (Folder no.): 3017（6） Folder title: 201-0.2: I Corps - History of Occupation of Japan (1 Dec 1945 - 31 Jan 1946) Date: 1946/?-?/? Item description: Title: "I Corps, History of Occupation of Japan, 1 Dec 1945 - 31 Jan 1946" / [149 p.] / Includes Map.
  • Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

    Japan Ground Self-Defense Force

    JGSDF Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Home Page of JGSDF JSDF Official YouTube Channel https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/ Home Page of JSDF Recruitment JSDF Recruitment Call Center https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/jieikanbosyu/ Special Special Feature Ground Defense Capability to realize Feature Newly-establishment and 1 "Multi-domain Defense Force" 2 Reorganization in JGSDF Ground Defense Concept based on "National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) 2018" Establishment of new camp and vice-camp We establish a ground defense force that will realize "Multi-domain Defense Force" and strengthen deterrence In order to strengthen defense posture in the Southwest region, we newly established security forces and through troop deployment and constant maneuver. In the event of an emergency, we block and eliminate others at camps such as Camp Amami and Camp Miyakojima on March 26, 2019. We also established invasions by exerting the cross-domain capability. Vice-camp Sakibe (Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture) and deployed a part of ARDB. NDPG 2018 "Multi-domain Defense Force" Land Defense Capability to realize“Multi-domain Defense Force” Ground Defense Concept Cross-domain / Maneuver & Deployment / Strengthening of Foundation Mobile Fighting Vehicle loaded onto a ship Type-03 medium-range surface-to-air missile deployed at Camp Amami Camp Amami *Image Strengthening capabilities in Cyber and EMS domains Establishment of cyber defense unit Establishment of EMS operations unit Strengthening of deterrence and response capabilities through sustained and persistent maneuver
  • 2021 DEFENSE of JAPAN Defense White Paper DIGEST

    2021 DEFENSE of JAPAN Defense White Paper DIGEST

    2021 DEFENSE OF Pamphlet JAPAN On the Publication of Defense of Japan 2021 Minister of Defense KISHI Nobuo In the year 2020, not only did the entire world face unprecedented difficulties due to COVID-19, but various security challenges and destabilizing factors became more tangible and acute, and the international order based on universal values, which has underpinned the peace and prosperity of the international community, has been greatly tested. Looking at the situation around Japan, China has continued its unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas. China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels are sighted almost daily in the contiguous zone surrounding the Senkaku Islands, an inherent part of the territory of Japan, and repeatedly intrude into Japan’s territorial waters. Furthermore, there have also been incidents of CCG vessels approaching Japanese fishing boats while intruding into Japanese territorial waters, further making the situation serious. Against this backdrop, China entered into force the China Coast Guard Law in February 2021. The CCG Law includes problematic provisions in terms of their inconsistency with international law. Sources of inconsistency include, among others, ambiguity as to geographical areas the CCG Law applies and how the rules governing the use of weapons are implemented. The CCG Law must not be allowed to infringe on the legitimate interests of the relevant countries including Japan. Furthermore, the raising of tensions in the East China Sea and other sea areas is completely unacceptable. In addition, North Korea is proceeding with ballistic missile development at an extremely rapid pace. It launched ballistic missiles of a new type in 2021, and such military trends, including nuclear and missile development, pose grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security.