CHAPTER SIX

THE BEGINNING OF THE MONOPSYCHISM CONTROVERSY

By far the most difficult problem arising from Aristotle's De anima was the nature of the intellect and its relation to the body of the individual human being. There are many ambiguities and inconsistencies in Aristotle's account, to which we called attention in chapter 1, and indeed there seems to be no way to reconcile the various statements he made about it. A brilliant attempt to make Aristotle's teaching on the intellect consistent with his metaphysical principles and with what he said elsewhere about the rational soul was made by the Spanish Muslim Averroes in book 3 of his Great Commentary on De anima. Averroes himself had struggled with this question for many years, and his final view, which we shall examine here, represents a complete reversal of his earlier opinion as contained in his Epitome οι De anima} But brilliant as this attempt was in bringing consistency to Aristotle's teaching, this explanation raised insuperable difficulties for both the Muslim and Christian religions, as well as psychological problems in accounting for our experience of understanding.

AVERROES. At the beginning of book 3 of his Great Commentary on De anima Averroes had developed his famous interpretation of the human intellect. He began by pointing out that Aristotle had said that the intellect must be unmixed so that it might grasp and receive all things, for if it were mixed, then it would be a body or a power in a body; and if it were either of these, it would have its own form, a fact that would prevent its reception of the forms of other things. Although the intellect itself is not transmutable, it has something passive in it, inasmuch as it is moved by the 'forms in act' that it receives, to which it is in potency. But since it strips these forms of their material and particular determinations as it receives them, it must also be

1 See the excellent treatment of this development in Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect (New York/Oxford, 1992), pp. 258-98. It is Davidson's opinion that Averroes seriously misread Aristotle on this point (pp. 298,356), and as evidence of the still present confusion concerning Aristotle's true doctrine he cites E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen 2.2 (4th ed., Leipzig, 1921), pp. 573-75 and F. Nuyens, L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote (Louvain, 1948). pp. 303-04, 308, 311, who considered the intellect to be transcendent, J. Rist, "Notes on Aristotle De anima 3, 5," in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, ed. J. Anton (Albany, 1972), pp. 506-07, who considered it to be a part of the individual soul, and W. D. Ross, who in his edition of Aristotle's works (5th ed., London, 1949), p. 153 considered it to be transcendent but had changed his mind by the time he edited the De anima (Oxford, 1961), pp. 45-47. 114 CHAPTER SIX active. And therefore Aristotle says that it is necessary to posit a power of acting and a power of being acted upon in the rational soul, and he clearly says that both these parts are ungenerated and incorruptible. But even though the intellect is passive in some respects, it is nevertheless completely unmixed with matter and has nothing of the nature of material forms. If it did, it would not be able to receive such forms, for thus it would receive itself, and the mover and thing moved would be the same. The material intellect (the name Averroes uses for the possible intellect) is potentially all meanings of all material forms, and it is not any being actually before it understands something. Its receptivity differs from the potency of prime matter (which is similarly in potency to all forms), since the intellect is in potency to universal forms, which it distinguishes and grasps, whereas prime matter is in potency to individual forms, and it does not distinguish or grasp them. Then Averroes raises a question that he says is of very great difficulty: If the possible intellect is the first perfection of man, as it is according to Aristotle's definition of the soul, and the speculative intellect is his last perfection, but man is generable and corruptible and is numerically one being through his last perfection by the intellect, it is necessary that it (i.e., the speculative intellect) be his first perfection, since through the first perfection of the intellect, I am other than you and you are other than me; and thus man would not be generable and corruptible in the respect in which he is man, but in the respect in which he is an animal. It is thought that, in the same way that it is necessary that, if the first perfection were a hoc aliquid and numerable by the number of individuals in order that the last perfection might be of this sort, thus also the contrary is necessary, namely that if the last perfection is numbered by the number of individual men, then the first perfection should also be of this sort. Averroes then treats a number of impossible consequences of this, providing in the process many of the arguments that the Latins would use against him, investigating the views of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Abubacer, Avempace, and Theophrastus, and finally says: "Let us now return to our own views. ... And since there are all these different opinions, it seems to me that I should expound this matter as it seems to me. And if what appears to me is not complete, it will be the beginning of a full account. And thus I ask the brothers who see this work to write down their doubts, and perhaps in this way the truth will be found, if I have not yet found it. And if I have found it, as I think, then it will be made more plain by these questions." This seems

"Revertamus igitur ad nostrum. ... Et cum ista sint, ideo visum est michi scribere quod videtur michi in hoc. Et si hoc quod apparet michi non fuerit completum, erit principium complementi. Et tunc rogo fratres videntes hoc scriptum scribere suas dubitationes, et forte per illud invenietur verum in hoc, si nondum inveni. Et si inveni, ut