“Inner Light” of Mystics and Reason Leibniz’S Engagement with Jacob Böhme

Aries – Journal for the Study of Western Esotericism 18 (2018) 75–95 ARIES brill.com/arie

Compatibility of the “Inner Light” of Mystics and Reason Leibniz’s Engagement with Jacob Böhme

Susanne Edel Independent Researcher, Frankfurt am Main, Germany [email protected]

Abstract

Following his conviction that the truth, in principle, could only be one truth, Leib- niz wanted to prove that the “inner Light” of “true mysticism” was compatible with philosophers’ insights into reason. He placed his own doctrine of the individual substances (“Monadology”) in the tradition of philosophia perennis, and in his opinion “true” mysticism belonged to this same tradition. Through representatives of the so- called Christian Kabbala, which made Jewish and Christian mysticism part of the same lineage, Leibniz became aware of the controversial writings of Böhme. He discussed the theosopher’s thought with his correspondence partner, the Böhme adherent André Morell, and after a critical investigation, Leibniz placed Böhme in a tradition of “true mysticism” which could be measured against reason. The author posits that the result of this engagement was Leibniz’s treatise “True Mystical Theology”, a translation of his doctrine of monads in mystical terminology.

Keywords

Jacob Böhme – Leibniz – Cambridge Platonists – Philosophia perennis – theosophy – Christian Kabbala

An Ambivalent Reception History

In the 1690s Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) composed a short text that historians of philosophy have cited up to the present day to argue that the great rationalist was attracted to mysticism, or even that he may have

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2018 | doi: 10.1163/15700593-01801003Downloaded from Brill.com09/29/2021 05:32:26AM via free access 76 edel been, deep within his heart, an unrecognized mystic. In the text, entitled Von der wahren Theologia Mystica—“On True Mystical Theology”—Leibniz clearly tries to translate his doctrine of monads into mystical language by using the term “inward Light” as a synonym for reason. For Leibniz, Böhme’s thought was ultimately in harmony with the tradition of “true mysticism”. Indeed, I will go a step further and argue that it is actually Böhme that Leibniz had in mind when he wrote his “True Mystical Theology”, thus hoping to rehabilitate Böhme’s (falsified) teachings.1 To make this clear, it will be necessary to take a closer look at the history of Leibniz’s engagement with Böhme, before turning to some observations about Leibniz’s text, “On True Mystical Theology”. First, however, a look ahead: The peculiar connection between theosophy and rationalism that this essay highlights drew the attention of a later-born commentator: ‘I found … amongst the most imaginative expressions something reasonable, and thought, along with Malebranche and Leibniz, that one must correct this layman’s terminology. […] Finally I saw that Jacob Böhme’s dark words had to be measured against clear ones’, wrote Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702–1782) in a letter following his first reading of Böhme.2 A prominent theologian and representative of Lutheran Pietism in Swabia, Oetinger held Böhme to be a perspicacious interpreter of Christian doctrine in the wake of the Kabbalists. Oetinger saw no contradiction between his own adherence to Böhme’s teachings and his position as practicing theologian in the official state church. Oetinger’s conviction did not correspond to the prevailing opinion of his time regarding Böhme and theosophy. In 1745, Johann Heinrich Zedler’s Univer- sal-Lexicon condemned theosophers as a “sect”—with Böhme at their head and alongside him, Paracelsus, Weigel and Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont as the most prominent leaders.3 According to Zedler, theosophers not only disdained reason, but also secretly the Scriptures. Zedler thus concluded that their systems did not deserve to be considered “philosophy”. He asserts that they have not sought philosophy in the ‘use of the acquired, purified light of

1 I have discussed the relationship between Böhme and Leibniz in detail in Edel: Die individuelle Substanz. An article on this subject in German is published in Edel, ‘Anmerkungen’. 2 ‘Ich fand […] unter den imaginativsten Ausdrücken etwas Räsonables und dachte, mit Male- branche und Leibniz müsste man dieses Laien Terminos korrigieren. […] Endlich sah ich, daß Jakob Böhmes dunkle Worte nach den deutlichen müssen gemessen werden’. See Ehmann (ed.), Oetingers Leben und Briefe, 36. Unless otherwise stated, all translations into English in this article were made by Lucinda Martin. 3 Zedler, ‘Theosophici’, 1116–1121.

looked to the fantasies of their overheated imaginations and made these into the measure of reason and revelation, and also for this reason praised a secret Divine insight, granted only to certain illuminated persons, into the deepest mysteries of nature and have allowed themselves to dream of recognizing their extraordinary effects, and also because of this, they have made a lot of noise about magic, chemistry, astrology and similar sciences, which unlock the secret access to nature, und beyond this they have (unjustifiably) subsumed such secret and Divine philosophy under the ancient secret tradition of Wisdom and the name of Kabbalah.4

The lengthy lexicon article on the Theosophici reads like an indictment, in which the dangers inherent in the “theosophical system” are methodically enumerated, including the threat to the values and accomplishments of the Enlightenment, chief among them the role of reason. In Zedler’s opinion, theosophers execute their most serious attack on reason by misusing, or even claiming the same term for themselves:

Indeed, they use the word reason themselves, but understand it not as the recognition of truth derived from natural principles or the power to discern these, but instead as the inward principle, which they seek as an outflowing and spark of Divine being in the human soul, which they oppose to that which is taken to be reason in normal understanding.5

4 Zedler, ‘Theosophici’, 1116. That is: nicht ‘in Gebrauch des anerschaffenen gereinigten Ver- nunft-Lichtes, als vielmehr in einem angeborenen übernatürlichen Göttlichen Lichte und dessen Erleuchtung’. Sie haben ‘die Vorstellungen ihrer erhitzten Einbildungs-Kraft dafür angesehen, und selbige zur Richtschnur von Vernunft und Offenbarung gesetzt, auch aus diesem Grunde sich einer geheimen Göttlichen, allein gewissen erleuchteten Personen mit- geteilten Einsicht der tiefsten Geheimnisse der Natur gerühmt, und deren außerordentliche Wirkungen erkannt zu haben sich träumen lassen, auch deswegen von der Magie, Chemie, Astrologie und dergleichen Wissenschaften, welche die geheimen Zugänge der Natur auf- schließen, viel Rühmens gemacht, und noch überdies (ungerechtfertigterweise) solche geheime und Göttliche Philosophie für die uralte geheime Tradition der Weisheit unter dem Namen der Cabbala ausgegeben’. 5 ‘Es bedienen sich zwar dieselben auch des Wortes Vernunft, sie verstehen aber dadurch nicht die Erkenntnis derWahrheit aus natürlichen Principiis, oder die Kraft dieselbige zu erkennen, sondern das inwendige Principium, das sie als einen Ausfluss und Funken des Göttlichen

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Finally the article cites Gottfried Arnold’s “History of Church and Heresy” (Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie, 1699–1700) to demonstrate that the “heretics” and “enthusiasts” that Arnold rehabilitates not only discredit reason and the sciences, but also, through their sectarian ways, “true Christianity” (das wahre Christentum) itself, since such sects ‘proceed with such pride at their virulence and contemptuously bully and scorn all that does not accord with them’.6 This discourse in the middle of the eighteenth century serves above all to underscore the ambivalence of reception history. Today historians often cite Arnold’s History of Church and Heresy as a harbinger of, and source of ideas for, the deist historical view of the Enlightenment, since the work made ‘openness and tolerance into determining principles of historiography’.7 Yet, at the end of 1699—a half century before the publication of Zedler’s Universal- Lexicon, Leibniz criticized the polemical basis and the methodological failings of Arnold’s work, although he admitted that he had not read it. In keeping with his irenic position, Leibniz emphasized the commonalities of the parties and the basis of a universal truth (philosophia perennis) in pursuing a union of the churches. He saw the sharp tones that Arnold had voiced against the official church as sectarian and not helpful for real moral improvement. In this context, Leibniz saw the “mildness” and “moderation” of Jacob Böh- me, Thomas á Kempis and Philipp Jacob Spener as exemplary and lauded the bonne intention of these authors.8 Leibniz was already familiar at this time with the controversial and divisive image of Böhme that circulated, but it appears that after some hesitation he arrived at a position of appreciation for him. At the same time, Leibniz sensed that a challenge to Böhme’s opponents would only increase their bias against the theosopher and provoke further prejudice.

Wesens in der menschliche Seele suchen, das sie der in ordentlichenVerstande genommenen Vernunft entgegensetzen’ (ibid.). 6 That is, ‘solcher Stolz auf eine Heftigkeit losgehe, welche alles, was nicht mit ihnen hält, verächtlich traktiere und verspotte’ (Zedler, ‘Theosophici’, 1119). Cf. Arnold, Unparteyische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie. 7 ‘Gottfried Arnold’ in Kindlers Neues Literaturlexikon, 743: ‘Durch seinen Enthusiasmus für die wegen dogmatischer Irrlehren verfolgten Häretiker, die Arnold als wahre Christen und Heilige erweist, werden Offenheit und Toleranz bestimmende Prinzipien der Historiographie’. 8 Letter to André Morell from 17 (27) December 1699: ‘La douceur et la moderation de Kempis, de Böhme et de M. Spener me plaist d’avantage, et me paroist plus propre à produire du fruit’. In the following references to Leibniz, I rely on the Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (edited by the DeutschenAkademiederWissenschaftenzuBerlin), hereafter abbreviated as “a”,along with the series, volume and page. The letter cited here is thus Leibniz, a, i, 17, 719f. For certain of Leibniz’s writings, I also cite Die philosophischen Schriften (edited by C.I. Gerhardt), hereafter referred to as gp.

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His strategy was rather to tackle the problem himself. In a letter to his corre- spondent, André Morell, Leibniz expressed the wish that one should put the positive content of Böhme’s “profound speculations” to the test, without however personally attacking those who combine Böhme’s thought with unsound ideas.9 The text concerning us here—Leibniz’s “True Mystical Theology”— mentions no particular mystic by name, but there is ample evidence that it is the very trial of Böhme’s thought that Leibniz had proposed.

Leibniz and Morell: A Catalyzing Correspondence

Leibniz’s sympathetic position on Böhme appears in one of his last letters to the Böhme adherent, André Morell, with whom Leibniz corresponded for about four years (1696–1700), mainly on subjects that Leibniz would also address in his “True Mystical Theology”. In this correspondence, Morell repeatedly and emphatically urged Leibniz to read Böhme, especially in connection with controversies surrounding Pietism.10 This epistolary exchange not only contains Morell’s expositions of Böhme’s teachings, but also documents Leibniz’s engagement with the theosopher. Leibniz proclaims time and again his interest in Böhme, but deplores not having an accessible summary of his basic ideas, since reading Böhme’s voluminous writings with their dense metaphorical language seems too arduous. Morell recommends to him the writings and com- mentaries of Johann Georg von Gichtel (1638–1710) and Abraham von Franck- enberg (1593–1652), but Leibniz finds them even darker and less accessible than Böhme himself. Nonetheless, Leibniz expects to profit from reading Böhme and finally an- nounces that one day he will do so, since Morell believes that Böhme’s insights are central for resolving the arguments between the Lutheran orthodoxy and the various mystical, quietist and pietist streams.While Morell is of the opinion that reason has no place in matters of faith, Leibniz wants to show that natural theology can mediate between the official doctrine of the church and “true

9 ‘J’approuve fort la manière de Jacob Böhme qui au milieu de ses profondes speculations gardoit tousjours son humilité et sa douceur, je voudrois qu’on approuvat par tout ce qui est bon sans faire la guerre à ceux qui y melent du mal, à peu pres comme les saints ne font point la guerre aux malades’. (Letter to Morell from 1 September 1699). 10 In particular Morell recommends that he read Mysterium Magnum (Böhme’s interpretation of Genesis), the first chapter as well as chapter 35 (on natural language), as well as Böhme’s Vom dreifachen Leben des Menschen, chapters 6 and 11.

Aries – Journal for the Study of Western EsotericismDownloaded 18 from (2018) Brill.com09/29/2021 75–95 05:32:26AM via free access 80 edel mysticism”. He argues that ‘reason is the natural voice of God’.11 The “inward Light” (inwendigesLicht) of the mystics and the reason of the philosophers both amount to the recognition of a common universal truth. According to Leibniz, reason and inner Light both have the same divine source and reason is the “natural inner Light”. What is more, the inner Light must be measured against reason.12 In this respect, Leibniz remains true to himself, when he says that he concurs with Böhme’s content to the extent that it is reasonable.13 At the beginning of 1700, Morell recommends that Leibniz read John Por- dage’s Theologia Mystica, an attempt at systematizing Böhme that was published in German translation in 1698. Yet Morell still prefers Böhme to his English disciple; he finds two or three pages of Böhme more instructive than Pordage’s entire book. The latter played an important role in the spread of Böhme’s teachings in England, but in Pordage’s work, philosophical aspects of Böhme’s thought are flattened and made into something altogether different by the addition of Pordage’s own fantastic visions. Pordage was a reputed visionary and under Cromwell he was seen as a suspicious heretic and mystical panthe- ist. From the onset of his Theologia Mystica, Pordage contrasts the mysteries of religion to reason.14 It is easy to imagine that Leibniz wanted in his “True Mysti- cal Theology” to refute this cognitive dualism by bolstering Böhme’s theosophy with his own metaphysics.15 In this way, he could demonstrate the general compatibility between true mystical theology and reason.

11 That is, ‘la raison est la voix naturelle de Dieu’. Letter to Morell from 29 September (9 October) 1698, in Leibniz, a, i, 16, 163. 12 That is, ‘ce n’est que par la raison que la voix de Dieu revelée se doit justifier, à fin que nostre imagination, ou quelque autre illusion ne nous trompe point’ (Ibid.). 13 ‘Sans avoir assez lu Böhme et Poiret, je m’accorderois peutestre avec eux en ce qu’ils ont de raisonnable’ (Letter to Morell from January 1698) in: Leibniz, a, i, 15, 264. 14 Cf. Pordage, Theologia Mystica. 15 Out the outset of his French translation of “Von der wahren Theologia Mystica”, Arnaud Pelletier confirms my thesis that Leibniz’s text could have arisen out of his correspondence with Morell, or more precisely, in connection with Böhme and the discussion about identifying reason with the “inner Light”.Pelletier further theorizes in accordance with me that Leibniz’s treatise may have been a reaction to the publication of Pordage’s Theologia Mystica, although the latter text was not the object of Leibniz’s investigation. In this too, Pelletier approaches my opinion that Leibniz’s content derives directly from his conversations with Morell about Böhme, possibly complemented by readings of Böhme that Morell had recommended (Pelletier, ‘Leibniz et la raison’, 267).

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Böhme in the Crossfire of the Debate about Christian Kabbala

Seeking cohorts for an integrated, reasonable compatibility of philosophy and theology, Leibniz had already identified and come to esteem representatives of a mystical strand of philosophy in the 1670s and 80s. The so-called “Cam- bridge Platonists” held the conviction that there is only one truth and that belief and reason are one. Through Henry More (1614–1687), the group’s lead- ing figure, the young Leibniz had already become indirectly acquainted with Böhme’s thought. In England, “theosophy” first came into use in connection with Böhme’s philosophy, yet the Cambridge Platonists developed their own use of the term to signify the study of the divine. At the same time, they—and especially More—warned of the enthusiastic excesses of certain contemporary ‘Chymists and Theosophists’, who claimed to be authentic messengers of God, but who in truth had succumbed to the ‘danger of astrology’.16 While More’s student, Anne Conway (1631–1679), and the vitalist and Chris- tian Kabbalist, Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont (1614–1698/9), gave inner Light priority over outer reason, More tried to convince his colleagues that it is solely the right use of reason in matters of religion that could protect against atheism and fanaticism. More accepted Böhme, but only according to his own neo-Platonic interpretation, since he believed he found in Böhme’s theosophy a reasonable approach grounded in religion, but accompanied by enthusiastic, pantheistic and materialistic aspects. More’s Philosophiae teutonicae censura sive Epistola privata, published in 1679, contains his critical response to Böhme. The focus of More’s critique was Böhme’s doctrine of the seven “source spirits”, which Böhme relied on to illustrate the revelation of the dark Divinity and its manifestation in Creation as a dynamic process—in Böhme’s words, the gath- ering of the Ungrund into the Grund.17 This critique has to be seen in the light of More’s parallel engagement with Jewish mysticism and his criticism of the doctrine of divine emanation, which he knew from the Kabbala Denudata (1677/1684), the chief work of Christian Kabbala. This anthology of Jewish mystical writings edited by Christian Knorr von Rosenroth (1636–1689) included Isaak Luria’s description of the theogonic process, from the Ensoph through ten divine emanations or Sefiroth, a narrative that More likewise considered to be pantheistic.18 Indeed, More makes just

16 Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, article, “Theosophie”. Cf. More, Enthusiasmus Triumphatus, 29f., 36. 17 Cf. Martin, ‘Schöpfung’. 18 More’s critique took the form of 16 kabbalistic axioms and their refutation in his Fun-

Aries – Journal for the Study of Western EsotericismDownloaded 18 from (2018) Brill.com09/29/2021 75–95 05:32:26AM via free access 82 edel this connection between Luria and Böhme in the introduction to his Opera Philosophica of 1679, which was one of Leibniz’s first contacts with Böhme’s philosophy. More equates Böhme’s source spirits (Quellgeister)—as in other contexts Luria’s Sefiroth—on the one hand with God and on the other hand with all creatures and the entirety of creation. He thus imputes to Böhme’s God (as already Luria’s God) physicality and divisibility, without considering the different stages and processes of creation, not to mention the metaphorical render- ings, of both Böhme and Luria.The six lower source spirits represent for Böhme the dialectic of the struggle between the principle of love and the dark principle of wrath in God. Yet More interprets the six lower source spirits through a neo-Platonic lens: He conceives of six Plotinic hypostases that are divided into two analogous groups of three. More eliminates Böhme’s seventh source spirit and thus the third principle, mildness (Lieblichkeit) or the kingdom of God, in which the two preceding principles become substantial and are revealed. In its place in the hierarchy, More sets the sixth universal form or region of the physical monads, the last purely passive, homogenous extension of creation. The mortal, material world thus loses its disposition as individual revelation of God in creation and its gnoseological significance, taking on form and diver- sity only through the active influence of the Spiritus Naturae as an image of the eternal divine intellect.19 More was recommended to Leibniz as an adept and advocate of Platonic philosophy, who dealt equally critically with Spinozan pantheism and Carte- sian materialism as well as with their atheistic consequences. Leibniz abhorred both systems, because their doctrines stood in conflict to divine and human freedom. As More was regarded as an expert on both Kabbala and Jacob Böhme, Leibniz initially adopted More’s interpretation of the teachings of both Luria and Böhme uncritically. Prompted by More’s discussion of Böhme, Leibniz composed his own short text entitled, Aurora seu Initia Scientiae Generalis (a Divina Luce ad humanam felicitatem), which was intended as an introduction for his planned work on universal science (Allgemeinwissenschaft).20 The Aurora seu Initia Scientiae Generalis addresses in particular the episte- mologically relevant aspects of More’s Censura. Leibniz naively takes up More’s neo-Platonic transformations of Böhme’s teachings and then contrasts two types of knowledge with one another—one represented by Böhme and one

damenta Philosophiae sive Cabbalae Aeto-paedo-melissaeae. The work draws on the Liber Druschim von Chaim Vital, which contains Luria’s creation doctrine. 19 Cf. Edel, Die individuelle Substanz, 86f. 20 ‘Aurora seu Initia, scientiae Generalis’, in: Leibniz, gp 7, 54–56.

Aries – Journal for the Study of Western EsotericismDownloaded from 18Brill.com09/29/2021 (2018) 75–95 05:32:26AM via free access compatibility of the “inner light” of mystics and reason 83 by More. Two different versions of the origin of the flame epitomize inductive knowledge based on facts (Böhme) and deductive knowledge based on reason (More). For Böhme, flames emerge from the dark principle of the eternal nature in God, while for More they radiate from a divine center of light. Leibniz gives More, as the further advanced scientifically of the two, the advantage. Yet Leibniz did discover something on this occasion in Böhme that he missed in More, namely an explanation for human perfectibility. Leibniz could discover in Böhme’s first principle—the will of God toward self-knowledge and the formation of the Ungrund into the Grund—a correspondence to the psychological drive toward perfection in human beings, and moreover, for the scientist’s pursuit of ever more knowledge. These two aspects would become key to Leibniz’s own system: The method by which one acquires knowledge and the mental motivation for doing so—More stood for the one and Böhme for the other—correspond in Leibniz’s doctrine of the monads to the two essential characteristics of the “spirit monad” (Geistmonade), that is, of the human. Leibniz labels these two aspects Apperzeption, perception or facility for knowledge of the world, self and God, and Appetition, the pursuit or drive for a progressive increase in knowledge. More’s passive physical monads are fed solely by divine influx, but Leibniz’s spiritual monads are characterized by self-propulsion and possess, so to speak, organic structures through which the monads guide themselves. Relying on the processes that Böhme had proposed for the source spirits, Leibniz aims to represent ‘the methods and degrees in which reasonable beings develop into something higher’.21 Later, after carrying out more detailed studies, Leib- niz found that More’s teachings needed to be amended, and even that they were inconsistent and therefore contestable. Leibniz detected in More’s neo- Platonic speculation on the “spirit of nature” (Naturgeist) a “lowly world-soul” (niedere Weltseele), created by God as a kind of intermediate being, a contradiction to the Christian doctrine of the immortality of the individual soul, and a theory that ultimately amounted to materialism.22 If creatures can only act through the medium of a superior homogenous spiritual principle, then matter would have to be responsible for the heterogeneity in nature. The doctrine of the “world soul” thus supported the very dualism

21 That is, ‘methodi […] et velut gradus quibus mentes meliores reddunter’. (Leibniz, gp 7, 54). 22 In his treatise, Considérations sur la doctrine d’un Esprit Universel Unique (1702), Leibniz compared the various versions of monopsychism—the belief that all humans share an eternal consciousness—with his own theory of the immortality of the individual soul.

Aries – Journal for the Study of Western EsotericismDownloaded 18 from (2018) Brill.com09/29/2021 75–95 05:32:26AM via free access 84 edel between theology and philosophy that More had so vehemently opposed.23 In the meantime, Leibniz had become familiar with the theist creation doctrine of Lurianic Kabbala as represented in the writings of van Helmont and Conway. From then on, he recognized Lurianic Kabbala as “true Kabbala” (wahre Kab- bala), and later on, he even integrated it into the final version of his doctrine of the monads in the “Monadologie”.24 The result of this adaption of the doctrine of monads is preserved in Leib- niz’s text, Réfutation inédite de Spinoza par Leibniz, which sought to demonstrate that the world of the Sefiroth or kabbalistic divine emanations was nei- ther superimposable with More’s neo-Platonic “world soul” nor with Spinoza’s divine Modi. Instead, it was congruent with his own plurality of individual substances, which possessed individual freedom and immortality as autonomous divine decrees or direct emanations of God.25 The Réfutation was Leibniz’s response to a new pantheistic interpretation of the Kabbala, which maintained that Spinoza had resuscitated the “true” tradition of Kabbala.26 This thesis, put forth by Johann Georg Wachter in his Elucidarius cabalisticus (1706), together with Leibniz’s rebuttal implicitly referred to Böhme.27 This was especially the case because the controversy was set in motion by Johann Peter Spaeth (d. 1701), who not only appealed to Kabbala and Spinoza, but who also converted to Judaism under the influence of kabbalistic overtones in Böhme’s theosophy. At any rate, Leibniz’s new and more differentiated view of Kabbala had given him the occasion to correct his image of Böhme. It is thus no accident that in the same month that he edited his Réfutation (September 1699), Leibniz also penned a letter to André Morell expressing his wish for a rehabilitation of Böhme’s thought, cleansed of the misunderstandings of those who mix in rubbish (‘qui y melent du mal’).

23 Leibniz invokes the Lateran Council of 1512 which condemned the double truth (dualism between theology and philosophy). 24 Cf. Leibniz, ‘Monadologie’, in: gp 6, 607–623. 25 For Leibniz, the tenth Sefira (Malchuth or the “kingdom of God”), which represents the rest of souls on the Sabbath or in paradise, is the paradigm for the “final cause” behind creation, while Sefiroth 1–9 represent the “effective cause”. The correspondence between the Sefiroth and the source spirits in Böhme’s writings consequently could have allowed Leibniz to rehabilitate the seventh source spirit in this same way. 26 Leibniz wrote in the Théodicée: ‘Un certain Allemand natif de Suabe devenu Juif il y a quelques années, et dogmatisant sous le nom de Moses Germanus, s’étant attaché aux dogmes de Spinosa, a cru que Spinosa renouvelle l’ancienne Cabala des Hebreux, et un savant homme, qui a refuté ce proselyte Juif, paroit etre du meme sentiment’ (Leibniz, Théodicée, §9, in: gp 6, 55). 27 Wachter, Elucidarius Cabalisticus.

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Böhme as Representative of the “Cabala vera” or True Mysticism

Leibniz was certainly no closeted mystic, but he was concerned his entire life to weave together all philosophical and theological strands and to inves- tigate the truth content of all of them equally, as a transmission of universal truth or philosophia perennis. In Leibniz’s day, Kabbala became synony- mous with philosophia perennis as a tradition of original reason, and even Pythagoras and Plato were held to be students of the doctrine. In one respect, Böhme was for Leibniz already in earlier years a representative of the “Cabala vera”, namely in regard to his theory of natural language, the Natursprache or Adamische Sprache. In contrast to methods of linguistic magic or a kind of “Vulgär-Cabbala”, Böhme’s ideas about Adamic language assumed an essential connection between names and things, and thus emphasized the epistemological value of language. According to Böhme, the proper understanding of the Word of God is a gift of grace to the illuminated individual; for Leibniz, it is a matter for those gifted in reason. Böhme’s Adamic language serves as a model for Leibniz’s outline of his Characteristica Universalis or Ars combinatoria. By affiliating terms with their underlying simple ideas (analysis) and then coordinating the signs that represent the ideas in a reasonable and insight- ful way (synthesis), Leibniz’s system was meant to enable conclusions about new, compound ideas (ars inveniendi). In this way, it would allow scientists to gain knowledge and make new discoveries through reason.28 As inspiration for his outline, Leibniz takes Böhme’s premise that the theosopher, in considering nature, is able to “spell” the being of God. The spiritually reborn person or “new Adam” is able to retrieve the inner signatures of things (signatura rerum) and in this way understands the original natural language.29 For Böhme—and in correspondence to Leibniz—the goal of a composition of signatures is the creative view of essences by the prophetic human being—that is, the theosopher—

28 Leibniz only realized the rudiments of the universal idea of a Characteristica Universalis. Cf. Mahnke, Leibnizens Synthese, 19: ‘namely in the invention of the symbols and algo- rithms in modern, higher analysis and in re-shaping formal logic into a mathematically symbolized, exact science’ (‘nämlich in der Erfindung der Symbole und Algorithmen in der modernen höheren Analysis und in der Umgestaltung der formalen Logik zu einer mathematisch symbolisierten, exakten Wissenschaft’). 29 Regarding the illumination of mystics, Leibniz sometimes used the expression Meditation in contrast to simple contemplation (Betrachtung) to describe the procedure of moving from “ersten Prinzipien und Axiomen” to knowledge of “higher truths and conclusions” (Cf. the letter to Landgraf Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels, 15 [25] March 1688, in: Leibniz, a, i, 5, 67.).

Aries – Journal for the Study of Western EsotericismDownloaded 18 from (2018) Brill.com09/29/2021 75–95 05:32:26AM via free access 86 edel in imitation of God’s activity as Creator.30 The driving force toward the imitation of divine creative power through language, called by Böhme “desire” (Begierde) or “contemplativeness of the free will” (Beschaulichkeit des freien Willens), becomes for Leibniz (as was also the case in connection with More) a model for the vital force of the Appetitus in the monads, or in other words, for the human impulse to acquire knowledge. The visionary power of Böhme’s language also serves Leibniz as a model for the use of his mother tongue. In an “Admonition to the Germans” (Ermahnung an die Teutsche), Leibniz finds that Böhme writes so ‘clearly, expressively and at the same time so purely and naturally’, that he doubts whether he himself ‘would have been able to do so in the same way; and yet it was enough to sense that it flowed from his quill without much rumination’.31 Both men, Leibniz and Böhme, assume that all natural languages claim a share in the perfect original language (Ursprache) and thus perpetuate divine revelation in history. They believe that the German language possesses a high degree of fidelity and natural authenticity, a transparency of the medium. Leibniz could thus assert, ‘It appears that the Teutonic language has preserved more of nature or to speak in Böhme’s language, more of Adam’.32 For Leibniz, the German language is a “touchstone” (Probierstein) for thought and is naturally best suited for philosophical discourse, because it is able to distinguish to a high degree

30 ‘Wenn sich die Lust des Menschen in eine Begierde fasset, als der freie Wille des Men- schen, so fasset er das ganze Alphabet, dann die Begierde ist das ‚Fiat‘, und die Lust zur Begierde ist die Beschaulichkeit des freien Willens, als das geformte Wort der Weisheit, […] und wann sich der freie Wille hat beschauet, so schöpfet er mit der Lust in den Buchstaben, als in dem “Sensu” der Natur, und componiret die “Sensus” der Buchstaben zusammen, und fasset die Lust in ein Wort, dasselbe stehet in einer innerlichen Form, als in einem gefasseten Gedanken’. MysteriumMagnum, 35:54, in: Böhme, Sämtliche Schriften (1730), Bd. 7. 31 That is, ‘deutlich, nachdrücklich und dabei so rein und natürlich gestellt’, that he doubted whether he ‘würde haben nachtun können; und dennoch war genugsam zu spüren, dass ihm solches ohne viel nachsinnen aus der feder geflossen’. Leibniz, ‘Ermahnung an die Deutschen ihren Verstand und ihre Sprache besser zu üben’, a, iv, 3, 814. 32 That is: ‘Es scheint, dass das Teutonische mehr Natürliches bewahrt hat oder um in Böhmes Sprache zu reden Adamisches’. Nouveaux Essais de l’Entendement, Book iii, Chap. 2, “De la signification des Mots,” §1, in: Leibniz, a, vi, 6. Cf. Böhme: ‘verstehe nur deine Mutter-Sprache recht, du hast so tieffen Grund darinnen als in der Hebräischen oder Lateinischen, ob sich gleich die Gelehrten darinnen erheben wie eine stolze Braut; […] Der Geist zeiget, daß noch vorm Ende mancher Laye wird mehr wissen und verstehen, als jetzt die klügsten Doctores wissen’ (in: Böhme, Schriften, Bd. 1, Aurora, 8:73).

Aries – Journal for the Study of Western EsotericismDownloaded from 18Brill.com09/29/2021 (2018) 75–95 05:32:26AM via free access compatibility of the “inner light” of mystics and reason 87 between adequate and inadequate thoughts, that is, between those that are well grounded and those that are not. ‘Like the mystical philosophy of Plato or Pythagoras, our mystical theology too has its utility, and it serves to touch souls more deeply’, wrote Leibniz in a letter to Friedrich Bierling in July of 1711.33 Over time, the terminology of Ger- man mysticism in Leibniz’s “True Mystical Theology” had become the bench- mark for his own metaphysical thoughts. At the same time, Leibniz carried out his desired test and rehabilitation of the “positive”, reasonable content of Böhme’s speculation by employing terms spanning the entire tradition of Ger- man mysticism. Because of certain terminological similarities, researchers have long seen Valentin Weigel (1533–1588)—among other authors—as the mystic addressed by Leibniz’s “True Mystical Theology”.34 Indeed, there are echoes of Weigel’s commentary on the Theologia Deutsch.35 As is well known, Böhme was familiar with Weigel and was influenced by his thought. At least his terminology reap- pears in Böhme, especially in his “Way to Christ” (Weg zu Christo), which recalls the tradition of mystical speech.36 The work invites comparison with Thomas á Kempis’s “Imitation of Christ” (Nachfolge Christi), whom Leibniz mentions in one breath with Böhme. Perhaps Leibniz simply wanted to embed Böhme’s “profound speculations” in the established tradition of German mysticism. It is also true that Böhme’s anthroposophy—his views on humans—and his “Chris- tosophia” were closer to Leibniz than his theosophy and cosmosophy. In fact, Leibniz had tried in his correspondence with Morell to bring Böhme’s theosophy and cosmosophy closer to his own philosophy, but it seemed to him too metaphorical and remained alien to him.37

33 That is, ‘Wie die mystische Philosophie Platons oder Pythagoras, so hat auch unsere mystische Theologie ihren Nutzen, und sie dient dazu, die Seele stärker anzurühren’, (Leibniz, gp, vii, 497). 34 Donald Rutherford, ‘Leibniz and Mysticism’, 44. 35 Weigel, Kurtzer Bericht. 36 Cf. Böhme, Schriften, Bd. 4: Weg zu Christo. 37 Based on a passage regarding Böhme’s metaphorical language found in a letter from Leibniz to Bourguet in 1710, Enrico Pasini speaks of Böhme as the chief representative of a “false form of mysticism” or a “pseudophilosophy” in Leibniz’s opinion (Corpo e funzioni cognitive in Leibniz, 150). In fact, Leibniz warns here against a superficial reading of Böhme, who, ‘nachdem er gewisse metaphysische, mystische und chemische Bücher in einheimischer Sprache gelesen hatte, wunderliche Possen erdichtet habe, die vielen an der Oberfläche der Dinge Haftenden als großartige Geheimnisse erscheinen mögen’. He thus appeals to reason as a control. Pasini does not consider the fact that in his cor-

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The aspects of Böhme’s Christosophia that interest Leibniz here consist in the direct consequences that derive from his teachings on humankind. In his early engagement with Böhme, Leibniz had come to appreciate these teachings in connection with his cognitive metaphysics and his doctrine of natural language. The crux, for Leibniz, is the mental drive, as an image of the divine Will, which allows the reborn human being or “new Adam” in imitation of Christ continually to gain knowledge of God, the self and the world. Against the foil of Böhme and the “positive” German mysticism that he represented, Leibniz engaged critically in his “True Mystical Theology” with another variant of mysticism, one that he discussed over a period of years in his epistolary exchange with André Morell. The most consistent manifestation of this mysticism was the Quietism of the Spanish priest Miquel de Molinos (1628–1697) and his counterparts in France, the Bishop of Cambrai, Fénelon (1695–1715) and the visionary Madame Guyon (1648–1717). The ideal of Qui- etism consisted in the pure passivity of souls, to the point of absolute self-denial by the God-fearing believer. This passivity was often paired with a disdain for knowledge and was absolutely opposed to Leibniz’s demand for—in the words of Dietrich Mahnke—an ‘intellectual immersion and ethical activation of religious mysticism’.38 In Leibniz’s opinion, the quietist form of mysticism even accommodated the danger of atheism, since ‘all is reduced to nothing’ (tout se reduisait au Néant). Ultimately, Quietism amounted to a deterministic pantheism such as the monopsychism of a Henry More; instead of a plurality of individual substances or discrete souls, a single divine substance—even if it was spiritual—was invalid, according to Leibniz.39

Leibniz: On the True Mystical Theology

Leibniz’s “True Mystical Theology” contains epistemological explications, including their relevance for the divine and moral determination of human beings in salvation history.He discusses the origin, ways and goals of knowledge of God, the essence and the divine determination of humans, the notion of sin and the election of grace and finally love of God and one’s neighbor. It would go beyond the bounds of this essay to dissect section by section Leibniz’s

respondence Leibniz consistently spoke from the perspective of his epistolary partners. This explains Leibniz’s view of Böhme in his letters to Morell. 38 Cf. Mahnke, Die Rationalisierung der Mystik, 9. 39 Leibniz, Essais de Théodicée (gp 6, 55).

Aries – Journal for the Study of Western EsotericismDownloaded from 18Brill.com09/29/2021 (2018) 75–95 05:32:26AM via free access compatibility of the “inner light” of mystics and reason 89 treatise.40 A few highlights will suffice to reveal what it was about Böhme that occupied Leibniz, beyond the general interest of the polymath, and what he sought in Böhme in opposition to quietist mysticism. In contrast to the quietist ideal of “disinterested love,” Leibniz finds that “true mysticism” is characterized by “active love” (tätigen Liebe). This confirms for him the teleological principle of an all-powerful God combining all possible knowledge (Allwissenheit) with a transparency of his positive goals (Allgüte), who thus could become a model for human beings in creation and a guarantee of their salvation. It was this same teleological principle—and with it the foundation of natural theology—that André Morell had challenged. In a letter of August 1698, he wrote Leibniz that, in the face of the ills of the world, disinterested love seemed like a good policy. One who truly loves God (amateur de Dieu) would be satisfied in hell, because despite the usual teaching of the church, both good and evil are equally present in God. It would therefore be wrong to believe that, ‘heaven and hell were two separate places of joy and suffering, […] since God, the devil, heaven, hell, the blessed and the damned are located in the inner spiritual world in the same place’.41 In this context, Morell refers to Böhme: ‘Only the surging (Quall) or wafting (Wallen) differentiates’. Quall was for Böhme a surging related to pain (Qual) and thus, for Morell, likely a reference to hell, while the gentler Wallen or wafting probably denoted a connection to the kingdom of Light.42 Morell contends that if Leibniz wants to set reason against the Quietists’ indifferent resignation to God’s will, then he must also admit that, in the face of the world’s ills, God must have been lacking omnipotence (Allmacht), omniscience (Allwissenheit) or infinite goodness (Allgüte) when creating the world. In his reply, Leibniz anticipates his famous idea of Theodicy (Théodicée), or the best of all possible worlds in which evil itself contributes to the perfection of things.43 Underlying physical and moral evil is a metaphysical evil that God did not expressly desire, but which was admitted into creation as a catalyst for nature, and ultimately to lead into the kingdom of grace. If one wished to trace all factual truths, including evil, back to their truths as reason, one would tread a path ad infinitum. It is not a dialectical cognitive process, as in

40 Cf. Edel, Die individuelle Substanz, 112–162. 41 That is, ‘car Dieu, Diable, Ciel, Enfer, bienheureux, damnés, dans le monde interieur et spirituel, sont et font un mesme lieu’ (Morell to Leibniz, 14 (24) August 1698, in: Leibniz, a, i, 15, 775). 42 Cf. the discussion of these terms in Weeks, ‘Boehme’s Vocabulary’, 13–67, here: 41–42. 43 That is, ‘les pechés […] augmentent la perfection des choses’. Letter to Morell from 29. September (9. Oktober) 1698, in: Leibniz, a, i, 16, 162.

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Böhme, that leads to overcoming evil and to knowledge of the “light principle” in God. Rather, it is the continual progression of knowledge as reasonable insight into creation and thus religious-moral judgement that accounts for humankind’s notion of advancement. Leibniz backs up his thoughts with his idea (reminiscent of Pascal) of a double infinity: alongside the infinite plurality of the monads, there is an infinity of the cosmos with its infinity of suns and worlds. This infiniteness guarantees the infinite perfectibility of knowledge, yet at the same time establishes that human beings can never attain an adequate perfection of knowledge to fully judge the beauty of Creation. According to Leibniz there are no unreasonable eternal truths, but instead ultra-reasonable eternal truths which cannot (yet) be proven through analyt- ical understanding. Reason—the voice of God—is the ultimate criterion for measuring their probability. In this context, Leibniz also speaks of the assis- tance of the Light of the Holy Ghost and of a patience that is necessary to grasp divine Wisdom and Goodness and to achieve true happiness. Even if Leibniz holds that divine Wisdom precedes divine Will, it is important to note that, for him, a causal connection between knowledge of God and love of God (bonne intention) is necessary. Significantly, he also calls this a priori conviction or intu- ition in human beings of the divinity of human reason the “natural inner Light”. Böhme could well be the model for this kind of mystical visionary, particularly since Morell had spoken of a “revelatory character” in his writings, which had been written through the dictation of the Holy Ghost. In Leibniz’s “True Mys- tical Theology”, this “dictation” becomes the ‘eternal Word of God, in which all Wisdom, all Light, indeed the original image of all being and the origin of all truth [is], without anyone becoming orthodox’.44 Böhme departs from a universal point of view that strives after holistic knowledge: The human cognitive faculty issues from the love of God, so that these two are in relation to one another.45 One must add however, that this cognitive faculty is only accorded those human beings who decisively commit to the second divine principle, the divine Light (Christus). The terms “understanding” (Verstand) and “reason” (Vernunft) are defined differently for Böhme than for Leibniz. In Böhme’s writings, reason corresponds to the spirit of finite nature (Spiritus Mundi) and is the cause of distinction within the divinity as well as evil in the world. The human being caught up in selfhood is satisfied with reason. In contrast, the inner Light of understanding represents the spirit

44 That is, the ‘ewigen Wort Gottes, in welchem alle Weisheit, alles Licht, ja das Urbild aller Wesen und der Ursprung aller Wahrheit (ist), ohne das niemand rechtgläubig […] werde’ (Leibniz, ‘Theologia Mystica’, 129). 45 Cf. Wehr, Jakob Böhme, 97.

Aries – Journal for the Study of Western EsotericismDownloaded from 18Brill.com09/29/2021 (2018) 75–95 05:32:26AM via free access compatibility of the “inner light” of mystics and reason 91 of eternal nature and the origin of the vitality of God in nature, which is only grasped by the human who is driven by the challenge of reason to give up selfhood in favor of the inner divine being or “second principle”.46 Since, according to Böhme, the existential experience of evil must precede this decision, it has so to speak a cathartic function, a counterpart to the catalytic function of evil in Leibniz’s thought. In his “True Mystical Theology”, Leibniz addresses the difference between the person trapped in selfhood and the spiritually reborn person in Böhme’s writings. Leibniz contrasts the Quietists’ self-denial with Böhme’s selfless love, which tries to assimilate God’s will and divine perfection: ‘The denial of the self is the hate of the monstrous in us, and the love of the origin of our self-being; that is God’s.This consists in crucifying the old Adam and in taking on Christ; to let Adam die away and Christ to live’.47These terms have a direct antecedent in Böhme’s writings, for example, in his Signatura Rerum, where his “serene Will” (gelassener Wille) or “Love-Self” (Liebe-Selbheit) conquers the will of selfhood, which draws “foreign beings to itself in its self-lust”.48This “Love-Self” in Böhme corresponds to the virtue of the spirits that participate in the kingdom of God in Leibniz’ “Monadologie”.49 The monads all reflect the entire universe from different perspectives in a microcosm-macrocosm relationship, but it is the spirit monads alone that are also images of the divinity.50 Only they are able ‘to recognize the system of the universe and to reproduce something from it in their own system architec-

46 Cf. Edel, Die individuelle Substanz, 128f. 47 That is, ‘Die Verleugnung sein selbst, ist der Hass des Unwesens, so in uns, und die Liebe des Ursprungs unsers Selbstwesens; das ist Gottes. Darin bestehet, den alten Adam kreuzi- gen, Christum anziehen; dem Adam absterben und Christo leben’. Leibniz, ‘Theologia Mystica’, 131. 48 That is, it draws ‘in ihre Selbst-Begierde fremdes Wesen an sich’. Signatura Rerum, 15:12f., in: Böhme, Schriften, Bd. 6, 43 and 45. 49 Cf. Leibniz, ‘Monadologie’, in: gp 6, 607–623, §§85 and 90. 50 Cf. Wahre Theologia Mystica, 130: ‘Ein jeder Selbststand, als ich und du, ist ein einig unz- erteilig unverderblich Ding, und bestehet nicht aus dreien Teilen’. According to Leibniz, the Pauline division into body, spirit and soul, which is present for example as well in Weigel (cf. Gnothi seauton, Chap. 3), contradicts the immortality of the individual soul. However, Leibniz can coordinate Böhme’s doctrine of the three dynamic powers in the human soul (the fiery origin of the soul, the holy temple of the soul and the “outer” bodily soul) with his own three faculties of the soul (Appetitus, Perception / Apperzeption and individual reality or Subjekt). As in Böhme, these three reproduce the Trinity in humans. (Cf., Edel, Die individuelle Substanz, 135).

Aries – Journal for the Study of Western EsotericismDownloaded 18 from (2018) Brill.com09/29/2021 75–95 05:32:26AM via free access 92 edel ture’.51They are therefore able to enter into community with God (as sovereign) in a theocracy (the kingdom of God), which represents a moral world within the natural world.52 Virtue is, for Leibniz as for Böhme, the result of belief in prov- idence, of having insight into the divine purpose of the human being, whose task it is to complete creation through salvation history. The consequence for both thinkers is the notion of serving God and one’s neighbor through good works. Love of God thus consists for Leibniz not in passive devotion, as for the Quietists, but rather in active deeds for the good of humanity.53 In this context, he refers to Böhme’s interpretation of the Bible verse, ‘I have seen thy face, as though I had seen the face of God’, (Gen 33:10).54 In this passage, the recognition of the divine in one’s brother becomes an alle- gory for neighborly love, ultimately promising humankind happiness through love of God and neighbor. Significantly, Leibnitz and Morell had discussed Böhme’s views in the context of discussing the eternal fate of non-Christians.55 All his differences to Böhme notwithstanding, for Leibniz, human behavior can correspond to the piety that is essentially bound to the theosopher’s conviction that he is illuminated and called by God.56 Human activity has as its

51 That is, ‘das System des Universums zu erkennen und etwas davon in eigener System- baukunst nachzubilden’. Leibniz, ‘Monadologie’, in: gp 6, 607–623, §§83f. 52 Ibid. 53 Heinekamp thus writes, ‘Diese uneigennützige Liebe und diese Gleichgültigkeit gegen- über dem eigenen Heil sind nach Leibniz psychologisch nicht möglich. Alles Handeln der Menschen ist selbstbezogen’. Dennoch sieht er seine Auffassung im Einklang mit dem Ideal der reinen Liebe, denn wenn man aufrichtig liebe, suche man nicht den eigenen Vorteil, sondern seine Freude in der Befriedigung und im Glück der geliebten Person. “Die Liebe ist jener aktive Zustand der Seele, der uns unsere Freude im Glück oder in der Befriedigung des anderen finden lässt” (Heinekamp, Leibniz und die Mystik, 197f.; see also Heinekamp, 202f.). 54 Böhme, Schriften, Bd. 6, Signatura Rerum, 16:41; Cf. Edel, Die individuelle Substanz, 149. 55 In his letter from 22 February 1998, Morell had recommended to Leibniz two chapters in Böhme’s Dreifachen Leben des Menschen (Chaps. vi und xi). He writes that Leibniz could invoke Böhme in his conviction that, contrary to the opinion of the orthodoxy, the election of grace was not reserved for Christians alone, but that “heathens” were also assured of salvation as long as they sought God: ‘Gottes Wille stehet allen Menschen offen’, Dreifachen Leben, Chap. xi, 82 (Cf. Chap. vi, 21). In his reply to Morell in a letter from 29 September 1698, Leibniz remarks that he favors the doctrine of apokatastasis taught by Jane Leade (and with her van Helmont and Origines), which conceives not of eternal damnation but of restitution. 56 ‘Die Frömmigkeit (pietas) besteht für Leibniz darin, dass wir unseren Blick erweitern auf die Ordnung der Dinge und an ihr teilhaben. Die Liebe ist unser Beitrag zur Harmonie der Welt. Liebe zu Gott ist Erkenntnis Gottes, und der Prüfstein der Gottesliebe ist der […]

Aries – Journal for the Study of Western EsotericismDownloaded from 18Brill.com09/29/2021 (2018) 75–95 05:32:26AM via free access compatibility of the “inner light” of mystics and reason 93 object of knowledge the kingdom of grace, and in the place of the fatalistic, blind resignation to God’s will exhibited by the Quietists stands the free com- mitment to God. In his “True Mystical Theology”, Leibniz thus describes the characteristics of the “true mystic”:

When one sees the true Light, one is convinced that it is from God and not from the devil or flesh. Just as the sun verifies itself, so too this Light. […] This Light fills the mind with clarity and assurance, not with illusion and wild movement. Some imagine a light world in their brains, they suppose that they see brilliance and splendor and are surrounded by a thousand tiny lights. That is however not the true Light, but an overheating of their blood.57

Here Leibniz contrasts true mystics such as Böhme and false mystics who have mixed Böhme’s profound speculations with bogus visions and fantasies and reinterpreted them. He wants to guard against the corruption and watering down of Böhme’s thought. As the article in Zedler’s Universal-Lexicon men- tioned at the beginning of this essay shows, this was not a wish that was shared universally. Many were prepared to use the writings of some of Böhme’s more eccentric followers to discredit him. To the present day, the exact timing of the production of Leibniz’s “True Mys- ticalTheology” has been disputed.The assumption that the text was aimed personally at Böhme is therefore also up for debate, although it appears plausible. At any rate, one must note that Böhme exhibited the essential characteristic of the “true mystic” and, more generally speaking, of a representative of the philosophia perennis and thus he became for Leibniz in this regard an exemplar. Namely, Böhme was one of those “well-disposed persons” who participated in the proclamation of the one truth and whose message deserved to be heard, regardless of differences that do no wrong to the principle.58

Eifer für die Verbreitung des allgemeinen Wohls’. (Heinekamp, 197) Cf. Böhme, Schriften, Bd. 4: Weg zu Christo, Chap. 2,16. 57 ‘Wenn man das rechte Licht siehet, ist man überzeuget, daß es von Gott sei und nicht vom Teufel oder fleisch. Gleich wie die Sonne sich selbst beweiset, also auch dieses Licht. […] Dieses Licht erfüllet das Gemüt mit Klarheit und Versicherung, nicht aber mit Einbildung und toller Bewegung. Einige bilden sich in ihrem Hirn eine Lichtwelt ein, meinen, sie sehen einen Glanz und Herrlichkeit, und seien mit viel tausend Lichterlein umgeben. Das ist aber nicht das wahre Licht, sondern eine Erhitzung ihres Geblüts’ (Leibniz, ‘Theologia Mystica’, 130). 58 ‘Ainsi je voudrais que les personnes bien intentionnées de quelque parti ou profession

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qu’ils fussent s’entendissent bien entre eux, sans se brouiller pour des differences qui ne font pas grand tort au principial, qui est la pieté’ (Letter to Morell, 1/11 September 1699, ai, 17, 474).

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