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Psychologism: a Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge/Martin Kusch

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Psychologism: a Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge/Martin Kusch PSYCHOLOGISM For most of this century, Western philosophy has been resolutely antinaturalist, and until recently the sharp distinction between the empirical sciences and philosophy seemed almost self-evident: the questions of why they should be separate, and of how they came to be separate, were never asked. These questions are at the heart of Martin Kusch’s groundbreaking study. Antinaturalism rose to dominance in the debate on psychologism among German academic philosophers at the turn of the century. Psychologism, according to received opinion, was decisively refuted by Frege and Husserl. Kusch therefore examines their arguments and, crucially, relates them to the context that shaped that debate and gave those arguments their persuasive force. Drawing on perspectives pioneered by the sociology of scientific knowledge, he reconstructs the dynamics of the psychologism debate; he uncovers its causes and weighs the factors that determined its outcome. What emerges is the fascinating picture of a struggle, between ‘pure’ philosophy and the newly emerging experimental psychology, for academic status, social influence and institutional power. The triumph of antinaturalism, far from being the only logical conclusion, was dependent on historical contingency. Introducing forms of analysis new to the history of philosophy, Psychologism will make fascinating reading for lecturers and students of philosophy, psychology, sociology and cognitive science; it will also stimulate renewed debate on the prospects of antinaturalism at the close of this century. Martin Kusch is Lecturer at the Science Studies Unit of the University of Edinburgh. He is the author of Language as Calculus vs. Language as Universal Medium (1989), and Foucault’s Strata and Fields (1991). PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN SCIENCE Edited by W.H.Newton-Smith Balliol College, Oxford THE RATIONAL AND THE SOCIAL James Robert Brown THE NATURE OF DISEASE Lawrie Reznek THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENCE OF PSYCHIATRY Lawrie Reznek *INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION Peter Lipton *TIME, SPACE AND PHILOSOPHY Christopher Ray MATHEMATICS AND THE IMAGE OF REASON Mary Tiles METAPHYSICS OF CONSCIOUSNESS William Seager *THE LABORATORY OF THE MIND James Robert Brown *COLOUR VISION Evan Thompson * Also available in paperback PSYCHOLOGISM A case study in the sociology of philosophical knowledge Martin Kusch London and New York First published 1995 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 © 1995 Martin Kusch All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Kusch, Martin. Psychologism: a case study in the sociology of philosophical knowledge/Martin Kusch. p. cm.—(Philosophical issues in science) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Psychologism. 2. Phenomenological psychology. 3. Frege, Gottlob, 1848–1925. 4. Husserl, Edmund, 1859–1938. I. Title. II. Series. BF41.K87 1994 190′.9′034–dc20 94–43123 CIP ISBN 0-203-98389-0 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 0-415-12554-5 (hbk) ISBN 0-415-12555-3 (pbk) v Philosophy will clip an Angel’s wings. (John Keats) CONTENTS Foreword by David Bloor xi Acknowledgements xv Note on appendices xviii 1 PSYCHOLOGISM: AN INTRODUCTION 1 Introduction 1 ‘The same old story’ 2 Psychologism: Definitions and accusations 4 The curse of Frege’s and Husserl’s antipsychologism 6 Phenomenology and the schism in twentieth-century 12 philosophy Psychologism and sociologism 14 2 TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHICAL 16 KNOWLEDGE Introduction 16 Philosophical versus nonphilosophical histories of 16 philosophy The sociology of philosophical knowledge 22 3 PSYCHOLOGISM REFUTED? 28 Introduction 28 Frege’s criticism of psychological logic 28 Frege’s arguments in the Grundlagen (1884) 28 Frege’s arguments in the Grundgesetze (1893) 31 viii Frege’s review of Husserl’s Philosophie der Arithmetik 36 (1894) Husserl’s criticism of psychologism in the Prolegomena of 39 the Logische Untersuchungen (1900) Part I: Logic as practical-normative discipline 39 (Kunstlehre) Part II: The refutation of psychologism 42 Part III: An outline of pure logic 57 Frege’s and Husserl’s criticisms compared 58 4 THE CRITICISM OF HUSSERL’S ARGUMENTS 62 AGAINST PSYCHOLOGISM IN GERMAN PHILOSOPHY, 1901–20 Introduction 62 Objections to Husserl’s main theses 62 Normative antipsychologism, and logic as a normative 63 discipline (H2 and H3) The distinction between real and ideal laws (H4) 66 The psychological interpretation of logical principles (H5) 72 Fallacies as counterexamples to psychological 73 interpretations of logical laws (H7) Scepticism, relativism and anthropologism (H8.1 and H8. 74 2) The independence theory of truth (H8.3 and H9.2) 76 Self-evidence (H8.3 and H9.3) 81 Thought economics (H10) 86 Further accusations and comments 87 Criticisms and accusations: A summary 90 5 VARIETIES OF ‘PSYCHOLOGISM’ 1866–1930 93 Introduction 93 Accused and accusers 94 ix The temporal limits of the debate 96 ‘Psychologism’ before Husserl 98 ‘Psychologism’ after Husserl 105 6 ROLE HYBRIDISATION: THE RISE OF THE NEW 120 PSYCHOLOGY Introduction 120 The rise of the new psychology in numerical terms 121 Key figures of the new psychology 124 Wundt 125 Brentano 134 Stumpf 138 Ebbinghaus 140 Müller 141 Külpe 143 A science of one’s own? 145 An obligatory crossing point 147 7 ROLE PURIFICATION: THE REACTION OF ‘PURE 157 PHILOSOPHY’ AGAINST THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY Introduction 157 The cleansing strategies of pure philosophy 158 Dilthey: Descriptive versus explanatory psychology 159 The neo-Kantians 166 Husserl’s phenomenology 174 Pure philosophy and the new psychology 185 Power politics? 186 The petition and its background 186 Wundt’s intervention 189 Marbe’s headcount 193 x The Lamprecht-Simmel controversy 196 Experimental psychology and psychologism 198 Why Husserl—and not Frege? 199 8 WINNER TAKES ALL: LEBENSPHILOSOPHIE AND 206 THE TRIUMPH OF PHENOMENOLOGY Introduction 206 War and peace 207 ‘The genius of war’: Pure philosophy goes to war 208 ‘Between the clergyman and the medical doctor’: 214 Psychology goes to war The triumph of phenomenology: Philosophy and psychology 218 in the Weimar Republic The Weimar mentality 219 From Lebensphilosophie to phenomenology 222 How psychology ceased to be a threat 252 Summary and conclusions 265 Notes 272 Bibliography 283 Index 315 FOREWORD How do things stand today between the department of philosophy and the department of psychology? I mean: how do we think of their relative positions on the map of knowledge? Naturally, opinions will vary, and developments in cognitive science have disrupted some of the old certainties, but until recently the answer would have seemed clear to many philosophers—and to some minds the old certainties remain. Philosophy, it would be said, deals with knowledge, with what makes something into knowledge rather than mere belief. Psychology, by contrast, deals with the processes and conditions of coming to know. These are quite different and disjoint concerns. Psychology deals with causes, philosophy with reasons. Philosophy concerns truth; psychology cannot rise above belief and taking-for-true. Well rehearsed lines of this sort tripped off the tongues of bright philosophy students. They would quickly pick up the manner and tone of their tutors in expressing these truths. I don’t think it unfair to say that philosophers have cultivated a certain complacency in this regard and, perhaps unwittingly, conveyed to their students a disdain for those who believed they could illuminate knowledge by studying rats in mazes, or learning curves for lists of nonsense syllables or the documentation of a child’s growing skills. If the aim was conceptual analysis, only a minimum of factual knowledge of this kind was needed. During the heyday of Oxford ordinary- language philosophy, students would occasionally expose their naivety by asking why the likes of Austin or Ryle didn’t study the use of language empirically, rather than from the armchair. Such enquiries were not welcome, though I doubt if they ever received a fully satisfactory answer. The picture was never a simple one and has become progressively more complicated. Philosophers of science always took pride in knowing their science, but they still had to conjure up a boundary of a similar sort to fend off the accusation, and perhaps even the inner fear, xii that they were just playing at being scientists. Some philosophers have always been interested in psychology, though it has been rare for them to construct their philosophy on, rather than apply it to, psychology. Those few who have adopted this bold scientistic and psychologistic line are probably the ones most conscious of the attitude of mind I have been describing. They will feel it most keenly, because they will provoke it most intensely. What sustains the sniffiness about goings-on in the psychology department? If the argument
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