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ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, Ml 48106 18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND 8001852 W a g n e r , M i c h a e l F r a n k CONCEPTS AND CAUSES: THE STRUCTURE OF PLOTINUS’ UNIVERSE The Ohio State University Ph.D. 1979 University Microfilms International 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 18 Bedford Row, London WC1R 4EJ, England Copyright 1979 by Wagner, Michael Frank All Rights Reserved CONCEPTS AND CAUSES: THE STRUCTURE OF PLOTINUS' UNIVERSE DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Michael Frank Wagner ****** The Ohio State University 1979 Reading Committee; Approved by; Ivan Boh Peter K. Machamer Robert G. Turnbull Adviser Department of Philosophy To my parents, Victor and Anette Wagner my wife, Monica; and my adviser, Robert Turnbull. VITA September 29, 1952 .............Born - Victoria, Texas 1970-197^...................... Opportunity Awards Scholarship, Texas A & M University, College Station, Texas 1973 ..........................Phi Kappa Phi 1 9 7 ^ ..........................B.A. cum laude, Texas A & M University, College Station, Texas 197*+-1978 .................... University Fellowship, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1975-1977 .................... Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1976 .......................... M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 1978-1979 .................... Teaching Assistant, Department of Philosophy, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio PUBLICATIONS "Vertical Causation in Plotinus," in The Structure of Being: A "Supposition-Theory and the Problem of Universals," Franciscan Studies (forthcoming). TABLE OF CONTENTS Page DEDICATION.......................................... ii VITA ................................................ iii Chapter I. SENSATION AND THE ACTIVE SOUL IN PLOTINUS AND AUGUSTINE ................................... 1 1. The Soul and the Senses in Perc e p t i o n....... b 2. Observation, Theory and the Conceptual Order . lU Footnotes..................................... 28 II. PERCEPTION AND KNOWLEDGE IN P L A T O ............... 33 1. Sense Relativity and the Order of Becoming . 35 2. Objects of Perception and Objects of Science . 5^+ Footnotes..................................... 65 III. PLOTINUS' THEORY OF PROGRESSION ................. 69 1. Schematization, Being and the Progression . 71 2. Horizontal Causes and Vertical Causes ....... 78 3. Contemplation and the Categories of Explanation. 96 Footnotes..................................... 109 IV. PLOTINUS' DOCTRINE OF S O U L .................... 112 1. Body as the Instrument of S o u l .............. 115 2. Soul and the Empirical Use of Concepts....... 123 Footnotes..................................... 1^3 V. THE LOGIC OF PLOTINUS' PROGRESSION............. IU7 1. Hypostases and Phenomena.................... 152 2. The One, the Many and the One-over-many .... 170 Footnotes..................................... 190 iv Chapter Page VI. LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND PLOTINUS'UNIVERSE ....... 193 1. Language and Things in Augustine............. 196 2. Principles and Things in Plotinus and the Stoics..................................... 209 3. Representation and Plotinus'On e ............. 218 Footnotes..................................... 225 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................... 227 v Chapter I SENSATION AND THE ACTIVE SOUL IN PLOTINUS AND AUGUSTINE The questions "What is the nature of our universe?" and "How, or in what sense, can we have knowledge of it?" have motivated Western philosophy since its beginnings in ancient Greece. Plato, in synthesizing various strands of pre-Socratic thought and producing the first systematic metaphysics and epistemology available to subse­ quent eras, profoundly influenced philosophers' answers to these questions. Plato especially influenced the tradition known as Neoplatonism, which dominated much of Late Hellenistic, Medieval and Early Modern thought. Though it is difficult (at best) to isolate any one philosopher who ought to be called 'the founder of Neoplatonism', the title usually goes to Plotinus.-*- For Plotinus' status in the Neoplatonic tradition seems to be much the same as Plato's in the earlier Greek tradition. Plotinus' Enneads comprise the earliest detailed and systematic Neoplatonic document available and they influ­ enced all subsequent Neoplatonic philosophy. Plotinus' answers to our two opening questions are the primary topics of this work. Before turning to Plotinus more exclusively in chapters 3-6, however, it will be helpful to explain some general features of Neoplatonism. I shall begin with some features of Neoplatonic views on sensation and perception. To introduce those views, it will he helpful to contrast Neoplatonism with some views common to the modern and contemporary tradition known as Empiricism. In chapter 2, we shall see that some of the central features of Neoplatonic views on sensation and perception are common to Ancient philosophers in general. The contrast with Empiricism is interesting and helpful because Empiricism departs from certain basic metaphysical and epistemological views of preceding Western philosophers in general and Neoplatonists in particular. Empiricism's departure from the Neoplatonic views I shall be discussing thus provides a means for introducing Neoplatonism to contemporary philosophers who, on the whole, are more familiar with Empiricism than with Neoplatonism. The task of understanding Neoplatonism is made somewhat easier, moreover, by some recent work in American philosophy, whose "back to Kant" tendencies have recaptur­ ed some of the more traditional views of Western philosophers— though not without important modifications. I shall use some of this recent work (primarily, the work of Wilfrid Sellars) in this chapter. I shall introduce one feature of Empiricism with an argument by Descartes. Though Descartes is not himself an Empiricist, he plays an important role in preparing the ground for Empiricism. My use of Descartes and Empiricists (especially Locke) is aimed at providing contrasts with Neoplatonism. Accordingly, I shall focus upon certain especially useful passages from Descartes and from Empiricists, but I shall not argue for a general interpretation of either. 3 We normally take ourselves to be in most intimate contact with our universe in perception. Empircists, accordingly, take perception to be our primary faculty of knowledge. Scientific theory is general­ ly taken by Empiricists to be, as a body of knowledge, derivative from perception (or, as it is commonly called, observation). Empiri­ cists normally distinguish sharply between observation and theory and take observation to have a privileged claim to "getting at" the extern­ al universe. One way to give observation special epistemic status is to construe it as an essentially passive matter. The idea that the mind or soul plays a determining role in one's conception of the uni­ verse has, Empiricists suppose, unsavory consequences. Insofar as one takes an active role in determining how he shall conceive of something, the supposition goes, his conception is fictional rather than factual. But insofar as we are passive and the universe itself causally deter­ mines our conception of it, our conceptions are well-founded or fact­ ual. Thus, a theory's factual justification must come from some link it has with observation, construed by the Empiricists as passive. I shall first address the claim that there is something essentially passive about observation (for now, perception)