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Sextus Empiricus and the Scientific Scepticism ENCEPHALOS 50, 62-74, 2013 SEXTUS EMPIRICUS AND THE SCIENTIFIC SCEPTI- CISM STAVROS J.BALOYANNIS* Summary philosophical books, which survived, but remained for long in obscurity, been rediscovered in the late Renaissance. Two Sextus Empiricus is the most eminent representative of these works on the title, “Adversus Mathematikus”, include of the ancient sceptisism, which is a Post-Classical, Hellenis- large number of strong arguments against the Logicians, the tic philosophy based on the criterion of life, the experience Physicists and the Ethicists. The third and most important of and the analysis of phenomena, aiming to provide a straight the books on the title “Outlines of Pyrrhonism” provides an out- and practical way of life, leading to interior peace and mental line of Pyrrhonian scepticism, incorporating at the same time tranquility, sharply opposed to a purely theoretical pursuit of his own philosophical doctrines. Sextus offers thoroughly a dogmatic philosophy. The term “sceptic” is a derivative of the general overview of scepticism, describing and explaining the noun, skepsis (σκέψις), which means thought, examination, meaning of the sceptical investigation, the value of suspen- inquiry, consideration, meditation and investigation. The scep- sion of judgment and the importance of the sceptical dialectics. tical school was connected for a long period of time with the Sextus insists that the skepticism does not accept or reject any Empirical school of physicians, who based the good medical impression and substantially does not affirm or deny anything. practice on the clinical experience rather than on the theoret- Sextus claims that appearances (φαινόμενα) are the practical ical erudition, dedicating themselves to observation, memory criteria of approaching to the truth and by the continuous inves- and continuous clinical practice. As a matter of fact they en- tigation the thinker is prevented from mental or psychological deavored to derive from experience what would be beneficial inactivity (ανενεργησία). The only wise way of life is to suspend for the patients, believing that the medical capability consists in judgment, regarding everything, therefore never facing the risk subjective experience. Sextus who lived in Alaxandria, Athens of being wrong in anything. The human being has the innate and Rome was an empiricist who adopted sceptisism as philo- capacity for perception, thinking, analysis of the phenomena, sophical doctrine and way of life in view that the sceptical way ability to distinguish what is true and what is false and to med- was characterized by persistent commitment to investigate the itate avoiding dogmatism. According to Sextus’ doctrines, logic truth, based on objective arguments and real evidence. How- is based on phenomena and criteria. Sextus proposed several ever he was mostly known in the literature as a sceptic thinker practical criteria and ten main ways (modes, τρόποι) that the and not as empirical physician. Although there are many skep- man could follow whenever he would decide to suspend judg- tical elements in the works of many Greek Pre-Socratic philos- ment on absolute truth. The main mode is the “epoché” (εποχή) ophers, the term scepticism was mainly applied to members of or suspension of judgment, in order to achieve the deep interior Plato’s Academy during its late period. The ancient sceptics, peace and serenity of mind, since the attainment of tranquility, avoiding dogmatism, used to search for the truth, posing many psychological equilibrium or imperturbability (αταραξία) must dialectic questions about knowledge and beliefs, feeling that all be the supreme target of the human life, leading to permanent arguments could be opposed by other strong arguments of the well-being (ευδαιμονία), in an attempt to be raised above the same persuasive force and validity, underlining the dynamics suffering, which pain and psychological distress impose. Ac- of the philosophical investigation and dialectics. Phenomena cording to Sextus, science is considered as being the main are the only things, which the sceptic thinkers do not deny, source of pure knowledge, underling at the same time the rel- since they constitute the appearance of objects. In a parallel ativity of the scientific data. Science, therefore, could not pre- way, phenomena are the ordering criteria of sceptics daily life sume to provide the authoritative truth and all its issues must and activity. According to Diogenes Laertius, Arcesilaus was be understood from a dialectical perspective, since whatever “the first to argue on both sides of a question”. He insisted that is debatable may concern reality. The scientific methodology for every reasoning there is an equally strong opposite rea- consists of investigation, as starting point, of equipollence, a soning, since the reality of things seems to be inaccessible balancing estimation of all positive and negative aspects, of and definite certitude would be impossible for the human mind. suspension of judgment and of tranquility of mind and imper- Sextus’ writings are the main source of most of our knowledge turbability. Always reality has to be investigated but appear- of ancient scepticism and the other philosophical tendencies ance must be accepted without any debate, since it is clearly of the Hellenistic era. He wrote some medical dissertations, obvious. Every effort to approach the truth is feasible only by which unfortunately have been lost during the times and three assessing the phenomena, since absolute reality could never be known. Sextus, although suspended judgment on absolute *Professor Emeritus, Aristotelian University, Thessaloniki, truth, he endeavored to elaborate various sceptical formulas Greece for proceeding to a statement concerning the truth. He insists that any argument requires definite proof, precisely proven, ENCEPHALOS 50, 62-74, 2013 otherwise it might lead to an ‘infinite regression’ resulting to fall or conflicting reasonings have equal force (ισοσθένεια) then into a vicious circle. The escape from infinite regression might the philosopher has to suspend of judgment, in order to es- be based on a hypothesis. Encountering disagreement, when- cape from disturbance and retain his interior serenity of mind ever several points of view and strong arguments seems to be (αταραξια) or tranquility of soul8. The search for the truth is very of equal validity (ισοσθένεια), the thinker being unable to judge difficult and the absolute reality is always inaccessible9. and decide properly and accurately, has to give up, for attain- According to Sextus, scepticism is a powerful attack ing peace of mind (αταραξία). Sextus insists that arriving to a on constructive philosophy insisting that all arguments can be definite conclusion is not merely a matter of high education, opposed by equally strong arguments and no argument exists intellectual integrity, wisdom or experience, since it is mostly a that is incontrovertible. By the intellectual power the philos- matter of the proper nature of the problem. In the field of moral- opher may place arguments in opposition to each other and ity, Sextus and the other ancient sceptics deny the existence of phenomena in opposition to other phenomena. Many times the absolute good, but most of them admit the potentiality for a due to equipollence (ισοσθενείαν10) in the opposed objects continuous amelioration of the life, based on the proper eval- and arguments the sceptic should come first to suspension uation of the ongoing experiences and research. However to of judgment (εποχή)11 adopting a neutral attitude towards the the sceptics nothing is in itself either good or evil, since he who value of both views. Τhat attitude leads to tranquility, peace of considers anything as good or evil is always troubled and suf- mind and imperturbability (αταραξίαν)12,13. fers being not at rest. Sextus’ doctrines have exerted a strong There are many reasons and many modes (tropoi) for sus- influence on the course of Western philosophy, from the sev- pending judgment. Tropos or mode is a way of thought, a man- enteenth century and onwards, inspiring Michel de Montaine, ner of reasoning, a standpoint of judgment. Among the ten prin- Rene Descartes, David Hume, Hegel and many philosophers cipal modes of Pyrro14 for epoche the most important are those, of our Era in their theoretical orientation. The sceptical influx is which are related to the thinker who judges15 as well as to the of substantial importance for the current philosophy of the sci- object16, which is judged or to both of them17. ence, the neurophilosophy, the scientific research, the modern schools of psychology, offering also an essential theoretical The search for the truth background for the evidence based medicine. Many arguments, which try to trace the path of truth are op- Key words: Sextus Empiricus, sceptisism, Hellenistic philos- posing each other, been definite and indefinite, positive and ophy, imperturbability. Peace of mind, Psychotherapy, Medical negative, been in conflict and contradiction. Therefore they are sceptisism. unable to lead to the truth, since they could not be convincing and they induce anxiousness and confusion. On the other hand Introduction there are many intellects and it is expectable that many dis- agreements and disputes may arise, which is going to increase Sextus Empiricus is the most eminent representative thinker’s anxiousness. Those who believe also that things are of the ancient sceptisism in the constellation of the Greek phi- good or evil
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