Sceptical Paths Studies and Texts in Scepticism

Home , Benson Mates, Brain in a vat, Cartesian doubt, Contextualism, Dream argument, Duncan Pritchard

Edited on behalf of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies by Giuseppe Veltri

Managing Editor: Yoav Meyrav

Editorial Board Heidrun Eichner, Talya Fishman, Racheli Haliva, Henrik Lagerlund, Reimund Leicht, Stephan Schmid, Carsten Wilke, Irene Zwiep Volume 6 Sceptical Paths

Enquiry and Doubt from Antiquity to the Present

Edited by Giuseppe Veltri, Racheli Haliva, Stephan Schmid, and Emidio Spinelli The series Studies and Texts in Scepticism is published on behalf of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies

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© 2019 Giuseppe Veltri, Racheli Haliva, Stephan Schmid, Emidio Spinelli, published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg, Ms Cod. Levy 115, fol. 158r: Maimonides, More Nevukhim, Beginn von Teil III. Printing & binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com Contents

Introduction 1

Carlos Lévy Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes: An Ignored Jewish PremonitoryCritic of the Cogito 5

Stéphane Marchand Sextus Εmpiricus’suse of dunamis 23

Diego E. Machuca Does Pyrrhonism Have Practical or Epistemic Value? 43

Heidrun Eichner endoxa and the TheologyofAristotle in Avicenna’s “Flying Man”:Contextsfor Similarities with Sceptical and Cartesian ArgumentsinAvicenna 67

Warren ZevHarvey The Problem of Many Gods in al-Ghazālī,Averroes, Maimonides, Crescas, and Sforno 83

Josef Stern What is Maimonidean Scepticism? 97

Henrik Lagerlund Medieval Scepticism and Divine Deception 127

José María Sánchez de León Serrano Spinoza on Global Doubt 147

Sébastien Charles Scepticism in Early Modern Times 165

Stephan Schmid Three Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism 181

Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández Narrowing of “Know” as aContextualist Strategy against Cartesian Sceptical Conclusions 203 VI Contents

List of Contributors 221

Index 223 Introduction

The following book of collected essays is the main resultofthe First International ConferenceonScepticism held from 8to11May 2017 at Universität Hamburgand organised by the MaimonidesCentre for Advanced Studies (MCAS) in close cooperation with the Department of Philosophy at the Sapienza University of Rome. It addresses the main elements, strategies,and definitions of scepticism. The book is divided according to ahistoricalframework with special foci on ancient,medieval, and early modernphilosophy: EmidioSpinelli (the Sapienza University of Rome) was responsible for the ancient period, Racheli Haliva (MCAS, Universität Hamburg) was responsible for the Middle Ages, and Stephan Schmid (MCAS, Universität Hamburg)was re- sponsiblefor the earlymodern period. The redaction of the book was undertaken by Yoav Meyrav (MCAS, Universität Hamburg), and the following contains an overview of all the essays included in the present volume, looking into the topics discussed in the conference and elaborated upon for publication. In his paper “Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes:AnIgnored Jewish Premonitory Critic of the Cogito,” Carlos Lévy argues that Philo of Alexandria foresawand refuted the Cartesian cogito as the solution to the problem of absoluteknowledge.After lo- cating the main tenets of Philo’sattitude to the Pyrrhonian tradition, which is illumi- nated by acomparison with Cicero’srespective attitude, Lévy shows how Philo’sattitude to knowledge precludes the possibilityofDescartes’scogito. Philo would probablyhavedismissed Descartes’scogito as absurd, as it involves an artificial dis- connection between the human self and its metaphysical rootedness in God, onlyto re-establish it later.For Philo, as for Augustine after him, the problem of knowledge is intertwined with the ethical question of the relationship between God and the human being,atwhich the human being arrivesthrough grasping the shortcoming of reason and the priority of faith. In “Sextus Εmpiricus’suse of dunamis,” Stéphane Marchand embarksupon a terminological exploration of the word dunamis in Sextus’scorpus.Although not frequent in Sextus’swritings, dunamis is explicitlyconnected to the sceptical praxis and its application is tellingregarding Sextus’sunderstanding of sceptical discourse, which avoids the dogmatic meaningofdunamis as found, for example, in the Aris- totelian tradition. Through acareful examination of the instances of dunamis in Sex- tus’scorpus,Marchand shows that it can expresssceptics’ observable ability to carry out their activity,and also function as alexicaltool to uncover semantic equivalence or logical entailment,which maymask weaknesses in dogmatic arguments. Finally, Marchand argues that whenever one findsaninstance of dunamis that can be understood as if its employmentreflects acertain theory,this is in fact part of Sextus’s strategyofarguing accordingtothe usagenorms of the field within which he argues, without committingtothe theory behind this usage. In his paper “Does Pyrrhonism Have Practical or Epistemic Value?”,DiegoMa- chuca examines the Pyrrhonian notions of suspension and undisturbedness and

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asks whether they are in fact valuable with regard to moralityand knowledge.In other words, can these notions reallycontributetobehaviourthatismorallyright or wrong, and can they really allow one to attain truth and avoid error?Itseems that if this is not the case, then Pyrrhonism is fundamentallyuseless and perhaps even harmful. In the course of his argument,Machucaargues against this negative assessment,most notablyrespondingtoMartha Nussbaum’scritique and exhibiting its shortcomings. Machuca argues in favour of Pyrrhonism’svalue accordingtothe basic Pyrrhonian principle of appearance: it is sufficient to show that Pyrrhonism appears valuable to the Pyrrhonist in order to defend its value. In “endoxa and the Theology of Aristotle in Avicenna’s ‘Flying Man’:Contexts for Similarities with Sceptical and Cartesian Arguments in Avicenna,” HeidrunEichner offers afresh analysis of Avicenna’sfamous “flying man” thoughtexperiment, which is frequentlycompared to Descartes’sargument for the existenceofthe metaphysical cogito. Eichner argues thatinstead of asingle argument,inAvicenna we find acluster of “flying man” arguments, which, when discussed side by side, reflect acontinuous development in Avicenna’sphilosophy. This development consists of two contributingfactors:Avicenna’sattitude towards endoxa type arguments and the legacyofarguments for the immortality of the soul which stemfrom the so-called Theology of Aristotle (in reality amedieval Arabic adaptation of Plotinus’s Enneads). Equippedwith these fresh analytical tools,Eichner shows thatAvicenna’s “flying man” can be understood as alogical inversion of Descartes’scogito;for Avicenna, thinking correctlyabout a “flying man” is enough to secure his existenceasadistinct mental entity. In “The Problem of ManyGods in al-Ghazālī,Averroes,Maimonides, Crescas,and Sforno,” Warren Zev Harvey uncovers anarrativeofargumentation and counter-argu- mentationregardingreason’sability to defend monotheism. In the Muslim tradition, Averroes employed an Aristotelianargument based on the claim thatthe universe is aunifiedwhole to counter al-Ghazālī’ssceptical claim thatreason alone cannotpre- vent the possibility of aplurality of Godsand hence is an insufficient foundation for the theological principle of God’sunity.Harvey shows that subsequent argumentations in the Jewishtradition—here reflectedinMaimonides, MosesNarboni, Hasdai Crescas,and Obadiah Sforno—are variations on this theme, which is refined, en- riched,and opensavenues for philosophical and theological novelties. In “What is Maimonidean Scepticism?”,JosefStern delvesinto one of the most heated scholarlydebates surrounding Maimonides’sphilosophy; namely, the place of scepticism in his thought. Stern argues that there are two ways in which Maimo- nides can in fact be regarded as asceptic: first,his argumentative method is similar to the Pyrrhonian method for generating equipollence, and second, he finds apractical value in the suspensionofjudgment.Regarding the first way, Stern shows that Maimonides thinksthat the mere possibility of doubtisinsufficient to challengea knowledge claim; Maimonides prefers to present,inmanycontexts, two opposing arguments of equal strength between which there is no criterion to decide. Regarding the second way, Stern shows that in Maimonides, suspension of judgmentcan lead to Introduction 3

astate of tranquillity, akind of happiness,and/or aweand dazzlement that is akinto the kind of divine worship thatthe dogmatist holds can be achieved through the acquisition of positive knowledge about God. In “Medieval Scepticism and Divine Deception,” Henrik Lagerlund outlinesthe Greek and Latinsources of scepticism available in medievaltimes, tracing the roots of an original form of sceptical argumentation in the Latin tradition; namely, divinedeception. Even though there weresome influences from earlier forms of scepticism during this time, Lagerlund shows that scepticism was largely reinvented in the Middle Ages according to anew set of considerations thatare independent of the ancient tradition. Unlikethe Pyrrhonian view,which aims at the suspension of judgment and tranquillity,and is therefore apractical consideration, medievalscep- tical arguments revolvearound epistemological debates. In other words, it was in medievalphilosophythatscepticism became intertwined with epistemology,asit is to this day. In his paper “Spinoza on Global Doubt,” José María SánchezdeLeónSerrano proposes areassessment of Spinoza’sstrategyagainst the radical scepticism adopted by Descartes in his Meditations. Whereas scholars tend to see Spinoza’smonism as his main defence against the sceptical threat,Sánchez de León Serrano argues that monism is in fact liable to generate scepticism. Spinoza can onlyresolve this internal difficulty by showing how the finite human mind can adequatelygrasp the whole of Nature that contains it. In “Scepticism in EarlyModern Times,” Sébastien Charles challenges the attempt to reduce the phenomenon of scepticism in the earlymodern period to an appropri- ation of Sextus Empiricus’sversion of Pyrrhonism. Arguing against the univocal meaning of scepticism in earlymodernity,Charles discusses three authors whose respective forms of scepticism differ from each other with respect to motivation, em- ployment,and argumentation. First,Pierre-Daniel Huet—who is oftenthe subject of debatesastowhether he was aPyrrhonian or an Academic sceptic—is primarily aChristian philosopher who uses sceptical strategies as part of his apologetic project to safeguard the Christian religion from attacks from earlymodern rationalism. Sec- ond, Simon Foucher actuallyopposes Pyrrhonism, which he interprets as aform of negative dogmatism. Instead, he adopts what he believes to be the Academic sceptical approach; scientific progress is possible as long as it is granted that scientific claims are revocable and that they are not apodictic truths. Finally, despite being usually regarded as aradical sceptic, Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville conceived scepticism primarilyinapropaedeutic role, as afoundation for the natural philoso- phyofits time. In “Three Varieties of EarlyModern Scepticism,” Stephen Schmid alsoargues against understanding earlymodern scepticism as aspecies of Pyrrhonism. Instead, Schmidproposes adistinction between Pyrrhonian, Cartesian, and Humean scepticism, which represent different stages in the historicaldevelopmentofsceptical ideas. Each stagediffersfrom the others in extent and scope, constructinganargu- mentative succession which increases in gravity.The object of Pyrrhonian scepticism 4 Giuseppe Veltri

is the ability to know the nature of things, leaving the question of the fact of their existenceuntouched; Cartesian scepticism is directed against the very existenceof thingsoutside us, but leavesuntouched the question of whether we have thoughts with adeterminate content in the first place; Humean scepticism takes up this final problem, doubting not onlythe truth of our thoughts,but alsowhether what we taketobethoughts about certain thingsare proper thoughts about these things at all. In “Narrowingof‘Know’ as aContextualist Strategyagainst Cartesian Sceptical Conclusions,” Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernandez tackles epistemic contextualism,a contemporaryresponsetoscepticism. Epistemic contextualism claims that Cartesi- an-style sceptical arguments set extremelyhighstandardsfor knowledge that we do not have to meet in ordinary or scientific contexts. Nuñez Hernandez develops an original proposal to address the main criticisms of this position, arguing that in Cartesian-style sceptical arguments, the meaning of “know” is narrowed down to such an extent that it does not applytothe vast majorityofthe instancesto which “knowledge” is actuallyattributed. My thanks go to all my colleagues for their cooperation, to the MCAS team, and primarilytoYoavMeyrav for his professional redaction of every article and his help in summarising the content of the contributions. Special thanks are duetoRachel Aumiller for her involvement in the earlystagesofthe preparation of this volume. Thanks are also duetoMaria Wazinski and Mikheil Kakabadze for theirvaluable editorial help. This is also the appropriateplace to thank the GermanResearch Council (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) for the generous financial support that made the creation of the MaimonidesCentreand the open access of this publication possible.

Hamburg, May2019 GiuseppeVeltri Carlos Lévy Philo of Alexandria vs.Descartes: An Ignored JewishPremonitoryCritic of the Cogito

The starting-point of this paper is adouble statement of fact.First,inthe transmission of the sorts of tablets of the sceptic lawthat are the tropes of Aenesidemus, our initial witness is neither aphilosopher in the narrow sense, nor adoxographer,nor an encyclopaedist,but someone who was and remains an atypical character in the world of philosophy: aJew born in Alexandria, raised in the paideia,who never abandoned the principles of his faith. Philo thoughtthat there could exist akind of complex compatibility between the Jewish Torahand Greek philosophy. Nowa- days,scholars generallydismiss the Philonian version of the tropes.¹ In my opinion—but it seems that Iamalmostthe onlyone to think so currently—it is an error,since Philo was, from achronological, geographical, historical, and linguistic point of view,the closest to Aenesidemus. H. vonArnim expressedthe same opinion at the beginning of the twentieth century that was, but it was shaken by Janáček’s(to my mind) unconvincing criticism, whose authority playedanimportant role in de- valuing Philo’sversion of the tropes.² Certainlytherewould be much to sayabout this question, but the main fact is thatPhilo, who livedinacity brimming with philosophers, quicklyidentified Aenesidemus’stropes as something very important to his own reflections on Jewish law. On this matter,thereisasharp contrast between the attitudes of Ciceroand Philo. Cicerowas himself adisciple of the sceptic Academyand agood friend of Tu- bero, to whom Aenesidemus dedicated his Pyrrhonian books, yetCiceronever mentions Aenesidemus.³ In his opinion the tradition of doubt was represented by the AcademyofArcesilaus and Carneades. Scepticism, aterm that had no precise equivalent in his vocabulary,was for Ciceroessentiallyanaspect of Platonism. UnlikeAe-

 On this question, see Carlos Lévy, “Philon d’Alexandrie est-il inutilisable pour connaître Éné- sidème? Étude méthodologique,” Philosophie antique 15 (2015): 7‒26.  Hans vonArnim, Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1889); KarelJanáček, “Philon vonAlexandreia und skeptische Tropen,” Eirene (1982):83‒97.  Photius says that Aenesidemus’sbook was dedicated to Lucius Tubero, who was his sunairesiōtēs (“classmate”)inthe Academy. This Tuberoiscommonlyidentified with Lucius Aelius Tubero, who was alegateofQuintus Cicero duringhis pro-consulate in Asiafrom63to58BCE. On Tubero, see John Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht,1978), 118. On the debateabout the Academic identity of Aenesidemus,see the contradictory positions of Fernanda DeclevaCaizzi, “Aenesidemus and the Academy,” Classical Quarterly 42 (1992):176‒89,who denies that Aenesidemus was astudent in the Academy, and Jaap Mansfeld, “Aenesidemus and the Academ- ics,” in Thepassionate intellect. Essaysonthe transformation of Classical Literature, ed. Lewis Ayres (New Brunswick-London: Transactions, 1996), 235‒48, whoaffirmsthat he was.

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nesidemus, he never intended to removescepticism from the familyofthe Socratic doctrines. Forhim Pyrrho was adogmatic indifferentist.⁴ Further in this paper,inacomparative perspective,weshall deal with Augus- tine’sintellectual and spiritual itinerary.Itiswell-known that,after avery long and complex evolution, he had an illumination in the garden of Milan, in July 386.Itwas acrucial moment for his conversion.⁵ One could think that,atthis time of his life, he would have isolated himself in order to write some fresh theological meditation. But it was not the case. He retired with his mother and some friends in Cassiciacum, in order to tackle agreat number of philosophicalthemes, the first of which was the refutation of the New Academy.Thisseems even stranger as in Con- fessions 5.25,⁶ when he speaks about his own sceptical crisis (in 384‒85), he seems to consider it as aminor episode, in the context of his liberation from along-lasting Manichaean influence. In the case of Augustine, as in thatofPhilo, dealingwith scepticism seems to have been more thananintellectual challenge, but an actual kind of emergency. Hereagain, the contrast with Ciceroistelling. Cicerowrote his Academica when he was sixty,anage roughlyequivalent to today’seighty,given differences in life ex- pectancy.One would perhaps object that the link between Philo and Augustine is mere coincidence. But the paradoxical relation between faith and scepticism is a line which runs through the history of Western thought.The namesofMontaigne and Pascal can be mentioned here, among so many others, as carefullystudied by Charles Schmitt.⁷ The presenceofthis relation, however,does not meanthat it would be unidimensional. By exploring the cases of Philo and Augustine, we will try to determine what,ifanything,they have in common. In principle, thingslook quite simple; Philo adopts and adapts the tropes of Ae- nesidemus, while Augustine wants to triumph over the scepticism of the New Acad- emy. In fact,this contrast between the former,who seems to feel some attraction towards scepticism, and the latter,who treats it as an adversary,isfallacious. In both

 See Carlos Lévy, “Un problème doxographique chez Cicéron, les indifférentistes,” Revue des Études Latines 58 (1980): 238‒51.  On the Augustinian intellectual and spiritual itinerary,see Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo:ABi- ography,rev.ed. (Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress,2000).  Augustine, Confessions 5.25: “Accordingly,after the manner of the Academics,aspopularlyunder- stood, Idoubted everything, and in the fluctuatingstateoftotal suspense of judgement Idecided I must leave the Manichees, thinkingatthat period of my scepticism that Ishould not remainamem- ber of asect to which Iwas now preferringcertain philosophers. But to these philosophers, whowere without Christ’ssavingname, Ialtogether refused to entrust the healingofmysoul’ssickness” (ita- que Academicorum more, sicut existimantur,dubitans de omnibus atque inter omnia fluctuans, mani- chaeos quidem relinquendos esse decrevi, non arbitrans eo ipso temporedubitationis meae in illa secta mihi permanendum esse cui iam nonnullos philosophos praeponebam. quibus tamen philosophis,quod sine salutari nomine Christi essent, curationem languoris animae meae committereomnino recusabam). Henry Chadwick, trans., Saint Augustine: Confessions (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1991).  Charles B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus (Leiden: Brill, 1972). Philo of Alexandria vs.Descartes 7

cases, thingsare far morecomplex. In the background of both cases is aquestion to which Descartesgaveananswer he considered to be definitive:isthere something that Ican know with absolute certainty?Iwill try to demonstrate that Philo had fore- seen and refuted the Cartesian solution, while Augustine in acertain sense anticipat- ed it.

1Prolegomena

Before dealing with Philo, Iwillsay something about the pagan attitude towards religion, and more specificallythat of the Hellenistic schools. In the Pyrrhonian tradition, passive observance of the religious tradition of the city is recommended in order to avoid the disturbance of religious dissension.⁸ We find something quiteopposite to this indifferentism in Cicero’streatise On the Natureofthe Gods (De naturadeorum). The main purpose of this treatise, in the tradition of the New Academy,istodemon- strate that the dogmatic explanations of the natureofthe gods offered by Stoics and Epicureans weredisappointingand contradictory.Ishall not insist on the arguments used by Cotta against his dogmatic adversaries, since they have been explored at length.⁹ HereIprefer to evoke apassageofthe third book, rarelyanalysed in com- mentariesonthis treatise.Atsections 11‒12 of the third book, Cotta, the exponent of the Academic refutation of Stoicism, refuses to grant that gods or dead heroes could appear among mortals and be seen in some exceptional occasions,let us sayinmiracles. He adds that he prefers to believesomething more probable, namely that the souls of the great men are divine and immortal.¹⁰ In the case of Cotta, the

 See Carlos Lévy, “La question du pouvoir dans le pyrrhonisme,” in Fondements et crises du pouvoir, eds.Sylvie Franchet d’Esperey,Valérie Fromentin, Sophie Gotteland, and Jean-Michel Roddaz (Bor- deaux: Ausonius,2003), 47‒56;RichardBett, Pyrrho:his Antecedents and his Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2000), esp. chap. 2; Emidio Spinelli, “Sextus Empiricus,l’expérience sceptique et l’horizon de l’éthique,” Cahiers philosophiques 115,no. 3(2008): 29‒45.  See Daniel Babut, La religion des philosophes grecs,2nd ed. (Paris:Les Belles Lettres,2019); Jean- Louis Girard, “Probabilisme, théologie et religion: le cataloguedes dieux homonymes dans le De naturadeorum de Cicéron (3,42et53‒60),” in Hommages àR.Schilling,eds.Hubert Zehnacker and Gus- tave Hentz (Paris:Les Belles Lettres,1983), 117‒26;JaapMansfeld, “Aspects of Epicurean Theology,” Mnemosyne 46 (1993): 172‒210; JordiPia, “De la Naturedes dieux de Cicéron àl’abrégédeCornutus: une nouvelle représentation des élites dans la réflexion théologique,” Camenae 10 (February 2012), http://saprat.ephe.sorbonne.fr/media/282f1da6517e2ba6025880dd887c8682/camenae-10-varia-jordipia-derniere.pdf.  Cicero, De Naturadeorum 3.12: “Would younot prefer to believethe perfectlycredible doctrine that the souls of famous men, likethe sons of Tyndareus youspeak of, aredivine and live for ever,rather than that men whohad been oncefor all burnt on afuneral pyrecould ride and fight in abattle ;and if youmaintain that this was possible, then youhavegot to explain how it was possible, and not merelybringforwardold wives’ tales” (nonne mavis illud credere, quod probari potest, animos praeclarorum hominum, quales isti Tyndaridae fuerunt, divinos esse et aeternos,quam eos qui semel cremati essentequitareetinacie pugnarepotuisse; aut si hoc fieri potuisse dicis,doceas oportet 8 Carlos Lévy

Academic argumentation has adouble function: first,todemonstrate thathuman reason is incapable of elaboratinganon-contradictory doctrine about the gods; and second, to consider the possibility of aless naïve,more persuasive,and more intellectual discourse about them. There is akind of subtle connexion between Cot- ta’scritical attitude and aform of transcendence. His critique aims at demonstrating that the inability of reason to find what is absolutely true does not necessarilyimply its incapacity to detect what is false or to have an intuition of what is probable. Cotta, as an Academic, is essentiallyanevaluator.Headvances arguments in order to demonstrate that the theory of the immortality of the best human souls is more plausible than the naïvebelief of the visiblepresenceofgods. Implicitly, it is an extension of the TheDream of Scipio (Somnium Scipionis,from book 6 of De republica)written by Ciceroten years before. It is quite difficulttodecide if this connexion between the Academic contraomnia dicere and atranscendent perspective had antecedents in the school of Arcesilaus and Carneades or if it wasCicero’sinnovation.¹¹ At no moment,however,does he presume to understand what could be the nature of this ego who, though not pretending to reach truth, thinksthat it is qualified to express a qualified opinion on opposite propositions. It can be asserted that,evenwhen he deals with philosophical themes, Cotta is unable to define his subjectivity otherwise than through his own position in the Roman tradition.¹²

2The Main Features of Philo’sScepticism

Iwill not enter into details regarding Philo’sversion of the tropes.Itmust be noted that Philo’ssceptical aspects are not limited to the tropes thatwefind in his On Drunkenness (De ebrietate). There are many other places whereheuses sceptic arguments in different ways.¹³ My purpose is to try to provide an answer to these two questions: whyPhilo and whyscepticism?Why does Philo frequentlyuse sceptic items,while he considers the sceptics themselvestobesophists?Heremymethod will be to revisit some conceptsofthe confrontation between sceptics and Stoics,trying to see what they become when they are used by Philo.

quo modo,nec fabellas aniles proferas). Cicero, On the Natureofthe Gods. Academics, trans. H. Rack- ham (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press), 1933.  On the relation between the New Academyand the Platonic legacy, see Carlos Lévy, “La Nouvelle Académie a-t-elle été antiplatonicienne?”,inContre Platon I. Le platonisme dévoilé,ed. Monique Dix- saut (Paris:Vrin, 1993), 139‒56.  Cicero, De Naturadeorum 3.9: “Formypart asingle argument would have sufficed, namelythat it has beed handed down to us by our forefathers” (mihi enim unum sat erat, ita nobis maioresnostros tradidisse).  On this point see Carlos Lévy, “La conversion du scepticisme chez Philon d’Alexandrie,” in Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy,ed. Francesca Alesse (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 103‒20. Philo of Alexandria vs.Descartes 9

2.1 Philo and Stoic Epistemological Concepts

First sunkatathesis (assent), katalēpsis (perception of reality), and epochē (suspension of assent). Briefly, since for the Stoics logos-nature is both God and Providence, it generouslyoffers true representations of the world to human beings. They are said to be freetoaccept or to refuse them, since assent depends on us. They can also suspend this assent.Atthe coreofthe confrontation between Stoics and sceptics is the fact that for the former, it is normaltogiveassent to natural representations,while for the latter no representation is adequatelyclear and unambiguous to be believed. Both schools agree, however,thatthe relation (or the absence of relation) between representations and assent is the central concern of the philosophyofknowledge. Philo’soriginality was chieflydue to his refusaltoadmit even the terms of the problem. Within his corpus,onlytwice does he use sunkatathesis,aterm which was specificallyStoic,since it wascoined from an electoral metaphor by Zeno,the founderofthe school.¹⁴ Forthe Stoics,human life is akind of permanent electoral process, in which representations are the candidatesand the subject atireless voter.Sensory representations are almostsure to be elected, since most of them are phantasiai katalēptikai (“cognitive representations”), whereas intellectual propositions need amore accurate examination. In Philo’shugecorpus,the near-absence of one of the main conceptsofStoic vocabulary—and more generallyofthe philosophic lingua franca of this time—can hardlybeconsidered amere coincidence. It would be temptingtoprovide astylistic explanation, since Philo generallyavoids ne- ologisms and non-classical concepts too narrowly connected to aprecise philosophical context.But,atthe same time, he often uses katalēpsis,another central concept of Stoic epistemology. In Stoic doctrine, katalēpsis is akataleptic, i.e., naturallyevi- dent representation, to which assent has been given.¹⁵ We know that Philo wasfamil- iar with these kinds of scholastic definitions, since in the De congressu,hegives several Stoic definitions with great accuracy,among them the concept of katalēpsis which he includes in the more general concept of science, epistēmē.¹⁶ It is true that Philo’svocabulary is often much more exegetical thanphilosophical and gener- allynot particularlyinclined towards terminological innovations.Atthe sametime, it is quiteprobable that he did not want to accept aconcept so clearlybelongingtothe Stoic system, which expressed the autonomyofthe human subject inside aperfectly

 See Carlos Lévy, “Breakingthe Stoic Language: Philo’sAttitude towards Assent (sunkatathesis) and Comprehension (katalêpsis),” Henoch 32 (2010): 33‒44.  Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians (Adversus mathematicos)8.396(=SVF 2.91).  Philo, On the PreliminaryStudies (De Congressu eruditionisgratia)141: “Knowledge on the other hand is defined as asureand certain apprehension which cannot be shaken by argument” (ἐπιστή- μης δέ· κατάληψις ἀσφαλὴςκαὶβέβαιος, ἀμετάπτωτος ὑπὸ λόγου). Philo, On the PreliminaryStudies, in On the Confusion of Tongues. On the Migration of Abraham. WhoIsthe HeirofDivine Things?On Mating with the PreliminaryStudies (Philo vol. 4), trans. F.H. Colson,G.H. Whitaker (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press),1932. 10 Carlos Lévy

determined nature. By contrast, katalēpsis had Platonic and Aristotelian antecedents.¹⁷ Ihope thatthe process of Philo’sterminological preferences will become clearer by examining one of the twooccurrences of sunkatathesis in his corpus. On the Life of Moses (De vita Mosis)shows Moses in astate of great perplexity about the date of Passover,avery complex religious problem.¹⁸ On one hand,the date of the festival was set at the fourteenth dayofthe first month, but on the other hand, certain mem- bers of the group wereplungedinto mourning by the death of relatives. Due to their ensuing state of ritual impurity,they could not attend the ceremonies of Passover and were quitedisappointed. Forthis reason, they asked the prophet to change the date. Philo reports that Moses was torn between contradictory sentiments, between admitting or rejecting these protests. Theinclination of aStoic philosopher probablywould have been to reject them, since grief wasone of the four fundamental negative passions. An Academic belongingtothe Carneadean tradition would have suspended his assent,while trying to see which of the two solutions would be the most persuasive.APyrrhonian would have said that they wereperfectly equivalent.But when Mosesdoes not know what to do, he asks God to give him asolution. Subsequently,God emitsanoracle preservingboth the Lawand loyalty to family. We suggest,therefore, that Philo refused to use the concept of sunkatathesis because it was aself-sufficient concept,namelyaconcept withoutany opening to transcendence. The Stoic conception of assent was the most elaborate expression of confidence in the sovereignty of the reason, both individual and universal, adoctrine that Philo could not accept.That is whyheprefers to use the term boulē (deliberation and decision), much less connected to an immanentist context.

2.2 The transcendent epochē

The decision to foregothe term sunkatathesis maybethought to implythe same attitude towards epochē,defined as suspension of assent.However,thingsare perhaps alittle more complex. Actually, epochē is usedonlyonce in the whole of Philon’scorpus.¹⁹ This seems to createanalmost perfect symmetry with the treatment of sunkatathesis. At the sametime, it is worth noting that in the abstract of Aenesidemus’s book Pyrrhoneioi logoi,written by the Patriarch Photius, the term epochē,which

 Plato, Gorgias,445c; Republic 526d; Laws 830c; Aristotle, Sleep and Waking (De somno et vigilia) 458a29;Pseudo-Aristotle, De spiritu 484b33.  Philo, On the Life of Moses (De vita Mosis)2.225‒32.  Philo, On Flight and Finding (De fuga et invetione)136: “Forthe best offeringisquietness and suspense of judgement,inmatters that absolutelylack proofs” (ἄριστον γὰρ ἱερεῖον ἡσυχίακαὶἐποχὴ περὶὧνπάντως οὔκεἰσι πίστεις). Philo, On Flight and Finding,inOn Flight and Finding.Onthe ChangeofNames.OnDreams (Philo vol. 5), trans. F.H. Colson, G.H. Whitaker (Cambridge,MA: Har- vardUniversity Press),1934. Philo of Alexandria vs.Descartes 11

will become so frequent in Neopyrrhonist philosophy, especiallyinSextus Empiri- cus, is never used.²⁰ LikePhilo, Aenesidemus (at least in Photius’sreport), frequently uses katalēpsis, katalēptos, akatalēptos,but he carefullyavoids sunkatathesis. In- stead of epochē,heprefers to use aporia. Of course, Photius’sreport is toobrief to allow for aperfectlyclear conclusion. The reliability of areport written so manycenturies after the book in question can be contested. But it cannot be excluded that one of the characteristics of Aenesidemus’sinnovations would have been to relinquish the traditionalproblematic sunkatatheis/epochē and emphasise instead the Pyrrho- nian idea of isostheneia,the equal strength of opposite realities,leadingtoaporia.²¹ Therefore, it is not impossible thatwhat we see in the Philonian corpus,namely the almostcompleterejection of the terms sunkatathesis and epochē,originatedinAene- sidemus himself. When Sextus giveshis own version of Pyrrhonian modes, he says in his introduction that “the usual tradition amongst the older sceptics is that the ‘modes’ by which suspension (epochē)issupposedtobebrought about are ten in number.”²² In Philo’s version of these modes, we find the verb epechein three times. The use of the term epochē expressed something strongerthan the verb epechein. The verb had afunc- tional meaning, while the noun had become the keystone, the motto of Academic thought, from which Aenesidemus tried to depart. In anycase, the onlyPhilonian occurrence of epochē deservesconsideration. It refers to one of the most famousepisodes in the Bible, the sacrifice of Isaac. When Isaac asks his father wherethe lamb for the holocaust is, Abraham answers that God himself will provide the lamb for the burnt offering.Inhis allegoricalcommentary, Philo explains thatthe victim is the suspension of our judgement on points where evidence cannot be found.²³ God accepts the epochē as the sacrificial offering,in the place of Isaac. epochē is not onlythe recognition of the limits of the human mind, but also the expression of the Patriarch’sfaith in the infinite capacities of God Almighty,able to surpass the limits of nature,for example by bringingupex ni- hilo alamb in adesert. In Philo’sexegesis, the lamb is bothahistorical reality,since he never excluded the literal sense of the sacred word, and the metaphor of the ep- ochē,which in his perspective is meaningless if not referred to God.

 Photius, Bibliotheca 212.  On these concepts,see Jacques Brunschwig, “L’aphasie pyrrhonienne,” in Dire l’évidence,eds. Carlos Lévy and Laurent Pernot (Paris:L’Harmattan, 1997), 297‒320;Bett, Pyrrho,14‒59;Harold Thorsrud, “Arcesilaus and Carneades,” in TheCambridgeCompanion to Ancient Scepticism,ed. Ri- chardBett (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2010), 58‒81.  Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism,trans. R.G. Bury (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1933), 1.14.  Philo, On Flight and Finding 136. 12 Carlos Lévy

If we exclude the dubious testimonyofEpiphanius,²⁴ no pagan Sceptic had suggested this kind of interpretation. ForaSceptic or aStoic, the understandingofthe meaning of epochē needed athorough comprehension of main intellectual processes. ForPhilo, it wasnecessarilybasedonthe hermeneutic of the divine Word, in apas- sageapparentlywithout relation to the suspension of judgement. Herewemuststress acrucial point.The main differencebetween Pyrrhonian and Academic philosophers was that for the former all presentations and opinions werebasically equivalent,while for the latter the impossibilityofreaching certain truth did not prevent the world from offering some semblance of plausibility. ForAr- cesilaus, the first scholarch of the New Academy, the eulogon,though produced by a fallible reason, was the best mean to act in anon-undifferentiated way. ForCar- neades, his most brilliant successor,the pithanon,the impression of plausibilitypro- duced by certain representations, allowed limited progress in knowledge and action.²⁵ Usually Philo shows great hostility towardsthe pithanon,perhaps because in his Platonic culture it had toomanysophistic associations. He has asomewhat more nuanced attitude towards eulogon,but also some negative views. In Allegorical Interpretation (Legum allegoriae)3.229, he says that it is unreasonable to believein logismois pithanois,anexpression which means here something like sophisms.²⁶ At 3.233itissaid that the pithanon involves no firm knowledge with regard to the truth. We find one of the most eloquent instances of this rejection in On the Life of Moses 1.174. When the prophet sawthat the Hebrews hesitatedtofollow him and to fight the Egyptian army, he asked them: “whydoyou trust in the specious and plausible and that only?” (τί μόνοις τοῖςεὐλόγοις καὶ πιθανοῖςπροπιστεύετε;). At the same time, in On the Special Laws (De specialibus legibus)1.36‒38 he develops the hierarchyinwhich the eulogon and the pithanon can find asense different from the one they had in Arcesilaus’sorCarneades’sphilosophies. Even if it is not possibletohaveperfect knowledge of the truth of God, Philo says,the research in itself is asourceofjoy: “Fornothing is better than to search for the true God, even if the discovery of Him eludes human capacity,since the very wish to learn, if earnestlyentertained, produces untold joys.” Actually, even if God is unknowable, it is possibletoact “like the athlete who strivesfor the second prize since he has been disappointed of the first.Now second to the true vision stands conjecture and theorising and all that can be brought into the category of the reasonable.”

 Epiphanius, Panarion, De fide 9.33‒34;fragment132 in Simone Vezzoli, Arcesilao di Pitane (Turnhout: Brepols,2016).  On these concepts see the oppositeinterpretations of PierreCouissin, “Le stoïcisme de la Nou- velle Académie,” Revue d’HistoiredelaPhilosophie 3(1929): 241‒76;Anna Maria Ioppolo, Opinione eScienza (Napoli: Bibliopolis,1986), esp. 121‒217.  In Philo, Allegorical Interpretation (Legum allegoriae)3.41, pithanotēs is evokedwithin the logoi sophistikoi. Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes 13

Like the Academics and the followers of Aenesidemus, Philo emphasises the continuity of research. Forexample, just before describing the sceptic modes at On Drunkenness 162, he says thatthe worse kind of ignorance is that which accentuates the lack of science, the belief of having reached science.The best waytoavoid this kind of ignorance is to indefatigably pursue inquiry,apoint on which Philo agrees with all the sceptics.There is, however,anessential and paradoxical difference. In his case, the research is not the pursuit of awhollyoralmost whollyunknown truth, but of the one that God Himself revealed to human beings.

2.3 The Status of ScepticisminPhilo: The EssentialRoleof Decency and Shame

How,then, to explain the rather heavy presenceofscepticism in Philo’scorpus?Ishis aim to merelydissipate the false illusion of knowledge,inorder to make the path towards the revealed truth easier? In my opinion, thereisamuch deeper connexion between theologyand philosophy. To understand it,let us go back to the primitive scene, i.e., the meetingofAdam and Eveinthe garden of Eden, ascene for which Philo givestwo interpretations. In the On the Creationofthe World (De opificio mundi)Philo takes some distance with respect to the biblical verse. He stresses aidōs (respect,decency), atranscenden- tal virtue in his axiology, since it is the onlyone that is mentioned in the Paradise. The version is somewhat different in the Allegorical Interpretation wherehegives his own interpretation of the biblical “and they werenot ashamed.” There he distin- guishesthree concepts: anaischuntia,shamelessness, which is the sign of evil; aidōs,decency, characteristic of virtuous people; and the lack both of decencyand of shamelessness.²⁷ The sageishere characterised by his aidōs,anidea which is absent from our Stoic testimonies. Of course, in Stoicism aidōs is asubdivision of eu- labeia,one of the three eupatheiai (positive passions), but Stoics never stressed aidōs as afundamental virtue of the sage.²⁸ As if he felt himself how surprising

 Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 2.65: “The words suggest threepoints for consideration: shameless,and shamefastness,and absenceofboth shamelessness and shamefastness.Shamelessness, then is peculiar to the worthless man, shamefastness to the man of worth, to feel neither shamefastness nor shamelessness to the man whoisincapable of right apprehension and of dueassent thereto and this is at this moment the prophet’ssubject.For he whohas not yetattained to the apprehension of good and evil can not possiblybeeither shameless or shamefast” (τρίακατὰ τὸντόπον ἐστίν· ἀναι- σχυντία, αἰδώς, τὸ μήτε ἀναισχυντεῖνμήτε αἰδεῖσθαι·ἀναισχυντίαμὲνοὖνἴδιον φαύλου, αἰδὼςδὲ σπουδαίου, τὸ δὲ μήτε αἰδεῖσθαι μήτε ἀναισχυντεῖντοῦἀκαταλήπτως ἔχοντος καὶἀσυγκαταθέτως, περὶ οὗ νῦν ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ὁ γὰρμηδέπω κατάληψιν ἀγαθοῦἢκακοῦ λαβὼνοὔτε ἀναισχυντεῖν οὔτε αἰδεῖσθαι δύναται).  Diogenes Laertius 7.116: “Andaccordingly,asunder theprimarypassionsare classedcertain others subordinatetothem, so too is it with theprimary eupathiesorgoodemotional states.Thusunder wish- ingtheybring well-wishing or benevolence, friendliness,respect,affection; undercaution,reverence 14 Carlos Lévy

this promotion of decencywas,asanessentialvirtue,and of shamelessness as the strongest expression of evil, Philo asks:

Whythen, seeingthat results of wickedness aremany, has he mentioned onlyone, that which attends on conduct that is disgraceful, saying “they werenot shamed,” but not saying “they did not commitinjustice,” or “they did not sin” or “they did not err”?The reason is not far to seek. By the only true God, Ideem nothing so shameful as supposing that Ithink and that Ifeel. My own mind the authorofits exertion?How can it be? (μὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ μόνον θεὸνοὐδὲνοὕτως αἰσχρὸν ἡγοῦμαι ὡςτὸὑπολαμβάνειν ὅτι νοῶἢὅτι αἰσθάνομαι. ὁἐμὸςνοῦςαἴτιος τοῦ νοεῖν; πόθεν;) Does it know as to itself, whatitisorhow it came intoexistence? Sense-perception the origin of perceivingbysense? How could it be said to be so, seeingthat it is beyond the keneither of itself or of the mind?Doyou not observethat the mind which thinks that it exercises itself is often found to be without mental power, in scenes of gluttony, drunkenness,folly? Where does the exercise of mind show itself then?And is not perceptive sense often robbedofthe power of perceiving?²⁹

This text is in my opinion essential to understand Philo’sattitude towardsscepticism. We must first notice the extreme solemnity of the affirmation, since he swears by God: “By the onlytrue God.” The most shameful thing one can imagine is to think that one is the subject of one’sthoughts and sensations. In the most common perception of the history of philosophy, the cogito is the one assertion that even the most radical sceptic cannotruin. Philo seems to have antici- pated the Cartesian responsetoscepticism and to have avantlalettre elaborated an objectionwhich is much more ethical than epistemological. To affirm that it is me who thinks is to discard the onlyvirtue evoked about human beingsinParadise, the virtue of decency, to ignore and to betray the content of Revelation. But it also raises aproblem of philosophical methodology: what kind of truth can we access by isolating knowledge from ethics?InsomanyPhilonian texts, aidōs is the capacity to control the desire for absoluteindependence and superiority.For Philo, the cogito is not the solution of the problem of knowledge,but the supreme fallacy,since it ar- tificiallyseparates knowledge from ethics and metaphysics.More exactly, it supposes that the problem of truth is onlyepistemological. In Philo, as, manycenturies later in another Jewishthinker,EmmanuelLevinas, the main route to transcendenceisethics,not epistemology.What is essentialismy relation to others, not my relation to the representations of the world. Sceptical arguments displaythe permanent fallibilityofthe human mind and sensations, but in Philo’sthoughtepistemological arguments are onlymeanstoassert something far more essential: the impossibility of considering ahuman being as the autonomous

andmodesty;under joy, delight, mirth, cheerfulness” (καθάπερ οὖν ὑπὸ τὰ πρῶτα πάθη πίπτει τινά, τὸναὐτὸντρόπον καὶὑπὸτὰςπρώτας εὐπαθείας· καὶὑπὸμὲντὴνβούλησιν εὔνοιαν, εὐμένειαν, ἀσπασμόν, ἀγάπησιν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴνεὐλάβειαναἰδῶ, ἁγνείαν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴνχαρὰντέρψιν, εὐφροσύνην, εὐθυμίαν). Diogenes Laertius, LivesofEminent Philosophers, Volume II:Books 6‒10,trans. R.D. Hicks,Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1925.  Philo, Allegorical Interpretation 2.68‒69,emphasis added. Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes 15

subjectofhis or her thoughts. Philo’sposition is exactlythe contrary of Descartes’s. Descartes’srefutation of the sceptic arguments provides him access to the cogito. God is then called upon for help, in order to reconnect the thinking subject with the world. Philo’sitinerary is exactlythe reverse. He first absolutelyrejects the cogito as an absurd pretension that ignores the metaphysical situation of the human being.Itispreciselythis rejectionthat legitimatises the use of the sceptic tropes. Philo would have probablyconsidered Descartes’smethod as an artificial manipula- tion. To disconnect the human mind from intersubjectivity and from arelation to God was, for him, simplyimpossible.

2.4 From the Negation of the Self to an Ethic of Responsibility

This transfer of the problem from knowledge to ethics and metaphysics implies adif- ficulty.IfIam not the author of my thoughts, how could Ibeconsidered responsible for my acts?This is something close to the objection expressed by the Stoics in order to refute their sceptic adversaries. How could Iberesponsible for my actionsifIdo not give my assent?Philo’ssolution to this difficulty is ingenious and original. When God tells him to go and see the Pharaoh, Moses, the most perfect man in Philo’sopinion, initiallytries to evade this obligation. He pretends thatheisnot gifted in speech and he suggests that God could choose somebodyelse. But God, who however understands the process of Moses’s aidōs,answers:

Dost thou not know whoitisthat gave man amouth, and formed his tongue and throat and all the organism of reasonable speech?ItisIMyself (autos eimi egō): therefore, fear not,for at a signfromMeall will become articulateand be brought over to method and order,sothat none can hinder the stream of words from flowingeasilyand smoothlyfromafountain unde- filed. And, if thou shouldst have need of an interpreter,thou wilthaveinthy brothera mouth to assist thyservice,toreport to the people thywords, as thou reportest those of God to him.³⁰

Philo wants to make clear that aidōs,ofwhich in his opinion scepticism is but a shadowyand perverse figure, cannot be an argument to avoid responsibilities. The human being is not the subject of his or her thoughts and actions, but he or she is responsible for them. That is the central paradoxofPhilo’sthought,something close to what willbeexpressed by Levinas through the expression difficile liberté. Afinal remark on Philo. If it is an errortothink that the human being is the real subjectofhis or her thoughts,the logical consequenceisthat the sceptic, in order to be coherent with himself, must disappear as author of his scepticism. In an entirely different philosophical context,itisthe conclusion at which Pyrrho arrived, though

 Philo, On the Life of Moses,inOn Abraham. On Joseph. On Moses (Philovol. 6), trans. F.H. Colson (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1935),1.84. 16 Carlos Lévy

he could not prevent his main disciple Timon from creatingafervent cult of personality.³¹ Philo never mentions the philosophersorthe rabbis whose work he followed. He rarelyquotes philosophers, and those he does cite are not always thoseyou might expect. But he is especiallyharsh with sceptics, whom he faults for theirarrogance and aggressiveness. In Questions and AnswersonGenesis (Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin)3.33they are compared to professional warriors, for they believethat phi- losophyisapermanent attack against otherdoctrines, without having anyidea of the causes and consequences of these fights. His main explanation of thataggressive- ness is that it givesthem real pleasure. Ismael is bothasceptic and asophist in his allegorical explanation, since it is said about him in Genesis 16.12that “‘His hands shallbeagainst all men, and all men’shands against him’;for this is just the Sophist’sway,with his pretence of excessive open-mindedness, and his loveof arguingfor the sake of arguing.This character aims his arrows at all the representativesofthe sciences, opposing each individuallyand in common. He is also their common targetsince they naturallyfight back, as though in defenceoftheir own off- spring,that is, of the doctrines to which their soul has givenbirth.” Neither is the function of scepticism to allow intellectual victories through asystematic critical attitude. In Philo’sopinion, if it is usedcorrectly, i.e., in away quite different from that of the sceptics themselves, its main aim is to lead one towardmetaphysical humility, of which the first and definitive expression must be found in Genesis.

3FromPhilotoAugustine 3.1 The Problem of the Self in the ContraAcademicos

Is it legitimate to saythat Philo openedthe waytoamonotheistic refutation of the cogito,anattitude founded on the idea of the impossibilityofisolating knowledge from ethics and transcendence? It would be arrogant to presume to provide acom- plete answer to such acomplex question, but it can be of some interest to examine if the transition from Judaism to Christianity entailedadeep modification of Philo’sin- tuition. Herewewill tackle onlyone case, but avery weighty one, thatofAugustine, achoice that can seem somewhat paradoxical, since he did not know enough Greek to read Philo and probablyfelt little empathyfor Philo’sexegetical method. On the other hand, he could not ignorehis existence,since he certainlyheard his master Ambrose speak about athinker whom he plagiarised so frequently. Forall these reasons, the confrontation between Augustine and Philo can perhaps help to differenti- ate what is structural in the monotheistic relation to scepticism and what depends on the culturaland the personal characteristics of the different thinkers.

 See Diogenes Laertius 9.64;fragment60inFernanda DeclevaCaizzi, Pirrone. Testimonianze (Na- ples:Bibliopolis,1981). Philo of Alexandria vs.Descartes 17

It is impossible here to enter into the very complex details of these three books of dialogue. Our aim is rather to try to understand how Augustine himself presented this strangeanti-sceptic emergency,apparentlymorephilosophical thantheological, that led him from Milan to Cassiciacum. Actually, Augustine evolvedinhis successive presentations of the Contra Academicos.His first letter to Hermogenianus offers manyexplanations in aquite surprising and somewhat confused way. He says nothing about his conversion, but he uses manyphilosophical items.Like Cicerowho, in aletter to Atticusparadoxicallyrecognised thathis refutation of the Stoic gnoseolog- ical doctrine was less persuasive than the defence of that doctrine proposed by Anti- ochus,³² he admits that he was unable to succeed in overcomingdoubt.³³ At the same time, he seems proud of having acted against the New Academy,since he says that in the search for truth, people were paralysed by the idea that aman as subtle as Car- neades had been unable to locate it.Last but not least,heagain expresses his theory of an esoteric teachingofadogmatic Platonism in the Academy. He recognises that there wasnocertaintythere, but asserts that it was riskier to let people think that the philosophers of the New Academy werereallysceptics, abelief that he presents as a cause for philosophicalapathy. He says that to affirmthat the Academics weresecret- ly dogmatists was away,perhaps not entirelyconvincing,tocreate adesire to seek out the truth.³⁴ In this letter,scepticism has an ambiguous status. It is an adversary but also an object of admiration and even of imitation. Imitatus sum,hesays, since like them he reacted to asituation: they tried to fight naturalist dogmatisms,while he wanted to break the intellectual inertia of his contemporaries. Fighting scepticism is presented by Augustine as an unavoidable mission if he had anyhope of inciting the inquisitio veri in them again. It must be noted thatfor him scepticism is also represented by the Academy, and in fact,solelybythe Acad- emy. The easiest explanation of the omission of neo-Pyrrhonism would be to saythat Cicero, his main source, had himself ignored Aenesidemus and his followers.But it can be objected that Aulus Gellius, Favorinus, and probablymanyothers had tackled the neo-Pyrrhonist innovations.That Augustine never heard about them is rather improbable. It seems more plausible that he limited himself to the New Academybe- cause he was interested less in scepticism itself than in the strangeconnection between transcendentalist Platonism and Academic philosophythathepresents as

 Cicero, Letters to Atticus 13.19.5: suntenim vehementer πιθανὰ Antiochia (“Forthe views of Anti- ochus are strongly persuasive”;mytranslation).  Augustine, Letters 1.3: “my chief delight is not your havingsaid—with moreaffection than truth— that Ihaveoutdone the Academics, but the fact that Ihavebroken amost hateful bond by which I was held back from tastingthe sweetness of philosophybydespair of attainingtotruth. And truth is the food of the soul” (non tam me delectat, ut scribis,quod Academicosuicerim, scribis enim hoc amantius forte quam verius, quam quod mihi abruperimodiosissimum retinaculum, quo aphilosophiae uberedesperatione ueri, quod est enim animi pabulum refrenabar). Augustine, Letters: Volume 1(1‒ 82),trans. Wilfrid Parsons (Washington,D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1951).  On the Augustinian myth of the secret dogmatism of Arcesilas, see Carlos Lévy, “Scepticisme et dogmatisme dans l’Académie: ‘l’ésotérisme’ d’Arcésilas,” Revue des Études Latines 56 (1978): 335‒48. 18 Carlos Lévy

the expressionofthe desperatioueri that created adistance between himself and philosophy. Manyelements here differ from what we found in Philo. First of all, Augustine is reallyconcernedbythe problem of the auctoritas of the Platonic school, aproblem that for Philo is meaningless. Thismajor Latinconcept is present from the beginning of the letter,whereAugustine expresses his reverencetowards the Platonic school, without excludingthe sceptic Academy. But it is also interesting to notice that for him these philosopherswerenot people in permanent search of truth but people who discouraged others from finding it.Onthis point Augustine at least uncon- sciouslyagrees with neo-Pyrrhonists, who accused the philosophers of the New Academyofpractising anegative dogmatism while themselvespretendedtobeseek- ers of truth. But Augustine, as the great reader of the Ciceronian Academica that he was, could not ignore that Cicerohad refuted this charge in advanceinthe Lucullus 109‒10.Antipater the Stoic said that “Carneades should at least allow that this principle itself is apprehended, thatthe wise person holds that nothing is apprehensible.” And the Ciceronian answer is: “but just as he holds those as persuasive rather than apprehended principles, so with this one, that nothing is apprehensible.”³⁵ There wasnonegative dogmatism in the Academy, at least in his Ciceronian version. In order however to fight his own desperatio ueri,Augustine needs to counterbalance the negative dogmatism he attributes to the Academics by his assertion of an esoteric dogmatism. Augustine presents himself bothassomeone who wants to make the most of philosophyand someone who feels responsible for the fate of philosophy among his contemporaries. It was asortofpastoralfunction inside the field of phi- losophybefore the religious pastoral functions. Hereweare very far from Philo. The similaritybetween the two thinkers is, however,thatinadifferent way, both hold that the sceptics werenot really people in search of the truth.

3.2 From Augustine to Philo?

Thingsbecome still more divergent in the Enchiridion,written in 422. There is no mention of this kind of pastoralfunction. Now Augustine essentiallyspeaks about himself. Retrospectively, the Contra Academicos becomes the means for fighting the doubts which assailedhim, at the moment when he was,hesays, tamquam in ostio,hesitating in embracing faith. There is no more mention of an uncertain hypothesis about the sceptical Academy,but he stresses the obligation of removing the desperatio veri,ofwhich the Academics are said to have been the champions, by all means(utique). The strength of this wordproves that he passed the stage

 Cicero, Lucullus 110: sed ut illa habet probabilia non percepta, sic hoc ipsum nihil posse percipi. nam si in hoc haberet cognitionis notam, eadem uteretur in ceteris. Cicero, On Academic Scepticism, trans. Charles Brittain (Indianapolis/Cambrige:Hackett,2006). Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes 19

wherehebelieved himself obliged to furnish ajustification of his attitude towards the Academy. Now he presents himself as the one who will find asolution to the problem for which the Academics wereunable to find asolution. And perhaps most important in the Enchiridion is the assertion that if thereisnoassent,there is no faith: At si tollatur assensio,fides tollitur;quia sine assensione nihil creditur.³⁶ The opposition is now radical, between scepticism—founded on the desperatio ueri—and faith, which is truth and hope. No more mention of the auctoritas of the Platonic school. In letter118, written in 410, Augustine says that if Stoics and Epicur- eans wereclearlywrong, the Academics could not assume the role of embodying true reason, since they werelacking humility, humilitas,anequivalent of aidōs and a bridge between Philo and Cicero. At the end of his life, in the Retractationes,Augus- tine will saythat he wasted much time in refuting philosophers who werebut impi- ous pagans.³⁷ Actually, Augustine seems to have moved from apre-Cartesian attitude to apost- Philonianone. In Against the Academics (Contra Academicos), he is in search of the proposition that will escape the sceptic systematic criticism and, as has been

 Augustine, Enchiridion 20.7: “Nor do Ipropose to solve avery knotty question which perplexed the subtle thinkers of the Academy: whetherawise man should give his assent to anythingatall, confronted as he is by error,should he approvewhatisfalse; for according to these men all things are obscureoruncertain. That is whyduring the earlydaysofmyconversion, Iwrote threevolumes,that my progress might not be hindered by objectionsblocking, so to speak, the doorway. Certainlyitwas necessary to removethat sense of the hopelessness of attainingtotruth which apparentlyfinds support in the arguments of the Academics.Now,among them every error is considered to be asin, and this they contend can be avoided onlybywithholding assentaltogether.Infact,they say, whosoever assents to things uncertain commits an error.Nothingiscertain in human experience because of the impossibility of seeingthrough the sham that falsehood puts on. And even if one’sassumption should happen to be true, they will disputeits truth by arguments extremelysubtle but at the same time shameless. However,amongusthe just man liveth by faith. But take away assent,and youtake away faith, since without assent one can believenothing. And there aretruths which maynot be understood, but unless they arebelieved, it will be impossible for us to attain to the happy life, which is no other tant life eternal. But Idonot know whether we should arguewith people whoare unawarenot onlythat they aretoliveforever,but that they arealive now” (Nec quaestio no- dosissima, quae homines acutissimos,Academicos torsit, nunc mihi enodanda suscepta est; utrum ali- quid debeat sapiens approbare, ne incidat in errorem, si proveris approbaverit falsa, cum omnia, sicut affirmant, vel occulta sint, vel incerta. Unde tria confeci volumina in initio conversionis meae, ne imped- imento nobis essent, quae tanquam in ostio contradicebant. Et utique fuerat removenda inveniendae desperatio veritatis,quae illorum videtur argumentationibus roborari. Apud illos ergoerror omnis puta- tur esse peccatum, quod vitari non posse contendunt, nisi omnis suspendatur assensio.Errarequippe dicunt eum quisquis assentitur incertis:nihilque certum esse in hominum visis propter indiscretam sim- ilitudinem falsi, etiamsi quod videtur,forte sit verum, acutissimis quidem, sed impudentissimis conflic- tationibus disputant. Apud nos autem, Justus ex fide vivit [Rom. I, 17]. At si tollatur assensio,fides tollitur; quia sine assensione nihil creditur.Etsunt veraquamvis non videantur,quae nisi credantur,ad vitam beatam, quae non nisi aeterna est, non potest perveniri. Cum istis vero utrum loqui debeamus ignoro, qui, non victuros in aeternum, sed in praesentia se vivere nesciunt). Albert C. Outler,trans., Au- gustine: Confessions and Enchiridion (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1955).  Augustine, Retractationes 13. 20 Carlos Lévy

stressed by manyscholars, he approaches the cogito.³⁸ In the following years, he dis- covers the autonomyoftheological thought in relation to philosophy. Gradually, he realised that the main aim for aChristian was not to achieveanego with aperfect certitude but to give,through the concept of humilitas (a concept rather rare in Cic- eronian philosophy),amerelylessimperfect evaluation of the human being’sontological situation. It is atask of which Philo would not have disapproved, since he would have interpreted humilitas as the Latin equivalent of aidōs. To conclude. Augustine uses the word moles to describe scepticism.³⁹ A moles is ahugeblock, something massive,impressive,that youcannot avoid. At the same time, if youbreak the moles youcan make manythingswith its fragments.The mon- otheisticRevelation changed everything in the frame of the debate established by Academics and Stoics:truth was no more an object of research, but aconcrete text transmitting the wordofGod. Faith, pistis,deprivedrational logic of its primacy. But at the same time, monotheism, at least in its principle, does not allow faith to be onlyapassive orthopraxy.Onthe contrary,itimplies acrucial interrogation of the status of the subject him- or herself. Philo and Augustine—the Augustine of the works laterthan Against the Academics—evidentlydisagree on manythings, but they agree on one point: the epistemological problem cannot be the central one; it cannot have aperfectlyautonomous existence. Actually, the main problem is that of humilitas/aidōs,thatistosay the attitude of the individual in front of God and in relation with other human beings.

Bibliography

Arnim, Hans von. Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1889. Augustine. Letters: Volume 1(1‒82). Translated by Wilfrid Parsons. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic UniversityofAmericaPress,1951. Babut, Daniel. La religion des philosophes grecs. 2nd ed. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2019. Bermon, Emmanuel. Le cogito dans la pensée de SaintAugustin. Paris: Vrin, 2001. Bett, Richard. Pyrrho: his Antecedents and his Legacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press,2000. Brown, Peter. Augustine of Hippo: ABiography. Revised edition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Brunschwig, Jacques. “L’aphasie pyrrhonienne.” In Dire l’évidence,edited by Carlos Lévy and Laurent Pernot, 297‒320.Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997. Chadwick, Henry. Trans. SaintAugustine: Confessions. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1991.

 See Emmanuel Bermon, Le cogito dans la pensée de Saint Augustin (Paris:Vrin, 2001), 405: “Si l’on ressaisit les principaux traits de cette pensée, le cogito revêttrois significations fondamentales: la prise de conscience de l’ego cogito,leretour de l’homme intérieur et enfin ce que l’on peut appeler l’‘orientation transcendantale.’”  Augustine, Against the Academics 3.30: “It is enough for me to cross this huge obstaclebyall the means” (mihi satis est quoquo modo molem istam transcendere). Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes 21

Cicero. On Academic Scepticism. TranslatedbyCharlesBrittain. Indianapolis/Cambrige: Hackett, 2006. Cicero. On the Natureofthe Gods. Academics. Translated by H. Rackham.Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress), 1933. Couissin, Pierre. “Le stoïcismedelaNouvelle Académie.” Revued’HistoiredelaPhilosophie 3 (1929): 241‒76. DeclevaCaizzi, Fernanda. “Aenesidemus and the Academy.” Classical Quarterly 42, no. 1(1992): 176‒89. DeclevaCaizzi, Fernanda. Pirrone. Testimonianze. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1981. Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Volume II: Books 6‒10. Translated by R.D.Hicks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1925. Girard, Jean-Louis. “Probabilisme, théologie et religion: le catalogue des dieux homonymes dans le De naturadeorum de Cicéron (3, 42 et 53‒60).” In HommagesàR.Schilling,edited by Hubert Zehnacker and Gustave Hentz, 117‒26. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1983. Ioppolo, Anna Maria. Opinione escienza. Naples: Bibliopolis, 1986. Janáček, Karel. “Philon vonAlexandreia und skeptische Tropen.” Eirene 19 (1982): 83‒97. Lévy,Carlos. “Breakingthe Stoic Language: Philo’sAttitude towards Assent (sunkatathesis) and Comprehension (katalêpsis).” Henoch 32 (2010): 33‒44. Lévy,Carlos. “La conversion du scepticisme chez Philon d’Alexandrie.” In Philo of Alexandria and Post-Aristotelian Philosophy,edited by FrancescaAlesse, 103‒20. Leiden: Brill, 2008. Lévy,Carlos. “La Nouvelle Académie a-t-elle été antiplatonicienne?” In ContrePlaton I. Le platonisme dévoilé,edited by Monique Dixsaut, 139‒56. Paris: Vrin, 1993. Lévy,Carlos. “Philon d’Alexandrie est-il inutilisable pourconnaître Énésidème? Étude méthodologique.” Philosophie antique 15 (2015): 7‒26. Lévy,Carlos. “Un problème doxographique chez Cicéron, les indifférentistes.” Revuedes Études Latines 58 (1980): 238‒51. Lévy,Carlos. “La question du pouvoir dans le pyrrhonisme.” In Fondements et crises du pouvoir, edited by Sylvie Franchet d’Esperey,Valérie Fromentin, Sophie Gotteland, and Jean-Michel Roddaz, 47‒56. Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2003. Lévy,Carlos. “Scepticismeetdogmatismedans l’Académie: ‘l’ ésotérisme’ d’Arcésilas.” Revue des Études Latines 56 (1978): 333‒48. Mansfeld, Jaap. “Aenesidemus and the Academics.” In The Passionate Intellect. Essays on the Transformation of Classical Literature, edited by Lewis Ayres, 235‒48. New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions, 1996. Mansfeld, Jaap. “Aspects of Epicurean Theology.” Mnemosyne 46, no. 2(May 1993): 172‒210. Outler,AlbertC.Trans. Augustine: Confessions and Enchiridion. London: Student Christian Movement Press,1955. Philo. On the Life of Moses. In On Abraham. On Joseph. On Moses (Philo vol. 6). Translated by F.H. Colson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1935. Philo. On the Preliminary Studies. In On the Confusion of Tongues. On the Migration of Abraham. Who Is the Heir of Divine Things? On Mating with the Preliminary Studies (Philo vol. 4). Translated by F.H. Colson, G.H. Whitaker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1932. Philo. AllegoricalInterpretation of Genesis 2and 3. In On the Creation. Allegorical Interpretation of Genesis 2and 3 (Philo vol. 1). Translated by F.H. Colson, G.H. Whitaker. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1929. Philo. On Flightand Finding. In On Flightand Finding. On the Change of Names. On Dreams (Philo vol. 5). TranslatedbyF.H. Colson, G.H. Whitaker. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1934. Pia, Jordi. “De la Naturedes dieux de Cicéron àl’Abrégé de Cornutus: unenouvelle représentation des élites dans la réflexion théologique.” Camenae 10 (February2012), http://saprat.ephe.sor 22 Carlos Lévy

bonne.fr/media/282f1da6517e2ba6025880dd887c8682/camenae-10-varia-jordi-pia-derniere. pdf. Schmitt, Charles. CiceroScepticus. Leiden: Brill, 1972. Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Translated by R.G. Bury.Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1933. Spinelli, Emidio. “Sextus Empiricus, l’expériencesceptique et l’horizon de l’éthique.” Cahiers philosophiques 115, no. 3(2008): 29‒45. Thorsrud, Harold. “Arcesilaus and Carneades.” In The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism,edited by RichardBett, 58‒81. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 2010. Vezzoli, Simone. Arcesilao di Pitane. Turnhout: Brepols, 2016. Stéphane Marchand Sextus Εmpiricus’suse of dunamis

Introduction

The main aim of my previous work on ancient scepticism has been to clarify the nature of the sceptical discourse, namelytoshow its peculiarity in contrastwith the dogmatic discourse. My contention is that there is, at least in Sextus, asystematic approach of sceptical discourse thatinvolvesboth atheoretical definition and practical applications in his writings.¹ My purpose in this paper is to focus on the use of avery special word, that is nonetheless very common in Greek literature: dunamis (“power,”“ability,” etc.). The reason for focusingonthis wordisthat,asanoun—or in its adverbialusage dunamei (“implicitly,”“virtually,”“potentially”)—it is frequentlyconnected, in Sextus’s works,with the logos skeptikos, the sceptical discourse. Forthat reason, even though Sextusdoes not use the wordextensively, its instances are worth examining. Thanks to the statistical data givenbythe TLG,weknow that the word dunamis is slightlyunder-represented in Sextus’sworks.² The Greek texts of the 2nd century CE are among those that use the wordfrequently(second onlytotextsinthe 4th century CE), probablydue to Galen’swork. By comparison, Sextus’susageseems parsimoni- ous. This does not mean that dunamis is unimportant to Sextus’swork, but on the contrary;heuses it cautiously, choosing it onlywhen it is necessary or significant. Obviously, dunamis is avery common wordinGreek, which cannot be reducedto an unequivocal meaning.Thus, not all the instances of dunamis in Sextuscan be

This paper waspresented at the International ConferenceonScepticism, organised by E. Spinelli and G. Veltri, 8‒11 May 2017,atthe Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies–Jewish Scepticism, Univer- sität Hamburg. Iwould liketothankthe organisersofthisconference and the audiencefor the discussion, and morespecially Gideon Freudenthal, Carlos Lévy,Jan Opsomer,Stephan Schmid, and Josef Stern. Iamalso grateful to DiegoMachucaand Jacques-LouisLantoine for their helpful comments on aprevious versionofthispaper.Iwould like to thank Anthony Paletta and Yoav Meyrav fortheir suggestions and comments.

 Stéphane Marchand, “Sextus Empiricus’ Style of Writing,” in New EssaysonAncient Pyrrhonism, ed. DiegoE.Machuca (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011), 113‒41.  By TLG Iamreferringtothe online database Thesaurus LinguaeGraecae,directedbyMaria Pan- tella: http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/. The TLG counts 209instances of the wordinSextus;relatively to the global use of the word in the TLG and the size of Sextus’scorpus,221 instances were expected, and if Sextus had used the term as his contemporaries,hewould have used it 263times.

OpenAccess. ©2019 Stéphane Marchand,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the CreativeCommons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-003 24 Stéphane Marchand

connected to asceptical move. Forinstance, in grammar dunamis means the “pho- netic value of sounds of letters,” and Sextus mainlyrefers to this meaning in AM 1.³ Similarly,Sextussometimes usesthe wordinreferencetothe Aristoteliancon- ception of dunamis,inoppositiontoenergeia (activity),⁴ although he does not endorse anyofthe Aristoteliantheses. It would be problematic if he did endorse them, since the Aristotelianconception of dunamis is roughlydogmatic: it grants ex- istencetosomething which is not self-evident and is instead the product of dogmatic reasoning. According to this use, something is said to be dunamei (“potentially”) when “it is capable of beingactually” (δυνάμει γάρ ἐστιν ὃ οἷόντέἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ ὑποστῆναι;PH2.226). But as Sextus shows in the case of the genus, nothing can exist without being actuallysomething:the potentiality of something is anything but evident,aslong as this potentiality has not been actualised.⁵ Forthe sake of my demonstration, Iwill call this last sense of dunamis the “potentiality-dunamis.” It derives from the idea that apower can exist without being cur- rentlyactive.Itseems clear that this sense rests on the opposition between dunamis and energeia,which is extraneous to the sceptical project to avoid the endorsement of aphilosophicaltheory. Prima facie,itseems coherent that Sextus avoids such a conception, preferringaconception of dunamisasavisible and evidentpower.How- ever,myaim is to question this assumption and to examine whether Sextus in fact totallyabandoned the use of a “potentiality-dunamis.” Moreprecisely, can we find in Sextussomething like a sceptical conception of dunamis as apotentiality? In order to answer this question, Iwill focus on three kinds of sceptical uses of the word dunamis: (1) to make referencetothe activity of scepticism; (2)toindicate the “implicit” or “virtual” content of some expressions or positions;and (3) to express something like asceptical idea of potentiality.

 See Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 1(=Against the Grammarians), sections 99,107,110, 115,116,117,125.Inmost cases,references to Sextus’sworks appear in parentheses in the bodyofthe text,abbreviated,respectively,asAM(Adversus Mathematicos)and PH (Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes).  One of the various changesAristotle introducedtothe philosophical conception of dunamis is to connect it clearlywith energeia. Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. 5.7. 1017a35: “Again, ‘to be’ means that some of these statements can be made in virtue of apotentiality and others in virtue of an actuality.For we saythat both that which sees potentiallyand that which sees actuallyis‘aseeingthing.’ And in the same waywecall ‘understanding’ both that which can use the understanding,and that which does; and we call ‘tranquil’ both that in which tranquillity is alreadypresent,and that which is potentially tranquil.” Aristotle, Metaphysics, Volume I: Books 1‒9,trans. Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge,MA: Har- vardUniversity Press, 1933). See, for example, Joseph Souilhé, Étude sur le terme ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ dans les dialogues de Platon (Paris:F.Alcan, 1919), 183; Gwenaëlle Aubry, Dieu sans la puissance: “dunamis” et “energeia” chez Aristote et chez Plotin (Paris:J.Vrin, 2006), 92.For acomprehensive analysisofthe word, see now David Lefebvre, Dynamis:sens et genèse de la notion aristotélicienne de puissance (Paris:J.Vrin, 2018).  Forthis use in PH, see 2.27,81(with adistinction between ousiai, sustasei, dunamei;cf. also AM 7. 38),83. Sextus Εmpiricus’suse of dunamis 25

1The ScepticalAbility

As is well-known, Sextus does not usually refer to scepticism as aphilosophy. In- stead, he frequentlyuses the word agōgē (“wayoflife,”“conduct”)todescribe his own stance. Since the sceptical activity mostlyconsists of the refutation of dogmatic philosophy, or the “so-called philosophy,”⁶ it seems quite natural thatSextus avoids the term “philosophy,” which carries dogmatic implications.⁷ However,weshould not expect absolutecoherence from Sextus in his usageofthe word “philosophy”; such absolutecoherencecannot be found in anyphilosopher or anynatural language. However,inthe case of Sextus, this lack of coherence is also grounded philosophically: the sceptic should not “fight over phrases” (PH 1.207). ForSextus, the point is that, overall, we understand each other,evenifweuse words looselyorim- properly. Forthat reason, sometimesSextus uses the expression “sceptical philosophy.”⁸ Be that as it may, Sextus’suse of philosophia to refertoscepticism remains marginal, and he clearlyprefers to speak of a skeptikē agōgē (“sceptical persuasion”). RobertaIolihas outlined the reasons whySextus preferred the word agōgē to hairesis (“choice,”“school”), concluding that scepticism “is aphilosophical ‘choice’ not because of its doctrines or its adherencetoafounder,but because of its dialectical attitude leading to epochē and apatheia,”⁹ that is, respectively,tosuspension of judgment and impassibility. Now,the studyabout the waySextus describes his own stance should be completed by his definitionofscepticism as a dunamis: a “faculty,” a “capacity,” or an “ability.” Compared to Sextus’swidespread use of agōgē, dunamis is not frequent, but it appears at two key moments linked to the “general account” of scepticism, whereadefinitionofscepticism and its method is being carriedout,without giving attention to the particularthesesofthe dogmatic philosophy. At AM 7.1, Sextus makes distinguishes between the account of “the general character of the skeptical ability” (Bett’stranslation of ὁ μὲνκαθόλου τῆςσκεπτικῆςδυνάμεως χαρακτὴρ),¹⁰ and its particular application in the specific part of dogmatic philosophy. In PH

 hē kaloumenē philosophia (PH 1.6; 2.1, 12, 205; 3.278); see also the expression hē legomenē philosophia (“whatthey call philosophy”;PH1.18; 3.1)  Forthe discussion of the relation between philosophyand scepticism with an interpretation of Pyr- rhonian scepticism as an anti-rationalism, see primarilyGisela Striker, “Scepticism as aKind of Phi- losophy,” Archiv fürGeschichte der Philosophie 83,no. 2(August 2001): 113‒29.  Scepticism is presented in PH 1.4asone of the “most fundamental kinds of philosophy” (hai anōtatō philosophiai), and Sextus can refertoitashēskeptikē philosophia (PH 1.5, 236; 2.6) or ephek- tikē philosophia (i.e., the philosophyofsuspension, PH 2.9).  Roberta Ioli, “Agōgē and Related Concepts in Sextus Empiricus,” Siculorum Gymnasium N.S. 56, no. 2(July‒December 2003): 422. See also John Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht,1978), 165‒66 and 180‒82.  RichardBett, trans., Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3. 26 Stéphane Marchand

1.11, as well, Sextus defines the Pyrrhonian philosopher as “someone who possesses this ability” (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ μετέχων ταύτης τῆςδυνάμεως). The ability in question is described afew lines earlier as “an ability to set out oppositions among thingswhich appear and are thought of in anyway at all” (δύναμις ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων καθ’ οἱονδήποτε τρόπον;PH1.8,inAnnas and Barnes’stranslation).¹¹ This definition of scepticism describes the real activity of asceptical philosopher: to set out an oppositionofimpressions or theses in order to produce the equipollence that leads to the suspension of judgment.This is the workofscepticism, the main activity of Sextus when he engages in philosophy: to show the “opposition of things” (τῆς ἀντιθέσεως τῶνπραγμάτων;PH1.31).¹² Whyshould we understand this activity as a dunamis? In PH 1.9, Sextus explains that “we call it an ability not in anyfancy sense, but simplyinthe sense of ‘to be able to’” (῾δύναμιν᾽ μὲνοὖναὐτὴνκαλοῦμεν οὐ κατὰ τὸ περίεργον ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶςκατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι). What exactlyisa“fancy sense” of dunamis? When describing language or style, periergos means “sophisticated” or “elaborate.”¹³ Here, by kata to periergon, Sextusrefers to asense of dunamis which is tricky or complicated to understand,because it seems to entail atheory of what acapacity is.¹⁴ Hence, for Sextus the sceptical ability does not entail such adogmatic conception of dunamis;itonlymeans that the sceptic is able to have this kind of activity,namely to show the opposition among thingsand appearances. Let us turn our attention to the question of my introduction: does this capacity have something to do with the potentiality-dunamis? It maybetemptingtobridge this use with the idea of potentiality (because afaculty is akind of potentiality which is not necessarilyatwork at all times, in the same wayasthe grammarian is not agrammarian in action at every moment of his life). Nevertheless, we should resist this temptation, considering thatthe sceptical dunamis is more obvious or evident; it merelyrefers to the fact that someonecan do something,just because he has alreadydone it once, without anyfurtherclaim about the nature or epistemological status of this capacity.Inthe potentiality-dunamis there is, indeed, the idea that a thing has aplurality of possible effects which can be realised under certain conditions, and it does not seem that Sextus implies such an idea with his sceptical dunamis.

 Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, trans., Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism (Cambridge/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).  The main activity and not the unique one, because this description does not fit with what Sextus is doing when he is writingthe general account of the scepticism, that is, when he givesanaccount of his own method.  Cf. LSJ, s.v. περίεργος.  As has been noted by Fabricius, for Sextus dunamis does not carry anydistinction with technēn, hikanotēta, hexin…not even with energeia. Johann Albert Fabricius,ed., Sexti Empiriciopera: graece et latine (Leipzig: sumptu librariae Kuehnianae,1840), 1:9, note r. Sextus Εmpiricus’suse of dunamis 27

This interpretation is confirmed by PH 1.240,whereSextus drawsaparallel between the sceptic’suse of certain expressions “without holding opinions” (adoxas- tōs)and the Methodics’ use of aperiergōs (translated by Annas and Barnes as “in astraightforward way”).¹⁵ ForSextus, saying something adoxastōs means saying something without attaching dogmatic certaintytoit; one is not asserting something with assent,but is merelystating what appears to him to be the case (cf., for example, PH 1.15). Hence, in the case of the sceptical ability,weshould not understand Sextusassaying that the sceptic possesses something like a “faculty” which would implyaknowledge of hiddenthings(for example, the nature of the soul, or of the intellect); he is rather stating thatwecan observethat the sceptic is able to set out oppositions, justbecause we sawthathehas alreadydone such things. Finally, this meaning seems to be confirmedbythe following sentences of PH 1.9, whereSextus explains the meaning of the definition of the sceptical ability (“an ability to set out oppositions among thingswhich appear and are thought of in anyway at all”). Sextusnotes thatthe final part of this definition, namely “in anyway at all” (kath’ oiondēpote tropon), “can be taken either with ‘an ability’ (to show that we are to understand the word ‘ability’ in its straightforward sense, as we said), or else with ‘to setout oppositions etc…’.”¹⁶ Iwill saysomething later about thatsubtle strategy; for now,itissufficient to note thatthereisnoaccurate or defined realisation of the sceptical capacity—there is no clear definition of what might be aright wayora wrongway to oppose things. Thus, there is also no distinctionbetween what could be areal or an accidental capacity of doing so. This sceptical ability can be realised “in anyway at all,” and that means that we should consider this term in his loose and non-technical sense, without narrowlydefining what acapacity is. Once again, the fact that one has provided oppositions of thingsinorder to provoke ep- ochē is the onlycriterion to decide that one has the capacity to do so. This first use of dunamis showstwo importantaspects of the scepticism of Sex- tus Empiricus: 1. The peculiar nature of scepticism as aphilosophical stance. Scepticism is aphilosophical position, but this position is shaped against more or less all the classical definitions of the philosophy, or at least the theoretical aspectsofphiloso- phy. By choosing the word dunamis to refer to the sceptical activity,Sextus expresses this very special relationship with philosophy. 2. The concepts used by Sextusare neutral, and he refers to them in adeflationist way. Here the point of interest is not that he uses concepts merelyinorder to be understood (in apragmatic way, which is also for Sextus one of the main rules of the sceptical use of language), but that he uses conceptstodenote something

 ᾿Aδοξάστως is not in the manuscript but comes from the traditio latina;the insertion is justified by the previous sentence, πρὸςτῷκαὶ τὸἀδόξαστόντεκαὶἀδιάφορον τῆςχρήσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων κοι- νὸνεἶναι τῶν ἀγωγῶν,and by the next sentence as well.  τὸ δὲ῾καθ’ οἱονδήποτε τρόπον᾽ δύναται προσαρμόζεσθαι καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, ἵνα ἁπλῶςτὸτῆςδυνά- μεως ὄνομα, ὡςεἰρήκαμεν, παραλαμβάνωμεν, καὶ τῷ῾ἀντιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων᾽. 28 Stéphane Marchand

evident,facts or phainomena,without making dogmatic assertions about things that are not evident.

As we have seen, this use of the word dunamis shows that the idea of asceptical ability is shaped by arejection of the dogmatic idea of afaculty thatcould possess some potentialities.Contrarytothe dogmatic conception of faculty,the sceptical dunamis seems to be the result of amoreeconomic method,based on fact,withoutany commitment to the structure or the nature of the mind.

2Fromimplicit to virtual: dunamis and the sceptical use of language

We can now switch to another use of dunamis by Sextus, which appears mainlyina linguistic context,under the form dunamei +saying verbs (phēmi, kaleō, legō, phaskō, apophainō).¹⁷ This use appears when Sextusaims to explain, clarify,orrefor- mulate an expression A by anew formulation B,claiming that “by A we say dunamei —i.e., implicitlyorvirtually—B.” Regarding this use,translators hesitated between “implicitly” and “virtually,” and we should wonder if this hesitation pointstowards amorecomplex interpretationofSextus’s dunamis.¹⁸ As Isaid, the main occurrences of this use of the wordisinlinguistic contexts with saying verbs. However,wewill see that it can be expandedtoverbs expressingall kinds of reasoning.¹⁹ It concerns either dogmatic statements or sceptical expressions.

2.1 To explain or refuteastatement

2.1.1 The implicit-dunamis

The “implicit-dunamis” refers to cases whereSextus shows thatanexpression A can be replaced by an expression B. This use is not necessarilynegative or critical.InAM 11.8‒10,for instance, Sextus uses dunamei or kata dunamin also to express semantic equivalences: in that case it is the contention that for the Stoics the definition is the

 Thereare 14 instances of this construction with sayingverbs (of the 209occurrencesofdunamis in Sextus).  Annas and Barnes choose to renderitsystematicallyby“implicitly”;Pellegrin and Bury seem to hesitatebetween both. See PierrePellegrin, trans., Sextus Empiricus.Esquisses pyrrhoniennes (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1997); R.G. Bury,trans., Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1933).  Cf. all the instances where Sextus uses verbs like logizomai (PH 1.69), antilegō (PH 2.155,193), tithēmi (PH 1.195,AM7.399, 8.40), etc. Sextus Εmpiricus’suse of dunamis 29

same thing as auniversalproposition: there is adifferencebetween both solelyinthe syntax (psilēitēisuntaxei), or in the words (tēiphōnēi).²⁰ This kind of usagedoes not entail the idea of anypotentiality.Apotential meaning implies that awordcan have an additional meaning beyond that which is being used. However,Sextus is not arguing that the dogmatic expression in question can have another meaning, nor even that it does have aplurality of meanings; he is merely saying that the new formulation is onlyareformulation of adogmatic thesis. This movedoes not even necessarilyentail acritical purpose, as it can be asimple refor- mulation of athesis, as for example in the case of Protagoras (PH 1.216), when Sextus explains that saying that man is the measure of thingsisimplicitly saying (that is, is equivalent to saying) thatman is acriterion of all things, which can be seen (falsely) as acommon feature with the sceptics.²¹

2.1.2 The virtual-dunamis

The second case, which Iwill call “virtual-dunamis,” is used to show the logical consequence of aposition. Sextus points out the virtual consequenceofanassumption, mainlyinorder to show aproblem or acontradiction in the thesis discussed. In the previous case, the dunamis was semantic, whereas in this case, it is alogical consequence, or an argumentative consequence. There is no big differencebetween those two cases, and we can saythat the meaning of dunamis is the sameinboth, but that Sextususes the wordintwo different contexts. The virtual-dunamis is linked to logical context:this use is akind of tool which allows to show the implication of aposition, mainlyinorder to show aproblem or a contradiction in the thesis discussed. That is the case, for instance, concerning the notion of place in AM 10.13when Sextusshows that the person who says that a part of place existsimplicitlymeans (δυνάμει ὁ λέγων…τοῦτό φησιν)that the place exists.²² In thatcase, the expressionwith dunamei is apolemical tool to display the theoretical implications of formulations which could appear unproblematic. It is mainlyused in order to realise the sceptic economical strategywhich does not aim to expose detailed arguments or to be exhaustive in argumentation, but to settle for arguments sufficient to provoke suspension of judgment,which is part of astrategyof providinganoutline. Thus, Sextus frequentlyshows that an argument or adefinition can be used to attain several aims, because it refutes dunamei agiven argument.For

 See also AM 8.236,where kata men tēndunamin is opposed to kata de tēnprophoran (“regarding the explicit statement”).  See also, again on Protagoras, AM 8.393.  See also AM 2.81,where Sextus shows the circular definition of the telos of the rhetoric. 30 Stéphane Marchand

instance, the arguments against the differencebetween conclusive and inconclusive arguments “implicitlyargued” against deficient arguments (PH 2.155).²³ In asimilar fashion, Sextus reports the fact that,for Chrysippus, the dog “is vir- tuallyreasoning” by using the “fifth unprovable.” Although in thosepassages Annas and Barnes translate dunamis by “implicitly,” we can understand whycertain translators choose “virtually.” Here, dunamis seems to be alittle more complex than in pure semantic cases because the problem is not onlyestablishing asemantic equivalence, but also determining if the positions taken involvecertain consequences or effects that are not clearlyinvolvedinthe explicit position. In those cases, “virtuality” is involved in so farasthe subject is not reallyconscious that he is doing what he is reallydoing or saying.That is clearlythe case for Chrysippus’sdog—which is reasoning,eventhough it is not conscious thatitisreasoning—or for Carneades, who is using dunamei as acriterion because he is seeking happiness (AM7.166). Although both uses of the of dunamis (the linguistic “implicitly” and the logical “virtually”)are very close, we stillneed to differentiatebetween them, because in the virtual-dunamis Sextus seems to be aware thatthe expression A is not strictly equivalent to B,but that the fact of claiming A has alsothe effect of claiming B. In anycase, neither of these usesimplies the potentiality-dunamis,because the potentiality-dunamis entails the fact thatunder certain conditions Acan be B,whereas in the implicit-dunamis or the virtual-dunamis,one who admits A necessarilyadmits B.

2.2 In Sceptical Contexts

2.2.1 To Explain ScepticalExpressions

Most of the instances of dunamis appear in sceptical contexts, in which Sextuspres- ents the meaning of the sceptical stance in PH 1, and especiallyinthe part devoted to the sceptical expressions (PH 1.188–thrice; 195,199,203,208). In such ausage,Sex- tus explains the meaning of asceptical expression (phōnē)which is “elliptical” (el- lipēs;1.188), and thereforerequires an explanation in order to ensure the reader’s nuanced and non-dogmatic understanding.Since the sceptical use of language has renounced to the myth of aperfect akribeia,namelytosay thingsexactlyas they are,and promotes apragmatic use of languagewheremutual comprehension or understanding is the onlyrule, the sceptic can use expressions which can be seen as incompleteand even ambiguous, provided that the reader understands his

 Also PH 2.112, 193; 3.37;AM7.91, 399;AM1.96. See also, in asceptical context,PH1.11, whereSex- tus says that the concept of sceptical persuasion virtuallydefines “the Pyrrhonian philosopher.” Sextus Εmpiricus’suse of dunamis 31

intention. Allthe sceptical utterances can be seen as aform of katachrēsis,aloose form of expression with an implicit content that can be elucidated.²⁴ In those cases, the formula dunamei +saying verbs is used to explicate what was implicit in the expression. Forexample, in PH 1.188 Sextus affirms that “when we say ou mallon (‘no more’), we implicitlysay ‘no more this than that’.”²⁵ Regarding the expression ou mallon,one can perfectly see how incompleteitis, since it introduces a comparison which is not explicit in the expression. In order to avoid adogmatic interpretation of ou mallon which could denote an absoluteindetermination of things— as is (maybe?) the caseinPyrrho’sthinking—Sextus’sexplanation givessense to the expression in the context of isostheneia wheretwo propositions or theses are opposed and have the samepower of persuasion, which leadstoepochē.²⁶ In the same fashion,Sextus presents sceptical assertions under the seal of relativisation or subjectivisation: if one can believethat the sceptic is making objective assertions, we need to assume that he is saying implicitly “relatively to me,” as in PH 1.199 or PH 1.135.²⁷ Besides, one can wonder if all the sceptical discourse, not merely the sceptical expressions,are to be interpreted as a katachrēsis,that is an approximation, carryingthat kind of dunamis which is not systematicallyexpressed for the reason that,once again, the main aim of the sceptical discourse is not to be accurate or precise but to be understood. Now,ifSextushad written his worktrying to express exactlyall his positions without leaving anyroom for approximation, aside from the fact that this project would have been impossible, it would have been un- readable, or at least more difficult to read. We have an example of an effort to com- pletelyexpress the dunamis of the expression panti logōilogos isosantikeitai (“opposed to every account there is an equal account”)inPH1.203,and it includes a pretty weighty sentence: “to every account Ihavescrutinised which purports to establish something in dogmatic fashion, thereappears to me to be opposed another account,purporting to establish something in dogmatic fashion, equal to it in convincingness or lack of convincingness.”²⁸ One can saythatall the procedureofren-

 See PH 1.135.  ὅταν εἴπωμεν ‘οὐ μᾶλλον,’ δυνάμει φαμὲν ‘οὐ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε’.  In AM 1.315 Sextus mentions several senses (dunamis)ofthe ou mallon: “Howwill they [sc. the sceptic] understand what force the phrase ‘no more’ has amongsceptics,whether it is interrogative or declaratory,and for what it is used, for the external object or the feelingwehave?” (ἢ ποῦ συνήσουσι τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει παρὰ σκεπτικοῖς ἡ῾οὐδὲνμᾶλλον᾽ φωνή, πότερον πυσματικήἐστιν ἢἀξιωματική, καὶἐπὶτίνος τάσσεται, ἆρά γε τοῦἐκτὸς ὑποκειμένου ἢ τοῦ περὶἡμᾶςπάθους;). English in D.L. Blank, trans., Sextus Empiricus, Against the Grammarians (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), 65.  PH 1.199: “someone whosays ‘every thingisundetermined’ also signifies according to us ‘relatively to me’ or ‘as it appears to me’” (οὕτως ὁ λέγων ‘πάντα ἐστὶν ἀόριστα’ συσσημαίνει ‘καθ’ ἡμᾶς’ ἢ ‘ὡςπρὸςἐμὲ’ἢ‘ὡςἐμοὶ φαίνεται’); PH 1.135: “we use ‘is’ loosely, in the sense of ‘appears’, implicitlysaying ‘everythingappears relative’” (τῷ ‘ἔστι’ καταχρώμεθα ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘φαίνεται’, δυνάμει τοῦτο λέγοντες ‘πρόςτιπάντα φαίνεται’).  δυνάμει τοῦτό φημι ῾παντὶ τῷὑπ’ἐμοῦ <ἐξητασμένῳ> λόγῳ, ὃςκατασκευάζει τι δογματικῶς, ἕτε- ρος λόγος κατασκευάζων τι δογματικῶς, ἴσος αὐτῷ κατὰ πίστιν καὶἀπιστίαν, ἀντικεῖσθαι φαίνεταί 32 Stéphane Marchand

dering the sceptical discourse explicit is in reality aprocess of relativisation: for the expression panti logōilogos isosantikeitai,the relativisation consists of reminding that: 1. This principle—which is the “chief constitutive of scepticism” (cf. PH 1.12)— should not be interpreted as an assertion about all possible logoi—that would be adogmatic assertion comparable with the position of Protagoras—but as an experimental principle grounded on the observation that for now the logoi ex- aminedare equalinconvincingness.²⁹ 2. Furthermore, this principle is not relevant for all logoi, but onlyfor the dogmatic logoi,and in this case the logos hos kataskeuazei ti dogmatikōs,that is the logos which establishes something dogmatically. Hence, not all logoi are dogmatic, or as Sextus says, “posit as real the thingsthey hold beliefs about”;the sceptical expression, and more generallythe sceptical logos is just an avowal, or asubjective expression of what is apparent to the sceptic (cf. PH 1.15). 3. This opposition constitutes the third point of explicitation: the expression of the equipollence of the logoi does not claim that in reality,orobjectively,the logoi are equal, but just that they seem or appear to be equal, which is sufficient for the suspension of judgment. 4. Finally, to elucidatethe expression, we must recall that the equalityinquestion has ascope; it is not an absoluteequality,but an equality in persuasion, which is necessary and sufficient to the suspension of assent,because the assent is given relative to the convincingness of one’s logos or proposition.

Once again, let us turnnow to the question of the potentiality-dunamis: are those instances cases of potentiality?Admittedly, one could saythat this use is very common and that we encounter instances of it in non-philosophicalcontexts which have nothing to do with the Aristotelian conception of dunamis. But this answer would be alazy one; we can imagine that—even in non-philosophical contexts—one can use both asophisticated conception of dunamis and of the idea of potentiality.The essential argument is that,ifany potentiality were involved, it would mean that asceptical expression would not necessarilyhaveasceptical meaning.However,that is not what Sextus says.Rather,heclaims thatthose expressions have aconstant meaning for asceptic, even if it is possible that those expressionshaveseveral sceptical meanings. It seems, then, thatinthis case the dunamis has nothing to do with potentiality,

μοι᾽, ὡςεἶναι τὴντοῦλόγου προφορὰνοὐδογματικὴν ἀλλ’ ἀνθρωπείου πάθους ἀπαγγελίαν, ὅἐστι φαινόμενον τῷ πάσχοντι.  Followingthe reading of Annas and Barnes,who print ἐξητασμένῳ instead of the ζητουμένῳ in Mutschmannand Mau’s1958 Teubner edition. Sextus Εmpiricus’suse of dunamis 33

and is rather to be connected to the previous linguistic meaning of dunamis as “a meaning” of word, thatisthe “implicit-dunamis.”³⁰ Thus, this usageofdunamis remains neutral, and does not carry anything like a potentiality.Itisjust away to express two facts: the fact that the expression or the sentencedoes not express explicitlyorverbatim something which it implicitly contains, and the fact that the implicit formulationisequivalent to the explicit one. However,itretains two problematic elements.

2.2.2 TwoApparentlyProblematic Instances

2.2.2.1 PH 1.22 We say, then, that the standardofthe Sceptical persuasion (tēsskeptikēsagōgēs)iswhatisap- parent (to phainomenon), implicitly(dunamei)meaningbythis the appearances; because, since the phantasia depends on passive and unwilled feelings,itisnot an object of investigation.³¹

Annas and Barnes’stranslation, quotedhere (slightlymodified), has “implicitly.” Pellegrin’sFrench translation reads “virtuellement,” and Rachel Barney in her paper on Sextean appearances likewise translates “virtually.”³² Formallyspeaking, the expression is the sameasinthe previous instances.How- ever,its meaning is not exactlythe same: Sextus does not saythat to phainomenon is an elliptical expression whose completemeaning should be tēnphantasian;neither does he explain (like in the dogmatic contextsabove) atheoretical implication of phainomenon. If we want to connect it to some of the previous instances, it is nearer to the passagewhereSextus uses dunamis to provide areformulation semantically equivalent to the expression, withoutany polemic intention. Yetitseems to me that this use is quite different: Sextus offers areformulation of acrucial term in the sceptical vocabulary,using aterm that is very common in dogmatic philosophy: phantasia. Thus, to explain the sceptical concept of phainomenon, he translates it using adogmatic term. Forthat reason, he has to clarify his own position by specifying what he has in mind with this comparison. Hence, we should understand the end of the sentence ἐνπείσειγὰρκαὶἀβουλήτῳ πάθει κειμένη ἀζήτητός ἐστιν,asareformulation: “because, since the phantasia depends on passive and unwilled feelings, it is not an object of investigation.”

 See LSJ, s.v. δύναμις (III): “forceormeaningofaword”;orDiccionario Griego-Español (http://dge. cchs.csic.es/xdge/), s.v. δύναμις (III): “c. sent.devalor yequivalencia. 1. ref. conceptos ypalabras: valor,significado,sentido; τὴνδύναμιν ἔχειν tener el valor de, equivaler,significar Th. 5.20.”  κριτήριον τοίνυν φαμὲνεἶναι τῆςσκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆςτὸφαινόμενον, δυνάμει τὴνφαντασίαν οὕτω καλοῦντες· ἐνπείσει γὰρκαὶἀβουλήτῳ πάθει κειμένη ἀζήτητός ἐστιν.  Cf. Rachel Barney, “Appearancesand Impressions,” Phronesis 37,no. 3(January 1992):301n25, 303.See also Bury’stranslation: “givingthis name to whatisvirtuallythe sense-presentation.” 34 Stéphane Marchand

What about dunamei in this case? Sextusdoes not saythat the word phainomenon can have this meaning under certain conditions.Rather,heclaims that phainomenon does contain the sense of phantasia,ifweagree to conceive the phantasia as a pure passive process. ForBarney,this dunamei means “virtually”:that phainomenon would not be identical to phantasia,but would signify arestriction “to the assent- compellingcontent of phantasia.” Thus, Barney believes that dunamei implies in this context that not every phantasia is identical to phainomenon,but onlysome kind of phantasia. By contrast,Ithink that dunamei here is the expression of the fact that for Sextus we can establish arelation between the sceptic phainomenon and the dogmatic phantasia,yet with the proviso that we should understand the phantasia withoutembedding anykind of activity. Thus, despite the apparent peculiarity of this instance,PH1.22isacaseof“implicit-dunamis.”

2.2.2.2 PH 1.195 Let us turn to PH 1.195:

Now it is, Ithink, clear that these phrases (sc. “perhaps,”“maybe,” and “possibly”)are indica- tive of non-assertion (aphasias). Forinstance, someone who says “perhaps it is” implicitly(dunamei)posits what is thought to conflict with it,namely “perhaps it is not,” insofar as he does not make an affirmation about its beingso.³³

Annas and Barnes, in their choice of one single translation of dunamei,use “implicitly.” It is true that Sextus explainedatthe beginning of the chapter that “we take ‘perhaps’ and ‘perhaps not’ in the sense of ‘perhaps it is and perhaps it is not’” (PH 1.194), in order to indicate the state of non-assertion (aphasia)ofthesceptic. But,atpresent,itseems that we are not facing asimple caseofsemantic equivalence. As amatter of fact,ifthis instance of dunamis meant “implicitly,” it would signify that the meaning of “perhaps” for asceptic is equivalent to “perhaps not.” Yet, this is in no waywhat Sextus is saying.Rather,his purpose is to explain thatbysay- ing “perhaps” he is alsosaying at the same time “perhapsnot,” in the very fact that by writing “perhaps” he is not making anydogmatic claim about the natureofreal- ity.Thus, in this case to posit dunamei B is to posit Batthe same time as saying A. The lastsentencecannot replace the formersentence: to properlyunderstand Sextus, we have to understand at the sametime A and B,since the sceptic neither posits nor rejects anydogmatic thesis (cf. PH 1.193). This seems to be acase of virtuality,ina certain manner similar to the logical implication. But once again, the differencebetween thosetwo uses of dunamei, “virtually” and “implicitly,” is thin, and we must

 ὅτι μέντοι αὗται αἱ φωναὶἀφασίας εἰσὶ δηλωτικαί, πρόδηλον, οἶμαι. ὁ γοῦνλέγων ‘τάχα ἔστιν’ δυνάμει τίθησι καὶ τὸ μάχεσθαι δοκοῦναὐτῷ,τὸ‘τάχα μὴ εἶναι’, τῷ μὴ διαβεβαιοῦσθαι περὶ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτό. Sextus Εmpiricus’suse of dunamis 35

acknowledge that it does not entail the idea of potentiality,because the potentiality entails the idea of apower which can be inefficient at least at agiven time.

3TowardaSceptical-Potentiality? 3.1 The potentiality of the sceptical expressions

So far, it seems that dunamis is never used by Sextus in order to express some sceptical potentiality.Yet,mycontentionisthat in the idea of potentiality within the notion of δύναμις there is something thatcan be worthwhile for asceptical approach. To introduce this use, we can return for awhile to PH 1.9, whereSextus explains that the expression “in anyway at all” (kath’ oiondēpote tropon) “can be taken” (dunatai prosarmozesthai)either with one wordorwith another.Sextus points out that such an expression has the potential to be interpreted or understood under both constructions, without mentioning which one is wrongortrue; they are bothtrue, or better,both are efficient depending on the argumentative situation. Admittedly, here Sextus does not use dunamis or dunamei but the verb dunatai (to be able). Nevertheless, this meaning of dunamis is preciselyconnected to the verb, in order to express the idea of possibility or potentiality carried by such a verb. Thus, in that case, we are faced with apotentiality-dunamis. Sextus contends that both constructions are possiblebut not necessary: “in anyway at all” (kath’ oiondēpote tropon)can be constructed either with “an ability” (tēidunamei), or with “to set out oppositions among thingswhich appear and are thought of” (τῷ῾ἀν- τιθετικὴ φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων᾽). There is no primacy of one construction over the other; both are right.Moreover,proposingone construction does not prevent him from proposingthe other construction. Thanks to the potentiality-dunamis, the sceptic has avery efficient and economical tool thatallows him to state phrases with apluralityofeffects, granting that agiven interpretation of aphrase does not necessarilyexclude another interpretation.Thus, aphrase or an object A which is potentially B can be both A and B at the same time, or can have onlythe effect of A or B under certain conditions. This sense of dunamis appears at the key passagePH1.15:

But then, if someone whoholds beliefs posits what he believes as beingthe case, whilethe Scep- tic utters his own expressions in such away that potentially(dunamei)they arebracketedby themselves, then he cannot be said to hold beliefs in utteringthem.³⁴

 πλὴν ἀλλ’ εἰὁδογματίζων τίθησιν ὡς ὑπάρχον τοῦτο ὃ δογματίζει, ὁ δὲ σκεπτικὸςτὰςφωνὰς αὑτοῦ προφέρεται ὡςδυνάμει ὑφ’ ἑαυτῶνπεριγράφεσθαι, οὐκ ἂν ἐντῇπροφορᾷ τούτων δογματίζειν λεχθείη.English translation in Luca Castagnoli, Ancient Self-Refutation: TheLogic and Historyofthe Self-Refutation Argument fromDemocritus to Augustine (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2010), T98 (p.271). 36 Stéphane Marchand

Ihavedeliberately switched to Luca Castagnoli’stranslation because Annas and Barnes renderedthe term once again with “implicitly.” But,Castagnoli’ssubtle interpretation shows that here dunamei has adifferent sense from the other passages. By dunamei Sextus is not saying that the sceptical expressions are always self-referential (that would be the case if dunamis meant “implicitly” or “virtually”), but thatthey can be self-referential, if they are interpreted dogmatically, that is as “absolutely true.”³⁵ This interpretation is central to Castagnoli’sposition, since his aim is to show that Sextus does not promotethe virtue of self-reversal or self-consumption of the sceptical arguments; so the so-called self-reversalfunctionofthe sceptical arguments is onlyapotentiality of the sceptical expressions,when they are interpreted in adogmatic way. It is thus apotentiality of thoseexpressions,but not astable virtue, aquality, or acapacity of those expressions. Besides, Castagnoli emphasises that there are, in the same context,two uses of dunamai in PH 2.188 and AM 8.480 that share the sameidea of potentiality regarding the idea thatsome logoi can cancel themselvesincertain conditions.³⁶ In both cases, as Castagnoli rightlyemphasises,³⁷ Sextus uses the verb dunamai to express apotentiality or apossibility, whereas he does not use it concerning the simile of the fire or the purgative drugs:the fact that they operate against themselvesisnot amere possibility,but astable or constant capacity.This is also the case in PH 1.206,whereSex- tus says that sceptical expressions can be cancelled by themselves(ὅπου γε καὶὑφ’ ἑαυτῶναὐτὰςἀναιρεῖσθαι λέγομεν δύνασθαι). Even if one does not agree with Castagnoli’spowerful and sophisticated interpretation, we can notice that this interpretation of the sense of dunamei is also shared by McPherran—with atotallydifferent aim—but with the same idea that here dunamei has apeculiarmeaning.³⁸ Thismeaning cannot be reduced to the implicit-dunamis or the virtual-dunamis because the self-cancellation of the sceptical utterance is linked to the interpretation of this utterance. If someonetakes asceptical

 Castagnoli, 274.  AM 8.480 explains how the argument against demonstration can cancel itself: “so toothe argument against demonstration, after doing away with all demonstration, can cancel itself as well” (οὕτω δύναται καὶὁκατὰ τῆς ἀπόδειξιν λόγος μετὰ τὸ πᾶσαν ἀπόδειξιν ἀνελεῖνκαὶἑαυτὸνσυμπερι- γράφειν); PH 2.188 givesthe same idea: “Arguments,likepurgative drugs which evacuatethemselves along with the matters present in the body, can actuallycancel themselvesalong with the other arguments which aresaid to be probative” (δύνανται δὲ οἱ λόγοι, καθάπερ καὶ τὰ καθαρτικὰ φάρμακα ταῖς ἐντῷσώματι ὑποκειμέναις ὕλαις ἑαυτὰ συνεξάγει, οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις λόγοις τοῖς ἀποδεικτι- κοῖςεἶναι λεγομένοις καὶἑαυτοὺςσυμπεριγράφειν).  Castagnoli, Ancient Self-Refutation,291n129.  Mark L. McPherran, “Skeptical Homeopathyand Self-Refutation,” Phronesis 32,no. 3(1987): 295n14: “By hōsdunamei Sextus simplymeans that—unlikethe Dogmatist—he utters his maxim in full awareness and acceptanceofthe fact that if his claims should happen to represent true propositions they would be capable of entailing their own falsehood.” PierrePellegrin translates in the same fashion by “elles portent en elles-mêmes en puissanceleur propre limitation.” Sextus Εmpiricus’suse of dunamis 37

utterance as it should be, that is as asubjective avowal, there is no need of aself- cancellation for the very reason that such an avowal does not entail anybelief. These interpretations reveal the sense in which a dunamis-potentialitycan be worthwhile to the sceptical stance. Scepticism is not aphilosophical system—even if it can appear as somewhat systematic; it has no dogmatic principle, nor any fixed criterion to determine what is trueorfalse. Moreover,scepticism is shaped against all kinds of dogmatism, not onlythe kind of dogmatism that prevailed in Sex- tus’stime. Thus, this kind of dunamis-potentiality seems to be an interesting adapt- able tool, ameans to show what an argument or an interpretation can do without asserting that it always has such apower.

3.2 The dunamis of the logos

So far,itmight seem thatthis sense of dunamis remains scarceand exotic. However, my purpose is now to show that one can connect this sense with another use of dunamis,which shares the same sense and the same link with dunamis and the verb dunamai in order to express the polymorphic power of the sceptical argumentation. This use can be seen in the well-known text of PH 3.280‒81, which is acrucial text since it describes preciselythe sceptical use of the logos:

Sceptics arephilanthropic and wish to curebyargument,asfar as they can (kata dunamin), the conceit and rashness of the Dogmatists.Just as doctors for bodilyafflictionshaveremedies which differ in potency, and applysevere remedies to patients whoare severelyafflicted and milder remedies to those mildlyafflicted, so Sceptics propound arguments which differ in strength(kata ischun logous). They employ weighty arguments,capable of vigorously rebutting (kaieutonōsanaskeuazein dunamenois)the dogmatic affliction of conceit, against those whoare distressed by asevererashness,and they employ milder arguments against those whoare af- flictedbyaconceit which is superficial and easilycured and which can be rebutted by amilder degree of plausibility.This is whythose with aSceptical impulse do not hesitatesometimes to propound arguments which aresometimesweighty in their plausibility,and sometimes appa- rentlyrather weak. They do this deliberately,sinceoften aweakerargument is sufficient for them to achievetheir purpose.³⁹

 Ὁ σκεπτικὸςδιὰτὸφιλάνθρωπος εἶναι τὴντῶνδογματικῶνοἴησίντεκαὶπροπέτειαν κατὰ δύνα- μιν ἰᾶσθαι λόγῳ βούλεται. καθάπερ οὖνοἱτῶνσωματικῶνπαθῶν ἰατροὶ διάφορα κατὰ μέγεθος ἔχουσι βοηθήματα, καὶ τοῖςμὲνσφοδρῶςπεπονθόσι τὰ σφοδρὰ τούτων προσάγουσι, τοῖςδὲκούφως τὰ κου- φότερα, καὶὁσκεπτικὸςοὕτως διαφόρους ἐρωτᾷ [καὶ] κατὰἰσχὺνλόγους, καὶ τοῖςμὲνἐμβριθέσι καὶ εὐτόνως ἀνασκευάζειν δυναμένοις τὸ τῆςοἰήσεως τῶνδογματικῶνπάθος ἐπὶ τῶνσφοδρᾷ τῇ προπε- τείᾳ κεκακωμένων χρῆται, τοῖςδὲκουφοτέροις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιπόλαιον καὶ εὐίατον ἐχόντων τὸ τῆςοἰή- σεως πάθος καὶὑπὸκουφοτέρων πιθανοτήτων ἀνασκευάζεσθαι δυναμένων. διόπερ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐμβριθεῖς ταῖςπιθανότησιν, ὁτὲ δὲ καὶἀμαυροτέρους φαινομένους οὐκ ὀκνεῖ λόγους συνερωτᾶν ὁἀπὸτῆςσκέ- ψεως ὁρμώμενος, ἐπίτηδες, ὡς ἀρκοῦντας αὐτῷ πολλάκις πρὸςτὸἀνύειν τὸ προκείμενον. 38 Stéphane Marchand

The crucial expression here is kata dunamin,translated by Annas and Barnes as “as far as they can.” This translation understandsthis expression as a caveat,amanner to expressa“cautiousattitude towardshis therapeutic arguments”.⁴⁰ My contention is that another understanding of this expression is possible, where dunamis is linked with the sceptic potentiality.⁴¹ To tell the truth, this expression is rather complex. At first sight,itseems obvious to me that it establishes arelation between the dunamis and the idea of the power of argumentation, in the same waythan Sextus, in this text,speaks of “remedies which differ in potency” (kata megethos echousi boēthēmata)orarguments “which differ in strength” (kata ischun logous). We mayfind this meaning of dunamis in Sextus’s works,inparticularpassages about power of argumentation as in PH 1.35 and 39. This interpretation prevails in Pellegrin’stranslation “le sceptique… veut guérir par la puissance de l’argumentation.”⁴² On such interpretation, the meaning of the pas- sageisthatthe sceptic wishes to cure by argument according to its power. Such an interpretation assumes that λογοῦ (“of the argument”)isimpliedwith κατὰ δύναμιν, in order to expressameasure of the power of the argument,which is certainlyone of the purposes of this passage. If so, it should be aquite different use from what we call the potentiality-dunamis. Let us dig deeper into the power in question. One can wonder from which point of view this power is determined: is Sextus thinking about an objective measure of the argument,namelythe fact thatanargument is sound or unsound,valid or invalid?Ifthat is the case, it meansthat Sextus does accept the fact that certain arguments are objectively good and others bad, which seems incompatible with the sceptical stance. Forthat reason, it seems preferable to consider thathere Sextus is not speakingabout the logical validity of the argument he uses in order to produce equipollence, but rather about the psychological effect an argument can have on the dogmatist to whom he is speaking.⁴³ This interpretation is confirmed by the very fact that

 DiegoE.Machuca, “Argumentative Persuasiveness in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” Méthexis 22 (2009): 107.  Indeed, this expression is an old one: it can be tracked back to Hesiod (Worksand Days 336) with this sense; for the history of this expression, see Lefebvre, Dynamis,37‒176. However,the other instances of the expression in Sextus (AM10.340 and 342) do not have this sense, and areopposed to kat’ entelecheian in an Aristotelianfashion. Obviously, this is not an impedimentthat the expression has in PH 3.280the sense “as far as he can,” it just underlines that,ifitdoes,itshould be a hapax. Thereisalso another instanceinAM11.10,cf. above, sec. 2.1.1.  See the similar construction in Rafael Sartorio Maulini: “el escéptico, porque es filántropo, desea curar por medio del discursolaarrogancia yprecipitación de los dogmáticos con arreglo asuinten- sidad.” Rafael Sartorio Maulini, trans., Sexto Empírico:Hipotiposis Pirrónicas (Madrid: Akal, 1996).  Forthis position, see the central paperofMachuca, “Argumentative Persuasiveness.” See also Svavar Hrafn Svavarsson, “Sextus Empiricus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence,” in Strategies of Argument: EssaysinAncientEthics,Epistemology,and Logic,ed. Mi-Kyoung Lee(Oxford: OxfordUni- versity Press, 2014), 356‒73;DiegoE.Machuca, “AgainonSextus on Persuasiveness and Equipol- lence,” Archiv fürGeschichte der Philosophie 99,no. 2(June 2017): 212‒28. Sextus Εmpiricus’suse of dunamis 39

Sextusisprimarilyinterested by the definition of the power of an argument in terms of plausibility (pithanotēs), since the equipollence or istostheneia is expressed in terms of “equality with regardtobeing convincing or unconvincing” (PH 1.10).⁴⁴ It seems, then, that an argument does not have anyobjectiveand stable power,but avariety of powers. If Ireturn to my distinction, Ishould saythatthese powers are not implicit (they are not the same power), nor are they virtual (they cannot be effectiveatthe same time); they are potentialities which depend greatlyonthe context of the argumentation and the beliefs of the person to whom such argument is given. Thus, it seems that the fact that aweighty argument can vigorouslyrebut (eutonēsanaskeuazein dunamenois)the dogmatic afflictionofconceit can be understood as apotentiality of this argument.And the kata dunamin can express the fact that the sceptic use of logos is an attempt to use the argument accordingtothose potentialities. Perhaps this interpretation is grounded in afundamental equivocality of the word dunamis and its cognates.Itistruethatwecan also find in Sextus instances of dunamis which express the objective power of something,like the power of the syllogism (PH 2.235; see also2.143,concerning the power of the assumptions), of nourishment (1.53;also1.131), the power of changingexternal objects(1.103), the me- dicinalpowers (1.133), and so on.⁴⁵ But it seems that in thosecases, Sextus is referring to dogmatic theory,and often to amedicaltheory of power.However,when he speaksabout the dunamis of the sceptical arguments, we are dealing with—according to my interpretation—adifferent appreciation of power,wherepotentiality is involved. To conclude, Iwould like to consider brieflytwo passages whereSextus speaks about the dunamis of the sceptical arguments, and more preciselyofthe ten modes of Aenesidemus. While introducing them, he expresses doubts about theirnumber (peri tou plēthous)and power (peri tou dunameōs): “they maybeunsound (sathrous), and there maybemorethan those Ishalldescribe” (PH 1.35). Admittedly, the word sa- thros seems to refer to akind of objectiveappreciation of the validity of the argument.Yet,the exposition of the tropes does not actuallycontain anyobjective evaluation of this kind. Rather,Sextus introducesthe whole exposition of the ten tropes as adescription of their dunamis (peri de tēsdunameōstade). By the way, Sextus is often ambiguous regarding the position of Aenesidemus from whom he borrows manyarguments, underliningthat they should be abbreviated or completed and criticising his Heraclitean affiliation.⁴⁶ As far as the dunamis of the tropes is concerned, one can consider thatheisoffering an overviewofthe potentiality of this

 ῾ἰσοσθένειαν᾽ δὲ λέγομεν τὴνκατὰ πίστιν καὶἀπιστίαν ἰσότητα, ὡςμηδένα μηδενὸςπροκεῖσθαι τῶνμαχομένων λόγων ὡςπιστότερον.  See also PH 3.15,60.  Carlos Lévy, “Pyrrhon,Énésidème et Sextus Empiricus:Laquestion de la légitimation historique dans le scepticisme,” in Antichi et Moderni Nella FilosofiaDiEtà Imperiale,ed. A. Brancacci (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2001), 299‒329. 40 Stéphane Marchand

stock of arguments, without consideringthatthey are always sufficient.Once again, the power of an argument is relative to acontext or asituation of argumentation; it is apotentiality that might lead to equipollence rather than an effective waytocertainly produce it.

Conclusion

Tworemarks to conclude. 1. Firstly, this studyofSextus’s dunamis pointsout thatthereisnosceptical theory of dunamis,but aplurality of usages which are connected to the common (philosophical) use of this polysemic term. This fact is coherent with Sextus’sown theory of the norms of language, since in Against the Grammarians he underlines the fact that asceptic should follow the usageofthe people he is talking to; then, in philosophyhefollows the “usage of the philosophers, and in medicine the medical usage” (AM1.233‒34). Even if it could be deceptive,there is nothing like asceptical theory of dunamis. 2. However,inhis use of the term, some interesting features have emerged. To sum up, Ishould saythatweare facing three sceptical functions of the dunamis,even if theyare not consciouslyconnected by Sextus. a. To denote the sceptical activity,thatisthe ability to set out oppositions (the capacity-dunamis). b. To express an equivalenceofaterm. This is what Icalled the “implicit-dunamis” in the linguistic field, in order to express asemanticclarification of an expression—where the term A has to be substituted by B,every time and under no condition: B is the real or true sense of A. And it is the same meaning which prevails in the logical field to express alogical consequenceofa proposition (the virtual-dunamis)—wherethe proposition A entails aproposition B as an implication. In this relationship, both A and B are effective at the same time, even though only A is uttered. c. In the meta-argumentative field:toexpress the potentialities of an argument (the potentiality-dunamis)where B is apossibility or apotentiality of A. In this relationship, an argument A has awide-rangeofpotentialities depending on the situation of enunciation or the beliefs of the interlocutors.

These functions show thateveninasceptical or empiricist context,one can talk and make referenceto“events” or “effects” (to tell the truth, Iamnot reallysure that there is awordwhich can express the object of that referencewithoutproviding the false impression that the sceptical have abelief on the nature of thatobject) that are not currentlyinaction. Sextus Εmpiricus’suse of dunamis 41

Bibliography

Annas, Julia, and Jonathan Barnes, trans. Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism. Cambridge/New York: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1994. Aristotle. Metaphysics, Volume I: Books 1‒9. TranslatedbyHugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1933 Aubry, Gwenaëlle. Dieu sans la puissance: “dunamis” et “energeia” chez Aristote et chez Plotin. Paris: J. Vrin, 2006. Barney,Rachel. “Appearances and Impressions.” Phronesis 37,no. 3(January1992): 283‒313. Bett, Richard, trans. Sextus Empiricus. Againstthe Logicians. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2005. Blank,David L., trans. Sextus Empiricus. Againstthe Grammarians: Adversus Mathematicos I. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. Bury,RobertGregg, trans. Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1933. Castagnoli, Luca. AncientSelf-Refutation: The Logic and History of the Self-Refutation Argument from DemocritustoAugustine. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 2010. Fabricius, Johann Albert, ed. Sexti Empirici opera: graece et latine. Leipzig: sumptulibrariae Kuehnianae, 1840. Glucker,John. Antiochus and the Late Academy. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1978. Ioli, Roberta. “Agōgē and Related Concepts in Sextus Empiricus.” Siculorum Gymnasium N.S. 56, no. 2(July‒December 2003): 401‒28. Lefebvre,David. Dynamis: sens et genèse de la notion aristotélicienne de puissance. Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 2018. Lévy,Carlos. “Pyrrhon, Énésidème et Sextus Empiricus:laquestion de la légitimation historique dans le scepticisme.” In Antichi et Moderninella filosofia di età imperiale,edited by Aldo Brancacci, 299‒329. Naples: Bibliopolis, 2001. Machuca, DiegoE.“Again on Sextus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99, no. 2(June 2017): 212‒28. Machuca, DiegoE.“ArgumentativePersuasivenessinAncientPyrrhonism.” Méthexis 22 (2009): 101‒126. Marchand, Stéphane. “Sextus Empiricus’ Style of Writing.” In New Essays on AncientPyrrhonism, edited by DiegoE.Machuca, 113‒41. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011. Sartorio Maulini, Rafael, trans. Sexto Empírico. Hipotiposis Pirrónicas. Madrid:Akal, 1996. McPherran, Mark L. “SkepticalHomeopathy and Self-Refutation.” Phronesis 32, no. 3(1987): 290‒ 328. Pellegrin, Pierre, trans. Sextus Empiricus. Esquisses pyrrhoniennes. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1997. Souilhé, Joseph. Etude surleterme ΔΥΝΑΜΙΣ dans les dialoguesdePlaton. Paris: F. Alcan, 1919. Striker,Gisela. “Scepticism as aKind of Philosophy.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83, no. 2(August 2001): 113‒29. Svavarsson, Svavar Hrafn. “Sextus Empiricus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence.” In Strategies of Argument: Essays in AncientEthics, Epistemology,and Logic,edited by Mi-Kyoung Lee, 356‒73. Oxford: Oxford University Press,2014.

DiegoE.Machuca Does Pyrrhonism HavePractical or Epistemic Value?

1Introduction

My purpose in this paper is to examine whether Pyrrhonian scepticism, as this stance is described in Sextus Empiricus’sextant works,has practical or epistemic value. More precisely, Iwould like to consider whether the Pyrrhonist’ssuspension of judgment (epochē)and undisturbedness (ataraxia)can be deemed to be of practical or epistemic value. By “practical” value Imean both moral value and prudential value. Moral value refers to moral rightness and wrongness; prudential value to personal or social well-being.Hence, when Iask whether the Pyrrhonist’ssuspension and undisturbedness have practical value, Imean whether they make us behave in amannerthat is morallyright or wrong,and whether they allow us to attain those goals thatwould make it possible to live well. As for “epistemic” value, it ba- sicallyrefers to the values of attaining truth and avoiding error. Hence, when Iask whether the Pyrrhonist’ssuspension has epistemic value, Imean whether it allows us to attain truth and avoid error.Mymain focus will be the practical value of both suspension and undisturbedness, because this is the value thatscholars of ancient philosophycritical of Pyrrhonism have emphasised. The reason for examining the epistemic value of suspension is thatdoing so will enable afuller assessment of the significance of Pyrrhonism as akind of philosophy, which is my primary concern. Iwill begin by brieflydescribing the states of suspension and undisturbedness and their connection, and by succinctlyconsideringsome objections to the effect that,despite claiming to suspend judgmentacross the board, Pyrrhonists actually hold anumber of beliefs. Thiswill provide the necessary framework for the subsequent discussions. Iwill then criticallyengagewith interpreters who have called into question the practical value of undisturbedness and suspension. Next,Iwill examine what the epistemic value of suspension might be.Iwillend by considering whether,from acontemporary vantage point,one must conclude that Pyrrhonism has no practical or epistemic value, and hence thatitisofnophilosophical interest.¹

This paper is asubstantially revised and expanded versionofanarticle originally publishedinDutch as “De praktische en epistemische waarde vanhet pyrronisme,” Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (2016): 73‒98. Fortheir comments, Iwould like to reiterate my thanks to the anonymous reviewer forthat journal and to Jan Willem Wieland, and to express my gratitude to the anonymous reviewer for the present volume.

 Sextus employs “sceptic” and “Pyrrhonist” (and their respective cognates) interchangeably. Iwill do the same. Iwill also follow him in usingthe term “dogmatist” to refer to anyone whomakes as-

OpenAccess. ©2019 Diego E. Machuca, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-004 44 DiegoE.Machuca

2Suspension and Undisturbedness

When someone with even aslight familiarity with ancient Pyrrhonism thinks of it, two notions invariablycome to mind, namely, epochē and ataraxia. Thisisperfectly reasonable. Consider,for instance, the definition of scepticism that Sextus offers at the beginning of his best-known work, the Pyrrhonian Outlines:

The sceptical [way] is an ability to set up oppositionsamong things that appear and things that arethoughtinany waywhatsoever,anability fromwhich we come,through the equipollencein the opposed objects and arguments,first to suspensionofjudgment and after that to undisturbedness (PH 1.8).²

At PH 1.10,Sextus defines equipollence or equal force(isostheneia)as“equality in respect of credibility and lack of credibility,sothatnone of the conflictingarguments takes precedence over anyotherasmore credible” (cf. PH 1.190,196,202); suspension as “astandstill of the intellect owing to which we neither denynor affirm anything” (cf. PH 1.192, 196); and undisturbedness as “lack of perturbation and calmness of soul.” Undisturbedness is not onlythe mental state at which the Pyrrhonist has arrivedafter suspending judgment,but the goal thatprompted the Pyrrhonist-tobe to engageinphilosophical inquiry in the first place. Indeed, Sextus tells us that the hope of becomingundisturbed is the “causal principle” (i.e., the initial motivation) of the sceptical philosophy(PH 1.12), and that so far the Pyrrhonist’saim is both undisturbedness in matters of opinion and moderation of affection (metriopatheia)inthose thingsthat are unavoidable (PH 1.25,30; cf. PH 1.18, 215; 3.235). Ac- cording to Sextus’sdescription of the Pyrrhonist’sphilosophical itinerary (PH 1.12, 26,29; cf. AM 1.6), the Pyrrhonist-to-bewas disturbed by the variation (anōmalia) he found in both perceptual and intellectual appearances and was in astate of aporia as to which of them he should assent to. Forinstance, the same object appeared to him to have conflictingperceptual properties depending on different spatial and quantitative variables,orthe same moral view appearedtohim to be both convincing and unconvincing depending on the vantage point from which it was considered. To removethat state of disturbance, the Pyrrhonist undertook philosophical investigation in order to determine which appearances are true and which are false. However, he was unable to do this owing to the seeming equipollence of the conflictingap- pearances,and so he suspended judgment.Tohis surprise, by suspendingjudgment he attained the state of undisturbedness that he was seeking all along—there being thus acontrast between the wayundisturbedness was initiallyexpected to be at-

sertions about how things reallyare on the basis of what they regardasobjective evidenceand sound arguments.  References to Sextus’sworks are supplied in parenthesis in the bodyofthe text,usingthe following abbreviations:PH(Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes), AM (Adversus Mathematicos), and AD (Adversus Dog- maticos =AM7‒11). All translations aremyown. Does Pyrrhonism HavePracticalorEpistemic Value? 45

tained and the wayitwas in fact finally attained. Sextus emphasises that undisturbedness has closelyfollowed suspension of judgment by chance (PH 1.26, 29) and as a shadow follows abody(PH 1.29). Sextusdoes not limit himself to reporting thatundisturbedness has in fact followed suspension. In the first and third booksofPH, and aboveall in Against the Ethicists (AD5=AM11), he also explains whyholding beliefs about how thingsreally are prevents one from becomingundisturbed,offering at the same time an account of how suspensionleadstoundisturbedness, and also to happiness. His explanation focuses exclusively on evaluative beliefs:the presenceofthe thingsone believes to be good and of those one believes to be bad produces perturbation. Forwhen a person lacks what he regards as good, on the one hand he intenselydesires to obtain it and, on the other,hethinks he is persecuted by thingsnaturallybad and restlessly tries to escape them. If he acquires what he considers to be good, he is nonetheless troubled both because he is irrationallyand immoderatelyelated and because he is afraid of losing it (PH 1.27,3.237,277;AD5.116‒17,146). Forthis reason, even when he is not directlydisturbed by the presenceofthose thingshedeems to be bad, he continues to be troubled by his constantlyguardingagainst them (AD5.117,129). In addition,those who believethat thingsare by nature good or bad are unhappy or can never attain happiness (AD5.111, 113,118, 130,144) inasmuchas“all unhappiness occurs because of some disturbance” (AD5.112; cf. 141). Unlikethe belief that thingsare by nature good or bad, suspension of judgment on the matter makes it possible to attain undisturbedness and happiness,and hencetolead asatisfactory life (PH 1.28;AD5.111,144,160,168;see alsoPH3.235;AD5.147,150), for thosewho suspend judgment “neither avoid nor pursue anything intensely” (PH 1.28). It should be noted that Sextus remarks thatundisturbedness supervenes upon suspension of judgment about all things(PH 1.31, 205; AD 5.144; cf. AD 5.160,168), which meansthat the attainment of undisturbedness has so far occurred onlywhen the sceptic has suspended judgment about all the matters he has investigated—both thosethat concern values and those that do not.The sceptic cannot of course rule out the possibility that others will attain undisturbednessbysuspending judgment onlyabout some beliefs, but givenhis past experience, it appears to him that undisturbedness will be attained onlywhen completesuspension is adopted.³ Despite what Sextus says in some of the passages just referred to,the Pyrrhonist is not free from all disturbance and hence cannot attaincompletehappiness, since not all disturbance is due to the intense pursuit of the thingsconsidered as good and the intense avoidance of the thingsconsidered as bad. Forthe Pyrrhonist is disturbed by certain thingsthat imposethemselvesupon him, such as thirst and hunger (PH

 Ihaveelsewhere argued that,inSextus’saccount of Pyrrhonism, one can identify three distinct causes of disturbanceconcerningmatters of opinion and that the holding of evaluative beliefs is the ultimatesource of doxastic disturbancebyreferencetowhich the other twocan be explained. See DiegoMachuca, “Sources of Doxastic DisturbanceinSextus Empiricus,” OxfordStudies in Ancient Philosophy 56 (2019). 46 DiegoE.Machuca

1.29;AD5.143,148‒50,156‒58;cf. PH 1.13,24). Yetheisbetter off with regard to these unpleasant affections(pathē)than the dogmatist, since he does not experience the additional disturbance induced by the belief thatsuch affections are by nature bad; it is preciselythe absence of thatbelief that renders them moderate and more easilyborne (PH 1.30,3.235‒36;AD5.118, 150‒55,161;see also AD 5.128‒29, 145, 156‒60). The existenceofthose involuntary affections is the reason whySextus says that moderation of affection in thingsunavoidable is, along with undisturbedness in matters of opinion, the sceptical aim. It might be objected that,despite claiming to suspend judgment across the board, Sextus holds anumber of beliefs about the natureofcertain mental states as well as about the meansfor,and the hindrance to, the attainment of suspension and undisturbedness. First,undisturbedness is presented as the corecomponent of human happiness and is hence deemed to be good or worthyofpursuit.Second, the state of disturbance,caused by the holding of beliefs, is considered as something bad or to be avoided. Third,thereexists acausal link between undisturbedness and suspension, which makes the latter adesirable state. Fourth,the Pyrrhonist believes that the opposing arguments he usesare, because of their objectiveequipol- lence, an effective meanstoinducesuspension. Forreasons of space, Iwill limit myself to making afew remarks in responseto that general objection. First,the Pyrrhonist suspendsjudgment or makes no determi- nations about the intrinsic value of anything (PH 1.28, 163; 3.178, 182, 235), and hence he does not believethat undisturbedness is objectively good or worthyofpursuit, and thatdisturbance is objectivelybad or to be avoided.Rather,these twostates appear to him to be, respectively, good and bad for himself and others, and hence when talking about them he is merelyreporting on how thingshavesofar appeared to him. At one point,Sextusexplicitlyobserves that,whenever the Pyrrhonist says that some thingsare good and others bad, he is simply reportingonhow they appeartohim (AD5.19‒20). Secondly, by saying that undisturbedness followed suspensionbychance, Sex- tus intends to express his characteristic caution, which prevents him from asserting that thingsare by nature such that undisturbedness can onlybereached by suspending judgment.Ofcourse, he does not denyanecessary connection between them either.Heissimplyrestricting himself to describingwhat has hitherto occurred to him and others, without making anyassertions about the causal connection between those states.Bylikeningthe connection between suspension and undisturbedness to thatofabodyand its shadow, he is not being inconsistent.For one must not put the emphasis on the fact that ashadow always and necessarily follows abody when the bodyblocks light,but on the fact that in this situation there is a close connection between them. Sextus’sintention is onlytoemphasise that up until now the Does PyrrhonismHavePractical or Epistemic Value? 47

sceptic’ssuspension has been closely accompanied by the state of undisturbedness.⁴ Although the sceptic does not assert thatsuspension causes undisturbedness, given his past experience he has the expectation that undisturbedness willcontinue to follow upon his suspension of judgment about everything.And if undisturbednessre- mains an aim he hopes to achieve, this will be amotivation for suspendingjudgment.The sameconsiderations applytothe connection between the holding of beliefs and the state of disturbance:the sceptic onlyreports on his own experience. Thirdly, Sextus does not believethat the arguments he has so far examined are objectivelyequipollent or equallycredible, but onlyreports that they appear so to him (PH 1.196,203). He employs certain types of arguments not because he can as- sure us thatthere is anecessary connection between them and suspension, but simplybecause those arguments have thus farbeen successful in inducingthis state in himself and others. But this would be onlyapart of his response, giventhat,atPH 3.280‒81, he tells us thatthe Pyrrhonist employs anytherapeutic argument that makes it possibletoinducesuspension in his dogmatic patients.⁵ This shows that the Pyrrhonist does not restrict himself to utilising the arguments that have induced suspension in himself and his past patients, but mayalso use other arguments that have not proven similarlysuccessful. Or—to put it another way—it shows that the arguments that have induced suspension in the Pyrrhonist and his past patients may not achievethe sameresults with future patients. Afinal and related point concerns the following question: when the Pyrrhonist suspendsjudgment in the face of disagreements between equipollent positions, is the connection between equipollence and suspension to be interpreted as arequirement of rationality or as amerelypsychological constraint? Somescholars have defended arationalist interpretation accordingtowhich by suspendingjudgment the Pyrrhonist is abidingbythe following principle or norm of rationality:one is ration- allyrequired to suspend judgment about p in the face of adisagreement between views on p that strike one as equipollent. Others have defended the psychological interpretation accordingtowhich suspension is the involuntary psychological effect of being confronted with rival views thatappear to one to be equipollent.Given that the Pyrrhonist is athinking being (PH 1.24) who is hardwired to respond in specific ways,heisaffectedbythe consideration of arguments pro and con p and automati- callyreacts in agiven way, even though he refrains from making assertions about both whether thosearguments are sound and whether they are objectively equipollent.Iwill not enter here into the debate between the two interpretations, limiting

 See DiegoMachuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” Ancient Philosophy 26 (2006): 116.  On the Pyrrhonist’sargumentative therapy,see Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 129‒34;Machuca, “Argumentative Persuasiveness in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” Méthexis 22 (2009): 102, 112; Machuca, “Pyrrhonian Argumentation: Therapy, Dialectic, and Inquiry,” Apeiron 52 (2019): 199‒221. 48 DiegoE.Machuca

myself to saying thatIside with the psychological interpretation.⁶ As we willsee in Section 4, the assessment of the epistemic value of suspension seems to partiallyde- pend on which interpretation is correct.

3The PracticalValue of Suspension and Undisturbedness

Whereas Sextus’sexplanation of how holding value beliefs producesdisturbance maytoacertain extent sound plausible from acontemporary vantage point,the references to undisturbedness and happiness sound alien to those who are todayinthe business of philosophy. The reason is that, in general, philosophydoes not have much to do with our well-beinganymore. Moreover,the claim that undisturbedness follows upon suspension maysoundstrangebecause we do not believethat we could ever getrid of much of what disturbs us in our livesbysuspending judgment across the board. These and similar reasons no doubtexplain whysystematic discussions of Pyrrhonian scepticism in contemporary analytic philosophyhaveentirelyig- nored what Sextus says about undisturbedness, focusingfor the most part on the epistemologicalimplications of the so-called “Five Modes of Agrippa” and,toaless- er degree, on whether it is possibletoeschewall beliefs and to act accordingly.Itis nonetheless worthwhile to examine what practical value there maybeinPyrrhonian suspension and undisturbedness, because some scholars of ancientphilosophyhave called into question boththeir prudential and their moralvalue. Iwillreview their criticisms and attempt to address them—at least in part. One of the strongest and most common chargeslevelled in antiquity against both Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism is the inactivity (apraxia)objection, of which there werevarious versions. Accordingtothat objection, the denial of all knowledge and the suspension of all judgment should be rejected because they make it impossible either to performany actionatall, or to act in certain ways (morally, sensibly, or rationally).⁷ Similar pragmatic responses to scepticism are found among interpreters of Pyrrhonism, some of whom have contested the prudential value of both suspension of judgment and undisturbedness.⁸ Forinstance,ithas been argued that most

 See DiegoMachuca, “Pyrrhonism and the LawofNon-Contradiction,” in Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and ContemporaryPhilosophy,ed. DiegoMachuca (Dordrecht: Springer,2011), sec. 5; Machu- ca, “Pyrrhonism,Inquiry,and Rationality,” Elenchos 34 (2013): sec. 4.  Iexamine the various versions of the objection and the replies offeredbyArcesilaus and Sextus in Machuca, “Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité,” in Les raisons du doute: études sur le scepticisme antique,eds.DiegoMachuca and Stéphane Marchand (Paris:ClassiquesGarnier,2019), 53‒87.  The attempt to refute scepticism (of one kind or another)byfocusingonits practical consequences is still todayacommon manoeuvre among both philosophers and ordinary people, whousuallydis- card scepticism because its implications aredisastrous,depressing, or immoral. Even in current discussions of the epistemic significanceofdisagreement,suspensionofjudgment is sometimes rejected Does Pyrrhonism Have Practical or Epistemic Value? 49

theoretical puzzles, difficulties,ordisagreements do not bringabout anxiety but are rather exciting and enthralling⁹;that it is unreasonable or ridiculoustothink that suspension can eliminate or mitigate the disturbance aperson experiencesorthat suspension is areliable recipe for tranquillity¹⁰;that belief in objectivevalues produces asense of security,not anxiety¹¹;and thatitishighlydoubtful that the attainment of undisturbedness is either desirable or psychologicallypossible.¹² If anyof this weretrue, then the prudential value of suspension and undisturbedness would be undermined. Forinthose cases in which unresolveddisagreements do not cause anxiety,there is nothing to be removedthrough suspension,while in those cases in which there is indeed anxiety concerning matters of belief, suspension is useless either because it is not efficacious in removingthatanxiety or because it is simplyimpossibletoachievethatgoal givenhuman beings’ psychological makeup. And even if it werepsychologicallypossible to attain the state of undisturbedness by suspendingjudgment, living an undisturbed life is not appealing or desirable because it would deprive us of all excitement. In response, let me first note that the abovecriticisms overlook the fact that it seems to be one’sown psychological makeup and one’spersonal history that determine to aconsiderable extent what causes anxiety in an individual, whether one regards an undisturbedlife as liberatingordepressing, and whether one is able to attain undisturbedness by suspending judgment or in anyotherway.¹³ Forinstance, some logicians and mathematicians seem to be distressed by their failuretofind solutions to certain logical and mathematical paradoxeswhile others do not,even

because of its allegedlydamagingpractical effects.See DiegoMachuca, “Conciliationism and the MenaceofScepticism,” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 54,no. 3(September 2015): sec. 3. This shows—pace Suzanne Obdrzalek, “From Skepticism to Paralysis:The Apraxia Argument in Cic- ero’s Academica,” Ancient Philosophy 32 (2012): 388‒90—that to replytoscepticism by pointingtoits practical consequences is not foreign to contemporary epistemological discussions.  See Benson Mates, TheSkeptic Way: Sextus Empiricus’s OutlinesofPyrrhonism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 63,75‒76;Jonathan Barnes, IntroductiontoSextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scep- ticism,trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, 2nd ed. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2000), xxx‒xxxi.  See Mates, TheSkeptic Way,63, 76‒77;Barnes, Introduction, xxxi; RichardBett, “Le scepticisme ancien est-il viable aujourd’hui?” in Les raisons du doute: études sur le scepticisme antique,eds.Diego Machuca and Stéphane Marchand (Paris:Classiques Garnier,2019), 172.  See Julia Annas, “Doing without Objective Values: Ancient and Modern Strategies,” in Compan- ions to Ancient Thought IV:Ethics,ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1998), 208, 213.  See Gisela Striker, “Historical ReflectionsonClassical Pyrrhonism and Neo-Pyrrhonism,” in Pyr- rhonian Skepticism,ed. WalterSinnott-Armstrong (New York: OxfordUniversityPress, 2004), 22;Strik- er, “Academics versus Pyrrhonists, Reconsidered,” in TheCambridge Companion to Ancient Scepti- cism,ed. RichardBett (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2010), 196.  See Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 124. Cf. Mark McPherran, “Ataraxia and Eudaimonia in AncientPyrrhonism: Is the Skeptic ReallyHappy?” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 5(1989): 150. 50 DiegoE.Machuca

though all of them care about theirresearch and believethat it has epistemic value, and perhaps even prudential value. Similarly, some people want to live alife of constant excitement,vertigo, and risk, and their heart would thereforesink at the prospects of alife characterised by the Pyrrhonist’sundisturbedness; but others do prefer an undisturbed life. Moreover,some might even regard an undisturbed life as exciting.Finally, the person taking up the Pyrrhonian attitude mayeither enjoyalaid- back and indifferent state of mind—being aware as he is of the unavoidable complexity of thingsand having,asitwere, seen it all before—or else experience profound angst—due to the uncertainty caused by unresolveddisagreements and the hesitation about what he is supposed to do in the absenceofanepistemic criterion that would allow us to determine what is true and what is false. Forinstance, the realisation thatone cannot establish whether there exist objectivemoral values might spare aperson the anguishsuffered by thosewho believethat an action they have per- formedismorallywrong, or else might lead that person to depression or distress. Whether,being aPyrrhonist,one finds oneself in one or the other of these states seems to depend on one’spersonality or temperament.Consider the indisputable, albeit often overlooked, fact that people react in strikingly distinct ways both while and after facing extremelyharsh situations. Forexample, while some people have been able to survive concentration camps or civil warsand then to rebuild their livesinremotecountries after losing literallyeverythingand without seeking revenge,manyofusfind their reactions extremelyhard to understand and would most probablyhavebeen incapable of behaving in the same way. Consider also how some religious believers lead an anguished life despite their belief in the exis- tenceofabenevolent and provident god, while some agnostics lead afulfilling life despite their suspension of judgment on the matter.Itherefore do not think that there are sufficient grounds for regardingSextus’sreportthat some people were able to become undisturbedafter suspendingjudgment as ridiculousorfalse, unless one believes that one is entitled to generalise one’sown experience and dismiss a person’sreportofhis experience when it is radicallydifferent.Suspension mayor maynot continue to work for the Pyrrhonist in the future and it mayormay not work for other people; it is up to each individual to try it and see, so thatthere is no room for prejudices about its possible success. Idonot mean to suggest that one must accept as true every testimonyone hears, but onlythat one should be ex- tremelycautious when discardingsomeone’sreportonhis own experience.¹⁴ We should keep in mind that Sextus does not intend to provide arecipe for becoming undisturbed or for attaining happiness,but onlyreports on what has so faroccurred to him and others, and offers what appears to him as atentative explanation of that experience.Insum, it does not seem possibletodetermine apriori whether suspen-

 See Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 124. Cf. McPherran, “Ataraxia and Eudaimonia in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” 150,171. Does PyrrhonismHavePractical or Epistemic Value? 51

sion and undisturbedness have anyprudential value, i.e., whether they either con- tribute to or make possiblethe attainment of thosegoals we seek in order to live well. MarthaNussbaum is the interpreter who has most vehementlycriticised Pyrrhon- ism on account of its practical consequences, focusingonthe moral and political value of suspension and undisturbedness. Her attack on Pyrrhonism in “Equilibrium: Scepticism and Immersion in PoliticalDeliberation” is conducted by contrasting it with John Rawls’smoral and political philosophy.¹⁵ Although she does not distinguish between them, Nussbaum in fact follows two different lines of argument: (1) one thatcalls attention to the supposedlyharmful practical implications of Pyrrhon- ism¹⁶;and (2)one that calls attention either (a) to the Pyrrhonist’salleged inconsis- tencyinbelieving in the value of undisturbedness and in being confident in the efficacy of his means to attain it,¹⁷ or (b)tohis alleged failuretoshow the impossibility of the kind of justification that Rawls provided for our moral and political choices.¹⁸ These two lines of argument can be labelled, respectively, “pragmatic” and “epistemic.” Note that,werethe epistemic line of argument successful, there would be no need for the pragmatic: if the Pyrrhonist wereinconsistent or did not succeed in un- derminingthe epistemic justification of our moral and political beliefs and practices, then therewould be no reason for worryingabout the pragmatic consequences of adopting his sceptical outlook. The primary purpose of Nussbaum’sessay, though, is to develop the pragmatic line of argument,mostprobablybecause she is shocked by what she takes to be the deeplydamagingeffectsofPyrrhonism and because she thinks thereisathreatening revival of Pyrrhonism in certain postmodernistthinkers and in the popular part of our public culture.¹⁹ Iwill refrain from addressinghere the epistemic line of argument mainlybecause Iamparticularlyinterested in Nuss- baum’spragmatic line of argument,but also because Ihavedealt with the kind of inconsistency she ascribes to the Pyrrhonist in the previous section and elsewhere²⁰ and because Ithink she simplyunderestimates the sceptical challengethat disagree-

 Martha Nussbaum, “Equilibrium: Scepticism and ImmersioninPolitical Deliberation,” in Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition (Acta Philosophica Fennica 66), ed. Juha Sihvola (Helsinki: So- cietas Philosophica Fennica, 2000), 171‒97.  Nussbaum, 191‒94.  Nussbaum, 189‒92.  Nussbaum, 183‒87.  In previous work, Nussbaumfocused at greater length on the epistemic line of argument.See Martha Nussbaum, “Skeptic Purgatives: Disturbanceand the Life without Belief,” in TheTherapy of Desire: Theoryand Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1994), 300‒306;Nussbaum, “Skepticism about Practical Reason in Literatureand the Law,” Harvard Law Review 107(1994): 733‒36.Although Nussbaumalso developed the pragmatic line of argument (see “Skeptic Purgatives,” 313‒15; “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” 737‒39,742), she nonetheless sawsome practical benefits in adoptingthe Pyrrhonian outlook (see “Skeptic Purgatives,” 313; “Skep- ticism about Practical Reason,” 738, 742).In“Skepticism about Practical Reason,” she discusses at greater length the views of those she regards as the contemporary counterparts of ancient Pyrrhon- ism.  See Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 115‒23,132‒33. 52 DiegoE.Machuca

ment poses to the task of epistemicallyjustifying our moraland political beliefs and practices. Nussbaum claims thatPyrrhonism is both “morallyand politically pernicious.”²¹ The Pyrrhonist’sdenial of the possibilityofreachingaconsensus among rival positions and his loss of commitment to normative beliefs are the sort of views that made the rise of Nazism possible and that could enable the recurrenceofsomething similar.The reason is that,for the Pyrrhonist,the choice of apolitical regime cannot be based on reason, but onlyonthe playofforces. She expresses aworry common among anti-sceptics:

[A]person who sees himself and his political life as simplyaspaceinwhich forces playthem- selvesout cannot be reliedonfor the same committed behaviour we can demand from aperson whosees justice as possible and worthyofprofound commitment and sacrifice. Aperson who views every claim as havingits equallypowerful counterclaim and his inclination to one side as mere antiquated habit is not likelytostick up for those habits in the waythat someone will who believes that they arejustifiable by arational procedure.²²

In addition, undisturbedness is not always desirable, for

the world in which we live is disturbing; disturbance is arational response to it.And the person whoiswith good reason disturbed,and who sees her disturbance as well grounded, will not be satisfied, likethe sceptic, by the removal of disturbance within her own person.²³

She even goes as far as to affirm thatPyrrhonism is

profoundlyselfish, indeed solipsistic … seen as aprogram for philosophyinaneedyand troubled world containingurgent human problems. … If philosophyisonlycapable of makingthe individualpractitioner feel calm, then Socrates’senemies would be right: philosophyisadan- gerousform of self-indulgence, subversive of democracy,and its teachers arecorrupters of the young.Fortunately, philosophyiscapable of much morethan that.²⁴

Nussbaum also thinks that Pyrrhonism deprivesusofpart of what makes us human. Forbysuspendingjudgment,motivated by his desire for undisturbedness, the Pyrrhonist loses his normative commitments, and when these go, “something fundamental to humanitygoes out with them, something that is integraltoour ability to care for another and act on another’sbehalf.”²⁵ She adds that

human beings arenot onlyinstinctual but also ethical creatures, whodocare about getting things right and do commit themselvestoviews of the good, modifyingtheir animal behavior accordingly.This means that the sceptic cannot straightforwardlyclaim to be allowingustofol-

 Nussbaum, “Equilibrium,” 171.  Nussbaum, 192‒93.Cf. Annas, “Doing without Objective Values,” 211‒12.  Nussbaum, “Equilibrium,” 193.  Nussbaum, 194.  Nussbaum, 173. Does PyrrhonismHavePractical or Epistemic Value? 53

low our nature: he must admit that he is removingorcurtailingsomethingthat is fundamental in the natures of most human beings.²⁶

Thus, Nussbaum believes that the Pyrrhonist (i) is immoral, (ii) is unreliable, (iii) does not care about others, and (iv) removes something essentialtoour human nature. Iwill make six sets of remarks in replytoNussbaum’sfour criticisms. The first thing to be noted is that Nussbaum commits a petitio principii inasmuch as she takesfor granted thatabout which the Pyrrhonist suspendsjudgment,namely,the existenceofsomething that is objectivelyright or wrong. Instead of establish- ing the truth of the belief, called into question by the Pyrrhonist,thatcertain things are morallygood or bad, Nussbaum begsthe question by assumingthe truth of that belief in her attack on Pyrrhonism. In her view,the world in which we live is disturbing because there are morallybad thingsthat occur that cause indignation and dis- approval—such as the rise of certain political regimes responsible for mass murder— and so looking for personal undisturbednessisobjectively wrong. This is whythe Pyrrhonist is portrayedasselfish, solipsistic, politicallysubversive,and corruptive. These claims, even if they weretrue, have forceonlyfor thosewho are already moral realists;and Ithink it is acceptable to criticise the Pyrrhonist if one adopts such apoint of view.But it should be borne in mind that,indoing so, one has not engaged the Pyrrhonist in philosophicaldebate, nor has one shown thatheis mistaken in suspendingjudgment in the moraldomain. Insofar as she does not discuss the Pyrrhonist’smetaethical arguments, Nussbaum’spragmatic line of argument is dialecticallyineffective. Secondly, it is amistake to claim that the Pyrrhonist is necessarily selfish, solipsistic,²⁷ politicallysubversive,orcorruptive,justasitisamistake to claim that he is necessarily philanthropic (despite what Sextus says at PH 3.280‒81), politicallycon-

 Nussbaum, 191.RichardBett makesasimilar point when claimingthat the Pyrrhonist’slack of moral commitments and the passivity shown in his practical decisionsreveal that he is not an ethi- callyengaged agent.See “HowEthical Can an Ancient Skeptic Be?” in Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy,ed. DiegoMachuca (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 3‒17.For this reason, he maintains,the sceptical life is not alife that people could reasonablywelcome or to which they could aspire. It is also worth notingthat arelated objection has recentlybeen raised by some interpretersonthe basis of aversion of the inactivity charge levelled by the Stoics against the Aca- demic sceptics:evenifthe Pyrrhonist’sscepticism does not condemn him to remain utterlyinactive, his actions arenot those of arational agent,for he does not believehecan offer anyepistemic reasons for his desiresand his decisions,and so Pyrrhonism deprivesusofthe rationality distinctive of human beings.Proponents of this objection include Casey Perin, TheDemands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Scepticism (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2010); Katja Vogt, “Scepticism and Ac- tion,” in TheCambridgeCompanion to Ancient Scepticism,ed. RichardBett(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2010), 165‒80;and JanWillem Wieland, “Can PyrrhonistsAct Normally?” Philosoph- ical Explorations 15,no. 3(September 2012): 277‒89.Ihave criticallydealtwith this objection in “Pyr- rhonism, Inquiry,and Rationality,” sec. 5, and in “Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité,” sec. 4.  Or individualistic, as Luciano Floridi has called him in Sextus Empiricus: TheTransmissionand Recovery of Pyrrhonism (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2002), 32. 54 DiegoE.Machuca

servative or conformist (despite following the laws and customs of his community, PH 1.23‒24),²⁸ or tolerant (despitethe fact thatheisunable to resolve disagreements and hence cannot reject anyview on epistemic grounds). Forwhether the Pyrrhonist adopts one or the other of these attitudes depends on circumstantial factors,such as his psychological makeup, his upbringing, his education, his life experiences,and his socio-culturalcontext.²⁹ None of these attitudes is necessarilyentailed by the suspension of judgment or the adoption of what appears (to phainomenon)asthe criterion of action (PH 1.21‒24;AD1.30 [= AM 7. 30]). Insofar as he continues to suspend judgment across the board, the Pyrrhonist has no epistemic reasons either to embrace or to reject agiven attitude, and so he will, as Nussbaum pointsout,let the playofforces drive him—aplayofforces that nonetheless is not totallypassive as it includes the exercise of the natural capability of thinking (PH 1.24).³⁰ But this means that nothing rules out the possibility that the Pyrrhonist may, for example, have been raised in afamilial and social context in which philanthropy is deemed to be morallycorrect,and that the waythingsnon-doxasticallyappear to him now is shaped by such aconception. By the sametoken, nothing rules out the possibility that he maybeselfish and individualistic because of the upbringinghereceivedor because of his life experiences.The samegoes for the Pyrrhonist’salleged conserva- tism or conformism, for he mayhavebeen raised so as to oppose authority and the accepted ways of conducting oneself.³¹ Similarly, the fact thathecannot reject a givenposition on the basisofits being incorrect or epistemicallyunjustified does not entail that he must be tolerant.For his suspension does not of course require that he respects all the views held in his community because such respect is the morallycorrect attitude. He mayresist certain positions simplybecause they constitutea practical hindrance to the wayinwhich he livesorsimplybecause they are emotion- allydisruptive.Now,Nussbaum herself recognises my point when she talks about the Pyrrhonist having an inclination towardsagivenattitude out of habit.She thinks that this makes him unreliable (a claim Iaddress next), but the point is that she should accept that this does not make him necessarily selfish, solipsistic, politically subversive,orcorruptive.Itisclear that,from the point of view of moral realists,the Pyrrhonist’ssuspension does not have moralvalue insofar as it does not entail the

 Bett writes about “the moregeneral conformism of the skeptic,” which he regards as an “unat- tractive feature” of the sceptic’sstance(“How Ethical Can an Ancient Skeptic Be?” 11).  See DiegoMachuca, Review of Luciano Floridi Sextus Empiricus:The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism, BritishJournal for the HistoryofPhilosophy 12, no. 2(2004): 338‒39;Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 134‒36.  On the Pyrrhonist’sextensive but non-normative use of reason,see DiegoMachuca, “Argumen- tative Persuasiveness,” 116‒23;Machuca, “Pyrrhonism and the LawofNon-Contradiction,” secs.4 and 5; Machuca, “Pyrrhonism, Inquiry,and Rationality,” sec. 4; Machuca, “Agrippan Pyrrhonism and the Challenge of Disagreement,” Journal of Philosophical Research 40 (2015): sec. 3; Machuca, “Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité,” sec. 5.  Here Idisagreewith Bett,who claims that it is “unlikelythat the skeptic will step far outside the status quo if … that would be difficultorunpopular” (“HowEthical Can an Ancient Skeptic Be?” 12). Does PyrrhonismHavePractical or Epistemic Value? 55

adoption of those attitudes they regard as morallycorrect.But,once again, this is entirelydifferent from claiming that he inevitably takes up attitudes that moralreal- ists regard as morallyincorrect.Someone might object thatthe Pyrrhonist’ssuspension lacks moral value all the same because, even though it does not preclude the adoption of an attitude of philanthropy,tolerance, or respect for accepted modes of conduct,such an adoption would not be basedonthe belief thatthese attitudes are morallycorrect.This maybesofrom the point of view of moral realists,but such an objection grantsthat the Pyrrhonist can conducthimself in away thatisnot selfish, individualistic, politically subversive,orcorruptive. Thirdly, from adescriptive point of view,Iam not sure thatpeople with strong commitments are in general reliable, nor that they are morereliable thanthose who lack such commitments and let the playofforces drive them. This is so even in those few cases in which people have reflected on their commitments and believe that they are epistemicallyjustified. Of all the religious believers and moral realists youknow,how manyare reliable becauseoftheirreligious and moral commitments? It maybethe case that someone is reliable preciselybecause he has strong commitments to certain principles and rules.But it seems clear that certain patterns of behaviour maybestrongerwhen they have been unreflectively acquiredinchildhood than when they are the resultofreflection, and in the former case they maybe much harder to dislodge even if one came to the conclusion that they have no rational basis. It is no doubt possiblethat such patterns of behaviour are strengthened by a processofreflection and justification, but the important point is that this does not mean thatthey are not strong enough to confer reliability on the person in whom they have been inculcated independentlyofsuch aprocess. Fourthly, as regards the claim that,bysuspendingjudgment about moral commitments, the Pyrrhonist deprivesusofpart of our human nature, two remarks are in order.The first is that, pace Nussbaum,³² the Pyrrhonist does not completely deprive us of our emotions, for it does not appeartobethe case that desiderative attitudes such as “anger,fear,jealousy,grief, envy,passionate love … all rest … upon belief”³³ and that “love, fear,grief” are based on “beliefs about worth.”³⁴ To be more precise, Idonot think that such emotions depend necessarily on belief. Forinstance, do animals, which do seem to experience anger,fear,grief, and affection, hold beliefs?Also, granting that atwo-year-old is capable of loving his mother, does he hold the belief that his mother is worth love? Andevenifhedoes, does he lovehis mother because he holds that belief?Someone could object that,evenifone granted thatemotions can be experiencedinthe absence of beliefs, Sextus’sascrip- tion of the state of undisturbedness to the Pyrrhonist indicates that he seeks to re- moveall emotions. One could replybynoting that,aswesaw in the previous section,

 Nussbaum, “Skeptic Purgatives,” 313‒14;Nussbaum, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” 737.  Nussbaum, “Skeptic Purgatives,” 313.  Nussbaum, “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” 737. 56 DiegoE.Machuca

one part of the twofold goal of scepticism is the moderation of affection in thingsthat are unavoidable, and by arguing that,among the affections in question, Sextus includes certain emotions. However,the examples he givesofunavoidable affections are always of aperceptual and physical kind: the feelingsofcold and heat,thirst and hunger (PH 1.13,24, 29,238;AD5.143,149,152), painand pleasure (AD5.143, 150,159)—wherethese seem to be understood exclusively in aphysical way—and the fact of having afever (AD5.156); he also speaks more generallyofthe wayone is affected perceptually(PH 3.236; AD 5.148). Inonetheless think that,whenSextus speaksofthe Pyrrhonist acting without opinionsinaccordancewith the laws and customs of his community (PH 1.17,23‒24,231, 237; AD 3.49,5.166),thereisanemo- tional component in the non-doxastic appearances he has by virtue of thosesocial norms. Note that Sextus points out thatthe Pyrrhonist,proceeding in accordance with traditional laws and customs,accepts that piety is good and impiety bad (PH 1.24), and thathewill choose one course of action and avoid the other if compelled by atyrant to do some unspeakable deed (AD5.166). It seems clear to me that this implies thatimpious actions induceanegative emotion and corresponding reaction in aPyrrhonist who belongstoagivensocio-culturalcontext.Similarly, if that Pyr- rhonist witnessed what moral realists regardasanunspeakable or forbidden deed, he might automaticallyexperience anegative emotion thatwould triggeragutreac- tion: for instance, if faced with an act of rape, murder,ortorture, he might experience avisceral response of repulsion and might do something to counter thatact, even though he suspendsjudgment about whether such an act is objectively bad or to be avoided.Ifmyinterpretation is on the right track, then even after suspending judgment about whether anything is objectively good or bad, the Pyrrhonist still experiences positive or negative emotions when confronted with certain situations.³⁵ Now,havingmoral emotions maybesufficient for us to be moral creatures. In this regard, note that, based on anumberofstudies in psychology, some moral psychol- ogists have called into question the rationalist view that moral judgment is caused by aprocess of conscious reasoning or reflection, claiming instead that it is primarily and directlycaused by moralintuitions and emotions. Forexample, accordingto the social intuitionist model defended by Jonathan Haidt,moral judgment is in general the resultofintuitions—i.e., quick,automatic, effortless, and affectively laden evaluations—and moral actionco-varies more with moralemotion thanwith moral reasoning. In his view,moral reasoningisusually nothing but an ex post facto process in which one seeks arguments that willjustify an already-made judgment with the aim of influencingthe intuitions and actions of others.³⁶

 Formoreonthis issue, see McPherran, “Ataraxia and Eudaimonia in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” 144, 154‒56;Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 131‒32;Machuca, “Argumentative Persuasiveness,” 123; Machuca, “Scepticisme, apraxia et rationalité,” sec. 4.  See Jonathan Haidt, “The Emotional Dogand ItsRational Tail: ASocial Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review 108, no. 4(October2001): 814‒34;Thalia Wheatley and Jon- Does Pyrrhonism Have Practical or Epistemic Value? 57

My second remark regarding Nussbaum’sclaim that the Pyrrhonist removes something thatisfundamental in the nature of most human beingsisthatthis would be aproblem onlyprovided that the thing removed is unquestionablygood. Giventhat it is clear that Nussbaum thinksthat the item removed is morallygood, Ishould repeat here my remark thatNussbaum assumes what she should prove when arguing against the Pyrrhonist:removingsomething that is deemed to be good by the moral realist is not aproblem for the Pyrrhonist inasmuch as he suspends judgment about whether anything is objectivelygood or bad. But setting the question of moral goodness aside, apresent-day Pyrrhonist could point out that not everyone agrees on the instrumental goodness or usefulnessofmorality, as is shown, for instance, by the contemporary metaethical disagreement on this issue. Moral error theorists maintain either thatall positive moral judgmentsare false because there are no objectivemoral properties,³⁷ or that they are all neither true nor false because the moral facts they presuppose do not exist.³⁸ However, among them there is adisagreement between moral fictionalists and moral abolitionists. The former claim that morality produces practical benefits (for example, personal happiness or political stability), and so that we should continue to make moral utterancesand have moral thoughts, while at the same time refraining from asserting such utterances and believing such thoughts. That is, even though moral realism is false, we should maintain the fiction that it is true.³⁹ One could arguethat moralfic- tionalists think that morality is instrumentallygood in that it is an effective meansto attain certain goals we seek. Moral abolitionists,bycontrast, contend thatmorality causes more suffering than it prevents, and that it is thereforedesirable and useful to abandon moral languageand thinkingaltogether.⁴⁰ Fifthly, and in connection with my previous remarks on the Pyrrhonist’semotions, the claim that his suspension prevents him from properlycaring about others overlooks the fact thatwhether one cares about someone or something seems to depend to aconsiderable extent on one’semotions rather thanonone’sbeliefs. A mother who instinctivelyreacts to save her child from danger does not saytoherself that she takes it to be true thatshe is morallyobliged to save her child or that her child is worth saving;infact,she maynot have formedthosebeliefs at all and might never form them. Youlikelycare about the well-beingofyour parents,your sib- lings, your children, your friends, or your spouse without having acquired the belief that youhavethe moral obligation to care about them or the belief that they are worth your care. Moreover,eventhough in some cases one concludes that one should

athan Haidt, “Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe,” Psychological Science 16, no. 10 (October 2005): 780‒84.  See John Leslie Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Rightand Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).  See RichardJoyce, TheMyth of Morality (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2001).  See Joyce, TheMyth of Morality.  See RichardGarner, “AbolishingMorality,” in AWorld without Values:EssaysonJohn Mackie’s MoralError Theory,eds.RichardJoyce and Simon Kirchin (Dordrecht: Springer,2010), 217‒33. 58 DiegoE.Machuca

not be concernedabout what might befall them, one will very likelybeconcernedall the same. Hence, the holding of beliefs does not seem to be a conditio sine qua non for loving your child, beingconcernedabout your dog’swell-being,orcaring about the resultofasoccer match. As Iargued above, it seems clear that the Pyrrhonist’s suspension does not do away with such emotions. Hence, Ithink that Julia Annas is mistaken when she claims that the Pyrrhonist cannot be concerned about others’ physical and emotional problems,⁴¹ i.e., their “mundane problems like toothache, poverty or unrequited love,” because “these could onlybother him if he believed that these werebad things, which of course he does not.”⁴² In her view,the Pyrrhon- ist can onlybebothered by others’ intellectual problems, i.e., by theirholding of beliefs, because thatiswhat he seeks to cure by means of his argumentative therapy, which is motivated by aphilanthropic attitude (PH 3.280‒81). If so, he could not be concerned about the well-being of another full-blown Pyrrhonist.Accordingtothe deflationary interpretation⁴³ to which Ireferred in my second setofremarks,neither philanthropy nor the therapeutic use of arguments should be viewed as definingfea- tures of Pyrrhonism: whether the Pyrrhonist is philanthropic or seeks to cure others of their dogmatism by means of argument willdepend on circumstantial factors. But then one can likewiseargue that nothing rules out the possibility thataPyrrhonist maybeemotionallytroubled by the unavoidable problems of others. APyrrhonist who happens to be philanthropic mayseek, by inducingsuspension, to remove the disturbance apparentlycaused in the dogmatists by their holding of beliefs, but he mayalsoseek to mitigate their unavoidable physical and emotional distur- bances because he maybeemotionallydistressed by the unavoidable suffering of anyone—whether adogmatist,anewlyconverted Pyrrhonist,oraveteran Pyrrhonist. Again, such distress willnot be the resultofthe holding of beliefs, but part of the emotionsthat impose themselvesonthe Pyrrhonist to the extent that he is affected by those psychological and social factors thathappen to influencehim. Someone will no doubt complain, once more, that this does not make the Pyrrhonist very reliable giventhathis concern about others’ problems of one kind or another will always be fortuitous or contingent.But Iamnot sure that this is different from the case of those who claim to care about others due to their beliefs or even reflectivebeliefs. Fortheir holding the beliefs they holdseems to be dependent to aconsiderable extent on circumstantial factors.Inaddition, we see on adailybasis how many who claim to be moral realists or religious believers and to reject inequality and unfair sufferingare entirelyindifferent to those in need. Therefore, we should conclude ei-

 Julia Annas, TheMorality of Happiness (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1993), 246‒48, 353.  Annas,246.  The reasonIcall my interpretation of certain aspects of Sextus’saccount of Pyrrhonism “deflationary” is simplythat Idonot take such aspects to be essential to this form of scepticism. My interpretation of the practical and epistemic value of Pyrrhonism is also deflationary inasmuch as, in my view,the Pyrrhonist does not think that his stancehas either kind of value in an objective sense. Does PyrrhonismHavePractical or Epistemic Value? 59

ther that they are being disingenuous in expressing theirnormative commitments, or that belief does not ensure genuine concern for others. Finally, Ithink it is important to make the probablyobvious remark that,evenif we grant thatPyrrhonism has no prudential or moral value, we should guard against mistaking pragmatic reasons for rejectingPyrrhonism (or other forms of scepticism) for epistemic reasons.The fact that Pyrrhonism represents ahindrance to the attainment of certain goals one takes to be crucial to one’spersonal or social life does not provethat Pyrrhonism is incoherent or false. To do so, one has to examine whether there are epistemic reasons for rejecting Pyrrhonism, and if one cannot find any, then one should be prepared to accept the pragmatic consequences of our inability to refute it,evenifthey are appalling. At least thosewho are in the business of philosophyshould swallow theirfear and follow wherethe arguments lead. Ishould emphasise that my aim has not been to defend the Pyrrhonist from the charge of immorality in the sense of showing thathenecessarilyconducts himself in amoral way, for whether he behavesmorallyorimmorallyfrom the point of view of non-Pyrrhonists depends on anumber of fortuitous factors. Nor have Iattempted to show thatPyrrhonism is adesirable or attractive philosophyinasmuchasitwould contributetoour well-being,for whether one finds it so will depend, to aconsiderable extent,oncontingent psychological factors.Myaim has instead been to dispel certain serious misunderstandingsregarding the Pyrrhonian stance.⁴⁴

4The Epistemic Value of Suspension

What about the epistemic value of the Pyrrhonist’ssuspension of judgment?What is its value concerningthe goals of attaining truth and avoiding error? The answer seems to depend in part on whose vantage point one adopts and in part on how one interprets the connection between equipollence and suspension. Let me address the second point first.Aswesaw in Section 2, such aconnection can be interpreted either as arequirement of rationalityorasamerelypsychological constraint.Ifthe Pyrrhonist’sreason for withholding assent whenever confronted with conflicting views on p that strike him as equipollent were acommitment on his part to investigating truth by applying the requirements of rationality, then the

 Forother replies to the charge that Pyrrhonism lacks practical valuethat somewhat complement the arguments advanced in the present section, see John Christian Laursen, “Yes, Skeptics Can Live Their Skepticism and Cope with TyrannyasWell as Anyone,” in Skepticism in Renaissance and Post- Renaissance Thought,eds.José Maia Netoand RichardPopkin (Amherst,NY: Humanity Books, 2004), 201‒23;Laursen, “The Moral Life of the Ancient Skeptics:LivinginAccordancewith Natureand Free- dom fromDisturbance,” Bolletino della Società Filosofica Italiana 219(2016): 5‒22;and Emidio Spine- lli, “Neither Philosophynor Politics?The Ancient Pyrrhonian Approach to EverydayLife,” in Skepti- cism and Political Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,eds.John Christian Laursen and GianniPaganini (University of TorontoPress: Toronto, 2015), 17‒35. 60 DiegoE.Machuca

epistemic value of his suspension would be clear.For,first,byrefraining from adopting aview on p in favour of which he does not have compellingevidence,the Pyr- rhonist seeks to avoid error.Second, by remainingengaged in rationallydriveninqui- ry,hekeeps searchingfor further evidence that could tip the balance in favour of one of the rival views on p,which would bring him closertothe truth. If, by contrast,the psychological interpretation of the connection between equipollence and suspension werecorrect,itcould be argued that Pyrrhonism does not have much to offer in terms of epistemic value. Foralthough the Pyrrhonist is athinking being who is hardwired to suspendjudgment when confronted with arguments pro and con p that strike him as equipollent, he refrains from making assertions about whether those arguments are sound, whether they are equipollent,and whether suspension is the correct rational response in the face of equipollent disagreement.The Pyrrhonist does suspend judgment,hedoes refrain from affirming thatinvestigation of truth is doomed to failure, and he does keep on inquiring into the various subjects about which people holdbeliefs.But although his suspension might make it possible to avoid error,hedoes not affirm that this is indeed the caseand that the avoidance of error is therefore one of his reasons for suspendingjudgment.And although his ongoing inquiry might make it possible to find the truth, he makesnoassertions about whether his inquiry is the correct meanstosearch for truth. In line with my deflationary interpretation of Pyrrhonism, Ithink thatthe Pyrrhonist’scontinuing engagement in philosophicalinquiry is to be explained by the influenceofpsycho- logical and social factors,and that his suspension onlyentails thathecannot affirm or denythat truth can be found. Ithink, however,that it is amistake to claim that Pyrrhonism is of no epistemic value if the psychological interpretation is correct,amistake thatbringsmetothe first point mentioned above. Forevenifthe Pyrrhonist himself refrains from affirming (or denying) the epistemic value of his suspension, this does not mean that the suspension he exercises lacks epistemic value from the vantage point of thosenon- Pyrrhonists who are committed to the requirement of rationality according to which one should suspend judgment when confronted with adispute one is unable to settle. From that vantage point,itcould also be argued that the epistemic value of Pyr- rhonian suspension consists in that it encourages or promotes the intellectual virtues of caution and humility,intwo respects.First,the Pyrrhonist’ssuspension is arecognition of his inability to give his assent to anyone of the partiestoagiven dispute, i.e., arecognitionthat he has so far been unable to settle the disagreements he has examined. He describes as arrogance, rashness, and self-satisfaction the attitudes of his rivals⁴⁵ inasmuchasthey holdfast to their views on p without taking careful account of rival views on p or even despite acknowledging the existenceofwidespread and entrenched disagreement over p. One could take the Pyrrhonian attitude to be a good antidote to jumpingtoconclusions and performing hasty actions. He lacks his

 See, for example, PH 1.20,90, 177, 3.235, 280‒81. Does Pyrrhonism Have Practical or Epistemic Value? 61

rivals’ overconfidence in the correctness of their own opinions and the reliability of their cognitive powers. In this regard, it is perhaps worth mentioningsome recent studies in psychologythat show thatunskilled people tend to suffer from “illusory superiority,” rating theircognitive abilitiesasabove average, whereas skilled people tend to suffer from “illusory inferiority,” underestimating or underratingtheir cognitive abilities.⁴⁶ One could arguethat Pyrrhonian suspension would protect us from this kind of epistemic bias, faced as we are with the difficulty of determining from which sort of illusion we might be suffering. Second, Pyrrhonian investigation is characterised by open-mindedness inasmuchasthe Pyrrhonist does not affirm (or deny) thatthe disagreements he has so far inspected are unresolvable in themselves, but carries on his philosophical inquiry into the disputed matters. In other words, the Pyrrhonist’spast failuretodiscover the truth in those matters (if there is any) does not lead him to claim that the search for truth is doomed to failure. Forhecannot rule out the possibility that,through further investigation, he might discover new evidence and arguments bearing on the disputed matters that will make it possible to adjudicatethe disagreements. Some people—probablymost—might nonetheless regard the Pyrrhonist’sacross- the-board suspension as lacking anyreal epistemic value in thatitpushes intellectual caution and humility to the extreme. They would arguethatthe Pyrrhonist ac- tuallymanifests the vices of intellectual cowardice and of undue timidity in one’s intellectual life. Foralthough there are cases in which suspension is indeedration- allyrequired by the equal forceofthe evidence and arguments in favour of each of the conflictingviews, in most cases we do have strong epistemic reasons for prefer- ring one of the views to the other(s).For this reason, they would also arguethat the Pyrrhonist is intellectuallydishonest when he claims that,inall the disagreements he has considered, the rival views strike him as equipollent.Inresponse, it should be remarked that, aside from the fact that the objectors’ own experience is different from the Pyrrhonist’s, there seems to be no reason for suspecting that the latter is not sincereortruthful whenreporting on what has happened to him up to this point.For it mayindeed be the case that the Pyrrhonist has found himself in the state of being at aloss how to resolve all those disagreements he has examined up to this point. Hence, Idonot think that the objectors can easilymaintain thatthe Pyrrhonist is disingenuous, although they could perhapsstill holdthat,from their own non-sceptical point of view,heisintellectuallycowardlyand undulytimid in his philosophical investigations.

 See, for example,Justin Krugerand David Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware of It:How Difficul- ties in RecognizingOne’sOwn IncompetenceLead to InflatedSelf-Assessments,” Journal of Person- ality and Social Psychology 77,no. 6(December 1999): 1121‒34;Joyce Ehrlinger, Kerri Johnson, Matthew Banner,David Dunning, and Justin Kruger, “Whythe Unskilled AreUnaware: Further Explorations of (Absent) Self-Insight amongthe Incompetent,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process- es 105,no. 1(January 2008): 98‒121. 62 DiegoE.Machuca

5Concluding Remarks

Does the Pyrrhonist promise us that,ifwesuspend judgment across the board, we will become undisturbed regarding matters of opinion?No, he does not because he cannot.Does he promise us that,ifweattain such amental state, we will find it enjoyable and will even achieveaconsiderable degree of happiness or well- being?No, he does not because he cannot.Does he promise us that the person who suspends judgment across the board will act morally? No, he does not because he cannot.Does he affirm that suspension has epistemic value in thatitallows us to attain truth and avoid error?No, he does not because he cannot.Does this all mean that suspension and undisturbedness have no practical or epistemic value for us and that readingSextus is of no philosophicalinterest to us?Ihave alreadypartiallyad- dressed this last question at the end of the previous section, but Iwould like to examine it further to conclude. Someone might indeed arguethat, if the Pyrrhonist has no doxastic commitment to the practical and the epistemic value of suspension and undisturbedness but only reports on the waythingshaveappeared to him up to this point,then his whole enterprise will look pointless and he will hardlywin new supporters.⁴⁷ Moreover,one might wonder whether Sextus’swritingsare of anyphilosophicalinterest insofar as throughout them he is merelyoffering apersonal testimonyonwhat has so far happened to him (e.g., PH 1.4, 187‒209). In reply, let me make two sets of remarks. To begin with, even though the absenceofassertionsmay lead manytoreject Sextus’swritingsout of hand, nothing necessarilyprecludes one from finding them philosophicallychallenging and intriguing. Foritisone thing how Sextus intends what he writes to be interpreted, and quiteanother how his readers react to his writingsorwhat use they can make of his writings. Forexample, someone maybe- lievethatsome of Sextus’sarguments are sound and have significant philosophical implications. Also, even if one rejects his stance as tooradical, one maystill find it philosophicallystimulating in that it challenges one to ponder more carefullyprob- lems concerning knowledge,justification, inquiry,disagreement,and action.⁴⁸ This in fact explains whyquite anumberofcontemporary epistemologists have engaged with the justificatory challenges posed by the Modes of Agrippa.Tobetter illustrate my point,let me refer to Henri Estienne’sexperience with Pyrrhonism as described in the prefacetohis Latin rendering of PH published in 1562.⁴⁹ In an autobiographical story of the genesis of the translation, he tells us that while afflicted by aquartan

 Cf. Nussbaum “Skeptic Purgatives,” 303;Nussbaum, “Equilibrium,” 189;and McPherran, “Atarax- ia and Eudaimonia in Ancient Pyrrhonism,” 139–40.  See Machuca, “Pyrrhonism,Inquiry,and Rationality,” 210n14.  Ihaveused the complete French translationofthe preface provided by Emmanuel Naya in “Tra- duire les Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes: Henri Estienne entrelafièvrequarteetlafolie chrétienne,” in Le scepticisme au XVIe et au XVIIe,ed. Pierre-François Moreau (Paris:Albin Michel, 2001), 48‒101. Does PyrrhonismHavePracticalorEpistemic Value? 63

fever thatwas causedbyanimmoderate studyofletters and that made him hate the very sight of books, he stumbled upon an incompleteand hasty translation of the main principles of the Pyrrhonian sect that he had made some time before.Its first readingimmediatelymade him laugh—subsequent readings having the sameef- fect—which in turn allowed him to overcomehis exhaustion and reconciled him with the letters.Byridiculing the doctrines of the dogmatic authors the readingofwhose works required so much intellectual effort,Sextus’swork had atherapeutic effect on Estienne,who therefore found Pyrrhonism of practical value. But,inEstienne’sview, it mayalso be of both practical and epistemic value to the dogmatists themselvesin- asmuch as it can renderthem humble by attacking the impudence and rashnessof their assertions, and by allowing them to recognisetheir cognitive limitations and to accept that the onlytruth is that of Revelation. By adopting such afideistic stance, Estienne took Pyrrhonism to be aremedynot onlyfor the aversion to the studyof letters people mayexperience after reading the dogmatists’ works,but also for the disease of impiety that affects the latter.Given such atwofold therapeutic effica- ciousness,Estienne decided to make PH available to thosewith no knowledge of Greek. Even though he recognises such acurative effect,hecautionsusagainst abus- ing the sceptical critical attitude by calling into question not onlythe erroneous thingssaid by the dogmatists but also thosethat are valuable, and despite observing at the outset that he has metamorphosed into asceptic, he laterremarks that he is not himself one and does not intend others to become sceptics. Although Estienne makes clear the fictive character of his autobiographical story,the benefitshe found in acertain application of Pyrrhonism are to be taken seriously. Sextus would of course reject afideistic use of Pyrrhonism on the grounds that those who made such ause would be doxasticallycommitted to certain metaphysical and religious views. But the issue under consideration is whether Pyrrhonism could be of practical or epistemic value to someone who is not aPyrrhonist,and hence who eschews some of his beliefs while retainingothers. In general, the fideis- tic use made of Pyrrhonism in Renaissance and modern philosophyisaclear example of the practical and epistemic value it mayhavefor non-sceptics. Secondly, it might well occur that some will identify with Sextus’saccount of his own experience or will be deeplyinfluenced by it.For it does not seem possible to establish apriori that Pyrrhonism is utterlyunappealing as aphilosophy.⁵⁰ Whether that is the casedepends on whether one values such attitudes as caution, open- mindedness, questioning,and intellectual modesty;and, if one does, on whether one thinksthose attitudes should be adopted across the board and on whether one thinks they are to be preferred to the sense of comfort or reassurance one mayexperience when confidentlyespousing, say, moralorreligious beliefs. Forin- stance, Iknow ascholar for whom the readingofSextus’swritingsprompts the experience of “being blissful,” in much the same wayasdoes the readingofcertain

 See Machuca, “The Pyrrhonist’s ἀταραξία and φιλανθρωπία,” 138. 64 DiegoE.Machuca

Buddhist texts.Also, if youmay forgive my being self-referential, Ishould point out that Ihavebeen readingSextus and been interested in Pyrrhonism as aphilosophy for almosttwenty years. Despite the deflationary interpretation of the epistemic and practical value of Pyrrhonism that Ihavedefended in this essay, Istill find that form of scepticism captivating and thought-provoking.This is duetothe fact that Iidentify both with the Pyrrhonist’sexperience of being at aloss how to resolve the entrenched and longstanding disagreements we encounter in philosophy, morality,politics, religion, and economics, and with his experience of finding oneself, whenever one carriesthe application of the logical and epistemological principles dictated by reason to the limit,inasituation of aporia in which such principles end up undermining themselves. Youmay still think thatSextus is not offering much, and youare of course free to think so. But just keep in mind thatothers maydisagree: the brand of Pyrrhonism presented in his writingsplayedanimportant part in the philosophical scene of the Imperial age, had atremendousimpact on Renaissance and modern philosophy thanks to the rediscovery of those writings,and continues to be atopic of lively discussion among both ancient philosophyscholars and analytic epistemologists.

Bibliography

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by John Christian Laursenand Gianni Paganini, 17‒35. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015. Striker,Gisela. “Academicsversus Pyrrhonists, Reconsidered.” In The Cambridge Companion to AncientScepticism,edited by RichardBett, 195‒207.Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2010. Striker,Gisela. “Historical Reflections on Classical Pyrrhonismand Neo-Pyrrhonism.” In Pyrrhonian Skepticism,edited by WalterSinnott-Armstrong,13‒24. New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 2004. Vogt,Katja. “Scepticism and Action.” In The Cambridge Companion to AncientScepticism,edited by RichardBett, 165‒80.Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2010. Wheatley,Thalia and Jonathan Haidt. “Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral JudgmentsMoreSevere.” Psychological Science 16, no. 10 (October 2005): 780‒84. Wieland, Jan Willem. “CanPyrrhonists Act Normally?” PhilosophicalExplorations 15, no. 3 (September 2012): 277‒89. HeidrunEichner endoxa and the TheologyofAristotle in Avicenna’s “Flying Man”:Contextsfor Similarities with Sceptical and Cartesian ArgumentsinAvicenna

Starting with the publication of a1927article by GiuseppeFurlani, Avicenna’s thoughtexperiment of aflying man (known as the “flying man argument,” the ab- breviation is FMA)has been investigated as apotential precursor of the Cartesian cogito.¹ The FMA refers to athought experiment that occurs in multiple forms with varied emphases in several Avicennian texts.² Arecent summary of the FMA-complex runs as follows:

We areaskedtoimagine that amature, fullyfunctioninghuman is created by God out of nothing.The human is in mid-air,his sight veiled and his limbs splayedsothat he is not touchinghis own body. Thereisnosound or smell. In other words, this person is in astate of total sensory deprivation. Furthermore, he has just been created, so he has no memories of prior sensory experience. Avicenna askedwhataperson in this situation could know.[…]Avicenna thoughtthat the flyingman would be awareofhis own existence. […]Afterall, Avicenna reasoned, the flying man’ssoul is awareofitself, but not of its body. How could this be, if the soul and bodywere the same thing?³

Avicenna’sFMA evokes some reminiscence of certain sceptical attitudes, but these are difficult to pinpoint in the textspresented below and seem to be restricted to

 Giuseppe Furlani, “Avicenna eil‘Cogito, ergo sum’ di Cartesio,” Islamica 3(1927): 53‒72.For alist and discussion of research articles up to the year 2000,see DagNikolaus Hasse, Avicenna’s “De anima” in the Latin West: TheFormationofaPeripateticPhilosophy of the Soul 1160‒1300 (London: WarburgInstitute, 2000), 80n5.  Foralist of references, see Hasse, Avicenna’s “De Anima,” 80‒6. In my contribution, Ilabel these texts as De Anima-type FMA (i.e., al-Šifāʾ,DeAnima 1.1and 5.7; al-Išārāt, Namaṭ 3, al-Risāla al-Aḍ- ḥawīya,chapter4). By endoxa-type FMA Iamreferring to passagescontained in sections on non-demonstrative premises,i.e., mostlydiscussions of endoxa (in various Arabic equivalents) versus primary conceptions.Ihave not been able to use Ahmet Özcan’sedition of the al-Ḥikma al-Mašriqīya, in his “İbn Sīnaʾnınel-Hikmetuʾl-meşrikiyyeadlı eseri ve tabiat felsefesi” (PhD thesis, Marmara Üni- versitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü,Istanbul, 1993). The references in Hasse, Avicenna’s “De Anima” suggest that the textruns parallel to the version contained in the Kitābal-Šifāʾ.  Peter Adamson, Philosophyinthe Islamic World. AVeryShort Introduction (New York: OxfordUni- versity Press, 2015), 84.While this account,and manyothers,ispresentedasakind of digest of the argument’score, some analyses include longer translations of the original texts. See for example Mi- chael Marmura, “Avicenna’s ‘FlyingMan’ in Context,” The Monist 69,no. 3(July 1986): 383‒95;Hasse, Avicenna’s “De anima,” 80‒87; Šifāʾ (De Anima) 1.1istranslated intoEnglish in JonMcGinnisand David C. Reisman, eds., ClassicalArabic Philosophy:AnAnthology of Sources (Indianapolis:Hackett, 2007), 178‒79.

OpenAccess. ©2019 Heidrun Eichner,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-005 68 HeidrunEichner

the vaguephenomenon of “doubting.” Scholars have become increasinglycautious about the comparison to Descartes(first made by Furlani) and have observed that the apparent similarities are rather superficial. Dag Hasse’semphasises the historical connections:nodirect or indirect connection between Avicenna’sand Descartes’srespective textscould be established so far.⁴ Ahmed Hasnaoui carries out aprofound analysis and comparison of the two philosophical projects,identifying three areas of difference: (1) while both philosophers systematicallyuse doubt as amethod, Des- cartes’sdoubt is general and metaphysical, whereas Avicenna’sdoubt concerns particular propositions.(2) ForDescartes, doubting,thinking,and being form atriad; knowledge of one’sexistenceisconstituted as aresultofdoubt. This is not the case with Avicenna. (3) While Descartes seeks to find an Archimedean point in order to establish astable base for certainty,Hasnaouisuggests that Avicenna seeks to establish an Eastern philosophythattranscends the philosophyofthe Cor- pus Aristotelicum.⁵ Based on the arguments’ goals, Peter Adamson spells out the differencebetween the two philosophersalong the following lines: Descartes is concerned with radical doubt, while Avicenna is concerned with soul and body, that is, with self-awareness.⁶ In this essay, Iwould like to suggest an interpretation of the FMA’sdevelopment that helps to strengthen our understanding of how elements that have been frequently perceivedasthe argument’ssceptical undertone can be contextualised historically. Contrary to most studies on this subject,which analyse the FMA with reference to Avicennianphilosophyasasystem, my analysis emphasises that the argument’svar- ious forms should be interpreted independentlyfrom each other,asdocuments of a continuous development of Avicenna’sphilosophy.⁷ In otherwords, we are dealing with a “cluster of flying men,” who are not always flying,and are perhaps even not always men. This single thought experiment evolves, varies, and shifts in emphasis throughout Avicenna’swritings.

 Hasse, Avicenna’s “De Anima,” 80.For amoredetailed discussion of the Latin versions see Juhana Toivanen, “The Fate of the FlyingMan,” in Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Volume 3, ed. Rob- ert Pasnau(Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,2015), 64‒98.  Cf. Ahmed Hasnaoui, “La consciencedesoi chez Avicenne et Descartes,” in Descartes et le Moyen Âge,ed. Joel Biardand Roshdi Rashed (Paris:Vrin, 1997), 290‒91.  Peter Adamson, “Peter Adamson on Avicenna’sFlyingMan Thought Experiment,” Philosophy Bites (Podcast audio), November 26,2012, https://philosophybites.com/2012/11/peter-adamson-on-avi cennas-flying-man-thought-experiment.html: “Descartes is about radical doubt,Avicenna on soul and body.” On cogito versus self-awareness see Adamson, Philosophyinthe Islamic World. AHistory of Philosophy Without AnyGaps, Vol. 3 (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,2016), 134.  Ahmed Alwishah is one of the few contributors whotries to trace achronological development of the argument.See Alwishah, “IbnSīnāon FloatingMan Arguments,” Journal of Islamic Philosophy 9 (2013): 49‒71.Unfortunately, Alwishah does not discuss the chronologyalongthe lines established by Dimitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna’sPhilosoph- ical Works,secondedition (Leiden: Brill, 2014). endoxa and the TheologyofAristotle in Avicenna’s “Flying Man” 69

The argument is fed by two major source-contexts, which are clearlydiscernible in avery earlystageofthe arguments’ developmentinal-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ (on this new text,see the appendixbelow). Thesetwo source-contexts are adiscussion of endoxa in treatisesonlogic on the one hand, and the Neoplatonist exhortation to strip off one’sbodyonthe other.Moreover,the FMA is usedand further elaborated by Avi- cenna in his various writingsintwo contexts: (1) the discussion of non-demonstrative premises (this is roughly identical to the first source-context,namelythe discussion of endoxa); and (2)the immateriality of the soul. The degree to which each of the two source-contexts influences the various versions of the FMA differsdepending on systematic philosophical concerns thatweredriving the elaboration of the details of the argument in agiven context.Sometimes, but not always,the variations depict a chronological evolution of Avicenna’sphilosophy. Forthe purpose of my argument,itisimportant that we deal with asingle cluster of arguments elaborated in two contexts. As Iamgoing to show in closer detail, the sceptical undertone can be traced directlytothe discussion of widespread opinions (Greek endoxa;inArabicthe term varies—in this case ḏāʾiʿāt).⁸ In his logical writings, Avicenna devotes much attention to the role of demonstrative and non-demonstrative premises.There, probing widespread assumptions by making oneself doubt them is described as atool for distinguishingbetween notions that are basedonunshakable intuitive knowledge and notions that we accept because of what we hear about them from others. Ahitherto unstudied passagefrom al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ can show that in this quite earlyAvicennian text,the discussion of endoxa is combined with areference to apassagefrom the so-called Theology of Aristotle.⁹ Thus, al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ can show thatthe Neoplatonistexhortation to strip off one’sbody, which is present in one wayoranother in each of the well-

 Avicenna’sterminologyisquitecomplex and presumablynot fullyconsistent,which we have to understand as areaction to his sources.The Glossarium Græco-Arabicum (http://telota.bbaw.de/ glossga/) lists the followingcounterparts for endoxon just in the translations of works by Aristotle: mašūr and maqbūl for the Posterior Analytics, maḥmūd for the Rhetoric,and the term ḏāʾiʿ is regularly used in the translation of Aristotle’s Topics.This variety in translations of Aristotle’sworks is poten- tiallytobesupplemented by the Arabic translations of commentariesonthem. Forthe terminological variety see the lists in Deborah Black, “Certitude, Justification, and the Principles of Knowledge in Avicenna’sEpistemology,” in Interpreting Avicenna,ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge:Cambridge Uni- versity Press,2013), 124; Hasnaoui, “La conscience,” 287‒88. Foradescription of an instanceinwhich Avicenna amalgamates conflictingtranslationsofterminology in the context of physics (i.e., different types of moisture), see Heidrun Eichner,Averroes’ Mittlerer Kommentar zu Aristoteles’ De generatione et corruption (Paderborn:Schöningh,2001), 204‒15.  The Theology of Aristotle is an adaptation of selections from Plotinus’s Enneads 4‒6. It was very popular in the Arabic-Islamic tradition. Itstextual history is quitecomplex, and its relation to the Greek Plotinian texts has been studied intensively albeit not exhaustively;for afirst orientation on this see MarounAouad, “La Theologied’Aristote et Autres Textes du Plotinus Arabus,” in Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques,ed. RichardGoulet (Paris:CentreNational de la Recherche Scientifique, 1989), 541‒90.The Arabic text is published in ʿAbdal-RaḥmānBadawī, Aflūṭīn ʿinda al-ʿArab (Kuwait: Wikālat al-Maṭbūʿāt, 1977). 70 HeidrunEichner

studied De Anima-type FMAs, is added to the discussion of the endoxa at quite an earlystageinthe development of Avicenna’sphilosophy. This discussion in al-Muḫ- taṣar al-Awsaṭ alludes to apassageatthe beginning of chapter 2ofthe Theology of Aristotle,which contains the exhortation to strip off one’sbodyinorder to become pure intellect and thus climb up to the divine world and become placed thereand become suspended within it (see below). By taking adevelopmental attitude towardsthe evolution of Avicenna’swritings seriously,textual source-contexts from which Avicenna takes his starting point can be distinguishedfrom systematic philosophical concerns thatweredriving the elaboration of his argument.Within such aframework, instead of trying to develop an essentialised standard account of the FMA, it might be easier to accommodate the competinginterpretations as referringtotwo distinct branches of acomplex argument in the making.

1The Discussion of endoxa: Al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ

As noticed by Ahmed Hasnaoui and Deborah Black, we encounter several versions of thoughtexperiments thatbear some similarity to the FMA in Avicenna’sdiscussions of non-demonstrative premises.Both authors account for this similarity by pointing to Avicenna’sgeneral predilection for such atype of thoughtexperiment.¹⁰ In contrast to Hasnaoui and Black, Iargue that we are dealingwith one single argument and its variants;Ialso arguethat the discussion of endoxa in Avicenna’swritings on logic actuallyprovides the context from which the FMA evolveslater on. Apre- sumablyearlyversion of the Avicenniandiscussion of endoxa which has passed hitherto unnoticediscontained in the Burhān (the section on the Posterior Analytics)of al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ.¹¹ The main part of this discussion, which is very much like later versions of the De Anima-type FMA, is introduced with an emphasis on its special status as alegacyand recommendation.¹²

 Cf. Hasnaoui, “La conscience,” 288‒89: l‘hypothèse de l’homme créé d’un coup est un procédé hab- ituel—en tout cas,ilnes’agit pas d’un hapax—auquelAvicenne recourt quand il veut mettreentre pa- renthèses certaines croyances naturelles;cf. Black, “Certitude,” 138: “this introspective technique is one of which Avicenna is fond” (part of ageneral discussionat137‒39).  Foratranslation of the relevantpassage, see the Appendix below.Onal-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ see Gutas, Avicenna,433.The Kitābal-Burhān of al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ is beingeditedbyOrainab Ma- shayekhi as part of her M.A. thesis.Iwould liketothank her for allowingmetoaccessher edition.  fa-innī uwaṣṣī tawṣiʾatan,cf. Appendix below.Ibn Sīnā, Šifāʾ (De Anima), in Psychologie d’Ibn Sina (Avicenne) d’après son oeuvre Aš-Šifa’ =Psychologie vjeho dile Aš-Sifa’,ed. JánBakoš (Prague: Éd. de l’Acad. Tchécolovaque des Sciences, 1956), 18.7: ʿalā sabīlal-tanbīhwa-l-taḏkīrišāratan šadīdatan,in the case of the passageinal-Išārātwa-l-Tanbīhāt,the work’stitle alludes to this. Adiscussion of this is found in Peter Adamson and Fedor Benevich, “The ThoughtExperimental Method: Avicenna’sflying man argument,” Journal of the Americal Philosophical Association 4, no. 2(Summer 2018): 150, endoxa and the TheologyofAristotle in Avicenna’s “Flying Man” 71

Other than later (shorter)versions of discussing the probingofendoxa,¹³ the passageinal-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ hints at an immediate connection to the Theology of Ar- istotle.Turning to oneself, stripping off one’shabits and becomingintellect in the wording of al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ parallels exactlythe wording at the beginning of chapter (mīmar)2of the Theology of Aristotle.This mīmar parallels Plotinus’s En- neads 4.4.1‒4and 4.3.18‒20,¹⁴ adding comprehensive independent material on docta ignorantia.¹⁵ Mīmar 2isdevoted to the soul’sknowledge of the higher world, its recollection of the higher world afterits descent to the body, and to explain how ignorance of some details of the bodilyworld constitutes asuperior type of knowledge.Inthis context,¹⁶ the beginning of the chapter contains an exhortation to be alone with oneself and turn to one’sself by stripping off one’sbodyand becoming an immaterial substance:

with moredetails in Tommaso Alpina, “The Soul of,the Soul in itself,and the Flying Man Experi- ment,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 28,no. 2(September 2018): 207‒8.  Here Iwill not deal systematicallywith these later versions of the endoxa,which arecontained in virtuallyall comprehensive summae by Avicenna. On the chronology of the major works see Gutas, Avicenna,165.Within this framework, the chronologyofthe textsisasfollows:(early) middle period: ʿUyūnal-Ḥikma,ed. ʿAbdal-RaḥmānBadawī (Kuwait: Wikālat al-Maṭbūʿāt, 1980), 12.5‒12; Kitābal-Hi- dāya,ed. Muḥammad ʿAbduh(Cairo: Maktabat al-Qāhiraal-Ḥadīṯa, 1968), 110.6‒112.9; later middle period: Kitābal-Šifāʾ:Kitābal-Burhān,ed. ʻAbdal-RaḥmānBadawī (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍah al- Miṣrīyah, 1954), 65.17‒66.4 and so forth; Kitābal-Naǧātfīal-Ḥikma al-Manṭiqīya wa-l-Ṭabīʿīya wa-l-Ilā- hīyat,ed. Māǧid Faẖrī (Beirut: Dāral-Ǧīl, 1985), 80.6‒81.3 and 82.1‒83.1 (partial translation in Has- naoui, “La conscience,” 288); lateperiod: Kitābal-Išārātwa-l-Tanbīhāt,ed. Jacques Forget (Leiden: Brill, 1892).Inal-Naǧāt,the section on the primary notions contains an extensive discussion on the internal senses,most notably on wahm. In al-Išārātwa-l-Tanbīhāt,the discussionofnon-demonstrative premises is extensive,given this work’sgeneral brevity.  Forabrief survey of the correspondences between the chapters of the Theology of Aristotle and the Enneads as wellasonits contents, see Rotraud Hansberger, “Die Theologie des Aristoteles,” in Islamische Philosophie im Mittelalter,ed. Heidrun Eichner,Mathias Perkams,and Christian Schäfer (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,2013), 166‒67.  Cf. Peter Adamson, TheArabic Plotinus (London: Duckworth, 2002), 140‒47.  The importanceofthis passage in the Theology of Aristotle has been discussed repeatedly with reference to Avicenna’stheory of abstraction. Notethat the focus of my analysisisdifferent,though some elementsare related. Forarecent reassessment of how Neoplatonic and Aristotelian elements merge in Avicenna’stheory see Dag Nikolaus Hasse, “Avicenna’sEpistemological Optimism,” in In- terpreting Avicenna. Critical Essays,ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1‒38. Cristina d’Ancona emphasises the importance of Neoplatonic elements,including the be- ginningofmīmar 2. See d’Ancona, “Degrees of Abstraction in Avicenna,” in Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy,ed. Pekka Kärkkäinen and Simo Knuuttila (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 47‒71.Dimitri Gutas criticises an earlier version of d’Ancona’sapproach, including areference to FMA, in his “Intuition and Thinking: The EvolvingStructureofAvicenna’sEpistemology,” in As- pects of Avicenna,ed. Robert Wisnovsky (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers,2001), 1‒38. Fora morebalanced evaluation of d’Ancona’sinsistenceonNeoplatonic elementssee Hasse, “Avicenna’s Epistemological Optimism,” 110‒12. 72 HeidrunEichner

TheologyofAristotle, mīmar 2 Al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ

innī rubbamā wa-law innā raǧaʿnā ḫalawtu bi-nafsī ilā anfusinā

Imight stay alonewith If we were to turn to myself ourselves

wa-ḫalaʿtu wa-ḫalaʿnā

and sloughoff and sloughoff

badanī ǧānibanal-ʿādāt

my body, drawn away the habits

wa-ṣirtuka-annī wa-ṣirnā ka-annā

and become as if Iwereand become as if we were

lamnasmaʿ šayʾan nothearing anythingand wa-lam naʿtaqidwa- nothaving convictions innamā haṣalnā fī al- and being thereinthe dunyā dufʿatan worldall of asuddenas

ǧawharmuǧarrad ʿaqlan

an immaterial an intellect substance

bi-lā badan without body

fa-akūnu dāḫilan and Iwould be inside fīḏāti rāǧiʿan myself, turningtoit. ilayhā

Such close parallelism as is found in al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ (whichcomesclose to an actual paraphrase of the Theology of Aristotle)does not reappear in discussions of endoxa contained in Avicenna’slaterwritings.¹⁷ Among the texts in the logica, onlythis passageinal-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ uses the notion of “sloughingoff habits” (ḫalʿ al-ʿādāt)while others use more neutral expressions for disregarding reported opinions. This earlyversion speaks of “becomingintellect,” aconcept that corre-

 Amongthe De Anima-type FMA, the passageinal-Išārāt combines the thoughtexperimentwith the exhortation to turn to oneself: irǧaʿ ilā nafsika […]Ibn Sīnā, al-Išārāt,119,2.InKitābal-Hidāya, the element of “coming down to the world” from an elevated positionisalluded to in the endoxa-type FMA: ka-annakawaradta ʿalā al-ʿālam dufʿatan (110.10). In the Theology of Aristotle,the pureintellect is suspended and attached (mutaʿalliq)tothe higher world, whereas the flyingman in al-Išārāt is splayedand suspendedinfree air for amoment (munfariǧawa-muʿallaqa laḥẓamāfīhawāʾ ṭalq; 119.9). endoxa and the TheologyofAristotle in Avicenna’s “Flying Man” 73

sponds to the Theology of Aristotle and is not present in later versions.¹⁸ An element that remains stable throughout the various FMA versions is the notion of “[being there] all of asudden.” It is present in nearlyall versions of the discussions of endoxa,aswell as in the De Anima-type versions of the FMA in al-Aḍḥawīya, al- Šifāʾ,and al-Išārāt.Inthe context of the discussion of endoxa,this feature is clearly linked to not basing one’sjudgement on oldhabits or,mostnotably, opinions that we have heard from others. In the De Anima-typethis should be interpreted as areference to memory of past sensations. The element of “hearing” deserves attention: while in the De Anima-type accounts in al-Šifāʾ and al-Išārāt, “hearing” appears to be an example of the activity of the senses, in the endoxa-type versions and in al-Aḍḥawīya, “hearing” is the waytohaveaccess to the opinionofothers. In al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ,the wayto have access to information is described as the extraction of ameaning (maʿnā) from its expression (lafẓ)—sensation is not an issue here. The state of the abstract intellect is compared to sleep.¹⁹ Thus, among the discussions in the logical writings, al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ plays an important role for my argument of acontinuous evolution of the FMA as one thoughtexperiment modified and adapted repeatedly. In this very earlywriting, the concern for freeingone’sintuitiveunderstanding from opinions deeplyrooted in custom and habit (i.e., the discussion of endoxa)infact can be linked to the The- ology of Aristotle’s exhortation to strippingoff one’sbody.

2 Al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya

Al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya is atreatise stemmingfrom the (early) middle period of Avi- cenna’sactivity;thus, it predates al-Šifāʾ.²⁰ It is devoted to the fate of the soul, and the FMA is embedded in achapter that argues that even in this world the ego is not to be identifiedwith body. Hence, after death,whenthe bodyisstripped from itssoul, the permanence of personal identity does not requireatransformation of the soul. The FMA occupies roughlythe first half of chapter 4. The second half of the chapter focuses on good and evil—good and evil pertaining to the bodyaffect the soul in away comparable to the wayitreactsiffriends are affected. In the context of my argument here, al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya plays an important role for showing how the two types of FMA (endoxa-typeand De Anima-type) relate

 Onlyafew amongthe other passagesonthe endoxa makeany referencetoʿaql: Closest comes ʿUyūnal-Ḥikma: “if ahuman beingweretoimagine himself createdfor the first time as intellecting” (law tawahhama al-insānnafsahū ḫuliqa fī al-ḫulqa al-ūlā ʿāqilan;Ibn Sīnā, ʿUyūnal-Ḥikma,12.11‒12).  This might strengthen al-Ṭūsī’sinterpretation of the referencetosleep in al-Išārāt as areference to astatewhere the senses areblocked and the operation of intellect is pureand undisturbed. On this see below.  Cf. Gutas, Avicenna,472‒77. 74 HeidrunEichner

to each other: Amongthe “classical” De Anima-type FMA, al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya dwells most extensively on how we can step-by-step eliminate various parts of the bodyfrom being the foundation of personal identity. Al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya places its emphasis on the epistemological component of identifying several distinct parts of the body. While some organs in (actual) existence (fī al-wuǧūd)can be taken away completely, others can onlybetaken away in part (i.e., the brain). The heart can be taken away onlyinimagination (tawahhum). It is clear that the heart is not the self-evidentcoreofpersonal identity because it is less well-known than this self-evident core:

As to the brain: One can assume that one part of it is separated fromitwhile this item [i.e., guar- antyingpersonal identity] remains. As to the heart: This is not possible for it in existence(wuǧūd)but in imagination (tawahhum). This is so because ahuman beingcan know that his that-ness about which he talks is existent while it is possible that at the same time he does not know that he has aheart and how it is, what it is and whereitis. Manypeople who do not see the heart affirm it and are convinced about [its existence] based on what they hear,not intuitively (samāʿan lā bidāhatan), and they think that it is the stomach. It is impossible that athingisone whileitisbeingknown and unknown together at one time.²¹

The fact thatwehavenointuitive knowledge of the heart and have to rely on what we hear from others means that we have onlyimprecise and perhaps even false information about it.Thus, in this discussion of how we know about the heart as part of our body, the connection to the discussion of endoxa is still preserved in aquite explicit way. Among the various versions of the FMA, in al-Aḍḥawīya,the motive for taking away various layers of our bodyisspelled out most explicitly. One part of this process is carried out in actual existence, the othersolelyinimagination. Beyond the other De Anima-type versions, al-Aḍḥawīya does not draw on the concept of cutting off the individual from external information (beitopinions heard from others or sensory perception). In al-Aḍḥawīya, “doubting” does not at all appear as an epistemic strategy. The focus is rather on taking away parts of the bodyand thus identifying them as distinct from each other.Someparts can be iden- tified by taking them away in actual existence(external limbs, parts of the brain), while some can be taken away in imagination. In the case of the heart (in order to distinguish from the true self), al-Aḍḥawīya operates with adistinction between intuitive knowledge and knowledge based on hearsayorevenfalse opinions, but it does not refer to doubt.Instead of doubtable versus undoubtable knowledge,

 IbnSīnā,Al-Aḍḥawīya fī al-Maʿād,ed. Ḥasan ʿĀṣī (Beirut: al-Muʾassasa al-Ǧāmiʿīya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Našrwa-l-Tawzīʿ,1987), 127.13‒128.5. Unless notedotherwise, all translations into English are my own. endoxa and the TheologyofAristotle in Avicenna’s “Flying Man” 75

there is the distinction between what is known (the soul) and what is not known or at least not known to all (the heart).²² In the second half of the chapter after the thought experiment, Avicenna elabo- rates on his conception of the relation between soul and bodyasarelation that is comparable to how we become accustomed to friends and companions:when the bodysuffers, the soul is affected in the same wayasweare affected when friends have to suffer evil:

If someone imagines that fromthis entity these bodilyconcomitants aretaken away,and that he loses some type of comfort and pain which he has because he shares in body, then he is like someone wholoses comfort and pain which exist in his brethren and companions.And if then he obtains comfort and pain which arespecific for him, then he is trulycomfortable or suf- feringpain.²³

3 Kitābal-Šifāʾ’sDeAnima 1.1 and 5.7²⁴

As the versions of the FMA in al-Šifāʾ’s De Anima-part have been discussed quite frequently, in the present context Iwill emphasise onlysome minor details that have receivedlittle attentionsofar and which mayassist in identifying and reassessing the context of elements of scepticism in Avicenna’stext.²⁵ Both passages in al-Šifāʾ’s De Anima-part draw on al-Aḍḥawīya argument’score structure of identifying known and unknown parts of the human being and its body.

 Adamson and Benevich’sanalysis of the FMA in the De Anima part of al-Šifāʾ’spoints out that the statement “whatisaffirmed is distinct from what is not affirmed” is the weakspot of the argument. The argument should not be savedbyunderstanding it as saying “that these twothings arepossibly distinct,” but rather this is “statedconfidentlyand with no caveat.” There is no “reference to ademonstration to be givenlater on that might show that they reallyare distinct” (Adamson and Benevich, “ThoughtExperimental Method,” 151‒52). In view of Adamson and Benevich’sanalysis,itshould be notedthat the al-Aḍḥawīya in fact addresses the problem; it even stands at the core of this FMA version.  IbnSīnā,Al-Aḍḥawīya,129.10‒14.  Respectively,Ibn Sīnā, Kitābal-Šifāʾ (De Anima), 18.4‒19.2; 252.1‒254.4and following.  The classic expositionisMarmura, “Avicenna’s ‘FlyingMan’ in Context.” Thereare several recent contributions:Adamson and Benevich center on al-Šifāʾʾs De Anima. According to them, the FMA serves to “determine whetheritbelongs to the soul’sessencethat the soul be related to abody… The answer to this question is no” (“Thought Experimental Method,” 148). The soul’sessencecan grasped by identifyingits essential attributes (155‒60). Marwan Rashed argues that “Avicenna bor- rowsarguments developed originallybyAbūHāšim in order to demonstratethat adefinitemode belongstothe livingbeingasawhole (ǧumla).” Rashed, “Chose, item et distinction: L’”homme volant” d’Avicenne avec et contre Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāʾī,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 28,no. 2(Septem- ber 2018): 167. Tommaso Alpina contextualises the FMA within the overall structureofal-Šifāʾʾs De Anima and analysesitasa“transition from the inquiry into the existenceofthe soul as a relational entity to that into the essenceismarked by the Flying Man argument at the end of I, 1” (Alpina, “The Soul of,” 202). 76 HeidrunEichner

The passageinDe Anima 1.1refers twice to the old remedyfor dealingwith obstinate sceptics (beating them): at the beginning,Avicenna points out that we talk to aperson who is able to see the truth, who is not in need of being educated and beaten, and who does not requireguidance away from sophistries (min ġayr iḥtiyāǧ ilā taṯqī- fihī wa-qarʿi ʿaṣāhu wa-ṣarfihī ʿan al-muġālaṭāt).²⁶ Towardsthe end he stresses again that,inthe case of aperson who is unaware of his self, this person must be beaten (wa-in kāna ḏāhilan ʿanhu yuḥtāǧuilāyuqraʿu ʿaṣāhū).²⁷ In De Anima 1.1, the context of sensorydeprivation is new as compared to earlier versions: In the discussion of endoxa,the thought-experiment is primarilyabout making sure that the person has not heard from others about theiropinions. In other words, the argument is primary concernedwith moral and ethical implications. In De Anima 1.1, however,vision and touchare ruled out as sources of information due to the fact that there exist parts of the bodytowhich these senses correspond.²⁸ In addition, the role of imagination (here, taḫayyul)isemphasised:athree-dimen- sional extension of the incorporeal part of the self cannot be conceivedand, even if imagination were to conceive an additional hand,itwould not conceive it as part of the immaterial.²⁹ The concept of doubting—familiar from the endoxa and missing in al-Aḍḥawīya—is reintroduced and combined with the concept of affirmation (iṯbāt): the flying man does not doubt the affirmation of his self. In the De Anima 5.7the focus has somewhat shifted. The argument is embedded in adiscussion of how the various levels of the soul’sfaculties and powers are unit- ed, most notablyasregards sensation (iḥsās)and appetitive powers (quwwā šahwā- nīya)(as it turns out,accordingtoAvicenna’spsychologythese two are located in the animal and vegetative part of the soul).³⁰ The FMA provides the third argument for this principle’simmateriality.³¹ The FMA is introduced as areference to what has

 IbnSīnā,Kitābal-Šifāʾ (De Anima), 18.8  IbnSīnā,19.2  OnlyinDe Anima 5.7(Ibn Sīnā, Kitābal-Šifāʾ [De Anima], 252.3: lam yasmaʿ ṣawtan)isthe flying man also blocked from hearing.When touch and vision are beingblocked, in all accounts,this seems to primarilyservethe aim of preventingthe flyingman fromhavingany notion of his parts.  It is not easy to discern preciselywhat the argumentative contextfor this remark is. One context might be the elaboration of the roleofthe internal senses in Avicenna’stheory of mental existence: the thoughtexperiment’sman can conduct morethoughtexperiments—this does not weakenthe ontological status of what he is thinking. Moreover,Iwould like to suggest that this should be linked to discussions on the roleofimagination when doubtingconclusions.The term Avicenna prefers for this in his discussions of endoxa and non-demonstrative premises, however,iswahm. The activity of wahm leads to correct results onlyifitreliessolelyonsensation, not if it relies on moreabstract notions.  This unifyingprinciple is to be construed by analogy to the common sense that unites the activ- ities of the five senses (Ibn Sīnā, Kitābal-Šifāʾ [De Anima], 249.9‒11). It coordinates various layers of activity: “Because of this it is true when we say: ‘When we feel somethingwehaveadesire.’ Or: ‘When we see this we become angry.’ This one thing in which these powers areunited is what everyone estimates to be his self (ḏāt).” IbnSīnā,Kitābal-Šifāʾ (De Anima), 250.6‒8.  IbnSīnā,Kitābal-Šifāʾ (De Anima), 251.10,and so forth. endoxa and the TheologyofAristotle in Avicenna’s “Flying Man” 77

been said earlier,and in fact this version in De Anima 5.7standscloser to al- Aḍḥawīya than De Anima 1.1: the structure of its argument revolvesaround the “What is known is not identical to what is not known.”³² The (Plotinian) theme of taking off one’sbodylike garments is emphasised:

In reality,these parts of the bodyare nothingelse but garments which become for us likeparts of us because they have been attached to us for such along time. When we imagine ourselveswe don’timagine ourselvesasnaked but with bodies as cover.The reason for this is the long attach- ment.Inthe case of garments,weare used to takingthem off and throwing them away,other than it is the case with the parts of body. Our opinion (ẓannunā)that the parts of our body areparts of us is moredeeplyrooted than our opinion that garments are apart of us.³³

These parts of the bodyare not known intuitively,i.e. “because Iknow that Iammy- self.”³⁴ Rather Iknow thatIhave aheart and abrain “by sensation, by hearing [what others say], by experience (bi-l-iḥsāswa-l-samāʿ wa-l-taǧārub).” Here, we can discern how De Anima 5.7relates to al-Aḍḥawīya’s reference to the distinction between intuitive knowledge and questionable knowledge:inal-Aḍḥawīya,knowledge about the heart is based on hearsay(samāʿ); in De Anima 5.7this is amplified to knowledge based on these three sources. In this account,wecan discern an immediate connection to Avicenna’selaboration of the theory of sensation, most notablythe internal senses. In addition to sensation in astricter sense, this includes experiencethat rests on memory,which is one of the five internal senses.

4 Al-Išārātwa-l-Tanbīhāt

When describing the evolution of the FMA as acontinuum of modifications in the arguments’ scope, an element of continuity between al-Išārātwa-l-Tanbīhāt and De Anima 5.7exists in their shared interest in just what constitutes personal identity and also coordinates the various powers.However, al-Išārāt’sversion introducesa completelynew level of “sceptical” attitude to the argument by questioning the very possibility of intuitiveintrospective access to the self—albeit very tentatively and, ultimately, dismissively.While in all other versions of the FMA this was not presented as aproblem, the reference to mental states that might question this ability garners al-Išārāt’sdiscussion aspecific quality.Wemay try to explain this feature by the fact that the theory of self-awareness,offeeling (šuʿūr)one’sself, becomes in- creasinglyimportant in the later works of Avicenna. In De Anima 1.1, the obstinate sceptic who questions intuitiveself-awarenessistobetreated by being beaten: he cannot be reached by the argument. Al-Išārāt is somewhat more careful when stip-

 IbnSīnā,252.4.  IbnSīnā,252,4‒8.  IbnSīnā,252.15. 78 HeidrunEichner

ulating the conditionsfor the thought experiment.The person should be “sound” (ṣaḥīḥ)orinsome other state in such away that they have sound intuition (bal wa-ʿalā baʿḍ aḥwālika ġayrihā bi-ḥayṯutufaṭṭinu li-l-shayʾ fiṭnatan ṣaḥīḥatan)³⁵: “I think (ʿindī)that this is something which [every] person has who carries out this in- trospection (al-mustabṣir), in away that even in the case of asleeper during his sleep and adrinker in his drunkenness his self does not escape him, even if no representation of the self existsinmemory (ḏikr).”³⁶ “Soundness” as aprecondition for carrying out the thought experiment extends not onlytointellect (ʿaql)but alsotothe (bodily) condition (hayʾa).³⁷ Sensationisblocked from the flying person; more precisely, as in De Anima 1.1, seeing and touch are blocked in away that prevents the flying person from perceiving parts of the body. The version of the argument in al-Išārāt has become quite influential for many interpretative approaches. In particular,the interpretation which has been made popularbyal-Ṭūsī’scommentary has influenced its later reception. Al-Ṭūsī’scommentary has the tendency to understand the text as systematicallycovering all options of ascenario. He understands the referencetothe one who sleeps as an allu- sion to someone whose external senses are blocked, while the referencetothe one who is drunk would refer to both external and internal senses.³⁸ This implication is not reallypresent in Avicenna’stext,and one might as well think of sleep and drunkenness as states wherethe mind is not functioning completelysoundly.Like- wise, al-Ṭūsī interprets the condition that the person should not see the parts of the bodyasanallusion to the whole (ǧumla); he interprets the condition thatthe person’slimbs should not touch each other as aprecaution against feelingthe parts. Other texts (the arguments in al-Aḍḥawīya and De Anima 1.1) suggest that for Avicen- na himself the emphasis is onlyonthe parts. Al-Ṭūsī interprets hawā’ ṭalq as “tepid air,” and thinks that Avicenna suggests that sensation of heat and cold is also blocked. If we understand hawā’ ṭalq as justreferringto“free air” (a lexicalised expression), the passageinal-Išārāt (like the scenario in De Anima)takes precautions against the parts of the bodytouchingeach other.

5Conclusion: Cogito YesorNo?

How can these observations on details of the development of the flying man argument help us to better understand the argument’sscope as well as the presenceof “sceptical” elements?Apart from showing that there is in fact aconnection between the evolution of the FMA and the discussion of endoxa in antiquity and after,wecan

 IbnSīnā,al-Išārāt,119.2‒3.  IbnSīnā,119.4‒6.  IbnSīnā,119.7:(al-dhāt) […] ḫuliqat […] ṣaḥīḥaal-ʿaql wa-l-hayʾa.  Cf. al-Ṭūsī, Šarḥ al-Tamwīḥāt,inIbn Sīnā, Kitābal-Išārātwa-l-Tanbīhāt,ed. SulaymānDunyā (Cairo:Dāral-Maʿārif, 1985), 2:343.1‒344.1. endoxa and the TheologyofAristotle in Avicenna’s “Flying Man” 79

better understand how certain elements function in the overall framework of Avicen- na’scorpus.Wecan see whythe role of doubt oscillates so much in our interpretations. In the endoxa-type of the FMA, doubtserves to evaluate informationand to filter external influences: opinions we hear from others can be doubted, they do not form part of the coreofcertain knowledge we have in ourselves. How thinking or the formation of concepts is actuallyeffected is not of interest in this context. In the De Anima-type, this feature of blocking external information is taken over by sensory deprivation: The flying man (possiblytothe exclusion of the Išārāt’sversion) does not actively doubt the objects of sensation or the exterior world, but the very setting of the thoughtexperiment blocks him from these objects. These two elements function in analogous ways in the two types of arguments and hence can be easilyreplaced by each other in our analyses when comparing Avi- cennian texts.Infact,eventhe De Anima-type FMA calls for this type of interpretation: When the De Anima-type emphasises thatthe flying man does not doubt his self, we are led to the question what would happen if we did not block the flying man from sensation. Could he systematicallydoubt all the informationhereceives from his senses?Would he then have doubts about his self?Among the Avicennian texts themselves, only al-Išārāt’sversion seems to think along these lines and to include the optionofreally questioning sensation (duringsleep and drunkenness). Even giventhe thought experiment’sprovisions for isolating him from the exterior, the flying manmight encounter problems in accessing his self-evident self—when sleeping or when drunk.Avicenna thinkshedoes have access, but does not seem to be entirelysure about this. In contrast,the earlier texts assume that after doubting there remains something certain. We have to keep in mind thatthis process is not reallywhat we are familiar with calling “thinking” nowadays.Avicenna’stheory of the internal senses and his interest in the phenomenon of self-awareness wereimportantsteps in elaborating amore “modern” medieval conception of thinking.His theories integratedcontemporary medicalstate-of-the-art knowledge about the importance of the brain with the philosophical imperative of explaining intellectual activity as apurelyimmaterial process relying on external immaterial principles. By amalgamating the two types of FMA, one might easilyconstruct astriking parallel with Descartes.However,Avicenna keeps these two strands separate. The De Anima-type flying man is facing asituation which is the inverse of the Cartesian setting:His genius malignus would be the person who carries out the thought experiment and manipulates the flying man’ssmall little world. This genius malignus would not deceive the flying man by deceiving his senses when providing them with false information, as in the Cartesian example. Rather,the genius would create an empty world in which all possibilities of sense-perception (or more general: anytype of doubtable knowledge)appeartobeapriori eliminated. The flying man knows onlywhat is left over and what is not taken away by the all-doubt-eliminating genius, and what is left over is the flying man’simmaterial self. As aresult,Avicenna’s De Anima-type flying man actuallycannot have doubts about anything at all. 80 HeidrunEichner

When comparinghis situation to that of the Cartesian thinking ego,however,we must also consider the framework of Avicenna’sontology.This ontology includes a strongconception of mental existence: objects formedinthe intellect and/or imagined in our minds do exist.The very existenceofthe doubting flying man is secured by the thought activity of the person who carries out the thought experiment—this thinking person securing his (mental) existencedoes not necessarilyhavetobe the flying man himself, but could be.IfAvicenna or someoneelse carries out this thoughtexperiment,the doubting and flying man is made aform by the active intellect as well. Giventhis form of aflying man, the flying man as an entity does exist in mind and has amental existence. Thus, for the very existenceofthe flying man’simmaterial self it is sufficient that someone(externallyorinternally) creates it as adistinct entity by thinkingabout it correctly, an ego cogito id est,sotosay.InAvicenna’s FMAs references to the first person and the third person are used quite interchangeably—in our minds, we can isolate our own selvesaswellasthoseofother persons.

Appendix:AText from the Section on the Posterior Analytics in Al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ

Ms.Istanbul Nuruosmaniye 2763, folio 102r:Ifweweretoturn to ourselvesand slough off the habits,and if we weretobecome as if we do not hear anything and do not have convictions and as if we werethere in the world all of asudden as an intellect,and if we weretomake ourselvesdoubt them [i.e., the ḏaʾiʿāt, “widespread opinions” mentioned earlier]—then this is possiblefor us, and this is not possiblein the case of the intelligibles and objects of imagination mentioned earlier.For example, if we place ourselvesinthis position, and if then we present to ourselvesthat justiceisgood and lying is base,and if we then make ourselvesdoubt about this, this is possible for us. Or rather,itisnot necessary for us to think this is true. If we present to ourselvesthatthe whole is largerthanthe part,then it is not possible for us to have doubts about this. If we were to present to ourselvesthat behind the universe there is either something or vacuum it would not be possiblefor us to have doubts about this, while this [in fact] is false. folio 102v:Widespread [views (ḏāʾiʿāt)] and the accepted [views (maqbūlāt)] which take their rank are the principles of dialectics (ǧadal). When they are taken in ademonstration, this is sophistry (muġālaṭa). Opinions (maẓnūnāt)are the principles of rhetoric (ḫiṭāba), and the ambiguous [views (mušabbahāt)] are the principles of sophistry (muġālaṭa). Hereweare onlytalking about what is good for demonstration, how it is, what its signs are, and how it is usedindemonstration. Before this Ishall give youarecommendation (fa-innī uwaṣṣī tawṣiʾatan). Isay:Ifyou wish to consider whether apremise is primary,then takeitasifyou wererefutingwhat is familiar and the customs and what youhaveheard people say. endoxa and the TheologyofAristotle in Avicenna’s “Flying Man” 81

Rather think that this is the first dayyou hear something or thatintellectingitis sleep. Then make present the premise as ameaning (maʿnā)without its wording (lafẓ)inyour mind. See if it is possible that youhavedoubts about it,and whether youfind for yourself thatits opposite is possible. If youdonot find something like this, see whether there is no wayfor what calls youtobelieveitistrue that its opposite enters your imagination (wahm)and leaveswhat is in the custom of your senses (ḥiss). [And see] whether the impossibility of forming its concept in your imagination is because your imagination calls youinittoone of the statesofsensibles. If this is the case, have doubts about it,and if this is not the case, then it is self-evident.

Bibliography

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Medieval philosophers usually held thatmonotheism can be proved by reason. They had good authority for this opinion, since the Philosopher himself had concluded his Metaphysics 12.1076a5,with afelicitous quotation from Homer: “apluralityofsover- eigns is not good. Let therebeone sovereign!” (Iliad 2:204). Nonetheless, therewere some medieval sceptics who denied that reason can provemonotheism. Twosuch sceptics were al-Ghazālī and Hasdai Crescas.Inmyfollowing remarks, Ishalldiscuss the views of al-Ghazālī and Crescas,aswell as those of two staunch defenders of Ar- istotelianmonotheism, Averroes and Maimonides.The story Iwish to tell begins with al-Ghazālī,moves on to Averroes and Maimonides, and concludes with Crescas.Cres- cas maybeseen as taking up the cudgels for al-Ghazālī against Averroes and Maimo- nides. My story will also includeasection on Moses Narboni, who was the first to perceive the relationship of Maimonides’sview to Averroes’s. In addition, it will include apostscript on Obadiah Sforno’sdiscussion of the problem.

Al-Ghazālī (1058‒1111)

In his Incoherence of the Philosophers,Discussions 5‒7, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammadibn Muḥammadal-Ghazālī maintains that God’sunity is not known by reason but by prophecyalone. Accordingtoreason, he argues, there can be more than one God. He held that Aristotelian philosophers, like al-Fārābī and Avicenna, werethus neces- sarilyunsuccessful in their attempts to establish God’sunity philosophically. In Discussion 5, al-Ghazālī challenges the Aristotelian view that Necessary Exis- tenceentails unity.Why,heasks, could there not be two Necessary Existents,both uncaused(in accordance with the definition of necessary existence), and thus neither the cause of the other?Why,inother words, could therenot be two independent Gods?¹ In Discussion 7, al-Ghazālī returns to the problem of manyGods, and again speaksabout the possibility of two separate uncaused beingswho were both “creating Gods.” He asks, “Whyshould it be impossible for the causal series to end in two causes, one the cause of the heavens and the other the cause of the [four] elements, or one the cause of the intellects and the other the cause of all bodies?[…][The phi-

 Al-Ghazālī, TheIncoherence of the Philosophers,ed. and trans.Michael E. Marmura (Provo: Brig- ham Young University Press, 2000), 85. The passage is found also in Averroes, TheIncoherence of the Incoherence,trans. Simon vanden Bergh(London: E.J.W. Gibb Memorial, 1969), 1:170‒71.Arabic text: Averroes, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut,ed. MauriceBouyges(Beirut: ImprimerieCatholique, 1930), 288.

OpenAccess. ©2019 Warren ZevHarvey,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-006 84 Warren ZevHarvey

losophers’]inability to denytwo creating Gods [ilāhayn ṣāniʿayn]has become clear.”² Al-Ghazālī’schallengeisplain and simple: Whynot posit two independent creating Gods, each necessarilyexistent,each the first cause of His own causal chain?After all, Aristotelian philosophers had emphasised the essential differencebetween the celestial realm, made of the “fifth element,” or ether,and the terrestrial realm, made of earth, water,air,and fire. They had also emphasised the essentialdifference between the intellects,which are incorporeal, and the corporealbeings, whether made of the four elements or of the fifth element.Why not,then, supposethat part of the universe was created by one God, and another part by asecond God? Whynot?Shouldn’tthe Aristotelians be able to agree with such asupposition?

Averroes (1126‒98)

Abū l-WalīdMuḥammadibn Aḥmad ibn Rušd(Averroes) responds to al-Ghazālī’s challengeinDiscussions5‒7ofhis Incoherence of the Incoherence. In Discussion 7, Averroes presents aparticularlyinteresting argument.One world entails one God.Heavenand earth, incorporeal beingsand corporeal beings—all are one and interconnected. The world is acohesive and coherent whole. Everything fits. It has no loose parts. Itsoneness points to its One cause:

Now,this proposition [i.e., al-Ghazālī’sconjecturethat one God could rule one part of the world, and asecond God another part] is not true […]The Creator of the heavens is [also] the Creator of the cause that created the [four] elements.This is the theory of the philosophers […]For it is evident that the worlds [e.g.,the celestial and terrestrial worlds or incorporeal and corporeal worlds] exist through cause and effect,and it is the inquiry concerningthese causes which leads us to afirst cause [ʿilla ūlā]for everything. And if some of these different principles werewhollyindependentofothers—that is, if some were not the cause of others—then the world could not be asingle [wāḥid]and interconnected [murtabiṭ]whole. To the impossibility of this the divine words refer, “Had there been in [heavenand earth] Gods besides God, both [heavenand earth] surelywould have been destroyed” (Quran 21 [The Prophets]:22).³

Al-Ghazālī had alluded to the putatively absoluteAristoteliandivisions between the celestial and terrestrial realms or the incorporeal and corporeal realms.Averroes now deniesthat these divisionsare absolute.⁴ The world, he insists, is one (wāḥid)and interconnected (murtabiṭ), and thus can have onlyone first cause, who is God.

 Al-Ghazālī, Incoherence of the Philosophers,113;Averroes, Incoherence of the Incoherence,1:226 (Arabic 375).  Averroes, Incoherence of the Incoherence,1:228‒29 (Arabic 379‒80). Averroes argues against the possibilityofmanyGods also in his LongCommentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.See below, “Post- script: Obadiah Sforno (1475‒1550).”  Averroes holds that the celestial and terrestrial realms have several factorsincommon. See his De Substantia Orbis,ed. and trans. Arthur Hyman (Cambridge,MA: Medieval AcademyofAmerica, 1986), chapter2,87‒98 (Hebrew30‒36). The Problem of Many Gods in al-Ghazālī,Averroes, Maimonides, Crescas,and Sforno 85

To be sure, it is not clear what forceAverroes attributed to the argument for God’s unity based on the unity of the world. Did he consider it an apodictic proof (burhān) or onlyagood dialectical response to al-Ghazālī?This question shallnot concern us here.

Maimonides (1138‒1204)

Rabbi Moses ben Maimon (Maimonides) raises the problem of manyGods in the course of presentinghis philosophic proofs for the existence,unity,and incorporeal- ity of God in Guide of the Perplexed 2:1. The problem is found in twoofthree proofs which appear as asortofaddendum after the conclusion of his discourse on the four philosophic demonstrations of God based on the premise of the eternity of the world. In the second of these three addended proofs,Maimonides writes:

It has alreadybeen established as true by means of ademonstration [bi-l-burhān;ibn Tibbon: ba-mofet][in Guide 1:72]that all that exists is like one [wāḥid;ibn Tibbon: eḥad]individual with interconnected [murtabiṭ;ibn Tibbon: niqšar]parts, and that the forcesofthe sphereper- vade this lowly matter and fashion it.Thus,itisimpossible […]that one God should be exclusively concerned with one part of what exists,and another God with another part,for one part is interconnected [murtabiṭ;ibn Tibbon: niqšar]with the other […][T]he substrate of the action [of the supposed twoGods] is one [wāḥid;ibn Tibbon: eḥad], and its parts interconnected [murtabiṭ; ibn Tibbon: niqšar][…] In the case of anycomplex composed of parts,[…][its] first cause [al-sabbab al-awwal;ibn Tib- bon: ha-sibba ha-riʾšona]is[that which causes] the coming-together of [those] parts […]Ifthe agent that causes the parts of the complex to come together […]isone, He is indubitably God […][T]he fact that all that exists is one indicates to us that He who caused it to exist is One.⁵

The argument that Maimonides bringshere against the conjecturethat there are manyGods is preciselyAverroes’sargument against al-Ghazālī:ifthe world is one and interconnected, it must have onlyone first cause. Maimonides does not mention here al-Ghazālī or Averroes,but it is clear he has in mind the exchangebetween them. The description of the world as “one” and “interconnected,” together with the use of the concept of “first cause,” reflects prima facie the direct influenceof Averroes’s Incoherence of the Incoherence.⁶ The triple use of the word murtabiṭ (“in-

 Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed,trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1963), 1:250‒51.Arabic text: Dalālat al-Ḥāʾirīn,ed. Shlomo Munk and Isaschar Joel (Jerusalem: Juno- vitch, 1931), 174‒75.When citing Arabic terms from the Guide,Ihave also giventhe renderings in Rabbi Samuel ibn Tibbon’smedievalHebrewtranslation, which was used by Narboni, Crescas, and Sforno.  Averroes’s Incoherence of the Incoherence was written in 1179/80, about adecade beforethe completion of Maimonides’s Guide in 1190.Inaletter to his pupil Joseph ben Judah ibn Simeon written in 1191,Maimonides statedthat he had just receivedall of Averroes’scommentariesonAristotle except the ParvaNaturalia,and praised them. See Iggerot ha-Rambam,ed. Isaac Shailat (Maaleh Adummim: 86 Warren ZevHarvey

terconnected”)isparticularlysignificant.Moreover,Maimonides’sprevious proof, i.e., the first of the three addended proofs,which similarlyraised the problem of manyGods, mayalso be indebted to the al-Ghazālī–Averroes debate.⁷ Maimonides begins the present proof of divine unity by alludingtohis discussion of the world as a macroanthropos in Guide 1:72. In this long and provocative chapter,hepresents much empirical evidence supportingthe unity and interconnectedness of the world. The influenceofAverroes’s Incoherence of the Incoherence may also be seen in this chapter.Maimonides writes, “just as in the single human being there is aforcethat connects [quwwa tarbiṭu;ibn Tibbon: koaḥ yiqšor]the parts of the bodyone with the other[…]sothere subsistsinthe world as awhole aforcethat connects [quwwa tarbiṭu;ibn Tibbon: koakh yiqšor]its parts one with the other.”⁸ This very samecomparison is found in Averroes’s Incoherence of the Incoherence, Discussion 10: “there must exist a[…]forcediffused in all the parts of the universe in the same wayasthere is aforceinall the parts of asingle animal which connects them [quwwa tarbiṭu]one with the other.”⁹ Guide 1:72 contains alsothe statements that the oneness of the world is very “necessary” (ḍarūrī;ibn Tibbon: hekhraḥi)or very “useful” (mufīd; moʿil)for the proof of God’sunity,and that “the One has created one being.”¹⁰ In addition, it is written there: “it is impossible that the parts of the world should exist […]without one another such that […]the heavens could exist without the earth or the earth without the heaven.”¹¹ Guide 1:72 and 2:1complement each other and both chapters reflect the influenceofAverroes’s Incoherence of the Incoherence.

Maʿaliyyot,1987), 313;cf. 552‒53.The books receivedpresumablyincluded Averroes’ long commentaries on Aristotle. Now,Averroes’ long commentaries on the Physics, De Caelo, De Anima,and Meta- physics werewritten between 1186 and 1191,and Maimonides’sacquiringthem alreadyin1191 indi- cateshis great interest in Averroes’swork. It is plausible that he had previouslyread some of Averroes’sAristotelian epitomes, begun in 1159,and middle commentaries,begun in 1168. Maimoni- des’s Guide alludes in at least one passage to Averroes’s DecisiveTreatise,written in about 1178;see my “Averroes and Maimonides on the Duty of Philosophical Contemplation (iʿtibār),” [in Hebrew,] Tarbiz 58, no. 1(1989): 122‒30.Thereisalso evidencethat the Guide was influencedbyAverroes’s Ex- position of the MethodsofProof,written in 1179/80; see Sarah Stroumsa, Maimonides in His World (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2009), 73‒76.The DecisiveTreatise and the Exposition,together with the Incoherence of the Incoherence,comprise Averroes’sthreemain theological treatises.  Maimonides, Guide 2:1, p. 249‒50 (Arabic 173‒74). Maimonides,likeAverroes, presumes herethat if therewereasecondGod, He would be similar to the first God in one respect and different in another. See Averroes, Incoherence,1:228 (Arabic 378).  Maimonides, Guide 1:72, p. 187‒88 (Arabic 130).  Averroes, Incoherence of the Incoherence,1:253‒54 (Arabic 420). Averroesattributes this view to Alexander of Aphrodisias.Van den Bergh(Incoherence,2:143)notesthat this precise view is not found in Alexander’sknown writings,although similar views arefound in them.  Maimonides, Guide 1:72, p. 187(Arabic 129)  Maimonides, Guide 1:72, p. 187(Arabic 129‒130). The Problem of Many Gods in al-Ghazālī,Averroes, Maimonides, Crescas,and Sforno 87

The notion of the interconnectedness of the world also appears in Guide 1:54. Moses is said in thatchapter to have contemplated the entire worldand the interconnectedness (irtibāṭ; hiqqašram)ofits parts.¹² As with Averroes, it is not clear what forceMaimonides attributed to the proof of God’sunity basedonthe unity of the world. He refers to it as “necessary” or “useful,” which mayindicate that it is dialectical, not demonstrative.However,aswe have seen, he writes in Guide 2:1, that it has been proven “by means of ademonstration [bi-l-burhān;ibn Tibbon: ba-mofet]” in Guide 1:72 that “all thatexists is likeone individual with interconnected parts.”

Narboni (c. 1300‒c. 1362)

The relationship between Maimonides’sabovementioned proof of God’soneness in the Guide of the Perplexed 2:1, and Averroes’scritique of al-Ghazālī in the Incoherence of the Incoherence,was astutelynoticed by Rabbi Moses ben Joshua of Narbonne, known as Narboni, in his Commentary on the Guide.Narboni writes:

“It has alreadybeen established as true by means of ademonstration [in Guide 1:72]that all that exists is likeone individual,” etc. [Maimonides’s] wordshere areself-evident.However,itmight seem on the basis of what we have said [in commentingonMaimonides’sprevious proofs] […] that “it is not impossible that there be two Gods,one the cause of the heavens and the other the cause of the earth, or one the cause of the intelligible and the other the cause of the sensible […] Now,this proposition is not true […][Rather,] the Creator of the heavens is the Creator of the cause that created the [four] elements. This is,” as Averroessaid [in the Incoherence of the Inco- herence,Discussion 7], “the theory of the philosophers. Foritisevident that the worlds [e.g., the celestial and terrestrial worlds or the incorporeal and corporeal worlds] exist through cause and effect,and it is the inquiry concerning these causes which leads us to afirst cause for everything. And if some of these different principles werewhollyindependentofothers—that is, if some werenot the cause of others—then the world could not be asingle and interconnected whole [davar eḥad we-niqšar].” The sensible would not be connected to the intelligible, one part of the world would not be connectedtothe other.The world would fall apart and be destroyed. The Master [Maimonides] pointedtothis, saying[in Guide 1:72]: “the fact that all that exists is one indicates to us that He whocaused it to exist is One.”¹³

 Maimonides, Guide 1:54,p.124 (Arabic 84). Cf. my “Maimonides’ Critical Epistemology and Guide 2:24,” Aleph 8(2008): 216‒18.  Moses Narboni, Beʾur le-Sefer More ha-Nevukhim,ed. JakobGoldenthal (Vienna: Imperial and RoyalStatePress, 1852), 2.1.26a‒b(my translation). The passage begins with aquotation of Maimo- nides (from the textofthe Guide citedabove), continues with aquotation of al-Ghazālī (from the text of the Incoherence of the Philosophers citedabove, but as paraphrased by Averroes in his Incoherence of the Incoherence), and follows with aquotation of Averroes (fromthe text of the Incoherence of the Incoherence citedabove). The wordsquoted from Maimonides’sand Averroes’sbooks areplaced here in quotationmarks.OnNarboni’sCommentary on the Guide,see Gitit Holzman, “Narboni’sCommen- tary to Maimonides’ Guide,” [in Hebrew,] Daat 74/75(2013): 197‒236. 88 Warren ZevHarvey

One of the most important medieval commentators on the Guide,Narboni also wrote commentaries on at least five works by Averroes.¹⁴ He read Averroes’sbooks, as he read Maimonides’s Guide,inHebrew translation, and is sometimes considered to be more an Averroist than aMaimonidean.¹⁵ In the text under discussion, Narboni does not mention al-Ghazālī by name and mentionsAverroes onlyobliquely, even though the whole passageistoalarge extent copied verbatim from TheIncoherence of the Incoherence,which Narboni read in Rabbi Qalonymus ben David ben Ṭodros’sHebrew translation (c. 1328). Although Narboni’setiquette of quotation leavesmuch to be desired, it is safe to saythathe was not trying to hide the influenceofal-Ghazālī and Averroes on his comments. His discussions of Maimonides’sprevious proofs of God refer the reader to the views of al-Ghazālī and Averroes in the Incoherence of the Incoherence;heclearlyex- pects the reader to read Maimonides’sdiscussion of divineunity togetherwith Aver- roes’sdiscussion. It is Narboni’sstyle to weavequotations into his owncomments. Narboni did not add anything new to the debate about manyGods between al- Ghazālī,Averroes,and Maimonides. However,hedeserves credit as acommentator for perceptivelydocumenting the relationship of Maimonides’sproof of the oneness of God to Averroes’scritique of al-Ghazālī.

Hasdai Crescas(c. 1340‒1410/11)

Rabbi Hasdai ben Judah, known as Hasdai Crescas,agreed with al-Ghazālī that Rea- son cannot provethe existenceofthe one God. He embraced al-Ghazālī’ssceptical argument for manyGods, but also conceded the counterargument broughtbyAver- roes and Maimonides.Ineffect,herevised al-Ghazālī’sargument in order to meet the common objection of Averroes and Maimonides. His discussion of the subject is found in his Lightofthe Lord 1:3.4—achapter treatingthe dogma of God’sunity:

This root [of the unity of God] comprises twonotions:first,that God is One in Himself in perfect simplicity;and second, the denial of plurality.For after it has been posited that He is One in Himself and simple,itisstill open to doubt [safeq]whether thereismorethan one God. As for […]the [question of a] plurality [of Gods], it arises if we posit that thereisaGod, one and simple, but that thereismorethan one. It is inescapable that the other [God] either occupies Himself with the governmentofthe universe or apart thereof, or does not. It is false that He occupies Himself with apart thereof, for the entireuniverse is interconnected [niqšar]and “like one individual” [eḥad][see Maimonides, Guide 1:72; 2:1], and it is fittingthat it

 Gitit Holzman, “The Theory of the Intellect and the Soul in the Thought of Moses Narboni” [in Hebrew] (PhD diss., The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1996), 14‒24.  Forexample, “Moses Narboni […]was the most accomplished Jewish philosopherofthe Averroist school,” and considered it “apious duty to mold Maimonides’ wordssothat they agreewith Averro- es’sversion of Aristotle’sphilosophy.” Herbert A. Davidson, Moses Maimonides (Oxford: OxfordUni- versity Press, 2005), 391‒92. The Problem of Many Gods in al-Ghazālī,Averroes,Maimonides, Crescas, and Sforno 89

comes from one Agent. As for the case in which [the other God] does not occupy Himself with the governmentofthis universe, an objector can claim that there is aGod whogoverns adifferent world from this one, for the possibilityofother worlds will be demonstrated [in Light of the Lord 4:2; cf. 1:2.1]. Here the doors of speculation are locked. In order to remove this perplexityand this doubt,and to annul every objection to this great root [i.e., the unity of God], the Lawhas enlightenedour eyes, we the community of believers, by its dictum, “Hear, OIsrael, the Lord our God, the Lord is One” [Deuteronomy6:4].¹⁶

Although Crescas does not cite al-Ghazālī,Averroes,Maimonides, or Narboni, his discussion of the problem of manyGods manifestlycontinues their conversation. He surelyhad Maimonides’s Guide open on his desk, and his mention of the world’s being interconnected “likeone individual” clearlyalludes to it.Hemay not have had before him al-Ghazālī’s Incoherence of the Philosophers or Averroes’s Incoherence of the Incoherence,but,asHarry Wolfson has observed, he could have been ade- quatelyinformed on the al-Ghazālī–Averroes debate simplybyreadingNarboni’s Commentary on the Guide,which he usedextensively.¹⁷ He mayalso have consulted al-Ghazālī and Averroes more directly: his student Rabbi Zeraḥiah ha-Levi Saladin authored the Hebrew translation of al-Ghazālī’s Incoherence. In agreement with Averroes and Maimonides, Crescas holds that reason proves that this world has onlyone God: the empiricallyobservedoneness of the world points to the oneness of God.However,hedoes not conclude thatal-Ghazālī’sargument cannot be salvaged. It is still possible, according to him, to arguethat one God governs one part of creation and other Gods govern other parts. Our world mayindeed be one and interconnected and therefore have onlyone God, but there may be many worlds—each of them coherent and cohesive,and each having its own one and simple God. Crescas argues in Light 4:2and elsewherethatthere exists aplurality of worlds: since space is an infinite expanse and an infinitenumber of magnitudes is possible, it maybeinferred that there could be an infinite number of worlds.¹⁸ Twice he cites a midrash accordingtowhich God “travels about in 18,000 worlds” (b. AvodahZarah

 Crescas, Light,1.3.4,p.115‒16 (English 114). Cf. Light,1.1.31, p. 60;1.2.19,p.93(English 68‒69,96). Pagereferences to the Light aretoOr Adonai,ed. Shlomo Fisher (Jerusalem: Ramot,1990), followed by references in parentheses to the English translation: Light of the Lord,trans. Roslyn Weiss (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2018). Ihaveomitted the text beginning with omnam ke-še-yitbaʾer and ending with bilti manhig le-davar,since it almost certainlywas not written by Crescas. See below, “An Interpolation in Crescas’ Text.”  Harry Austryn Wolfson, Crescas’ Critique of Aristotle (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1929), 14.Cf. 729,s.v.Narboni, Moses.  Crescas, Light,4:2,p.388‒92 (English 334‒37);cf. 1:2.1, p. 75;1:2.15, p. 89;1:2.19, p, 93 (English 82, 93, 96). See Wolfson, Crescas,117‒18. See also my Physics and Metaphysics in Hasdai Crescas (Amster- dam: Gieben, 1998), 8‒13,23‒29,31‒40.Cf. Ari Ackerman, “Hasdai Crescas and the Scholastic Philos- ophers on the Possible ExistenceofMultiple Simultaneous Worlds,” Aleph 17 (2017): 139‒54. 90 Warren ZevHarvey

3b).¹⁹ If there are 18,000 worlds,there could be 18,000 Gods. If there is an infinite number of worlds,there could be an infinite number of Gods. Crescas does not draw this mind-bogglingconclusion explicitly, but it is implicit in his arguments. Much likeal-Ghazālī,Crescas concludes: Reason cannot establish monotheism. The belief thatGod is One is based not on Reason but on Scripture: “Hear,OIsrael, the Lordour God, the LordisOne” (Deuteronomy6:4). Crescas’santi-Aristoteliantheory of manyworlds givesdramatic support to al- Ghazālī’sargument that reason cannot establish monotheism. Reason maybeable to establish thatthere is one God for our closed little world, but it cannot establish that thereisone God for the infinite universe. Crescas successfullyprovided anew and improved version of al-Ghazālī’sargument—aversion thatreflected the “new physics” which was taking its first steps in his day. In the quoted passage, Crescas uses the word “doubt” (safeq)twice: “it is still open to doubt whether thereismorethan one God”; “to remove[…]this doubt […] the Lawhas enlightened our eyes.” Similarly, he writes in Light 1:3.6: “although [Abraham]had an inclination towardthe truth, he did not escape all doubt until [God] caused His light to overflowupon him, which is prophecy.”²⁰ Reason cannot dispel doubtregardingGod. It cannot dispel scepticism. Onlyprophecycan do that.

An Interpolation in Crescas’sText

The passageunder discussion from Crescas’s LightoftheLord 1:3.4contains two additional sentences in the printed editions of the book.Onthe basis of manuscript evidence, it is clear that these sentences are an interpolation added sometime between the early1405 recension and the final 1410 recension. There are manysuch interpo- lationsinthe Light,some inserted by Crescas and some by students and colleagues who helpedhim edit the book in his lastyears.²¹ In the present case, the interpolation is anti-climactic, confused, and so preposterous that it maybeconcluded with a

 Crescas, Light,1:3.4,p.116 (English 115); 4:2, p. 388 (English 337).  Crescas, Light,1:3.6,p.122 (English 119). See my “Maimonides,Crescas,and the Parable of the Castle,” in Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in Medieval JewishPhilosophyand Thought,ed. Racheli Hal- iva(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 167‒76.  In the superior Florencems. of the Light,written in Saragossa in 1405 by ascribe in Crescas’scir- cle and revised therein1410, the words omnam ke-še-yitbaʾer through bilti manhig le-davar are added in the margin. See my Physics and Metaphysics,12; 34‒25.Inthe introduction to the Light,Crescas mentions “associates” (ḥaverim)who helped him edit the book (p.7;English 24).Regarding problematic interpolations inserted by the “associates,” see my “The Authorship of the Reservations concerning Determinism in Crescas’ Light of the Lord,” [in Hebrew,] KiryatSefer 55,no. 4(1980): 794‒801.The problem of divine power occupied Crescas in his last years. The discussion of divine omnipotence (Light,2:3)was alateaddition to the book. In the uncorrected 1405 textofthe Florence ms., it is omit- tedinthe list of topics giveninthe prefaceofLight 2. See my Rabbi Hasdai Crescas [in Hebrew] (Jer- usalem: Zalman Shazar Center,2010), 48‒50. The Problem of Many Gods in al-Ghazālī,Averroes, Maimonides, Crescas,and Sforno 91

highdegree of confidencethat Crescas could not have written it.The paragraph con- taining the interpolation reads as follows (with the interpolation italicised):

As for the case in which [the other God] does not occupy Himself with the governmentofthis universe, an objector can claim that thereisaGod who governs adifferent world other than this one, for the possibilityofother worlds will be demonstrated [in Light 4:2; cf. 1:2.1]. However, since it will be provedinBooks 2and 3 [i.e., in 2:3, and 3a:1] that God’spowerisinfinite in intensity,itisclear that the One has power for them all. As for the case in which one [God] governsand the other [God] does not governanything,]here the doors of speculation arelocked.

The interpolation begins with aresponse to the sceptical argument from many worlds:evenifthere are manyworlds,the one God has sufficient power to govern them all, for His power is infinite. This argument seems to have been framed by someone who did not understand the original Averroist-Maimonidean proof. The argument deviates from the logic of that proof,which was based on the empiricallyob- served interconnectedness of the world and had nothing to do with the metaphysical question of God’spower.The expected rationalistic response to the argument that manyworlds might entail manyGods would be the counterargument that the entire infinite universe with all its multiple worlds is one and interconnected and so reflects the work of one God. In the continuation of the interpolation, it is argued, in favour of the sceptical thesis, that,accordingtoReason,itispossiblethatthere might be two Gods—one governing the many worlds and another who does not govern them. This is curious. What does it mean to imagine aGod who governs nothing?Ifdivinity is defined as implying omnipotence, does it make sense to speak of an idle God?Meyer Waxman, who generallylauds Crescas’stheology, derided this argument:

It must be admitted that Crescas in this point is not onlyweak, but prejudiced. His polemical natureovermasteredthe philosophical. What does he mean by apassive God?IfGod possesses infinitepotence, whatthen is that other being? […]Itisevident that this absurd argument was onlyadvanced […]asashot at the philosophers,though it fell short of the mark.²²

Waxman is right that the argument is “weak” and “absurd.” However,hedid not know of the manuscript evidence that the argument is an interpolation and almost certainlynot authored by Crescas.

 Meyer Waxman, The Philosophy of Don Hasdai Crescas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1920), 70. 92 Warren ZevHarvey

Conclusion: Al-Ghazālī and Crescas vs Averroes and Maimonides

The debate between al-Ghazālī,Averroes,Maimonides, and Crescas about the possibility of manyGods concerns the epistemologicalfoundations of monotheism. Does monotheism depend on Reason or on Faith?IsReason, left on its own, powerful enough to overcome scepticism and provemonotheism?With regard to the fundamental theological principle of God’sunity,Averroes and Maimonidesmade avaliant effort to defend Reason, while al-Ghazālī and Crescas were hard-nosed sceptics.

Postscript: ObadiahSforno (1475‒1550)²³

The problem of manyGods was revisited about acentury after Crescas by the famed biblical exegete Rabbi Obadiah ben JacobSforno of Cesena, who endorsed the Aver- roist-Maimonidean approach. His discussion appears in his philosophic treatise, Lightofthe Nations,Question 8(cf. Question 6). Sforno wrote two recensions of this work, one in Hebrew (Or ʿAmmim,1537) and one in Latin (Lumen Gentium, 1548). He knew intimatelyMaimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,which he read in IbnTibbon’sHebrew translation. He maynot have read Crescas’s LightoftheLord, which was not readilyavailable in Italyuntil it was printedinFerrarain1555.Sfor- no’sdiscussion of the problem of manyGodsisbased primarily on Averroes’sLong Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics,but he also makesreference to the Incoher- ence of the Incoherence.Heread Averroes’sworks in Latin translations. He begins his discussion of the problem of manyGodsasfollows:

We shall investigateifthereisonlyone Creator or if thereare manyCreators.Now,itseems at first that there aremany. The support for this is the argument of manyofthe ancients related by Averroes in his [Long] Commentary on the Metaphysics 12.52 [= 12.10.1075a], saying: “Sincecon- traries should have contrary principles,and the good and the bad we see in the world are con- traries, it maybesupposed that thereare at least two principles or efficient causes in the world, one producingthe good things and the other the bad things.” However,the oppositeprovestobethe case. The Creator is One and thereisnoother Creator equal to Him. First,this is proved by Aristotle’sargument in the Metaphysics 10.7 [=10.2. 1054a], namely: “In passions,qualities,quantities,and motions,thereisone in number.” These wordsofhis wereexplained by Averroes as follows: “As for passions,qualities,quantities, and motions,thereisineach of these species one thingthat is the principle of the number of them.” He further said: “When we join this with what has been proved in the Physics [8.5‒6;

 When this paperwas originallypresentedinHamburginMay 2017 at the conference on “Scepti- cism from Antiquity to Modern Times,” it stopped with Crescas. Followingmypresentation, Dr.Giada Coppola suggestedIadd adiscussionofSforno. Ithank her for her suggestion and her helpful advice. The Problem of Many Gods in al-Ghazālī,Averroes,Maimonides, Crescas,and Sforno 93

256a‒260a], i.e., that there is apre-existent Prime Mover absolutelyseparate fromall matter […] it is also proved that this existent [i.e., the Prime Mover] is the principle of Substance.”²⁴

The argument for the existenceofmanyGods, here set down by Sforno in the name of “the ancients,” as reportedinAverroes’sLongCommentary on the Metaphysics,is similar to the argument set down by al-Ghazālī in his Incoherence of the Philosophers. However,whereas al-Ghazālī argued thatthe existenceofaplurality of Godsmay seem to follow from the opposition of heavenand earth or of intellect and body, “the ancients” make the sameargument with regard to the opposition of good and bad. Sforno’sproof here against the existenceofmanyGods is based on Averroes’s remarks in his LongCommentary on the Metaphysics,not on his remarks in the In- coherence of the Incoherence.All species of thingshavefirst causes, but there is one First Cause for all thingsinthe universe. In asubsequent passage, Sfornohas recourse to the argument from the world’s “interconnectedness” and “oneness” that we have seen in Averroes’ Incoherence,Dis- cussions 5‒7, and Maimonides’ Guide 1:72 and 2:1. Sforno writes:

[That thereisonlyone God] is argued in Aristotle’s Metaphysics 12.52[=12.10.1075a], in his saying: “There is good in the armyand good in the commander,but thereismoregood in the commander” […]Headded: “All beings areorderedtogether,and directed toward abeing that is one in number.” Averroes explained: “It is clear this includes all beings,for they all exist for the sake of one […]which is the First Cause […]” It is thereforeappropriatethat in Scrip- ture the Creator,who […]orders all species of beings,iscalled “the LordofHosts [Adonai ṣevaʾot]” [1 Samuel 1:3, 11, etc., esp. Jeremiah 31:34]. This teaches that from the manifest order […]inwhich the entireworld is interconnected and one [mequšar we-eḥad;Lat. unitas], there is demonstrated the existenceofanOrdererwho is One, and whointended the unity of the world.²⁵

Aristotle and Averroes explain that the critical good is that of the military commander who knows how to arrangehis troops with an eyetoone purpose. As awell-ordered armyreflects the skill of its commander,sothe well-ordered universe demonstrates the existenceofthe First Cause or God. The unitas universi proves the unitas Ordinator. In using the expression “interconnected and one,” Sforno alludes to Aver- roes’sarguments in the Incoherence,Discussions 5‒7, and Maimonides’sarguments in the Guide 1:72 and 2:1. Sforno’sexplanation of the term “LordofHosts” is resource-

 Obadiah Sforno, Kitve Rabbi ObadiahSforno,ed. Zev Gottlieb (Jerusalem: Mosad Ha-RavKook, 1983), 456; Sforno, Lumen Gentium (Bologna: Anselmo Giaccarelli, 1548), 45a. See Averroes, Aristotelis Operacum Averrois Commentariis (Venice:Iunctas,1562‒74), 8:256a‒257a; 338a. Arabic text: Tafsīrmā baʿdal-Ṭabīʿa,ed., MauriceBouyges(Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1938‒52), 1273‒77;1715(notethe reading ǧawāhir instead of ǧawhar,i.e., “substances” not “substance”). Cf. Charles Genequand, Ibn Rushd’sMetaphysics:ATranslation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd’sCommentaryonthe Metaphysics, Book Lām (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 201.  Sforno, KitveSforno,457; Lumen Gentium,45b. See Aristoteliscum Averrois,8:337a‒338a (Arabic text,1709‒15). Cf. Genequand, Ibn Rushd’sCommentary,198‒200. 94 Warren ZevHarvey

ful, apt,and apparentlyoriginal. He interprets the biblical “LordofHosts” in the light of Aristotle’sexcellent military commander,who arranges his troops skilfully and unites them.Later in the text,herepeatsthis explanation:

This is whatthe Prophets taught,when they used the expression “The LordofHosts” [I Samuel 1:3, 11;Jeremiah 31:34; et al.]. Forfromthe manifest connection [qešer; unitas]between the celestial hosts and the terrestrial hosts,with their wonderful order,likethe order found in every army, whose soldiers uniteaccording to the intention of the commander,the unity of the Creator is demonstrated.²⁶

Celestial and terrestrial physics are wondrouslyinterconnected, and reveal the unity of the Creator,the LordofHosts. Although Sforno’smain discussion of the problem of manyGods is found in Lightofthe Nations,Question 8, he broaches it in Question 6inafascinating exegetical passage:

The Lawofour God […]gaveaprooftoshow that the universe has aCreator whobroughtitinto existence, when it said: “These arethe generations of the heavenand the earth when they were created” [Genesis 2:4]. In other words, from the connection [qešer; colligatum]of“the heaven with the earth,” their beingconjoined and concurringinthe activity of their “generations” […]itisprovedthat “they werecreated” by the powerofaCreator[…]asitisstated explicitly in the continuation of the verse: “in the daythat the LordGod made earth and heaven” [Genesis 2:4] […] This very same proof was expoundedbyMoses our Teacher,may peacebeupon him, saying: “Know this dayand layittothy heart,that the Lord, He is God in heavenaboveand upon the earth beneath, there is none else” [Deuteronomy4:39]. This means that from the connection [qešer; colligatio]ofthe higher realm with the lower realm and the arrangement of their order […] it is demonstrated that “the Lord,” whobrings the universe into existence[…], is the “God,” who is the Governor and Ordinator. Now,fromthis it is clear that “thereisnone else.” Forthe exis- tenceofmorethan one Creator is not possible,aswill be provedbyademonstration in what follows [i.e., in Question 8].²⁷

The collaboration between heavenand earth, testified by Genesis 2:4and Deuteron- omy4:39, proves that there is one Creator (“the Lord”), who is also the Governor (“God”)who givesorder to the celestialand terrestrial “generations” (i.e., the plants, animals, and other creatures). In sum, with regard to the problem of manyGods, Sforno agreed with Averroes and Maimonides and not with al-Ghazālī and Crescas.His distinctive contribution to the debate concerning this problem was his novel Aristotelian explication of the biblical cognomen, “LordofHosts,” and his adroit exegeses of Genesis 2:4and Deu- teronomy4:39.

 Sforno, KitveSforno,460; Lumen Gentium,46b.  Sforno, KitveSforno,452‒53; Lumen Gentium,43a‒b. Cf. Sforno, Commentaryonthe Pentateuch (in standardrabbinic Bibles), Genesis, ad loc. and Deuteronomy, ad loc. The Problem of Many Gods in al-Ghazālī,Averroes, Maimonides, Crescas,and Sforno 95

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Wolfson, HarryAustryn. Crescas’ Critique of Aristotle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1929. Josef Stern What is Maimonidean Scepticism?

Nowadays we call aphilosopher asceptic when he denies that knowledge is possible, and scepticism is aproblem in epistemology,indeed aproblem for its very possibility.Since Descartes,the sceptic is alsoprone to raise radical, hyperbolic doubts like demon deceivers or brains-in-a-vatthat challengeordinary beliefs or common knowledge like the existenceofanexternal world or the existenceofother minds. It is no surprise, then,that the contemporary sceptic is someone primarilytobere- butted, his doubts exposed as not just unjustified but even pathologicallyabnormal. Scepticism nowadays is adisease whose cure is refutation. In antiquity,itwas different.Faced with conflictingperceptual appearances, and the resulting anxiety and unhappiness of not knowing which one to believe, one in- itiated enquiryinorder to discover what is true and what the real natures of things are, to reveal what to believewith security and thereby achieve some modicum of happiness.But lo and behold, scientific enquiry led to new and additional conflicts, not among appearances but between equallystrong but opposing theories between which the inquirer had no clear reason to believeone rather than the other.Not yet freed from uncertainty and unhappiness, the rational reaction for the inquirer was not to assert that knowledge is impossible—for that would also be aclaim that would raise conflictwith others—but rather to suspend judgment,torefrain from assertion, i.e., from commitments about what is real and true. Unlikethe dogmatist who claims to have reached his destination, the truth, the sceptic instead continues the enquiry,never terminatinghis search with anyfinal determination, which would once again make him vulnerable to aconflictingassertion, and more unhappiness. This indeed was the original meaningofskepsis: unceasingenquiry or investigation, not doubt or the denial of knowledge.Bysuspending all judgment,bydivesting himself of the anxious drive to achieveknowledge,thereby circumventing the sourceof unhappiness, the sceptic ipsofacto finds himself in astate of happiness,ifonlytran- quillity or peace of mind. In sum, for the ancients, scepticism was not the disease, but acure to the dogmatist’sunhappy condition that results from his unsatisfiable pursuit of the true naturesofthingsinwhich to believe.¹

IwishtothankGad Freudenthal fororiginally suggesting to me thatIwrite aprécisofmybook, The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide,aswellasthe Maimonides Centre forAdvanced Studies— Jewish Scepticism forhosting me as asenior fellow in 2016‒17 while Iwrote thispaper and presented it at the Centre’sInternationalconferenceonscepticism.

 This,ofcourse, is an oversimplifiedpresentation of ancient scepticism that,amongother things, does not distinguish between Academics and Pyrrhonians.For amorenuanced, critical presentation, see Myles Burnyeat, “Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism?” in TheSkeptical Tradition,ed. Myles Bur- nyeat,(Berkeley:University of California Press,1983), 117‒48;Michael Frede, “The Skeptic’sBelief,” in

OpenAccess. ©2019 JosefStern, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-007 98 Josef Stern

Accordingtothe lore of our forefathers, after the third centuryCE, scepticism dropped out of sight duringthe Middle Ages. Over the past quarter century,this re- ceivedview has now been corrected by distinguished scholars such as Dominik Per- ler,Robert Pasnau, and Henrik Lagerlund, who mainlydrawonevidence culled either from earlyChristian thought, such as Augustine’s Contra Academicos,orfrom late thirteenth through fourteenthcentury Latin philosophy, beginning with John of Salisbury,continuingthrough Henry of Ghent,Siger of Brabant,Scotus,Ockham, and Nicholas of Autrecourt.² In the Islamic world, one finds mention of al-Ghazālī, who survivedashort bout of scepticism and some of whose sceptical arguments an- ticipate Hume and Descartes.³ In this paper,Iwant to sketch in broad strokes asceptical philosophyput forth in the Arabic philosophicalworld, not in the writingsofa Muslim but of arguablythe greatest medieval Jewish philosopher,Moses Maimonides (1138‒1204).⁴ To call Maimonides asceptic, or someone with sceptical leanings, will be asurprise for those who know him, as he has traditionallybeen cast, as acard-carrying

EssaysinAncient Philosophy (Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press,1987), 179‒200; Frede, “The Skeptics’sTwo Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of Knowledge,” in EssaysinAn- cient Philosophy (Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress,1987), 201‒22;Gisela Striker, “Academ- ics versus Pyrrhonists, Reconsidered,” in CambridgeCompanion to Ancient Scepticism,ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2010), 195‒207; Striker, “On the Differencebetween the Pyrrhonistsand the Academics,” in EssaysonHellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 135‒49;Striker, “Scepticism as aKind of Philosophy,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83,no. 2(August 2001): 113‒29;Striker, “Sceptical Strategies,” in Doubt and Dogmatism,ed. Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat,and Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: OxfordUni- versity Press, 1980), 54‒83.  It is noteworthy that RichardBosleyand Martin Tweedale,eds. BasicIssuesinMedievalPhilosophy, second edition(Toronto: Broadview, 2006), an “interactive” anthology of medieval philosophy,contains atopical unit on “Skepticism,” includingreadingsfromAugustine,Henry of Ghent, SigerofBrabant, John Duns Scotus,and Nicholas of Autrecourt.Onmedievalscepticism, seeHenrikLagerlund, “AHis- toryofSkepticisminthe Middle Ages,” in Lagerlund, ed. Rethinkingthe HistoryofSkepticism. TheMiss- ingMedievalBackground (Leiden, Boston:Brill,2010),1–28;RobertPasnau, ThomasAquinas on Human Nature:APhilosophicalStudy of SummaTheologiae,1a, 75‒89 (Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 2002); Pasnau, “Scienceand Certainty,” in CambridgeHistory of Medieval Philosophy,ed. Robert Pasnau (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,2010),357‒68;Dominik Perler, “Does GodDeceive Us?Skepti- calHypothesesinLateMedievalPhilosophy,” in Rethinkingthe HistoryofSkepticism:The MissingMedi- eval Background,ed. Henrik Lagerlund(Leiden,Boston: Brill, 2010), 1‒28;Perler, “Skepticism,” in Cam- bridge HistoryofMedievalPhilosophy, vol. 1,ed. Robert Pasnau (Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 2010), 384‒96;Perler, “Scepticism andMetaphysics,” in TheOxfordHandbookofMedievalPhi- losophy,ed. John Marenbon (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress,2012),546‒65.  On al-Ghazālī’sscepticism, see Taneli Kukkonen, “Al-Ghazali’sSkepticism, Revisited,” in Rethink- ing the History of Skepticism: TheMissing Medieval Background,ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 29‒60.  As an overview of asceptical readingofMaimonides’s Guide and for reasons of space, this essay does not attempttoevaluatealternative and, in particular,dogmatic readingswhich would be necessary to makeafull case on its behalf. Forsuch an evaluation of dogmatic readings,see Josef Stern, TheMatter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press, 2013). What is Maimonidean Scepticism? 99

Aristotelian, Neoplatonist,orRationalist (whatever thatmeans), or as atraditional pious rabbi. But,infact,hewas alreadyread in the Middle Ages and either appre- ciated or criticised for his sceptical or agnostic views bothbysome of his greatest commentators—includinghis translator Samuelibn Tibbon, Shem Tovb.Joseph ibn Falaquera, and Profayt Duran (Efodi)—and, among the Latinscholastics, by no less than Thomas Aquinas.⁵ However,this readingofMaimonides was eclipsed by Averroism in the later thirteenthand fourteenthcenturies, and onlyduring the last forty years has it re-emerged—indeed, as the catalyst for what Itaketobethe liveliest debate in contemporary Maimonidean studies. The historical sources of Maimonides’sscepticism are not known. To the best of our knowledge,none of the classical sceptical works were translated into Arabic (or Hebrew,including Philo’sdescription of the Modes), although we have agood description of the Pyrrhonists and Academics in Saadia’s Book of Doctrines and Beliefs (probablydrawn from adoxography). Galen and the medicaltradition are apossible avenue of transmission, and specific sceptical arguments surface not infrequentlyin the Arabic literature.⁶ Arabic terms like wuqūf or tawaqquf and takāfu’ al-adilla have been identifiedastranslations of epochē and isostheneia;sceptics wereknown as šākkūn, ǧuhhāl, mutaǧāhilūn, ḥisbānīya, muʿānida, lā adrīya,and sūfisṭāʾīya,a term by which Maimonides refers to those who doubt the senses, aview he attributes to the kalām.⁷ At the end of the day, Maimonides’ssources remain amystery,and we

 Based on aclose reading of Aquinas’ Commentaryonthe Sentences,inwhich we can see him work- ing out the positions and their sourceslater expressed in their matureform in the Summas, Richard Taylor argues that Aquinas read not onlyMaimonidesasasceptic about God and His attributes, but also Avicenna through aMaimonidean lens. See RichardTaylor, “Maimonides and Aquinas on Divine Attributes: The ImportanceofAvicenna,” in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed in Translation: AHis- toryfromthe Thirteenth Century to the Twentieth,ed. Josef Stern,James T. Robinson, and Yonatan A. Shemesh (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, forthcoming2019). Forfurther discussionofMaimo- nides’ssceptical influenceonAquinas,see David B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides,Aquinas (NotreDame: University of Notre Dame Press,1986); Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, Mai- monides and St. Thomas on the Limits of Reason (Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press, 1995); and MercedesRubio, Aquinas and Maimonides on the Possibility of the KnowledgeofGod. An Exami- nation of the Quaestio de attributis (Dordrecht: Springer,2008).  See Saadia Gaon, Sefer Emunot we-Deʿot [in Hebrew,]trans. Joseph Qafih (Jerusalem: SurahPress, 1969/70), 69‒72. English translation in Saadia Gaon, TheBookofBeliefs and Opinions,trans.Samuel Rosenblatt (New Haven: Yale University Press),80‒83.Saadia refers to the Pyrrhonistsasthose who hold the doctrine of wuqūf and the Academicsasmutaǧāhilīn. See also Harry A. Wolfson, Repercus- sions of the Kalam in JewishPhilosophy (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversity Press,1979),160‒62; Abraham Joshua Heschel, “The Quest for Certainty in Saadia’sPhilosophy,” JewishQuarterly Review 33,no. 3(January 1943): 265‒313.  On scepticism in the Islamicateworld, see Saul Horowitz, Der Einfluss der griechischen Skepsis auf die Entwicklung der Philosophie bei den Arabern (Breslau: Schatzky,1915); Josef vanEss, “Skepticism in Islamic Religious Thought,” Al-Abḥāṯ 21 (1968): 1‒15;Patricia Crone, “UngodlyCosmologies,” in Islam, the Ancient Near East and Varieties of Godlessness: Collected Studies in Three Volumes,Volume 3, ed. Hanna Siurua, (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 124‒27;Moshe Perlmann, “IbnHazm on the Equivalence of Proofs,” JewishQuarterly Review 40,no. 3(January 1950):279‒90;Franz Rosenthal, KnowledgeTrium- 100 Josef Stern

also should not rule out the possibility that his scepticism wassimply original to him. We can date the beginning of the contemporarydebate to an essaypublished in 1979 by Shlomo Pines, who argued that Maimonides adopted aposition allegedly held by al-Fārābī in his lost Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics accordingto which “the human intellect can onlycognize objects perceivedbythe senses and images deriving from sense data.”⁸ On that basis Pines claimed that “Maimonides is of the opinion that no scientificcertainty can be achievedwith regard to objectsthat are outside the sub-lunar world,”⁹ thereby ruling out human cognition of the form, or concept,ofany purelyimmaterial being like God and,indeed, of anything beyond the sublunary realm of terrestrial physics,thereby excludingcosmology and astronomy. However,the conclusionPines drew from these epistemic limitations was that Maimonides, anticipating Kant,was a critical and not a sceptical philosopher.Lack- ing certaintythat there exist separate intellects,Maimonides held, to quote Pines again, “there is no point in setting oneself the aim to intellect or to achieve acon- junction with aseparate intellect,”¹⁰ and instead Maimonides gave primacy to the life of political or practical action over thatofintellectual perfection.¹¹

phant (Leiden: Brill, 1970); Michael Cook, Early Muslim Dogma (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1981); Stern, Matter and Form,146‒47,n25.  Shlomo Pines, “The Limitations of Human Knowledge According to Al-Farabi, IbnBajja, and Mai- monides,” in Studies in Medieval JewishHistoryand Literature,vol. 1, ed. IsadoreTwersky (Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press, 1979),93. Iwritethat al-Fārābī allegedly held this view because, in the absenceofthe lost Commentary,all our evidenceare reports by ibn Bāǧǧa, Averroes, and others,which has been recentlychallengedbyHebert A. Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge,” MaimonideanStudies 3(1995): 49‒103;Davidson, Maimonides the Rationalist (Oxford: Littman Li- brary of Jewish Civilization, 2011).  Pines, “Limitations,” 93.  Pines,94.  Pines claims that Maimonides should be characterised as acritical (rather than as asceptical) philosopher. See Shlomo Pines, “The Philosophical Purport of Maimonides’ Halakhic Works and the Purport of the Guide of the Perplexed,” in Maimonides and Philosophy,ed. Shlomo Pines and Yir- miyahu Yovel(Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987), 11. See also Pines, “Dieu et L’EtreSelon Mamonide: Exégese d’Exode 3,14 et doctrine connexe,” in Celui Qui Est: Interprétations JuivesetChrétiennes d’Exode 3‒14, ed. Alain de Libera and Émilie ZumBrunn (Paris:Cerf, 1986), 15‒24;Pines, “Les limitesdelaméta- physique selon al-Farabi, IbnBajja, et Maimonide: sourcesetantithesesdeces doctrine chez Alex- andred’Aphrodise et chez Themistius,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13,no.1(1981): 211‒25;1‒14;Pines, “Translator’sIntroduction,” in Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed,translated by Shlomo Pines (Chi- cago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 1:lvii‒cxxxiv. Pines’sthesis has generated ahugeliterature, some supportingbut most challengingit. Those sympathetic to Pines or his general view include War- ren Zev Harvey, “Maimonides’ First Commandment,Physics, and Doubt,” in Hazon Nahum: Studies in JewishLaw,Thought, and History, presented to Dr.Norman Lamm on the occasion of his seventieth birthday,ed. Jacob Elman and Jeffrey. S. Gurock (New York: Yeshiva University Press,1997), 149‒62; Warren Zev Harvey, “Maimonides’ Critical Epistemology and Guide 2:24,” Aleph 8(2008): 213‒35;Ken- neth Seeskin, Searching for aDistant God (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1999); Joel L. Kraemer, “Is There aText in this Class?” Aleph 8(2008): 247‒99;and Stern, Matter and Form. Critics include What is MaimonideanScepticism? 101

Ibelievethat Pines put his finger on the pulse of the Guide but in calling Mai- monides asceptic rather than acritical philosopher,Iintend to depart bothfrom Pines’sconclusionthat Maimonides surrendered the theoretical and adopted apractical or political ideal for human happiness and from Pines’sempiricist basisfor Mai- monides’sepistemic limitations. On the otherhand, Idonot mean to claim that Mai- monides neatlyfits into ancient categories of scepticism, either Pyrrhonian or Academic. Since his dogmatists are the falāsifa,the Arabic (some more, others less Neoplatonised) Aristotelians, the conception of knowledge (epistēmē or ʿilm), that is the targetofhis sceptical critique is different from the Hellenistic models of belief that his predecessorswereattacking. And because his scepticism is also, I shall argue, restricted to metaphysics,the specific arguments he givesdiffer from the modes one finds in, say, Sextus.¹² Notwithstanding these differences, Iwill arguethat Maimonides is best characterised as asceptic for two main reasons:First,his arguments follow the sceptic’s general argumentative schemata. In some cases, he deliberatelygives for each argument for aproposition p acounter-argument of equal strength for not-p (or acontrary of p), resultinginastate of equipollence with respect to which the inquirer is brought to suspendjudgment, epochē,and not assent to either proposition. In other cases, he shows how reasoningspecificallyabout metaphysics leadstoits own self-refutation and, again, epochē. And in almostall arguments, the deciding factor is the lack of a criterion—although what that criterion is differsfor Maimonidesfrom the Ancients. As with the Pyrrhonists, what is critical for scepticism for Maimonidesisthat the arguments lead to conflicting claims of equal strength, equipollence (in Greek, isosthe-

Alexander Altmann, “Maimonides on the Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics,” in Vonder mittelalterlichen zur modernen Aufklarung (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr,1987), 60‒129;Herbert A. Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge”;Davidson, Maimonides the Rationalist;Charles H. Man- ekin, “Belief, Certainty,and Divine Attributes in the Guide of the Perplexed,” Maimonidean Studies 1(1990): 117‒41;Manekin, “Maimonides and the Arabic Aristotelian Tradition of Epistemology,” In Beyond Religious Borders:Interaction and Intellectual Exchangeinthe Medieval Islamic World,eds. David M. Freidenreich and Miriam Goldstein (Philadelphia, PA:University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 78‒95;Barry S. Kogan, “What Can We Know and When Can We Know It?Maimonides on the Active Intelligenceand Human Cognition,” in Moses Maimonides and His Time,ed. Eric Ormsby (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1989), 121‒37;Alfred Ivry, “The Logical and Scientific Premises of Maimonides’ Thought.” In Perspectives on JewishThought and Mysticism,edited by Alfred. L. Ivry,Elliot R. Wolfson, and Allan Arkush (Amsterdam: Harwood, 1998), 63‒97;Ivry, “Guide 2:24 and All That (i)jâza,” Aleph 8(2008): 237‒46.  Another differenceIcannot discuss herefor reasonsofspaceisthat,unlikethe classical sceptics, whogenerallyadopted metriopatheia,ormoderation, as their stance towards moral behaviour and the emotions,Maimonides advocates apatheia,the eradication of (moral) emotions and bodily urges(to the highestdegree possible) and, where that is not possible, their minimisation as aform of accommodation to necessity.This differencereflects Maimonides’sNeoplatonic negativevaluation of all things material or bodily. See Stern, Matter and Form,chapter7.Because the bodyisphysical or natural, this stanceisagain compatible with his scepticism about metaphysics but it yields arather different picturethan that of the classical sceptics. 102 Josef Stern

neia). It is not sufficient to raise a doubt,the least possibility that would challenge the certainty of the knowledge claim. Second, the value Maimonides sees in suspension of judgment, epochē,orthe self-refutation of reasoning,isnever simply theoretical but also practical: to put oneself in astate of mind either of tranquillity,hence, a kind of happiness,and/or of aweand dazzlement that is an analogue to the kind of divineworship that the dogmatist holds one can achievethrough the acquisition of positive knowledge about God.For Maimonides as for the Ancients, scepticism is always in the service of apractical end.¹³ In order to sharpen these two motivations for characterisingMaimonides as a sceptic, Iwill begin by spelling out the dogmatic background to which he is reacting. From the start to finish of the Guide,Maimonides emphasises time and again that the true human self is the intellect and that true human perfection is intellectual:

[The human’s] ultimateperfection is to become rational in actu, Imean to have an intellect in actu; this would consist in his knowingeverythingconcerning all the beings that is within the capacity of man to know in accordance with his ultimateperfection (Guide 3:27,511).¹⁴

The true human perfection […]consists in the acquisition of the rational virtues—Irefertothe conception of intelligibles,which teach true opinions concerning the divine things.This is in true reality the ultimateend; this is what givesthe individual true perfection, aperfection be- longing to him alone; and it giveshim permanent perdurance; through it man is man (3:54, 635).

Within Maimonides’sNeoplatonised Aristotelian philosophicalworld, one achieves this ideal human perfection through full actualisation of one’sintellectual potentiality:one acquires all possibleconcepts and truths—of physics,cosmology,and metaphysics—and then contemplates or uses these truths in theoretical reasoning constantly, exclusively,and continuously. The individual who achieves this intellectual state is as close as one can be to adisembodied (separate)intellect.This is the philosophers’ ideal, and it is alsoMaimonides’sideal.¹⁵ But that leavesopen the question—the coreofthe current controversy—as to whether Maimonides believed thatthis ideal of intellectual perfection can be realised or achieved by real human beings. The obstacle is that the human being for Maimo-

 See Burnyeat, “Can the Skeptic,” on the practical dimensionofscepticism in particular and, on ancient philosophyingeneral, PierreHadot, Philosophy as aWay of Life,ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. by Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy? Trans.Michael Chase (Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press, 2002).  References to the Guide appear in parentheses in the bodyofthe textaccording to book number and book chapter,followedbythe pagenumber in Pines’sEnglish translation.  Pines argued that,because of his critical epistemology, Maimonides givesupthe theoretical ideal in the closingparagraphofthe Guide 3:54 and opts for alife performing acts of loving-kindness,right- eousness,and judgment through assimilationtoGod’sactions which he interprets as civic or political happiness.This movehas been criticised by many. Foranalternative explication of this passage, see Stern, Matter and Form,340‒49. What is MaimonideanScepticism? 103

nides is necessarilyahylomorphic substance composed of matter/bodyand form/intellect: therecan be no form without matter and no matter without form. But this in turn raises the question whether the human’smatter/bodyabsolutelyprevents her from achieving the perfection of her form/intellect.Morespecifically, (1) does one’smatter/body,which includes bodilyfaculties like the imagination, prevent one from purelyintellectual apprehension of metaphysics and the heavens; and (2) do bodilyneeds and desires prevent one from constantly, exclusively,and undivided- ly attendingtoand engaginginintellectual activity with the requisite concentration to be afullyactualised, constantlyactive intellect?Ifweanswer yestoeither question, the tension between the human’sintellect and bodyleavesher at most with an incompletegrasp of metaphysics and with significantlyless continuous and less in- tensive intellectual activity than what perfection demands. In response to this open question, readersofthe Guide fall into two camps. Dog- matic readers hold that Maimonides believed thatthe ideal of intellectual perfection is humanlyrealisable; hence, it must be possible for human beingstoacquireknowl- edge of metaphysics,cosmology,and God.Sceptical readers hold that Maimonides did not believethis is possiblefor the reason that,asMaimonides states, “matter is astrong veil preventing the apprehension of that which is separate from matter as it truly is” (3:9,436‒37). Here “matter” signifies the imagination, which, as abodilyfaculty,cannot conceive or represent anything except as abody, i.e., asubjector substance with attributes,akind of compositeness or complexity that conflicts with the simplicity of the immaterial. But without knowledge,orapprehension, of the immaterial, there is no knowledge of metaphysics,hence, no absolute perfectionofthe intellect and no happiness consequent to that state. In other words, dogmatic readers of the Guide identify Maimonides’sviews with those of his dogmatists, the falāsifa,the (more or less Neoplatonised) Arabic Aristo- telians,like the earlier Al-Fārābī and Avicenna who, for all their differences, claim that perfectedhuman intellects possess scientificknowledge of metaphysics that in turn enables conjunction or union with the Active Intellect and the highestkind of intelligible happiness. This widely-held identification of Maimonides with the falā- sifa is easilyunderstandable. On traditionaldogmatic readings of the Guide,itwas assumedthat,because Maimonidesharshlyattacks the kalām,and because the falā- sifa are their enemy, then,onthe assumption that the enemyofone’senemyisone’s friend, he must identify himself in general with the falāsifa and their Aristotelian views. However,the full picture is much more complicated and nuanced. First,Mai- monides’sdeepest objection to the kalām—one sensesgenuine revulsion—concerns their method or philosophical ideology: he depicts them as apologists, polemicists, and theological opportunists who, rather than “[…]conform in their premises to the appearance of that which exists, consider how being ought to be in order that it should furnish aproof for the correctness of aparticular opinion” (1:71, 178). They shape the facts to fit their theory rather than, as Themistius insisted, have “the correct opinions conform to that which exists” (1:71, 179). However,onparticularques- tions of significancefor metaphysics and epistemology—especiallyonthe nature of 104 Josef Stern

the modalities, the limits of causal explanation, and the evidence from the heavens for belief in adeity—Maimonides findsinthe kalām not insignificant grains of truth and correctivestothe philosophers’ self-confidence in their claims to knowledge (see 1:73,208;211;1:74, 219; 2:19,303;3:15, 460). On the other hand, Maimonides is highlycritical of the philosophers, especially on matters of metaphysics and cosmology.Ofcourse, even giventhe receiveddog- matic picture, thereare specific issues whereMaimonides explicitlydeclareshis dis- agreementwith the philosophers, most notablythat of creation vs.eternity.However, the default assumption is that whereMaimonides cites the philosophers without indicating adisagreement,heagrees with them (and especiallywhen he adds that the Lawalsoagrees with them, for example, on the existenceofseparate intellects, namely, angels). Thus, it is frequentlyassertedthat Maimonides accepts the philosophers’ four proofs of the existenceofGod (in 2:1) and their doctrine of the unity of the intellect in act,its object,and subject(in 1:68).¹⁶ In fact,however,when he attributes agiven view to the philosophers, it is arguable that he means to distinguish it as their view,not his, which he then attacks.¹⁷ Furthermore, on anumber of subjects (prophecy,providence,cosmology), Mai- monides adopts the familiar sceptical strategyofarguing ad hominem against the philosophers, avoiding dogmatic assumptions of his own by assuminghis opponent’sown assumptions and showing the antinomies or conflictingopinions to which they lead—recognition of which should lead these opponents to give up their assertions and suspend judgment.One such example is the philosophers’ theory of separate intellects,which they use to explain the motions of the spheres,and

 See Altmann, “Maimonides”;Davidson, Maimonides the Rationalist,126‒27,Ivry, “Logical and Scientific Premises,” 73;Joel L. Kraemer, “How (Not) to Read The Guide of the Perplexed,” Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 32 (2006): 350‒403;Howard Kreisel, Maimonides’ Political Thought: Stud- ies in Ethics,Law,and the Human Ideal (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999); Tamar Rudavsky, Maimonides (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Josef Stern, “Maimonides’ Demonstrations:Principles and Practice,” Medieval Philosophyand Theology 10 (2001): 47‒84.Tobesure, some amongboth the medieval commentators and modern scholars arguethat even on issues likeeternity vs. creation, despite his explicit statements,Maimonidesesotericallyagrees with the philosophers;see LeoStrauss, “The Literary Characterofthe Guide of the Perplexed,” in Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe: Free Press, 1952),38‒94;Warren Zev Harvey, “AThird Approach to Maimonides’ Cosmogony-Prophetology Puzzle,” Harvard Theological Review 74,no. 3(July 1981): 287‒301. On the other hand, the sceptical reading that distinguishes Maimonides’sstancefromthe philosophers’ does not claim that Maimo- nides sees no cognitive valueinthe views of the philosophers.Maimonides generallyadapts the philosophers’ positions as the kind of wisdom that is appropriatetocommunal welfareevenifisnot “the truth as it reallyis,” i.e., what sciencewould demonstrate. Forfurther discussion, see Stern, Matter and Form,12‒15;32‒37.  See Maimonides’sexplicit statement distinguishingthe philosophers’ premises and “methodsof inference” to provethe existenceofthe deity from “the method Ishall adopt” in 1:71,183‒84.Like- wise, the doctrine of the unity of the intellect is proposed as the “dictum of the philosophers” (1:68, 163). What is MaimonideanScepticism? 105

which Maimonides presents in detail onlyinorder to launch avigorous critique.¹⁸ In the same spirit,heprovides adeep critique of their account of divine attributes,and in particularnegative attributes (as we shallexplain below).But at critical moments in the Guide,Maimonidesalso takes scepticism as his own stance and cultivates suspension of judgment as the correct reactive attitude towardall metaphysical problems, exercise of which will lead to peace of mind and/or worship of God. Yet even at thosemoments when it turns out (as the sceptical reader argues, on Maimo- nides’sown view) that the intellectual ideal cannot be realised by human beings, it does not follow that Maimonidessurrenders the ideal of intellectual perfection. In- stead it continues to serveasaregulative ideal that orients and shapes alife of unending enquiry. However,what is necessary is thatwere-evaluatehow we measure perfection: whether we judge it solelyinterms of the product—the content of the knowledge—attained, or whether we focus instead on the process and practicesof intellectual activity and enquiry,regardless of whether or not they achievetheirends. Where Maimonidesagrees with the falāsifa is that all knowledge includingmet- aphysics,and in particularknowledge of God (if possible), must be based on the natural world explainedbysublunar science:

Ihavealreadylet youknow [1:34, 74]that thereexists nothingexceptGod […]and this existent world and that thereisnopossible inferenceproving His existence[…]except those deriving from this existent takenasawhole and fromits details.Accordingly it necessarilybehooves one to consider this existent as it is and to derive premises fromwhatisperceivedofits nature. Forthis reason it follows that youshould know its perceptible form and nature, and then it will be possible to makeaninferencefromitwith regardtowhat is other than it (1:71, 183).

But if the onlyroutetoknowledge of God is via “the existent world”—through the natural sciences—it follows thatMaimonides does apparentlybelievethat we do have knowledge of physics and nature. Indeed, he repeatedlystates that “everything that Aristotle has said about all thatexists from beneath the sphere of the moon to the centreofthe earth is indubitably correct” (2:22, 319;cf. 2:24,326). But not onlyis Aristotelian natural science true, it is also Maimonides’sparadigm of scientific knowledge.Its demonstrations and proofsfurnish standardsand criteria thatany other purported science or explanation, including divine science, or metaphysics, must meet.For example, what is metaphysicallypossible(or necessary) must both be compatible with and be constrained by nature as it actuallyis. Andwhen he argues ad hominem against the falāsifa,the main fault he finds in their theories of cos- mologyand metaphysics is preciselytheir failuretoliveuptotheir own standards of knowledge givenintheir theories of physics. The first moral to be drawn, then, for Maimonides’sscepticism is that it is limited to what lies beyond physics, in particular the philosophers’ cosmological and metaphysical theories. Elsewhereinthe Guide,Maimonidesexplicitlydisowns scepticism

 See Stern, Matter and Form,250‒305. 106 Josef Stern

with respect to the senses (1:73, 213‒14), and he also allows for mathematical knowledge (1:31, 66). He alsomakes every effort to insulate his scepticism from the natural sciences—although Iamnot as confident that his attempt at insulation or his distinction between the epistemic credentials of human knowledge of physics and of metaphysics is as stable as he thinks.¹⁹ Now,thatone’ssceptical stance can be restricted is not news; as we will next mention, Pyrrhonists also restricted their scepticism to non-evident beliefs, allowing themselvesassentoratleast acquiescence to the evident.²⁰ However,Maimonides’sdistinction is between twodomains or subjectmat- ters (nature or the sublunar world vs. cosmology and metaphysics), and the fact that his scepticism is limited to metaphysics enables him to make dogmatic assumptions about the sublunar world that the classical sceptic could not make—for example, assumptions about what human (scientific) knowledge requires, about physical motion, causation, matter,and form presupposed by physics,assumptions from which Maimonideslaunches his sceptical critique of the philosophers’ theories of metaphysics. Acomplementary restriction on Maimonidean scepticism is thatitis directed exclusively against claims to possess scientific knowledge,the kind of cognitive state the calibre of which would enable the human, in medieval terms, to achievethe status of afullyactualised or acquired intellect that either is in or leads to conjunction with the active intellect.Unlikesome interpretationsofclassical scepticism, Maimo- nides does not challengeordinary or rustic beliefs or “common knowledge,” let alone generallyaccepted or “conventional” opinions or dialectical conclusions, or

 Notwithstanding all these statements avowingscientific knowledge of the sublunar world and the natural sciences, at least one medieval commentator and one modern scholar have appealed to apas- sage in 3:23,496 to arguethat Maimonides was also sceptical of knowledge of the sublunar sphere. See Shem TovIbn Falaquera, Moreh ha-Moreh,[Heb.,] ed. Yair Shiffman (Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish Studies Press, 2001), 274‒77 and WarrenZev Harvey, “Maimonides’ Critical Epistemology and Guide 2:24,” Aleph 8(2008): 234‒35.Idiscuss this passage in Josef Stern, The EpistemologyofProphe- cy:Maimonides on the False Prophet (manuscript in preparation). The largerissue is whether our lack of knowledge of ultimatesuperlunar causes impugns our knowledge of the proximatesublunar causes. Sufficeittosay for now that,although it is clear that Falaquera himself takesscepticism to extend both to the sublunar and superlunar worlds, all that Maimonidesdenies in that passageisknowledge of the “origination” of sublunar natural things,i.e., explanation by their ultimatecauses in the superlunar sphere.  It is asubject of endless scholarlycontroversy how to characterise the evident/non-evident distinction: whether the evident are mere appearances that one passively receives, (non-epistemic) reports about one’sown mental state rather than the world, or ordinary (rustic) beliefs as opposed to theory-embedded or scientific/philosophical (gentleman’s) beliefs;see Jonathan Barnes, “The Be- liefs of aPyrrhonist,” Elenchos 4(1983): 5‒43;Burnyeat, “Can the Skeptic”;Frede, “Skeptics’sbelief”; Frede, “The Skeptic’sTwo Kinds”;Striker, “Sceptical Strategies”;and Casey Perin, “Scepticism and Belief,” in CambridgeCompanion to Ancient Scepticism,ed. RichardBett(Cambridge:Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2010), 145‒64. What is MaimonideanScepticism? 107

claims accepted because they suffer from fewer doubts than rival hypotheses.²¹ Nei- ther are his arguments directed against claims as to what reallyexists in the sublunar world or about the natures of thingsasopposed to their appearances. Since he discusses certaintyasaspecies of belief (1:50, 111), Maimonides’sscepticism also does not exclude the possibilitythat someone mayhavecertain belief in a proposition about which he has no knowledge or understanding,specificallycon- cerningwhich he suspends judgment (I will sketch one example of this possibility).²² His termfor scientific knowledge is most frequently ʿilm,which translates the Greek epistēmē (less frequently, he uses maʿrifa). Like most of his philosophicalterms,Mai- monides nowhereexplicitlydefines ʿilm,and his use of the term is sometimes loose.²³ Within the Aristotelian tradition, epistēmē is closelylinked to demonstration (burhān)and to the intellect (ʿaql). And among the conditions Aristotle requires for premises of ademonstration, the most important for Maimonides is that they must contain the cause, or explanation, of the conclusion. Forinorder to have scientific knowledge of x,one must understand x accordingtoits “true reality” (ḥaqīqa), rather than as it appears or accordingtocommon opinion, and we onlyunderstand x when we know its causal explanation.²⁴ Aristotle goes on to distinguish explicitlybetween demonstrations that contain amiddle term that is the cause and explanation of the conclusion, entailing both the fact that (to hoti;Arabic inna)the conclusion obtains and its explanation why (to dioti, Arabic limā)and those demonstrations that contain no cause and merelyestablish the fact that the conclusion is true. Among the scho- lastics, this distinction came to be known as the differencebetween demonstrations propter quid and quia,and Ihaveargued elsewherethatonlydemonstrations propter

 According to Alexander of Aphrodisias’sprinciple; see Guide 2:3, 254; 2:23,321. It is an intriguing question whether Alexander’sprinciple mayberelated to the Academic’sidea of reasonable or probable belief as acriterion in the absenceofknowledge. On the status of Aristotelian (not kalām) dialectical arguments,see Joel L. Kraemer, “MaimonidesonAristotle and ScientificMethod,” in Moses Maimonides and His Time,ed. Eric Ormsby (Washington D.C.:Catholic University of America Press, 1989), 53‒88;Arthur Hyman, “Demonstrative,Dialectical, and Sophistic Arguments in the Philosophy of Maimonides,” in Moses Maimonides and His Time,ed. Eric Ormsby (WashingtonD.C.: Catholic Uni- versity of America Press, 1989), 35‒51;Ivry, “Logical and Scientific Premises.”  On certainty as an epistemic notion in Arabic philosophy, see Deborah L. Black, “Knowledge (ʿIlm)and Certitude (Yaqīn)inAl-Farabi’sEpistemology,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 16 (2006): 11‒45,explicatingal-Fārābī, Kitābal-Burhān,inAl-Manṭiq ‘inda al-Fārābī,volume 4, ed. Majid Fakhry (Beirut: Dar al-Machreq, 1987). Partial English translation in JonMcGinnis and David C. Reisman, eds., Arabic Philosophy:AnAnthologyofSources (Indianapolis:Hackett PublishingCom- pany, 2007), 63‒67.Manekin, “Maimonides,” argues that Maimonides replaced explanatory understanding(ʿilm or epistēmē)bycertainty as the standardofdemonstration, hence,ofscientific knowledge.For criticism, see Stern, Matter and Form,142‒45,and Stern, Epistemology.  See Hyman, “Demonstrative”;Maimonides, Moreh Nevukhim [Hebrew,] trans. Michael Schwartz (Tel Aviv:Tel Aviv University Press, 2002), 1:7n12 (translator’snote);Stern, “Maimonides’ Demonstra- tions”;Stern, Matter and Form,138‒42.  See Myles Burnyeat, “Aristotle on UnderstandingKnowledge,” in Aristotle on Science,ed. Enrico Berti (Padua: Antenore, 1981), 97‒139. 108 Josef Stern

quid furnish what Maimonides, following Alexander of Aphrodisias, believes is necessary to achieveknowledge or understanding.²⁵ Iwillreturn to this shortly, but the significant upshot for us is that the targetofMaimonidean scepticism is exclusively scientific knowledge or understanding of metaphysics,not knowledge of physics and not even beliefs held with certainty about metaphysics. Against this background, we can now turn to what Iearlier called the practical orientation of Maimonidean scepticism. Maimonidesdoes not simplymake atheoretical case thatthe falāsifa and he himself (and generalising,all humans) lack the epistemic credentials for knowledge claims about metaphysics.Healso makes the normative claim that, givenasceptical critique, one ought to “refrain and hold back,”“stop,” or “stand”—all translations of wuqūf,his term for epochē—upon rec- ognisingher lack of knowledge/understanding.But wuqūf or epochē is also not an end in itself. Rather it is astep, as we also sawfor the classicalsceptic, towards achieving akind of happiness.For the Pyrrhonist,their non-eudemonian happiness is tranquillity (ataraxia), acertain kind of mental state, peace of mind, thatfollows almost as an accident (or so it is depicted) from epochē,the suspension of judgment on all questions.Maimonides, in contrast,describes two different practical statesinthe contexts of different arguments: one is also tranquillity,but the second is dazzlement or awe. First,hesees the sceptic’s wuqūf as away of freeing oneself from the unceas- ing anxiety,endless irresolvable disagreements, and bad science that resultfrom the drive to satisfy the unsatisfiable epistemic desire to have knowledge of metaphysics.

When [studying “obscurematters likemetaphysics”]one should not makecategoric affirmations in favorofthe first opinion that occurs to him and should not,fromthe outset,strain and impel his thoughts towardthe apprehension of the deity;herather should feel awe and refrain and holdback until he graduallyelevates himself (1:5,29; my emphasis).

[I]f youstayyour progress because of adubious point; if youdonot deceive yourself into believing that thereisademonstration with regardtomatters that have not been demonstrated; if you do not hasten to reject and categoricallytopronouncefalse anyassertions whose contradictories have not been demonstrated; if, finally, youdonot aspiretoapprehend that which youare unable to apprehend—youwill have achieved human perfection and attained the rank of Rabbi Aqiba […]who entered in peace [shalom]and wentout in peace [shalom]whenengaged in the theoretical studyofthese metaphysical matters (1:32, 68‒69).

When points appearingasdubious occur to him or the thingheseeks does not seem to him to be demonstrated, he should not denyand rejectit, hastening to pronounceitfalse, but rather should persevere and thereby haveregardfor the honor of his Creator [yaḥus ʿal kevodqono]. He should refrain and hold back [Ar.: yaqif;Heb. ya‘amod](1:32, 70).

In the first of these passages (1:5), the “holding back” is in part an expression of caution in judgment,although the aweofthe deity that motivates it and thatitelicits hints at more. However,inthe next two passages, the first of which alludes to an enigmatic rabbinicstory of four scholars who entered a pardes,ororchard, which

 See Stern, Matter and Form, 162‒67. What is Maimonidean Scepticism? 109

Maimonides interprets as the studyofmetaphysics, wuqūf, “staying your progress” and “stopping,” is not merelynot assenting to or not rejectingindividual metaphysical propositions. Rather it is not aspiring or seeking to know what one cannot know. It is giving up or divesting oneself of the very aspiration or drive,and ipso facto tranquillity follows by freeing oneself of this sourceofunhappiness. The Hebrew word shalom,here peace of mind or tranquillity,plays on shelemut (Arabic kamāl), perfection. But this perfection is achieved without knowledge and, indeed, onlywhen one does “not aspire to apprehend that which youare unable to apprehend,” namely, the truths one seeks in “the theoretical studyofthese metaphysical matters.” Hence, the perfection Maimonides recommends is not the unachievable intellectual one that requires literallyknowledge of everythingincluding metaphysics. Insteaditisthe perfectionofthe one who, having disavowed his own unsatisfiable epistemic desires, lacks no unfulfilled desire. At the sametime, Maimonides makes clear that the point is not to give up intellectual enquiry and the intellectual ideal: “The intention […]isnot […]whollytoclose the gateofspeculation and to deprive the intellect of the apprehension of thingsthatitispossibletoapprehend […]Their purpose, in its entirety,rather is to make it known that the intellects of human beings have alimit at which they stop” (1:32, 70). To stop at one’slimits is ipso facto to redirect oneself back into enquiry into the domainofhumanlyachievable knowledge,physics,and the sublunar world. However,enquiry into natural sublunar phenomena leads one, naturally, as an inquisitive inquirer,toseek ultimatecauses, hence, back into the realm of the unsatisfiable epistemic desire to have knowledge of metaphysics with all its ill effects, leadingagain to wuqūf/epochē,redirection to the sublunar,and so on. wuqūf is the cure for the intellectual unhappiness that is duetounsatisfiable epistemic desires.But it is also part of acircular exercise of skepsis as persistent,unending enquiry that never ceases at afinal destinationofsecure dogmatic knowledge of ulti- mate metaphysical causes. The second result, or practical effect,ofwuqūf is an expression of divine worship —dazzlement,awe, spontaneous praise—that follows recognition of the limits of one’sintellect.Just as Sextus tells us how Apelles achieved the effect of ahorse’s foam onlywhen he gave up and flunghis spongeatthe canvas,soMaimonidesde- picts how at the very moment thathis sceptic suspends judgment about metaphysical knowledge through the discipline of self-imposed limits on his intellect,heputs (or,better,finds) himself in astate of aweand dazzlement in the presenceofGod, the metaphysical object par excellence—analogous to the state of divine worship thatthe dogmatist seeks to achieve through the acquisition of positive knowledge about metaphysics and God. Forexample, following an antinomyconcerning divine attributes (to which we will return), he exclaims:

All men, those of the past and those of the future,affirm clearlythat God […]cannot be apprehended by the intellects,and that none but He Himself can apprehend what He is, and that apprehension of Him consists in the inability to attain the ultimateterm in apprehendingHim (1:59, 139). 110 Josef Stern

Glory then to Him whoissuch that when the intellects contemplateHis essence, their apprehension turns into incapacity […](1:58, 137).

Forthe governanceand the providenceof[God] accompanythe world as awhole in such away that the manner and true reality of this accompaniment arehidden from us;the faculties of human beings areinadequatetounderstand this. On the one hand, thereisademonstration of His separateness, mayHebeexalted,fromthe world and of His beingfreefromit; and on the other hand, there is ademonstration that the influence of His governanceand providence in every part of the world, however small and contemptible, exists. MayHewhose perfection has dazzled us be glorified (1:72, 193, my emphasis).

[Followingthe interpretation of the parable of the Garden of Eden and Adam’s “sin”:] Praise be to the Master of the will whose aims and wisdom cannot be apprehended (1:2,26).

In each of these cases, Maimonidesworks us through aprocess of sceptical reasoning leading to an equipollence of contrary propositions,followed by wuqūf. Treating this process as aHadot-likespiritual exercise, he shows us how one puts oneself into astate in which one cannot but express aweand spontaneous praise of God—analogous or parallel to the state the dogmatist soughttoachievethrough the acquisition of positive knowledge of God. One final feature of the Maimonidean sceptical programme that Iwilljustmen- tion—but,for reasons of space, not elaborate—is its distinctive brand of exegesis whose central elementisthe parable and the parabolic interpretation of texts in Scripture, Rabbinic literature, ancient philosophy, and of Maimonides’sown making.²⁶ Maimonides’suse of the parable is not,however,asitisusually presented, to control the dissemination of knowledge fully grasped by its author.Rather the parable serves him as amedium for the expression of its author’s incomplete, partial, flash-likegrasp of metaphysics. Maimonidesbegins the Guide with arich parable de- picting an inquirer’sintellectual experience when engaged in enquiryinto metaphysics, using images of atug of war of perplexity and lightning-likeflashes in dark night to capturethe fact that none of “the great secrets [of metaphysics] are fully and completelyknown to anyone among us,” i.e., all humans (1:Introduction, 7). The parable, he continues,isthe primary verbal form by which his ancient predecessors among the prophets,rabbis,and Greek philosophers, for example, Plato, attempted to put this intellectual experience into words. Following suit,Maimonides composes his own parables to express his incomplete understanding of metaphysics. Interpreting the proverb “Awordfitly spoken is likeapples of gold in filigree, or finer tracery,ofsilver” (Proverbs 24:11) as itself aparable about the interpretation of parables, Maimonides argues that the multi-levelled semantic structure of aparable corresponds to the structure of the cognitive experience of incomplete understanding of metaphysics.Heshows how we begin by workingthrough propositions that are com- monlybelieved but not scientificallydemonstrated. These constitute the parable’sex- ternal meaningand often turn out to express the Aristotelian position. Next we focus

 Foradetailed discussion of the Maimonidean parable,see Stern, Matter and Form,chapter 2. What is Maimonidean Scepticism? 111

on their implications and presuppositions and thereby expose problems,inconsis- tencies,and antinomies. Through this cognitiveprocess, one comes to grasp what one can of the parable’sinner meaning:anincompletegrasp of metaphysics and asceptical acquiescence to the limits of one’sunderstanding. To give afeelfor the character of Maimonides’sscepticism with respect to knowledge of metaphysics and, in particular, God, Inow turn to two of his arguments, sketched in broad strokes. Recall Pines’sempiricist claim that all knowledge for Maimonides must be ab- stracted from sensible images, thereby excludingthe intelligible forms of purelyimmaterial beings, such as the Active Intellect or God.The dogmatist will object that we maynot be able to directly apprehend or perceive intelligible forms of immaterial beings, but we can come to know general metaphysical propositions by inference, ab- stracting physical concepts (for example, body, time,and space) and more general intelligible concepts (such as unity,cause,simple, and incorporeal), combining them into propositions,building syllogisms,constructingascience,and demonstrating general propositions,say,thatthere is one simple, incorporeal, first cause of the universe—and this is God.²⁷ In replytothis dogmatic counter-argument,the sceptic must explain whythe falāsifa’sdemonstrations, their indirect proofs for metaphysical theses, do not meet the standards of scientific knowledge.AsIhave mentioned, the sourceofthe problem is materiality and in particularthe bodilyfaculty of the imagination. The strongest case adogmatist could make for the possibilityofknowledge of metaphysics would be to produce afull-fledgeddemonstration for an unquestiona- ble metaphysical proposition such as the existenceofthe deity.²⁸ Maimonides seems to refertosuch aproof in the following threepassages:

 See Altmann, “Maimonides”;Davidson, “Maimonides on Metaphysical Knowledge”;Davidson, Maimonides the Rationalist. Fordiscussion, see Davidson, Maimonides the Rationalist,65‒66.Addi- tional examples of metaphysical propositions that aresaid to have been demonstrated are found in Guide 1:58, 135;1:59, 137‒39;1:68, 163; 165; 1:71,180‒81;1:76, 227; 2:1, 246,252; 2:4, 256; cf. Davidson, Maimonides the Rationalist,173‒74.Insome of these cases,however,itisthe philosophers whoclaim to have demonstrated them; in others,weare givenwhat is designated a “proof” (dalīl)which mayor maynot be ademonstration.  Such a “full-fledged” demonstration would ideallybeademonstration propter quid of the exis- tenceofGod, ademonstration containingamong its premises the cause, or explanation, of the conclusion that God exists.Apurported demonstration of this kind is, for example, Anselm’sontological proof which is, in turn, criticised by Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae Ia, Q2,A1, ad. 2. Herbert Da- vidson claims that no ontological arguments aretobefound in medieval Arabic and Jewish philosophy, which insteadconcentrateoncosmological arguments that invariablybegin from the world, i.e., effects,fromwhich they reason to afirst cause or necessarilyexistent being. See Herbert A. Da- vidson, Proofs for Eternity,Creation, and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and JewishPhilos- ophy (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,1987), 214‒15.However,apart from ontological arguments, Marwan Rashed has argued that al-Fārābī aimed to reconstruct “analytic” proofs that arguefromef- fects as “synthetic” proofs that begin from causes, suggestingthat “full-fledged” demonstrations are in fact propter quid. See Marwan Rashed, “Al-Fārābī’sLost Treatise On Changing Beings and the Pos- 112 Josef Stern

Foritisthe greatestproof through which one can know the existenceofthe deity—Imean the revolution of the heaven[…](1:70,175)

On account of [its grandeur], the heaveniscalled a throne,indicating […]Hewho caused them to exist and to move, and whogoverns this lowerworld […]the heavenindicates My existence, grandeur,and power[…](1:9, 34‒35)

[…]the heavenprovestousthe existenceofthe deity,who is its mover and governor,asweshall explain. We shall make it clear that thereisnoproof indicating to us the existenceofthe Maker, according to our opinion, likethe indicationderivingfromthe heaven. The latter also proves, as we have mentioned,according to the opinion of the philosophers, the existenceofthe Mover of the heavenand His not beingeither abodyoraforce subsisting in abody(2:18, 302).

What is the proof in question?Maimonidessaysthat the heavens provethe existence of God, but he does not tell us whatabout the heavens constitutes the basis of that proof; there are,infact,two candidates.Either it is the eternal motion of the spheres from which the philosophersprovethe existenceofaprime mover or the irregular motions, different velocities, and different directions of the embedded planets which provethe existence of what Maimonides calls a “creator” or “particulariser” who freelychose or willed to originatethe spheres.²⁹ Now,itiswell-known that Maimonides denies that either eternity or creation/ origination can be demonstrated; for this reason, the evidence for eternity and creation must be the empirical observation of the motions of the heavens. That is, each is known from its effects or quia and the most that can be proven is the fact that the world is either eternal or originated(to hoti; inna), not why it is. Thus, lacking afull-fledgedexplanatory demonstration (propter quid; to dioti; limā), Maimonides does not choose one proof rather thanthe other (whichwould rest the existence of God on something less thanfullydemonstrated), and instead presents his own proof, which is in the form of aStoic “simple constructive dilemma.”³⁰ In fact,he

sibility of aDemonstration of the Eternity of the World,” Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 18, no. 1 (March 2008): 19‒58. As we shall arguebelow,Maimonides’ critique of the best argument for the ex- istenceofGod is not simplythat it is from effects and not fromacause—after all God has no cause— but,moresignificantly, that the attempt to causallyexplain His existenceruns intoanantinomy.  Forthe former,see the philosophers’ twenty-sixth premise (2: Introduction, 239‒41); for the latter, 2:19,310: “To my mind, thereisnoproofofpurpose stronger than the one founded upon the differences between the motions of the spheres and upon the fact that the stars arefixed in the spheres. For this reason youwill find that all the prophets used the stars and the spheres as proofs for the deity’s existingnecessarily.”  In Stoic terminology,the argument has the form: “If the first,then the third; if the second, then the third; but either the first or the second; thereforeinany case the third.” William Kneale and Mar- tha Kneale, TheDevelopment of Logic (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1978), 178. It should be noted that this argument form is neither an Aristotelian demonstration nor asyllogism. Foranearlier version of the argument,see Ibn Ṭufayl, Hayyben Yaqdhân: romanphilosophique d’Ibn Thofaïl,ed. and trans. Léon Gauthier (Beirut: Imprimeriecatholique,1936). English translation in Lenn E. Goodman, Ibn Tufayl’sHayyIbn Yaqzan (Chicago:University of Chicago Press,2003), 94;Jon McGinnisand David C. Reisman, eds. Classical Arabic Philosophy:AnAnthology of Sources (Indianapolis:Hackett Publish- What is MaimonideanScepticism? 113

presents two versions of this proof— once in 1:71,181‒82, and again in 2:2, 252—the main differencebetween them consistinginthe addition of alast line in the second proof. Forreasons of space, Iwill give onlythe second version.

1. The fifth body, i.e., the sphere, hence,its motion, must either be subjectornot be subjectto generation and corruption (i.e., either originated or eternal). 2. [Suppose the sphereissubject to generation and corruption, i.e., originated.] Anythingthat exists after havingbeen non-existent cannot have brought itself into existence, hence, of necessity must have been brought into existencebysomethingelse. (First Intelligible) 3. Therefore, if the sphereissubjecttogeneration and corruption, theremust be something else that brought it into existenceafter havingbeen non-existent. 4. That beingisthe deity. 5. Therefore, if the sphereissubjecttogeneration and corruption, the deity exists. 6. Suppose now that the sphereisnot subject to generation and corruption (i.e., eternal). If it has always and never will cease to be moved in aperpetual and eternal movement,then the mover that causes it to moveinthis eternal motion is not abodyoraforce in abody. (As- sumes premises 1, 3‒11, 14‒17,16in2:Introduction) 7. Such amover is the deity. 8. Therefore, if the sphereisnot subject to generation and corruption, the deity exists. 9. But the world has either comeintoexistenceafter having been non-existent or it has not (i.e., it either is or is not subject to generation and corruption, originatedoreternal). 10.Therefore, on both lemmas,the deity exists. 11. This deity whohas been proventoexist (according to both lemmas) is the beingthat nec- essarilyexists by virtue of itself.

In the concluding line (11)—the line not found in the version in 1:71—Maimonides identifiesthe deity (proven on both lemmas) with the AvicenneanNecessary Existent in virtue of itself, i.e., the being that is necessarilyexistent in itself and is entirely uncausedbyanything else, hence, one and simple.³¹ If youweretoobject that the two lemmas of eternity and creation provethe existenceofvery different deities, Mai- monides’saddition of line 11 maybeintended to claim that thereisonlyone such ultimatebeing thatisboth creator and cause of the first intellect or prime mover.³²

ing Company, 2007), 290‒91. See Joel L. Kraemer, Maimonides:The Life and WorldofOne of Civiliza- tion’sGreatest Minds (New York: DoubledayPress, 2008), 383.  In Stern, Matter and Form,156‒58, Iargue that Maimonidesuses the term “Creator” to designate the Avicennean Necessary Existent in Itself, based on his description in Guide 1:69,169‒70 which he in turn identifies with the Particulariser in 2:19,303;310;2:20, 314; and 2:15,449‒51.  Forexample, see Harvey, “Maimonides’ First Commandment,” 153; Harvey, Physics and Metaphy- sics in Hasdai Crescas (Amsterdam:Gieben, 1998), 77‒82; Harvey, “Maimonides’ Critical Epistomolo- gy,” 228‒30;Kraemer, “How (not) to Read,” 17;Kraemer, “Is There aText,” 365, whoboth see the two lemmas leadingtodifferent conceptions of the deity,one of the kalām or Bible, and one of the philosophers. Harvey, Physics, provides avery good review and analysisofthe classical commentators (including ibn Tibbon, Joseph Kaspi, Profayt Duran [Efodi], and Hasdai Crescas), whoall take Maimo- nides’sreferencetothe Necessary Existent in Itself to be based on the third of the philosophers’ proofs in Guide 2:1, thereby creatingacontradiction internal to the Guide. On my view,Maimonides’s 114 Josef Stern

Maimonides repeatedlyrefers to this proof as a “method of demonstration about which therecan be no doubt” (1:71, 180), by which “perfect certaintyisobtained” (1:71, 181), and “as to which there is no disagreementinany respect” (1:71, 182). Giventhis praise, Itake it that the constructive dilemma is the “greatest proof” to which Maimonides is referring in the passages quoted earlier from 1:70,1:9,and 2:18. The proof is so certain and indubitable thatone would assume that it alsoyields ʿilm,orscientific knowledge,that God exists. Yet, at the end of his long discussion of the setofincompatibilities between Ptol- emaic astronomyand Aristotelian cosmology that led to the “crisis of the sciences” in twelfth-century Andalusia, Maimonideswrites:

Foritisimpossible for us to accede to the points startingfromwhich conclusions maybedrawn about the heavens;for the latter aretoo far away from us and toohighinplaceand in rank. And even the general conclusionthat maybedrawn from them [the heavens], namely, that they provethe existenceoftheir Mover,isamatter the knowledge of which cannot be reached by human intellects (2:24,327,myemphasis).

This passagehas been the subject of much recent controversy,³³ but what Maimo- nides literallysaysisthatthere is aproof—prima facie,the constructive dilemma— from the heavens to the existenceof“their Mover” but that its conclusion is not something of which the human intellect has knowledge.How is that possible? If the constructive dilemma is aproof and,indeed, certain, whyisn’titknowledge? And if it is not knowledge,how could it be aproof whose conclusion is believed with certainty? My answer in brief is that the proof maymoveustoassenttoits conclusion— after all, its two lemmas exhaust the possibilitiesand, therefore, it is necessary and certain—but it is not knowledge because our assent to the premises of the two lemmas,eternity and origination, is onlybasedontheirobservable effects, the spheres’ unending motion and irregular,different motions, respectively,and from the premises of eternity and origination, we in turn inferthe deity,the necessarily existent being,astheir cause.Hence, the proof is doubly quia: the existenceof God is proven from His effects twice over,and we lack anyexplanatory cause of the conclusion that would yield understanding,knowledge,orʿilm/epistēmē. Thus “the greatest proof” is simplythe best we humans can do, the proof no greater than which is known by anyhuman: indubitable, certain, and even necessary— but,lacking anyexplanation, “amatter the knowledge of which cannot be reached by human intellects.” However,this is not the end of Maimonides’sstory.One might take Maimonides’s argument to show,asdid his fourteenth-century commentator Moses of Narbonne,

own proof is not that of the philosophers but the proof in Guide 2:2, thus avoidingany contradiction, although the proof nonetheless furnishes no knowledge.  See the symposium of papers in Aleph 8(2008). What is MaimonideanScepticism? 115

that “[The existenceofGod cannot be demonstrated] from prior[causes] because He […]isprior to all and nothing is prior to Him. How could [His existence] be explained by ademonstration from the cause when He is the cause of everything and everything is His creation?”³⁴ But this onlyprompts the objection: If God’sexistencenec- essarilyhas no cause, whyshould the fact that we cannot give acause or explanation count against our knowledge of His existence? There exists no cause we do not know. Why, then, shouldn’tacertain, necessary,and indubitable quia demonstration suf- fice for (scientific) knowledge of this conclusion?Without some idea of what we do not understand, there is no punch to the sceptic’schallenge. Contrary to Narbonne, Iwant to propose that Maimonides’sclaim that we have no knowledge of the existenceofthe deity on the basis of this proof is not because God has no priorcause,true though that is. The real problem is that the attempt to provide an explanation of God’sexistenceruns into an antinomy. The best explanation of the existence of God restsoncontradictory premises:each is individually well-motivated but togetherthey are incompatible. ForMaimonides, this tension sig- nals our incompleteunderstanding of the notions in question. Maimonides presents this antinomythrough an extended parable scattered throughout the Guide about aruler who is known by his subjects onlybymeans of his actions of governance.³⁵ However,for reasons of space, Iwill sketch the objection Maimonides raises by focusing on the twoconflictingprinciples on which it rests.One is about final ends, the other about the structure of immaterial causation, arelation for which Maimonides appropriates the Neoplatonicterm for emanation or overflowing,inArabic fayḍ. The principle about final ends is that “The end is nobler than the thingsthat subsist [or act] for the sake of the end” (2:11, 275). The principle about emanation is that the direction of emanation is always from the more noble to the less noble.³⁶ Now,ifweweretoexplain God’semanation of the world, it presumably would be by wayofits final cause, the good it achieves. That good will never be a benefit for God (for how can He be benefited by His ownact?) but necessarilyaben- efit for the world. However,accordingtothe first principle, final ends must be more noble thanwhat subsists or acts for their sake and, according to the second, emanation goes from the more noble to the less. So, either the final cause of the emanation would necessarilybesomething more noble thanthe deity or divine emanation, or emanation would proceed from the less to the more noble—both of which are absurd. Therefore, Maimonidesconcludes: “[Whenever an immaterial being, e.g.,aseparate intellect or the deity]causes acertain good thing to overflow from it,[…]the exis-

 Moses Narbonne, Der Commentar des Rabbi Moses Narbonensissudem werke More Nebuchimdes Maimonides, ed. and trans.Jakob Goldenthal(Wien: K.K. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1852), 15b‒16a.  Forthe parable of the ruler,see Guide 1:46,97‒98;1:69, 168‒71;1:70, 175; 3:13,454;and Stern, Mat- ter and Form,168‒77.  On Maimonides’sunderstandingofemanation, overflowing, or fayḍ,see Guide 2:12, 278‒80;3:22, 317‒20. 116 Josef Stern

tence, the purpose, and the end of the being conferringthe benefits do not consist in conferringthe benefitsonthe recipients” (2:11, 275).³⁷ The emanation of goods is never for the sake of anything else; instead there is simply a “residue” thatsuffices, or overflows, to perfect something else as anecessitated by-product of the divine cause. In quasi-ethical terms, emanation is an expression of grace, which is indeed one waytotranslate the Arabic term fayḍ. But this conclusion has acost: without a final cause for the sake of which the emanating beingsubsists or the emanation acts, we cannot explain the causal relation between God (or aseparate intellect) and the sublunary world, and, without an explanation, we have no understanding of emanation, hence, no knowledge.³⁸ Before Iturn to Maimonides’sdiagnosis of the sourceofthis failure of apprehension, Iwant to sketch asecond Maimonidean argument thatshows the impossibility of knowledge of aclassofmetaphysical propositions. Thisargument is laid out in Maimonides’sdiscussion of divine attributes which culminates in his frequentlydis- cussed via negativa or,moreprecisely, his analysis of categorial negations of privative attributivestatements about God. Contrary to the dogmatic reading accordingto which Maimonides usesthese negations to furnish us with knowledge about God— knowledge of what He is not—Ishall arguefor the sceptical readingthatMaimonides argues that even these statements furnish no knowledge,not even knowledge of what He is not!³⁹ There are three background concepts thatmust be unpacked. First,because the dogmatist against whom Maimonides’sargument seems to be directed is Avicenna, the distinguishing fact about God is His unity,not merelythat He is numericallyone, but that He is alsoindivisible, absolutelysimple, incomposite, and, insofar as He has no parts or structure thatwould requireany explanation of His unity,absolutelyuncaused. Thisiswhat is meantbysaying that God is necessarilyexistent in itself, from which it also follows that He is incomparable and unique. Maimonides alsotrans- forms the Avicennean God’smetaphysical uniqueness into asemantic thesis that all predicates that applytoGod and to creatures are totallyequivocal and, because all our understanding of linguistic terms derives from their application to creatures, it follows that we have no understanding of anyofthe predicatesthat applytoGod. (Herewesee Maimonides shifting from an ad hominem argument,directed against

 In moregeneral terms:Whenever abeing b of rank n emanates agood or benefit on abeing c of rank n-1—which is necessarilythe case because the direction of emanation is from the higher rank to the lower rank—the final cause or end of (the subsistenceoract of) b cannot consist in emanating that good onto c.  Forasimilar objection, see al-Fārābī, Risāla fī al-ʿAql,ed. M. Bouyges(Beirut: 1938), 30.English Translation by Arthur Hyman: “Letter on the Intellect.” In Philosophy in the Middle Ages,ed. Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh (Indianapolis:Hackett,1983), 219. Al-Fārābī criticises those whoexplain whyforms descend to this world by the final cause “so that matters attain amoreperfect existence” because that “contradicts what Aristotle has shown” that the end must always be morenoble than that which it acts for the sakeof.  Foramoredetailed exposition of this argument,see Stern, Matter and Form,191‒249. What is Maimonidean Scepticism? 117

his Avicenneandogmatist,tohis own sceptical stance.)Conversely, on this Avicen- nean conception, belief in adeity thatisnot uncausedorisaplurality,divisible, or compositeisbelief in something other than God; it is idolatry or polytheism, the false belief that God is not one, hence, material and even bodily. WhatMaimo- nides will argueagainst the dogmatist is that,inhis attempt to provide a theory of our knowledge of divine unity,heends up with idolatry. Second, Maimonides argues thatthe objects of belief and knowledge are not words—the sounds that come out of our mouths that he calls “external speech”— but mental representations (taṣawwur), the system of which he calls “inner speech,” the languageofthought, which he thinks of as alanguageinits own right,asitwere, with its own linguistic structure and syntax. Thisistosay two things. First,there is no cognition without representation. So, if no consistent,coherent inner representation corresponds to astring of words in external speech, one just mouths sounds instead of expressingbeliefs (1:50, 111‒12). Second, the expressive resources of inner speech, or of the mental representations, must be adequate to the demands of knowledge,and in at least the natural or sublunary sciences they are. Unlikethe grammars of external speech that are conventional and vary across linguistic communities,the syntax of the languageofinner representation is universal and,insofar as it is struc- tured in ways that perspicuouslyreveal logical relations,itistherefore the preferred system of representations to guide one to knowledge in the sciences.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, however superior the inner mental representations are to external speech, they are also composed according to asyntax. As aconsequence, they also willbeproblem- atic when it comes to expressing truths about metaphysics and, in particular, about the absolutelysimple God. Third, Maimonides assumes asignificant constraint on all representations,in- cludingthoseofinner speech, if they are to count as knowledge.Not onlymust the representation be true; its content must correspond to what exists in the world. To this Maimonides adds the condition that,inorder to serveasanobject of knowledge,atrue representation must not onlyrepresent what is the case: how it represents whatitrepresents must also be the case. So, astatement about God,such as (1) “God is one” is true not onlyifand onlyif God is one, the statement must also represent Him as one. In particular, it cannot represent Him as if He wereacompositebeing with asubstratum or essence and at-

 See Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic (Maḳālah fi-Ṣinā‘at al-Manṭiḳ),trans. and ed. Israel Efros, Pro- ceedings of the American Academy of JewishResearch 8(1937‒38), chapter14. Arabic in Efros, “Mai- monides’ Arabic Treatise on Logic,” Proceedings of the American Academy of JewishResearch 34 (1966). On al-Fārābī’sinfluenceonMaimonides’sconception of logichere, see Josef Stern, “Maimo- nides on Languageand the ScienceofLanguage,” in Maimonides and the Sciences,ed. Robert S. Cohen and Hillel Levine (Dordrecht: Kluwer,2000), 173‒226; and for the Farabian background, the Introduction to Fritz W. Zimmermann, Al-Farabi’sCommentaryand Short Treatise on Aristotle’sDeIn- terpretatione (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1981). 118 Josef Stern

tributes or accidents.With this constraint in place, Maimonidesargues thattherecan be no representationbywhich we can know,for example, that God is one is true. Suppose Maimonides’sdogmatist opponent, the philosopher,demonstrates (1): that God is one, an absoluteunity,simple, and incomposite.⁴¹ Keep in mind that no term including “one” applied to God has the same content it possesses when applied to anyother creatureand, furthermore, we also simplydonot understand its content.But even apart from its pure equivocality, the predicate “is one,” insofar as it is apredicateorattribute-term, designates some affirmative attribute, or “possession,” which is either essential or accidental, i.e., part of God’sessence or acon- tingent attribute separate from Hisessence. In either casethe dogmatist next needs to explain whythe complex essence,oressence-attributecombo, constitute one being;heneeds acause. But God, he has said, is necessary in itself and uncaused. Hence, in demonstrating that God is one, the dogmatist has represented Him in a waythat in turn requires an explanatory cause,contradictinghis assertion that God is absolutelyuncaused. In short,hehas misrepresented Him and indeed ended up with idolatry.

Accordingly,you have not arrivedataknowledge of the true reality of an essential attribute, but youhavearrivedatmultiplicity.For youbelievethat He is acertain essencepossessingunknown attributes […]for if yousay God […]isacertain substratum upon which certain borne thingsare superposedand that this substratum is not likethese adjuncts,the utmost of our apprehension would be, on the basis of this belief, polytheism and nothingelse. Forthe notion of the substratum is different fromthat of the adjunct borne by it (1:60, 144‒45).

To avoid this contradictory metaphysical consequenceofaffirmative attribution, Mai- monides proposes to the dogmatist that he might translate or regiment the external speech statement,the affirmative(1), in inner speech as (2), the categoricalnegation of the privation (“is many”)corresponding to the affirmative attribute or possession (“is one”): (2) “Not (God is many).” Acategorial negation denies that the subject (here: God) falls under whatever category to which the predicateinquestion (“is many”)belongs. So, to use Maimonides’sown example (1:59, 136), (3) “Awall does not see” does not saythatawall is blind but that it does not fall in the category of thing that is either seeing or blind. Andaprivation, in turn, is the absenceofthe possession of an attribute in asubject in which the attribute oughttoexist or normally does exist.So, blindness is aprivation in creatures who, by nature, ought to have sight.Now,privations,being absences, are not parts of anything,hence, they avoid the problem of part-hood, hence, divisibility,created by affirmativeattributes. But Maimonides also emphasises that they are nonetheless attributes attributed, or pre- dicated, to subjects and that, like affirmative attributes, they servetoindividuate

 Notethat Maimonidesisarguingwith the dogmatist,the faylasūf,onhis grounds,onhis assumption that the deity is the necessary existent. What is MaimonideanScepticism? 119

subjects.⁴² So, privations avoid the problem of divisibility,and the categorial negation in turn denies that the subject belongstothe superordinate category to which the privation (and its positive possession) belongs, hence, they doubly negateany complexity of God.Nonetheless,while these categorial negations are better thanaf- firmative attributions to God, Maimonides argues they are still not good enough. In particular, they fail the condition that how what is represented is represented must also be true. “Forthere is no oneness at all except in believing thatthere is one simple essence in which there is no complexity [tarkīb;lit. “composition”][…]and you will not find therein anymultiplicityeither in the thing as it is outside of the mind or as it is in the mind […]” (1:51, 113,myemphasis). Even though (2)isbetter than(1), its subject-predicate syntax still impliesthat there existsanattribute (signified by the predicate)formallydistinguishable from the substratum or substance (signified by the subject term), and this structural division holds even if the attribute is privative and categoricallynegated. So, negated privative attributes are stillsubjecttoall problems of attribution from which Maimo- nides concludes: “[…]negation does not give knowledge in anyrespect of the true reality of the thing with regardtowhich the particular matter in question has been negated” (1:59, 139). So, whenever we can demonstrate that God is one or,in regimented inner speech, the (categorial) negation of (the privation of)multiplicity/compositeness,itisnonetheless presupposed (hence, entailed) from the syntactic form of the demonstrated proposition thatHeiscomposite! This problem for divine attribution—which Icall the “syntactic problem” of divineattributes—infectsall attribution, affirmative and negative.Maimonides, contrary to common opinion, is not an advocate but asceptical critic of negative theology. And again, the philosophers’ theory thatattemptstocapturedivineunity ends up also representing God in an idolatrous form. Without pursuing this antimonyfurther,itputs Maimonides in the state of spontaneous aweand praise of God in the passages we quoted earlier (1:58, 137 and 1:59, 139). However,given his owncritique of the possibility of expressingtruths about God in language, what form can that praise take?

The most aptphrase concerningthis subject is the dictum occurringinthe Psalms, Silence is praise to Thee (Psalms 65:2), which interpreted signifies:silencewith regard to Youispraise […]Accordingly,silenceand limitingoneself to the apprehensions of the intellects aremoreap- propriate—just as the perfect ones have enjoined when they said: Commune with you own heart upon your bed, and be still. Selah (Psalms 4:5) (1:59, 139‒40).

The silence in this passageisnot onlysilence in external but also in inner speech: neither affirmative nor negative privative attributions express truths, hence, praise

 See 1:58, 134‒35;1:59, 137‒39;1:60, 143‒44. 120 Josef Stern

of God.⁴³ The silence is also an expression of epochē. By holding back from representing God using afalse expression, thereby acknowledging the limitations of one’srep- resentational powers,one expresses God’sgreatness.Atthe sametime, the silence is conjoined with “limiting oneself” to the domain in which there are “apprehensions of the intellect” in which knowledge is possible. Silence with respect to metaphysics goes along with continuing skepsis in the sublunar domainofnatural science. To return finallytoMaimonides’sdiagnosis of his scepticism with respect to knowledge of metaphysics,his ultimateexplanation of the human epistemic condition is thatheisahylomorphic substance whose matter limits the extent which his form or intellect can be actualised.⁴⁴ As he writes in explanation of whyhecannot have knowledge of the existenceofthe deity: “[God] has enabled man to have knowledge of what is beneath the heavens, for that is his world and his dwellingplace” (2:24,327)—i.e., as acompositematerial substance, the human’snatural place is the worldofthe elements, and it is there that he can achieve knowledge.But among his material, or bodily, faculties, aparticular sourceofthe sceptical limitations on the human intellect is his imagination.⁴⁵ As we sawwith the syntactic problem of divine attributes,our human intellects must apprehend God through inner speech representations that necessarilyemploy compositesubject-predicate syntax. Why “necessarily”?Because,asembodied intellects,wecan never free our representation of an existent from the influenceofthe body, forced by our “wish to preserve the conception of the imagination” (1:51, 114). ForMaimonides,this representational role of the imagination is ageneral obstacle to knowledge of immaterial beings.Not onlyisthe one God conceivedincorpo- real terms as an essence or substratum with attributes (1:51, 114). Similar antinomies

 Maimonides employsPsalms 4:5three times in the Guide. In 1:50,112, the silenceisofexternal speech; in 1:59,140 it is of inner speech; and in 2:5, 260, he uses the verse to illustratethat the true praise of God, likethat of the spheres (literally), is articulated in mental representations,not through “speech of lip and tongue.” The imageofPsalms 4:5also underlies Maimonides’sclaim in 3:51,623 that “true intellectual worship” of God occurs in those rare moments “when youare alone with yourself, and no one else is thereand whileyou lie awake upon your bed.”  Because this possibility is afact about humans,hence, about somethinginthe sublunar sphere, and not metaphysics, Maimonidescan allow himself this diagnosis.  Unlike other Arabic philosophers who posit distinct faculties of imagination for each of these functions, Maimonides posits one faculty with multiple functions:retention of material forms corre- spondingtosense impressions,the composition of givenforms intomorecomplex ones and division of others, and the representation of truths (as propositions with, for example, essences as subjects and attributes in predicateposition). Note that the last roleofthe imagination is problematic only when it is called upon to represent immaterial beings that areabsolutelysimple; the representation of compositematerial substances usingcompositestructures is perfectlyfine. In addition,Maimo- nides identifies the imagination with the “evil impulse” and the source of all deficiencies of reason and character (2:12, 280). Indeed, Iknow of no medieval philosopherother than Maimonides who assigns such anegativevalencetothe imagination and sees as much tensionbetween it and the intellect.AmongMaimonides’smanyreferences to the imagination in the Guide,see Maimonides 1:46, 98;1:51, 114; and 1:73,208‒11. What is MaimonideanScepticism? 121

arise, as we saw, with the idea of emanation (fayḍ)which Maimonides regardsasthe best available figure to express the causality of an immaterial being even though it is inadequate to the task of expressing the “true reality”: “Forthe mental representation of the action of one who is separate from matter is very difficult,inawaysimilar to the difficulty of the mental representation of the existenceofone who is separate from matter” (2:12,279). Again, the difficulty is that the imagination, abodilyfaculty, cannot represent anyexistent except as abodyorany action except as aspatio-tem- poral event.Recall that it is through aparable (of the ruler’sbeneficencetohis subjects)—i.e., an imaginative product—that Maimonides articulatesthe emanational final causal relation and exposes what we do not understand as glimpsed in the an- tinomytowhich it leads. Maimonides’sobjection, however,isnot simplyAristotle’spoint that no intellec- tion or intellectual representation is possiblewithout imagination, but rather that we have no principled waytodistinguish between the two.⁴⁶ Forexample, in order for demonstration to serveasthe basis of scientific knowledge,wemust be able to distinguish between the necessary,the possible, and the impossible. But are these modalities to be determined by the intellect and by science (i.e., that the possibleisa potentiality that willbeactualised at some point in infinite time) or by what is ad- missible to the imagination (i.e., by mental judgments about equal alternatives among which we choose to act)? What we need,Maimonidestells us, is acriterion “that would enable us to distinguish the thingscognizedintellectuallyfrom those imagined” (1:73, 211). Nonetheless,when pushed to produce this criterion, Maimo- nides concedes thathepossesses no such principle “that permits differentiation between the imaginative facultyand the intellect” (3:15, 460). If there wereone, would it be “something altogether outside boththe intellect and the imagination, or is it by the intellect itself that one distinguishesbetween that which is cognizedbythe intellect and that which is imagined?” (3:15, 461).⁴⁷ Of course, this question is no surprise. If our matter prevents our intellects from apprehending the immaterial, it will prevent us from clearly distinguishingthe actualised intellect from bodilyfaculties like the imagination. Andwithout acriterion to distinguish them, there can be no principled scientific knowledge.Maimonides concludes: “these are pointsfor investigation which maylead very far” (3:15, 460): they are the stuff of skepsis,enquiry that never terminates in knowledge.

 Aristotle, On the Soul 2.7.431a16.  See Emil Fackenheim, “The Possibility of the Universe in Al-Farabi, IbnSina and Maimonides,” Proceedings of the American Academy for JewishResearch 16 (1946/47): 60n61. 122 Josef Stern

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Henrik Lagerlund Medieval Scepticismand Divine Deception

1Introduction

In his 1937 work TheUnity of Philosophical Experience,Étienne Gilson writes: “Medi- eval philosophyentered it [i.e., scepticism] as soon as Ockham’sphilosophytook deep root in the European Universities of the fourteenth century.”¹ This was an influential statement,but,asmanyhaveshown, it is simplynot true. First,Ockham’s philosophical thinking did not have sceptical implications, as Gilson asserts;² second, there werevery few sceptics in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.Tobe fair,Gilson himself seems to have changed his mind in his great HistoryofChristian Philosophyinthe Middle Ages,which he publishedin1955.³ However,hewas not wrongtoclaim thatphilosophychanged after Ockham. The generation following him rethoughtphilosophyingeneral and epistemology in particular. There was a looming threat of scepticism after Ockham, but it never materialised. There weresev- eral reasons for this, as we shall see.⁴ Although there werefew actual sceptics in the Middle Ages,⁵ this does not mean that sceptical arguments failed to playanimpor- tant role in medieval philosophy. As Iwill suggest in this article, sceptical arguments playedacentral role in the Latin Middle Ages from the late thirteenthcentury onwards.Atthe time,philosophers started emphasising epistemology,which was accompanied by arediscovery of ancient scepticism. As Iwill highlight,thereisare- markable knowledge of ancient scepticism in the Latin medieval tradition from the late thirteenth centuryuptothe sixteenth century, which, for some reason, has been downplayedbyprevious scholarship. The most important form of sceptical argumentation in the Middle Ages was the development of anew formofsceptical hypothesis akin to the kind of sceptical argument entertained by René Descartes in the seventeenth century.Itgrew up in the earlyfourteenthcentury and had aprofound effect on philosophy. It developed

Iamindebted to two anonymous reviewersfor their comments.

 Étienne Gilson, TheUnity of Philosophical Experience (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,1999), 72. For an overview of this debatesee Dominik Perler, Zweifel und Gewissheit: Skeptische Debatten im Mitte- lalter (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2006), 4−8.  Marilyn McCordAdams, William Ockham (NotreDame: University of NotreDame Press, 1987), 588 −94.  Étienne Gilson, HistoryofChristian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward,1955).  See Henrik Lagerlund, “Divine Deception,” in Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present,eds.Diego Machuca and Baron Reed (London: Bloomsbury Academic,2018), 222−31, for moreonthis.  Thereweresome noticeable exceptions.See HenrikLagerlund, ed., Rethinking the HistoryofSkep- ticism: TheMissing Medieval Background (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

OpenAccess. ©2019 Henrik Lagerlund, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-008 128 Henrik Lagerlund

from the idea thatGod, givenhis power,could deceive us. The mere possibilitythat God could be adeceiverhad the consequencethat nothing we think we know about the world is certain because everythingcan be called into question. Such ahypothesis had never before been seriously entertained in the history of philosophy; it could have had the implications that Gilson suggested, but it did not.There were several reasons for this, but the most philosophicallyinteresting one wasthe development of anew conception of knowledge by John Buridan and his followers.They argued that the possibility of divine deception meansthat we should lowerthe standard for what counts as knowledge.Knowledge can no longer be thought of as infallible, which had been the prevailing view in the Aristotelian tradition up to the fourteenth century. Iwillbegin this article by consideringthe question: What wasscepticism in the Middle Ages?Iwill thendiscuss the sources of ancient scepticism available to medieval philosophers. After this section, Iwill return to the argument from divine deception and its implications. Before addressing the question of whyitdid not cast philosophyinto globalscepticism, Iwill make an excursioninto the history of both divinedeception and externalworld scepticism.

2Whatwas Scepticisminthe Middle Ages?

Medieval scepticism must be distinguished from ancient scepticism because medieval scepticism wasnot practical in nature, that is, its aim was not tranquillityorhap- piness. Consider Sextus Empiricus’sdefinition of scepticism from Outlines of Pyr- rhonism.Hewrites: “Skepticism is an ability to set out oppositionsamong things which appear and are thought of in anyway at all, an ability by which, because of equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgment and afterwards to tranquillity.”⁶ He immediatelyclarifies that by “ability” he does not mean afancy ability in anymetaphysical sense; it onlymeans “to be able to.” Basically, we “can” setout opposites among appearances and thoughts.Due to these opposites and the equipollence between them, we must suspend judgment, which will cause tranquillity.This is scepticism with amethodology and an aim, and, even though there is arecognition that perhaps there is truth and knowledge and, in some instances, we will perhaps not be able to set out the equipollence, the assumption seems to be that we will always be able to and we must live as if we can. Hence, there is in Pyrrhonism an emphasis on living life in acertain way. Obviously, much more can be said about the Pyrrhonian approach to scepticism, but it is clear right from the start thattherewas nothing like this in the Latin Middle Ages, that is, there was no scepticism with the aim of the suspension of judgment

 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism,ed. and trans.Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cam- bridge:Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1.8. Medieval Scepticism and Divine Deception 129

and tranquillity.Asfar as Ihavebeen able to ascertain, scepticism was never away of life in the Middle Ages—at least for the clear majority of philosophers.⁷ What was scepticism in the Middle Ages, then?Scepticism, or sceptical argumentation, was usedinepistemological debates,and then nearlyalways in anegative sense as an argument against certain views. Medieval scepticism, therefore, is epistemological, which also differentiates it from ancient scepticism. It is at this point in the history of philosophythat scepticism becomes connected with epistemology—a connection it will never shed. Hence, when we speak about scepticism in the Middle Ages, we must use the term in abroad sense that incorporates both the positive view (that is, that of actual sceptics like John of Salisbury and Nicholas of Autrecourt)— which holds that everything is merelyprobable—and the negative view,which uses scepticism as atool or an argument against certain other views but whose user is not necessarilyasceptic. One of the first such uses of scepticism or sceptical argumentationcan be found in Peter Olivi (1248−98) as he argues against the species theory of cognition.⁸ Asim- ilar kind of argumentation against species theory can be found in William of Ockham (1285−1347), who writes:

The thingrepresented needs to be cognized in advance; otherwise the representative would never lead to acognition of the thingrepresented as to somethingsimilar.For example, astatue of Hercules would never lead me to acognition of Hercules unless Ihad seen Hercules in advance. Nor can Iknow otherwise whether the statue is similar to him or not.But according to those positingspecies,the species is something prior to every act of intellectively cognizing the object.Therefore,itcannot be posited on account of the representation of the object.⁹

Ockham here takes species to be representations, an idea which was common but not universal in the thirteenthcentury,and asks if arepresentation can lead to knowledge of an object external to us. Hisanswer is that it cannot,unless we already know the object in question. Arguments likethis one werealreadywell-known

 PerhapsJohn of Salisbury (1115‒76)isanexception. In anyway,heseems to me to comeclosest to the view of scepticism defended by Sextus.Hewas,however,not influenced by Sextus at all, but by Cicero’s Academica,and adheres to his own version of Academic scepticism. In his most famous work, Metalogicon,John defends somethingsimilar to Carneades’sprobabilism, as it was reported by Cicero. See Henrik Lagerlund, ed. Rethinking the HistoryofSkepticism,and Christophe Grellard, “Jean de Salisbury.Uncas me´die´val de scepticisme,” FreiburgerZeitschrift fü rPhilosophie und Theo- logie 54 (2007): 16−40,for more. Thereseem to be thinkers in the Greek, Byzantine, and medieval tradition that follow Sextus and Ancient scepticism moreclosely. See Börje Bydén, “‘To Every Argu- ment There is aCounter-Argument’:TheodoreMetochites’ Defence of Scepticism (Semeiosis 61),” in Byzantine Philosophy and Its Ancient Sources,ed. KaterinaIerodiakonou (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 183‒218.  Juhana Toivanen, “Animal Consciousness:Peter Olivi on Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul” (PhDdiss., University of Jyväskylä, 2009), chapter4.  William Ockham, Reportatio,II, 12‒13: Operatheologica V, 274. All translations aremyown unless otherwise indicated. 130 Henrik Lagerlund

from Plato’s Phaedo (74d9‒e4). Sextus, as well, presents an argument against criteria of truth that is identical to Ockham’sargument (although Iknow of no reason to think that Ockham had anyknowledge of Sextus, it is possible, as we shall seein the next section). Sextus writes:

Just as someone whodoes not know Socrates but has looked at apictureofhim does not know whether the pictureislike Socrates, so the intellect,studyingthe feelings of the senses but not observingthe external objects,will not know whetherthe feelings of the senses arelike the external existingobjects.Therefore,itcannot relyonsimilarity to judge them.¹⁰

Hence, external objects cannot be judgedbased on appearances,Sextus claims. Ock- ham and Sextus seem to be using species and appearances in asimilar way, namely, as representations of external objects thatare supposedtoconveyknowledge of these objects by being similar to them. Both hold this to be impossible, and therefore also hold that invoking representations in this waymustlead to scepticism. ForSex- tus, this is the end of the discussion, while for Ockham this is onlythe beginning,as he proceedstodevelop anew theory of cognition that does not relyonrepresenta- tion. Ockham, after all, is not asceptic—Sextuswould have branded him adogmatic thinker—but he does not hesitate to use sceptical arguments to his own advantage.¹¹ In the earlier well-known debate between Henry of Ghent (1217−93)and John Duns Scotus (1266/8−1308) about divine illumination,¹² sceptical arguments are used in much the same way; it is here that we also find actual references to ancient sceptical authors, which are lacking in the writingsofOlivi and Ockham. Forexam- ple, in the first two questions of Henry of Ghent’s Summa,the first question of Article 1asks “whether humans can know anything” and the second question asks “whether humans can know anything withoutdivine illumination.” The ancientsources Henry uses to informhis answers to these questions are Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics 4, naturally; however,Henry alsouses Plato’s Meno,which contains the theory of recollection that is the background to Augustine’snotion of divine illumination and which is essential to Henry’sargument.Another sourcefrequentlyused is Augustine himself as well as the manyreferences to ancient scepticism in his works.

 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism 2.75  Thereare important differencesbetween Ockham and Sextus as well. Forexample, Ockhamem- phasises that the representation of athing(aspecies) can onlyhelp to recognise athingthat is al- readyknown. In other words,itcan onlyhelp to re-actualise habitual knowledge,but it cannot help to initiallyacquire knowledge,whereas Sextus does not seem to distinguish between these two cases.  See Martin Pickavé, “Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on Skepticism and the Possibility of NaturallyAcquiredKnowledge,” in Rethinking the HistoryofSkepticism: TheMissing Medieval Back- ground,ed. Henrik Lagerlund(Leiden: Brill, 2010), 61‒96,and RichardCross, Duns Scotus’sTheoryof Cognition (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2014), especiallychapter 4, for moreonthis debate. Medieval Scepticism and Divine Deception 131

Henry uses both Augustine’s Contra Academicos and, more significantly, Cicero’s Academica.¹³ As part of his discussion, Henry develops an argument similar to those that we found in Ockham and Sextus (although neither referto“essence”). In the first question of the Summa,hewrites:

Athingcannot be known, if its essenceornatureisnot cognized, but onlyits image,because Herculesisnow known, if onlyhis picturehas been seen. Ahuman beingonlyperceivesa thingthrough its image, in the wayofaspecies receivedthroughthe senses,which is an imageofthe thing, not the thing itself.¹⁴

The question in which this argument is embedded asks whether humans can have knowledge.The argument is presented as one of several sceptical arguments that Henry will eventuallyreject.Ultimately, however,certain knowledge is onlyattaina- ble, according to Henry,with the help of God. He argues this point with references to Augustine. In his rejectionofdivine illumination, Scotus portraysHenry as an Aca- demic sceptic, and presents astrongbut controversialdefence of anaturalistic theory of knowledge acquisition. After Henry,presentations of Academicscepticism and sceptical arguments can be found in most commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (thereare many of them from the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenthcenturies). An earlyexample of this is the commentary by Walter Burley(1275−1344) from around 1300.Hebegins by pointing out two sceptical positions about knowledge:the Academicone, which claims that we cannot know anything,and the Platonic one, which claims that we cannot know anything new.¹⁵ The Academicposition is outlinedwith explicit references to Cicero’s Academica,and Plato’sposition is presented with references to Meno (his sourcehere could be Averroes’soutline of Meno from his commentary on Metaphysics rather than Plato’soriginal work, but this is aspeculation). From the fourteenth century onwards,these two positions came to be taken as representative of sceptical views and werementioned in most Posterior Analytics commentaries.¹⁶

 See Pickavé, “Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus,” for an account of Cicero’sinfluence on Henry as well as an argument that Henry was the one whomade Cicero’s Academica popular again, which seems true to me. Henry quotes four passagesfromCicero’s Academica in the first threequestions of his Summa.Inall cases the quotations arefromLucullus’sspeech (Lucullus 19, 21,22, 30). Henry uses these passages primarilytoestablish that knowledge is possible and that we can trust our senses,but also in one placetonote that the Academicsreject certain knowledge. Lucullus plays apositive roleinanotherwise negativestory. He is aStoic and used by Cicerotode- fend Stoicism as wellastopresent arguments against the Academics.  Henry of Ghent, Summa quaestionum ordinarium I, 1, arg. 7(Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia XXI).  Walter Burley, Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum,64.  See Lagerlund, “Divine Deception.” 132 Henrik Lagerlund

They convenientlyprovide the “vicious” extremes in-between which the correct views should be located.

3The Sources of Medieval Scepticism

In this section, Iwould like to saysomething about the various sources of ancient scepticism that wereavailable in the Middle Ages. By putting these together, it might look like the Latin medieval thinkers had almostasgood (or bad) aknowledge of the ancient sceptics as we have today, but this supposition is incorrect.¹⁷ Although the sources were there and, to some extent,available and used, we know very little about just how well-used they in fact were. This is particularlytrueofthe Latin trans- lationsofSextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius. Hereisthe list of available texts: 1. Cicero, Academica (known throughout) 2. SextusEmpiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (late thirteenthcentury) 3. SextusEmpiricus, Against the Mathematicians (date unknown, but probablythe same as item 2) 4. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of EminentPhilosophers (a partial translation from the twelfth century and acompleteone from the fifteenth century) 5. Augustine’s Contra Academicos (known throughout)

Cicerowas enormouslyinfluential in the Middle Ages, perhaps even as influential as Aristotle, as Schmitt suggests in his pioneering study.¹⁸ The manuscript tradition of the Academica (item 1) is divided into twobecause it is based on the two editions of the work thatCicerohimself produced. They are often referred to as Academica priora,which survivedonlyinthe second of two books, and Academica posteriora, which survivedonlyinthe first of four books. These togetherare what we now refer to as the Academica.AccordingtoSchmitt,there is little influenceofthe Aca- demica posteriora before the fifteenthcentury,¹⁹ and this seems to me to be correct. Manymedieval authors refertothe Academica as Lucullus,which is the name of the person delivering the main monologue from Academica priora. The first references to the Academica appear in the ninth century, but one of the more important usesofthe work can be found in the aforementioned twelfthcentury thinker John of Salisbury.The next importantusageofitisinHenry of Ghent’s

 Neither Cicero nor Sextus weretranslated into Arabic, and as far as Iknow they had very little influenceonthe Arabic philosophical tradition.  See Charles B. Schmitt, Cicero Scepticus:AStudy of the Influence of the Academica in the Renais- sance (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972).  Schmitt,chapter 2, for moreonCicero’s Academica in the Middle Ages. Schmitt has made onlya limited studyofthe influenceofCicero’sbooks in the Middle Ages and does not mention at all the fourteenth century,aperiod which contains morereferences to Cicerothan at anyprevious time in the Middle Ages. Medieval Scepticism and Divine Deception 133

Summa.²⁰ From that time onwards, however,the Academica came to be usedand referenced in most Posterior Analytics commentaries.The Academics are,asmentioned, presented as representativesofthe negative position that knowledge is not possible. Although he misses its influenceonthe Posterior Analytics tradition, Schmitt emphasises thatCicero’swork graduallygrew in influenceinthe fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In his book on the reception of Sextus Empiricus’swork, Luciano Floridi mentions three medieval Latinmanuscripts of Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism (item 2): one in Venice, another in Madrid, and athird in Paris.²¹ As others have shown, they seem to be three different versions of one late thirteenth-century translation of all threebooksofSextus’s Outlines (Floridi, though, dates it to the fourteenth century). Floridi also mentions twoadditional sixteenth-century translations, one by Jo- hannesPaéz de Castro, aknown Spanish scholarand philosopher,and another by Henri Estienne (Henricus Stephanus), from 1562. It is the lastone that became the most influential of the three different Latin translations: for example, it was printed and usedextensively by Montaigne. Floridi’sconclusions about the first Latin medieval translation are not to be trusted, however.Abetter studyofthese manuscripts has been completed more re- centlybyRoland Wittwer.²² He has shown that the translation must be from between 1265 and 1280,and, although he cannot make an attribution to anynamed translator, he finds the closest stylistic parallels with an anonymoustranslator of Aristotle’s De partibus animalium from the same time. Wittwer is, however,abletodiscredit the suggestion by Floridi and others that Nicholas of Reggio (born 1280) is the translator.²³ He alsoshows that the three manuscripts are written by different hands and are independent of each other.Interestingly,healso points out that there is areference to Pyrrhonism in Peter of Auvergne’s(died 1304) commentary on Aristotle’s Pol- itics.Wittwer is not able to document anysubstantial influenceofthis translation besides pointingout that its readership was not as small as scholars have previously assumed.²⁴ It must be noted, of course, thatour Latin wordfor sceptic, scepticus,de- rivesfrom this translation.

 Henry’streatment of knowledge is also broughtupand defended against ScotusbyGianfrancesco Picointhe fifteenth century.See Schmitt,41.  See Luciano Floridi, Sextus Empiricus:The Transmission and RecoveryofPyrrhonism (Oxford: Ox- fordUniversity Press,2002),chapter3.  See Roland Wittwer, “Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism in the Middle Ages,” Vivarium 54 (2016): 255‒85.  Michael Frede argues that Nicholas of Reggio translated Galen’s An Outline of Empiricism in the earlyfourteenth century,which is important sinceitcontains multiple references to Sextus as wellas Pyrrhonism. See Frede, “AMedieval Source of Modern Scepticism,” in Gedankenzeichen. Festschrift fü rKlaus Oehler zum60. Geburtstag,ed. Regina Claussen and Roland Daube-Schackat (Tübingen: Stauffenburg,1988), 65‒70.  Charles B. Schmitt argues that onlyone person read Sextus in the fourteenth century,namelythe translator himself, but this is obviouslyfalse. He also has the datewrong.See Schmitt, “The Redis- 134 Henrik Lagerlund

In his book on Sextus, Floridi also mentions apartial anonymous translation of Contra mathematicos (item 3) from around the sametime as the translation of the Outlines.Itsurvivesinone manuscriptfrom Venice and contains books 3.37 to 5.25.There are, furthermore, twomanuscriptsfrom another translation, from the fifteenth century:one preserved in amanuscript in Rome that contains books 1‒4, and another in aTurin manuscript that contains books 1‒3. The first completetranslation is from 1569.²⁵ Diogenes Laertius (item 4) was translated before the 1160s by Henricus Aristip- pus. The manuscript of the translation is lost,but Henricus is thought to have translated at least books1‒5, since those are referenced in two later works:Geremia de Montagnone’s Compendium moralium notabilium (1285), and Pseudo-Burley’s De vita et moribus philosophorum (between 1317and 1320).²⁶ The latter work was for some time celebrated as aproduct of the famousearlyfourteenth-century logician and philosopher Walter Burley,since it is attributed to him in afifteenth-century manuscript,but it is now known that he wasnot its author.The work was, however, extremelysuccessful and is extant in over 270manuscripts as well as in numerous translations into vernacular languages. It has asimilar structure to Diogenes Laer- tius’swork and often starts with aquotation from it.Itcontains entries on Academic sceptics like Arcesilaus and Carneades but makes no mention of the Pyrrhonian sceptics,which is probablybecause the author did not have access to Diogenes’sen- tire work (Pyrrhonism is onlytreated in book 9). The more famous translation of Di- ogenes was composed in 1433 by Ambrogio Traversari. It is completeand contains references to Pyrrho, Timon, and Sextus, as well as Pyrrhonism. Thistranslation was the first one to be printed, in the earlysixteenth century.²⁷ Idonot need to add much about Augustine’s Contra Academicos (item 5), since it was, along with Augustine’sother works,known and referredtothroughout the Mid- dle Ages. Nevertheless,itisnoticeable how much more frequentlyitiscited after the late thirteenth century.Aswith Cicero’s Academica, Contra Academicos appears more often after Henry of Ghent’suse. Henry uses it frequentlyinthe first few questions of his Summa and from there it makes its wayinto Posterior Analytics commentaries in the fourteenth century.Burley’scommentary,mentioned above, is acase in point.

covery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times,” in TheSkeptical Tradition,ed. Myles F. Burnyeat (Ber- keley:University of CaliforniaPress, 1983), 225‒51.  See Floridi, Sextus Empiricus,chapter4,for moreonthese translations.Wittwer (“Sextus Empiri- cus,” 272) argues that this translation is the work of the same person whotranslatedthe Outlines.  Rita Copeland, “Behind the ‘LivesofPhilosophers’:ReadingDiogenes Laertius in the Western Middle Ages,” Interfaces:AJournal of Medieval European Literatures,3(2016): 245‒63.  Charles B. Schmitt, “John Wolley (ca. 1530‒1596) and the first Latin Translation of Sextus Empir- icus,adversus logicosI,”in The Sceptical Mode in Modern Philosophy:EssaysinHonorofRichardH. Popkin,eds.Richard. A.Watson and James E. Force(Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1988), 61‒70,lists afirst printing in 1565but thereare several earlier printings,some of which arecomplete and others that are shortened. Ihaveconsulted an edition from 1535. Medieval Scepticism and Divine Deception 135

4Divine Deception

The epistemological debates of the earlyfourteenth century became increasinglyin- tense and started to dominate the philosophical landscape. These debates were further fuelled by the introduction of anew sceptical argument—an argument that had the power to cast all medieval philosophyinto scepticism, namely, the hypothesis of divinedeception. In the earlydecades of the fourteenth century,following Scotus’s introduction of logical possibilityand the separation of necessity and possibility from essence,anew conception of divine omnipotencedeveloped.²⁸ Thisnew view of God’spower generated the sceptical hypothesis of divinedeception. God is so powerful, that the mere possibility of deception threatens to cast philosophy into global scepticism and undermine anyknowledge of the externalworld. John Buridan puts it succinctlyinhis commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics:

As is commonlysaid, the senses can be deluded, and it is certain that the species of sensible things can be preserved in the organsofsense in the absenceofsensibles, as is mentioned in De somno et vigilia. And then we judgeabout whatdoes not exist as if it existed, and so we err through the senses. And the difficulty is greatlyaugmented by the fact that we believe on faith that God can form sensible species in our senses without the sensible thingsthemselves, and preservethem for along time. In that case, we judge as if thereweresensible things present.Furthermore, sinceGod can do this and greater things,you do not know whether God intends to do this, and so youhavenocertitude and evidentness [regarding the question] whether there aremen beforeyou while youare awakeorwhile youare asleep, since in your sleep God could makeasensible species as clear as—indeed, ahundred times clearer than—what sensible objects could produce. And so, youwould then judge formallythat thereare sensible objects beforeyou, just as youdonow.Therefore,since youknow nothingabout the will of God, you cannot be certain about anything.²⁹

Buridan is very clear in his response to the sceptical argument thatour intellects can correct for sensory illusion and thatour senses are overall reliable. Under anynatural circumstance, we can thus trust our senses and realise when they are deceiving us, but in the case of divinedeception, this is obviouslynot possible, as he explains. If God chose to deceive us, we would have no wayofknowing it,and, in this way, we cannot be certain about anything. The kind of argument presented by Buridan swept over fourteenth-centuryphi- losophyand theology; all major thinkers of the time commented on the topic. Ock- ham, Robert Holkot,and Adam Wodeham wereall very influential philosophers and theologians preceding Buridan and Peter Ailly. All of them agreed thatGod could be deceiving us. Wodeham adds the following observation about the conse-

 See Lagerlund, “Divine Deception.”  John Buridan, In Metaphysicen Aristotelis Questiones argutissimae (Paris,1518).Rep. as Kommen- tar zurAristotelischen Metaphysik (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva: 1964), II, q. 1, fol. 8rb‒va. 136 Henrik Lagerlund

quences of this doctrine: “we cannot know of anyexternal thing—more precisely, of anything otherthan our own mind—that it exists.”³⁰ Even though secondaryliterature mostly discusses the notion of divine deception in the context of its use in theological works and Sentence-commentaries,it should be noted thatthis kind of scepticism also quicklyworked its wayinto com- mentariesonAristotle’s Posterior Analytics.Atellingexample of this is John Buri- dan’scommentary,but alsohis somewhat younger contemporary,AlbertofSaxony, who offers an extensive treatment of the implications of divine deception for scientific knowledge,thatis, scientia. In question 3ofthe first book of his commentary,he writes:

Is it possible for us to know something? It is argued that this is not the case, because we cannot have evidentness about somethingwithout fear of the opposite. Hence,itisnot possible for us to know something. The consequenceholds from this, that scientia is evident without fear of the opposite, therefore, it is not possible for us to know something. And the antecedent is proved, because we cannot have anotion of something, that is neither evident by the senses nor the intellect,hence, in no way. The consequenceholds.And the antecedent is proved, first,since this is not the case through the senses.For as much as it is apparent to me by the senses that fire is hot,nevertheless,itisathand that Idonot have the judgment or the evidentness about this, that is, that fire is hot,without fear for [the opposite]. Foritispossible that some power, for in- stanceadivine, produced in my senses aspecies representinghot,and that cold has been destroyed and hot introduced [in its stead], and that the action of the cold [thing] is suspendedin the senses.Ifthis is posited, then it is apparent to me that fire is hot,but in truth it is cold. By positingthis case, which is possible,bythe First Cause actingfreely, it follows that as much as I see the fire, Imust be in doubt about the hotness of the fire,namely, that the coldness has been corrupted and ahotness introduced. Hence,aspecies of hotness is represented in the senses, and the action of acold[thing] is suspended in the senses by the First Cause. Therefore, as much as somethingappears to me to be hot,Ihave neverthelesstobeindoubt about [this]. Hence,bythe sense of touch, it is not possible to hold acertain judgment about something.³¹

AlbertofSaxonygoes on to draw very strongconclusions basedonthe idea of divine deception.³² This kind of argumentation can be found throughout philosophyinsentence- commentaries and commentaries on Aristotle’sworks all the wayuptothe sixteenth century.Inhis commentary on Peter of Spain’s Summaries of Logic,John Mair writes

 Elizabeth Karger, “Ockham and Wodeham on Divine Deception as aSkeptical Hypothesis,” Viva- rium 42 (2004): 229.  Albert of Saxony, Expositio et Questiones in AristotelislibrosPhysicorum ad Albertus de Saxonia attributae,ed. Benoit Patar (Louvain-la-Neuve:Peeters, 1999), I, q. 3, fol. 3vb. See also Albert of Sax- ony, Questiones circalogicam,inAlbert of Saxony’sTwenty-FiveDisputed Questions on Logic. Acritical edition of his Questionescirca logicam, ed. Michael J. Fitzgerald (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2002), 345.  Henrik Lagerlund, “Skeptical Issues in Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics: John Bur- idan and Albert of Saxony,” in Rethinking the HistoryofSkepticism: TheMissing Medieval Background, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 193‒214. Medieval Scepticism and Divine Deception 137

the following: “God can annihilate the ballwithout me knowing it while conserving in my soul the assent that Ihave. In this way, Ihaveassented to [the proposition] that ‘the ball is round’ and in this Iammistaken.”³³ Mair is here developing an example used by Ockham about astar that God annihilates while preservingmycognition of it.For Mair,this is acase of divine deception.³⁴ Allthese thinkers are, it seems to me, in the samesituation as Descartes after the First Meditation.All knowledge claims about thingstowhich God’spower extends can be disproven and it seems we cannot know anything for certain anymore.³⁵

5The PredecessorsofDivine Deception

Divine deception is aglobal sceptical argument—as opposed to the traditionallylocal sceptical arguments one can find in ancient thought—which generates scepticism towards the external world. As mentioned, this kind of scepticism first appeared in the earlyfourteenthcentury and continued in philosophywell into Descartes’stime.It did have some predecessors, though, threeofwhich Iwill mention here: aview outlined in Cicero’s Academica;one present in Augustine’s Contra Academicos;and a third, visibleinal-Ghazālī.First,let us have alook at what Cicerohas Lucullus say:

Sincethe Academics have amethodical approach, Iwill set out their arguments systematically. The first type tries to show that thereare often [persuasive]impressions of things that don’texist at all, sinceour minds aremoved vacuouslybywhat is not the case in the same wayasbywhat is the case. Afterall, they say, youclaim that some impressions aresent by god, for instancein dreams and revelations fromoracles,auspices, or entrails. […]Well, they ask, how is it that god can makepersuasive impressions that are false, but can’tmake persuasive impressions that ap- proximatethe truth very closely? Or,ifhecan do that,why not persuasive impressions that can onlybediscriminated [from true impressions], though with considerable difficulty?And if that, why[not false but persuasive impressions] that don’tdiffer at all [from true impressions]?³⁶

This is asomewhat casual remark by Lucullus,who is reporting the arguments of some Academic sceptics.Since Lucullus is aStoic, he does not accept these arguments, and Ciceroemploys him to ground arguments against the Academic position.

 John Mair,Commentary of Peter of Spain’s Summulae,Section of PosteriorAnalytics,144vb.  See Elizabeth Karger, “Ockham and Wodeham,” and the response to this in Claude Panaccio and David Piché, “Ockham’sReliabilism and the Intuition of Non-Existents,” in Rethinking the Historyof Skepticism: TheMissing Medieval Background,ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 97‒118.  Unlike José L. Bermúdez, “The Originality of Cartesian Skepticism: Did it Have Ancient or Medi- aeval Antecedents?” HistoryofPhilosophy Quarterly 17 (2000): 333‒60,Ithink there is very little original thought in Descartes’ssceptical arguments.For moreonthis see Lagerlund, “Divine Deception.” Most medieval thinkers did not think that divine deception casts doubt on logicand mathematics, as Descartes does,but some did. See Lagerlund, “Skeptical Issues.”  Cicero, Academica 2.47.The translation quoted hereisfromCicero, On AcademicScepticism,trans. Charles Brittain (Indianapolis:Hackett,2006), 29. 138 Henrik Lagerlund

Neither Ciceronor anyone else at the time the Academica was written deals compre- hensively with the idea that the Gods can deceive us and impart impressions to us that are as persuasive as true ones. There is no indication that Ciceromeant this to be applied globallysothatthe Gods would always do this, which is what would have to be the case for Cicero’ssuggestion to be like Descartes or the medieval idea of divinedeception. It remains an intriguing,but isolated remark. An equallyfascinating passagecan be found in book 3ofContra Academicos, Augustine seems to suggest aview very near to external world scepticism. Iquote the passageinits entirety:

“Howdoyou know that the world exists,” replies the Academician, “if the senses aredecep- tive?” Your arguments werenever abletodisown the powerofour senses to the extent of clearly establishingthat nothingseems to be so to us.Nor have youeverventured to try to do so. How- ever,you’ve energeticallycommitted yourself to persuading us that somethingseems so and yet can be otherwise. Therefore, Icall the whole that contains and sustains us,whatever it is, the “world”—the whole, Isay,that appears beforemyeyes, which Iperceive to include the heavens and the earth (or the quasi-heavens and quasi-earth). If yousay nothingseems to be so to me, I’ll never be in error.Itisthe man whorecklessly approves what seems so to him whoisinerror.You do saythat afalsehood can seem to be so to sentient beings.You don’tsay that nothingseems to be so. Every ground for disputation,where youAcademicians enjoy beingthe master,iscompletely taken away if it is true not onlythat we know nothing, but also that nothingseems to be so to us. However,ifyou denythat what seems so to me is the world, then you’re makingafuss about aname, since Isaid Icall this “world.” You’ll ask me: “Is what yousee the world even if you’re asleep?” It has alreadybeen said that Icall “world” whatever seems to me to be such.³⁷

The Academic sceptic with whom Augustine is arguing asks hypotheticallywhether we can be certain the world exists if we cannot trust our senses. Augustine backped- als in response and says that by “world” he means “my world,” that is, the world as it appears to me,and the appearance of the world cannot be denied. Augustine does not develop this.Hemerelyuses it as an argument against the sceptic, but what is interesting is, of course, that his view implies scepticism about the external world as wellasthe related problem of other minds. This might be the first statement of such aview in the history of philosophy. Iamnot aware of anyone else who had de- velopedthe view here expressed by Augustine, and he himself did not use it as a sceptical argument—on the contrary,heconsidered it to be an anti-sceptical argument. There are also some extreme sceptical arguments expressed in Arabic philosophy, however,nothing quite like what we find in the Latin tradition. It is well- known, at least among scholars, that al-Ghazālī’s(1085‒1111) sceptical arguments are remarkablysimilar to arguments advanced by of Descartes and Hume. There

 Augustine, Against the Academicians and the Teacher,trans. Peter King(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), 74. Medieval Scepticism and Divine Deception 139

have even been attempts to show that he must have influenced them.³⁸ Thissimilar- ity emergesnot onlyinhis most famous work, TheIncoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-Falāsifa), but also in his attitude to knowledge in his lesser-known intel- lectualautobiography, Deliverance from Error (al-Munqiḏ min al-Ḍalāl). There he describes how he set out to find infallible knowledge,but could not.Hewrites, “Ipro- ceeded therefore with extreme earnestness to reflect on sense-perception and the necessary truths, to see whether Icould make myself doubt them.”³⁹ In the autobiog- raphy, he mentions some familiar objections to sense-perception and findsthathe cannot trust it as asourceofknowledge.Hethen proposes the now famous dream-doubt:

Do younot see how,whenyou areasleep, youbelievethings and imagine circumstances, holding them to be stable and enduring,and, so long as youare in that dream-condition, have no doubts about them?And is it not the case that when youawake youknow that all youhaveim- agined and believed is unfounded and intellectual?Why areyou content that all your waking beliefs,whether from sense or intellect,are genuine? They aretrue in respect of your present state; but it is possible that astatewill comeupon youwhose relation to youwakingconscious- ness is analogous to the relation of the latter to dreaming.Incomparison with this stateyour wakingconsciousness would be likedreaming!⁴⁰

Like Descartes in the Meditations,al-Ghazālī suggests that what Itake to be my conscious experience might turn out to be adream. There is no waytobesure that this is not the case. Struck by this insight,al-Ghazālī is disheartened and cast into scepticism.

When these thoughts had occurredtomeand penetratedmybeing, Itried to find some wayof treatingmyunhealthycondition; but it was not easy.Such ideas can onlyberepelled by demonstration; but ademonstration requiresknowledge of first principles;since this is not admitted, however,itisimpossible to makethe demonstration. The disease was baffling, and lasted almost twomonths,during which Iwas asceptic in fact though not in theory nor in outward expression. At length God cured me of the malady; the necessary truths of the intellect became oncemoreaccepted, as Iregained confidenceintheir certain and trustworthycharacter this did not come about by systematic demonstration or marshalledargument,but by alight which God most high cast into my breast.⁴¹

 See Ulrich Rudolph and Dominik Perler, Occasionalismus:Theorien der Kausalität im arabisch-islamischen und im europäischenDenken (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht,2000). Taneli Kukko- nen, “Al-Ghazālī’sSkepticism Revisited,” in Rethinking the HistoryofSkepticism: TheMissing Medie- valBackground,ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 29‒59,expresses strong reservations concerning anydirect influencebyal-Ghazālī on Descartes and Hume.  See Montgomery Watt, The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), 23.  Watt,24.  Watt,25. 140 Henrik Lagerlund

As this quotation reveals, the similarities with Descartes’s Meditations are striking, but it is not just Descartes whom al-Ghazālī precedes. Consider the following quote from the seventeenth discussion of the Incoherence of the Philosophers:

The connection between what is habituallybelieved to be acause and what is habituallybelieved to be an effect is not necessary […]Itisnot anecessity of the existenceofthe one that the other should exist,and it is not anecessity of the nonexistenceofthe one that the other should not exist—for example, the quenching of thirst and drinking, satiety and eating, burning and contact with fire, light and the appearance of the sun, death and decapitation, healingand the drinkingofmedicine, the purgingofthe bowels and the usingofapurgative,and so on to include all that is observable amongconnected things in medicine, astronomy, arts,and crafts. Their connection is duetothe prior decreeofGod, whocreates them side by side, not to its being necessary in itself, incapable of separation. On the contrary,itiswithin divine powertocreate satiety without eating, to createdeath without decapitation, to continue life after decapitation, and so on to all connected things.⁴²

This criticism of the necessary connection between cause and effect is remarkably similar to Hume’scriticism and, before that,toNicholas of Autrecourt’sarguments. We cannot observethe necessary connection, but onlythat one thing follows the other in time. In the quotation, we can also seeevidence of al-Ghazālī’soccasional- ism. He thinksthat it is God who creates the coexistenceofcause and effect,and, hence that God can also see to it that acause does not produce an effect.Hewrites the following about God’sability to deceive us:

Idonot know what is at the house at present.All Iknow is that Ihaveleft abook in the house, which is perhaps now ahorse that has defiled the library with its urine and its dung,and that I have left in the house ajar of water,which wellmay have turned into an apple tree. ForGod is capable of everything, and it is not necessary for the horse to be created from sperm nor the tree to be created from the seed—indeed, it is not necessary for either of the twotobecreated from anything.⁴³

God can do pretty much anything he wants, al-Ghazālī argues, although he will not. On the contrary,God is for him the sourceofcertainty and knowledge as he is for Descartes. It seems that al-Ghazālī’ssceptical discussions had very little influenceonthe Latin medieval and earlymodern tradition. Deliverance from Error was not translated in the Middle Ages or in earlymodern times, but the Incoherence of the Philosophers seems to have been. It was, however,not translated as aseparate text in the Middle Ages, but as part of Averroes’srefutation of that text.Averroes’swork is called the Incoherence of the Incoherence,and was translated into Latin in 1328.⁴⁴ Afair amount

 Al-Ghazālī, TheIncoherence of the Philosophers,ed. and trans. Michael Marmura (Provo, Utah: Bringham Young University Press, 2000), 166.  Al-Ghazālī,170.  The Latin translation was printedin1497together with acommentary by the latefifteenth-century Italian philosopher,Augustino Nifo. Averroes’swork was then reprinted without Nifo’scommen- Medieval Scepticism and Divine Deception 141

of knowledge of al-Ghazālī preceded this translation, however.Other works of his weretranslated, and Averroes referred to him. Still, it is interesting that he was being translated at atime whenscepticism had become aproblem and Latin philos- ophyhad turned to worry about epistemology and the status of Aristotelian science.

6The Rejection of Divine Deception⁴⁵

The doctrine of divine deception did not lead the fourteenth centuryinto scepticism. One might ask, why? It certainlycould have,but there are at least three reasons why it did not.First,some thinkers argued that divine deception willsimplynot happen, since it would be contrary to God’sbenevolence. Second, other thinkers argued that, although God can deceive,hewill not do so because of acovenant between God and humankind laid down at the moment of creation. The third and most philosophically interesting reason consists in the revision of the concept of knowledge and the rela- tivising of the concept of evidence. Gregory of Rimini argued that God cannot be adeceiversince this would contradict his benevolent nature. Gabriel Biel in the fifteenth century and Francisco Suárez in the sixteenth century defendedsimilar views. Rimini’sargument is that God cannot deceive,since it would implysaying or making someone believesomething false. He writes: “God cannot saysomething false to someone, willing thereby thatthe person, to whom he says it,assents to what is said.”⁴⁶ God cannot saysomething false or make someone else saysomething false if thatmeans that what is said is said in a meaningful way, without irony, and in an assertive mode. Saying something false in this wayamounts to lying,argues Rimini, and God cannot lie, even givenhis absolutepower.Riminiishence limiting God’somnipotence by saying that due to his benevolence he cannot be adeceiver. Asecond reason whydivine deception did not have the implications for philos- ophyitcould have had was the appeal to acontractorcovenant between God and humankind. This was avery common view,particularlyamong certain theologians following Ockham, and all the main thinkers who wereconcerned with divine deception adhered to this view.Wefind it in Ockham, Holkot,Rimini, Ailly, and Biel. The notion of acovenant governs both the natural and the moral order established by God in the creation of the world. It takes as its starting point the idea that what is is determined by God’swill and thatwhatever natural or morallawsthere are are

tary in 1527.See AnthonyH.Minnema, “The Latin Readers of Algazel, 1150−1600” (PhDdiss., Univer- sity of Tennessee, 2013), http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2602. It is, hence,possible that Des- carteshad knowledge of it.  This section is similar to asection appearing in Lagerlund, “Divine Deception,” 228‒30.  Quoted in Dominik Perler, “Does God Deceive us?Skeptical Hypothesis in LateMedieval Episte- mology,” in Rethinking the History of Skepticism: The Missing Medieval Background,ed. Henrik Lager- lund (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 182. 142 Henrik Lagerlund

also determined by an act of God’swill. These laws, therefore, are not absolute but decided on or chosen by God. God had infinitepossibilities from which to choose in creatingthis world, and chose to establish this particularmoral lawand this particular causal order,which, of course, makes them special and necessary. As someone like Aillyunderstands, within the concept of “covenant” there are two covenants corresponding to the two kinds of ordained power.The first covers the world in general and is made with all humans. The second is made with the Church.⁴⁷ Accordingtothe first covenant,God has promised to uphold his creation and all the laws that govern it.Accordingtohis absolutepower,God could act in whatever wayhewanted towards his creation: changeit, deceive us, and so forth. However,according to his ordained power,hewill not.Instead, he acts in accord with the established laws. This view does not limit God’somnipotenceinany way, since God is not limited by the laws he has put down, although giventhe covenant he will abide by them. As humans, we can hence trust that God will not make changes and that he is not deceiving us. The doctrine of covenant plays an important role in late medievaland earlymodern thought,but perhaps the most important aspect of the theory is thatitdid not allow divine deception to take holdofphilosophy. The third waytodeal with divine deception is the most interesting philosophically. Buridan is generallycredited with devising this approach; it was repeated by almostall philosophers following him well into the sixteenth century. Iwill here present the view as defendedbyAlbertofSaxonyand Peter of Ailly. Both philosophers take as their starting point the assumption that,inthe face of possible divinedeception, knowledge can no longer be assumed to be infallible. GivenGod’somnipotence, as we sawBuridan explain above, we can no longer be certain of anything;ifwehold on to the idea that knowledge is infallible, we will have to accept scepticism. Buri- dan’sway out is to saythat knowledge is fallible and that we must relativise what he calls “evidentness” to the domain of enquiry we are concernedwith. Albertof Saxonyexplains this very clearly. He writes:

It must be noted that evidenceisused in twoways, namelymaximal and natural evidence. Max- imal evidenceisused for propositions in accordance with which the intellect by its nature cog- nizes with assent to the proposition, and cannot dissent from it.Inthis way, we saythat the principle of non-contradiction is evident,and, similarly, it is by this evidencethat it is evident that I know that Iexist.Natural evidence, however,issuch evidencethat nothingoppositeappears through human reasoning unless by sophistry.And in this waynatural principles and conclusions aresaid to be evident.Itmust be noted that [such principles] arenot strictlyspeakingevi- dent,since the intellect that holds this to be evident can be deceivedbyasupernatural power.⁴⁸

Albertusesthe example to explain thatGod mayhavechanged appearancessothat Socrates,who appears human to me, is in fact adonkey,orthat fire is hot when it in fact is cold. Hence, it is not maximallyevident that “Socrates is ahuman being” or

 William Courtenay, “Covenant and Causality in Pierred’Ailly,” Speculum 46 (1971): 94‒119.  Albert of Saxony, Questiones circalogicam,348‒49. Medieval Scepticism and Divine Deception 143

that “Fireishot.” These are onlynaturallyevident,which meansthat thereisnonat- ural counterevidencetothem. Theseare truths onlygiven the assumption that we are not being deceivedbyGod. Aillyexplains this distinction in asimilar way. He explains it,however,interms of absoluteversus conditional evidence. Forthe latter he also uses secundum quid and ex suppositione. In Albert’sview,natural evidence is conditional in Ailly’stermi- nologybecause it assumes that God is not deceiving us, that is, it puts God aside,so to say. He notes as well that whatever is absolutelyevident is infallible (infallibilis), and the examples he givesare the principle of non-contradiction and the certainty that one is alive.Healsoadds to this list truths such as the fact that one cannot be made cold by warmth.⁴⁹ Aillyalso adds adistinction between what is condition- allyevident and what is merelyprobable. Something is probable if it is possibleto conclude the opposite, but if something is evident,onthe other hand,then there is no counterargument to it,save, of course, divine deception.⁵⁰ Mainlythrough Ailly, this concept of knowledge and the new account of evidentness that followed from it influenced later philosophy. We can see its influencewell into the sixteenth century.⁵¹ It very elegantlyshort-circuited the global sceptical threat of divine deception and, although it ultimatelymoved from aview of knowledge as infallible to aview of it as fallible, it allowed philosophyand natural science to develop without the threat of scepticism, which it did well into the sixteenthcentury whenthe debate took adifferent turn.

7Conclusion

Scepticism or sceptical argumentation in the LatinMiddle Ages was very different from ancient scepticism. It took on an epistemological flairfrom the late thirteenth century onwards, which it never quite escaped. Astrongmotivator for the epistemological turn in the use of sceptical argumentations was the development of anew argument that had apower and global reach unlike anything previouslysuggested in the history of philosophy, namely, the hypothesis of God as adeceiver. This new argu-

 Peter of Ailly, Quaestiones super libros sententiarum cum quibusdam in fine adjunctis (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1968), I, q. 1, art.1,fol. 48r.  Peter of Ailly, I, q. 3, art.3,fol. 78r. The same argument with the same terminologyisused by John Mair in the earlysixteenth century.See Henrik Lagerlund, “Knowledge and Scientia in Two Posterior Analytics Commentaries after Buridan: Albert of Saxonyand John Mair,” in KnowledgeinMedieval Philosophy, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (London: Bloomsbury,2018), 213‒32.  See Elizabeth Karger, “ABuridanian Response to aFourteenth Century Skeptical Argument and ItsRebuttal by aNew Argument in the EarlySixteenth Century,” in Rethinking the History of Skepti- cism: TheMissing Medieval Background,ed. Henrik Lagerlund(Leiden: Brill, 2010), 215‒32. Karger presents adebatebetween Mair and Antonio Coronel from the earlysixteenth century about Buri- dan’stheory.Coronel presents asceptical argument questioningthe idea that natural evidenceis enough for knowledge. 144 Henrik Lagerlund

ment threatened to cast philosophyinto global external world scepticism, but dueto new developments, particularlythe suggestion that knowledge claims are not infallible, this threat was removed. At the sametime as this debate about the status of knowledge claims, medieval philosophyalso rediscovered both Academic and Pyr- rhonian scepticism. Thisrediscovery was surelymotivated, at least in part,bythe debate. It was Academic scepticism that came to have the most influenceonthe ongoing debate.

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1Introduction

This paper proposes areassessment of Spinoza’sresponsetoglobal or hyperbolic doubt,which is the distinctive mark of Cartesian scepticism. Scholars have tradition- allyinterpreted the scarcity of Spinoza’spronouncements on the topic of doubtand scepticism as asign of dogmatic indifference towards sceptical worries and as a weakness of his philosophy. Recent studies have detected greater nuance than this first impression and attempted to identify amore elaborate response to radical scepticism in Spinoza’smetaphysical commitments,onwhich his epistemological views are based.¹ The majority of these studies conclude that monism constitutes Spinoza’s main defence against scepticism. Despite variations, their chief argument is the following.Sceptical worries do not emerge unlessweassume afundamental disagreement between our perceptions and reality.The monistic framework presented by Spi- noza, by contrast, conceivesofreality as aunifiedwhole in which ideas and physical thingsare one and the samesubstance, expressed in two different ways.Therefore, there is no place in such amonistic conception for the fundamental disagreement between ideas and thingspresupposed by the sceptic. In what follows Iwill arguethat Spinoza’smonism, far from precluding sceptical doubt,isinfact liable to generate it.This is not to saythat Spinoza is asceptic (he is definitelynot). What Iwould like to show is that his theoretical framework is more congenial to modernscepticism than is usuallyassumed. The perfect agreementbe- tween ideas and physical things, which Spinoza’smonism in principle entails, disappears when we descend from the level of the one infinite substance to the level of the finite human mind. Whereas scholars have acknowledgedthis fact,they have under- estimatedits far-reachingimplications. Spinoza explains the existenceofdoubtinus by the fact that we are part of nature and, consequently, grasp thingspartially. More- over,heconceivesfalsity as the privation of knowledge that our partial apprehension of thingsinvolves. The problem of scepticism resurfaces here: how can the human mind, being part of nature, grasp thingsother than partially, i.e., falsely? The gap between the one infinite substance and the finite human mind entails afundamental disagreement between our ideas and reality,analogous to the disagreement assumed by the sceptic. In this specific sense, Ihold thatSpinoza’smonism unavoidablygen- eratesscepticism, unless there is away to bridge the gapbetween the finite human mind and the one infinite substance.Inthis paper,Iexamine Spinoza’sapproach to this crucial problem. Iargue thatthe adequacy of ideas, which makes them impervi-

 See section 2.

OpenAccess. ©2019 José María Sánchez de León Serrano, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the CreativeCommons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-009 148 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

ous to doubt,isultimatelyfounded upon the human mind’sability to conceive the infinite. Ifurther arguethatthis ability,inturn, requires the existenceoffeatures or properties that are common to God and the human mind and allow the human mind to transcend its partial viewpoint.Iwill proceed as follows: the next section provides abrief account of some recent readings of Spinoza’santi-scepticism as grounded in his monism. The third section examines Spinoza’sreflections on doubt contained in his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect² and shows that onlyaclear apprehension of God’sessence can dispel scepticism. The fourth section explores the conditions of possibilityofsuch an apprehension in the finite human mind, accordingtothe second book of Spinoza’s Ethics.The final section proposes anew hypothesis concerning the theoretical presuppositions behind modern scepticism and argues that Spinoza and the modern sceptic, despite their antagonistic views, share asimilar conception of knowledge.

2Spinoza’sMonism versus the Sceptical Challenge

Since the present paper deals with Spinoza’sstance towards global doubt,let us first clarify the meaning of the expression “global doubt.” Scholars generallyagree that the variety of scepticism that emergesduringthe 16th and 17th centuries differs in crucial respects from its ancient counterparts. One possible wayofexplaining the main differencebetween the two is that whereas ancient scepticism argues that true perceptions are indistinguishable from false ones, earlymodern scepticism supposes that the entire set of my perceptions is false.³ Although this might not sound like asignificant difference,itisactuallyacrucial one. The ancient form of scepticism does not question the existenceofveridical perceptions, onlyour ability to distinguish them successfullyfrom false ones. Thus, one can endorse this form of scepticism and stilladmit “the possibility of some sortofknowledge of the world.”⁴ The

 All the quotations in English fromSpinoza’sworks aretakenfromBaruch Spinoza, The Collected WorksofSpinoza,ed. and trans. Edwin Curley,2vols.(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985‒ 2016). References are according to Spinoza Opera,ed. Carl Gebhardt, 4vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Verlag, 1925); henceforth: G. Iemploy the followingstandardabbreviations for Spinoza’sworks: TIE— Treatise of the Emendation of the Intellect (Tractatus de IntellectusEmendatione); TTP—Theological- Political Treatise (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus), Ep.—Letters (Epistolae). Passagesinthe Ethics will be referred to by means of the followingabbreviations:a(‐xiom), c(‐orollary), p(‐roposition), s(‐cholium) and app(‐endix); “d” stands for either “definition” (whenitappears immediatelyto the right of the part of the book), or “demonstration” (in all other cases). Hence, E1d3 is the third definitionofpart 1and E1p16d is the demonstration of proposition 16 of part 1.  See José Luis Bermúdez, “The Originality of Cartesian Skepticism: Did it have Ancient or Mediaeval Antecedents?” HistoryofPhilosophy Quarterly 17,no. 4(October 2000): 337‒38.  Bermúdez,337.Tomakethis clearer,consider the followingexample. Atypical sceptical argument amongancient sceptics is that the same object appears differentlyunder different circumstances, thus makingimpossible to determine which appearance is the true one. This kind of sceptical reason- SpinozaonGlobal Doubt 149

modernform of scepticism, by contrast,assumesthat all my perceptions can be si- multaneouslymistaken, thus suggesting the extreme possibilitythatthere is nothing but universal deception. Due to its all-embracing character,this form of doubthas been described as “globaldoubt.”⁵ Thisisthe kind of doubt that Descartesadopts in his Meditations,expressed in sceptical scenarios such as the deceiving God. How does Spinoza, well versed in Cartesian philosophy, respond to global doubt? We find his most explicit pronouncement on this issue in his account of true ideas (mainlycontained in the TIE and in the second book of his Ethics). In conformity with the traditionalconception of truth, Spinoza holds that “atrue idea must agree with its object” (E1a6). However,hecontends that the certainty of atrue idea—i.e., the features through which the mind recognises an idea as true—must be contained in the idea itself,not in its relation to an external object.Certainty is thus an intrinsic rather than an extrinsic property of true ideas. This means that, by merelyhaving atrue idea, the mind is certain of its truth and can clearlydistin- guish it from afalse one. One could of course ask whether the mind has true ideas at all. AccordingtoSpinoza, we must assume it does, for otherwise the acquisition of knowledge would be impossible. Ican onlyknow what certainty is if Ialready have atrue idea which serves as astandard or model of truth. Spinoza illustrates this point in the TIE through the analogywith the fabrication of tools (G4:13‒14). Since toolsare produced by means of other tools,one could ask: how did the first human beingsmake theirtools, when there werenotools available? They made them “with the tools they werebornwith” (G2:13). In like manner,Spinoza claims, “theremust be atrue idea in us, as an inborn tool” (G2:16), by means of which our intellect is able to form new true ideas. In order to serveasthe standard of truth, this true idea in us must be certain in virtue of itself, not in virtueofsomething else. This intuitionistic account of true ideas is of course unlikelytoconvince asceptic who has embraced global doubt.⁶ After all, global doubt affects the totality of our perceptions, even thosethatseem most certain. When confronted with the sceptic’s profession of doubt, Spinoza’saccount of certainty seems to allow onlyfor two explanations of her state of mind: either the sceptic has no true ideas at all, or she sim- plyfeigns her global doubt. Such responses are unsatisfying and rather ineffective against the worries raised by modern scepticism. Scholars have sought deeper reasons for Spinoza’sapparent indifferencetowards doubt, and recent attempts have located them in his metaphysical commitments.Since Spinoza’sepistemology is derivative of his metaphysical views, it is reasonable to look for abetterresponse to

ing still presupposes the existenceofobjects appearingtous. See DominikPerler, “Wieist ein globaler Zweifel möglich? Zu den Voraussetzungendes frühneuzeitlichen Außenwelt-Skeptizismus,” Zeits- chrift fürphilosophischeForschung 57,no. 4(October‒December 2003): 484.  See Perler.  See Robert Mason, “Ignoringthe Demon?Spinoza’sWay with Doubt,” Journal of the HistoryofPhi- losophy 31, no. 4(October 1993): 545‒46. 150 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

scepticism in such views. Michael Della Rocca and Dominik Perler have presented, in my view,the most elaborate and compellingcases in favour of this reading.⁷ In what follows, Iwill summarise the results of their inquiries.⁸ Accordingtothese scholars, the key to the question lies in Spinoza’smonism, whose main claims are that “except God, no substance can be or be conceived” (E2p14) and “nothing can be or be conceivedwithout God” (E2p15). By virtue of this monism, Spinoza rejects all claims based on an arbitrary separation between spheres or realms in reality.⁹ Spinoza, thus, dismisses all views of human nature that isolate it from the rest of nature (or God) and treat it as arealm apart,insofar as such separation runs counter to nature’sfundamental oneness. Certainly,Spinoza drawsasharp distinction between the mental and the physical and deniesany causal interaction between the two. Yetthe aim of this distinction is to establish their union more effectively.Strictlyspeaking,the mental and the physical are not parts or areas of reality,but the same infinite reality explained in two different ways.Spi- noza thus concludes that “acircle existing in nature and the idea of the existing cir- cle, which is also in God, are one and the samething,which is explained through different attributes” (E2p7s). When considered against this monistic background, Spinoza’sdismissal of scepticism becomes more plausible. To begin with, as Perler observes, the sameness of the physical and the mental excludes all possible doubts regarding the existence of aphysical world corresponding to our perceptions.¹⁰ By virtue of this sameness, Spinoza establishes thatthe human mind is an idea whose object or ideatum is the human body. Since abodyexisting in nature and the idea of it are the same thing explainedthrough different attributes,Icannot doubt, as Descartesdoes, the existenceofmyown body. Monism also provides the key to Spinoza’sconception of certainty as an intrinsic property of true ideas—apoint that Della Rocca stresses.¹¹ The sameness of thought (i.e., the mental)and extension entails thatthought “contains in itself objectivelythe whole of Nature” and that “thoughts proceed in the same mannerasNature, its object,does” (Ep. 32; G4:173a‒174a). The nature of thoughtthus consists in representing its objects as they are in themselves, i.e., in

 See Michael Della Rocca, “Spinozaand the Metaphysics of Scepticism,” Mind 116,no. 464 (Novem- ber 2007): 851‒74;Dominik Perler, “Spinozas Antiskeptizismus,” Zeitschrift fürphilosophische For- schung 61, no. 1(January‒March2007): 1‒26.  Thereisawealth of literatureonthe relationship between Spinoza and scepticism. Iconfine my discussiontothe studies of Della Rocca and Perler because they specificallytrace Spinoza’santi- scepticism back to his monism. Forfurther studies,see Martha BrandtBolton, “Spinoza on Cartesian Doubt,” Noûs 19,no. 3(September 1985): 379‒95;Willis Doney, “SpinozaonPhilosophical Skepti- cism,” in Spinoza:EssaysinInterpretation,eds.MauriceMandelbaum and Eugene Freeman (La Salle: OpenCourt,1975), 139‒57;José María Sánchez de León Serrano, “The Place of Skepticism in Spinoza’sThought,” HistoryofPhilosophy Quarterly 35,no. 1(January 2018): 1‒19.  See Della Rocca, “Spinozaand the MetaphysicsofScepticism,” 853.  See Perler, “Spinozas Antiskeptizismus,” 13‒14.  See Della Rocca, “Spinozaand the MetaphysicsofScepticism,” 860‒61. SpinozaonGlobal Doubt 151

knowing them, and thereforecertainty is inherent to it.Here, again, we must bear in mind that monism impels Spinoza to reject all arbitrary divisions of reality into separate compartments.¹² Thus, it makes no sense for Spinoza to divorce—as the sceptic does—ideas and certainty, for this is tantamount to arbitrarilydividing reality into unconnected spheres. It is apparent that there is no place for global doubt within such ametaphysical framework. The sceptic is obviouslynot compelled to accept this monistic conception and can reject it as adogmatic invention.¹³ Yethere is wherethe sceptic’sweapon turns against herself:Spinoza can also retort and demand ajustification of the sceptic’sassumption that ideas and cognition are not the same. The sceptic can onlyen- tertain the hypothesis that all my ideas are wrong under the assumption that ideas and knowledge constitutetwo separate realities,independent of one another.Inthis respect,there is alsoacertain view of reality—aquite dualisticone!—behind the sceptic’sposition, even if she refuses to make claims about reality and believes that her doubts are freefrom presuppositions. Thus, the strength of Spinoza’santi- scepticism consists in revealing the theoretical assumptions behind scepticism and showing their arbitrariness.¹⁴ This is, in broad strokes, the recent verdict of two important scholars on the question of the relationship between Spinoza’santi-scepticism and monism. Al- though Igenerallyagree with this assessment,Ibelieveitcontains an important flaw: it mainlyaddresses the question of doubtfrom the viewpointofthe one substance or God—whereall ideas are true—but not from the viewpoint of the finite human mind, wheredoubt actuallyoccurs.Ifwedescend, as it were, from one level to the other,the congruence between ideas and thingsceases to be obvious and becomes aproblem. As Ishow in the next sections, the question of global doubt,albeit inexistent with respect to God, resurfaces at the level of the limited human mind. Obviously, both Della Rocca and Perlertakeinto account the limitation of the human mind and the fact that,beside true ideas, it also has inadequate ones. Yetthey still address the issue onlyfrom the perspective of the one infinite substance, and thereforeonlyadmit the possibilityofa“local” doubt,not aglobal one.¹⁵ Certainly, if all ideas are true in God, and the human mind is part of the divine intellect,then the human mind necessarilypartakes of God’strue ideas. However, this “participation” is preciselythe issue, insofaras, for Spinoza, the inadequacy of our ideas consists in the fact that they grasp reality ex parte,not absolute (E2p11, p34,p35). The fact thatthe human mind is part of God’sintellect can lead to the conclusion that all the ideas in the human mind are alsopartial, and therefore inadequate. Unfortunately, Spinoza is unclear on this point,the importance of which scholars have not sufficientlyemphasised.Iwill address this issue in the next two

 See Della Rocca,852‒53.  See Perler, “Spinozas Antiskeptizismus,” 22‒23.  See Perler, 4.  See Perler, 23;Della Rocca, “Spinozaand the MetaphysicsofScepticism,” 852‒53. 152 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

sections, first by focusingonSpinoza’sreflections on doubt contained in the TIE (which show thatSpinoza admits the possibility of global doubt), and then by briefly examining his account of adequacy in the second book of the Ethics.

3Spinoza’sAnalysis of Doubt

Paragraphs 77‒80 in the TIE (G2:29‒30) contain the most thorough examination of the question of doubt ever offered by Spinoza.¹⁶ An attentive readingofthese paragraphs shows that extreme doubt, far from being afalse problem, is for Spinoza an almostinexorable consequence of our containment in nature (i.e., our limitedness).¹⁷ It also shows that the elimination of doubtcan onlyoccur through an adequate grasp of God’sessence. This puts Spinoza’sapproach to doubtinclose vicinity to Des- cartes’,although,asIalso show in this section, theirrespectivestrategies on this point differ in crucial respects. Finally, the analysis of these paragraphs will help us define the actual question Spinoza has to solve in order to overcome global doubt: how can the finite grasp the infinite? In §78, Spinoza writes:

There is no doubt in the soul, therefore, through the thingitself concerning which one doubts. That is, if thereshould be onlyone idea in the soul, then, whether it is true or false, therewill be neither doubt nor certainty,but onlyasensation of acertain sort.For in itself [this idea] is nothing but asensation of acertain sort.But doubt will arise throughanother idea which is not so clear and distinct that we can infer fromitsomethingcertain about the thingconcerning which thereisdoubt.That is, the idea that puts us in doubt is not clear and distinct (G2:29‒30).

We can distinguishinthis passagetwo important claims, which, as Iwill show later, provide the key for Spinoza’ssolution to global doubt.The first claim establishes that the cause of doubt differsfrom the thing concerning which one doubts. Thisimplies that,inorder for doubt to arise, aplurality of ideas is required. Indeed, the veracity of agiven perception can onlybechallenged by another perception, for aperception

 It has been argued that Spinoza’sconcernwith doubt is onlypresent in the TIE due to the early influenceofDescartes and disappears in subsequent works, showingthat Spinoza lost interest in the question. Yetthere is, Ithink, amoreconvincingway to explain the apparent disappearance of the issue of doubt in Spinoza’slater writings.Spinoza admittedlyconceivedthe TIE as an introduction to amoresystematicwork. Thus,heformulates in the TIE problems that will onlyfind their definitive solution in the Ethics.Icontend that this is preciselythe case with the issue of sceptical doubt,which, as Iargue in this and the next section, finds adefinitive answer in Spinoza’saccount (contained in the second book of his Ethics)ofthe human mind’sability to grasp God’sessenceadequately.  Thomas Nagel points out in asimilar fashion the link between scepticism and our “containment in the world”: “Skepticism is radical doubt about the possibility of reachingany kind of knowledge, freedom, or ethical truth, givenour containment in the world and the impossibility of creating our- selvesfromscratch.” Thomas Nagel, TheView from Nowhere (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,1986), 6‒7. SpinozaonGlobal Doubt 153

cannot contradict itself. The second claim asserts that the idea that causes doubt is not clear and distinct.Inother words, if Iperceive something thatchallenges the veracity of aprevious perception and generates in me doubts about it,this second perception willnot increase my knowledge or make me apprehend the first perception better.There is, thus, no insight or cognitive discernment in doubt. In order to illustrate these claims, let us consider the example Spinoza givesdi- rectlyafterwards. Country people, he says,react with great surprise when they hear that the sun is much biggerthanthe earth. Forthem, the sun seems unquestionably much smaller,for this is the wayitappears to them and nothing in their dailyexpe- rience contradicts this perception. In order to cast doubt on such an ordinary perception, one must know thatthe sensesdeceive.Wecan recognisehere Spinoza’sfirst claim: what causes doubt about agiven perception (i.e., our perception of the sun) cannot be this perception itself, but adifferent one (i.e., perception of the deceptiveness of the senses). Now,toknow thatthe senses deceive does not improve my perception of the sun, it onlymakes me distrust its veracity,and for that reason Spinoza observesthat “the idea that puts us in doubtisnot clear and distinct.” To know that the senses deceive does not reallyincreasemyknowledge.¹⁸ To know how the senses deceive,onthe contrary,does. If Iknow,for instance, how visual perception works,Ican learn something certain about the size of the sun. Thisimprove- ment of my knowledge will then make my doubts about my perception of the sun disappear.Wethus conclude that doubt disappears as soon as the mind can form aclear and distinct idea of the cause of doubt. The example justconsidered is about aparticulardoubt concerning visual perception. Let us now applythe two aforementioned principles to global doubt. Global doubt,asalreadynoted, affects the entire set of my perceptions. Ientertain this kind of doubtwhen Isuppose, for instance,thatadeceiving God distorts all my perceptions, even thosewhich seem most certain and reliable. According to the first principle, the cause of doubt differsfrom the thing concerning which one doubts. In the hypothesis under consideration, the thing concerning which one doubts is the entire setofmyperceptions (i.e., everything), whereas the sourceofdoubt is the supposition of adeceiving God. The second principle establishes that “the idea that puts us in doubt is not clear and distinct.” Certainly, the idea of adeceiving God is afig-

 These reflections show that doubt,insofar as it challengesthe truth of our ordinary perceptions, constitutes for Spinoza akind of middle stagebetween our pre-theoretical, biased view of things and true knowledge.Thus,evenifdoubt per se does not increase knowledge,itclears the ground for a true cognitive development. This approach to doubt is reminiscent of Hegel’s, whoinhis early work TheRelationship of Scepticism to Philosophy describes scepticism as “the free side of every philosophy,” insofar as scepticism liberatesthought fromthe limitedness and “the dogmatism of common sense.” GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1801‒1807,eds.Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag,1986), 229, 238. Interestingly,Hegel mentions some definitions and propositions from Spinoza’s Ethics as examplesofthis organic link between scepticism and philosophy(Hegel, 229‒30). 154 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

ment of the imagination, and as such it is not aclear and distinct idea. It simplydes- ignatesanunknown sourceofdoubt.The strength of this sceptical hypothesis lies in the fact that it locates the sourceofdeception in an entity (i.e., God) that is prima facie beyond the scope of our perceptions. The solution to this predicament must thereforeconsist in expanding the scope of our perceptions to make God’snature accessible to the human intellect.¹⁹ Is this not the sameasdivinising the human mind? In away it is, as Iwill show later. However,accordingtothe account of true ideas examined in the previous section, Spinoza does not even accept the possibilityofglobal doubt.For Spinoza, as has been alreadynoted, the mere possession of any true idea makes me certain of its truth and dispels all doubts. Yetthe continuation of the text we are analysingsug- gests the opposite:

From this it follows that,onlysolong as we have no clear and distinct idea of God, can we call true ideas in doubt by supposingthat perhapssome deceivingGod exists,who misleads us even in the things most certain. I.e., if we attend to the knowledge we have concerningthe origin of all things and do not discover—by the same knowledge we have when, attendingtothe nature of the triangle,wediscover that its threeangles equal tworight angles—anythingthat teaches us that he is not adeceiver […]. But if we have the kind of knowledge of God that we have of the triangle,then all doubt is removed (G2:30).

This intricate passageisquite explicit regarding the following threepoints. First: we can indeeddoubttrue ideas by supposingthat adeceiving God exists. Second: this supposition is conceivable as long as we have no clear idea of the origin of all things (i.e., God). Third: if we are able to form aclear idea of God (comparable, in terms of clarity,tothe idea of the triangle), then all doubt disappears.Spinoza, then, does admit the possibility of global doubt. In fact,globaldoubt seems to result almostin- exorably from an imperfect knowledge of God.²⁰ Yethow does this conclusioncohere with Spinoza’saccount of true ideas as self-validating?Atfirst glance, the requirement of knowing God in order to remove global doubtseems to contradict the claim thattrue ideas are certain in virtue of themselves. The contradiction is indeed inescapable if we wrongly interpret this requirement—as some scholars tend to do— in aCartesian fashion, as implying thatGod is a “supernatural guarantor” of our rational certainty, external to rationality itself.²¹ As aresultofthis extended misinter-

 Suppose that thereindeed is adeceivingGod and Ican form atrue idea of it.Since “to have atrue idea means nothingother than knowingathingperfectly” (E2p43s), the waythis deceivingGod manipulates my perceptions would no longer be amystery for me. Therefore,its deceivingmechanism would be neutralised.  This is not the onlypassagewhereSpinoza affirms this. Consider the followingones from the TTP, Chapter6(G3:84,ADN.VI): “So long as the idea we have of God himself is not clear and distinct,but confused, we doubt God’sexistence, and consequently, we doubt everything.”  See for instanceRobert Mason, TheGod of Spinoza:APhilosophical Study (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1997), 105: “It is not the origin of our clear and distinct ideas that matters.The whole SpinozaonGlobal Doubt 155

pretation, scholars have generallydisregarded Spinoza’srequirement,consequently assuming that the possession of anytrue idea is enough to dispel global doubt.²² In what follows Iwant to show thatSpinoza’sunderstanding of God as the foundation of certainty differs substantiallyfrom Descartes’ and is consistent both with his monism and with his conception of trueideas as self-validating. The apparent contradiction between basing our certaintyonGod and conceiving of true ideas as self-validatingdissolveswhen we take into account Spinoza’sanal- ogyoftools, examined in the previous section. Recall that,accordingtoSpinoza, “theremust be atrue idea in us, as an inborn tool” (G2:16), which serves as the standard of truth and enables the intellect to form new true ideas. In order to serveasthe standard of truth, this true idea in us must be certain in virtue of itself, not in virtue of something else. Employing the analogyoftools,wecan saythat,justasthe rest of tools exist in virtue of an original tool, true ideas are certain in virtue of this original true idea in us. Thus, the certainty of true ideas is derivative of the certainty of the original true idea from which they stem. The TIE suggests (§38;G2:16) that the original true idea in question is the idea of the most perfect being.Wecan thus understand how it is possibletodoubt true ideas in the absenceofaclear idea of God. Properlyspeaking,onlyclear knowledge of God—understood as the standard of truth—is self-validatingand impervious to doubt. The remainingtrue ideas are certain only insofar as they derive from this fundamental knowledge,and, for this reason, Spinoza statesthat God is the principle and foundation of our knowledge (E5p36s).²³ Without this basic knowledge,true ideas are “like conclusions without premises” (E2p28d) and hence subjecttodoubt.²⁴

notion of God as asupernatural guarantor ‘supremelygood and veracious’ is whollyout of keeping with Spinoza’smetaphysics.” Mason automaticallyassumeshere that to makedistinct ideas dependent upon their origin is tantamount to embracing Descartes’ conception of God.  See again Mason, 105‒6: “Rather,the point of Spinoza’sapparent afterthoughttohis exposition of Descartes must have been that knowledge of any clear and distinct idea is enough to removethe possibility of ageneral suspension of reason.” See also Pierre-François Moreau, Problèmes du Spinozisme (Paris:Vrin, 2006), 181: “[…]l’idée vraie, quelle qu’elle soit,nous rend incapables de doutes.”  Forasimilar reading of the dependenceoftrue ideas on God, see Aron Garrett, Meaning in Spi- noza’sMethod (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2003), 71: “Foranidea to be adequatemeans it relates to God’sidea and part of its adequacyderivesfromthis relation, thereissomethingofwhat it means to be God’sidea involved in each adequateidea. This ‘something’ must be known adequately,otherwise we could not have adequateknowledge.Tohaveadequate knowledge is to know the cause. The regress of causes stops at God’sinfiniteand eternal essenceinthought. Consequently, to have an adequate idea is to have knowledge of God’seternal essenceinthought.”  One could arguethat,sinceadequate knowledge of God is likeaninborn toolinus(that is, an innateidea), global doubt is utterlyimpossible for Spinoza. In apparent agreement with this,Spinoza declares in E2p47s that “God’sinfiniteessenceand eternity areknown to everybody.” Yetinthe very same passage,Spinozastates that “men do not have such aclear cognition of God as they have of common notions,” dueto“the fact that they cannot imagine God, as they can bodies,and that they have joined the name God to the images of things which they areused to seeing.” Thus,having innateknowledgeofGod is compatible with ignoringGod’snatureand sinkinginto scepticism. This 156 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

Yetwhat exactlymakes clear knowledge of God the standard of truth and impervious to doubt?In§76 of the TIE, Spinoza describes God as “aunique and infinite being,beyond which there is no being” (G2:29). Recall that,asSpinoza’sanalysis of doubthas established, the cause of doubtdiffers from the thing concerning which one doubts. We can therefore doubtany content whatsoever—includingtrue ideas—as long as we can conceive of something else that negates it.Yet in the case of God, this is not possible, for God is “aunique and infinitebeing, beyond which there is no being” (italics mine). Since God encompasses all beings, forminga clear idea of God leavesliterallynoroom for the supposition of another being beside it (like an evil genius)that could challengethe truth of this idea. Similarly, if aclear idea of God leavesnoroom for another idea that could denyits truth, it also cannot be certain in virtue of something else. Therefore, clear knowledge of God must be, due to its all-embracing character,certain in virtue of itself. Spinoza’sconception of adequacy,developed in the second book of the Ethics,is in perfect accord with the foundational role that he attributes to the idea of God. By “adequacy” Spinoza understands the intrinsic properties of atrue idea regardless of its relation to an external object (seeE2d4). In other words, adequacy is what makes atrue idea self-validating or certain in virtue of itself. In E2p34,Spinoza defines more preciselythe notion of adequacy in the following way: “Every idea that in us is absolute,oradequate and perfect,istrue” (italicsmine). An adequate idea is, thus, an idea that is absolute in us. This equation between adequacy and absoluteness deserves our attention. Theadjective “absolute” has different meanings.Philosophical- ly,itcan refer to something that is not relative to something else, as well as to something that featuresnorestrictions or limitations. Spinoza employs the adjectivein this twofold sense with reference to ideas in §108 of the TIE (G2:38‒39). There he states thatthe intellect forms certain ideas absolutely,and certain ideas from other ideas. “Those that it forms absolutely,” he adds, “express infinity.” Absoluteness is thus, in its twofold sense of infinity and non-derivability from prior concepts, the intrinsic property of thoseideas thatare certain in virtueofthemselvesand, for this very reason, constitutethe foundation of knowledge.²⁵ It is easy to see that these intrinsic properties are present in the idea of God described above, insofar as God is “a uniqueand infinite being” and “the origin of all things.”

innateknowledge can still be confused because of deeplyentrenched prejudices or other natural in- clinations.The task of philosophyconsists preciselyinremoving such obstacles to adequateknowledge.Regarding Spinoza’saffirmation that “God’sinfiniteessenceare eternity areknown to everybody,” see Yitzhak Y. Melamed, “On the Fish’sKnowledge of God’sEssence, or WhySpinozawas not aSceptic” (unpublished manuscript).  Descartes had alreadyargued in his Rulesfor the Direction of the Mind (particularlyinRule Six), that the “secret” of the true philosophical method consists in correctlyidentifyingthe “absolute” and the “relative.” See René Descartes, ThePhilosophical Writings of Descartes,trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff,and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1985), 1:21‒24. Spinoza on Global Doubt 157

Yetthe most pressingquestion stillremains unsolved. For, even if we know now that adequate knowledge of God removes general doubt,itisnot obvious at all that such knowledge is within our reach. It is not just the theological and philosophical tradition before Spinoza that disagrees with him on this point.²⁶ Even from the stand- point of Spinoza’smonism, the possibility of adequate knowledge of God presents serious difficulties.Certainly, Spinoza equates God with nature, thus making the divine accessible to rational inquiry.Yet the very fact that we doubt—even true ideas— shows thatthe human intellect is limited and unable to apprehend nature in its entirety.Spinoza statesinE4p4 that “it is impossiblethat aman should not be apart of Nature.” If the cause of doubt is our limitation, which is irremediable, how can we possiblyremovedoubt? Differentlyput,how can apart of nature transcend itself and adequatelygrasp the whole thatcontains it?Inthe next section, Iexamine Spi- noza’sanswer to these crucial questions in the second book of his Ethics.

4How Canthe Finitegrasp the Infinite?

Spinoza stresses in numerous passages throughout his writingsthat the human mind is part of God’sinfinite intellect.Thisclaim has, with respect to human knowledge, two opposite consequences.Onthe one hand,asthe scholium of E2p43states,being part of God’sintellect enables the human mind to “perceive thingstruly.”²⁷ On the other hand,asthe corollary of E2p11 establishes, the very same fact entails that the human mind perceivesthingspartially, i.e., inadequately. Since Spinoza admits both the imperfection of human knowledge and its capacity to know thingsade- quately, we must assume that he employs the sameexpression (i.e., “being part of God’sinfinite intellect”)intwo different senses. The sense in which our being part of God obstructs knowledge is easier to understand than the sense in which it enables it.Inthe corollary of E2p11, Spinoza affirms:

[…]and when we saythat God has this or that idea, not onlyinsofar as he constitutesthe nature of the human Mind, but insofar as he also has the idea of another thingtogether with the human Mind, then we saythat the human Mind perceivesthe thing onlypartially, or inadequately.

The fact that God’smind has countless other ideas besides the human mind explains for Spinoza thatweperceive thingspartially, or inadequately. Our partial perception of thingsdoes not merelyrestrict the scope of our knowledge in comparison to God’s:

 Most philosophers and theologians before Spinoza agree that God’sessenceisunknowable to the human intellect.See Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination (New Jersey:Prince- tonUniversity Press), 25‒28.  E2p43s: “Addtothis that our Mind, insofar as it perceivesthingstruly, is part of the infinitein- tellect of God; hence, it is as necessary that the mind’sclear and distinct ideas are true as that God’s ideas are.” 158 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

it also makes our ideas false. According to E2p35, “falsityconsists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or mutilated and confused, ideas involve.” Spinoza, thus, equates falsity with ignorance. This equation is prima facie contrary to good sense: whyshould the unlimited extent of our ignorance render our ideas false? In principle, knowledge of aparticularthing does not requireknowledge of everything. Yethere lies preciselythe issue, for,asalreadyshown in the previous section, Spi- noza’smonism does not allow the possibility of having complete knowledge of anything without knowing the whole of nature.Ideas of particular thingsare unavoid- ablymutilated(i.e., false) if they are not accompanied by clear knowledge of the “unique and infinite being” that encompasses them.The difficulty is aggravated by the fact that,accordingtoSpinoza, “the object of our Mind is the existing body and nothing else” (E2p13d). On the face of it,the prospects of human knowledge could hardlylookworse: if the human mind onlyperceivesthe body, which is a tinyfragment of nature, and fragmentary knowledge of nature unavoidablyentails falsity,then the human mind is doomed to totalerror. Spinoza, however,holds that this is not the case. There is alsoasense in which participation in God’sintellect enables the human mind to perceive thingstruly. Spi- noza expresses this “positive” participation in the divine intellect by means of a rather obscure phrase, namely: “God insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind” (E2p34). As opposed to the previous understanding of our mind’spar- ticipationinGod, this one stresses the common identity between God’sintellect and ours. Certainly, if the falsityofour perceptions results from the differenceofscope between God’sintellect and ours, it seems that true perceptions must consist in some sort of coincidenceorconjunction between God’stotalperspective and our partial perspective.²⁸ AccordingtoSpinoza, this coincidenceoccurs when the human mind grasps “those thingswhich are common to all, and which are equallyinthe part and in the whole” (E2p38). Let us first focus on the expression “equallyin the part and in the whole” (aeque in parte ac in toto). If something is equallypresent in the part and in the whole, it will remain the same considered either as apart or as awhole. Therefore, such athing willbeperceived in exactly the same way from God’s total perspective and from our limited, partial perspective.Our limitation is no im- pediment for perceiving such thing:since it is equallypresent in the part and in the whole, perceiving it partiallydoes not entail anydeformation or mutilation of its nature.The same can be said about the expression “common to all” (omnibus communia). If something is common to all, or is present in all parts of nature, then it must be cognitively accessible from all possible perspectives, even the most restricted and partial ones. Otherwise, such thing would not be “common to all.” In sum, Spinoza’smain claim concerning all-pervasive thingsisthat the human

 See Lilli Alanen, “Spinoza on the Human Mind,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 35,no. 1(Decem- ber 2011): 16. SpinozaonGlobal Doubt 159

mind can grasp them adequately(i.e., without mutilating them), preciselybecause they are equallyspread throughout all parts of nature. It remains to determine what exactlythese all-pervasive thingsare. As Spinoza indicatesinE2p37,the expression “common to all things” refers to the fact thatall particularthings(be they thoughts or bodies) “agree in something,” namely, in that “they involvethe concept of the sameattribute.” To clarify this,takefor instance the attribute of extension. All particularbodies have in common the mere fact of being extended; extension is thereforethe quality or naturethat pervades all bodies. The sameapplies to thought: all ideas have in common the mere fact of being modes of the attribute thought, which is equallypresent in all of them. Extension and thoughtare, thus, the all-pervasive contents that the human mind, despite its constitutive limitation, can grasp adequately or absolutely.²⁹ But this is not all. Thoughtand extension are twoamong God’sinfinite attributes,which express an eternal and infinite essence (E2p1‒2).Therefore, through the adequate grasp of thought and extension, the human mind adequatelygrasps God’sinfinite essence. We find conclusive evidence in favour of these claims in E2p46d, whereSpinoza affirms that “what gives knowledge of an eternal and infiniteessence of God is common to all, and is equally in the part and in the whole.” In sum, we must conclude that,byadequatelygrasping those thingsthat are equallypresent throughout all parts of nature(i.e., thought and extension), the human mind attains adequate knowledge of God and overcomes global doubt.

5The Presuppositions of GlobalDoubt and Spinoza’sIdeal of Knowledge

The previous section has shown that Spinoza’sconception of those thingsthat are “common to all” (omnibus communia)contains his actual responsetoscepticism as well as the epistemologicalgroundingofhis monism. Yetthis response is also quite revealing of the kind of scepticism that Spinoza seeks to combat.AsIwant to argueinthis final section, Spinoza and modern scepticism share asimilar ideal of knowledge,despite their opposite views concerning the possibility of achieving it.Aclose examination of this common ideal can shed some light on the much-debated question regarding the theoretical presuppositions of global doubtand the ori- gins of modern scepticism.

 One could arguethat extension and thoughtare not the onlythingsthat arecommon to all. Being, for instance, is also somethingthat all things have in common. Yet, in spiteofits common character, beingdoes not designateanythingexistingoutside of the mind (as extension and thought do), but merely an imaginative/subjective wayofgrouping things,asSpinoza expresses in E2p40s1: “But when the images in the bodyare completelyconfused, the Mind also will imagine all the bodies con- fusedly, without anydistinction,and comprehend them as if under one attribute, viz. under the attribute of Being, Thing,etc.” 160 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

In the second section, Ihaveoutlined in broad strokes (following Bermúdez and Perler) the main differencebetween ancient and modern scepticism. Whereas the former pointsatthe impossibilityofdistinguishing between false and true perceptions, the latter entertains the much moreradical hypothesis that all our beliefs about the world might be mistaken. The difference between them is thus one of scope. The kind of doubtthat characterises ancient scepticism is “local”:itdoes not question the assumption thatthingsmanifest themselvestous, onlyour capacity to discern the right manifestations. The second kind of doubt,bycontrast,questions all my beliefs about the world, even the deeplyentrenched one thatsupposes external objects as the sourceofmyperceptions. The hypothesis of adeceiving deity corresponds to this second kind of doubt,which is alsothe kind of doubt with which Spinoza grapples. Scholars have tried to understand whythe sceptical worries of ancient thought re- mainedmerely “local” and did not reach the scope and degree of radicalismthat characterise modern scepticism. Does modern scepticism have conceptual resources at its disposal that ancient scepticism lacked?Ifso, which resourcesare they?Atany rate, everything indicates thatasignificant conceptual shift took place between the two. Bermúdez and Perler,among manyothers,³⁰ have proposed interesting theories to answer this question.³¹ Bermúdez invokes the notion of divine omnipotence to explain what he calls “the originality of Cartesian scepticism.” The absence of this notion in the ancient mindset might explain whyancientscepticism did not conceive sceptical scenarios such as the deceiving God.After athorough examination of late medieval sources, however,Bermúdez concludes thatthe notion of omnipotence is anecessary,yet not in itself sufficient condition for generatingCartesian scepticism. Late medieval discussions regardingthe possibility of God deceiving us by virtue of God’somnipotenceremained strictlyconfined to the sphere of theology. The reliability of our knowledge,which late medieval thinkers generallytook for granted, was not at the centreofthese debates. In order for divine omnipotencetobecome a sourceofsceptical doubt,otherfactors are required, such as Descartes’ scientific outlook, which according to Bermúdez “shows that there is systematic and pervasive error in our experience”.³² Bermúdez’stheory can be complementedwith Perler’s. Perlerargues that globaldoubt is onlypossibleinvirtue of astrict separation—foreign to the ancient mindset—between the realm of material objects and the realm of

 We can mention herePopkin, TheHistoryofScepticism from SavonarolatoBayle (Oxford: Oxford University,2003); Myles F. Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Sawand Ber- keley Missed,” ThePhilosophical Review 91, no. 1(January 1982): 3‒40;Gail Fine, “Descartes and An- cient Skepticism: Reheated Cabbage?” ThePhilosophical Review 109,no. 2(April 2000): 195‒234. In this list we should also include the aforementioned earlytext by Hegel, TheRelationship of Scepticism to Philosophy (Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1801‒1807).  See Bermúdez, “The Originality of Cartesian Skepticism”;Perler, “Wieist ein globaler Zweifel möglich?”  Bermúdez, “The Originality of Cartesian Skepticism,” 352. SpinozaonGlobal Doubt 161

mental representations. The “autonomisation” of the mental thatthis strict separation entails sets the ground for extreme sceptical conjectures such as the inexistence of areality beyond our representations. Such extreme conjectures are onlyconceiv- able underthe assumption that representations are completelydisconnected from material objectsand have an existenceoftheir own, devoid of physical substrate.³³ Perlerthen uses this theory to give account of Spinoza’santi-scepticism (see section 2).InSpinoza we alsofind the strict heterogeneity between the mental and the physical that is at the foundationofmodern scepticism. Yet, since this heterogeneity does not indicate for Spinoza real ontologicaldiversity (for thought and extension are for him attributes of one and the same substance), the threat of global errorisprevented by his monism from the very outset. Iwould like to complement the two theories Ihavejust presented with athird one, based on my previous inquiries. My main claim is that global doubtisbound up with an ideal of knowledge that takes divine knowledge as the standard or meas- uring stick of valid cognition. Spinoza’sphilosophyisgoverned by this ideal of knowledge.Iarguethat global doubt resultsfrom the failuretomeet this standard. My exposition has started with Spinoza’saccount of true ideas, accordingto which certainty is an intrinsic rather than extrinsic feature of true ideas. We can recognisehere the “autonomisation” of the mental described by Perler,which according to him enables Descartes to conjecturethe inexistence of an external world. Spinoza turns this “autonomisation” into an advantage for human knowledge in the following way. Since mental entities are causallyindependent of external objects, the ach- ievement of truth must take place in the mind by virtue of its own power,without the aid of anyexternal entity.The knowledge that the mind has of its objects does not derive from the objectsthemselves, but from its ownactive nature.Knowledge is thus for Spinoza aself-sufficient domain identical with the sphere of the mental and governedbyits own rules. Ihavethen shown how extreme doubtfitsinto this picture. If knowledge and the mental are the same, the onlypossibleway of ac- countingfor error and doubt(which are mental states) is by construingthem as frag- mentaryknowledge. In order rank as such, knowledge must be all-embracing,not in the sense of being omniscient,but in the sense of grasping the general structure of reality (i.e., thosethingsthat are “common to all”)byvirtue of its ownpower.Frag- mentary or mutilated knowledge unavoidablyleads to error,and eventuallytothe hypothesis of adeceiving God. AccordingtoSpinoza, onlyadequate knowledge of God can removesuch ahypothesis,for knowing God is tantamount to apprehending the general order of nature. This knowledge,inturn, renders the mind fullyautono- mous and self-sufficient,insofar as it consists in acertain conjunction between the total perspective of nature and the partial perspective of the human mind. In the third section, Ipointed out that Spinoza’ssolution to global doubt entails acertain “divinisation” or “deification” of human knowledge.Indeed, the account of

 Perler, “Wieist ein globaler Zweifel möglich?” 501. 162 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

human knowledge justpresented exhibits striking similarities with the waymedieval thoughtgenerallyconceivedofdivineknowledge as opposed to human knowledge. Prior to the “autonomisation” of the mental described by Perler,human cognition was viewed, to agreat extent,asreceptive and causallydependent upon its objects.³⁴ Accordingtothis view,the privilegeofknowing thingsapriori is reserved to God, who as the creator of the world knows everythinginthe same wayasanartisan knows the objectsshe produces.Human knowledge,bycontrast, comes afterits objects.³⁵ Due to its dependence on external objects, human knowledge cannot be one and all-embracing,asdivineknowledge is. From the “medieval” viewpoint,the variety and multiplicity of thingsrequires different sciences governed by different rules and endowed with varyingdegrees of certainty.³⁶ This is not the case with divine science, which, insofar as it is priortothe thingsthemselves, is not affected by their plurality and mutability.Inaway, the medieval distinction between divine and human knowledge becomes in Spinoza the distinction between true knowledge and imagination: whereas true knowledge is unitaryand autonomouslyproduced by the mind, imagination is multiple and dependentupon external factors. As paradoxical as it maysound, Spinoza’sideal of knowledge is more liable to generate extreme doubt thanthe medievalconception from which it departs. To begin with, Spinoza’sideal stands in stark contrasttothe limitedness,fallibility, and relativity of human conceptions. As has been shown in this paper,Spinoza is

 See Funkenstein, Theologyand the Scientific Imagination,298‒99.  Take for instancethe followingpassagefromMaimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed: “Forweknow all that we know onlythrough lookingatthe beings;thereforeour knowledge does not grasp the future or the infinite. Our insights are renewedand multiplied according to the thingsfromwhich we acquire the knowledge of them. He,may He be exalted,isnot likethat.Imean that His knowledge of things is not derivedfromthem, so that thereismultiplicity and renewal of knowledge. On the contrary,the things in question follow upon His knowledge,which preceded and established them as they are: […]. Hence,with regardtoHim, mayHebeexalted, there is no multiplicity of insights and renewal and change of knowledge.For through knowingthe true reality of His own immutable essence, He also knows the totality of what necessarilyderivesfromall His acts.” Moses Maimonides, TheGuide of the Perplexed,trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago:University of Chicago Press,1963), part III, chapter21(vol. II, 485). Forasimilar approach to divine knowledge,see Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae,I,q.14, a. 8.  See Dominik Perler, “Does God Deceive Us?Skeptical Hypotheses in Late Medieval Epistemolo- gy,” in Rethinking the HistoryofSkepticism,ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 190.Itisnote- worthythat,right up until the fourteenth century,theologians and philosophers abided by the famous Aristotelian prohibition against metabasis eis allo genos,i.e., mixingmethodsfromdifferent areas of knowledge.See Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination,303‒12; see also Cohen, How Modern Science Came into the World: Four Civilizations,One 17th-CenturyBreakthrough (Amsterdam:Amsterdam University Press, 2010), 509‒19.This prohibition is based on the assumption that thereexist clearlydifferentiated domains of knowledge,correspondingtothe different genera of beings.Each domain requiresits own particular method,and henceitis“unscientific” to applythe method of one domain in another one. From this point of view,sciencesare (and must be) irreducibly disparate and plural. Jean-Luc Marion shows how Descartes reverses this principle.See Jean-Luc Mar- ion, Sur l’ontologie grise de Descartes,4th ed. (Paris:Vrin, 2000), 30. Spinoza on Global Doubt 163

aware of this fact and attempts to provethat all-embracing knowledge is within the human mind’sreach despite its finitude. Modern sceptic thinkers such as Montaigne and Sanchez argued, analogous to Spinoza, that the onlyacceptable form of knowledge is one thattranscends all partial perspectivesand limitations—such as God’s knowledge.³⁷ However,they rejected the possibility thatthe human mind could attain such knowledge and, consequently, advocated scepticism. The medieval ideal of knowledge does not involvethis difficulty,simply because—unlike Spinoza and the sceptics just mentioned—it does not restrict valid knowledge to divine cognition. Acloselyconnected aspect of Spinoza’sideal of knowledge that is liable to generate scepticism is its strict requirement of unifying knowledge under aclear notion of God. Plurality of ideas and sciences is for Spinoza the breeding ground for doubt: all our ideas (even true ones) are for him subject to doubt as long as they lack auni- fying principle, i.e., aclear idea of God. If this unifying principle turns out to be un- attainable, then global doubt becomes inescapable. From the “medieval” point of view,bycontrast,aplurality of disciplines and methodsdoes not entail uncertainty. One can have one science without having another,and this circumstancedoes not detrimentallyaffect the soundness of the science one possesses. In sum, agood case can be made for viewing modern scepticism and global doubt as the resultofthe collapse of the medieval ideal of knowledge and its replace- ment by amore “monistic” ideal (such as the one endorsedbySpinoza). Acompel- ling substantiation of this claim, however,would requireaseparate study.

Bibliography

Alanen, Lilli. “Spinozaonthe Human Mind.” MidwestStudiesinPhilosophy 35, no. 1(December 2011): 4‒25. Bermúdez, José Luis. “The Originality of Cartesian Skepticism: Did it haveAncient or Mediaeval Antecedents?” History of PhilosophyQuarterly 17,no. 4(October 2000): 333‒60. Bolton, Martha Brandt. “SpinozaonCartesian Doubt.” Noûs 19, no. 3(September 1985): 379‒95.

 Consider the followingpassagesfromFranciscoSanchez’s(1550‒1623) That Nothing is Known (Quod nihil scitur), which show strikingparallels with Spinoza. “In the natural universe there is but one kind of knowledge,not several kinds (or would be, if it could be obtained), by which all things might be fullyunderstood; for one thingcannot be fullyunderstood apart from all other things.” FranciscoSanchez,That Nothing is Known (Quod Nihil Scitur), eds.and trans. Elaine Limbrick and Douglas F.S. Thomson (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1988), 211; “Therefore, in order to understand anyone thingperfectlywemust understand everything; and whoiscapable of this?” (Sanchez, 207); “OnlyHe, beingHimself perfect wisdom and understanding,and perfect intelligence, enters intoall things,iswise in relation to all things,comprehends everythingand understands everything, because He Himself is all things and is in all things,while all things are God Himself and are in Him” (Sanchez, 239). Regarding the connection between pantheism and the scepticism of Mon- taigne and Sanchez,see Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Neueren Zeit (Berlin: Verlag Bruno Cassirer,1922),1:176‒78. 164 José María Sánchez de León Serrano

Burnyeat,Myles F. “Idealism and GreekPhilosophy:WhatDescartesSaw and Berkeley Missed.” The Philosophical Review 91, no. 1(January1982): 3‒40. Cassirer,Ernst. Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der Neueren Zeit. Vol. 1. Berlin: Verlag Bruno Cassirer,1922. Cohen, H. Floris. How ModernScienceCame into the World:Four Civilizations, One 17th-Century Breakthrough. Amsterdam: AmsterdamUniversityPress, 2010. Della Rocca, Michael. “Spinozaand the Metaphysics of Scepticism.” Mind 116, no. 464 (November 2007): 851‒74. Descartes, René. The PhilosophicalWritings of Descartes. Translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff,and Dugald Murdoch. 2vols. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,1985. Doney,Willis. “Spinoza on PhilosophicalSkepticism.” In Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation,edited by Maurice Mandelbaumand Eugene Freeman,139‒57.LaSalle: Open Court, 1975. Fine, Gail. “Descartes and AncientSkepticism: Reheated Cabbage?” The PhilosophicalReview 109, no. 2(April 2000): 195‒234. Funkenstein, Amos. Theologyand the Scientific Imagination. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986. Garrett, Aron. Meaning in Spinoza’sMethod. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 2003. Hegel, GeorgWilhelm Friedrich. Jenaer Schriften 1801‒1807. Edited by EvaMoldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986. Marion, Jean-Luc. Sur l’ontologie grise de Descartes. 4th ed. Paris: Vrin, 2000. Maimonides, Moses. The Guide of the Perplexed. Translated by Shlomo Pines. 2vols. Chicago: UniversityofChicago Press, 1963. Mason, Robert. “Ignoring the Demon? Spinoza’sWay with Doubt.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 31, no. 4(October 1993): 545‒64. Mason, Robert. The God of Spinoza: APhilosophical Study. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1997. Melamed, Yitzhak Y. “On the Fish’sKnowledge of God’sEssence, or Why Spinozawas not a Sceptic.” Unpublished manuscript. Moreau, Pierre-François. Problèmes du spinozisme. Paris: Vrin, 2006. Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1986. Perler,Dominik. “Does God DeceiveUs? SkepticalHypotheses in Late Medieval Epistemology.” In Rethinking the History of Skepticism,edited by Henrik Lagerlund, 171‒92. Leiden:Brill, 2009. Perler,Dominik. “Spinozas Antiskeptizismus.” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 61, no. 1 (January‒March 2007): 1‒26. Perler,Dominik. “Wie ist ein globaler Zweifel möglich? Zu den Voraussetzungen des frühneuzeitlichen Außenwelt-Skeptizismus.” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 57,no. 4 (October‒December 2003): 481‒512. Popkin, RichardH.The History of ScepticismfromSavonarola to Bayle. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2003. Sanchez, Francisco. That Nothing is Known (Quod Nihil Scitur). Edited and translated by Elaine Limbrick and DouglasF.S. Thomson. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,1988. Sánchez de León Serrano, José María. “The PlaceofSkepticism in Spinoza’sThought.” History of PhilosophyQuarterly 35, no. 1(January2018): 1‒19. Spinoza, Baruch. The Collected Works of Spinoza. Edited and Translated by Edwin Curley.2vols. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1985‒2016. Spinoza, Baruch. Opera. Edited by Carl Gebhardt. 4vols. Heidelberg:Carl Winter,1925. Sébastien Charles ScepticisminEarly Modern Times

Introduction

Anyone interested in defining the nature and function of scepticism in earlymodern thoughtcannot overlook the remarkable and always useful work of Richard Popkin on the subject. By emphasising the decisive importance of scepticism in understanding the complexity of earlymodern thought,his HistoryofScepticism from Savonar- ola to Bayle has modified our view about the earlymodern history of ideas, which cannot be reduced to asimple philosophical variation on Cartesian rationalism. That being said, it seems to me that Popkin’s HistoryofScepticism has provided a somewhat truncated readingofearlymodernscepticism, for example (1) by exagger- ating the sceptical orientation of some of the thinkers he has considered, as we will see laterwith the example of Pierre-Daniel Huet; (2)byinsisting on the influenceof Pyrrhonian scepticism at the expense of Academic scepticism;¹ and (3) by dogmati- callydenying the existenceofascepticism proper to the Enlightenment (aside from Hume, of course), even though he subsequentlymodified some of his positions.² In order to propose aspecific and critical readingofPopkin’sinterpretation of the nature and functionofearlymodern scepticism, Iwillpresent threefigures of that period analysed by Popkin, namelythose of Pierre-Daniel Huet,Simon Foucher, and Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville. In doing so, Iwant also to underlinethe difficulty in presentingacoherent and consistent history of earlymodernscepticism and the importance of determining preciselythe role and function of scepticism at that time, whereitismore of an individual attitude thanashared legacyor“school” (as it wasinthe ancientperiod), which raises of course the question of its interpretation. This individual attitude variesaccordingtothe historical and philosophical context in which it occurred. Indeed, scepticism could not be used in identical ways in, for example, the pre-Cartesian and post-Cartesian contexts; for Cartesian rationalism, in claiming to surmount doubtand achievecertaintybymeansofthe cogito,had required areconfiguring of the sceptical toolkit,afact thatgaverise to the emergence of anew sceptical typologyaimed at opposing this new dogmatism. Sim- ilarly, scepticism wasobliged to reconceptualise itself in response to the success of Newtonian physics,and this mayaccount for the differencebetween the radical

 This is acommoncriticism, particularlyinthe work of French scholars workingonEarlyModern scepticism. Agood summary of such criticism can be found in Sylvia Giocanti, “Histoiredufidéisme, histoire du scepticisme,” Revue de Synthèse 199,nos.2‒3(April 1998): 193‒210.  See my “Introduction: What is Enlightenment Scepticism?ACritical Rereading of RichardPopkin,” in Scepticism in the Eighteenth Century: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklarüng, eds.Sébastien Charles and Plinio Junqueira Smith (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 1‒15.

OpenAccess. ©2019 Sébastien Charles, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-010 166 Sébastien Charles

scepticism more characteristic of the seventeenth century—at amoment whereall fields of knowledge were being criticisedand all forms of dogmatismwereatarget —and the mitigated scepticism, limited in its spheres of application, of the Enlight- enment. At this level, the analysis Ipropose contrasts sharplywith the usual attacks against Popkin’s HistoryofScepticism. Indeed, what is generallyfaulted in Popkin is the excessive importance he attributes to the religious question, using Pyrrhonism first and foremost as acritical tool in the service of atheism,³ and the relatively vague definitionofPyrrhonism he proposes,which takes little account of the textual tradition in which the sceptical texts are inscribed in order to stress its argumentative dimension.⁴ So in consideringthe threeexamples Ihavejust mentioned, the purpose of this work is not so much to criticise Popkin’sanalysis as to try to demonstrate how difficult it is to speak univocallyabout earlymodern scepticism stricto sensus,that is to sayinthe form of arelatively fixed and consistent methodasfound in Sextus Em- piricus. Rather than rejecting Popkin’sgeneral reading of modern scepticism, Iprefer to show,byusing some striking examples, how the exclusive reduction of scepticism to Pyrrhonism does not work, and represents an important interpretative mistake, similar to aform of reductionism.Onthe contrary,itisimportanttounderstand how anyform of reductionism on this topic is unthinkable, because it is impossible to present earlymodernscepticism as aphilosophicalstream with internal coherence and auniquepurpose.

1The Natureand Function of Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Scepticism

Let me begin with the figure of Pierre-Daniel Huet,who is regarded by Popkin as an exemplary representativeof“Christian Pyrrhonism,” Huet being in fact a “complete Pyrrhonian sceptic.”⁵ That Popkin adopted this readingofHuet is no surprise, since his general approach concerning scepticism consisted chieflyofemphasising the moderns’ rediscovery of ancientPyrrhonism, even if this meant obscuring or forget- ting the otherstrands of scepticism such as Academic thought in the Classical period. Thissomewhat biased interpretation is currentlybeing counterbalanced by much more charitable readingsofthe influenceofAcademic scepticism on seventeenth and eighteenthcenturyphilosophy. Forexample, Thomas Lennon and José Raimun-

 Giocanti, “Histoire du fidéisme, histoire du scepticisme.”  Emmanuel Naya, “Le phénomènepyrrhonien: lire le scepticisme au XVIe siècle” (PhDdiss., Univer- sitéStendhal—Grenoble III, 2000), 5‒10.  RichardPopkin, TheHistoryofScepticism from SavonarolatoBayle (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2003), 278‒82. Scepticism in Early Modern Times 167

do Maia Neto⁶ treat todayPierre-Daniel Huet as acentral figure in the revival of Aca- demic scepticism.⁷ It is true that areadingofHuet’swork soon makes it clear that he was deeplyfamiliar with the sceptical tradition, Pyrrhonian and Academic.⁸ He cites in turn Diogenes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, Cicero, Aulus Gellius, and Saint Augus- tine, in support of his arguments, and in so doing he displays asubtle and precise intimacy with ancient scepticism. But if Huet advances an informed readingand a comparatively fair interpretation of the themesand proponents of scepticism, it remains to be demonstrated that he really is asceptic, and what role he assigns to scepticism within his own philosophical enterprise. In this sense, it is as useless to present Huet as aPyrrhonian (Popkin) or as an Academician (Lennon and Maia Neto), the stakes of the debate being more consequential than acharacterisation which seems as anachronistic as it is sterile. And, in fact,acloser look at his Censure de la philosophie cartésienne quicklyreveals that scepticism serves him aboveall as a weapon against the modern dogmatism represented by Cartesianism. In that sense, the differences between Pyrrhonism and Academism are not reallyimportant to him, and he largely prefers to underline their proximity by showing thatsceptics have in fact avery similar visionofthe real nature of philosophy.⁹ Thus, if he takes the differences between Pyrrhonians and Academic sceptics to be essentiallyverbalafter all, it is because he thinksthatthey agree to suspendjudgment in the realm of theory while following appearances in the realm of practice. In this respect,they are the onlytrue philosophers, for unlike the dogmatics, they seek to attain wisdomand truth rather than claiming to have alreadyachieved them. In that sense, Huet’srecourse to both Pyrrhonian and Academic arguments serves to show how Descartes and his disciples had warped the very essence of philosophy, which consists of doubting and of questioning one’sown prejudices.This the Cartesians had done by exceedingthe limits imposed by the exercise of doubt and claiming that it is possiblefor certaintytobeborneout of uncertainty by means of the cogito,which is, accordingtoHuet, “aprinciple that is no less uncertain

 Thomas Lennon, “The Skepticism of Huet’s Traité philosophique de la foiblesse de l’esprit humain,” in Scepticisme et modernité,eds.Marc-André Bernier and SébastienCharles (Saint-Étienne: Publica- tions de l’Université de Saint-Étienne, 2005): 65‒75;José RaimundoMaia Neto, “Huet n’est pas un sceptique chrétien,” Les Etudes philosophiques 2(2008): 209‒22. Seealso Maia Neto, “Academic Skep- ticism in EarlyModern Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas 58, no. 2(1997): 199‒220, and Maia Neto, “Huet sceptique cartésien,” Philosophiques 35,no. 1(2008): 223‒39.  See Sébastien Charles, “Pierre-Daniel Huet’sReadings in Scepticism,” in Academic Scepticism in the Development of Early Modern Philosophy,eds.PlinioJunqueira Smith and SébastienCharles (Dor- drecht: Springer,2017), 259‒74.  On this topic, see the sections “La ripresa dello scetticismo antico” and “Huet elatradizione scet- tica,” in Elena Rapetti, Pierre-Daniel Huet: erudizione, filosofia, apologetica (Milan: Vita ePensiero, 1999), 255‒79.  Pierre-Daniel Huet, Traité philosophique de la faiblesse de l’esprit humain (Amsterdam:Henri du Sauzet,1723), 138. 168 Sébastien Charles

than all the others that he subjectedtodoubt.”¹⁰ In Huet’sstrategy, sceptical arguments servetoshow thatitisimpossible to treat the cogito as acertain proposition. Henceheaccumulatesarguments that show that the cogito,which Descartes presents as an intuition, is in fact adeduction, and an invalid one.¹¹ This is the central concern of both his Censure de la philosophie cartésienne and his Censure de la réponse de Monsieur Régis àlaCensure de la philosophie cartésienne,anincomplete manuscript that Huet intended as aresponse to abook by Pierre-Sylvain Régis defending Descartes’ philosophy. In fact,for Huet,nothing is less self-evident thanthe purportedself-evidence of the cogito. First,Descartesdoes not even raise the question of knowing what this term “to be” means and whether the thinking subjectreally is—aquestion he ought to have broached if his doubt wereasradical as he claimed and extended so far as the category of existence. Forafter all, as Montaigne had alreadyrecog- nised, the predication of existenceshould applyinreality onlytoasingle subject, God, the sole trulyexistent being,since all other natural beings have onlyaphenom- enal, not asubstantial, existence. Next,had Descartesexamined the question of what being is more thoroughly, he would have recognised that the “I” or the “self” that thinks cannot think without being,and hence that the cogito is nothing more thanatautology: “Iamathinker,therefore Iam”;indeed, it is adefective syllogism of the question-begging kind: “If Ithink,Iam; Iam; thereforeIam.” If we look upon the cogito as aline of argument,Huet suggests, we must acknowledge that it is not valid. The major premise that deals with thoughtisalso problematic, for what can it mean if not, “Ithink that Ihavethought,” since there is both alogical and achronological anteriority between the moment when we think and the following moment when we have deduced that we exist?Given that Descartes himself recognised that memory is adeceptive faculty,Icannot be sure of having trulythought before concluding that Ihavetrueexistence, because there is nothing to assureme that this idea of having thought is certain—hencethe impossibility of reachinga valid conclusion. Huet presents this line of thoughtasfollows:

La mémoiredel’homme étant peu ferme et peu fidèle, la conclusion peut fort bien s’appliquer à une autre proposition qu’àcelle d’où elle est tirée. Ce qui nous arrive tous les jours dans les entretiens familiers,oùl’on oublie souvent en raisonnantlesujet de la conversation, et ce qu’on adessein de prouver.Iln’yadonc rien de certain et il peut yavoir de l’erreur dans la connexion de l’argument de Descartes, et par conséquent il ne vaut rien. Ajoutons àcela que ce raisonnement étant fondé sur ce principe,que tout ce qui pense est au moment qu’il pense, il s’ensuit

 Pierre-Daniel Huet, Against Cartesian Philosophy,ed. and trans. Thomas M. Lennon (Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2003), 1.14.109‒10.  Forananalysis of Huet’scritique of the evidenceofthe cogito,see SébastienCharles, “Évidence, vraisemblance et véritéselon Huet :lecartésianisme en question,” in Les usages de la preuve d’Henri Estienne àJeremyBentham,eds.Jean-Pierre Schandeler and Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin (Paris:Her- mann, 2014): 101‒17;Charles, “On the UsesofScepticism against aCertain Philosophical Arrogance: Huet as aCritic of Cartesian Logic and Metaphysics,” Science et Esprit 65,no. 3(2013): 299‒309. Scepticism in Early Modern Times 169

que quand je conclus que je suis de ce que je pense, je ne veux rien direautre chose sinon que je suis dans le moment où je pense. Or,est-il que cettepensée s’évanouit et ne subsisteplusdès que je dis «Donc je suis», puisqu’il yaune différencedetemps entrelapremièreproposition et la conséquence?C’est pourquoi ce raisonnement doit nécessairement signifier ou «Jepense, donc je serai»ou«J’ai pensé, donc je suis». Et,ainsi, cet axiome «Tout ce qui pense est dans le moment qu’il pense», d’où Descartes fait dépendretoute la force de son argument,n’yaura aucun rapport,etpour luidonner quelque force, il faudra le tourner ainsi :«Tout ce qui pense est,même quand il ne pense point». Autant de changements et de corrections qui produiront un sens entièrement faux et ridicule,del’aveu même de Descartes.¹²

In short,there is no criterion of truth on which we can found aphilosophicalsystem in an assuredmanner.Ifthe arguments against the cogito are not all demonstrative or original, what matters to Huet is to show thatdeductive propositions purportedly foundedonreason are all subject to doubt, basedonthe fact that reason is alimited and fallible faculty.Inthat case, scepticism has aprotreptic function, but it does not mean that Huet is asceptic. In fact,Huet’srecoursetoscepticism is incomprehensi- ble without taking the theological dimension of his thought into consideration. In- deed, scepticism is in no wayanend in itself for Huet; it is astrategic means of rejecting Cartesianism because it tends towardsconceptualising aunique kind of truth, placing faith and reason on the same level. The PrefacetoHuet’s Censura leavesno room for doubt about his apologetic intentions, which are to criticise Descartesabove all, because “although he teaches that philosophyshould submit to faith, he in fact adjusted the faith to the principles of his philosophy,”¹³ thereby opening the door to asubjection of religious truth to reason and allowing the mysteries of faith to be interpreted by reason and rejected on the basis of their implausibility,with, as aconsequence,anegation of Christian revelation. On the contrary, Huet thinks that the truths of reason must be subordinatetothose of faith and thatthe exercise of reason

 Pierre-Daniel Huet, Censure de la philosophie de Descartes,Bibliothèque Nationale de France, manuscript fonds français 14702, 6v‒7r.English translation in Huet, Against Cartesian Philosophy,88‒ 89: Moreover,sinceman’smemory is weakand unstable, the conclusion can be referredtosome premise other than the one from which it follows.Somethinglikethis happens to us in everyday ordinary discourse, in which it is customary for us not to remember what the subject is of the conversation and what one is tryingtoprove. Therefore, the connection of this pair of propositions,«I am thinking,»and «I am,» is uncertain and deceitful, and is thereforeaninvalidargument.Tothis it maybeadded that sincethe argument,«Iamthinking, thereforeIam,» dependsonthe proposition, «whatever is thinking, is so long as it thinks,» it follows that when Iconclude that Iamfromthe fact that Iamthinking, nothingelse is meant but that Iamsolong as Iamthinking. And that thoughthas alreadyceased when Isay,«Iam.» The antecedent,«Iamthinking,» is at adifferent time from the conclusion, «thereforeIam.» The argument therefore means either «I am thinking, thereforeIwill be,» or else «I thought, thereforeIam.» And the proposition, «whatever is thinking, is so long as it is thinking,»onwhich Descartes would base his argument,isirrelevant to it.The resultisthat for it to be useful to his argument,itmust be changedtothe following, «whatever is thinkingis, even while it is not thinking.» Even according to Descartes, these changesand alterations areridiculousand false.  Huet, Against Cartesian Philosophy,64. 170 Sébastien Charles

has to be limited: “Ibelievethat God is three in one, not by virtue of reason, but by virtue of the first truth that revealed this.”¹⁴ In this respect,asking the question whether Huet was trulyaPyrrhonian (Popkin) or an Academic sceptic (Lennon and Maia Neto), or more one thanthe other, is not of great importance. He is aboveall aChristian philosopher who uses scepticism in apurelystrategic wayto servehis apologetic project,which is to preserveChristian religion from the attack of earlymodernrationalism.

2Simon Foucher’sAcademic Scepticism, or the ScepticalWay to ModernScience

The interpretation of the second figure, Simon Foucher,ismore problematic considering my presentation of Popkin as having little interest in the renewal of Academic scepticism. Foucher presents himself as amodern representative of this philosophical current,and Popkin was of course aware of it,ashequoteditinhis Historyof Scepticism: “Foucher sawhimself as the reviverofAcademicscepticism.”¹⁵ Neverthe- less, it is not Foucher’sinterpretation of Academic philosophythat interests Popkin, but his anti-Cartesian epistemologyand in particularhis critique of the possible distinctionbetween primary and secondary qualities. Surprising as it maysound, the wayFoucher interpreted Academic scepticism in the seventeenth century did not interest Popkin, reflectinghis disinterest in the question of the modern revival of Aca- demic scepticism. However,this question is far from trivial. Even if Foucher’sinterpretation of Aca- demic scepticism is sometimes confusing, it nevertheless enables us to understand what the role of scepticism in earlymodernthoughtcould be and whyitwas, according to Foucher,the best and perhaps the onlyphilosophyfor his times.¹⁶ In that case, it is a juste milieu between dogmatism and Pyrrhonism, which is auseful position to legitimatise the scientificspirit of his century: “On peut distinguer les Académiciens des Pyrrhoniens, en ce que les Académiciens reçoivent quelques vérités, comme de géométrie et de mécanique.”¹⁷ If Foucher wished to rehabilitate Academicphiloso- phy, this was because he sawsignificant advantagesinit. Indeed, Academism ap-

 Pierre-Daniel Huet, Alnetanae quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei (Caen: J. Cavelier,1690), 1.2, §7,30.  Popkin, HistoryofScepticism,275.  Joël Boudreault and Sébastien Charles, “Simon Foucher’sAcademic Scepticism: Between Truth and Probability,” in Academic Scepticism in the Development of Early Modern Philosophy,eds.Plinio Junqueira Smith and Sébastien Charles (Dordrecht: Springer,2017), 245‒58.  Foucher Simon, Dissertation sur la recherche de la vérité (Paris,Estienne Michallet,1687), 29‒30. English translation: “The Academicians can be distinguished from the Pyrrhonians,inthat sense that the Academicians receive some truths,such as in the domains of geometry and mechanics.” All Eng- lish translations of Foucher are my own. Scepticism in Early Modern Times 171

peared to be the onlyphilosophycapable not onlyofdismantling the impasses created by Cartesianism (bymaking amore useful use of doubt,for example), but also of achieving reconciliation with Christianity,all the while providing the nascent sciences of the time with more flexible, less dogmatic foundations than those advocated by the Cartesians.¹⁸ Because Foucher thought thatapeculiar use of scepticism could support Chris- tianity,assuming aclose proximitytoHuet’sposition, as Popkindoes,may be under- standable, but actuallyamountstoasignificant misinterpretation. Foucher has a much morecharitable conception of philosophythanHuet,hestresses its parscon- struens rather than his parsdestruens,and every philosopher who seeks truth with sincerity is on the right path, as long as he knows how to recognisethe evidence whereitmanifests itself, and to remain doubtful when there is no evidence.In fact,itisimportant to escape either to positive dogmatism (Cartesianism) or negative dogmatism (which is symbolised, for him, by Pyrrhonism, aphilosophicalcurrent which rejects all type of truths¹⁹). Furthermore, according to Foucher,this is really the method of the Academics:

Il est vrai que les Académiciens doivent douter d’une très grande quantitédechoses,mais c’est parce que ceschoses sont douteuses,etilsetrouvenéanmoins que les principales vérités leur sont connues, de sorteque leurs doutes regardent seulement les matières de sciences et les propositions dogmatiques que l’on pourrait fairesur les sujets de purespéculation humaine.²⁰

Another fundamental differencebetween Foucher and Huet concerns their relation to Cartesianism. Indeed, Foucher’sconception of the Academic method of philoso- phising is stronglyinfluenced by his reading of Descartes, particularlyhis Discours

 It should not be forgotten that Foucher prided himself on his own knowledge of scienceand that he was the author of astudyonhygrometers in which he touted the methodological advances of sci- enceinhis era. See his Nouvelle façon d’hygromètres (N.p., 1672), reissued in his Traité des hygromè- tres, ou machines pour mesurer la sécheresse et l’humidité de l’air (Paris:Estienne Michallet,1686).  Foucher often tends to present Pyrrhonism as aform of negative dogmatism. This strategyaims to highlight the positivity of academicscepticism. But he tries sometimestobringthem closer,byinsisting on their zetetic method: “Lespyrrhoniens et sceptiques différaient de nos académiciensence qu’ils ne reconnaissaient aucune vérité, au lieu que nos philosophesenreconnaissent plusieurs. Mais en cela leur différence n’était pas si fortequ’elle ne se pût ôter avec le temps,car les uns et les autresfaisaient profession de rechercher la vérité.” Foucher, Dissertationssur la recherche de la vérité (Paris:Jean Anisson, 1693), 177. English translation: “The Pyrrhonians or Sceptics differed from our Academicians,inthat they did not recognise anytruth, instead of our academic philosophers recognize several. In this,their difference was not so strong that it could not be takenaway with time, for both professed to seek the truth.”  Foucher, Dissertation,IX. English translation: “It is true that the Academics must doubt avery large number of things,but that is because these things aredoubtful; and it is neverthelessthe case that the principal truths areknown to them, such that their doubts relate onlytothe subject matters of the sciences and the dogmatic propositions that could be formulated on topics of pure human speculation.” 172 Sébastien Charles

de la méthode.Henceitisnocoincidencethat some maxims of this method resemble those of Descartes,as, for example, the first one, which consists of refusing to treat the senses as the criterion of truth, and the second one, which requires us to set aside opinions and prejudice. Due to this method, it is possible to demonstrate anumber of metaphysical truths that have the advantage of being certain because they are not based on sense perception but on the work of the mind upon itself.²¹ Thesetruths, supposedlyall known to the Academics and transmitted esoterically, recall in part the results Descartes arrivedatinhis Meditations.They consist first (1) of the immediate and primary knowledge of the soul; then (2)ofthe knowledge of its fundamental characteristics, namely its unity,spirituality,and immortality;(3) then of the knowledge of God and God’sessentialattributes,namelyunity,infinity,and eternity; and last comes (4) the reconciliation of divine providence with human freedom. These truths emerge from demonstrations that are based solely on the work of the mind on itself, which has caused them to follow from one to another and,according to Foucher,transforms Academicphilosophyinto akind of praeparatio evangelica,²² and Cartesianism into amodernform of Academism. As we can see once more, we cannot embrace auniform readingofthe modernreception of scepticism without questioning the use made of sceptical texts by earlymodernauthors who resort to them. In the specific case of Foucher,the recourse to Academic scepticism leads him to adopt apurified form of Cartesianism, in which its overlydogmatic aspects have been rejected because they tended to lead to an opposition between philosophy and theology. If Foucher’sinterpretationofAcademic philosophyseems somewhat disconcert- ing and hardly “sceptical,” this has to do with his inclination to stress the epistemological productivity of this method to defeat Cartesianism on its own ground, even if he shares with Descartesmoreorless the sameconception of truth founded on evidence, and the same rejection of probabilism. It is in the context of this debate with Cartesians thatwemust view Foucher’s critical readingofCarneades’ probabilism.²³ While Ciceroseems to have granted an enviable epistemologicalstatus to the probable, Foucher considers it as no more than amakeshift which ought not to constituteanessential component of Aca- demic philosophy, since thatphilosophyultimatelyaims at the true and the certain

 Foucher, Dissertation,125: “The Academicshavingadmitted that the things we know begin from our ways of being[ideas], they assume that the first things we know belongtousand areinour souls, that is, in the beingthat knows within us.”  Foucher, Dissertation,144: “It is this that led Saint Augustine to saythat if the Gospel had been preached at the time of these philosophers, they would have said, ‘This is what we were lookingfor.’ As well, we have had the experienceofPlatonists and Academicshavingwillingly embraced our religion, so true is it that this disposition of mind which leads to contempt for sensory things and to avoidingprejudicesisbeneficial to Christianity.”  Section 10 of the Dissertation (Ce que c’est que connaîtreles choses probablement,suivant les Aca- démiciens; “What probableknowledgeconsists of, according to the Academics”)isentirelydedicated to an exposition of the concept of the probable. See Foucher,144‒47. Scepticism in Early Modern Times 173

and to this end possesses asure criterion, none other than evidence. Accordingto Foucher,who again follows Descartes, it is evidence that provides that highly sought-after criterion of truth, while probability always contains an immanent reason for doubt:

Nous ne saurions trouver une meilleuremarque de la véritéque la force qu’elle ad’emporter notre consentement malgré nous-mêmes,etsans que nous ajoutions quoi que ce soit àson action. Au lieu que la vraisemblancenous peut bien solliciter àconsentir,mais elle ne saurait nous obliger de le fairemalgré nous.²⁴

In that case, adistinction must be made between the apodictic (or demonstrative) sciences such as mathematics—in which the probable plays no more than amethodological role and must bow out in favour of the demonstration to which it has givenrise, whose evidence imposes itself on our minds—and hypothetical “sciences” such as medicineand moral philosophy, in which the probable finds justification because it allows for the desired actiontooccur but without our necessarilybeing able to know whether anybetter action could have occurred. Thus, accordingtoFoucher, we must distinguish opinion—thatis, the fact of acquiescinginthingsthat are not evident and are at best probable, which means thatopinion always includes acomponent of prejudice and is thus doubtful—from sensation, which consists of acqui- escing in thingsthatare clear and evident.Foucher reminds us that in matters of science, the wise person must assent onlytothe true and never to the probable, for assenttothe probable is onlytolerated in the sphere of the practical in order to avoid inaction and the reproach of apraxia levelled by the dogmatists. This is whyour knowledge is at one and the sametime certain and limited, in contrast to divine knowledge;and it is in this respect that Cartesianism represents the height of philosophical arrogance, for it treats extension as the very substance of the material world, whereas for Foucher,although it is clear that we know the sensible world through our ideas, it is not obviousthat the modifications of our immaterial soul are capable of representing amaterial thing.Weare dealinghere with one of the major issues of Foucher’sepistemology, accordingtowhich the perceived world is no more thanarelative one,²⁵ of which science provides us with no more

 Simon Foucher, Critique de la Recherche de la vérité (Paris:Martin Coustelier,1675), 98:«We cannot find abettermark of the truth than the force with which it impels our consent in spiteof ourselvesand without our adding anything whatever to its action. Whereas, the probable can very well inviteustoconsent,but it cannot force us to consent in spite of ourselves.»  On this score, see the fictional dialoguebetween an Academic and adogmatic presented in Foucher, Dissertation,100: “‘It is not just with regardtoastick that appears to us to be bent in the water that our senses deceive us,itiswith regardtoeverythingwesee in anysettingwhatever.’ ‘What?’ he [the dogmatic] said, displayingastonishment, ‘we onlysee phantoms?’‘If by that you mean that we onlysee the images of thingsthat areoutside of ourselvesand not the things themselves, that is certain, because the senses onlyacquaint us with the effects and results of the action of external things.But these effects and results arenomorethan ways of beingormodifications of 174 Sébastien Charles

than asummary description.²⁶ Thus Foucher advances a “fallibilist” conception of science, because he deems thatscientificpropositions can be considered true so long as we managetoshow that anyother explanations for the samephenomena are false. In this way, progress is possible in science so long as we are in agreement about both the fact that scientific claims are revocable and the fact that they are not of the same order as the truths proper to the apodictic sciences.This scientificmethod, whose discovery,accordingtoFoucher,istobecredited to the Academics, has the advantage of avoiding dogmatism and Pyrrhonism at the same time, as for Foucher,Pyrrhonism is aform of negative dogmatism.

3Jacques-PierreBrissotdeWarville: from Universal Scepticism to RevolutionaryDogmatism

My third and final point deals with the radical differencesbetween the reinterpreta- tion of scepticism specific to the seventeenth century and the use made of it in the eighteenthcentury,inacontext whereCartesianism and Christianity were bothin crisis and no longer served as unconquered philosophical and theological reference points as in the previous century. In these circumstances,the legacyofscepticism once more took on new shape and the sceptical textsofAntiquity ceased to serveprimarilyfor the condemnation of the dogmatic arroganceofrationalist metaphysics,eventhough thinkers such as Voltairecontinued to use them occasionallyfor this purpose.²⁷ Rather,those texts wereconsultedprimarilyfor their methodological value. Losingpart of its critical radicality, scepticism now became apreparatory stageinwhich doubt was used to question current knowledge not in order to refuteitbut to deepen it.All of this harmonised with the concept of scientific progress established at that time. Of course, an ongoing increase in knowledge does not implythe disappearance of sceptical doubts. Indeed, doubt retains all its validity when aphilosopher seeks to ex- trapolatefrom facts givenbyexperienceametaphysics that would try to explain them within asystem. Hence is the distinction made by the French thinkers of the Enlightenment between the “systematic mind” (esprit systématique), which is only concerned with classifying and orderingfacts and discoveries, and the “spirit of the system” (esprit de système), which claims to be able to give them afinal and ul-

our own substance, which depend on alarge number of circumstances. It is not at all by the senses that we can judge of the realities of things,bythe senses we can judge onlyofhow they appear;and it is impossible that things should trulybeeverythingthey seem to be.’”  Which does not,ofcourse, preclude the progress of scienceand an increasinglynuanced description of nature, as Foucher testifies when he mentions the progress achieved through the use of the microscope.  On Voltaire and scepticism, see Sébastien Charles, “Entrepyrrhonisme et académisme:le scepticisme de Voltaire,” Cahiers Voltaire 11 (2012): 109‒31. Scepticism in Early Modern Times 175

timate explanation. But if sceptical doubtisuseful at amethodological level, the fact remains thatthe progress of science is undeniable and makes incongruous aradical and globalform of scepticism, in which the idea of truth would be problematic. HenceEnlightenment thinkers ofteninvoked amitigated scepticism or reasonable Pyrrhonism,²⁸ whose sphere of application must be restricted to the moraland political fields. This reasonable or mitigated scepticism, as it wasthen called,consists in making use of humility in the scientific domainand thereforehas amethodological function.Moreover,itisstronglylimited in its scope, touchingonlythe field of natural philosophy, and leaving aside moraland political philosophy, not to mention religion. On this score, the figure of Jacques-Pierre BrissotdeWarville will now serveme well, for Brissot’scase is one of atransition from radical scepticism to reasonable scepticism condensed into aperiod of just afew years. In this perspective,the reading proposed by Popkin, which renders Brissot an “optimistic sceptic”²⁹ is highly questionable. To achievethis, Popkin would have to erase the subtle variations that led Brissot away from sceptical withdrawal to political engagementand assume that the youngBrissot—who draped himself in the mantle of scepticism at the end of the 1770s—shared the convictions of the Brissot of ten years later,who wishedtofulfil political ambitions. To assert,asPopkin does explicitly,³⁰ thatifBrissot did not complete his project of universal scepticism it was because he was so tragicallycut down in 1793,istooverlook alarge portion of Brissot’sintellectual journey and to miss the fact that right from 1782,with the publication of his work on truth, his sceptical project had alreadybeen somewhat compromised. It is true that in his earlywritings,Brissot is among the few eighteenth-century authorswho present themselvesasdisciples of Sextus Empiricus, borrowingfrom Sextusthe idea of asystematic critique of the sciencesand applying it to the modern sciences for demonstrating both theirvacuity and their uncertainty.Insodoing,Bris- sot went against the tenor of acentury that congratulated itself on the continuous progress of knowledge and the disseminationofthe Enlightenmentspirit.

 Beausobreused this expression in 1755 in his Pyrrhonisme raisonnable (Berlin: Étienne de Bour- deaux, 1755). On this interpretation of scepticism, see Sébastien Charles, “Des excèsdogmatiques àla guérison sceptique :lepyrrhonisme raisonnable de Beausobre,” Libertinageetphilosophie au xviie siècle 12 (2010): 205‒17.  RichardH.Popkin, “Scepticism and Optimism in the Late18th Century,” in Aufklarüngund Skep- sis.Studien zurPhilosophie und Geistesgeschichte der 17.und 18. Jahrunderts,ed. Lothar Kreimendahl (Stuttgart: Fromman Verlag, 1995), 173‒84.  Popkin, “Scepticism and Optimism,” 176: “At the very end of his treatise, Brissot said that he hoped to discover in each sciencethe very few truths that there are. He thoughtitwould take him several years to do so. Then, in afootnoteatthe end, he said that if his workonlegislation and politics permit,intwo or three years he could present a ‘tableau’ of these truths along with auniversal scepticism applied to all the sciences, and this would constituteareasonablescepticism. Unfortu- nately Brissot was executed beforehecould complete his work because he was the leader of the Gi- rondists.” 176 Sébastien Charles

The first delineation of his monumental undertaking to undermine the scientific optimism of the Enlightenment is found in amanuscript Brissotreferred to as Plan du scepticisme universel appliqué àtoutes les sciences (“Plan for Applying Universal Scepticism to Allthe Sciences”).³¹ In this manuscript,which outlines aproject con- ceivedbythe young Brissot as acollective enterprise that would offer readersascep- tical encyclopaedia to competewith Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie,Brissot’s reflections take the form of acritical review of all the knowledge of his time:

Ressusciter le pyrrhonisme trop longtemps oublié, détruireles fondements de toutes les connaissances humaines,étendreledoutejusque sur les sciences qui semblent le plus évidemment marquées du sceaudelacertitude, paraîtraleprojet le plus fou, le plusridicule, le plus atroce auxyeux des philosophes,des savants, des théologiens, des femmes même, qui tous se flattent de savoir quelque chose. On croiteneffet dans ce siècle décoré du titre fastueux de philosophique, que l’homme aperfectionné toutesles sciences, parcourutous les degrés de leur échelle; on croit que les erreurs ont disparu, que la véritén’aplusdevoile, on croitêtreaumilieu de la lumière et on est toujours dans les ténèbres.³²

The radicalism of Brissot’sproject resides aboveall in his rejection of certaintyinthe sphere of science, in which every discovery givesrise to new difficulties and adds to what is unknown, indeed unknowable. Passing from theologytometaphysics to other fields of thought,heuses and reuses the method of diaphōnia,assuming that the clashbetween philosophical factions on every issue refutes dogmatism. AccordingtoPopkin, Brissot’sthoughtconstitutes “the most extended presentation of French Enlightenment scepticism,”³³ and we are indebted to him for having “carried scepticism beyond the usual moderate view of the preceding philosophers and scientists of the Enlightenment.”³⁴ But isn’tthis toooptimistic?Brissot’sradical scepticism is in evidence onlyinhis unpublished manuscript on universalscepti-

 See Jacques-PierreBrissot de Warville, De la vérité, ou Méditations sur les moyens de parvenir àla vérité dans toutes les connaissances humaines (Neuchâtel: ImprimeriedelaSociététypographique, 1782), 361. The title Brissot uses therefor the manuscript was the one he finallysettled on; another title, Plan raisonné du système de pyrrhonisme général (“Reasoned Planfor aSystem of General Pyr- rhonism”), is found on the manuscript itself, but struck out (See Brissot de Warville, Plan raisonné du système de pyrrhonisme général, Paris, ArchivesNationales,pressmark 446 AP 21).  Brissot, Plan raisonné,f.1.English translation: «TorevivePyrrhonism,too long forgotten, to destroy the foundationsofall human knowledge,toextend the reachofdoubt to include those sciences that seem to have been most clearlystamped with the seal of certainty,will appear to be the most foolish, ridiculous,and outrageous of projects in the eyes of philosophers, learned people, theologians,and even women, whoall flatter themselvesthat they know something. It is the case that in this century,solavishlystyled ‘philosophical,’ it is believed that human beings have broughtto completion all the sciences and climbed every rung of their ladders.Itisbelieved that error has vanished, that truth is no longer obscured by aveil; it is believed that we arebathed in light even as we continue to dwellindarkness.» All English translationsofBrissot de Warville aremyown.  Popkin, “Scepticism and Optimism,” 176.  RichardH.Popkin, “Brissot and Condorcet: Skeptical Philosophers,” in TheSkeptical Tradition around 1800,eds.Johan vander Zande and RichardH.Popkin (Dordrecht: Kluwer,1998), 31. Scepticism in Early Modern Times 177

cism. The true project of his treatise on truth published in 1782 was no longer to demonstrate the vanity of the scientific enterprise, but rather to “seek what is certain in human knowledge.”³⁵ Brissot had now embraced the “reasonable scepticism” of his century,which consisted at the theoretical level of developing apragmatic concept of science and at the morallevel of giving an ethical purpose, namely, human happiness, to the philosophical enterprise.³⁶ Moreover,heexpressed his hopes of estab- lishing an organ intended to disseminate scientists’ and scholars’ observations in order to increase and perfect human knowledge,aproject he followed up on in 1783,when he established, in London, both a “Lyceum,” whose mission was to bring togetherscholars and scientists, and ajournal designed to publish theirdiscov- eries. Brissot’slater thinkingacknowledgesthat obstacles of course lie in the path of the search for truth and always will: the fallibility of the senses; confused and obscure ideas proper to certain fields such as metaphysics; the difficulty of grasping all the relationships that come together to produce afact; the limits of the human mind; the misuse of words, especiallyabstract terms;the systematising spirit; false erudition; passions and prejudices.These are all factors that lead us to arecognition of the highlylimited nature of the truths we can arrive at.But for all that,they do not invalidate this enterprise of making us wise and happy.From this perspective, philosophical inquiry should no longer seek to doubtfor doubt’ssake, but should aim to meditate in order to be useful to others and to one’sself. Forthis reason scepticism is to be condemned, since it turns philosophyawayfrom the consideration of the public good. Ithink the interest of Brissot’scaseresides in the wayheallows us to picture the transformation of the role of the philosopher at the end of the Enlightenment,which prefigures the intellectuelengagé of the last century and renders the sceptical pos- ture, if not impossible, at least extremelyrare. Of this transformation, Brissot was himself conscious, emphasising in his autobiographical sketch that he “wanted to liberate philosophyfrom the yoke of despotism.”³⁷ But being an activist for equality and liberty is to acknowledge value in ideals, which ancient sceptics taught to be ir- rational. ThusBrissotappears to have understood that the reactivation of scepticism in the eighteenth century presumed its readjustment and thatthe scepticism of the Enlightenment could not be independent of the new imperative of public utility which the philosopher must obey,thereforebreaking with the Hellenistic ideal of the philosopher who is indifferent to the values shared in the public space.

 Brissot, De la vérité,1.  On the expressions “reasonable scepticism” and “mitigated Pyrrhonism” and their meaning, see Sébastien Charles, “Introduction,” and Charles, “Escepticismo ilustrado:entrepirronismo razonable yescepticismo radical,” in Dudas filosóficas.Ensayos sobre escepticismoantiguo,moderno ycontem- poráneo,eds.Armando Cintoraand JorgeOrnelas (Barcelona: Editorial Genisa, 2014), 177‒202.  Jacques-PierreBrissot de Warville, “Portrait de Phédor,” in Mémoires (1754‒1793) (Paris:Alphonse Picard&Fils, 1910), 1:15. 178 Sébastien Charles

Conclusion

The figures of Huet,Foucher,and Brissotillustrate well the plural uses made of scepticism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the difficulty of providing a just interpretation of its nature and its function. Ratherthan trying to overestimate the importance of the Pyrrhonian current in relation to the Academic one, or to priv- ilegethe epistemic role playedbyscepticism in the question of the relationship between faith and reason, as Popkin did in his work, Iwanted to show in this paper the difficulty of arriving at an unambiguous definitionofthe nature and function of early modernscepticism. It is thus difficult to define Huet’sscepticism, be it Academic or Pyrrhonian, without taking into account the apologetic purpose of his work, where scepticism is an instrument used principallytoservethe cause of Christianity.The same holds for Foucher,whose avowedpurpose is identical, even if his use of scepticism follows amethodologyultimatelyvery close to Cartesianism, which seems to him to make sceptics the best craftsmen of the development of earlymodern science. As for Brissot de Warville, his recoursetoscepticism is just as dependent on acertain context,wherescepticism is conceivedprimarilyinapropaedeutic role, as afoundation for the naturalphilosophyofits time, which amounts to making him lose much of his radicality. If Ihad malgré tout to give my definition of earlymodern scepticism, Iwould distinguish two forms. First,aradical form,dominant in the seventeenth century,which either employed sceptical arguments for religious purposes in order to save religion from rationalist criticism or,alternatively,employed sceptical arguments in order to question the principles on which religion is based (dogmas,miracles, prophecies, etc.). Second, amore mitigatedformofscepticism, specific to the eighteenth century, which is mainlyusedasamethod to overcome our prejudices and to build knowledge collectively accordingtothe encyclopaedic model. In this respect,Hume’sscepticism is an exception duringthe Enlightenment,asifthe sceptical radicalism of the previous century was perpetuated through his thought.All this mayappear very different from ancient scepticism, but it seems to me, nevertheless, that acertain spirit of scepticism has been preserved over time, which consists in thinking by oneself and distrusting dogmatism and prejudices,asifthere wereinfactakind of skepsis perennis integrating both sides, Academic and Pyrrhonian. Scepticism in Early Modern Times 179

Bibliography

Beausobre, Louis de. Le pyrrhonisme raisonnable. Berlin: Étienne de Bourdeaux, 1755. Boudreault, Joël and Sébastien Charles. “Simon Foucher’sAcademic Scepticism: Between Truth and Probability.” In Academic Scepticisminthe DevelopmentofEarly Modern Philosophy, edited by Plinio JunqueiraSmith and Sébastien Charles, 245‒58. Dordrecht:Springer,2017. Brissot de Warville, Jacques-Pierre. De la vérité, ou Méditations surles moyens de parvenir àla vérité dans toutes les connaissances humaines. Neuchâtel: Imprimerie de la Société typographique, 1782. Brissot de Warville, Jacques-Pierre. Mémoires(1754‒1793),Paris: Alphonse Picard and Fils, 1910. Brissot de Warville, Jacques-Pierre. Plan raisonné du système de pyrrhonisme général. Paris, Archives Nationales, pressmark 446 AP 21. Charles, Sébastien. “Des excès dogmatiques àlaguérison sceptique: le pyrrhonisme raisonnable de Beausobre.” Libertinage et philosophie au XVIIe siècle 12 (2010): 205‒17. Charles, Sébastien. “Entrepyrrhonisme et académisme :lescepticisme de Voltaire.” Cahiers Voltaire 11 (2012): 109‒31. Charles, Sébastien. “Escepticismo Ilustrado: entre pirronismo razonableyescepticismo radical.” In Dudas filosóficas. Ensayos sobreescepticismo antigo,moderno ycontemporáneo,edited by Armando Cintoraand Jorge Ornelas, 177‒202. Barcelona: Editorial Genisa,2014. Charles, Sébastien. “Évidence, vraisemblanceetvéritéselon Huet :lecartésianismeenquestion.” In Lesusages de la preuve d’Henri Estienne àJeremy Bentham,edited by Jean-Pierre Schandeler and Nathalie Vienne-Guerrin, 101‒17.Paris: Hermann, 2014. Charles, Sébastien. “Introduction:WhatisEnlightenmentScepticism?ACriticalRereading of Richard Popkin.” In Scepticisminthe EighteenthCentury: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklarüng,edited by Sébastien Charlesand Plinio JunqueiraSmith, 1‒15. Dordrecht: Springer,2013. Charles, Sébastien. “On the Uses of Scepticism against aCertain PhilosophicalArrogance: Huet as aCritic of Cartesian Logic and Metaphysics.” Scienceetesprit 65, no. 3(2013): 299‒309. Charles, Sébastien. “Pierre-Daniel Huet’sReadings in Scepticism.” In Academic Scepticisminthe DevelopmentofEarly Modern Philosophy,edited by Plinio JunqueiraSmith and Sébastien Charles, 259‒74.Dordrecht: Springer,2017. Foucher,Simon. Critique de la Recherche de la vérité. Paris: Martin Coustelier,1675. Foucher,Simon. Dissertation sur la recherche de la vérité. Paris:Estienne Michallet, 1687. Foucher,Simon. Dissertationssur la recherche de la vérité,Paris: Jean Anisson, 1693. Foucher,Simon. Nouvelle façond’hygromètres. N.p.: 1672. Foucher,Simon. Traité des hygromètres, ou machines pour mesurer la sécheresse et l’humidité de l’air. Paris: Estienne Michallet,1686. Giocanti, Sylvia. “Histoire du fidéisme, histoireduscepticisme.” Revue de Synthèse 199, nos. 2‒3 (April 1998): 193‒210. Huet, Pierre-Daniel. AgainstCartesian Philosophy,edited and translated by Thomas M. Lennon. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books, 2003. Huet, Pierre-Daniel. Alnetanae quaestiones de concordiarationis et fidei. Caen: J. Cavelier,1690. Huet, Pierre-Daniel. Censuredelaphilosophie de Descartes. Bibliothèque Nationale de France, manuscrit fonds français14702. Huet, Pierre-Daniel. Traité philosophique de la faiblesse de l’esprit humain. Amsterdam: Henri du Sauzet, 1723. Lennon, Thomas M. “The Skepticism of Huet’s Traité philosophique de la foiblesse de l’esprit humain.” In Scepticisme et modernité,edited by Marc-André Bernier and Sébastien Charles, 65‒75. Saint-Étienne: Publications de l’UniversitédeSaint-Étienne, 2005. 180 Sébastien Charles

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Introduction: RichardPopkin on Early Modern Scepticism

Scepticism loomed large in the earlymodern period. In fact,manyphilosophers from the late sixteenth until the midstofthe eighteenth centurygrappled with the problem of how to justify our knowledge claims in amuch more explicit and fundamental waythan theirAristotelian forerunners had.¹ In numerous articles and books, particularlyinthe latest edition of his volume TheHistoryofScepticism from Savonarola to Bayle,Richard Popkin argued that the earlymodern obsession with scepticism was prompted by the rediscovery of SextusEmpiricus’swritingsfrom the second century CE. As Popkin puts it,the reception of Sextus’swritingsled to “an insoluble crise pyrrhonienne,asthe various gambits of Sextus Empiricus are explored and worked out.”² While Sextus’ssceptical considerations were first applied in theological contexts and religious debates,Popkin explains, they weresoon transferred to other areas as well. In Popkin’sdiagnosis,this led to a nouveau pyrrhonisme,which “was to envelop all the human sciencesand philosophyinacompletesceptical crisis, out of which modernphilosophyand the scientificoutlook finally emerged.”³ It is hard to overstate the importance of Richard Popkin’swork on the history of scepticism. Not onlydid his investigation of earlymodern scepticism bring to the fore authorswho werewidelyneglectedbefore him, but it also pavedthe wayfor arange of outstanding studies in the history of earlymodern scepticism, which would have been plainlyimpossible withouthis pioneering work. All these merits notwithstanding and without denying due credit to Popkin’sex- ceptional historiographical work, Iwant to challengehis main tenet thatthe early

Iamgrateful to discussions with ZevHarvey, Yitzhak Melamed, José María Sánchez de León Serrano, and Máté Veres and the excellent stylistic suggestions by Anthony Paletta and Yoav Meyrav,which improved thischapter.Ialso thank the Maimonides Centre forAdvanced Studies, DFG-FOR 2311, formakingthischapterpossible in the first place.

 This is not to saythat Aristotelian philosophers wereuninterested in sceptical or even epistemological questions.This long-standing historiographical prejudice is finallyabout to be corrected. Fornuanced investigations into medieval or Aristotelian debates about scepticism, see Dominik Per- ler, Zweifel und Gewissheit: skeptische Debatten im Mittelalter (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2006), and Henrik Lagerlund, ed., Rethinking the HistoryofSkepticism: The Missing Medieval Back- ground (Leiden: Brill, 2014).  RichardPopkin, TheHistory of Scepticism fromSavonarolatoBayle (Oxfordand New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 5.  Popkin, HistoryofScepticism,59.

OpenAccess. ©2019 Stephan Schmid, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-011 182 Stephan Schmid

modernperiod wasshaken by aPyrrhonian crisiswhich then led to a nouveau pyrrhonisme. Iamnot the first to do so, but my criticism is different from previous ones. In order to clearlyarticulate my objection and to distinguish it from other critiques, it is important to distinguish twodimensions of Popkin’smain tenet. Popkin’sclaim that the earlymodern period was characterised by a crise pyrrhonienne can be read in two ways—and it seems that Popkin is happy to defend it in both. In one reading, which highlights the historicaldimension of Popkin’stenet, he makes aclaim about the historical origin of earlymodern scepticism, stating that it was triggered, influenced, and inspired by the rediscovery and reception of SextusEmpiricus’swritings. In another reading,which emphasises the taxonomical dimension of Popkin’stenet,hemakes aclaim about the nature of earlymodern scepticism, stating thatitisindeed aform or species of Pyrrhonian scepticism and is thereforeaptly described as “new Pyrrhonism” (nouveau pyrrhonisme). While most critics of Popkin focused on the historical dimension of Popkin’stenet and argued that earlymodern scepticism was influenced and inspired by many other writ- ingsand traditions besides thoseofSextus Empiricus,⁴ here Iwant to takeissue with the taxonomical dimension of Popkin’sclaim. More precisely, Iwillargue that understanding earlymodern scepticism as aspecies of Pyrrhonism is misleading at best. Even the two most famous earlymodern sceptics,René Descartes and David Hume,I submit,developed and employed varieties of scepticism which are distinctivelynon- Pyrrhonian.⁵ In addition, Iargue that distinguishing between different varieties of scepticism is of pivotal historicalimportance insofar as appreciating the fact that Pyrrhonian, Cartesian, and Humean scepticism differ in crucial ways from one another is keytounderstanding the historicaldevelopment of sceptical ideas. These three varieties of scepticism differ from one another in that each is in an important sense strongerorbroader than its antecedent versions; in otherwords, each calls into question what had been taken for granted by their antecedents. In particular,itisimportant to distinguish between Cartesian and Humean scepticism in order to understand Kant’sphilosophical project after the earlymodern period. Kant’sproject was developed in response to Hume’sscepticism about causation,which is different from both

 Good examples areJosé Raimundo Maia Neto, “Academic Skepticism in EarlyModern Philosophy,” Journal of the HistoryofIdeas 58, no. 2(1997): 199‒220; Dominik Perler, “WasThere a ‘Pyrrhonian Crisis’ in Earlymodern Philosophy? ACritical NoticeofRichardH.Popkin,” Archiv fürGeschichte der Philosophie 86,no. 2(June 2004), 209‒20;and Ian Maclean “The ‘Sceptical Crisis’ Reconsidered: Galen, Rational Medicine and the Libertas Philosophandi,” Early Science and Medicine 11, no. 3 (2006): 247‒74.  By this restriction Idonot mean to implythat the twovarieties of scepticism developed by Des- cartesand Hume arethe onlyvarieties of scepticism to be found in the earlymodernperiod nor that they wereexclusively and originallydeveloped by Descartes and Hume. My restriction is simply duetothe fact that Descartes and Hume areboth famous and highlyinfluential earlymodernphilos- ophers. Three Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism 183

Cartesian and Pyrrhonian scepticism.⁶ Thus, understandingthe history of scepticism in general—and the proper targetofKant’sphilosophising in particular—requires us to appreciate varieties of scepticism different from the Pyrrhonian scepticism presented by SextusEmpiricus. The paper consists of four sections. In section 1Iprovide abrief characterisation of Pyrrhonian scepticism on the basis of Sextus Empiricus’sdescription of Pyrrhon- ism in his Outlines of Scepticism.This will set the basis for my comparativeanalysis in the two subsequent sections, devoted to the two presumably most famous mani- festationsofscepticism in the earlymodern period: section 2will be concernedwith the “hyperbolic” scepticism of René Descartes,which he famouslydevelops in his Meditations,while section 3will focus on DavidHume’sscepticism about causation. Section 4willsummarise my findings.

1Pyrrhonian Scepticism

We can onlyproperlyassess the taxonomical correctness of Popkin’stenet,according to which the earlymodern period was shaken by aPyrrhonian crisis which led to a new Pyrrhonism, once we clarify the meaning of Pyrrhonian scepticism. Onlythen can we compareitwith earlymodernvarieties of scepticism. At this point,one might raise afundamental objection to my project.Describing Pyrrhonism as avariety of scepticism parallel to earlymodernvarieties presupposes that ancient Pyrrhonism is an intellectual endeavour of the very same form or type as modernscepticism, such that both enterprises are forms of “scepticism” in the same sense. As recent scholarship in ancient philosophyhas shown, however,this assumption is highlyproblematic.⁷ For, unlike modern scepticism, which is concerned with underminingknowledge claims about certain domains by raising doubts about these domains, ancient Pyrrhonism is not particularlyconcernedwith doubtatall. In fact,there is not even an ancient Greek term for “doubt,” and if the Latin term du- bitatio is usedintreatises in the ancient sceptical tradition, it is not wielded in any

 This is meticulouslydefended by Michael Forster, Kant and Skepticism (Princeton: PrincetonUni- versity Press, 2008).  See for instanceMichael Williams, “Descartes’ Transformation of the Skeptical Tradition,” in The CambridgeCompanion to Ancient Scepticism,ed. RichardBett (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 289‒91,who lists altogether nine differences between Pyrrhonian and Des- cartes’sscepticism. Other enquiries intothe differencebetween ancient and (early) modern scepticism areMyles Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Sawand Berkeley Missed,” ThePhilosophical Review 91, no. 1(January 1982):3‒40;and José Luis Bermúdez, “The Orig- inality of Cartesian Skepticism: Did It Have Ancient or Mediaeval Antecedents?” HistoryofPhilosophy Quarterly 17,no. 4(October 2000): 333‒60. 184 Stephan Schmid

technical sense.⁸ The Greek word skeptikos simplymeans “seeker” or “investigator.” This is exactlyhow ancient sceptics conceivedofthemselves: as investigators interested in the very questions of physics, ethics, and logic addressed by theirdogmatic opponents. Unliketheir opponents, however,they recommended suspending judgment about these matters since they did not find conclusive evidence to decisively answer these questions.⁹ What is more,ancient sceptics advertisedtheir scepticism as ameans for happiness or an untroubled life. By contrast, modernscepticism is and wasconsidered mainlyasathreat,which not onlyundermines the endeavour of scientific research but is also at odds with our self-understanding as cognitive agents living in amaterial world. Idonot want to question these findings; especiallyinlight of the fact that they are grist for the mill of my case against Richard Popkin’sidentification of a crise pyrrhonienne in the earlymodernperiod. However,these findings provide such afundamental refutation of Popkin’sidentification of a crise pyrrhonienne in the earlymodern period that it is hard to believethat he reallywanted to claim that earlymodern sceptics were in fact Pyrrhonists in the sense portrayedbySextus Empiricus. Instead, Iwill assume that Popkin construed “Pyrrhonism” as aposition one can come to adopt on the basis of Sextus’sviews if one is interested in the typicalmodern epistemological project of exploring the limits of our knowledge by raising specific doubts. Accordingly, my sketch of Pyrrhonian scepticism is not to be read as an adequate representation of ancient Pyrrhonism, but as asystematisation of the sorts of doubts that Pyrrhonians would have launched had they engagedinakind of project typicallypursued by their earlymodernsuccessors. That said, what does (a “modernised” version of)Pyrrhonian scepticism consist of?Towardswhat kind of epistemic state does aPyrrhonian aim, and which types or domains of knowledge does s/he undermine? In responsetothese questions, the openingparagraph of Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines turns out to be particularlyrevealing.Inthis passage, Sextus distinguishes three schools of philosophersconcerned with findingthe truth. One school of thought—which Sextusassociateswith Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics—believes that they have actuallydiscovered the truth. Sextus calls adherents of this school dogmatists. Another school—which Sextus associates with “Clitomachus and Car- neades, and other Academics”—asserts thatwecannot arrive at the truth. In making such adefinite assertion, adherents of this school alsoqualify as dogmatists in Sex- tus’sview.They are,asitwere, negative dogmatists.¹⁰ Finally, followers of the third

 Katja Vogt, “From Investigation to Doubt: The Beginnings of Modern Skepticism,” in Roman Reflec- tions:EssaysonLatin Philosophy,ed. by Gareth Williams and Katharina Volk (Oxford, New York: Ox- fordUniversity Press,2015), 262‒64.  Vogt,262.  It should be notedthat,asamatter of historical fact,Sextus’scharacterisation of the Academics is probablywrong: as Ciceroreports(in his Acad. 45 and Luc.28), both Arcesilaus and Carneadesde- claredthat they did not even know whether they know anything. Foraninvestigation into the real Three Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism 185

school—whom Sextus identifies with the (Pyrrhonian) sceptics—have yettocome to a conclusion about the truth. They are still investigating—and are for that matter true “sceptics” in the original sense of the Greek term, or “seekers.” Lacking aconvincing resolution of the question as to what the truth is, Pyrrhonian sceptics withhold their judgmentsabout the truth of thingsorevenabout our capacity to know the truth. Pyrrhonian scepticism, then, is aphilosophicalstance that —unlike the one Sex- tus attributes to the Academics—is entirely anti-dogmatic. Pyrrhonian sceptics are opposed to two dogmatic camps of philosophyinthat they neither claim to know the truth nor definitelydenyour capacity to know it.Rather,they suspend theirjudg- ment about the nature of thingsand our capacity to (eventually) know it.Thisanti- dogmatic nature of Pyrrhonian scepticism is reflected by Sextus’sofficial definition of Pyrrhonism:

Scepticism is an ability to set out oppositions amongthings which appear and are thought of in anyway at all, an ability by which, because of the equipollenceinthe opposed objects and accounts,wecomefirst to suspension of judgement and afterwards to tranquillity (PH 1.4.8).¹¹

APyrrhonian sceptic, Sextus explains, is able to counter every argument for aputa- tive knowledge claim with an equallystrongorconvincing counter-argument.Inlight of these conflicting arguments for and against acertain view,aPyrrhonian sceptic will suspend judgment.Asitturns out,this suspension of judgment resultsinthe sceptic’stranquillity or peace of mind. This is, Sextus explains, because the dogmatics “who holdthe opinion that thingsare good or bad by natureare perpetuallytrou- bled” (PH 1.12.27); as long as they lack what they take to be good, they feel thatthey are victims of some natural evil, and when they have reached it they are in constant fear of losing it.Pyrrhonian sceptics,bycontrast, “who make no determination about what is good and bad by nature neither avoid nor pursue anything with intensity; and hence they are tranquil” (PH 1.12.28). Due to their suspension of judgment about the truth of the matter,Pyrrhonian sceptics are less troubled than their dogmatic opponents, and acquire—albeit accidentally—the desired peace of mind, in hope of which philosophers come to philosophise in the first place. Sextus’sdefinition of Pyrrhonian scepticism hints at another essential element of Pyrrhonism: ThePyrrhonian sceptic comes to withhold her or his judgment about the nature of thingsbysetting out “oppositions among thingswhich appear and are thought of in anyway at all.” In doing so, the Pyrrhonian sceptic does not call into question that there arethings that appear to us in acertain wayand differencebetween historical Pyrrhonists and Academics, see Gisela Striker, “On the Differencebe- tween Pyrrhonists and the Academics”,inEssaysonHellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 135‒49,and Striker, “Academics versus Pyrrhon- ists,Reconsidered,” in TheCambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism,ed. RichardBett (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 195‒207.  All references fromSextus,abbreviatedasPH, arecitedinparentheses and taken from Outlines of Scepticism,trans. Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1994). 186 Stephan Schmid

are thought of in many ways.Sextus is explicit about this point,writing that “no-one, presumably, will raise acontroversy over whether an existing thing appears this way or that; rather,they investigate whether it is such as it appears” (PH 1.11.22).The scepticism launched by aPyrrhonian sceptic, then, is of arestricted scope: it is restricted to the true nature of things, leaving untouched the fact that there are things, which appear to us in various ways.¹² In sum, we should note two corefeatures of Pyrrhonian scepticism: First,Pyr- rhonism is anti-dogmatic in nature. As opposed to positively denying that we can know the true nature of things, aPyrrhonian sceptic simplysuspendsjudgment and is silent about the true nature of things. Whether we can, in principle, know the true natureofthingsornot,the Pyrrhonian merelyobservesthat thereare as manyconvincing arguments for agiven position about the nature of thingsas there are arguments against it and thus refuses to take astance on the question, withholdingjudgment.For all that—and this marks the second core-feature of Pyr- rhonism—aPyrrhonian sceptic is arealist of acertain stripe: the Pyrrhonian does not doubt or question the very reality of thingsthat appear in acertain way. He or she onlyquestions whether the thingsinthemselves really exist in the waythey appear to us. There is much more to be said about Pyrrhonian scepticism. This should be enough,though, for my present purpose of assessingPopkin’sclaim that the early modernperiod was shaken by a crise pyrrhonienne.

2Cartesian Scepticism

Descarteswas no sceptic. To the contrary, he was convinced that we can achieve ab- solutelycertain knowledge (scientia)about ourselves, God, and the nature of bodies. In fact,hetook great pains in defending his epistemological optimism, but in the course of doing so, he famouslyemployed sceptical strategies and doubts. Far from defending scepticism, Descartes was onlyamethodological sceptic who con- sciouslyinvoked doubts in order to laybare an unshakable and firm foundation for certain and stable knowledge.¹³ But what is the nature of the scepticism that Des- cartes employs in his search for certain knowledge?

 This “realist character” of Pyrrhonism has been convincinglypointed out by Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy,” and Stephen Everson, “The Objective Appearance of Pyrrhonism,” in Psychol- ogy(Companions to Ancient Thought 2),ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1991), 121‒47.Cf. the critical remarks by Gail Fine, “Sextus and External World Skepticism,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2003): 349‒52.  See the openinglines of Descartes’ Meditations,whereheexplains that “onceinthe course of his life” he wanted to “demolish everythingcompletely and start againright from the foundations.” See Oeuvres de Descartes,ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris:Vrin, 1974‒1989;henceforth AT), 7:14; Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Editedand translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Three Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism 187

It is well known thatDescartes develops his methodologicaldoubtinthree stages, each of which is strongerthanits preceding stagetothe extent thatitcalls into question what was left untouched in the previous stage. ConcerningPopkin’s tenet,the crucial question is whether these three forms of doubt are indeedPyrrho- nian in nature. Popkin himself had no doubts about this. Or so it seems, when he characterises Descartes’sthree stages of doubt:

By movingfrom[1] the partial Pyrrhonism of doubtingthe reliabilityofour senses to [2]the metaphysical Pyrrhonism of the dream hypothesis,doubtingthe reality of our knowledge,to[3] the total Pyrrhonism of the demon hypothesis,doubtingthe reliabilityofour rational faculties, we finallydiscover the cogito,atruth so subjectively certain that we areincapable of doubtingitat all.¹⁴

Let us have abrief look at Descartes’sthree stages of doubt in order to see whether Popkinwas right in describing them as three forms of Pyrrhonism. Descartesbegins his sceptical “demolition” of beliefs by casting doubt on his sensorybeliefs, that is, those beliefs he “acquired either from the senses or through the senses.” Noting that he has often found that “the senses deceive,and it is pru- dent never to trust completelythosewho have deceivedusevenonce” (AT7:18; CSM2:12),Descartes findsdoubtinall our sensory beliefs at once and consequently rejects them as uncertain. At the sametime, Descartesisclear that just pointing out that the senses sometimes deceive us is not sufficient for undermining our confidence in sensory beliefs in general. As he remarks,sensorybeliefs might be problematic with respect “to objects which are very small or in distance,” but he admits that “there are manybeliefs about which doubt is quite impossible, even though they are derived from the senses,” citing examples likehis belief that he is “sitting by the fire,wearingawinter dressing-gown” (AT7:18; CSM2:12),and so forth. Descartes’sfirst stageofdoubt,based on the occasional deceptiveness of our senses, does not venture very far.Itdoes not even undermine our perceptual beliefs in general, as it leavesuntouched our beliefs about objects that are neither very small nor distant. Descartes’ssecond stageofdoubt, which he induces by his famous dream hypothesis,ismoreambitious. It might well be,Descartesconsiders,thatweare asleep and that we just dream about the thingsthatweseem to perceive. “How often, asleep at night,amIconvinced of just such familiar events,” he remarks, “thatIam here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire—when in fact Iamlying undressed in bed!” (AT 7:19;CSM 2:13). However,aslongasIcannot reject the hypothesis thatIam just dreamingwhat Iseemtoperceive,mysensory beliefs become dubitable. Unlike

Dugald Murdoch (vols.1and 2; henceforth: CSM), and AnthonyKenny(henceforth: CSMK) (Cam- bridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984‒1991), 2:17.References to Descartes’swritings aregiven in parentheses.  Popkin, HistoryofScepticism,156‒57 (numberingadded). 188 Stephan Schmid

the observation that our senses are sometimesdeceptive,then, Descartes’sdream hypothesis can undermine all our sensory beliefs. Giventhe possibility of dreaming, it might well be that his formerlyunquestioned beliefs—“that my eyes are open, that I am moving my head and stretching out my hands—are not true. Perhaps,indeed, I do not even have such hands or such abodyatall” (AT7:19; CSM2:13). But the doubtinduced by the dream hypothesis goes farther than just affecting our beliefs in the qualities of external things. It also undermines our confidencein the very existenceofthese things. As for the dream hypothesis,itisnot onlythe case thatextra-mental thingsmight in fact be quite different from the waythey appear,but alsothat they maynot exist at all. Giventhat he might justbedreaming, Descartesponders, he might “not even have such hands or such abodyatall.” Forall this,Descartes’ssecond stageofdoubt leavesmanyother beliefs unaffect- ed. In particular, it does not undermine non-empirical beliefs. “Forwhether Iam awake or asleep,” Descartesargues, “two and threeadded together are five,and a square has no more than four sides” (AT7:20; CSM2:14). It is onlyDescartes’sthird and last stageofdoubt,which is induced by the evil demon hypothesis, that undermines non-empirical beliefs as well. Giventhat it is (epistemically) possiblethat we are all victims of an evil demon thatpersistentlyde- ceivesusand interferes with our cognitive faculties,almostall our beliefs can be doubted. As Descartesvividlyputs it:

HowdoIknow that he [i.e., an evil demon] has not broughtitabout that thereisnoearth, no sky,noextended thing,noshape, no size, no place, while at the same time ensuringthat all these things appear to me to exist just as they do now?What is more, sinceIsometimes believe that others go astrayincases where they think that they have most perfect knowledge,may Inot similarlygowrong every time Iadd twoand threeorcount the sides of asquare, or in some even simpler matter,ifthis is imaginable? (AT7:21; CSM2:14)

To the extent that Icannot rule out the possibility thatall of my thoughts—together with theirappearance of certainty—could have been instilled by an evil demon (and how could Iknow for certain that Iamnot avictim of such apervasive deception), pretty much everythingthat Iusually accept as true could be false.Evensuch simple non-empirical beliefs as that 2+3=5orthat squares have four sides could have been instilled in me by an evil demon together with the conviction that these facts cannot be otherwise. As it is well known, there is onlyone belief thatsurvivesthis third stageofdoubtaccording to Descartes. This is the cogito,Descartes’sinsight that “this proposition, Iam, Iexist,isnecessarilytrue whenever it is put forward by me or conceivedinmymind” (AT7:25; CSM2:17). So much about Descartes’sthree stages of doubt.Are they aptlydescribed as forms of Pyrrhonism, as suggested by Popkin?Ashas become plain in this brief sketch of these three stages already, this question is clearlytobeanswered in the negative.Asseen above, Pyrrhonian scepticism is committed to acertain sort of realism:the Pyrrhonian does not doubt the reality of thingsthatappear in acertain way, but onlyquestions whether the thingsare by nature the waythey appear to Three Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism 189

us. Descartes’ssecond and third stages of doubt,bycontrast,undermine such arealist commitment: As long as we cannot rule out the possibilityofdreamingorbeing deceivedbyanevil demon, we cannot be certain whether there are in fact external thingsthatappear to us in acertain way—or whether we are simplyhallucinating. UnlikePyrrhonian scepticism, the scepticism raised by Descartes’slast two stages of doubt, which Popkin describes as “metaphysical” and “total Pyrrhonism,” concerns our beliefs in the existence of extra-mentalthings, of which there is “no controversy” according to Sextus. In fact,undermining our confidence in non-empirical beliefs (such as our beliefs that 2+3=5orthatsquares have four sides), Des- cartes’sthird stageofdoubt even undermines our beliefs in what we usuallytake to be necessary truths.¹⁵ Forifwemight be mistaken in thinkingthat squares have four sides, squares with five,six,seven, or anyother number of sides might well be possible, after all—and the same holds for the rational square root of 2orthe largest prime number. Relying on the criterion of scope, onlyDescartes’sfirst stageofdoubt,which concerns the reliability of our senses and which leavesour confidenceinthe existenceof extra-mental thingsuntouched, retains alegitimate claim to count as aform of Pyr- rhonism.But when we also take the first core-feature of Pyrrhonism into account—its anti-dogmatic nature—even the scepticism induced by Descartes’sfirst stageof doubt fails to be Pyrrhonian. Thisisdue to the strongepistemologicaluse Descartes makes of his methodologicallyemployed doubts. As he writes in the second Meditation:

Anythingwhich admits of the slightest doubt Iwill set aside just as if Ihad found it to be wholly false; and Iwill proceed in this wayuntil lrecognize somethingcertain, or,ifnothingelse, until I at least recognize for certain that thereisnocertainty (AT7:24; CSM2:16).

In employing his scepticism as amethodfor revealing an indubitable foundationof knowledge,Descartesuses his doubts not onlytoincite suspension of judgment,but as an immediate reason for denying claims of true knowledge or certaintyabout a particulardomain. This is quite different from the Pyrrhonian, who would always remain open to the possibilityofovercoming these doubts and thereforerefuse to adopt the negative epistemologicalverdict announcedbyDescartes. Hence, far from yielding an anti-dogmatic state of universal suspension of judgment,Descart- es’sscepticism, if successful, helps us “to recognize for certain” that we do not have anytrue or certain knowledge after all. In his quest for certain knowledge,Des-

 This result is closelyrelated to another famous and widelydebated view of Descartes: his conviction that necessary and eternal truths depend on the will of God (and aretothis extent not ultimately necessary insofar as God could have chosen adifferent set of necessary and eternal truths). As an entry point intothe debate, see his Letter to [Mersenne], 27 May1630(AT 1:152; CSMK 25)and David Cunning, “Descartes’ Modal Metaphysics,” in TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,ed. Ed- wardN.Zalta (Spring2014Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/descartes- modal/. 190 Stephan Schmid

cartes takes the possibilityof(the slightest) doubt about the belief that p to immedi- atelyestablish the (dogmatic) epistemological verdict that we do not have anycer- tainty or true knowledge as to whether p.¹⁶ Starting from the textuallywell-founded premise that Pyrrhonian scepticism is essentiallycharacterised by that fact that it is (1) anti-dogmatic in nature(and merely aims at our suspension of judgment) and (2)restricted in scope to the extent that it does not question the existenceofextra-mental thingsthat appear to us in acertain way, we have to conclude that, pace Popkin, none of the scepticisms invoked by Des- cartes’sthree stages of doubtqualifyasgenuine formsofPyrrhonism. As an instrument for laying bare asecureand lasting foundationofknowledge,Descartestakes his scepticism to be sufficient to refuteour claims of certain knowledge about aparticular domain and for this reason it is clearly dogmatic in nature. Furthermore,the forms of scepticism invoked by Descartes’sdream and evil demon hypothesis go far beyond the restricted scope of Pyrrhonism in thatthey undermine our beliefs in the existenceofextra-mentalthingsingeneral. Descartes’sscepticism is distinctively non-Pyrrhonian.¹⁷

3HumeanScepticism (about Causation)

In fairness to Popkin, it is important to note that he did not classify David Hume¹⁸ as aPyrrhonian sceptic in the traditional sense, though he argued that “Hume, himself, actuallymaintained the only ‘consistent’ Pyrrhonian point of view.”¹⁹ In fact,Popkin identifiestwo aspects in Hume’sscepticism that he takes to be different from Sextus Empiricus’sstandard formulation of Pyrrhonism.²⁰ First,Popkin contends that Hume’sscepticism is more dogmatic than Pyrrhonism in that Hume assertorically

 Notethat even if we takeDescartes to articulateonlyamaxim of assent here, according to which we should not accept what can be doubted, this maxim is stronger than the ancient sceptic’sprecept to onlyaccept aproposition for which there is moreevidencethan counter-evidence. Foradiscussion of this point,see Janet Broughton, Descartes’ Method of Doubt (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2002), 43‒49.  This is not changedbythe fact that Descartes’ contemporaries (like Hobbes; see AT 7:171; CSM 2:121) as wellasDescartes himself (AT7:171‒72,CSM 2:121; AT 5:147, CSMK 333) denied that the sceptical considerations of his first Meditation have anytitle of novelty or originality.Vis-à-vis ancient Pyr- rhonism, Descartes’ssceptical considerations were original indeed.  Hume’sworks arecited in parentheses according to the followingabbreviations:EHU refers to An EnquiryConcerning Human Understanding,edited by TomL.Beauchamp (Oxfordand New York: Ox- fordUniversityPress, 1999); Trefers to ATreatise of Human Nature,ed. David F. Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxfordand New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2000). Citationsfromboth works arefollowed by areferencetoL.A. Sebly-Biggeand P.H. Nidditch’sClarendon editions (1975 and 1978,respectively), abbreviated as SBN.  RichardPopkin, “David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique of Pyrrhonism,” ThePhilosoph- ical Quarterly 1, no. 5(October 1951): 385.  Popkin, 386‒87. Three Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism 191

claims that (many) philosophicalquestions are ultimatelyunanswerable. Second, Popkinholds that Hume does not discuss, let alone accept the traditional Pyrrhonist strategyfor deciding practical questions by appeal to our appearancesand local customs and traditions. UnlikeSextus, who would concede that we can “have opinions about what appears to be the case, withoutgivingupone’ssuspensive attitude as to what really is the case,”²¹ Hume famouslydenied thatweare able to persistently withhold judgmentsabout what appears to be the caseevenifphilosophical enquiry reveals that we lack anyrational grounds for these judgments. Idonot want to discuss Popkin’scharacterisation of Hume’sscepticism here. Let me just note that,unlike Popkin,Iam not fullysure whether there is more than a verbaldisagreement when it comes to Hume’sand Sextus’sdiverging verdicts on the possibilityofshedding our opinions by suspending our judgment.²² However,I very much agree thatmanyofHume’ssceptical considerations are much more dogmatic than thoseprovided by Sextus insofar as they aim not onlyatour suspension of judgment but also at defeating our claims of trueorcertain knowledge altogether.²³ Iwill thus follow Popkin in his first assessment thatHume’sscepticism is less anti-dogmatic than traditionalPyrrhonism. All this leavesthe second corefeature of Pyrrhonian scepticism—its scope—untouched. What about the scope of Hume’s scepticism? Giventhe manysceptical facets of Hume’sphilosophy, this question defies auni- fied and simple answer.There are justtoo manysceptical strandsinHume’sthought to determine the scope of Hume’sscepticism. In the following Iwill focus on onlyone form of scepticism in Hume—his famous scepticism about causation.AsIwillargue, Hume’sscepticism about causation is not onlydecidedlywider in scope than traditional Pyrrhonism, but also venturesbeyond Descartes’smost radical from of scepticism,his evil demon hypothesis.²⁴ Hume’sworries about causation have many facets:One of these concerns our justification in making causal inferences—our practice of inferring from aperceived

 Popkin.  Forsimilar concerns in this direction, see TerenceIrwin, review of Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology,ed. Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat,and Jonathan Barnes, Noûs 17, no. 1(March 1983): 127; Irwin, TheDevelopment of Ethics: AHistorical and CriticalStudy,Vol. 2: FromSuareztoRousseau (Oxfordand New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 2011), 253‒54;and Julia Annas, “Hume and Ancient Scepticism,” Acta Philosophica Fennica 66 (2000): 271‒85.Ihave profited considerably from discussions with Máté Veresonthis point.  Aparticularlytelling passage with respect to Hume’snegative dogmatism is his famous dictum that all reasoning must,inlight of sceptical reflections, “from knowledge degenerate intoprobabil- ity” (T 1.4.1.3, SBN 181).  Notethat the kind of scepticism that Iaminterested in with respect to Hume also manifests in his considerations about substances (T 1.1.6; 1.4.6). Iconfine myself to Hume’sscepticism about causation because Hume is moreexplicit about the distinctive natureofthis form of scepticism and because it is this kind of scepticism to which Kant explicitlyrefers. 192 Stephan Schmid

object the existenceofits (unperceived) cause.²⁵ Another worry concerns our very notion of acause, which is takentoundergird our practice of causal inferences because it is traditionallyconceivedasanotion of necessaryconnection between objects or events, which licensesthe inferential transition from the perception of one object or event to another.HereIfocus on the latter. Hume’sworry about our notion or our idea of causationgoes back to his empiricist commitment that all our ideas must ultimatelybederived from impressions. Or, as Hume puts it: “all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones” (EHU 2.5, SBN 19).²⁶ Even though Hume allows for minor exceptions to this principle, he is clear that these are onlysingular cases, and asin- gular case is “scarceworth our observing,and does not merit thatfor it alone we should alter our general maxim” (T 1.1.1.10,SBN 6). He is thus firmlyconvinced that his “general maxim” applies to our idea of causation as well. Accordingly, Hume opens his inquiry into the experiential sources of our idea of causation by noting:

Ibegin with observingthat the terms of efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion,and productivequality,are all nearlysynonimous; and therefore ’tis an absurdity to employ anyofthem in definingthe rest.Bythis observation we rejectatonce all the vulgar definitions, which philosophers have givenofpower and efficacy; and instead of searchingfor the idea in these definitions, must look for it in the impressions,fromwhich it is originallyderiv’d(T 1.3.14.4,SBN 157).

Giventhat thereisawhole family of conceptuallyinterrelated causal concepts or ideas, it will not help to uncover the empiricist sourceorbasis of our idea of causation by appealing to other ideas of this family(as it is done by what Hume calls “vulgar definitions”). In order to give an empiricisticallyacceptable analysis of causation, we “must look for it in the impressions, from which it is originallyderiv’d”. As Hume famouslyargues, however,there is no single impression that could serveasthe experiential basisorsourcefor the idea of causation thatphilosophers seem to relyonwhen they conceive of causation as anecessary connection between events or objects. While experience makes us acquainted with events or objects(regularly) succeeding each other,itdoes not provide us with anyimpression of aforce or connection between them. As Hume lucidlyputs it:

 As Hume famouslyexplained, “[a]ll reasoningsconcerningmatter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidenceofour memory and senses” (EHU 4.4, SBN 26).  In his Treatise,Hume articulates his so copy-principle,saying “[t]hat all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’dfrom simple impressions,which arecorrespondent to them, and which they exactly represent” (T.1.1.1.7,SBN 4). Forfurther discussionofthis principle and problems connected with it,see Don Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in Hume’sPhilosophy (Oxfordand New York: Ox- fordUniversity Press,1997), 41‒57. Three Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism 193

[E]ven in the most familiar events, the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most un- usual, and […]weonlylearn by experiencethe frequent Conjunction of objects, without being ever able to comprehend anythinglike Connection between them. (EHU 7. 21,SBN 70)

Consider athrown stone breakingawindow.Wetake it for granted thatthe thrown stone causes the window to shatter.But on what grounds?Humeisclear that this “ground” is no impression or experience of acertain connection holding between the stone and the breakingwindow because all we can actuallyobserveisthe fact that one event—the stone hitting on the window—is followed by another event— the window’sbreaking; an experience,indeed, thatwecan have repeatedly: whenever we have seen astone hitting awindow,wehaveobservedthe window breaking afterwards. But far from being aware of anycausal tie or connection between events or objects, “we onlylearn by experience the frequent Conjunction of objects,” i.e., their regular succession. The lack of asingle impression thatcould figureasasourceofour idea of causation leavesusinanawkwardsituation. GivenHume’s “general maxim” that an idea is nothing but a “feeble copy” of acorrespondingimpression, the lack of an impression that underlies our idea of acausation seems to implythat we do not have an idea of causationinthe first place. Hume is well aware of this difficulty—and suggests an ingenious solution to it:

Thus upon the whole we mayinfer,that when we talk of anybeing[…]asendow’dwith apower or force, proportion’dtoany effect; when we speak of anecessary connexion betwixt objects, and suppose, that this connexion depends upon an efficacy or energy,with which anyof these objects areendow’d; in all these expressions,soapply’d,wehavereallynodistinct meaning,and makeuse onlyofcommon words, without anyclear and determinateideas. But as ’tis moreprobable,that these expressions do here lose their true meaningbybeing wrong apply’d, than that they never have anymeaning; ’twill be propertobestowanother consideration on this subject,tosee if possiblywecan discover the natureand origin of those ideas, we annex to them (T 1.3.14.14, SBN 162).

As Hume reminds us, concluding that we do not have anycausal notions or ideas— such that all of our causal vocabulary is meaningless—is onlyone of two possibilities. Another possibleconclusion—and this is the conclusion that Hume is going to embrace—is that our causal vocabulary has adifferent meaning than philosophers usually assume: it does not express an idea of anecessary connection between distinct events or objects (which—due to alack of acorresponding impression—we do not have in the first place). AccordingtoHume, our idea of acause is rather the idea of “an object, followed by another,and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second” (EHU 7. 29,SBN 76), as our experience reveals us no more than such regular sequences. Hume’ssolution to the awkwardsituation mentioned aboveconsists in providing arevisionist theory of causation accordingtowhich causation simplyamounts to a regular succession or “conjunction”—as Hume puts it—as opposed to amodallyro- bust relation or a “connexion.” In addition to this,Hume offers an explanation for 194 Stephan Schmid

the fact that manyphilosopherstake their idea of causation to be about anecessary connection between distinct objects or events, even though we simplycannot have such an idea. In Hume’sdiagnosis,philosophers are usuallymistakenabout their idea of causation because they misinterpret the impressions that accompanyour ideas of regular successions. If we observearegular succession between objectsor events frequently, we grow accustomed to this succession. Andhaving grown accustomed to this sequence, we tend to expect and thereby mentally anticipatethe suc- ceedingevent or object upon the observation or imagination of its typicalantece- dent.Inthe course of acquiringanidea of aregular succession of events, then, we also acquirethe habit to mentally transit from the appearance of the formertothe idea of the latter.Thishabit manifests itself in atypical feeling:upon the experience of an event of aregular succession we feelurgedtoexpect its usual attendant.Itis “[t]his connexion,” Hume explains, “which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant,[that] is the senti- ment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion” (EHU 7. 28,SBN 75). Philosophers,then, tend to conceive of A causing B as aform of A necessitating B,because they themselvesfeelpsychologicallyforced or necessitated to think of Bsupon the appearance of As. And since they acquired this psychological determination in the course of having observed Bsregularlyfollowing As, they mis- takenlytake to perceive this psychological “necessitation” as ametaphysical necessitation in the regularlysucceeding objectsorevents themselves. Let me clarify the precise nature of Hume’sscepticism about causation. As re- vealedbymybrief sketch, this scepticism is primarilydirected towards our idea or notion of causation. Not onlydoes Hume call into question the possibility to know whether events or objects are genuinely causally connected (in the sense of being related by anecessary connection), he even disputes thatwecan have the very idea or notion of such arelation. In Hume’swords:

[W]e cannot […]point out that circumstanceinthe cause, which givesitaconnexion with its effect.Wehavenoidea of this connexion; nor even anydistinct notion what it is we desire to know,whenweendeavour at aconception of it (EHU 7. 29,SBN 77).

Closelyinspecting our idea of acause and cognate notions, Hume argues, we find that they onlyrefertoaregular succession of objectsorevents and that every assumption about this regular succession having adistinct modal character is due to amisunderstanding of our felt psychological tendencytotransit from the appearance of one object to its usual attendant.Lacking adistinctiveimpression of a cause necessitatingits effect,wecannot even have an idea or notionofwhat the distinctive mode of necessitation thatwetend to attribute to what we describeascausal relations would actually be like. Three Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism 195

4Three Varieties of Scepticism

How is Hume’sscepticism about causationtobedistinguished from the othervari- eties of scepticism considered in this chapter?Being first and foremost concerned with our ideas or notion of causation, it goes significantlybeyond the forms of scepticism that Descartesinvokes by his dream and evil demon hypothesis. Forasradical as Descartes’s “hyperbolic” doubtmight be, it never questions the very meaning of our ideas. This is particularlyevident from the strategyDescartes uses to rebut the hyperbolic doubtheintroduced, namely provingGod’sexistence, who—as abenev- olent and omnipotent being—would never allow us to be systematicallydeceived along the lines suggested by Descartes’sdream and evil demon hypotheses. This argument for God’sexistenceproceeds from asurvey of our ideas in our minds, about which Descartes explains, in the third Meditation:

[A]s far as ideas areconcerned, provided they areconsidered solelyinthemselvesand Idonot referthem to anythingelse, they cannot strictlyspeakingbefalse; for whether it is agoat or a chimera that Iamimagining, it is just as true that Iimagine the former as the latter (AT7:37; CSM 2:26).

AccordingtoDescartes,therecan be no question about the “falsity” of our ideas: they have adistinctive representational content,which is—at least primarily—fully transparent to us and about which we cannot be deceived; an idea about agoat is about agoat,and an idea about achimeraisabout achimera.²⁷ The question invoked by Descartes’sscepticism onlyappears when we ask ourselvesabout the relation between our ideas and the external reality:doour ideas, with their distinctive content,correspond to an extra-mental reality?Inthis vein, Descartes’sscepticism takes the intentionality of our ideas for granted. He does not question that they have adistinctive intentional content or representational purport.Hesimply questions theirtruth: is the world reallythe waythat our ideas represent it to be? This is different from Hume’sscepticism about causation.UnlikeDescartes’s form of scepticism, Hume’sscepticism about causation not onlycalls into question whether thingsare in fact causallyrelated, but undermines our very idea of causation as anecessary connection. In Hume’sview,when we think about causation as anecessary connection, we are deceivedabout our own ideas. Being misled by our psychological habit to associate ideas of causes with ideas of their effects, we

 Notethat in the third Meditation,Descartes concedes that while ideas by themselvescannot strictly speakingbefalse, still some of them qualify as materiallyfalse, “when they represent non-things as things” (AT7:43, CSM2:30). (His paradigm example is the idea of coldness that represents some- thingasrealand positive even though it is just an absenceofheat.) Nonetheless,Descartes is clear that materiallyfalse ideas exist and have adistinctive representational content, it is just that this content is so confused that “Iamunable to judge whether or not what it represents to me is something positive which exists outside of my sensation” (AT7:234,CSM 2:146). 196 Stephan Schmid

take causes to stand in anecessary connection to their effects, even though “we have no idea of this connexion; nor even anydistinct notion what it is we desire to know, when we endeavour at aconception of it” (EHU 7. 29,SBN 77). As opposed to the truth of our thoughts, which are questioned by Descartes’sscepticism, Hume’sscepticism about causation concerns the very meaning or intentional content of our idea of causation: are our causal notions in fact about anecessary connection or about something else? The particularthreat of Hume’sscepticism consists in his caseofthe possibility that we can be and in fact are deceivedabout the content of our own thinking,something which had been exempt from Descartes’shyperbolic doubt. This all makes plain thatfar from just rehashing forms of Pyrrhonian scepticism, Descartes’shyperbolic scepticism and Hume’sscepticism about causation introduce varieties of scepticism that are markedlydifferent from the kind of scepticism described by Sextus Empiricus. Not onlyare Descartes’sand Hume’sforms of scepticism both “negatively dogmatic” in the sense that they justify the claim that we do not have anygenuineknowledge about their specific domains, they are alsosig- nificantlymore comprehensive,calling into question what Pyrrhonism stilltakes for granted. In fact,Hume’sscepticism about causation defines avariety of scepticism that is even strongerthan Descartes’shyperbolic scepticism insofar as it calls into question the very intentionality or meaningofour ideas, which Descartes takes to be unquestionablytransparent (though not necessarilyadequate).²⁸ We should thus distinguish between at least three forms of scepticism, each characterised by adistinctive form of doubt:

Pyrrhonian Scepticism asks whether x is really F,oronlyappears to be F,and pertains to the adequacyofour thoughts as to the nature of things,leaving the existenceofthe thingsrevealed in our thoughts untouched.

Cartesian Scepticism—as manifested in Descartes’shyperbolic doubt—asks whether there is in fact an x that is F,asitappears to be and pertainstothe truth of our thoughts (of the form x is F), leaving their meaning or intentionality untouched.

HumeanScepticism—as manifested in Hume’sscepticism about causation—asks whether the thought of x being F is athoughtabout x being F at all and concerns the very meaning or intentionality of thoughts.

 In fact,Ithink that Cartesian scepticism and the Humean scepticism induced by Hume’sreflections on causation correspond to the twokinds of sceptical problematics that JimConant has distinguished in terms of “Cartesian” and “Kantian scepticism.” See Conant, “Two Varieties of Skepticism,” in Rethinking Epistemology,Volume 2,ed. Günter Abel and James Conant (Berlin and Boston: de Gruyt- er,2012), 1‒72.MyunderstandingofCartesian and Humean scepticism developed hereisvery much indebted to Conant’srevealingdiscussion of these twovarieties of scepticism. Three Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism 197

GiventhatPyrrhonian, Cartesian, and Humean scepticism articulate distinctive forms of doubt, each of which undermines adifferent claim or pretenceofour thought(is it adequate?isittrue? and is it genuine thought or about anything at all?), it is certainly of systematic importance to avoid subsumingthem under the uniformlabel of “Pyrrhonism,” as Richard Popkin had done.But distinguishing between these varieties of scepticism is also important from the point of view of the history of philosophy. This is because these three varieties of scepticism raise different philosophical questions or problematics that have influenced prominent discussions in different periods of the history of philosophy. While Pyrrhonian scepticism raises questions about the adequacyorveracityofour thought,Cartesian scepticism calls into doubt the very existenceofthingsoutside our thought.Humean scepticism, in turn, raises aquestion about the content of our thought and our capacity to decide whether our thoughtisabout certain objectsinthe first place. The Pyrrhonian type of question is representative of the ancient discussion about acriterion of truth: is thereafeature of our thought that we can appeal to in order to justify its truth or adequacy—acriterion by which we can decidewhether thingsare reallythe waythat we take them to be? While the Epicureans and Stoics have fa- mouslydefended such acriterion, Pyrrhonists have denied its existence.²⁹ The Cartesian problematic invitesthe exploration of radicallyrevisionist metaphysical options that we can famouslyobserveamong prominent earlymodern philosophers such as Berkeley and Leibniz. Is there amaterial reality which our thoughts correspond to or should we rather embrace aversion of idealism according to which reality is ultimatelyconstituted by mind-like entities with particular thoughts?³⁰ Humean scepticism, finally, is akey for understanding Kant’sphilosophicalproj- ect.While Kant concedes in afamous letter to Herz that in previous work he just passed over the “question of how arepresentation that refers to an object without being in anyway affected by it can be possible,”³¹ it is this question thatlies at the heart of his transcendental philosophy, which he develops in his Critique of Pure Reason.Inthis work Kant prominentlyasks how there can be meaningful metaphysical thoughts, which are about something thatwecannot experience. It should not come as much of asurprise that this is the problem raised by Humean scepticism about causation: how can we be sure that our metaphysical idea of causation as a necessary connection between two events or objectsisreallyabout something rather than an empty phrase that we take to expressanidea, even though it does not.

 Foradiscussion of this debate, see Gisela Striker, “The Problem of the Criterion,” in Essayson Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,1996), 150‒65.  Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy,” makes apowerful case to the effect that idealism is a peculiar earlymodern idea, which is virtuallyabsent from ancient thought.  Kant,Letter Nr.65, to Marcus Herz, February 21,1772, in Kant’sgesammelte Schriften,ed. Köni- glich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin 1900‒), 10:125. 198 Stephan Schmid

Against this backdrop, Kant’sfamous Copernican revolution—according to which we should conceive objects as conforming to our mode of cognitionrather than taking our cognition to be determined by its objects—can be seen as ameans to ensure the representational purport of our metaphysical thoughts thathas been forcefullyundermined by Hume’sscepticism about causation. Giventhat our objects of cognition are constituted by our cognitive faculties,wecan be sure that thereare objects that our cognition is about.³² In fact,Kant himself points out that it was David Hume who “interrupted his dogmatic slumber and broughthim to adopt a fullynew direction in his investigations in the area of speculative philosophy.”³³ In light of the fact that it was David Hume’sscepticism rather than Descartes’s that awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber and broughthim to develop his transcendental philosophy, it is important not to conflate these different varieties of early modernscepticism, each of which is concerned with adifferent problematic of our thought.

5Conclusion

Richard Popkin famouslyargued thatthe earlymodernperiod wasshaken by an “an insoluble crise pyrrhonienne,asthe various gambits of Sextus Empiricusare explored and worked out”.³⁴ In this chapter,Iargued that Popkin’sdescription of the varieties of scepticism developedinthe earlymodern period as aspecies of Pyrrhonism is highlymisleading and blurs important differences. As Ihaveshown, both,René Descartes and David Hume,invoked and employed certain forms or varieties of scepticism which differ from Pyrrhonian scepticism. Even setting aside worries about the problematic assumption thatancient and earlymodern forms of “scepticism” are indeed forms of asingle overarching genus of intellectual endeavour,the forms of doubt launched by Descartesand Hume are cruciallydifferent from the doubts that would have been raised by Pyrrho- nians if they had raised anydoubts at all. In fact,the earlymodern varieties of scepticism,which Ihaveanalysed here, not onlydiffer from traditional Pyrrhonian scepticism with respect to the kinds of doubtthey incite, but also with respect to the epistemologicalverdict they justify. Concerningthe latter,wehaveseen that Sextus Empiricus puts great emphasis on the fact that Pyrrhonian sceptics recommend suspension of judgment about ev-

 Kant articulates his thoughtofaCopernicanrevolution in philosophyinthe preface of the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason,Bxvi‒xvii (Schriften 3:11‒12).For an excellent commentary of Kant’scritical project and its relation to his Copernican revolution see Sebastian Gardner, Routledge Philosophy GuidebooktoKant and the Critique of Pure Reason (London: Routledge,1999), 18‒33.  Kant, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wirdauftreten können (Schriften 4: 260).  Popkin, HistoryofScepticism,5. Three Varieties of Early Modern Scepticism 199

erything and even withhold their judgment as to the question about our possibility of knowledge.Pyrrhonism is anti-dogmatic, as it were. The varieties of scepticism articulated by Descartes and Hume, by contrast,are not anti-dogmatic in this sense. Moreover,the forms of scepticism put forward by Descartesand Hume and discussed in this chapter,which Ilabelled as Cartesian scepticism and Humean scepticism, raise different and moreall-encompassingkinds of doubts than those raised by Pyrrhonism. While the Pyrrhonian sceptics mainlycall into question whether we can know the nature of things, they do not doubt that there are thingsthat appeartous in acertain way. They leave the question about their existenceuntouched and merely question our ability to discern the adequacy or veracity of our thoughts with respect to the metaphysical structure of the world. Cartesian scepticism, by contrast,isdi- rected preciselyagainst the realist presumption of Pyrrhonism by calling into question the very existenceofthe external world. It therebyquestions our ability to discern the truth of our thoughts in general. Still, it leavesunquestioned whether—and thereby presupposes that—we have thoughts with adeterminatecontent in the first place. This presupposition is undermined by Hume’sscepticism about causation. In Hume’sview, we have no genuine idea of causation proper—viz.anecessary connection between twoevents or objects. Unlike Cartesian scepticism, then,Humean scepticism is concerned not onlywith the truth of our thoughts but with their intentional content or representational purport.Itputs into question whether what we take to be thoughts about certain thingsare proper thoughts about these thingsatall. Being clear about these three varieties of scepticism is important for bothsys- tematic or philosophical and historical reasons.The distinction is philosophicallyim- portant because the three varieties of scepticism differ in scope and strength: They call into question what is taken for granted by other varieties of scepticism. Distinguishing these three varieties of scepticism is alsopivotal for doing history of philosophyasitprovides us with abetterunderstanding of the problems that historical authors weregrappling with. In particular, distinguishing Cartesian from Hu- mean scepticism is crucial to understand the objectiveofKant’scritical project, which was first and foremost aresponse to David Hume’sscepticism about causation, and not to the varieties of scepticism suggested by René DescartesorSextus Empiricus.³⁵

 This is not to saythat Kant’sphilosophywas not also influencedbyother forms of scepticism. Michael N. Forster, Kant and Skepticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), argues quite convincinglythat Kant’sdiscussion of the antinomies is cruciallyinfluenced by Pyrrhonian scepticism. 200 Stephan Schmid

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Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández Narrowing of “Know” as aContextualist Strategy against Cartesian Sceptical Conclusions

1Introduction

This paper proposes thatthe free pragmatic enrichment process of narrowingcan explain the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution sentences,which is acentral tenet of epistemic contextualism.Epistemic contextualism is asemantic thesis about the truth conditions of knowledge attribution sentences of the form “S knows that p.” Even though it is alinguistic claim, it is proposed to solve an epistemic problem, i.e., the threat posed by Cartesian-style sceptical arguments. The rough idea behind epistemic contextualism’ssolution to the sceptical problem is to argue that the premises of Cartesian-style sceptical arguments (specifically, the first one) generate acontext in which the epistemic standards for knowledge attribution are extremelyhighand impossibletomeet,leading to the sceptical conclusion: “S does not know that p”;under thosestandards,the sceptical conclusion seems to be true. But ordinarily, the negation of the sceptical conclusion (whichisthe sen- tencethat asserts “Sknows that p”)isevaluated as true because the epistemic standards operatinginthat context are loose. Though epistemic contextualism provides an intuitive and elegant solution to the problem posed by Cartesian-style sceptical arguments, it seems to have become unpopularbecause of linguistic objections blaming epistemic contextualism for the lack of asemanticmodel capable of accounting for the context-sensitivity of “know.” Unlikeindexicals or gradable expressions, “know” is not clearlycontext-sensitive. Therefore, the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution sentences cannot be ac- counted for in asatisfactory manner. In this paper,Iwill propose thatthereisno need of such asemantic model to account for the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution sentences, because it can be explainedthrough afreepragmatic enrichment process—i.e., lexicalnarrowing—that operates on the meaningofknowledge attribution sentences. This proposal for overcomingthese linguistic objections will

Iwould like to thank AndreaIacona, FrançoisRecanati,Ricardo Mena, Axel Barceló,Mario Gómez Tor- rente and RobertJ.Staintonfor reading earlier versions of this paper,and forgiving comments and suggestions to them. In particular,Iwould like to thank Carmen Curcó, forsuggesting thatIread Car- ston and Wilson’swork; to MaiteEzcurdia forgiving me copies of some papersofher own on contextualism; and to the anonymous referee forhis or her helpful remarksonhow to improvethis paper.Also, thanks to the attendants of the International ConferenceonScepticism, whereIpresent- ed thispaper in May 2017.

OpenAccess. ©2019 Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the CreativeCommons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-012 204 Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández

allow us to recover confidence in the effectiveness of the contextualist strategy against Cartesian-style sceptical arguments.

2The Legacy of Cartesian Scepticismfor ContemporaryEpistemology

Scepticism is one of the main concerns of contemporary epistemologists. It can take manyforms, of which the so-called “Cartesian” scepticism is one of the most debated. Contemporary epistemologists understand the problem of Cartesian scepticism in terms of the following type of argument,which is characterised by the use of asceptical hypothesis whose main features are its impossibility of being ruled out by the available evidence and its inconsistency with propositions we ordinarilytakeour- selvestoknow:

1. Sdoes not know that not-h.

2. If Sdoes not know thatnot-h,then Sdoes not know that o.

3. Sdoes not know that o.

This is the general templatefor aCartesian-style sceptical argument.The varieties of sceptical hypotheses that can stand for the h in this type of argument are inspired by the dreamingorevil demon scenarios that Descartes portrays in the Meditations,¹ though he did not devise them in order to buttress asceptical argument,but rather to bring old prejudices into question.² The main feature of these scenarios is their incompatibility with manypropositions we ordinarilybelieveourselvestoknow (like “Ihavehands”). These propositions are the ones that stand for the o in the argument. The dreamingscenario is incompatible with knowledge of the external world. In the First Meditation,Descartessets it by inviting the reader to consider the possibility of being asleep dreaming. The assumed resemblancebetween some dreams and the reality of the external world known through perception is strongenough to make dreams and reality indistinguishable from one another: “waking can never be distinguishedfrom sleep.”³ Such resemblance raises the possibilityofmistaking dreams for perceptions of the external world. But dreams can be deceitful: “Let us suppose that we are dreaming, and that these particularthings(that we have our eyes open,

 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy. With Selections from the Objections and Replies, trans. Michael Moriarty (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2008).  Recall this passage from the FirstMeditation: “Hence Isaw that at some stageinmylife the whole structurewould have to be utterlydemolished, and that Ishould have to begin again from the bottom up if Iwish to construct somethinglastingand unshakable in the sciences” (Descartes, Meditations, 17).  Descartes, 19. Narrowing of “Know” as aContextualist Strategy 205

are moving our head, are stretching out our hands) are not true; and that perhaps we do not even have hands or the rest of abodylike what we see.”⁴ In such circumstances,wewould not know that we have hands. The impossibilitytodistinguish dreams from the reality known through perception precludes knowledge of the external world. The evil demon scenario is incompatible with portions of knowledge thatdid not seem to be under threat in the dreamingscenario, such as mathematical knowledge. The dreamingscenario is athreat to knowledge of physics, astronomyand anyother subjectmatter pertaining to the externalworld, but

arithmetic, geometry and other disciplinesofthe same kind, which deal onlywith the very sim- plest and most general things,and care little whether they exist in natureornot,containsome- thingcertain and indubitable.For whether Iamwakingorsleeping, twoplusthreeequals five, and asquarehas no morethan four sides;nor does it seem possible that such obvious truths could be affected by anysuspicion that they arefalse.⁵

Near the end of the First Meditation,Descartesinvites the reader to consider the possibility of the existence of an evil demon or spirit “supremelypowerful and cunning, [who] has devoted all his efforts to deceiving me.”⁶ The existenceofsuch an evil demon raises the possibilityoferrorevenabout mathematical truths. Therefore, the possibility of being deceivedbyanevil demonisathreat to knowledge so problematic that it even precludes mathematical knowledge. The coreofCartesian-style arguments discussed by contemporary epistemologists are the sceptical hypotheses inspired by the scenarios depicted in Descartes’s Meditations.Among the sceptical hypotheses standing for the h in those Cartesian- style sceptical arguments are:

a) The possibility of being asleep dreaming.

b) The possibility of being deceivedbyanevil demon.

c) The possibilityofbeing abodiless brain in avat that is being electrochem- icallystimulatedtoform the kind of beliefs ahuman being has as aresult of its ordinary perceptual experiences.

d) The possibility of being in asortofmatrix world or anyother alternative reality.

The Cartesian inspiration is obvious in a) and b), but the incompatibility with large portions of ordinary knowledge—characteristic of Descartes’ssceptical scenarios—is also afeature of c) and d). Forinstance, being abodiless brain in avat (BIV) is incompatible with knowledge of manypropositions Iwould ordinarilyclaim to know,

 Descartes, 19.  Descartes, 20.  Descartes, 22. 206 Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández

such as “Ihavehands.” If Iwas aBIV,Iwould not have hands, even though Iwas being electrochemicallystimulated to believethatIhave hands. Therefore, if Iwas a BIV,Iwould not know that Ihavehands. Thus, Cartesian scepticism has set the agenda for one of the main concerns of contemporaryepistemology:todefeat scepticism. John G. Cottingham refers to the influenceofCartesian scepticism in contemporary epistemology,asserting that

The subsequent development of abranch of philosophyknown as “epistemology” has tendedto see the theory of knowledge as aperpetual battleground between the sceptic and the anti-sceptic, with the latter attemptingtoestablish such basic truths as the existenceofthe external world, in faceofthe extreme “hyperbolical” doubts of the kind raised in the Meditations.⁷

Contemporary epistemologists have deployed manystrategies to overcomethosehy- pebolical doubts and defeat scepticism. Amongthosestrategies epistemic contextualism has been the most debated duetoits originality and perspicuity.Inthe next section of this chapter Iwill outline thatstrategy.

3The Contextualist Strategyagainst Cartesian-Style Sceptical Arguments 3.1 Outline of Epistemic Contextualism

Epistemic contextualism holds that knowledge attribution sentences of the form “S knows that p” are context-sensitive, which means thatthe truth conditions of those sentences can vary from one context to another,depending on which epistemic standards govern the context of the attribution.⁸ Broadlyspeaking,epistemic standards are standards for knowledge that vary accordingtothe attributor’scontext. Thus, manyepistemologists label this theory as “attributor contextualism.” Forin- stance, MichaelBrady and Duncan Pritchardclaim that

the view is known as attributor contextualism, in order to emphasise that it is the contextofthe person makingthe assertion that is important to epistemic status,rather than, the contextofthe subject whoisbeingascribedknowledge.⁹

 John G. Cottingham, ADescartes Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 52.  Keith DeRose, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” Philosophy and PhenomenologicalRe- search 52, no. 4(December 1992):913‒29;DeRose, “Solving the Skeptical Problem,” ThePhilosophical Review 104,no. 1(January 1995): 1‒52.  Michael Bradyand Duncan Pritchard, “Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects,” ThePhilosophical Quarterly 55,no. 219(April 2005): 161. Narrowing of “Know” as aContextualist Strategy 207

Giventhe interests, expectations, and other characteristics of knowledge attributors, some contexts could be governed by highepistemic standards,which means thata knowledge attribution sentence uttered in them will be assessed as true onlyifthe allegedly-known proposition p is true and the subject of the knowledge attribution sentenceisinavery strongepistemic position with respect to p;other contexts could be governed by lower epistemic standards,namelythat an assertion of the very same knowledge attribution sentencewillbeassessed as true even if the subject’sepistemic position with respect to p is weaker.Toillustrate these points, let us quote DeRose’sbank cases:

Bank Case A. My wife and Iare drivinghome on Fridayafternoon. We plan to stop at the bank on the wayhome to deposit our paychecks.But as we drive past the bank, we noticethat the lines inside are very long, as they often areonFridayafternoons.Althoughwegenerallyliketode- posit our paychecks as soon as possible,itisnot especiallyimportant in this case that they be deposited right away,soIsuggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on Saturday morning. My wife says, “Maybethe banks won’tbeopen tomorrow.Lots of banks areclosed on Saturdays.” Ireply, “No, Iknow it’ll be open. Iwas just theretwo weeks agoonSaturday. It’sopen until noon.

Bank CaseB.My wife and Idrive past the bank on aFridayafternoon, as in Case A, and notice the long lines. Iagainsuggest that we deposit our paychecks on Saturdaymorning, explaining that Iwas at the bank on Saturday morningtwo weeks agoand discoveredthat it was open until noon. But in this case, we have just written avery large and very importantcheck. If our paychecks arenot deposited into our checkingaccount before Mondaymorning, the important check we wrotewill bounce, leavingusinavery bad situation. And, of course, the bank is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts.She then says, “Banks do change their hours.Doyou know the bank will be open tomorrow?” Remainingasconfident as Iwas beforethat the bank will be open then, still, Ireply, “Well, no. I’dbettergoinand makesure.”¹⁰

If the bank willbeopen on Saturday, it seems thatinCase Awhen DeRose asserts that he knows the bank will be open on Saturday, his assertionistrue. But considering onlycaseB,itseems that when he denies that he knows the bank will be open on Saturday, his denial is also true. So, we have assessed as true aknowledge attribution sentence (“Iknow that the bank will be open on Saturday”)and its denial (“I don’tknow that the bank will be open on Saturday”). How is this possible? Because the standards for knowledge in Case Bare higher than in Case A. DeRosemeetsthe lower standardsinplace in Case Abut he does not meet the higher standards in place in case B, even though the strength of his epistemic position in bothcases is the same. DeRose’sexample illustrates the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution sentences and displays two key notions for epistemic contextualism:strength of an epistemic position and epistemic standard. Asubject is in astrongepistemic position with respect to aproposition she believes when her belief in thatproposition corresponds to the truth in anon-accidental way, i.e., when her belief is true and has

 DeRose, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions,” 913. 208 Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández

enough properties to constituteapiece of knowledge.¹¹ The truth of aknowledge attribution sentencedepends on the epistemic standards governing the context in which the sentenceisuttered, because those standardsdetermine how strong must be the subject’sepistemic position to count her as knowing aproposition.¹² Thus, one speaker can truthfullyattribute knowledge to asubject in one context, but in another context—in which higher standards are in place—that knowledge attribution would no longer be true, even though the subject and the allegedlyknown proposition are the same in both contexts.

3.2 Epistemic Contextualismversus Scepticism

Although epistemic contextualism is alinguistic claim regarding the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributionsentences, it was proposed to solve an epistemic problem, i.e., the threat posed by Cartesian-style sceptical arguments. To illustrate that threat,let us recall one instance of such kind of argument:

1. Idon’tknow that I’mnot aBIV.

2. If Idon’tknow thatI’mnot aBIV,then Idon’tknow thatIhave hands.

3. Idon’tknow that Ihavehands.

Accordingtothe contextualist,the previous argument is problematic because although each premise is plausible, the conclusion seems extremelyimplausible, yet the argument is formallyvalid. The first premise is plausible because it involves a sceptical hypothesis we cannotrule out through the available evidence. Therefore, it seems that we actuallydonot know that we are not aBIV.The second premise is plausible because it is an instance of the epistemic closure principle, which epistemic contextualists assume to be true. But the conclusion of the argument strikes us as highlyimplausible because it is something thatordinarilynoone would assert. Epistemic contextualists understand the problem of Cartesian scepticism as a clash between two premises that seem to be true and aconclusion thatseems to

 To define the properties that abelief has to have in order to constituteapieceofknowledge,DeR- ose appeals to Robert Nozick’struth-trackingaccount of knowledge.The rough idea behind this account of knowledge is that abelief constitutes apieceofknowledge if it is true and tracks the truth in nearby possible worlds where the subjectuses the same method of belief-formation she uses in the actual world. According to DeRose, those conditions must be fulfilled in order to be in astrongepistemic position. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that Saul Kripkepresented counterexam- ples to Nozick’struth-trackingaccount of knowledge in alecturegiven at the American Philosophical Association in the early1980s,and that havinganon-accidentallytrue belief is what matters for beinginastrong epistemic position.  Keith DeRose, TheCasefor Contextualism:Knowledge,Skepticism, and Context. Vol. 1 (Oxford: Ox- fordUniversity Press,2009), 7. Narrowing of “Know” as aContextualist Strategy 209

be false, all within avalid argument.This particularway of conceiving the problem posed by Cartesian-style sceptical arguments is exhibited by Keith DeRose:

We must explain how two premises that together yield aconclusion we find so incredible can themselvesseem so plausible to us.Onlywith such an explanation in placecan we proceed with confidenceand with understanding to free ourselvesfromthe trap.¹³

It is importanttokeep in mind that epistemic contextualists understand the problem of scepticism in these terms.Consequently, they believethat an adequate solution to the problem should fulfilthe following desiderata: i. explain the clashbetween the intuitions that lead to endorsing the premises of the argument and the intuitions thatlead to rejectingits conclusion; ii. safeguard the ordinary intuitions regardingknowledge attributions.

In order to fulfil these desiderata and “freeourselvesfrom the trap” of sceptical arguments, epistemic contextualism appeals to the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution sentences. Roughly,the idea behindthis solution is that the premises of sceptical arguments (specifically, the first one) generate acontext in which the epistemic standards governing knowledge attribution are impossible to meet,leadingtothe sceptic’sconcluding sentence: “Idon’tknow that Ihavehands.” Under these high standards,the sceptic’sconclusion is assessed as true. But the truth conditions of knowledge attribution sentences in the Cartesian-style sceptical argument context are at variancewith the ordinary context,because the latter is governed by lower epistemic standards.Due to such variation,knowledge attribution sentences made in ordinary contexts(like the denial of the sceptic’sconclusion “Iknow that I have hands”)are assessed as true. Therefore, in ordinary contextswenormally claim that subjects do know the very samepropositions whose knowledge is subse- quentlydeniedinthe sceptical conclusion. In other words, the variation among the truth conditions of knowledge attribution sentences allows us to safeguard our ordinary intuitions concerning knowledge attributions. Now that we have outlinedthe contextualist strategyagainst scepticism, let us see how it manages to fulfil desiderata i) and ii). In order to fulfil desideratum i), epistemic contextualism explains that Cartesian- style sceptical argument’spremises seem plausible whenever the sceptical hypothesis is well chosen.Recall that because of the main features of asceptical hypothesis it is impossible to rule out the argument’sfirst premise with the available evidence and this premise turns out to be inconsistent with propositions we ordinarilytake ourselvestoknow.Awell-chosen sceptical hypothesis possesses these features, due to which the argument’sfirst premise seems plausible and is endorsed. Since it is impossible to rule out the sceptical hypothesis through the available evidence, then it seems that we do not know thatitisfalse. To illustrate this point,let us think

 DeRose, “Solvingthe Skeptical Problem,” 3. 210 Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández

about premise 1ofthe previous instance of aCartesian-style sceptical argument.Re- garding 1, DeRoseclaims that “however improbable or even bizarre it mayseem to suppose that IamaBIV,italsoseems thatIdon’tknow thatI’mnot aBIV.How could Iknow such athing?”¹⁴ The use of awell-chosen sceptical hypothesis in the first premise makesitsalient and impossibletoignore, raising the standards for knowledge attribution.¹⁵ The second premise of the Cartesian-style sceptical argument gains plausibility from being an instance of ahighlyintuitiveepistemic principle: the epistemic closure principle.¹⁶ In addtition, once the first premise of aCartesian-style sceptical argument is endorsed, the second one will be endorsed as well, as long as the ordinary proposition involved in it is incompatible with the truth of the sceptical hypothesis. Premise 2ofthe previous instance of the Cartesian-style sceptical argument illus- tratesthis point: having handsisincompatible with being abrain in avat; therefore, if my epistemic position is not strongenough to inform me that Iamnot abodiless brain in avat,neither will it be strongenough to let me know that Ihavehands. And once premises 1and 2are endorsed, 3should be endorsed as well because it validly follows from them. That is how,inthe context of the Cartesian-style sceptical argument governed by unusuallyhighepistemic standards,anassertionlike “Idonot know that Ihavehands” seems to be true. However,endorsement of the argument’spremises does not entail thatitiseasy to endorse its conclusion. The intuitions leadingtoreject the conclusion of aCarte- sian-style sceptical argument arise whenever the argument is assessed through ordinary epistemic standards, which are looser and allow us to assert that we know many things. Assessingthe conclusionofthe Cartesian-style sceptical argument through ordinary epistemic standards,while assessing its premises through sceptical epistemic standards, results in aclashbetween the intuitions leadingtoreject the conclusion and the intuitions leading to endorse the premises. The previous explanation allows epistemic contextualism to fulfil desideratum i), and contains the seeds for fulfilling desideratum ii). Epistemic contextualism manages to safeguard our ordinary intuitions regardingknowledge attributions precisely by claiming that asceptical conclusion does not threaten the truth of our ordinary knowledge attribution sentences because these appear in acontext in which stand-

 DeRose, 2.  Different contextualist theorists have proposed different conversational mechanismstoexplain how epistemic standards areraised throughthe use of the sceptical hypothesis (David Lewis proposes aRule of Accommodation, DeRose proposes aRule of Sensitivity,etc.).The details of such mecha- nisms arenot relevantfor the present exposition of the general strategyused by epistemic contextualists to defeat scepticism.  Though there is much controversy surroundingthe epistemic closure principle, its most accepted version statesthat “if one believes aconclusionbycompetent deduction from some premises one knows,one knows the conclusion.” TimothyWilliamson, “Probability and Danger,” TheAmherstLec- tureinPhilosophy 4(2009): 2, http://www.amherstlecture.org/williamson2009/. Narrowing of “Know” as aContextualist Strategy 211

ards for knowledge attribution are more relaxed and easiertomeet.Thus, according to contextualism,a“skeptic’spresent denials that we know various thingsare perfectlycompatible with our ordinary claims to know those very propositions,” because the truth value of aknowledge attribution sentencedepends on the epistemic standards governing the context in which the sentence is uttered.¹⁷ Recall that the sceptic truthfullystatesher conclusion onlybyraising epistemic standards, therefore her argument “doesn’tthreaten the truth of our ordinary claims to know the very Os [ordinary propositions] our knowledge of which the skeptic attacks.”¹⁸ Explaining “how two premises thattogetheryield aconclusion we find so incredible can themselvesseem so plausible to us”¹⁹ has freed us from the sceptical trap by showing that our ordinary practises of knowledge attribution are safe from the sceptic’sthreat. By claiming thatthe same sentencecan have different truth-conditions in different contexts, epistemic contextualism holds that the conclusion of Cartesian-style sceptical argument poses no threat for our ordinary claims to know manythings. Though epistemic contextualism provides an intuitive and elegant solution to the problem of Cartesian-style sceptical arguments, it seems to have lost its steam due to the linguistic objections raised by Herman Cappelan and Ernest Lepore,²⁰ Jason Stanley,²¹ and others. These authors arguethat epistemic contextualism lacks asemanticmodel capable of accounting for the context-sensitivity of “know”—which is not clearlycontext-sensitivelike indexicals or gradable expressions—and therefore cannot satisfactorilyaccount for the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution sentences. In response to this specific criticism, Iclaim that there is no need for such a semanticmodel to account for the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution sentences, because it can be seen as the resultofamodulation-free pragmatic process called narrowing, which operates on the meaning of knowledge attribution sentences.²² Beforeexplaining my proposal to account for the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution sentences,Iwill introduce and explain the narrowingprocess.

 DeRose, “Solvingthe Skeptical Problem,” 5.  DeRose, 38.  DeRose, 3.  Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore, “Context ShiftingArguments,” Philosophical Perspectives 17 (2003): 25‒50.  Jason Stanley, “On the Linguistic Basis for Contextualism,” Philosophical Studies 119,nos.1‒2 (May2004): 119‒46;Stanley, Knowledgeand Practical Interests (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2005).  Robert Stainton and Geoff Pynn each propose similar strategies to defend epistemic contextualism from linguistic objections. See Robert Stainton, “Contextualism in Epistemologyand the Context Sensitivity of ‘Knows,’” in Knowledgeand Skepticism,eds.Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein (Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 2010), 113‒39;Geoff Pynn, “Pragmatic Contex- tualism,” Metaphilosophy 46,no. 1(January 2015): 26‒51.However,myproposal assumes that knowledge attribution sentences aretruth-evaluable and that the word “know” has an extension at acontext,which is fixed through afunction, as Iwill explain later.Stainton and Pynn would disagree, sincethey takeepistemic contextualism to be about knowledge attributions as speech acts,and 212 Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández

4Narrowing of “Know” in the Conclusionsof Cartesian-Style ScepticalArguments

4.1 Narrowing

“Narrowing” is atermused in lexical pragmatics for one type of pragmatic effect on the meaning contributed by awordtothe proposition expressed. Somewords can be seen as having extensions:the noun “meerkat” denotes (i.e., has as its extension) all and onlymeerkats (i.e., the set of meerkats), and astatement such as “Meerk is a meerkat” is true if and onlyifMeerk is amemberofthat set. “Narrowing” is the term used for cases wherethe meaning of awordis“narrowed” to cover just aproper subsetofits usual extension. Consider an utterance of “John drinks” used to express the proposition thatJohn drinks alcohol. Events of drinking alcohol are aproper subset of drinking events,sothis is an instance of narrowing. In this case, the narrowed meaning of the word “drink” has become lexicalized. In other cases, the narrowed meaning is purelyoccasion-specific, as with “John cut the cake” to meanthat John cut it with aknife. Some metaphorsmay also be cases of narrowing,for example the use of “John is aman” to express the idea thatheisaman with certain qualities: for example bravery and determination. The converse of narrowingisbroaden- ing,and both are species of lexicalmodulation. Iwill now outline the main proposals giventoexplain narrowing,and then show how the variations of the truth-conditionsofknowledge attribution sentences can be explained by appealing to the narrowingofthe usual extension of “know.” Narrowingisapragmatic process in which the use of awordpragmaticallycon- veys amorespecific meaning thanthe word’slexicallyencoded meaning.²³ Classical examples of this phenomenon are:

(1) Idon’t drink.

Even though the lexicallyencoded meaning of “drink” is something like the ingestion of anyliquid, since Idodrink several kinds of liquids, in (1) “drink” is used to mean “drink alcohol,” therefore conveying amore specific meaning. To make sense of (1), the linguistic denotationof“drink” must be narrowed to amorespecific one. Thisprocess is generallyunderstood as apragmatic one, since it occurs for pure- ly pragmatic reasons,i.e., to make sense of what the speaker is saying;itisnot triggered by the encoded or linguistic meaningofthe words in that sentence. The main proposals to explain this phenomenon have been the neo-Gricean account,Rele- vanceTheory,and Truth-Conditional Pragmatics.

denythat “know” is acontext-sensitive word whose meaninginvolvesafunctiontofix the extension of the word in agiven context.  YanHuang, The Oxford DictionaryofPragmatics (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,2012). Narrowing of “Know” as aContextualistStrategy 213

Neo-Gricean account of narrowing. YanHuang provides aneo-Gricean account of narrowinginwhich amodified set of maxims is assumed.²⁴ This set reduces the original Gricean programme (the maxim of Quality apart) to threeneo-Gricean pragmatic principles: Quantity,Informativeness, and Manner principles. These maxims are designed to account for “generalised implicatures,” treatingthem as default inferences. In this framework, narrowingisakind of default inference to astereotypical or pro- totypical interpretation governedbythe Informativeness principle (I-principle). The basic tenet of the I-principle is:²⁵

Speaker: Do not saymorethan is required. Addressee: What is generallysaid is stereotypicallyand specificallyexemplified.

The I-principle generates aconversationalI-implicature in which the general lexical- ly encoded meaning of an expression I-implicates amorespecific interpretation which accords best with stereotypical and explanatory expectations, thereby increas- ing informativeness. An example of lexicalnarrowingbased on this kind of I-implicature is:

(2)John had aglassofmilk for breakfast this morning.

In this case, “milk” I-implicates thatthe milk in question was cow’smilk, not goat’s milk or anyother mammal’smilk, so the semantically general term “milk” is narrowed viaI-implication to denote stereotypicallyexpected cow’smilk.

Relevance Theoryaccount of narrowing. Accordingtorelevance theorists,

Narrowing is the case where awordisused to conveyamorespecific sense than the encoded one, resultinginarestriction of the linguistically-specifieddenotation. …The effect of narrowing is to highlight aproper subpart of the linguistically-specified denotation.²⁶

Relevancetheorists explain how listeners bridge the gapbetween linguisticallyencoded meaning and what speakers intend to communicatebyappealing to relevance, which is aproperty of inputs to cognitive processes characterised in cost-benefit terms:the greater the cognitive effects, the greater the relevance; the greater the proc- essing effort,the lower the cognitive relevance. In this framework, understanding an utterance is the resultofaninterpretative process generated by expectations of relevance; this process adjusts the communicated meaningofindividual words basedon the interaction between linguisticallyencoded meaning,contextual assumptions, and contextual implications. Accordingtothis view,narrowingwould be triggered

 YanHuang, “Neo-Gricean Pragmatics and the Lexicon,” International Review of Pragmatics 1, no. 1(January 2009): 118‒53.  Huang, “Neo-Gricean Pragmatics.”  DeirdreWilson, “Relevance and Lexical Pragmatics.” Italian Journal of Linguistics 15,no. 2(2003): 274. 214 Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández

by the search for relevance following apath of least effort to choose easilyaccessible contextual assumptions, expectations and implications, adjustingthem with linguistic meaning and cognitive effects, until the expectations of relevance raised by the utterance are satisfied. Forexample, aconversation in which the speaker utters (3) as an excuse to avoid some commitment:

(3) Ihaveatemperature.

If the hearer does not narrow the linguistic meaningof“temperature” in (3) to con- veyhightemperature, the utterance would be trivial and irrelevant;hence to understand the speaker’sintentions,the hearer must derivepotential implication following apath of the least effort and stop when expectations of relevance are satisfied.

Truth-Conditional Pragmatics (TCP) account of narrowing. Accordingtothe TCPview, truth-conditional content of an utterance maybeaffected by free pragmatic processes—i.e., “top-down” or context-drivenprocesses not triggered by an expression in the sentence, but taking place for purelypragmatic reasons—in order to make sense of what the speaker is saying.²⁷ Such enrichmenttakes place when the following con- ditionsare met: (i) the context adds some elementtothe interpretation of the utterance; (ii) the element is truth conditionally-relevant;and (iii) its contextual provision is not necessary (i.e., not mandated by the linguistic material). François Recanati refers to these kindsoffreepragmatic processes as modulation processes.²⁸ Modulation operatesonthe meaning of expressions and returns ameaningof the same type, by narrowingdown the extension of an expression through the contextual addition of acomponent to its meaning.²⁹ Therefore, accordingtothis view, through freeenrichment “drink” in (1) is interpreted as meaning “drinkalcohol,” adding to the meaning of the verb aspecification of the kind of liquid Ihavein mind. Thisinterpretation enables to make sense of the intuitivetruth-conditional content of (1). TCPoffers asemanticconstrual of pragmatic modulation because the meaning of the expression is mapped to another,morespecific meaning.Asystematic truth-conditional semantics for natural languageisexplained by appealing to a mod function which takesanexpression e and the context c in which it occurs as arguments; the particularmodulation function g that is contextuallysalient/relevant/appropriatefor the interpretationofthat expression in thatcontext is the value of mod. The value of mod will be the identity function whenever modulation is unnecessary and the expression receivesits literal interpretation.³⁰ So, there is a

 François Recanati, Truth-Conditional Pragmatics (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press,2010), 4.  Recanati, Literal Meaning (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2004); Recanati, Truth-Condi- tional Pragmatics.  Recanati, “Pragmatic Enrichment,” in TheRoutledgeCompanion to Philosophy of Language,ed. Gillian Russell and Delia Graff Fara (New York: Routledge University Press, 2012): 67‒79.  Recanati,76. Narrowing of “Know” as aContextualistStrategy 215

literal sense of asimple expression e, which is its semantic interpretation I(e);and there is amodulated sense M(e)c carried by an occurrence of e in context c. The modulated sense of an expression e in acontext c results from applying the contex- tuallyappropriate modulation function mod(e,c) =gto its semantic interpretation I(e):

M(e)c = mod(e,c) (I(e)) = g(I(e))

To illustrate how this accounts for the interpretation of (1), let us take “ingestion of anyliquid” as the semanticinterpretation of “drink.” Let us assume thatIam the speaker uttering(1). As amatter of fact,Idon’tdrink anyalcoholic beverages but Idrinkwater on aregular basis, likeany other human being. In such acontext, “drink” is modulated to narrow down its literal sense to amore specific one, delivering “drink alcohol” as the value of the mod function;therefore, affecting the truth- conditions of (1), which Iuttertomean that Idon’tdrink alcohol. Thus, accordingto this view,the semantic interpretation of acomplex expression, likeasentence, is a function of the modulatedsenses of its parts and the waythey are put together.³¹ That is how,accordingtoTCP,pragmatic modulation mayaffect the semantic content of complex expressions.

4.2 Narrowing of “Know” in KnowledgeAttribution Sentences

As we have seen, epistemic contextualism claims thatthe truth conditions of knowledge attribution sentences can vary from one context to another.Attempts to explain such context-sensitivity through indexicality or gradability have not been satisfactory because “know” does not exhibit the semantic behaviour or properties attributed to clearlyindexical or gradable terms.Nevertheless,the context-sensitivity of the truth- conditions of knowledge attribution sentences is widelyacknowledged. HereIpro- pose that narrowing,understood as afree pragmatic enrichment process, can explain the context-sensitivity of the truth-conditions of knowledge attribution sentences.Since this proposal is based on TCP, as formulatedbyRecanati, it differsfrom what JeremyFantl and Matthew McGrath call “speech act contextualism,” which focuses on speech acts rather thansentences.³²

 Recanati,77.  See Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, KnowledgeinanUncertain World (Oxford: OxfordUniver- sity Press, 2009). It is worth recalling that,though Iamtalkingabout afreepragmatic enrichment process,Iam not fullyendorsingthe kind of pragmatic stanceproposed by Robert Stainton, which Fantl and McGrath call “speech act contextualism.” My explanation of that process appeals to the modulation function proposed by Recanati, which would operateinthemeaningof“know.” Stainton would disagreewith such amanoeuvre and with anyother operatingonthe meaningof “know.” 216 Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández

As explainedinthe previous section, free pragmatic enrichment occurs when the following three conditions are satisfied: (i) context adds some element to the interpretation of the utterance;(ii) the element is truth-conditionallyrelevant; and (iii) its contextual provision is not necessary.Utterances of knowledge attributionsentences meet all these conditions:(i) the context adds an epistemic standard to the interpretation of aknowledge attribution sentence; (ii) the truth-conditions of aknowledge attributionsentencedepend on that standard; but (iii) even if the epistemic standard is left aside, the knowledge attribution sentencewould still express acom- plete proposition. The epistemic standards are taken into account just to make sense of what the speaker is saying.For instance, asserting the conclusionofaCartesian- style sceptical argument like “she does not know she has hands”—whenthe subject actuallyhas hands—does not seem to make sense unless the epistemic standards generated by the sceptical hypothesis in the Cartesian style argument are taken into account.Thus, the conclusion of the sceptical argument should be interpreted as saying that knowledge cannot be properlyattributed to asubjectifshe does not fulfil certain epistemic standards. Otherwise, the conclusion would seem to be bluntlyfalse. Condition (iii) deserves attentionifthe truth-conditionsofasceptical argument’s conclusion are regarded as the resultofanarrowing process. In contrasttothis kind of freepragmatic enrichment processes, in bottom-up pragmatic processes (satura- tion) no proposition is expressed unless something like avalue is assigned to avar- iable: in the sentence “she is cute,” no proposition has been expressedifnoindivid- ual can be contextuallysingled out as the reference of “she.”³³ But knowledge attribution sentences, like the conclusion of aCartesian-style sceptical argument,express completepropositions even though the element added by the context—the epistemic standard—is not taken into account. Therefore, the truth-conditions of the conclusion of aCartesian-style sceptical argument can be explainedbyappealingtoafree pragmatic enrichment process in which the extension of “know” is narrowed down through the contextual addition of the epistemic standards generated by the sceptical hypothesis. The sceptical hypothesis in the argument givesplace to acontext in which the epistemic standards are so highthat it is necessary to eliminate such hypotheses to consider the subject as knowing anything.But ordinarily, the fulfilment of those unrealistic highepistemic standards is not considered necessary for attributingknowledge;therefore, according to the epistemic standards governing ordinary contexts, aknowledge attribution sentencelike the one assertedinthe conclusion of aCartesian-style sceptical argument would be regarded as false. This can be explained as the resultofanarrowing process in which the sense of “know” is narrowed down from its ordinary sense to amore specific one, determined by sceptical epistemic standards.

 Recanati, “Pragmatic Enrichment,” 70. Narrowing of “Know” as aContextualist Strategy 217

In order to understand how this could work, let us assume along epistemic contextualism lines that the literal interpretationof“know” is givenbythe ordinary practises of knowledge attribution sentences, which take into account loose epistemic standardsaccordingtowhich everyone knows many things, includingthat they have hands(whenever they actuallyhavethem). Thus, in ordinary contexts, the extensionof“know” includes manycases wherethe strength of asubject’sepistemic position is relatively low.But in the context of aCartesian-style sceptical argument,epistemic standardsare higher and “know” is modulated to narrow down its literal sense to amorespecific one, accordingtowhich the extension of “know” only includes cases wherethe subject’sepistemic position is very strong, delivering something like “know accordingtosceptical standards” as the value of the mod function. This means that in the context of aCartesian-style sceptical argument, “know” is understood in amore specific sense, through the provision of high epistemic standards. Such narrowingmay affect the truth-conditionsofknowledge attribution sentences, as, for example, aCartesian-style sceptical argument’sconclusion:

(4) Idon’tknow that Ihavehands.

An utterance of (4) made in the context of aCartesian-style sceptical argument seems to be true because in that context the meaningof“know” is narrowed down to con- veyjustaproper subset of its usual extension. The extension of that proper subset is restricted to cases in which the subject knows something accordingtohighepistemic standards;since Idonot fulfil thosestandards,anutterance of (4) in the context of a Cartesian-stylesceptical argument seems true. Such narrowingof“know” happens as the resultofafreepragmatic enrichment process giveninacontext governed by extremelyhighepistemic standards.This process, then, is not necessary but allows us to make sense of the conclusion of aCartesian-style sceptical argument,a conclusion that otherwise would seem nonsense. In this case, the three conditions for afreepragmatic enrichment are satisfied: (i) the context adds some element—a sceptic standard—to the interpretation of the utterance; (ii) this element has an im- pact in the truth-conditions of (4); and (iii) the contextual provision is not necessary but allows us to make sense of aproblematic assertion. In contrast, an assertion of “I know that Ihavehands” in ordinary contexts is assessed as true because in those contexts the extension of “know” covers not onlycases in which the subject knows accordingtohighsceptical standards,but alsocases in which the subject knows accordingtolow epistemic standards.When low epistemic standards govern the context of assertion, the extension of “know” is broad enough to include many cases in which the subjectdoes not fulfil the demands imposed by the sceptic standards for knowledge attribution. As happens with anyother case of narrowing, in this case the speaker can make sense of her assertionappealingtothe contextual provision thatmodulates the sense of the expression. Forinstance, when asked, the speaker of (1) can make sense of her assertion of (1) explaining that she meant “drink alcohol” when she used the word “drink”;likewise, the speaker of (4) can make sense of her assertion of (4) explaining 218 Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández

that she meant “know accordingtosceptical standards” when she usedthe word “know.” Accordingtoepistemic contextualism,this kind of explanation should be available to us, since

Even while we’re in acontextgoverned by highstandards at which we don’tcount as knowing that o [anyordinary proposition incompatible with the chosen sceptical hypothesis], we at the same time realize that as soon as we find ourselvesinmoreordinary conversationalcontexts,it will also be wrongfor us to denythat we know these things.³⁴

If we realise that as soon as we find ourselvesinmore ordinary conversationalcontexts,itwill be wrongtoassert something like (4), we can make sense of our assertion of (4) and explain that it belongs to acontext governedbyhighepistemic standards,inwhich either you “know accordingtosceptical standards,” or youdon’tknow at all. In line with this, the speaker can realise that her assertion of (4) in the context of the Cartesian-style sceptical argument does not commit her to assert something like that in an ordinary context governed by lower epistemic standards.From the exposition of the contextualist strategy(section 3.2),weknow this is akey element of the epistemic contextualist solution to the Cartesian-style sceptical problem:

according to the contextualist solution …the skeptic’spresent denials that we know various things are perfectlycompatible with our ordinary claims to know those very propositions. Oncewerealize this,wecan see how both the skeptic’sdenials of knowledge and our ordinary attributionsofknowledge can be correct.³⁵

So, once we realise that the context mayaffect truth-conditions of knowledge attribution sentences,weshould be able to explain that aknowledge attribution sentence could be assessed as true in an ordinary context,but as false in the context of aCar- tesian-style sceptical argument.Inthe latter context,itisnecessary to fulfil the sceptical standardsinorder to count as knowing something,narrowing down the extension of what is ordinarilyconveyedby“know.” In ordinary contexts, whereitisnot necessary to fulfil these highepistemic standards, the extension of “know” is broad- er and permits the assessment of more knowledge attribution sentences as true.

5Concluding Remarks

Epistemic contextualism provides an effectivestrategyagainst the problem posed by Cartesian-stylesceptical arguments. However,its effectiveness seems to be threatened by some linguistic objections. In this paper,Ishowed how to overcomethose linguistic objections and account for the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution

 DeRose, “Solvingthe Skeptical Problem,” 41.  DeRose, 5. Narrowing of “Know” as aContextualist Strategy 219

sentences through afreepragmatic enrichmentprocess called narrowing. Iproposed that variations in the truth values of knowledge attribution sentences can be the result of such anarrowing process. Through narrowing, the extension of an expression or wordasitisused in an utterance is more specific than the extension expected from its linguistic meaning. As Iexplained in this paper,narrowingcan account for the variations of the truth conditions of knowledge attribution sentences if we assume thatthe epistemic standards governing ordinary knowledge attributions define our understanding of knowledge itself. Therefore, whenthe sceptic states her conclusion, this turnsout to be true onlybecause the epistemic standards she imposes are higher than the ordinary ones, and thus, tend to narrowthe meaningorextension of “knowledge.” This proposal shows thatadvocatesofepistemic contextualism do not need to provide asemantic model to account for the context-sensitivity of the knowledge attribution sentences. This, in turn, pavesthe waytore-examine epistemic contextualism as asatisfactory solution to the problem posed by Cartesian-style sceptical arguments. The effectiveness of epistemic contextualism as asatisfactory solution to that problem tendedtobedisregarded because of some linguistic objections. Ishowed that it is not necessary to fulfilthe specific demands implied in those objectionsbe- cause it is possibletoaccount for the context-sensitivity of knowledge attribution sentences through the process of narrowing. Thus, the solution of epistemic contextualism against Cartesian-style sceptical arguments is safe from those objections and retains its effectiveness.

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Recanati, François. “Pragmatic Enrichment.” In The Routledge Companion to Philosophyof Language,edited by Gillian Russell and Delia Graff Fara, 67‒79. New York: Routledge UniversityPress, 2012. Recanati, François. Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 2010. Stainton, Robert. “Contextualism in Epistemologyand the Context Sensitivity of ‘Knows.’” In Knowledge and Skepticism,edited by Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke,and HarryS. Silverstein, 113‒39. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,2010. Stanley, Jason. Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 2005. Stanley, Jason. “On the Linguistic Basisfor Contextualism.” Philosophical Studies 119, nos. 1‒2 (May 2004): 119‒46. Wilson, Deirdre. “Relevance and LexicalPragmatics.” Italian Journal of Linguistics 15, no. 2 (2003): 273‒91. Williamson, Timothy. “Probability and Danger.” The AmherstLecture in Philosophy 4(2009):1‒35, http:// www.amherstlecture.org/williamson2009/. List of Contributors

Sébastien Charles is Vice-Rector at the UniversitéduQuébec àTrois-Rivières. Graduated from UniversityofOttawa (2001), he is aspecialist of early modern philosophy.His work focuses on two majorthemes: the influenceofBerkeley’simmaterialism on the French Enlightenment and the resurgence of scepticism during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Among his publications are Scepticisminthe Eighteenth Century. Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklarüng (2013), and BerkeleyRevisited: Moral, Social and Political Philosophy (2015).

HeidrunEichner (Dr.phil. Bochum2001) is Professor of Islamic Studies at the Universityof Tübingen. She specialises in the history of philosophy and theology of the Islamicateworld in the post-Avicennan period. She is the author of Averroes’ mittlerer Kommentar zu Aristoteles’ De Generatione et corruptione (Paderborn 2005) and The Post-Avicennian Philosophical Tradition and Islamic Orthodoxy: Philosophicaland Theological summae in Context (unpublished Habilitationsschrift, Halle 2009). Together with MatthiasPerkams and Christian Schäfer,she has edited the Islamische Philosophie im Mittelalter.Ein Handbuch (Darmstadt 2013; 2nd edition 2017).

Warren ZevHarvey is professor emeritus in the department of JewishThought at the Hebrew UniversityofJerusalem, wherehehas taught since1977.Heisthe author of studies on medieval and modern Jewish philosophy,and wasanEMET Prizelaureateinthe humanities (2009).

Henrik Lagerlund is Professor of the History of Philosophy at Stockholm University. He works primarily on Medieval and Renaissance philosophy.

Carlos Lévy received adoctoratd’ÉtatinRoman philosophy in 1986 under the supervisionof Professor PierreGrimal. He wasaprofessor of Roman philosophy and literature at the Sorbonne, Paris, until 2015. He is now aprofessor emeritus and fellow of the Israel InstituteofAdvanced Studies, as well as the Maimonides Centre forAdvanced Studies, Universität Hamburg. A specialist in Hellenistic and Romanphilosophy,hehas written many booksand papersonthe ScepticalAcademy,Cicero, Philo of Alexandria, Foucault, and ancient rhetoric.

Diego. E. Machuca is Researcher in Philosophy at CONICET (Argentina). Hisresearchisfocused on scepticism in ancient philosophy,epistemology,and ethics.

Stéphane Marchand is Assistant Professor at the UniversityParis1Panthéon-Sorbonne and a specialist in Ancient Scepticism. He published amonograph on Ancient Scepticism: Le scepticisme (Vrin, 2018).

Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernández earned her Ph.D.inPhilosophy at the National Autonomous UniversityofMexico (UNAM). She received aMaster’sdegree in Philosophy of Science from UNAM and aMaster’sdegree in Philosophy,Science, and Values from the Universityofthe Basque Country (UPV-EHU). She hasconducted researchatUNAM, the University of Turin, and Universität Hamburg.

StephanSchmid is professor forthe history of philosophy at Universität Hamburgand works mainly on topicsofearly modern metaphysics,epistemology,and philosophy of mind in both the Aristotelian and non-Aristotelian traditions. Since2016, he acts as the second co-director of the Maimonides Centre forAdvanced Studies. 222 ListofContributors

José María Sánchez de León Serrano received his PhD from the UniversityofHeidelberg witha dissertation on Hegel’s ScienceofLogic. He wasaresearch fellow at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is currently afellow at the Maimonides Centre forAdvanced Studies at Universität Hamburg. His current research focuses on early modern rationalism,inparticular on Spinoza.

Josef Stern is William H. Colvin Professor of Philosophy (Emeritus) at the Universityof Chicago. Hisscholarship ranges from medieval Jewish and Arabic philosophy to contemporary philosophy of language. His most recent book, The Matter and Form of Maimonides’ Guide, was awarded the 2014 Book Prizebythe Journal of the History of Philosophy forthe best book on the history of philosophy published in 2013. Index

Academic Scepticism 3, 5f., 18, 48, 53, 131, – Incoherenceofthe Incoherence 84‒89, 92f., 133f.,137f.,144, 165‒67,170‒74,178 140 Adam of Wodeham 135 Averroism 88, 99 Adamson, Peter 68 Avicenna2,67‒73, 75‒80, 83, 99, 103, 116 Aenesidemus 5f., 10f.,13, 17,39 – Al-Hidāya 72 –Pyrrhoneioi logoi 10 – Al-Išārātwa-l-Tanbīhāt 71‒73, 77‒79 Agrippa 48, 62 – Al-Muḫtaṣar al-Awsaṭ 69‒73, 80 Al-Fārābī 83, 100, 103, 111, 116 – Al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawīya 73‒78 Al-Ghazālī 2, 83‒90, 92‒94, 98, 137‒41 – Al-Šifāʾ – DeliverancefromError 139f. – Al-Burhān 70 – Incoherenceofthe Philosophers 83, 87,89, – Fī al-Nafs 73, 75f. 93, 139f. – flying manargument2,67‒70, 72‒80 Al-Ǧubbāʾī,AbūHāšim 75 Al-Ṭūsī,Naṣīral-Dīn78 Barnes, Jonathan 30, 33f.,36, 38 AlbertofSaxony 136, 142f. Barney,Rachel 33f. Alexander of Aphrodisias86, 107f. Berkeley,George 197 Ambrose 16 Bermúdez, José Luis 160 Annas, Julia 30, 33f.,36, 38, 58 Bett, Richard 25 Anselm of Canterbury111 Biel, Gabriel 141 Arcesilaus 5, 8, 12, 48, 134, 184 Black, Deborah 70 Aristotelianism83f., 103, 107,128, 181, 184 Brady,Michael 206 Aristotle 24, 32, 69, 84‒86, 88, 92‒94, 105, Brissot de Warville, Jacques-Pierre3,165, 107,116, 121, 130‒33, 135f.,184 174‒78 – De anima 86 – Plan du scepticisme universel appliqué àtou- – De caelo 86 tes les sciences 176 – De partibus animalium 133 Buridan, John 128, 135f.,142f. – Metaphysics 83f.,86, 92f.,130f.,135 Burley,Walter 131, 134 – Nicomachean Ethics 100 – Parva Naturalia 85 Cappelan, Herman211 – Physics 86, 92 Carneades 5, 8, 12, 17f.,30, 129, 134, 172, – Politics 133 184 – Posterior Analytics 69f.,130f.,133f.,136 Cartesianism147,165, 167,169, 171‒74,178, – Topics 69 182f.,186, 196f.,199, 204‒6, 208 Arnim, Hans von5 Castagnoli, Luca 36 Atticus, Tittus Pomponius 17 Christianity 171, 174, 178 Augustine of Hippo 1, 6f., 16‒20, 98, 130‒32, Chrysippus 30 134, 137f.,167 Cicero1,5‒8, 17‒19, 129, 131‒34, 137f.,167, – Confessions 6 172, 184 – ContraAcademicos 16‒20, 98, 131f.,134, – Academica 129, 131‒34, 137f. 137f. – Academica posteriora 132 – Enchiridion 18f. – Academica priora 6, 18, 132 – Retractationes 19 – Lucullus 18 Aulus Gellius 17,167 – De naturadeorum 7 Averroes 2, 83‒89, 92‒94, 100,131, 140f. – Somnium Scipionis 8 – Decisive Treatise 86 Cicero, QuintusTullius 5 – Exposition of the Methods of Proof 86 Clitomachus 184 Cotta,Gaius Aurelius7f.

OpenAccess. ©2019, Giuseppe Veltri, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591040-014 224 Index

Cottingham, John G. 206 HenryofGhent 98, 130‒32, 134 Crescas,Hasdai 2, 83, 88‒92, 94, 113 – Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae)130f., – Light of the Lord 88‒90,92 133f. Hermogenianus 17 d’Alembert, Jean-Baptiste le Rond 176 Herz, Marcus 197 d’Ancona, Cristina71 Hesiod 38 David ben Ṭodros, Qalonymus ben 88 Holkot, Robert135, 141 Della Rocca,Michael 150f. Homer DeRose, Keith 207‒10 – Iliad 83 Descartes, René 1‒3, 7, 15, 68, 79, 97f.,127, Huang, Yan213 137‒40,149f.,152, 155f.,160‒62, 167‒69, Huet, Pierre-Daniel 3, 165‒71, 178 171‒73, 182f.,186‒91, 195f.,198f.,204f. – Censure de la philosophie cartésienne 167‒ – deceiving god79, 149, 153f.,160f.,188‒91, 69 195 – Censure de la réponse de Monsieur Régis àla – Discours de la méthode 172 Censure de la philosophie cartésienne – dream argument 187f.,190,195 168 – Meditations 137,139f.,149, 172, 183, 189f., Hume, David 3, 98, 138‒40,165, 178, 182f., 195, 204‒6 190‒99 – Rules for the Direction of the Mind 156 – ATreatise of Human Nature 192 Diderot, Denis176 Diogenes Laertius 132, 134, 167 Ibn Bāǧǧa100 – Lives of Eminent Philosophers 132 Ibn Simeon, Joseph ben Judah 85 Ibn Tibbon, Moses 113 Epicureanism7,19, 184, 197 Ibn Tibbon, Samuel 92, 99 Epicurus 184 Ioli, Roberta 25 Epiphanius of Salamis12 epistemic contextualism 4, 203, 206‒11, 215, Janáček, Karel 5 217‒19 John DunsScotus98 Estienne, Henri 62f.,133 John of Salisbury 98, 129, 132 – Metalogicon 129 Fantl, Jeremy 215 Favorinus17 Kant, Immanuel 100,182f.,191, 197‒99 Floridi, Luciano 133f. – Critique of Pure Reason 197 Foucher,Simon 3, 165, 170‒74,178 Kaspi, Joseph 113 Furlani, Giuseppe67f. Kripke,Saul 208

Galen 23, 99, 133 Lagerlund, Henrik 98 – An Outline of Empiricism 133 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 197 Geremia de Montagnone 134 Lennon, Thomas 166f.,170 – Compendium moralium notabilium 134 Lepore, Ernest 211 Gilson, Étienne 127f. Levinas, Emmanuel 14f. GregoryofRimini 141 Lewis, David 210 Gutas,Dimitri 71 Maia Neto, José Raimundo 167,170 Haidt, Jonathan 56 Maimonides 2, 83, 85‒89, 92‒94, 98‒121, Hasnaoui, Ahmed 68, 70 162 Hasse, Dag Nikolaus 68, 71 – Guide of the Perplexed 85‒89, 92f.,101‒3, Hegel, GeorgWilhelm Friedrich 153 105, 110,115, 162 Henricus Aristippus 134 Mair,John 136f.,143 Henricus Stephanus See Estienne, Henri Manichaeism6 Index 225

Marion, Jean-Luc 162 Pseudo-Aristotle McGrath, Matthew 215 – TheologyofAristotle 69‒73 McPherran, Mark L. 36 Pseudo-Burley 134 Montaigne, Michel de 6, 133, 163, 168 – De vita et moribus philosophorum 134 Moses 87,94 Pyrrho 6, 15, 31, 134 Pyrrhonism1‒3, 7, 10, 12, 43‒48, 50‒64, 97, Nagel, Thomas 152 99, 101, 106, 108, 133f.,144, 165‒67, Narboni, Moses 2, 83, 87‒89, 114f. 170f.,174‒76, 178, 182‒91, 196‒99 negativetheology 116, 119 – Neo-Pyrrhonism 17f. Neo-Griceanism213 NicholasofAutrecourt 98, 129, 140 Rabbi Aqiba 108 NicholasofReggio 133 Rawls, John 51 Nifo, Augustino 140 Recanati, François214f. Nozick, Robert208 Régis, Pierre-Sylvain 168 Nussbaum, Martha 2, 51‒55, 57 Relevance theory213

Olivi, Peter 129f. Saadia Gaon 99 – Book of Doctrines and Beliefs 99 Paéz de Castro, Johannes 133 Saladin, Rabbi Zeraḥiah ha-Levi 89 Pascal, Blaise 6 Sanchez, Francisco 163 Pasnau, Robert98 Schmitt, Charles B. 6, 132f. Pellegrin, Pierre33, 38 Scholasticism107 Perler,Dominik 98, 150f.,160‒62 Scotus, John Duns130f.,135 Peter of Ailly 135, 141‒43 Sextus Empiricus 1, 3, 11, 23‒40,43‒48, 50, Peter of Auvergne 133 53, 55f.,58, 62‒64, 101, 109, 128‒34, Peter of Spain 136 166f.,175, 181‒86, 189‒91, 196, 198f. – Summaries of Logic 136 – Againstthe Ethicists 45 Philo of Alexandria 1, 5‒16, 18‒20, 99 – Againstthe Grammarians 24f.,28f., 31, 36, – AllegoricalInterpretation 12f. 38, 40 – On Drunkenness 8, 13 – Againstthe Mathematicians 132, 134 – On the Creation of the World 13 – Outlines of Pyrrhonism 25‒27,30f., 34‒38, – On the Life of Moses 10, 12 44f.,63, 128, 132‒34, 183f. – On the Special Laws 12 Sforno, Obadiah ben Jacob2,83, 92‒94 – Questions and Answers on Genesis 16 – Light of the Nations 92, 94 Photius 5, 10f. Shem Tovibn Falaquera99, 106 Pines, Shlomo 100f.,111 Siger of Brabant 98 Plato110,130f. Spinoza, Baruch 3, 147‒63 – Meno 130f. – Ethics 148f.,152f.,156f. – Phaedo 130 – Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect Platonic Academy 18f. 148f.,152, 155f. – New Academy 6‒8, 12, 17f. Stanley, Jason 211 Platonism 5, 17 Stoicism 7‒9, 13, 15, 19, 28, 53, 131, 137,184, Plotinus 69, 71 197 – Enneads 2, 69, 71 Suárez, Francisco141 Popkin, Richard165‒67,170f.,175f.,178, 181‒84, 186‒91, 197f. Themistius 103 Pritchard, Duncan206 TheologyofAristotle 2, 69‒73 Profayt Duran 99, 113 Thomas Aquinas 99, 111 Protagoras29, 32 – Commentaryonthe Sentences 99 – SummaTheologiae 111 226 Index

Timon of Phlius 16, 134 William of Ockham 98, 127,129‒31, 135, 137, Traversari, Ambrogio 134 141 truth-conditional pragmatics 214f. Wittwer,Roland 133 Tubero, Lucius Aelius 5 Wolfson, HarryA.89

Voltaire174 Zeno of Citium9

Waxman, Meyer 91