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University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Philosophy Dissertations, Theses, & Student Research Philosophy, Department of July 2008 A DEFENSE OF MODERATE INVARIANTISM Leo W. Iacono University of Nebraska at Lincoln, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosophydiss Part of the Philosophy Commons Iacono, Leo W., "A DEFENSE OF MODERATE INVARIANTISM" (2008). Philosophy Dissertations, Theses, & Student Research. 1. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosophydiss/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Dissertations, Theses, & Student Research by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. A DEFENSE OF MODERATE INVARIANTISM by Leo Iacono A DISSERTATION Presented to the Faculty of The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Major: Philosophy Under the Supervision of Professor Albert Casullo Lincoln, Nebraska August, 2008 A DEFENSE OF MODERATE INVARIANTISM Leo Iacono, Ph.D. University of Nebraska, 2008 Adviser: Albert Casullo This dissertation is a defense of moderate invariantism, the traditional epistemological position combining the following three theses: invariantism, according to which the word ‘know’ expresses the same content in every context of use; intellectualism, according to which whether one knows a certain proposition does not depend on one’s practical interests; and anti- skepticism, according to which we really do know much of what we ordinarily take ourselves to know. Moderate invariantism needs defending because of seemingly powerful arguments for contextualism, the view that, like ‘I’ and ‘now’, ‘know’ expresses different contents in different contexts. It has been argued that only contextualism can properly reply to skeptical arguments, and that only contextualism can account for our tendency to go from judging that a knowledge claim is true to judging that it is false in response to shifts in the context of use. Moderate invariantist replies to these arguments have largely failed. I propose new replies on behalf of moderate invariantism, while critiquing earlier, less successful attempts. Chapter one is introductory. In chapters two and three, I examine contextualist replies to skeptical arguments arising from radical skeptical hypotheses (such as the possibility that one is a brain in a vat) and from considerations involving lotteries. I argue that if contextualism can adequately respond to these arguments, then there are equally effective replies available to the moderate invariantist. In the next two chapters, I examine Stewart Cohen’s “Airport Case,” which elicits intuitions about knowledge claims that supposedly only contextualism can accommodate. In chapter four, I argue that none of the invariantist replies to the case that depend on denying the intuitions succeed; in chapter five, I accept the intuitions, but argue that contextualism does not follow from them. Finally, in chapter six, I evaluate two interesting invariantist critiques of contextualism; according to the first, contextualism collapses into the radical position that every English expression is context-sensitive; according to the second, ‘know’ fails a test for context-sensitivity involving indirect speech reports. For Millie, who puts things into context vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Several current or former Nebraska philosophers have provided me with helpful comments and advice at various stages of writing this dissertation. My greatest debt, by far, is to my advisor Albert Casullo, who has been an exemplary teacher and mentor to me throughout my graduate education. Al provided prompt, careful, and incisive feedback on multiple drafts of each of the chapters of this dissertation, as well as related papers that I sent to journals and conferences, and several other proto-chapters that didn’t get into the final version. In addition to his help with my dissertation, Al has been an unfailing source of support and good advice about the practice of philosophy and the philosophical profession. I couldn’t have hoped for a better advisor. Thanks also to Tim Black and Sarah Sawyer for comments on a draft of chapter 2, and to Joseph Mendola for his comments on a late draft of the entire dissertation. Much of the material contained here was initially presented at several meetings of the UNL philosophy department’s graduate student colloquium. I thank all those who attended those talks, and in particular Brent Braga, David Chavez, Mark Decker, Cullen Gatten, Danielle Hampton, Howard Hewitt, Clayton Littlejohn, Tim Loughlin, Sruthi Rothenfluch, and Steve Swartzer. Finally, love and thanks to my wife Amanda Gailey, whose patience, encouragement, good humor, and wit helped make writing this dissertation, and much else besides, a pleasure. vii CONTENTS ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................................iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ……………………………………………………………………vi TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................................vii Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... 1 1. Moderate invariantism and its competitors............................................................. 1 2. Traditional epistemology and EC: business as usual? ............................................ 3 3. Further preliminary comments................................................................................ 8 4. Outline of chapters 2–6......................................................................................... 17 2. CONTEXTUALISM AND SKEPTICISM................................................................. 20 1. Introductory remarks............................................................................................. 20 2. Constraints on an adequate response to the skeptical paradox ............................. 21 3. Invariantist and contextualist responses to AI ...................................................... 23 4. Representing different knowledge relations ......................................................... 24 5. DeRose-style responses to AI............................................................................... 25 6. The moderate standards argument from ignorance............................................... 27 7. Critiques from semantic ignorance....................................................................... 31 8. Restricting the contextualist’s options.................................................................. 38 9. The paradox presented by MAI ............................................................................ 49 3. CONTEXTUALISM AND THE LOTTERY ............................................................. 53 1. Introductory remarks............................................................................................. 53 2. The lottery conviction........................................................................................... 56 viii 3. Lottery arguments ................................................................................................. 57 4. EC and lottery arguments...................................................................................... 65 5. SSI and lotteries.................................................................................................... 69 6. A moderate invariantist reply to lottery arguments .............................................. 79 7. Rejecting the lottery conviction............................................................................ 85 4. THE AIRPORT CASE (I): INTUITION–DENYING REPLIES ............................... 96 1. Introductory remarks............................................................................................. 96 2. Warranted assertability maneuvers..................................................................... 100 3. Implicature based replies .................................................................................... 114 4. Bach and belief removal ..................................................................................... 126 5. Williamson and psychological bias..................................................................... 128 6. Stanley and salient questions .............................................................................. 131 5. THE AIRPORT CASE (II): SPEECH ACT PLURALISM ..................................... 136 1. Introductory remarks........................................................................................... 136 2. The response from speech act pluralism............................................................. 137 3. A new argument for EC...................................................................................... 143 4. An objection to the New Airport Argument ....................................................... 146 5. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 153 6. CAPPELEN AND LEPORE’S CRITIQUE OF CONTEXTUALISM..................... 157 1. Introductory remarks........................................................................................... 157 2. The collapse argument.......................................................................................
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