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Home , Fallibilism, James Pryor, Keith DeRose

Seminar in : (PHIL 468)

Professor Baron Reed Spring Quarter, 2012 office: 3-225 Kresge Hall 2-345 Kresge Hall email: [email protected] T 4:00-6:50 office hours: T/Th 12:30-1:30 and by appointment

Course Description: “We are all fallibilists nowadays,” says Michael Williams. This is almost entirely true. But, despite its near-universal acceptance, fallibilism remains poorly understood. There are significant problems that follow in its wake—e.g,. the and the Lottery Paradox. Moreover, some philosophers claim more for than fallibilism can deliver, tying knowledge to assertion, practical , and epistemic possibility. Finally, some philosophers think that the very idea of fallibilism is suspect; if the view is correct, it means “the world must do us a favor,” as John McDowell puts it. But the whole point of knowledge, one might have thought, is that it puts one in such a position that favors are not needed. In this seminar, we will investigate whether fallibilism has the resources to meet some or all of these concerns.

Required Texts: Readings to be posted on Blackboard.

Required Work: Work for the course will include a short paper, a presentation, a commentary on a classmate’s paper, and a final paper:

20% Short paper (4-5 pages) 20% Presentation (4-5 pages) 10% Comments (2 pages) 50% Final Paper (10 pages)

Excellent class participation may also factor into the final grade.

Course Policies:

(1) Regular contributions to discussion will be expected. (2) Extensions must be requested before the due date. (3) VERY IMPORTANT: plagiarism will not be tolerated. All cases of alleged violation of academic integrity will be referred to the Assistant Dean for 2

Advising and Academic Integrity. Possible penalties range from failing the course to permanent exclusion from the university. For more on plagiarism, see: http://www.wcas.northwestern.edu/advising/dishon.html http://www.writing.northwestern.edu/avoiding_plagiarism.html.

Students with Disabilities: Any student with a documented disability needing accommodations is requested to speak directly to the Office of Services for Students with Disabilities (SSD) (847-467- 5530) and the instructor, as early as possible in the quarter (preferably within the first two weeks of class). All discussions will remain confidential.

Blackboard: Much of the business of this course, including access to readings on reserve, will be conducted through the Course Management System (Blackboard). You are encouraged to check it frequently, as I may post announcements there from time to time. To access Blackboard, you will need to use your NetID and password. The web address for Blackboard is: https://courses.northwestern.edu/webapps/login/.

Schedule of Readings:

Mar. 27 Gettier problem (1) , “Is Justified True Knowledge?” Analysis 23 (1963): 121-3. (2) Stephen Hetherington, “The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier’s Challenge: A Case Study,” Philosophia (forthcoming).

Apr. 3 (1) , “, Knowledge, and Probability,” of 38 (1971): 216-220. (2) Andrew Moon, “Warrant Does Entail ,” Synthese 184 (2012): 287-97. (3) Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath, “Infallibilism or Pragmatic Encroachment?” ch. 7 of Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009), pp. 185-212. (4) Ram Neta, “A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism,” Noûs (forthcoming).

Apr. 10 Lottery & preface paradoxes (1) Dana Nelkin, “The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality,” Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 373-409. (2) John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004 (ch. 1). (3) Richard Foley, “Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis,” in 3

Degrees of Belief, ed. by F. Huber and C. Schmidt-Petri. Synthese Library 342 (2009): 37-47. (4) Niko Kolodny, “How Does Coherence Matter?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (2007): 229-63.

Apr. 17 Epistemic possibility and concessive knowledge attributions (1) Keith DeRose, “Epistemic Possibilities,” Philosophical Review 100 (1991): 581- 605. (2) Jason Stanley, “Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions,” Analysis 65 (2005): 126-31. (3) Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew, “Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2009): 123-32. (4) Dylan Dodd, “Confusion about Concessive Knowledge Attributions,” Synthese 172 (2010): 381-96. (5) Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew, “Clarity about Concessive Knowledge Attributions,” Synthese 181 (2011): 395-403. (6) Jason Stanley, “Knowledge and ,” Philosophical Issues 18 (2008): 35- 57. (7) Josh Dever, “Epistemic Modals,” in The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, ed. by Sven Bernecker and . London: Routledge, 2011 (545- 57).

Apr. 24 Epistemic probability (1) Henry Kyburg, Jr., “Probability as a Guide in Life,” in Probability Is the Very Guide of Life, ed. by Henry Kyburg, Jr., and Mariam Thalos. Chicago: Open Court, 2003 (135-50). (2) Alan Hájek, “Conditional Probability Is the Very Guide of Life,” in Probability Is the Very Guide of Life, ed. by Henry Kyburg, Jr., and Mariam Thalos. Chicago: Open Court, 2003 (183-203). (3) Richard Fumerton, “Epistemic Probability,” Philosophical Issues (Epistemology) (2004) 14: 149-64. (4) , “What Is Justified Belief?” in Justification and Knowledge, ed. by George Pappas. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979 (1-23). (5) James Van Cleve, “Probability and Certainty: A Reexamination of the Lewis-Reichenbach Debate,” Philosophical Studies 32 (1977): 323-34.

May 1 Action & assertion (1) , Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000 (ch. 2 [section 4], ch. 11). (2) John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley, “Knowledge and Action,” Journal of 4

Philosophy 105 (2008): 571-90. (3) Jessica Brown, “Fallibilism and the Knowledge for Assertion and Practical Reasoning,” in Assertion, ed. by Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 (153-74).

May 8 Epistemic agency & the goal of knowledge/belief (1) Marian David, “Truth as the Epistemic Goal,” in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty, ed. by Matthias Steup. Oxford: Oxford Univesity Press, 2001 (151-69). (2) Stephen Grimm, “Epistemic Goals and Epistemic Values,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2008): 725-44. (3) Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 (ch. 3). (4) Nishi Shah and J. David Velleman, “Doxastic Deliberation,” Philosophical Review 114 (2005): 497-534.

May 15 (1) James Pryor, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist,” Noûs 34 (2000): 517-49. (2) Jonathan Vogel, “Skeptical ,” Philosophical Issues 14 (2004): 426- 55. (3) Anthony Brueckner, “Fallibilism, , and Skepticism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005): 384-91. (4) , Reflective Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 (ch. 8).

May 22 Presentations

May 29 Reading period begins Presentations

June 5 Final papers due (12 PM)