1 a Tale of Two Interpretations

Notes 1 A Tale of Two Interpretations 1. As Georges Dicker puts it, “Hume’s influence on contemporary epistemology and metaphysics is second to none ... ” (1998, ix). Note, too, that Hume’s impact extends beyond philosophy. For consider the following passage from Einstein’s letter to Moritz Schlick: Your representations that the theory of rel. [relativity] suggests itself in positivism, yet without requiring it, are also very right. In this also you saw correctly that this line of thought had a great influence on my efforts, and more specifically, E. Mach, and even more so Hume, whose Treatise of Human Nature I had studied avidly and with admiration shortly before discovering the theory of relativity. It is very possible that without these philosophical studies I would not have arrived at the solution (Einstein 1998, 161). 2. For a brief overview of Hume’s connection to naturalized epistemology, see Morris (2008, 472–3). 3. For the sake of convenience, I sometimes refer to the “traditional reading of Hume as a sceptic” as, e.g., “the sceptical reading of Hume” or simply “the sceptical reading”. Moreover, I often refer to those who read Hume as a sceptic as, e.g., “the sceptical interpreters of Hume” or “the sceptical interpreters”. By the same token, I sometimes refer to those who read Hume as a naturalist as, e.g., “the naturalist interpreters of Hume” or simply “the naturalist interpreters”. And the reading that the naturalist interpreters support I refer to as, e.g., “the naturalist reading” or “the naturalist interpretation”. 4. This is not to say, though, that dissenting voices were entirely absent. Spencer and some other nineteenth-century thinkers interpreted Hume as a naturalist (see Pakaluk 1989, 454, n. 25). 5. Some of these earlier interpreters clearly saw that Hume was more than simply a sceptical thinker. For more on this topic, see Paul Russell (2008, ch. 2). 6. For more on this Russellian rehabilitation, see Garrett’s (2005, xxviii–xxix) introduction to the Kemp Smith work. 7. In Russell’s words: “David Hume ... developed to its logical conclusion the empirical philosophy of Locke and Berkeley, and by making it self-consistent made it incredible. He represents ... a dead end. ... I cannot but hope that something less sceptical than Hume’s system may be discoverable” (1947, 685). 8. A. J. Ayer’s famous Language, Truth and Logic, for example, explicitly patterns itself after a significant part of Hume’s philosophy: “The views which are put forward in this treatise derive from the doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein, which are themselves the logical outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley and Hume. Like Hume, I divide all genuine propositions into 157 158 Notes two classes: those which, in his terminology, concern ‘relations of ideas’ and those which concern ‘matters of fact’” (1952, 31). 9. An exception that appears to prove the rule is Ayer (1980). For some scathing criticisms of Ayer, see Flew (1986, 119) and Capaldi, King and Livingston (1991, 255). For a recent plea not to dismiss the positivist readings so quickly, see Williams (2004, 269–70). 10. Although Loeb explicitly restricts his claims about not interpreting Hume as a sceptic to the reasoning of Treatise I.iii.6 (Loeb 2006, 322), his overall argument rests upon Hume thinking that some beliefs are “justified” (Loeb’s term), which would presumably undermine any radically sceptical interpretation of Hume. 11. Even when those who see some sceptical leanings in Hume, such as Fogelin (1985), are accused of ignoring “the historical context of Hume’s writings”, the main criticism lodged is expository or philosophical: “The main diffi- culty with Fogelin’s book is trying to see exactly what Fogelin means by scepticism ... ” (Capaldi, King, and Livingston 1991, 257). 12. For a discussion of the relevant epistemological issues here, see Meeker (2004). 13. Recall that I have only claimed that there is an analogy between theory construction (and appraisal) in science and interpretation construction in philosophy. I am not claiming that they are identical. So it is not part of my view that refutability, a virtue of scientific hypotheses according to Quine and Ullian (1970, 79), is a virtue of an interpretive framework in philosophy. Nevertheless, in drawing on some of the theoretical virtues in scientific theorizing, I am attempting to construct something resembling a naturalistic theory of philosophical interpretation. In Chapter 8 I also appeal to some results on cognitive science to bolster my interpretation of Hume. Such an appeal to the scientific theories to help understand a philosopher’s thoughts is also, I take it, in line with a naturalistic theory of philosophical interpretation. Of course, such attempts to build a naturalistic theory of anything are plagued by many philosophical problems, some of which I soon discuss. 14. Note that (PIP) is an interpretive principle, one similar to Michael Huemer’s perceptual rule of Phenomenal Conservatism (see Huemer 2001, 99). 15. When Loeb writes about the “scholarly consensus” that the traditional interpretation of Hume as an inductive sceptic is “mistaken”, he sometimes appears to back off the claim that dissent is “untenable” and claims instead that “no serious historical work on Hume can ignore the case against the tradition” (Loeb 2008, 109). This claim fits well with my judgement that anyone proposing an overall reading of Hume as a sceptic (and not just about induction) needs to deal with the alternative interpretations that function as a defeater. 16. Even more specifically, according to Loeb: The amendments involve omitting wrongheaded arguments and theses to which Hume commits himself. ... The amendments I propose abandon a number of Hume’s destructive claims and in some cases remove obsta- cles to Hume adopting more positive positions. ... I propose the amendments in order to show how a suitably revised version of Book I would have left Hume’s constructive epistemological theory in a considerably stronger position (2002, viii–ix). Notes 159 17. These comments apply to standards for a communal philosophical debate. These remarks are not necessarily meant to apply to the justification any particular individual may possess in developing an interpretation of Hume. 18. Although Loeb is correct that there have always been a few “hold-outs” (Loeb mentions in particular Penelhum 1992 and Winkler 1999), the sceptical reading of Hume has welcomed some more recent, important defenders, such as Baxter (2008) and Schliesser (2008). 19. In another context this complaint is also specifically made about the “intel- lectual and textual surgery” (Capaldi, King and Livingston 1981, 168) performed on Hume’s works: “The surgery not only rips the life out of the text but it leaves a seemingly endless variety of Frankenstein monsters to stalk the philosophical journals. Succeeding generations then proceed to practice on the cadaver left by preceding generations. Hence is born the Hume industry” (Capaldi, King and Livingston 1981, 168–9). 20. Interestingly enough, even the “Just Say No” sign is not what it seems. Tom Sorell describes an e-mail exchange with the philosopher who alleg- edly posted the sign (Gilbert Harman) and relates that Harman’s views “ ... certainly do not express the deep hostility toward the history of philosophy that I ascribed to Harman on the basis of the gossip about the sign on his door” (Sorell 2005b, 44). The story of this sign seems to have taken on a life of its own. John Cottingham mentions the slogan appearing “on car stickers on some American campuses” (Cottingham 2005, 25). I suspect that much of the alleged conflict between analytic philosophers and historians of philosophy rests on misunderstandings and is flamed by misleading stories such as this sign saga. 21. Daniel Garber protests that “ ... in order to mine the past for arguments and positions of contemporary interest, as the collegial historian of philosophy [e.g., Bennett] wants to do, we must read the history of philosophy through our own philosophical categories” (Garber 2005, 18). It is not clear why a collegial historian must apply contemporary categories to historical texts. Couldn’t one try to discover how historical categories differ from contemporary ones for the purpose of detecting hidden presuppositions in our own approaches? 22. For complaints about Hume’s discussion of scepticism in EHU along these lines, see Norton (2002, 379) and Millican (2002b, 62). 23. We should also not ignore the continuity between contemporary sceptical discussions and historical ones. Richard Popkin, probably one of the fore- most historians of scepticism of all time, characterizes ancient scepticism in terms of a lack of knowledge and sufficient evidence (Popkin 2003, xvii). Even more remarkably, consider his portrayal of scepticism in the early modern period: “ ... scepticism meaning a philosophical view that raises doubts about the adequacy or reliability of the evidence that could be offered to justify a proposition” (Popkin 2003, xxi). 24. Others also distinguish broadly between scepticism about knowledge and scepticism about belief (see, e.g., Burnyeat 1983b, 118–19). My distinction also somewhat resembles Fogelin’s distinction between theoretical and prescriptive scepticism (see his 1983 and 1985). According to Fogelin theoretical scepticism amounts to the claim that “[t]here are no rational grounds for judgments of kind A” while prescriptive scepticism amounts to the claim 160 Notes that “[o]ne ought not to assent to judgments of kind A” (1983, 398). One of the most important differences between Fogelin’s classification and mine, as will be seen, is that my epistemic scepticism is a broader category than Fogelin’s theoretical scepticism, allowing for several subcategories that may include his theoretical scepticism. 25. It is also compatible with a denial of Fogelin’s theoretical or prescriptive scepticism.

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