Reconciling Aesthetic Philosophy and the Cartesian Paradigm Taryn Sweeney IDVSA

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Reconciling Aesthetic Philosophy and the Cartesian Paradigm Taryn Sweeney IDVSA Maine State Library Digital Maine Academic Research and Dissertations Maine State Library Special Collections 2018 Aesthesis Universalis: Reconciling Aesthetic Philosophy and the Cartesian Paradigm Taryn Sweeney IDVSA Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalmaine.com/academic Recommended Citation Sweeney, Taryn, "Aesthesis Universalis: Reconciling Aesthetic Philosophy and the Cartesian Paradigm" (2018). Academic Research and Dissertations. 21. https://digitalmaine.com/academic/21 This Text is brought to you for free and open access by the Maine State Library Special Collections at Digital Maine. It has been accepted for inclusion in Academic Research and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Maine. For more information, please contact [email protected]. AESTHESIS UNIVERSALIS: RECONCILING AESTHETIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE CARTESIAN PARADIGM Taryn M Sweeney Submitted to the faculty of The Institute for Doctoral Studies in the Visual Arts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy November, 2018 ii Accepted by the faculty of the Institute for Doctoral Studies in the Visual Arts in partial fulfillment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. COMMITTEE MEMBERS Committee Chair: Don Wehrs, Ph.D. Hargis Professor of English Literature Auburn University, Auburn Committee Member: Merle Williams, Ph.D. Personal Professor of English University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg Committee Member: Kathe Hicks Albrecht, Ph.D. Independent Studies Director Institute for Doctoral Studies in the Visual Arts, Portland iii © 2018 Taryn M Sweeney ALL RIGHTS RESERVED iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe a profound gratitude to my advisor, Don Wehrs, for his tremendous patience, sympathy, and acceptance of my completely un-academic self as I approached this most ambitious and academic of undertakings. I am a better writer, a better thinker, and a better inquirer because of him. I must, of course, acknowledge the faculty and staff of the Institute for Doctoral Studies in the Visual Arts: George Smith, Simonetta Moro, Sigrid Hackenburg, Denise Carvalho, Amy Cook, Michael Smith, and Amy Curtis. They have all been my teachers, both in the classroom and out. A very special thank you most go to Stefan Koller, who helped me find my voice as writer. To Geoff Andersen, for helping to make this a possibility. To Don’s wife, Lorna Wood, for dinners and encouragement (both are essential to success). To my parents, Bill and Kathy Sweeney, I am so very grateful for their love and support. To Glen and Ruth Archer for their sympathetic ears and sage advice. To Karen Dampeer for reminding me that I am capable of more. To Bill Sweeney, Laura Chandler, and Will and Hailey Archer for giving me the space and time to work. To all that have listened to the tears, the shrieks, and the grumbling. To all that wanted to know what I was writing about—you all helped me figure it out along the way. And most importantly, to Nathan Archer, for believing I could. v ABSTRACT Taryn M Sweeney AESTHESIS UNIVERSALIS: RECONCILING AESTHETIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE CARTESIAN PARDIGM The Cartesian paradigm, in its modern existence, can be understood as comprised of four pillars—the founding principle of cogito ergo sum, dualism, a mechanistic worldview, and mathesis universalis. Each of these four pillars contributes to aesthetic philosophy in foundational ways that are largely unacknowledged. This error is owed to literal readings of Descartes’ works that neglect the operational intentions of his paradigm. When one approaches the Cartesian paradigm operationally, it is revealed that aesthetic philosophy owes a tremendous debt to Descartes’ works. Moreover, modern philosophers have dedicated substantial efforts to connecting subjective concepts such as mood and sensation to Descartes’ paradigm. These connections, which all rely on literal readings of the paradigm, are often tenuous and depend heavily on large extrapolation from small notations. However a broader reading of Descartes’ model of the soul reveals a unique niche for subjective expression which provides a distinct role for aesthetic considerations in his epistemology. Revelatory knowledge—knowledge of a nonscientific nature that reveals things as they are—need not be marginalized from mathesis universalis. What is more, it is revealed that aesthetic philosophy is one of the largest contributors to the overall project of mathesis universalis in modernity. This contribution is based on the act of poiesis—a form of knowledge-making that is grossly overlooked as an epistemological process. A series of paintings by Joseph Wright of Derby provide a case study of how revelatory knowledge can be integrated with, and inform, the Cartesian paradigm. vi Concepts of modernity by Hans Blumenberg illuminate the need for understanding revelatory knowledge as integral to mathesis universalis by imaging the pillar as an evolving mechanism of human construction. In conclusion, a discussion of the parallels between aesthetics and other marginalized epistemic sources (women, artists, and fiction) reveal consonant efforts to reshape mathesis universalis as more inclusive of revelatory knowledge. Keywords: Descartes, Epistemology, Joseph Wright of Derby, Cartesian paradigm, Sources of Knowledge vii Table of Contents INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................1 CHAPTER 1 ....................................................................................................................................4 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................4 The Question of Need.....................................................................................................................5 The Cartesian Paradigm: The Four Pillars .................................................................................6 The Cogito as Performance and Peacemaker .............................................................................7 Dualism as a Practical Concept ..................................................................................................16 Mechanistic World View .............................................................................................................20 Mathesis Universalis ....................................................................................................................24 The Constitution of an Aesthetic Program ................................................................................26 The Arts and Knowledge .............................................................................................................34 CHAPTER 2 ..................................................................................................................................37 Connecting Descartes to Aesthetics ............................................................................................37 The Aesthetic Positions of Descartes’ Influences ......................................................................38 Augustine and Descartes .............................................................................................................39 Plato and Descartes ......................................................................................................................41 Aristotle and Descartes ................................................................................................................44 Filling the Aesthetic Void ............................................................................................................47 The Body as a Sensing Machine .................................................................................................49 Mood and Objectivity ..................................................................................................................53 Introspection as a Means of Objectivizing the Subjective .......................................................59 Heidegger’s Four Principles Opposing the Cartesian Paradigm ............................................65 Heidegger and Aesthetics ............................................................................................................71 CHAPTER 3 ..................................................................................................................................74 Descartes and Beauty ...................................................................................................................74 The Cartesian Model of the Soul: A Synthesis of Plato and Aristotle ....................................75 The Characteristics of the Cartesian Soul .................................................................................82 Cartesian Morality and Virtue ...................................................................................................85 Cartesian Practical Ethics ...........................................................................................................90 Descartes’ Views on Poetry as Medicine ....................................................................................93 Descartes on Beauty .....................................................................................................................97 CHAPTER 4 ................................................................................................................................100 Introduction ................................................................................................................................100
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