The Virtue of Feminist Rationality Continuum Studies in Philosophy Series Editor: James Fieser, University of Tennessee at Martin, USA Continuum Studies in Philosophy is a major monograph series from Continuum. The series features first-class scholarly research monographs across the whole field of philo- sophy. Each work makes a major contribution to the field of philosophical research. Aesthetic in Kant, James Kirwan Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion, Aaron Preston Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus, Christopher Brown Augustine and Roman Virtue, Brian Harding The Challenge of Relativism, Patrick Phillips Demands of Taste in Kant’s Aesthetics, Brent Kalar Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature, Justin Skirry Descartes’ Theory of Ideas, David Clemenson Dialectic of Romanticism, Peter Murphy and David Roberts Duns Scotus and the Problem of Universals, Todd Bates Hegel’s Philosophy of Language, Jim Vernon Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, David James Hegel’s Theory of Recognition, Sybol S.C. Anderson The History of Intentionality, Ryan Hickerson Kantian Deeds, Henrik Jøker Bjerre Kierkegaard, Metaphysics and Political Theory, Alison Assiter Kierkegaard’s Analysis of Radical Evil, David A. Roberts Leibniz Re-interpreted, Lloyd Strickland Metaphysics and the End of Philosophy, HO Mounce Nietzsche and the Greeks, Dale Wilkerson Origins of Analytic Philosophy, Delbert Reed Philosophy of Miracles, David Corner Platonism, Music and the Listener’s Share, Christopher Norris Popper’s Theory of Science, Carlos Garcia Postanalytic and Metacontinental, edited by James Williams, Jack Reynolds, James Chase and Ed Mares Rationality and Feminist Philosophy, Deborah K. Heikes Re-thinking the Cogito, Christopher Norris Role of God in Spinoza’s Metaphysics, Sherry Deveaux Rousseau and Radical Democracy, Kevin Inston Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue, James Delaney Rousseau’s Theory of Freedom, Matthew Simpson Spinoza and the Stoics, Firmin DeBrabander Spinoza’s Radical Cartesian Mind, Tammy Nyden-Bullock St. Augustine and the Theory of Just War, John Mark Mattox St. Augustine of Hippo, R.W. Dyson Thomas Aquinas & John Duns Scotus, Alex Hall Tolerance and the Ethical Life, Andrew Fiala The Virtue of Feminist Rationality Deborah K. Heikes Continuum Studies in Philosophy Continuum International Publishing Group The Tower Building 80 Maiden Lane 11 York Road Suite 704 London SE1 7NX New York NY 10038 www.continuumbooks.com © Deborah K. Heikes 2012 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Deborah K. Heikes has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 978-1-4411-8657-7 e-ISBN: 978-1-4411-8880-9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Heikes, Deborah K. The virtue of feminist rationality/Deborah K. Heikes. p. cm. – (Continuum studies in philosophy) Includes bibliographical references (p. ). ISBN 978-1-4411-8657-7 (hardcover) – ISBN 978-1-4411-8880-9 (pdf) 1. Rationalism. 2. Reason. 3. Feminist theory. I. Title. B833.H454 2012 128’.33082–dc23 2011034958 Typeset by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India For my mom and in memory of my dad vi Contents Acknowledgments viii Chapter 1: Why Reason? 1 Chapter 2: The Fossil of Reason 17 Chapter 3: The Virtue of Reason 43 Chapter 4: The Virtue of Embodiment 71 Chapter 5: The Virtue of Emotion 95 Chapter 6: The Virtue of Difference 119 Chapter 7: The Virtue of Subjectivity 149 Chapter 8: The Future of Reason 173 Notes 187 References 197 Index 205 Acknowledgments In a quite roundabout way, this work is the culmination of the task I set for myself when I wrote my dissertation. Back then, I had an inkling of what I wanted to say, but I knew that it was going to take me more than a couple of years to formulate it. And so it did. I certainly have not addressed nor resolved every issue that interested or still interests me, but it is a step in that direction. I would have loved to have written this book all those years ago, but I was not yet ready. That being said, I have many people to thank for my philosophical educa- tion and my leaning to think about these issues in the way I do. Stuart Rosenbaum and Steven Wagner have shaped my thoughts in especially sig- nificant ways, but the person who stood out the most while I was writing this is someone whose influence I failed to recognize for well over a decade, Peter Winch. Professor Winch is the person who truly taught me Wittgenstein, and while I have always been thankful to him for that, I never quite realized the impact he had on my life and career until recently. He was a shy and reserved man, but he took enormous interest in my career when I was a student at Illinois. Outside of my dissertation advisor, he probably had the biggest impact on my philosophical thinking. I wish he were here today so that I could personally thank him. Since he is not, this remembrance will have to do. In addition to my teachers, I also wish to thank the philosophy students I have had over the past year, especially in my Junior Research Seminar and Modern Philosophy classes. As I worked on this book, they helped me think through the ideas and have challenged me to find clear explanations of some of the key points concerning differences between modern and post- modern (in the broad sense) conceptions of rationality. Most directly, some of my colloquial explanations of Kant came directly from these classes. I am grateful to my colleagues at UAH who have been patient with my single-minded focus on finishing this text. To them, I promise to pick up the slack. I am equally grateful to Sarah Campbell and the entire staff at Acknowledgments ix Continuum. They make the process of publishing as painless as it can be. I thank Ann Cudd and Alessandra Tanesini for their support. Each has made substantial contributions to my efforts. And, as always, I thank Augusta Gooch for her tireless efforts to make my work clearer and more grammati- cally precise. I have a tendency to write sentences that are far too long, and she has a tendency to object to every last one of them. In the end, and after much resistance, I always find her to be correct. Finally, I want to thank my mom, who for several months had to listen to daily progress reports on this work. She is my biggest supporter, and I know she will proudly display a copy of this book on her living room bookshelf, even if she never reads it. x 1Chapter 1Chapter Why Reason? The concepts of reason and rationality have fallen on hard times. Over the past several decades, many philosophers have noted a “sudden loss of con- fidence in our traditional ideas about rationality . [one] marked enough, and widespread enough, to constitute . an episode, not just a collection of contemporary events” (Toulmin 2001, 3). Despite the crisis that has befallen reason, feminists need the concept. Without it, we lack grounds for truth, and without truth, feminists can only proselytize and preach to the converted. Put simply, feminism needs a full-bodied, substantive, and nor- mative rationality. While such claims may appear antithetical to much of feminism, I firmly believe that feminists who fail to consider positive accounts of rationality are giving up far too much. My goal is to consider what feminists want from rationality and to begin building an account that is not simply sensitive to feminist concerns but, more importantly, that seeks to capture what rationality genuinely is. Because rationality has always had a strong association with the mascu- line, the search for a feminist theory of rationality appears contrary to much feminist thinking. One of the more common feminist attitudes is that “there is no place on the terrain of Reason to which women can claim rightful occupancy” (Code 1991, 119). And for much of philosophical history this sentiment correctly assess the philosophical landscape. The history of phi- losophy carves out precious little space for women, and what space is avail- able is, almost without exception, undesirable. Nevertheless, abandoning reason to men is a risky tactic. If feminists share anything in common, it is that women have been and are oppressed and that such oppression is unjust. How can we argue for or establish the truth of these claims if we concede the inherent masculinity of reason? If we accept that there is no place for women within the domain of the rational, how are we to frame our moral and political requests (and demands) so that they are (or should be) taken seriously? And despite rationality’s almost invariable historical association with the masculine, why should feminists accept this sort of 2 The Virtue of Feminist Rationality essentialism concerning the concept? Why can women not co-opt philo- sophical concepts in the same manner that men are accused of doing? The answers to these questions by no means come easily, but accepting the inherent masculinity of reason is a dead end. Women must carve out for ourselves territory within the terrain of Reason that is our rightful domain. We should not accept either exile or living as strangers in a strange land. So what do feminists stand to gain by formulating a theory of rationality? The short answer parallels Sandra Harding’s response to the question: Why do feminists need an epistemology? First, because “feminists need a defense against, and an alternative, positive program to, the traditional discourses .