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The Pennsylvania State University The Graduate School College of the Liberal Arts EXISTENTIALIST ROOTS OF FEMINIST ETHICS A Dissertation in Philosophy by Deniz Durmus Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy August 2015 The dissertation of Deniz Durmus was reviewed and approved* by the following: Shannon Sullivan Professor of Philosophy Women's Studies, and African American Studies, Department Head, Dissertation Advisor, Co-Chair Committee Sarah Clark Miller Associate Professor of Philosophy, Associate Director of Rock Ethics Institute, Co-Chair Committee John Christman Professor of Philosophy, Women’s Studies Robert Bernasconi Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of Philosophy, African American Studies Christine Clark Evans Professor of French and Francophone Studies, Women’s Studies Amy Allen Liberal Arts Professor of Philosophy, Head of Philosophy Department *Signatures are on file in the Graduate School. ii ABSTRACT My dissertation “Existentialist Roots of Feminist Ethics” is an account of existentialist feminist ethics written from the perspective of ambiguous nature of interconnectedness of human freedoms. It explores existentialist tenets in feminist ethics and care ethics and reclaims existentialism as a resourceful theory in addressing global ethical issues. My dissertation moves beyond the once prevalent paradigm that feminist ethics should be devoid of any traditional ethical theories and it shows that an existential phenomenological ethics can complement feminist ethics in a productive way. The first chapter, introduces and discusses an existentialist notion of freedom based on Simone de Beauvoir and Jean Paul Sartre’s writings. In order to establish that human beings are metaphysically free, I explain notions of in-itself, for-itself, transcendence, immanence, facticity, and bad faith which are the basic notions of an existentialist notion of freedom. I discuss the changes in Sartre’s notion of freedom in his early and late writings and point out Beauvoir’s possible influence on this change. The second chapter discusses Simone de Beauvoir’s account of oppression within the framework of her existential feminist ethics. By examining her three major philosophical works which are ‘Pyrrhus and Cineas’, The Ethics of Ambiguity, and The Second Sex, I explain her notion of interconnectedness of freedom as the basic human condition and develop it as a model of relational subjectivity that constitutes the core of feminist ethics. I argue that the notion of relational subjectivity constitutes the fundamental congruence among feminist and existentialist ethics. The ways in which we relate to and deal with others determines the ethical stance we take in the world. Hence, relational subjectivity invites a broadly construed notion of responsibility as another basic component of Beauvoir’s account of existentialist phenomenological feminist ethics and another point of congruence between feminist ethics and existentialist ethics. I respond the feminist critiques leveled at existentialism and defend Beauvoir’s account as one that already foresees the problems in existentialist ethics and offers viable corrections to them; i.e., Beauvoir’s notion of generosity as a corrective to Sartre’s account of necessarily conflictual human relations. My third chapter starts with a brief history of feminist ethics and care ethics based on Carol Gilligan’s and Nel Noddings’ works. I show both that care ethics constitutes a preliminary and significant part of feminist ethics, yet it is surpassed by the expanding critiques and discussions in feminist ethics. Drawing on the critiques of care ethics, I examine the recurring appearance of the idealized feminine subject of patriarchy in care ethics. I discuss Margaret Urban Walker’s account of care ethics as a healthy reconstruct of care ethics alert to the potential danger of reification of patriarchal femininity in care ethics. In this chapter, I also show how existentialism plays a significance role in the formulation of care ethics especially in Noddings’ work. I show that Beauvoir’s account of human existence and interpersonal relations as fundamentally interconnected and interrelated through each one’s freedoms and projects as it is developed in Ethics of Ambiguity and The Second Sex seems to offer a desired account that can operate within the framework of care ethics Noddings develops. In the fourth chapter, I explore Judith Butler’s work on feminist ethics in relation to Beauvoir’s existentialist feminist ethics. In the first section, I show how Beauvoir’s account of agency as an ambiguous becoming reverberates in Butler’s theory of gender performativity. In the second section, I discuss how Butler takes on some basic ethical questions concerning vulnerability and violence Beauvoir already accentuates in her writings. In my fifth chapter I discuss the strengths of the existentialist feminist ethics I develop in addressing issues in transnational feminism. I show that this account provides the ground for willing both one’s self and others free and assumes responsibility to foster both. On that basis, I provide an ethical critique of an attitude of indifference, which we all as privileged people living iii in affluent countries enjoy, and argue for an ethical responsibility that moves us into action in the face of atrocities we witness all around the world. I emphasize that such a critique from a Western perspective should be mindful of postcolonial and hegemonic discourses that underlies such atrocities. I use Beauvoir’s intervention in Djamila Boupacha’s detention and torture case during the Algerian War as a historical example where that type of a critique proved to be effective. Overall, I argue that the existential feminist account of ethics I develop in my dissertation is practically efficacious in compelling us to action based on the theoretical principles of our being free and our freedoms being intertwined. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………..….……vi INTRODUCTION Thesis Overview……………………………………………………………………………….1-9 Chapters Outline………………………………………………………………….… ………10-12 Chapter 1. FREEDOM AS THE BASIS OF AN EXISTENTIALIST ACCOUNT OF ETHICS Freedom as the Basic Human Condition……………………………………..………13-30 An Existentialist Account of Freedom……………………………………….....……30-48 Chapter 2. BEAUVOIR AND SARTRE’S CONCEPTION OF OPPRESSION……….........49-77 Chapter 3. EXISTENTIALIST ROOTS OF FEMINIST CARE ETHICS Introduction……………………………………………………………………..……78-82 Care Ethics……………………………………………………………………..…….82-88 Critiques of Care Ethics…………………………………………………………..….88-95 Existentialist Roots of Feminist Care Ethics………………………….……………95-116 Chapter 4. BEAUVOIR’S INFLUENCE ON BUTLER’S FEMINIST ETHICS Introduction………………………………………………………………………….…117 Judith Butler’s Theory of Gender Performativity and the Problem of Personal Agency in Butler and Beauvoir…………………………………………………………….…118-132 Existentialist Dimensions of Butler’s Ethics………………………………….…..132-145 . Chapter 5. EXISTENTIALIST FEMINIST ETHICS WITHOUT BORDERS Introduction……………………………………………………………………..…146-149 The Question of Intervention……………………………………………….….….149-153 Beauvoir’s Intervention in Djamila Boupacha’s Detention and Torture….....…….153-176 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………...….…177-185 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………..……......186-196 v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my family, friends, the professors at the Philosophy Department at Bogazici and Koc Universities in Istanbul and the professors in the Philosophy Department at the Pennsylvania State University. vi INTRODUCTION Thesis Overview My dissertation reintroduces existentialism as a viable ethical theory that has fruitful resources for feminist theory in general and feminist ethics in particular. In my dissertation, I demonstrate that existentialist ideas have had a significant influence on feminist ethics that often is unacknowledged. Through an analysis of the main works in care ethics and Judith Butler’s writings on ethics, I show the abundance of affinities between the basic insights that comprise these ethical theories. By emphasizing possible solutions existentialist ethics may offer for current problems in feminist ethical theory, my dissertation shows the continuing relevance of existentialist ethics. In bringing existentialist and feminist accounts of ethics together, my aim in this dissertation is to develop a defensible account of existentialist feminist ethics to which Beauvoir alludes in her writings without labeling it as feminist. In Ethics of Ambiguity, she explicitly describes her project as “existentialist ethics”. In The Second Sex, the project of an existentialist feminist ethics takes its most mature form. The fundamental principles of Beauvoir’s existentialist feminist ethics are that human beings are free, that their freedoms are interconnected, and that the first and foremost precondition of ethical action is to acknowledge one’s freedom and the relation of one’s freedom to others’ freedoms. Although I attribute the skeleton of the theory I am developing here to Beauvoir, I go beyond her work and use Sartre’s both early and late work to establish this fundamental principle about freedom. Using Sartre’s writings to support an existentialist feminist account of ethics presents its own challenges. To begin with, Sartre’s writings have been the target of feminist critiques for various reasons. First, 1 Beauvoir scholars have had to endure a long and challenging fight to show the philosophical independence