DOCSLIB.ORG

PENSARE IL BIOS B@Belonline/Print

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
PENSARE IL BIOS B@Belonline/Print PENSARE IL BIOS B@belonline/print Rivista semestrale di Filosofia N. 5 – Anno 2008 B@belonline/print è la versione a stampa della rivista elettronica www.babelonline.net Due modalità di esprimere la filosofia oggi che dialogano nell’identità e nella differenza dei modi e dei contenuti Questo numero della rivista è stato realizzato con il contributo del Dipartimento di Filosofia dell’Università degli Studi Roma Tre. B@belonline/print Direzione e Redazione Dipartimento di Filosofia Università degli Studi Roma Tre Via Ostiense 234 00146 Roma Sito Internet:http://host.uniroma3.it/dipartimenti/filosofia Tel. + 39.06.57338338/57338425 – fax + 39.06.57338340 Direttore: Francesca Brezzi Comitato direttivo: Patrizia Cipolletta ([email protected]) e Chiara Di Marco ([email protected] ) Comitato scientifico: Giuseppe Cantillo, Riccardo Chiaradonna, Claudia Dovolich, Daniella Iannotta, Giacomo Marramao, Elio Matassi, Paolo Nepi, Maria Teresa Pansera, Stefano Poggi, Beatrice Tortolici, Carmelo Vigna Comitato di redazione: Mattia Artibani, Francesca Gambetti, Carla Guetti, Davide Maggiore, Sabine Meine, Paolo Mulè Abbonamento annuale: 25 € (Italia), 30 € (Estero), 20 € (Studenti), 35 € (Sostenitori) da versare sul c.c. n. 38372207, intestato a: Associazione Culturale Mimesis. Spedire fotocopia della ricevuta alla Redazione di B@belonline via fax, o via e-mail, o via posta. Numeri arretrati: versare 20 € sul c.c. indicato e inviare la ricevuta alla Redazione. Libri per recensioni, riviste e manoscritti possono essere inviati alla Segreteria di redazione: Claudia Dovolich presso il Dipartimento. © 2008 – Mimesis Edizioni (Milano) Sede operativa e amministrativa: Via Mario Pichi 3 – 20143 Milano Telefono e fax: +39 02 89403935 Per urgenze: +39 347 4254976 E-mail: [email protected] Catalogo e sito Internet: www.mimesisedizioni.it In copertina: La Torre di Babele, Pieter Bruegel il Vecchio, 1563 Elaborazione Grafica di Marco De Meis B Voci e percorsi della differenza Rivista di Filosofia Mimesis B @belonline I ndice Editoriale di Francesca Brezzi Il Tema di B@bel a cura di Maria Teresa Pansera Pensare il bios Presentazione di Maria Teresa Pansera Il contributo della biologia all’antropologia filosofica del ‘900 Helmuth Plessner L’uomo come essere vivente Peter Sloterdijk L’animale abortito e la “autogenesi” del soggetto Rossella Bonito Oliva Immaginazione e sperimentazione. Due casi emblematici: Bolk e Simondon Franco Bosio, Natura e vita nel pensiero di Max Scheler Anna Calligaris Sloterdijk e l’umanismo, tra antropologia e filosofia Joachim Fischer Zur Kompatibilität von Biologie und Menschenwürde. Theorie strategien der Philosophischen Antropologie Micaela Latini L’antropologia eretica di G. Anders. Contingenza dell’umano ed eclissi del senso Paolo Nepi Jonas e il fenomeno della vita Maria Teresa Pansera Natura e cultura nell’antropologia di Arnold Gehlen Vallori Rasini Ambiente e organismo. Plessner, Gehlen e il pensiero biologico di von Uexküll Giacomo Scarpelli L’eredità della scimmia I ndice B @belonline Il bios e la peculiarità dell’umano. Nuove aperture e possibili confronti Guido Cimino La specificità dell’umano nella storia delle neuroscienze Chiara Di Marco “Corpo io sono e anima”. L’ambiguità della biopolitica Mauro Dorato Ha senso parlare delle basi biologiche della morale? Mauro Fornaro Aggressività tra natura e cultura Federica Giardini I neuroni specchio: alcuni antecedenti Elio Matassi Il cervello musicale di Mozart. Musica e neuroscienze Spazio Aperto a cura di Paolo Nepi Jean-Marie Schaeffer Théorie des signaux coûteux, esthétique et art Ventaglio delle donne a cura di Maria Teresa Pansera Francesca Borruso Scrittura e vita. L’autobiografia di Janet Frame Laura Percoco Scrittura di passaggi. Mireille Calle-Gruber lettrice di Assia Djebar Filosofia e... psicologia a cura di Beatrice Tortolici Silvia Brunelli, Isabella Poggi, Sissy Violini Il pettegolezzo. Curiosità, immagine e coesione sociale Immagini e filosofia a cura di Daniella Iannotta Fabrizia Abbate Ortega y Gasset e Pierre Bourdieu. Immagini letterarie e condizione umana B @belonline I ndice Giardino di B@bel a cura di Claudia Dovolich Tommaso Ariemma Persone e cloni. A partire dalla bio-logica di Derrida Mario Lucio Genghini La dimensione bio-estetica in Herbert Marcuse Ai margini del giorno a cura di Patrizia Cipolletta Giuseppe D’Acunto Elogio di Babele. La parola dell’incontro in Gadamer, Ricoeur, Panikkar Libri ed eventi a cura di Chiara Di Marco Libri... S. Ciurlia, Ermeneutica e politica. L’interpretazione come modello di razionalità (Antonio Quarta) G. Costanzo, Ágnes Heller: costruire il bene. Una teoria etico-politica della giustizia (Chiara Panetta) G. Marini, La filosofia cosmopolitica di Kant (Davide Maggiore) G. Marramao, La passione del presente. Breve lessico della modernità-mondo (Dario Gentili) V. Rasini, L’essere umano. Percorsi dell’antropologia filosofica contemporanea (Simonetta Madussi) …ed eventi Paul Ricœur. L’eredità di un maestro (Vanna Gessa Kurotschka/Gabriella Baptist/Anna Maria Nieddu) I generi della scrittura filosofica (Anna Stoppa) E ditoriale B @bel di Francesca Brezzi Il titolo di questo numero di Babelonline/print disegna immediatamente un ambito di ricerca, ma insieme propone alcuni interrogativi e indica un’esigenza: in un tempo di crisi, quale è il nostro, in cui talvolta si nega l’umanità nel profondo e con frequenza si annulla la dignità personale, in un momento di grave alienazione e spaesamento, è significativo per la riflessione mettere a tema l’essere umano, passando attraverso le discipline che lo pongono al centro della loro indagine, e talvolta come loro telos, – nel nostro caso – le scienze biologiche, l’antropologia filosofica, ma altresì le neuroscienze . Non possiamo affrontare, nello spazio di questo editoriale, un problema interno ad alcune di questi stessi settori di studio, – e pensiamo in particolare alle scienze fisico-matematiche, alle scienze cognitive, alla stessa biologia – , cioè quanto emerge da una panoramica del loro status, dalla loro ampiezza di orizzonti: per un verso i prorompenti sviluppi, una metodologia “forte e sicura”, che si vuole contrapporre alle astrattezze filosofiche, quindi alla filosofia del Totum (parafrasando Adorno), alla filosofia come metafisica, per rivendicare, mediante una epistemologia aperta, autonomia e indipendenza; per un altro, tuttavia, la presenza di polarità e tensioni, di grandi opposizioni e insanabili contraddizioni, che sono tuttavia un segno di vitalità Editoriale e non di debolezza teoretica; né va dimenticato che anche la ricerca filosofica stricto sensu, ha preso congedo dal pensiero Il tema di B@bel sistematico, dall’onto-teologia, per dirla con Heidegger, e l’ambito della speculazione contemporanea offre un panorama Spazio aperto culturalmente frantumato, manifesta vari fermenti, percorso dai sentieri molteplici di una nuova razionalità. Ventaglio delle donne Da qui il plesso teoretico e pratico che oggi ci interessa: ricordiamo le affermazioni di Max Scheler nei lontani anni ’20: Filosofia e... ‹‹Debbo constatare con una certa soddisfazione che i problemi dell’antropologia filosofica sono oggi in Germania al centro di Immagini e Filosofia tutta la problematica speculativa e che i biologi, i medici, gli Giardino di B@bel Ai margini del giorno Libri ed eventi psicologi e i sociologi anche fuori dai circoli specificamente filosofici, lavorano intorno ad una nuova concezione della struttura essenziale dell’uomo››, (La posizione dell’uomo nel mondo,1970); circa novant’anni dopo – considerando lo sviluppo intercorso –, ci interroghiamo circa i rapporti tra l’antropologia filosofica e le scienze che a questa si collegano e da questa si dipartono? Gli autori considerati in questo volume appartengono a varie scuole o tendenze, le culture di provenienza sono disparate, i percorsi indipendenti, e questo rappresenta un elemento propulsore e fecondo di ulteriori sviluppi, ma tutti sembrano voler rispondere alla domanda che costituisce un titolo significativo della cultura tedesca degli anni di Scheler – che sono anche quelli di Gehlen e Plessner, di Heidegger, Buber, e Löwith –: Was ist der Mensch? di Thomas Haecker. Leggendo i vari saggi che – come di consueto – manifestano itinerari diversi di pensiero volendo tracciare alcune costanti si può innanzi tutto affermare che l’essere umano – totalità vivente – , non deve essere studiato da una sola scienza o da un unico angolo visuale, sia esso morfologico o fisiologico, psicologico o anche teologico, ma dalla complementarietà di tutte; ne segue l’interrogazione che va al cuore del rapporto natura-cultura, il quesito che gli scienziati della mente – ma altresì i filosofi –si pongono negli inquieti tempi che viviamo: quanto dei nostri comportamenti è di origine innata, inciso nel nostro cervello e quanto invece è determinato dalla nostra interazione con il mondo esterno? La risposta può indicare come il radicarsi del soggetto alla natura non si risolva in un piatto naturalismo, ma anzi si offra una possibilità di superare ogni prospettiva meccanicistica, a favore di una visione organicistica. In secondo luogo si può sottolineare come emerga una valutazione critica e radicale dell’umano, da intendere sia come accettazione di alcune cifre caratteristiche, sia come rifiuto: non solo opposizione nei confronti di una concezione filosofica astratta, o di un Geist inglobante le differenze, ma anche critica di ogni atteggiamento di scientismo paleopositivista, per schiudere un quadro più ampio di correlazioni e rapporti
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 'Putnam on Bivs and Radical Scepticism'
    For Putnam on Brains in Vats, (ed.) S. Goldberg, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). ‘PUTNAM ON BIVS AND RADICAL SCEPTICISM’ DUNCAN PRITCHARD & CHRIS RANALLI University of Edinburgh & National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to explore Putnam’s influential ‘BIV’ argument against radical scepticism, both as he presents this argument and as it has subsequently been reconstructed. §1 explores the BIV argument as Putnam presents it and the anti-sceptical morals that he extracts from this argument. §2 examines a core critique of the argument, so conceived, from Anthony Brueckner. §3 then critically evaluates an influential reconstruction of Putnam’s argument, due to Crispin Wright. §4-5 explores the idea that Putnam’s argument is best thought of as a transcendental response to radical scepticism, and accordingly applies Stroud’s challenge to transcendental arguments to this proposal. Finally, §6 examines an influential criticism of Putnam’s argument which is due to Nagel. 1. PUTNAM’S BIV ARGUMENT A familiar way of arguing for radical scepticism is by appeal to radical sceptical hypotheses, such as the hypothesis that one might be a brain-in-vat (BIV) which is being radically, and undetectably, deceived about its environment. Roughly, the sceptical argument goes that since such sceptical hypotheses are by their nature indistinguishable from normal experience, so one cannot know that they are false. Furthermore, if one cannot know that they are false, then it follows that one can’t know much of what one believes, most of which is inconsistent with radical sceptical hypotheses. This last step will almost certainly require some sort of closure-style principle, whereby knowledge is closed under known entailments.
    [Show full text]
  • Having Hands, Even in the Vat: What the Semantic Argument Really Shows About Skepticism by Samuel R Burns
    Having Hands, Even in the Vat: What the Semantic Argument Really Shows about Skepticism by Samuel R Burns A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors Department of Philosophy in The University of Michigan 2010 Advisors: Professor Gordon Belot Assistant Professor David Baker ”With relief, with humiliation, with terror, he understood that he also was an illusion, that someone else was dreaming him.” Jorge Luis Borges, “The Circular Ruins” “With your feet in the air and your head on the ground/Try this trick and spin it/ Your head will collapse/But there’s nothing in it/And you’ll ask yourself: ‘Where is my mind?’” The Pixies © Samuel R Burns 2010 To Nami ii Table of Contents Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................iv 1. The Foundation ............................................................................................1 1.1. The Causal Theory of Reference ........................................................................4 1.2. Semantic Externalism ........................................................................................11 2. The Semantic Argument ...........................................................................16 2.1. Putnam’s Argument ...........................................................................................16 2.2. The Disquotation Principle ..............................................................................19
    [Show full text]
  • HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU Monografie Fundacji Na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej
    HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU monografie fundacji na rzecz nauki polskiej rada wydawnicza prof. Tomasz Kizwalter, prof. Janusz Sławiński, prof. Antoni Ziemba, prof. Marek Ziółkowski, prof. Szymon Wróbel fundacja na rzecz nauki polskiej Renata Ziemińska HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU W POSZUKIWANIU SPÓJNOŚCI toruń 2013 Wydanie książki subwencjonowane przez Fundację na rzecz Nauki Polskiej w ramach programu Monografie FNP Redaktor tomu Anna Mądry Korekty Ewelina Gajewska Projekt okładki i obwoluty Barbara Kaczmarek Printed in Poland © Copyright by Renata Ziemińska and Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika Toruń 2013 ISBN 978-83-231-2949-3 WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU MIKOŁAJA KOPERNIKA Redakcja: ul. Gagarina 5, 87-100 Toruń tel. +48 56 611 42 95, fax +48 56 611 47 05 e-mail: [email protected] Dystrybucja: ul. Reja 25, 87-100 Toruń tel./fax: +48 56 611 42 38, e-mail: [email protected] www.wydawnictwoumk.pl Wydanie pierwsze Druk i oprawa: Abedik Sp. z o.o. ul. Glinki 84, 85-861 Bydgoszcz Spis treści wstęp ......................................................................................................... 9 część i. pojęcie i rodzaje sceptycyzmu rozdział 1. genealogia terminu „sceptycyzm” ........................... 15 rozdział 2. ewolucja pojęcia sceptycyzmu .................................. 21 Starożytny sceptycyzm jako zawieszenie sądów pretendujących do prawdy .......................................................................................... 21 Średniowieczny sceptycyzm jako uznanie słabości ludzkich sądów wobec Bożej wszechmocy
    [Show full text]
  • Sceptical Paths Studies and Texts in Scepticism
    Sceptical Paths Studies and Texts in Scepticism Edited on behalf of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies by Giuseppe Veltri Managing Editor: Yoav Meyrav Editorial Board Heidrun Eichner, Talya Fishman, Racheli Haliva, Henrik Lagerlund, Reimund Leicht, Stephan Schmid, Carsten Wilke, Irene Zwiep Volume 6 Sceptical Paths Enquiry and Doubt from Antiquity to the Present Edited by Giuseppe Veltri, Racheli Haliva, Stephan Schmid, and Emidio Spinelli The series Studies and Texts in Scepticism is published on behalf of the Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies ISBN 978-3-11-058960-3 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-059104-0 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-059111-8 ISSN 2568-9614 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 Licence. For details go to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Control Number: 2019947115 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2019 Giuseppe Veltri, Racheli Haliva, Stephan Schmid, Emidio Spinelli, published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg, Ms Cod. Levy 115, fol. 158r: Maimonides, More Nevukhim, Beginn von Teil III. Printing & binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com Contents Introduction 1 Carlos Lévy Philo of Alexandria vs. Descartes: An Ignored Jewish
    [Show full text]
  • Brain in a Vat Or Body in a World? Brainbound Versus Enactive Views of Experience
    Topics 39.1 first pages:Layout 1 3/25/13 4:58 PM Page 163 PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS VOL. 39, NO. 1, SPRING 2011 Brain in a Vat or Body in a World? Brainbound versus Enactive Views of Experience Evan Thompson University of Toronto Diego Cosmelli Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile ABSTRACT. We argue that the minimal biological requirements for con- sciousness include a living body, not just neuronal processes in the skull. Our argument proceeds by reconsidering the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment. Careful examination of this thought experiment indicates that the null hypothesis is that any adequately functional “vat” would be a sur- rogate body, that is, that the so-called vat would be no vat at all, but rather an embodied agent in the world. Thus, what the thought experiment actu- ally shows is that the brain and body are so deeply entangled, structurally and dynamically, that they are explanatorily inseparable. Such entangle- ment implies that we cannot understand consciousness by considering only the activity of neurons apart from the body, and hence we have good explanatory grounds for supposing that the minimal realizing system for consciousness includes the body and not just the brain. In this way, we put the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment to a new use, one that supports the “enactive” view that consciousness is a life-regulation process of the whole organism interacting with its environment. 163 Topics 39.1 first pages:Layout 1 3/25/13 4:58 PM Page 164 Is consciousness all in the head, or more precisely all in the brain? Or
    [Show full text]
  • Chalmers Against Skepticism
    Chalmers Against Skepticism Philosopher David Chalmers has a solution to the problem of external world skepticism. The short version: You can know that you have hands even if you ARE a brain in a vat! 1. The Matrix as Metaphysics: Imagine that you are living 1,000 years ago. You look at some water and form the belief, <This is water>. Do you KNOW this? Plausibly, yes. Now, centuries later, scientists will discover that this substance is composed of H2O. You didn’t know that you were looking at some H2O, but does it matter? No. It just doesn’t seem like ignorance about the underlying, fundamental structure or nature of something undermines this sort of knowledge. In fact, you might have even held MISTAKEN beliefs about the underlying structure—for instance, you might have said that water is composed of tiny corpuscles that are perfectly round (that’s what makes it so fluid!). But, being mistaken about this fact doesn’t undermine your knowledge that <This is water>. Right? Well, Chalmers says something similar about the simulation scenarios. Imagine that you ARE a brain in a vat. You look at your digitally-rendered “hands” and form the belief, <I have hands>. It is very tempting to think that you lack knowledge in this case. Your belief is simply mistaken. You do not have hands. But, Chalmers argues that, even if you are a brain in a vat, you DO have hands. If you look down, and see and feel hands, then you have them! They might be composed of earth/air/fire/water, or atoms, or superstrings, or zeroes and ones.
    [Show full text]
  • The Archimedean Urge
    Philosophical Perspectives, 29, Epistemology, 2015 THE ARCHIMEDEAN URGE Amia Srinivasan University College London 1. Genealogical Scepticism In Aristophanes’ The Clouds, Socrates orders his hapless student Strepsiades to lie down on a couch to make him more receptive to philosophical inspiration. Instead he catches Strepsiades masturbating under the bedclothes. Aristophanes’ suggestion is that it amounts to much the same thing. Like philosophy, scepticism about philosophy has its modes and fashions. Sometimes the accusation, as with Aristophanes, is that a seemingly lofty activity is in fact chicanery, nonsense in the service of all too human desire. According to the sort of diagnostic scepticism associated with the later Wittgenstein, philosophy is a symptom of pathology or confusion. Scientistic scepticism impugns philosophy for falling short of some putative standard met by all respectable — that is, empirical — modes of enquiry. What we might call ‘genealogical’ scepticism complains that the building blocks of philosophy — the judgments and concepts on which it all hangs — are contingent features of whoever it is who is doing the philosophising: her or his particular history, culture, language, education, gender, character. Coming to terms with the genealogical contingency of thought has been a preoccupation of the European intellectual tradition since the mid-18th cen- tury. German historicists like Herder and Humboldt taught Europeans to think historically about thought itself, to see historical enquiry as a historically cir- cumscribed endeavour rather than an unencumbered encounter with the hard facts of the past. Hegel applied this historicist lesson to philosophy: as “each child is in any case a child of his time . thus, philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in thoughts” (1820/1991, 21).
    [Show full text]
  • Wittgenstein's Beetle and Other Classic Thought
    WITTGENSTEIN’S BEETLE AND OTHER CLASSIC THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS I do not want to give the impression that the use of large machines or of elaborate techniques is always justified; sometimes it contributes merely to the sense of self-importance of the investigator, and it is always salutary to remember Rutherford’s ‘We haven’t got the the money, so we’ve got to think!’ R. V. Jones in the Bulletin of the Institute of Physics (1962) recalling the dictum of Ernest Rutherford MARTIN COHEN Wittgenstein’s Beetle and Other Classic Thought Experiments Contents List of Figures vii Forward! viii Introduction: Deep Thought – a brief history of thought experiments 1 The A–Z A is for Alice and Astronomers Arguing about Acceleration 15 B is for Bernard’s Body-Exchange Machine 18 C is for the Catholic Cannibal 20 D is for Maxwell’s Demon 25 E is for Evolution (and an Embarrassing Problem with it) 28 F is for the Forms Lost Forever to the Prisoners of the Cave 30 G is for Galileo’s Gravitational Balls 33 H is for Hume’s Shades 37 I is for the Identity of Indiscernibles 41 J is for Henri Poincaré and Alternative Geometries 45 K is for the Kritik and Kant’s Kind of Thought Experiments 48 L is for Lucretius’ Spear 52 M is for Mach’s Motionless Chain 55 N is for Newton’s Bucket 58 O is for Olbers’ Paradox 62 P is for Parfit’s Person 65 Q is for the Questions Raised by Thought Experiments Quotidiennes 67 R is for the Rule-Ruled Room 70 S is for Salvatius’ Ship, Sailing along its own Space-Time Line 74 T is for the Time-Travelling Twins 78 U is for the Universe, and
    [Show full text]
  • SKEPTICISM, CONTEXTUALISM, and DISCRIMINATION Jonathan Schaffer
    SKEPTICISM, CONTEXTUALISM, AND DISCRIMINATION Jonathan Schaffer The skeptic (following Peter Unger 1975) says that “knowledge” is an absolute term, requiring the elimination of all logical possibilities of falsehood. The contextualist (following David Lewis 1979, Fred Dretske 1981, inter alia) says that “knowledge” is a relationally absolute term, requiring the elimination of only the contextually relevant possibilities of falsehood. Which is the better hypothesis about “knowledge”? And what implications do these hypotheses about “knowledge” have for knowledge? I argue that (i) it is the skeptic who has the better hypothesis about “knowledge”; but (ii) both the skeptical and contextualist hypotheses presuppose our capacity for epistemically salient discrimination, where (iii) such discrimination reveals why skeptical scenarios fail to undermine our epistemic standing. There is a deeply anti-skeptical morale buried in the skepticism- contextualism dispute. 1. Skepticism, Unger Style The skeptic says that we know nothing, or at least far less than is usually supposed. The skeptic may target various domains and employ various arguments. I am interested in the sort of skeptic who targets knowledge about the external world, with the following argument: 1) One cannot know that one is not a brain-in-a-vat (or dreaming, or under the spell of Descartes’s demon, or in some other skeptical scenario in which appearances deceive); 2) If one cannot know that one is not a brain-in-a-vat, then one cannot know that one has hands (or any other mundane proposition about the external world); 3) Therefore one cannot know that one has hands (or any other mundane proposition about the external world).
    [Show full text]
  • Brains in a Vat: Different Perspectives Author(S): Yuval Steinitz Reviewed Work(S): Source: the Philosophical Quarterly, Vol
    Brains in a Vat: Different Perspectives Author(s): Yuval Steinitz Reviewed work(s): Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 175 (Apr., 1994), pp. 213-222 Published by: Wiley-Blackwell for The Philosophical Quarterly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2219742 . Accessed: 19/08/2012 03:29 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Wiley-Blackwell and The Philosophical Quarterly are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Philosophical Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org ON MCDOWELL ON THE CONTENT OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE 213 in givingan expositionof one of thehorns of thedilemma. One hornof thedilemma is thatif we take consciousnessto be inseparablefrom the norm-governednotion of self-consciousnessand fromreflective and self-criticalattitudes towards oneself, then it does seem hard to accept thatDennett's framework, in whichconscious contents are a selectionof thecontents that go to and frobetween subsystems, will capture all of thephenomena; but by the same tokena frog'svisual experience will not countas contentfuland conscious,as McDowell claimsit does. But,on the otherhorn, if we shrinkthe phenomenonof consciousnessto exclude self-consciousnessand thereby includethe experienceof unself-consciouscreatures such as frogsas conscious,then it seemsto me thedual strategyI adopted - of(l) generalizingDennett's idea ofaccess relations,and (2) defusingMcDowell's epistemologicalalarms which motivatehis criticismof Dennett - providesa quiteadequate defence of Dennett against McDowell.
    [Show full text]
  • Read Book Epistemologies of the South 1St Edition
    EPISTEMOLOGIES OF THE SOUTH 1ST EDITION PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Boaventura de Sousa Santos | 9781317260349 | | | | | Epistemologies of the South 1st edition PDF Book The book examines its subject through the analysis of three main case studies, namely those of Colombia, India, and South Africa. It began to emerge as a distinct subfield in the 20th century. Rationalist views can range from modest views in mathematics and logic such as that of Gottlob Frege to ambitious metaphysical systems such as that of Baruch Spinoza. Eva Marques rated it really liked it Jun 28, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file. Epistemologists study the nature of knowledge, epistemic justification , the rationality of belief , and various related issues. An alternative resolution to the regress problem is known as " infinitism ". Views that emphasize the importance of a posteriori knowledge are generally classified as empiricist. Sep 14, Kelly Dombroski rated it really liked it. In that case, we can't The word "epistemology" was properly introduced into Anglophone philosophical literature by Scottish philosopher James Frederick Ferrier in , who used it in his Institutes of Metaphysics :. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Gettier then goes on to offer a second similar case, providing the means by which the specifics of his examples can be generalized into a broader problem for defining knowledge in terms of justified true belief. Either there are some beliefs that we can be justified for holding, without being able to justify them on the basis of any other belief, or else for each justified belief there is an infinite regress of potential justification [the nebula theory].
    [Show full text]
  • 0.Eujap | Vol. 12, No. 2, 2016 INTRO
    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY ! UDK 101 | ISSN 1845-8475 Editors Luca Malatesti University of Rijeka, [email protected] Majda Trobok !University of Rijeka, [email protected] Assistant editor Marko Jurjako !University of Rijeka, [email protected] Managing editor Borna Debelić !University of Rijeka, [email protected] Editorial administrator, web maintenance and layout Ivan Saftić !University of Rijeka, [email protected] Editorial boards Elvio Baccarini (University of Rijeka), Carla Bagnoli (University of Wisconsin- Milwaukee), Boran Berčić (University of Rijeka), Clotilde Calabi (University of Milan), Mario De Caro (University of Rome), Katalin Farkas (CEU Budapest), Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee), Pierre Jacob (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris), Carlo Penco (University of Genoa), Snježana Prijić-Samaržija (University of Rijeka), Michael Ridge (University of Edinburgh), Marco Santambrogio (University of Parma), Sally Sedgwick (University of Illinois, Chicago), Nenad Smokrović (University of Rijeka), Bruno Verbeek (University Leiden), Alberto Voltolini (University of Turin), !Joan Weiner (Indiana University Bloomington), Berislav Žarnić (University of Split) Advisory board Miloš Arsenijević (University of Belgrade), Raphael Cohen-Almagor (University of Hull, UK), Jonathan Dancy (University of Reading/University of Texas, Austin), Mylan Engel (University of Northern Illinois), Paul Horwich (City University New York), Maria de la Conception Martinez Vidal (University of Santiago de Compostela), Kevin Mulligan (University of Geneva),
    [Show full text]