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HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU Monografie Fundacji Na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej

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HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU Monografie Fundacji Na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU monografie fundacji na rzecz nauki polskiej rada wydawnicza prof. Tomasz Kizwalter, prof. Janusz Sławiński, prof. Antoni Ziemba, prof. Marek Ziółkowski, prof. Szymon Wróbel fundacja na rzecz nauki polskiej Renata Ziemińska HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU W POSZUKIWANIU SPÓJNOŚCI toruń 2013 Wydanie książki subwencjonowane przez Fundację na rzecz Nauki Polskiej w ramach programu Monografie FNP Redaktor tomu Anna Mądry Korekty Ewelina Gajewska Projekt okładki i obwoluty Barbara Kaczmarek Printed in Poland © Copyright by Renata Ziemińska and Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika Toruń 2013 ISBN 978-83-231-2949-3 WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU MIKOŁAJA KOPERNIKA Redakcja: ul. Gagarina 5, 87-100 Toruń tel. +48 56 611 42 95, fax +48 56 611 47 05 e-mail: [email protected] Dystrybucja: ul. Reja 25, 87-100 Toruń tel./fax: +48 56 611 42 38, e-mail: [email protected] www.wydawnictwoumk.pl Wydanie pierwsze Druk i oprawa: Abedik Sp. z o.o. ul. Glinki 84, 85-861 Bydgoszcz Spis treści wstęp ......................................................................................................... 9 część i. pojęcie i rodzaje sceptycyzmu rozdział 1. genealogia terminu „sceptycyzm” ........................... 15 rozdział 2. ewolucja pojęcia sceptycyzmu .................................. 21 Starożytny sceptycyzm jako zawieszenie sądów pretendujących do prawdy .......................................................................................... 21 Średniowieczny sceptycyzm jako uznanie słabości ludzkich sądów wobec Bożej wszechmocy ................................................... 22 Nowożytny sceptycyzm jako wątpienie o wartości sądów pretendujących do wiedzy ............................................................... 23 Współczesny sceptycyzm jako paradoksalna teza o nieistnieniu wiedzy i nieistnieniu znaczeń ......................................................... 25 rozdział 3. rodzaje sceptycyzmu i pojęcia pokrewne .............. 29 część ii. sceptycyzm starożytny rozdział 1. wątki sceptyczne u filozofów przedpirrońskich 41 rozdział 2. pirron z elidy i sceptycyzm etyczny ........................ 47 rozdział 3. sceptycyzm akademicki (arkezylaos i karneades) 63 rozdział 4. neopirronizm ainezydema i agryppy ........................ 79 rozdział 5. sekstus empiryk – summa starożytnego sceptycyzmu ............................................................................... 93 Pojęcie i kryterium prawdy ............................................................. 95 Znaki i dowody ................................................................................. 102 Krytyka fizyki, etyki i innych nauk ................................................ 111 Obrona spójności sceptycyzmu ...................................................... 120 Najnowsze interpretacje broniące spójności ................................. 124 „Odrzucenie drabiny” – czy Sekstus akceptuje samorefutację? .. 134 Pragmatyczna niespójność sceptycyzmu Sekstusa ....................... 138 Podsumowanie sceptycyzmu starożytnego ................................... 144 6 SPIS TREŚCI część iii. chrześcijańska recepcja sceptycyzmu. i jego rozwój w średniowieczu rozdział 1. wczesnochrześcijańska recepcja sceptycyzmu ... 149 rozdział 2. krytyka sceptycyzmu akademickiego u św. augustyna .............................................................................. 153 rozdział 3. sceptycy średniowieczni przed wilhelmem ockhamem (jan z salisbury, henryk z gandawy, piotr aureoli) ............................................................................................ 161 rozdział 4. wilhelm ockham – sceptycyzm i fideizm ................ 171 rozdział 5. ockhamiści i sceptycyzm zainspirowany bożą... sek13:177 wszechmocą .................................................................................... 177 Mikołaj z Autrecourt ........................................................................ 178 Jan z Mirecourt ................................................................................. 181 Podsumowanie sceptycyzmu średniowiecznego .......................... 184 część iv. sceptycyzm nowożytny rozdział 1. początki sceptycyzmu nowożytnego ...................... 189 (erazm z rotterdamu, gianfrancesco pico della mirandola, francisco sanchez) ............................................... 189 rozdział 2. sceptycyzm michela de montaigne’a ....................... 197 Wątki starożytne ............................................................................... 197 Wątki chrześcijańskie ....................................................................... 204 Wątki renesansowe ........................................................................... 206 Próba uniknięcia zarzutu niespójności .......................................... 209 Kontynuatorzy Michela de Montaigne’a (Pierre Charron, François de La Mothe Le Vayer) ..................................................................... 212 rozdział 3. hipotezy kartezjusza i radykalizacja sceptycyzmu:215 nowożytnego .................................................................................. 215 Hipoteza snu i złośliwego demona ................................................. 217 Idealizm i pogłębienie sceptycyzmu .............................................. 220 Sceptycyzm metodyczny .................................................................. 223 Próba odsunięcia hipotez sceptycznych ........................................ 226 Sceptycy między Kartezjuszem a Davidem Hume’em (Pierre Daniel Huet, Blaise Pascal, Pierre Bayle) ....................................... 233 rozdział 4. david hume i poszukiwanie spójności sceptycyzmu ... 241 Nawiązanie do tradycji starożytnej ................................................ 241 Akceptacja kartezjańskich hipotez ................................................. 245 Poszerzenie argumentów sceptycznych ......................................... 248 SPIS TREŚCI 7 Instynkt jako ratunek przed sceptycyzmem ................................. 253 Krytyka sceptycyzmu totalnego...................................................... 254 Poszukiwanie spójności sceptycyzmu umiarkowanego .............. 257 Dialektyka sceptycyzmu i naturalizmu .......................................... 259 rozdział 5. sceptycyzm transcendentalny immanuela kantak18:263 i sceptycyzm pokantowski ......................................................... 263 Immanuel Kant a tradycja sceptyczna ........................................... 263 Jałowość sceptycyzmu i akceptacja metody sceptyckiej .............. 265 Sceptycyzm transcendentalny ......................................................... 267 Sceptycyzm u Georga Wilhelma Hegla ......................................... 271 Sceptycyzm Fryderyka Nietzschego............................................... 274 Podsumowanie sceptycyzmu nowożytnego .................................. 278 część v. sceptycyzm współczesny rozdział 1. problem sceptycyzmu i zmiana pojęcia wiedzy... sek19:283 na początku xX wieku ................................................................. 283 Pragmatyzm ...................................................................................... 283 Filozofia analityczna ......................................................................... 291 Fenomenologia i egzystencjalizm ................................................... 300 rozdział 2. peter unger i współczesny sceptycyzm kartezjański ................................................................................... 305 „Wiedza” jako absolutny termin graniczny ................................... 305 Hipoteza złośliwego uczonego i mózgu w pojemniku................. 309 Inni sympatycy sceptycyzmu .......................................................... 313 rozdział 3. dyskusja ze sceptycyzmem kartezjańskim .............. 317 Wiedza nie wymaga pewności (falibilizm) ................................... 317 Wiedza nie rządzi się regułami dedukcji (Robert Nozick) ......... 319 Wiedza nie wymaga wiedzy o wiedzy (eksternalizm) ................. 321 Standardy dla wiedzy są zmienne (kontekstualizm) .................... 323 Uzasadnienie nie wymaga przejścia procedury uzasadniania (Michael Williams) ........................................................................... 330 Niespójność hipotezy mózgu w pojemniku (Hilary Putnam) .... 336 rozdział 4. sceptycyzm znaczeniowy kripkego– –wittgensteina ........................................................................... 341 Eksperyment myślowy z kwusem i powtórka z niespójności ..... 341 Praktyka językowa ratunkiem przed sceptycyzmem ................... 346 Sceptycyzm znaczeniowy odnoszący się do innych umysłów .... 349 Sceptycyzm odnoszący się do danych samoświadomości ......... 352 Podsumowanie sceptycyzmu współczesnego ............................... 356 8 SPIS TREŚCI zakończenie. pragmatyczna niespójność sceptycyzmu ........... 359 wykaz wybranych skrótów ............................................................... 367 bibliografia ............................................................................................ 369 kalendarium i geografia sceptycyzmu ......................................... 393 summary ................................................................................................... 395 indeks osobowy...................................................................................... 399 Wstęp Książka jest próbą rekonstrukcji dziejów stanowiska filozoficznego nazywanego od wielu wieków sceptycyzmem. Jest też próbą przed- stawienia współczesnego stanu
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