Reading Questions for Phil 251.200, Fall 2012 (Daniel)
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Demystifying the Saint
DEMYSTIFYING THE SAINT: JAY L. GARFIELDʼS RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION OF NĀGĀRJUNAʼS MĀDHYAMAKA AS THE EPITOME OF CONTEMPORARY CROSS-CULTURAL PHILOSOPHY TIINA ROSENQVIST Tampereen yliopisto Yhteiskunta- ja kulttuuritieteiden yksikkö Filosofian pro gradu -tutkielma Tammikuu 2011 ABSTRACT Cross-cultural philosophy approaches philosophical problems by setting into dialogue systems and perspectives from across cultures. I use the term more specifically to refer to the current stage in the history of comparative philosophy marked by the ethos of scholarly self-reflection and the production of rational reconstructions of foreign philosophies. These reconstructions lend a new kind of relevance to cross-cultural perspectives in mainstream philosophical discourses. I view Jay L. Garfieldʼs work as an example of this. I examine Garfieldʼs approach in the context of Nāgārjuna scholarship and cross-cultural hermeneutics. By situating it historically and discussing its background and implications, I wish to highlight its distinctive features. Even though Garfield has worked with Buddhist philosophy, I believe he has a lot to offer to the meta-level discussion of cross-cultural philosophy in general. I argue that the clarity of Garfieldʼs vision of the nature and function of cross-cultural philosophy can help alleviate the identity crisis that has plagued the enterprise: Garfield brings it closer to (mainstream) philosophy and helps it stand apart from Indology, Buddhology, area studies philosophy (etc). I side with Garfield in arguing that cross- cultural philosophy not only brings us better understanding of other philosophical traditions, but may enhance our self-understanding as well. I furthermore hold that his employment of Western conceptual frameworks (post-Wittgensteinian language philosophy, skepticism) and theoretical tools (paraconsistent logic, Wittgensteinian epistemology) together with the influence of Buddhist interpretative lineages creates a coherent, cogent, holistic and analytically precise reading of Nāgārjunaʼs Mādhyamaka philosophy. -
On the Logic of the Ontological Argument∗ X
Paul E. Oppenheimer and Edward N. Zalta 2 by `9y(y =x)' and the claim that x has the property of existence by `E!x'. That is, we represent the difference between the two claims by exploiting the distinction between quantifying over x and predicating existence of On the Logic of the Ontological Argument∗ x. We shall sometimes refer to this as the distinction between the being of x and the existence of x. Thus, instead of reading Anselm as having discovered a way of inferring God's actuality from His mere possibility, Paul E. Oppenheimer we read him as having discovered a way of inferring God's existence from Thinking Machines Corporation His mere being. Another important feature of our reading concerns the fact that we and take the phrase \that than which none greater can be conceived" seriously. Certain inferences in the ontological argument are intimately linked to the logical behavior of this phrase, which is best represented as a definite Edward N. Zalta description.3 If we are to do justice to Anselm's argument, we must not Philosophy Department syntactically eliminate descriptions the way Russell does. One of the Stanford University highlights of our interpretation is that a very simple inference involving descriptions stands at the heart of the argument.4 Saint Anselm of Canterbury offered several arguments for the existence The Language and Logic Required for the Argument of God. We examine the famous ontological argument in Proslogium ii. Many recent authors have interpreted this argument as a modal one.1 But We shall cast our new reading in a standard first-order language. -
Reading Questions for Phil 251.501, Spring 2012 (Daniel)
Reading Questions for Phil 251.501, Spring 2012 (Daniel) Class One: What is Philosophy? (Jan. 17) • How is philosophy different from mythology? • How is philosophy different from religion? • How is philosophy different from science? • What does it mean to say that the “love of wisdom” is concerned with the justification of opinions? • Why is giving reasons for your beliefs important regarding the main areas of philosophy (e.g., metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and logic)? Class Two: Philosophical Tools (Jan. 19) • What is “logical consistency”? Give some examples. • What is the difference between logical possibility and causal possibility? • What is the difference between lexical and real definitions? • What is the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions? • What are thought experiments? • In philosophy, what is an argument? • What is the difference between a deductive vs. and inductive argument? Class Three: Knowledge and Skepticism (Jan. 24) • What distinguishes propositional knowledge, “knowing how,” and “knowledge by acquaintance”? • How does Clifford’s insistence on having evidence highlight the moral significance of distinguishing belief and knowledge? • What are the three necessary conditions for knowledge? Give an example of a Gettier- case exception—that is, a case of meeting these conditions that is still not knowledge. • How are skepticism, empiricism, and rationalism different? • What is the difference between global and local skepticism? • What is Descartes’ method of doubt, and why does he adopt it? • For Descartes, why can’t we trust knowledge based on sense experience? • For Descartes, how are doubts raised by dreaming more profound than doubts about sensations? • How are the thought experiments of the evil demon, the brain in the vat, or the matrix even more profound than doubts about sense experience or dreaming? • How are skepticism, solipsism, and fallibilism possible responses to Descartes’ doubts? Class Four: Huemer on Skepticism (Jan. -
Divine Utilitarianism
Liberty University DIVINE UTILITARIANISM A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Masters of Arts in Philosophical Studies By Jimmy R. Lewis January 16, 2017 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter One: Introduction ……………………………...……………..……....3 Statement of the Problem…………………………….………………………….3 Statement of the Purpose…………………………….………………………….5 Statement of the Importance of the Problem…………………….……………...6 Statement of Position on the Problem………………………...…………….......7 Limitations…………………………………………….………………………...8 Development of Thesis……………………………………………….…………9 Chapter Two: What is meant by “Divine Utilitarianism”..................................11 Introduction……………………………….…………………………………….11 A Definition of God.……………………………………………………………13 Anselm’s God …………………………………………………………..14 Thomas’ God …………………………………………………………...19 A Definition of Utility .…………………………………………………………22 Augustine and the Good .……………………………………………......23 Bentham and Mill on Utility ……………………………………………25 Divine Utilitarianism in the Past .……………………………………………….28 New Divine Utilitarianism .……………………………………………………..35 Chapter Three: The Ethics of God ……………………………………………45 Divine Command Theory: A Juxtaposition .……………………………………45 What Divine Command Theory Explains ………………….…………...47 What Divine Command Theory Fails to Explain ………………………47 What Divine Utilitarianism Explains …………………………………………...50 Assessing the Juxtaposition .…………………………………………………....58 Chapter Four: Summary and Conclusion……………………………………...60 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………..64 2 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION Statement of the -
Forthcoming In: Episteme Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism
Forthcoming in: Episteme Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism Cannot Escape the Challenge of Self-Defeat Thomas Grundmann, University of Cologne penultimate version Abstract. Global meta-philosophical skepticism (i.e. completely unrestricted skepticism about philosophy) based upon disagreement faces the problem of self-defeat since it undercuts its motivating conciliatory principle. However, the skeptic may easily escape this threat by adopting a more modest kind of skepticism, that will be called “extensive meta-philosophical skepticism”, i.e., the view that most of our philosophical beliefs are unjustified, except our beliefs in epistemically fundamental principles. As I will argue in this paper, this kind of skepticism is well-motivated, does not undercut the conciliatory principle, but still poses a radical challenge to philosophy as a cognitive discipline. Moreover, I will argue that non-global skepticism that is still extensive undermines itself as well. The deeper reason for this is that this more modest kind of skepticism can only be motivated by the assumption that disagreement with philosophical peers is abundant and that we can identify peers only by relying on track-record arguments. But then one can argue for extensive meta-philosophical skepticism only if one presupposes that those philosophical beliefs that form the basis of track-record evaluations are justified. Here, the threat of self-defeat looms again. I will proceed by first defending the premises of this new anti- skeptical argument against standard objections from the literature. Second, I will show in more detail where the epistemic inconsistency arises in the argument for extensive meta-philosophical skepticism. I conclude with an assessment of the scope and the limits of my argument. -
Gce a Level Marking Scheme
GCE A LEVEL MARKING SCHEME SUMMER 2018 A LEVEL RELIGIOUS STUDIES - COMPONENT 2 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION A120U20-1 © WJEC CBAC Ltd. INTRODUCTION This marking scheme was used by WJEC for the 2018 examination. It was finalised after detailed discussion at examiners' conferences by all the examiners involved in the assessment. The conference was held shortly after the paper was taken so that reference could be made to the full range of candidates' responses, with photocopied scripts forming the basis of discussion. The aim of the conference was to ensure that the marking scheme was interpreted and applied in the same way by all examiners. It is hoped that this information will be of assistance to centres but it is recognised at the same time that, without the benefit of participation in the examiners' conference, teachers may have different views on certain matters of detail or interpretation. WJEC regrets that it cannot enter into any discussion or correspondence about this marking scheme. © WJEC CBAC Ltd. Marking guidance for examiners, please apply carefully and consistently: Positive marking It should be remembered that candidates are writing under examination conditions and credit should be given for what the candidate writes, rather than adopting the approach of penalising him/her for any omissions. It should be possible for a very good response to achieve full marks and a very poor one to achieve zero marks. Marks should not be deducted for a less than perfect answer if it satisfies the criteria of the mark scheme. Exemplars in the mark scheme are only meant as helpful guides. -
Summary %E History of Skepticism
Summary %e History of Skepticism. In Search of Consistency e book is devoted to the reconstruction of the history of the idea of philosophical skepticism from ancient to present time. It is also an attempt to present the recent state of research in the 'eld of both history of philosophical skepticism (recent interpretations) and epistemology of skepticism (recent discussions and opinions). e thesis of the book is that the basic problem for the skeptical position throughout history is the problem of inconsistency (self-refutation). Since antiquity skeptics were forced to answer to this charge, they invented many ways to avoid it. But the result was either not e0ective or too costly. Sextus Empiricus took his own words as the description of his feelings without any assertion. However, his skepticism is not a thesis at all and it cannot be accepted as true. Hume weakened the assertion for all beliefs and for his skeptical thesis. Such view in contemporary vocabulary is fallibilism rather than skepticism. In contemporary philosophy the skeptical thesis No one ever knows anything about anything or No one is ever justi(ed in believing anything is treated as a clear paradox. e main result of the book is the thesis that skeptical inconsistency is a pragmatic inconsistency. It is not a logical inconsistency, because there is no clear contradiction here. Pragmatic inconsistency is also a contradiction between two propositions, but only one of them is overtly stated; the second is tacitly presupposed in the act of assertion of the skeptical thesis. When skeptics assert No one ever knows anything about anything they presuppose that they have some reasonable ground for such assertion. -
Leibniz and Theodicy Nicholas R. Green
Leibniz and the Theodicy Modern Western Philosophy February 23rd, 2010 Is this the best of all possible worlds? • Leibniz asserts that it is • His argument depends on two essential components – Principle of Sufficient Reason – A cosmological argument for God’s existence A Brief Review of the PSR “…we consider that we can find no true or existent fact, no true assertion, without there being sufficient reason why it is thus and not otherwise, although most of the time these reasons cannot be known to us.” (Monadology 32, AW 278A) The take away? There is no effect without a cause. To understand the Theodicy, we need God. Let’s prove Him. A Cosmological Proof for God’s Existence CPG 1: A given event or object requires sufficient reason for its occurrence (I.e., every effect must have a cause) CPG 2: The cause of that given event (its sufficient reason) must itself have a cause (sufficient reason) CPG 3: There must be a stop to the infinite regress of causes CPG 4: The termination of the series of sufficient reasons must necessarily exist, and exist outside the chain CPG 5: This is God In Leibniz’s Words… “There must be a sufficient reason in contingent truths, or truths of fact, that is, in the series of things distributed throughout the universe of creatures, where the resolution into particular reasons could proceed into unlimited detail…And since all of this detail involves nothing but other prior and or more detailed contingents, each of which needs a similar analysis in order to give its reason…It must be the case that the sufficient or ultimate reason is outside the the sequence or series of this multiplicity of contingencies, however infinite it may be…The ultimate reason of things must be in a necessary substance in which the diversity of changes is only eminent, as in its source. -
Evil and the Ontological Disproof
City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 9-2017 Evil and the Ontological Disproof Carl J. Brownson III The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2155 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] EVIL AND THE ONTOLOGICAL DISPROOF by CARL BROWNSON A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, City University of New York 2017 1 © 2017 CARL BROWNSON All Rights Reserved ii Evil and the Ontological Disproof by Carl Brownson This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Date Graham Priest Chair of Examining Committee Date Iakovos Vasiliou Executive Officer Supervisory Committee: Stephen Grover, advisor Graham Priest Peter Simpson Nickolas Pappas Robert Lovering THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii ABSTRACT Evil and the Ontological Disproof by Carl Brownson Advisor: Stephen Grover This dissertation is a revival of the ontological disproof, an ontological argument against the existence of God. The ontological disproof, in its original form, argues that God is impossible, because if God exists, he must exist necessarily, and necessary existence is impossible. The notion of necessary existence has been largely rehabilitated since this argument was first offered in 1948, and the argument has accordingly lost much of its force. -
HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU Monografie Fundacji Na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej
HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU monografie fundacji na rzecz nauki polskiej rada wydawnicza prof. Tomasz Kizwalter, prof. Janusz Sławiński, prof. Antoni Ziemba, prof. Marek Ziółkowski, prof. Szymon Wróbel fundacja na rzecz nauki polskiej Renata Ziemińska HISTORIA SCEPTYCYZMU W POSZUKIWANIU SPÓJNOŚCI toruń 2013 Wydanie książki subwencjonowane przez Fundację na rzecz Nauki Polskiej w ramach programu Monografie FNP Redaktor tomu Anna Mądry Korekty Ewelina Gajewska Projekt okładki i obwoluty Barbara Kaczmarek Printed in Poland © Copyright by Renata Ziemińska and Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika Toruń 2013 ISBN 978-83-231-2949-3 WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU MIKOŁAJA KOPERNIKA Redakcja: ul. Gagarina 5, 87-100 Toruń tel. +48 56 611 42 95, fax +48 56 611 47 05 e-mail: [email protected] Dystrybucja: ul. Reja 25, 87-100 Toruń tel./fax: +48 56 611 42 38, e-mail: [email protected] www.wydawnictwoumk.pl Wydanie pierwsze Druk i oprawa: Abedik Sp. z o.o. ul. Glinki 84, 85-861 Bydgoszcz Spis treści wstęp ......................................................................................................... 9 część i. pojęcie i rodzaje sceptycyzmu rozdział 1. genealogia terminu „sceptycyzm” ........................... 15 rozdział 2. ewolucja pojęcia sceptycyzmu .................................. 21 Starożytny sceptycyzm jako zawieszenie sądów pretendujących do prawdy .......................................................................................... 21 Średniowieczny sceptycyzm jako uznanie słabości ludzkich sądów wobec Bożej wszechmocy -
A Non-Contextual Rule for Epistemic Contextualism.1
SKÉPSIS, ISSN 1981-4194, ANO VIII, Nº 15, 2017, p. 52-61. A Non-contextual Rule for Epistemic Contextualism.1 Gustavo Almeida de Azevedo (Universidade Estadual de Campinas) E-mail: [email protected] Abstract: Our idea here is to offer a version of epistemic contextualism that can respond to skeptical doubts. More precisely, we believe we can combine the theories of DeRose (1992) and Feldman (1988, 2004) in order to invert the burden of proof for the skeptical side. That is, what we call rule of reasonableness requires that the skeptic has to provide reasons why we should take their doubt into account, what I am calling here 'relevant alternative'. Thus, we claim that two clauses need to be reached, in order to such doubt be taken into account, namely, (i) S has evidence to believe R; and (ii) given the contextual standards of justification to which S is submitted, it is required that the possibility of R occurs remains excluded. Key words: Contextualism; Evidence; Skeptical Doubt. 1 - Introduction The following lines over this paper intend to discuss the possibility of an epistemic contextualism based on a non-contextual rule. Such strategy is not a new one and it was developed, for example, by Blome-Tillman (2014). However, I disagree with his development. In order to state the foundations for this disagreement and consequently state my proposal, I should have to establish the framework problem I am considering here, namely, the general skeptic argument (SA), which any epistemologist must dare to. SA, since Descartes (1641) at least, can be represented by the below formulation: If one subject S knows P, then S knows that R is not the case (sKp → sK~r) because R implies not-P. -
Kant on the Cosmological Argument
Philosophers’ volume 14, no. 12 Introduction may 2014 Imprint In the section of the first Critique entitled “The Ideal of Pure Reason,” Kant constructs an elaborately layered critique of the so-called “cos- mological proof” of the existence of God.1 He portrays the cosmologi- cal argument (as I shall more neutrally term it) as having three main phases.2 First, one observes that there is at least one existent being, and argues that it exists contingently (28: 1006). Second, appealing to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, one argues for the existence of Kant on the an absolutely necessary being as the ultimate cause (A 605/B 633n*) or ground (28: 1006) of this contingently existing being. Third, one argues that this absolutely necessary being is a most real being — or ens realissimum (A 605–6/B 633–34). In “The Ideal,” Kant presents Cosmological Argument this third step as drawing the argument to a close (A 606/B 634). But, judging by his discussion in the Religion Lectures, he sometimes con- ceives of the argument as intended to be completed by a sort of coda in which one argues that the absolutely necessary being, since it is an ens realissimum, must possess each of the traditional “divine attributes.”3 Kant raises three main objections to this version of the cosmologi- cal argument. First, it “presupposes” the correctness of the ontological argument in the sense, apparently, of tacitly incorporating the onto- logical argument as a proper part (A 607/B 635; A 608–9/B 636–7). Second, it commits an ignoratio elenchi, a fallacy of arguing for some- thing other than what was at issue (A 609/B 637).