The Influence of Pyrrho of Elis and the Pyrrhonian Praxis of Aporetic
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The Influence of Pyrrho of Elis and the Pyrrhonian Praxis of Aporetic Language by © Christopher Craig Dupuis A Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy Memorial University of Newfoundland May, 2014 St. John’s Newfoundland and Labrador 2 Table of Contents Abstract 4 Introduction and Overview 5 Chapter One 1 Pyrrho’s Aporetic Linguistic Praxis 12 1.1 Ataraxia in Epictetus and Epicurus 21 1.2 The Role of Epoche and Ataraxia in Pyrrho 23 1.3 Plato’s Socrates as Pyrrho’s Sage 43 1.4 Pyrrho and Plato’s Phaedo 45 1.5 Pyrrho, the Meno, and The Soul of The Hellenes 48 1.6 Appearances, Customs, and The Soul of the Sceptic 51 1.7 Pyrrho and Plato’s Theaetetus 55 1.8 Chapter One Conclusion 62 Chapter Two 2.1 Introduction: Academic Scepticism 64 2.2 Scepticism up to this Point 65 2.3 Arcesilaus And the Early Academic Sceptics 68 2.4 Carneades And the ‘New’ Academic Sceptics 81 2.5 Connecting with Pyrrho 91 Chapter Three 3.1 Introduction: Later Pyrrhonian Scepticism 95 3.2 Aenesidemus and the Revival of Pyrrhonism 97 3.3 Aenesidemus, Relativity, and Language Practice 107 3.4 Later Pyrrhonism: Sextus Empiricus 112 3.5 Outline of Sextus 118 3.6 Phantasiai 119 3.7 Apprehension 122 3.8 What the Sceptics Do 125 3.9 Ataraxia and Epoche 128 3.10 The Five Ways to Epoche 133 3 3.10.1 The First Trope: Diaphonia 136 3.10.2 The Second Trope: Infinite Regression 138 3.10.3 The Third Trope: Relativity 139 3.10.4 The Fourth Trope: Hypothesis 141 3.10.5 The Fifth Trope: Reciprocity 143 3.10.6 The Tropes in Action 144 3.11 The Sceptical Practice of Language 147 3.12 The Sceptical Utterances 151 3.13 Shielding, Suspending, and Purging 156 Conclusion 4 The Linguistic Praxis of Pyrrhonism 163 Glossary 169 Bibliography 170 4 Abstract This thesis aims to develop a specific understanding of Pyrrhonian scepticism that follows an analysis of ancient scepticism as it began to form in the teachings of Pyrrho of Elis, moved into the Academy, and reached its greatest clarity in Sextus Empiricus. The focus of the thesis is to expose an understanding of Pyrrhonism as offering an approach to finding a less troubled life by way of habitual alteration of everyday language. The discussion of Pyrrho centers on several key passages that indicate a specific attitude towards the human condition, towards the way beliefs are generated, and towards the way language can be utilized to refine the generation of beliefs. Further, comparisons are made between Pyrrho and Plato regarding aporia and how central uncertainty and wisdom through awareness of ignorance were to both of these thinkers. Turning to the Academic tradition, the thesis strives to underscore the unargumentative, ascetic aspect of Pyrrhonian scepticism by showing the fundamental differences between the ascetic, language oriented Pyrrhonians, and the eristic, argumentative Academics. Looking at Arcesilaus and then Carneades as examples of the Academic tradition, it is shown how the focus on finding the untroubled life as well as the language praxis found in Pyrrho’s teaching are diminished and supplanted by dialectical argument. The final chapter briefly examines the revival of Pyrrhonism by Aenesidemus, showing that he appeared to be aware of the language practice that Pyrrho espoused, as well as the tangent that Academic scepticism took from Pyrrho’s original intentions for living a less troubled life. A detailed discussion of Sextus Empiricus is contained in the third chapter, which revolves around a treatment of the five tropes of Agrippa, includes an explanation of several concepts key to understanding Sextus and an elucidation of the sceptical utterances central to the linguistic practice that has once again been reinstated. Ultimately Pyrrhonism is found to be a philosophy of revealed experience, such that she who wishes to live a more tranquil life needs to practice what Pyrrhonism teaches in order to experience its effects, beginning with aporia and epoche, and ending fortuitously in ataraxia. 5 Introduction and Overview This thesis develops a specific understanding of Pyrrhonian scepticism that follows an analysis of ancient scepticism as it began to take form in the teachings of Pyrrho of Elis, moved into the Academy, and reached its greatest clarity in Sextus Empiricus. The specific understanding aimed for considers Pyrrhonism as being attentive to the habitual use of everyday language by an individual, and how beliefs and convictions of individuals become implicitly intertwined with the language used to express them. This is problematic in the eyes of the ancient sceptics and Pyrrhonists in particular, as they do not find convictions or beliefs to be found or justified easily. Further, though phrased in a way lacking Pyrrhonian finesse, Pyrrhonists do not think (feel is perhaps a better word, for reasons that will become clear) that holding strong beliefs and convictions allow one to be unperturbed by troubles or to live a happy life – goals handed down from the Cynics before them. Beliefs tend to do the opposite: create divisions among opinions and people alike, fabricating notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. What is more, beliefs tend to be assumed to be grounded in unimpeachable fact, especially old ones, engrained from childhood or from generations past. The Pyrrhonian worry, in an allegorical nutshell, is that a childhood belief can be the seed of an adult prejudice. A single conviction combines with a new one in the future, joining with yet another, creating belief - a new ‘us’ and ‘them’, a new line in the sand - from potentially nothing, which is yet still assumed to be unimpeachable. The Pyrrhonian answer to this, and the specific understanding that is the aim of this thesis, is to adopt a discrete use of language which avoids the production and dissemination of beliefs and convictions, thereby giving 6 way to the revelatory and innately ascetic Pyrrhonian path to the happy life. Discrete language praxis consists of making all of one’s statements and locutions in accord with an aporetic attitude; that is, to speak with no inclination to claim what one says is known. The specific mode of aporetic language changes slightly with the development of scepticism over time, but can generally be understood as the shunning of making absolute claims about reality, the true nature of things, or one’s ability to know these things, in everyday speech. There is a connection between this approach to using language and some 20th century thinkers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Edward Sapir, and Benjamin Lee Whorl. These philosophers and linguists developed a theory that an individual’s language determines that individual’s thought. This theory, called linguistic determinism, is deeply connected to this thesis in that aporetic language can be seen to be a forerunner of, or even dependent upon, linguistic determinism. The full scope of the connections between aporetic language and linguistic determinism is not clear given that the ancient sceptics did not cash out their theory in these contemporary terms. It is quite clear, nevertheless, that aporetic linguistic practice shows an interest on the part of the sceptics in language and how our use of language can influence and obscure our beliefs and what we believe we know. However, the focus of this thesis is more upon how the Sceptical school of thought developed between the third century BCE and the third century CE, and how contemporaneous schools of thought influenced the sceptics and vice versa. The investigation into how connected the Sceptical way is to linguistic determinism would be a fruitful discussion, and I feel that a good starting point would be to recognize that the 7 relation between language and world is a reciprocal and continual one in that both one’s language and one’s world are constantly changing and evolving, sometimes together, sometimes not. Short of this brief foray, linguistic determinism is set aside. It is paramount to note that the Pyrrhonists do not attack those who hold such convictions, nor do the Pyrrhonists argue with those who try to justify beliefs. Rather, Pyrrhonists view the problems created by holding beliefs and convictions as essentially personal problems; the Pyrrhonist is more concerned with her own affiliation with her own beliefs. This is to say, Pyrrhonism is a deeply personal approach to living happily and is not antagonistic or intended for dialectics. This is accomplished through the shedding of beliefs via the habituation of the previously mentioned use of language, aimed at oneself and not at an interlocutor. If indeed this form of language use is ever ‘directed at’ or used upon another, it is almost certainly carried out in a pedagogical way meant to teach the uninformed of the Pyrrhonian way. The discussion of Pyrrho contextualizes the entire thesis and centers on several key passages that indicate a specific attitude towards the human condition, towards the way beliefs are generated, and towards the way language can be utilized to refine the generation of beliefs. The germ of the specific understanding of Pyrrhonian scepticism that will be drawn out is an attitude generated through aporetic language practice. Pyrrho’s ascetic, aporetic disposition is developed and maintained within language so as to address language use itself, and more importantly, to address the troubling effects that language has upon our conscious and unconscious ontological beliefs and opinions. He does this largely through conscious effort, to speak of things as being ‘no more’ this than that, having the attitude of this phrase underlie most every statement.