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This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights and duplication or sale of all or part is not permitted, except that material may be duplicated by you for research, private study, criticism/review or educational purposes. Electronic or print copies are for your own personal, non- commercial use and shall not be passed to any other individual. No quotation may be published without proper acknowledgement. For any other use, or to quote extensively from the work, permission must be obtained from the copyright holder/s. Neutral Monism Against the Qualiophiles George Peter Carpenter Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy October 2018 Keele University ii Abstract This thesis argues for an austere form of monism that incorporates aspects of panpsychism and physicalism, with the aim of putting naturalist epistemology on a secure footing. I criticise panpsychism for failing to live up to its promises of defending what we ordinarily think of as consciousness against physicalism, and criticise the metaphysical presuppositions of its current high‐ profile proponents. These presuppositions are contrasted with more recent approaches in philosophy of science. The mind‐body problem itself endures these assaults, however, and I criticise physicalists who claim their position is the more common‐sensical, along with naturalists who think they can avoid metaphysics. Both tendencies are represented by phenomenal concept strategists, whose position comes to seem extreme over the course of two chapters. I then offer my own solution to the mind‐body problem. My position seeks a dialectical reconciliation between the possibility of directly experiencing reality, associated with anti‐physicalist mysticism, and physical reductionism. I therefore take time to establish both the historical novelty of physicalism, and aspects of continuity which it may share with its predecessors. Key words: consciousness, panpsychism, physicalism, neutral monism, qualia, reductionism, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, history of ideas iii iv Contents Introduction................................................................................................................1 Chapter 1: Venturing on the Seas of Panpsychism..............................................9 [1.1] Chalmers’ Legacy.........................................................................................9 [1.2] Ghosts versus Zombies..............................................................................14 [1.2.1] The Possibility of Having ‘All the Facts’.................................................14 [1.2.2] Varieties of A Priori Metaphysics..........................................................20 [1.3] Russellian Monism....................................................................................25 [1.4] Goff in Focus: Foundations........................................................................33 [1.5] Goff in Focus II: Speculations.....................................................................41 [1.5.1] Aristotle ..............................................................................................43 [1.5.2] Mental Causation.................................................................................46 v Chapter 2: The Bonding Problems........................................................................61 [2.1] Problems and Prospects............................................................................61 [2.2] Lockwood’s Quantum Consciousness........................................................66 [2.2.1] Lockwood’s Mind‐independent Minds.................................................70 [2.2.2] The Sceptical Wedge...........................................................................79 [2.3] Against Humean Metaphysics...................................................................83 [2.3.1] John Heil: Powers and Qualities...........................................................84 [2.3.2] Wesley Salmon on Scientific Explanation.............................................89 [2.4] Wilkes on Personal Identity.......................................................................94 [2.4.1] Panexperientialism Again...................................................................100 [2.5] Rosenberg’s Ontology.............................................................................102 Chapter 3: Historicism and Naturalism..............................................................115 [3.1] Aristotle on Matter..................................................................................115 [3.2] Aristotle on Mind....................................................................................121 [3.3] Descartes Versus Aristotle.......................................................................128 [3.4] Science Versus Common Sense................................................................132 [3.4.1] Rosenberg’s Ambiguities....................................................................132 [3.4.2] Common Sense and the Principle of Separability................................141 vi [3.4.3] John Heil and the Fate of Direct Realism.............................................147 [3.4.4] Naturalism and Scepticism..................................................................156 [3.5] Functionalist and Teleological Semantics.................................................162 [3.6] The Heuristic Psychology of Science.........................................................171 [3.7] Relative Common Sense..........................................................................179 Chapter 4: The Phenomenal Concepts Strategy...............................................185 [4.1] Overview.................................................................................................185 [4.2] Strong Necessities...................................................................................190 [4.3] Objections...............................................................................................194 [4.3.1] Dual Revelation..................................................................................195 [4.3.2] The Possibility of Metaphysics............................................................197 [4.3.3] Translucent Consciousness..................................................................202 [4.3.4] Raffman Qualia....................................................................................206 [4.4] Types of Conceivability............................................................................210 [4.5] The Use‐Mention Distinction...................................................................222 [4.5.1] Unbelievable Physicalism.....................................................................225 [4.5.2] Using versus Mentioning Heuristics.....................................................228 vii Chapter 5: The Disconsolations of Physicalism................................................235 [5.1] Is PCS Illusionist?.....................................................................................235 [5.2] Raffman and Balog on “Presentational” Concepts...................................244 [5.3] Partial Revelation and Selfhood...............................................................255 [5.4] Gunderson on Stepping Outside of Ourselves..........................................263 Chapter 6: Neutral Monism Against the Qualiophiles....................................273 [6.1] Wimsatt’s Incoherence............................................................................273 [6.2] Rationalist Metaphysics and ‘Stress Free’ Modal Dualism........................279 [6.3] Translucent Consciousness and Neutral Monism.....................................286 [6.4] Globus on Pure Consciousness.................................................................392 [6.5] Some Epistemological Problems..............................................................300 [6.5.1] Scepticism...........................................................................................302 [6.5.2] Knowledge..........................................................................................310 [6.6] Conclusion...............................................................................................312 References...............................................................................................................315 viii ix Acknowledgements Many thanks to James Tartaglia, Giuseppina D’Oro, Sorin Baiasu, Stephen Leach, Adam Balmer, Christopher Murphy, Anne‐Elizabeth de Merode, Sebastian Orlander, Jonathan Head, Sam Thomas, Greg Oliver, George House, Damian Veal (RIP), and all other friends, colleagues and family – this thesis would be much the poorer without you. x Introduction This thesis is directed against philosophers of mind influenced by David Chalmers, who appeal to phenomenal qualities, or qualia, to ground arguments for the irreducibility of mind to matter. Chalmers’ arguments, if sound, challenge both physicalism and naturalism. Physicalism is defined by Chalmers as the claim “that everything in the world is physical, or that there is nothing over and above the physical, or that the physical facts in a certain sense exhaust all the facts about the world”.1 It is an ontological or metaphysical thesis about the nature of the mind‐independent world, and about the mind as being just as physical, or dependent upon the physical, as any other object. While naturalism is sometimes thought to be synonymous with physicalism (e.g. metaphysical naturalism),