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Kant's Theory of Progress 1 Kant’s Theory of Progress M. J. B. McCloughan University College London Submitted for the Degree of PhD in Philosophy at the University of London 2003 2 Abstract My topic is Kant’s theory of historical progress. My approach is primarily textual and contextual. I analyse in some detail Kant’s three most important essays on the topic: ‘Idea for a Universal History’, the third part of ‘Theory and Practice’ and the second part of The Conflict of the Faculties. I devote particular attention to the Kant-Herder debate about progress, but also discuss Rousseau, Mendelssohn, Hegel and others. In presenting, on Kant’s behalf, a strong case for his theory of progress, I address the main objections which have been put to it. These are: (i) historical teleology is incoherent (history can’t have a goal because there is no intentional actor functioning at the historical level); (ii) historical teleology undermines morality (if things are getting better anyway, why do I have to try to make them better?); (iii) progress involves ‘chronological unfairness’ (if things are getting better, doesn’t this mean that earlier generations get a raw deal?); (iv) progress consigns the species to ‘spurious infinity’ (isn’t endless improvement endlessly unsatisfactory?); (v) progress amounts to pernicious homogenization (doesn’t the elimination of traditional practices and values impoverish our world?); (vi) the idea of progress is just ‘secularized’ religion (and should be rejected accordingly). In relation to (vi), I consider the Löwith-Blumenberg debate, and draw some general conclusions about the issue of ‘secularization’. In relating these to Kant, I argue for the following position: (a) his theory of progress is more than merely secularized religion; (b) to the extent that it can be described in terms of the secularization thesis, this reflects his ‘critical’ endeavour to rationalize Christianity; (c) in any case, the idea of progress by no means exhausts the rational potential of religion, and so should not be seen as intended to replace the latter. 3 Contents ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................2 CONTENTS.....................................................................................................................3 NOTE ON CITATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS.......................................................4 INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................6 CHAPTER ONE: HERDER ........................................................................................10 CHAPTER TWO: WHAT’S THE IDEA (IN KANT’S ‘IDEA’)? ...........................23 CHAPTER THREE: KANT’S HISTORICAL TELEOLOGY................................35 CHAPTER FOUR: RECONCILIATION AND THEODICY..................................57 CHAPTER FIVE: HERDER (AND HEGEL) VS. KANT........................................68 CHAPTER SIX: WHAT IS ‘DISCONCERTING’ ABOUT PROGRESS? ............86 CHAPTER SEVEN: ‘THEORY AND PRACTICE’...............................................100 CHAPTER EIGHT: THE CONFLICT OF THE FACULTIES ..............................124 CHAPTER NINE: SECULARIZATION .................................................................149 BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................170 4 Note on Citations and Translations Kant All quotations from and references to passages in Kant’s works are located by parenthetical citations of the volume and page number in Kants Gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences, except for citations from the Critique of Pure Reason, which are located by the customary use of the pagination of the first (“A”) and second (“B”) editions. All Kant’s works referred to are listed below, in alphabetical order, along with: the year (or years) of publication or, with posthumously published writings, the year (or years) of composition; the volume and pages in Kants Gesammelte Schriften; the translation used (full details provided in the bibliography); a short title (if applicable). ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’ [1784] (8:33-42), trans. Mary Gregor, Practical Philosophy, pp. 17-22. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [1798] (7:117-334), trans. Mary Gregor. ‘On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, But Is of No Use in Practice’ [1793] (8:273-313), trans. Mary Gregor, Practical Philosophy, pp. 279-309 (‘Theory and Practice’). References to the Third Part will also include the paragraph number, e.g. ¶3. The Conflict of the Faculties [1798] (7:1-116), trans. Mary Gregor and Robert Anchor, Religion and Rational Theology, pp. 239-327. The Second Part (7:77-94) will be referred to as ‘An Old Question’, the shortened form of its sub-title (cf. p. 122). References to ‘An Old Question’ will also give the section number, e.g. §3, with §C referring to the Conclusion. ‘Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History’ [1786] (8:107-23), trans. H. B. Nisbet, Kant: Political Writings, pp. 221-34 (‘Conjectures’). Critique of Judgment [1790] (5:167-484), trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, Critique of the Power of Judgment (third Critique). Critique of Practical Reason [1788] (5:1-163), trans. Mary Gregor, Practical Philosophy, pp. 139-271 (second Critique). Critique of Pure Reason [1781, 1787] (3:1-552, 4:1-252), trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (first Critique). ‘The End of All Things’ [1794] (8:327-39), trans. Allen Wood, Religion and Rational Theology, pp. 221-31 (‘End’). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals [1785] (4:385-463), trans. Mary Gregor, Practical Philosophy, pp. 43-108 (Groundwork). ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ [1784] (8:15-31), trans. H. B. Nisbet, Kant: Political Writings, pp. 41-53 (‘Idea’). References will also give where relevant the Proposition number, e.g. #3. ‘Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion’ [1783-86] (28:993-1126), trans. Allen Wood, Religion and Rational Theology, pp. 341-451. The Metaphysics of Morals [1797] (6:203-493), trans. Mary Gregor, Practical Philosophy, pp. 363-603. 5 ‘On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’ [1791] (8:255-71), trans. George di Giovanni, Religion and Rational Theology, pp. 24-37 (‘Theodicy’). Toward Perpetual Peace [1795] (8:341-86), trans. Mary Gregor, Practical Philosophy, pp. 317-351 (Perpetual Peace). Religion with the Boundaries of Mere Reason [1793, 1794] (6:1-202), trans. George di Giovanni, Religion and Rational Theology, pp. 39-215 (Religion). ‘Reviews of Herder’s “Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity” ’ [1785] (8:43-66), trans. H. B. Nisbet, Kant: Political Writings, pp. 201-20 (‘Reviews’). Letters to and from Kant are referred to by sender, addressee, date and volume and page number in Gesammelte Schriften. All translations are taken from Correspondence, trans. Arnulf Zweig. Kant’s Handschriftliche Nachlaß is referred to by Reflection number (e.g. R6456) and volume and page number in Gesammelte Schriften. All translations are taken from Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770, trans. David Walford. Herder All quotations from and references to passages in Herder’s works are located by parenthetical citations of the volume and page number in Herders Werke, edited by Ulrich Gaier, Martin Bollacher and others, preceded by a page reference to the translation used, using the following key: B J. G. Herder on Social and Political Culture, trans. and ed. F. M. Barnard. Bu Against Pure Reason: Writings on Religion, Language and History, trans. and ed. Marcia Bunge. C Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind, trans. T. Churchill. Cr German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: Winckelmann, Lessing, Hamann, Herder, Schiller and Goethe, ed. H. B. Nisbet, trans. Joyce P. Crick. F Philosophical Writings, trans. and ed. Michael Forster. All Herder’s works referred to are listed below, in alphabetical order, along with: the year (or years) of publication; the volume and pages in Herders Werke; the translation used (full details provided in the bibliography); a short title (if applicable). ‘Extract from a Correspondence on Ossian and the songs of ancient peoples’ [1773] (2:447-497), trans. in Cr, pp. 154-161 (abridged) (‘Ossian’). Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Humanity [1784–1791] (6:11-898), excerpts trans. in B, pp. 255-326, Bu, pp. 48-58 and C, pp. 3-398 (Ideas). References to Ideas will also give book and chapter numbers, e.g. XV.3. ‘Journal of My Voyage in the Year 1769’ (9/ii:9-126), excerpts trans. in B, pp. 63-113. ‘Shakespeare’ [1773] (2:498-521), trans. in Cr, pp. 161-76. This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity [1774] (4:9-107), trans. in F, pp. 272-358 (This Too). Herder’s letters are referred to by addressee, date and page number in Briefe: Gesamtausgabe, vol. 5, eds. Wilhelm Dobbeck and Günter Arnold. 6 Introduction My primary aim in this thesis is to expound Kant’s theory of progress. By progress I mean historical progress. One might suppose that this would go without saying, were it not for the fact that much of Kant’s thought about progress is concerned instead with the progress of the individual, in particular as this features in his argument for the postulation of the immortality of the soul. I will at times have occasion to refer to this other theory of progress and consider its relation to my topic. Indeed, it would have been possible (and no doubt interesting) to treat the
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