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Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysical Nature of the Soul and Its Union with the Body

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Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysical Nature of the Soul and Its Union with the Body Syracuse University SURFACE Dissertations - ALL SURFACE June 2017 Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysical Nature of the Soul and its Union with the Body Kendall Ann Fisher Syracuse University Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/etd Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons Recommended Citation Fisher, Kendall Ann, "Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysical Nature of the Soul and its Union with the Body" (2017). Dissertations - ALL. 707. https://surface.syr.edu/etd/707 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the SURFACE at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations - ALL by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Abstract In this dissertation I examine Thomas Aquinas’ account of the metaphysical nature of the rational soul and its hylomorphic union with the body. Aquinas simultaneously holds that the rational soul is the substantial form of the human being and that it is an incorporeal subsisting thing that survives death. This particular pairing of views is notoriously difficult. On the one hand, Aquinas argues that because of the soul’s role as substantial form, it informs prime matter so as to compose a single unified substance—the human being. Unlike aggregates or accidental unities, the human being is something unqualifiedly one, that is, something unum simpliciter. On the other, his commitment to the incorporeity and subsistence of the soul as well as its continued exitence after death appear to threaten this unity—if the soul’s existence does not depend on the body, and it can exist on its own, then it seems to be a complete substance in its own right. If so, on Aquinas’ view, it cannot be united to anything else to form something unum simpliciter. So, in spite of Aquinas’ insistence that the human being is unqualifiedly one it is not clear that he is philosophically entitled to it. In the first half of my dissertation I determine the extent to which the incorporeity, subsistence, and incorruptibility of the soul threaten to undermine Aquinas’ account of human unity. I argue that when his account of the soul and its relationship to the body is properly understood within his metaphysical framework, the metaphysical nature of the soul is compatible with human unqualified unity. Moreover, I argue that although human beings are metaphysically unique among created substances in his ontology, Aquinas adequately motivates their peculiar hybrid status. In the second half of my dissertation, I discuss two of Aquinas’ arguments for the hylomorphic union of body and soul. Both arguments are found in Summa Theologiae I.76.1. The first is based on Aristotle’s demonstration in De Anima II.2 that the soul is the form of i the body. I argue that while Aquinas’ version of the argument is similar to Aristotle’s in many ways, it goes beyond Aristotle’s in ways that reflect his specific motivations, and in particular, his disagreement with Averroes concerning the relationship between intellective soul and body. The second argument for hylomorphism in Summa Theologiae I.76.1 involves Aquinas’ rejection of three competing accounts of the relationship between intellect and body, namely, the Platonist, Averroist, and Moved-Mover accounts. While Aquinas’ argument may initially appear to be a mere argument by elimination, I argue that a common theme emerges in his rejection of the alternatives. According to Aquinas, none of his competitors can satisfactorily account for the rationality, animality, and unity of the human being. At best, each competitor can account for two out of the three. In his view, therefore, Aquinas’ rejection of competing accounts provides positive reasons for affirming the hylomorphic account of body and soul, namely, that only his view can succeed where the others fail. ii Thomas Aquinas on the Metaphysical Nature of the Soul and its Union with the Body Kendall Ann Fisher B.A. Calvin College 2010 DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Syracuse University June 2017 iii Copyright © Kendall Ann Fisher 2017 All Rights Reserved iv Acknowledgements I would like to thank Kara Richardson and Kris McDaniel for their guidance and support throughout my graduate work and the dissertation writing process. I am so thankful. I would also like to thank Rebecca DeYoung, who inspired me to pursue philosophy and first introduced me to the work of Thomas Aquinas. I am grateful to my family for their love and encouragement, and above all, to Anthony Fisher for his love, tireless support, and constant faith in me. v Contents Abbreviations.......................................................................................................................viii Introduction ............................................................................................................................1 Chapter 1: Substance and Unity in Aquinas’ Metaphysics .....................................................10 1.1 Substance-Accident Ontology ......................................................................................11 1.2 Form-Matter Composition...........................................................................................13 1.3 Substantial and Accidental Form..................................................................................18 1.4 Esse-Essentia Composition ..........................................................................................23 1.5 Esse, Form, and Unity..................................................................................................27 1.6 The Human Being as a Hylomorphic Substance...........................................................31 Conclusion.........................................................................................................................35 Chapter 2: The Incorporeity of the Rational Soul..................................................................36 2.1 Intellectual Cognition: The Intentional Potency of the Possible Intellect.......................38 2.2 The Proper Object of Intellective Cognition.................................................................44 2.3 Agent Intellect and the Bodily Contribution to Intellective Cognition ..........................49 2.4 Incorporeity of the Intellect: Cognition of All Material Natures...................................52 2.5 Two Kinds of Potency..................................................................................................59 2.6 Incorporeity of the Intellect: Cognition of Universals...................................................67 2.7 The Rational Soul as an Incorporeal Form...................................................................72 2.8 Incorporeity and Unity.................................................................................................76 Conclusion.........................................................................................................................77 Chapter 3: The Subsistence of the Rational Soul ...................................................................78 3.1 Subsistence and Existence Per Se..................................................................................80 3.2 Argument for the Subsistence of the Soul: The Soul as a Per Se Operator ....................85 3.3 The Correspondence of Per Se Existence and Operation and the In-Act Principle........93 3.4 The In-Act Principle in the Argument for Subsistence ................................................101 3.5 The Subsistence of the Soul and the Subsistence of the Hand .....................................105 3.6 Independence and Separation.....................................................................................112 3.7 Inherence versus Subsistence ......................................................................................115 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................120 Chapter 4: The Incorruptibility and Existential Completeness of the Rational Soul.............121 4.1 Argument for Incorruptibility ....................................................................................122 4.2 Incorruptibility and Existential Completeness............................................................125 4.3 Incomplete in a Nature: Operational Dependence on the Body..................................129 4.4 The Disembodied Soul as an Incomplete Actuality.....................................................135 4.5 A Shared Act of Existence..........................................................................................139 4.6 Human Beings in Aquinas’ Hierarchy of Being ..........................................................141 vi Conclusion.......................................................................................................................142 Chapter 5: Aristotelian Argument for the Hylomorphic Union of Soul and Body................143 5.1 Aristotle’s Argument in De Anima II.2.......................................................................145 5.2 Aquinas’ Argument for the Intellective Soul as Form of the Body ..............................149 5.3 The Soul as the Principle of Vital Operation ..............................................................153 5.4 Immanent Action and the In-Act Principle.................................................................155 5.5 Anti-Averroism in Aquinas’ Argument for Hylomorphism.........................................158
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