The Conception of Al¯Eth¯Es Anthr¯Opos in Plotinus' Enneads*

S t udia Philosophica Wratislaviensia Supplementary Volume, English Edition 2012

AGNIESZKA WOSZCZYK University of Silesia Katowice

The Conception of al¯eth¯esanthr¯opos in Plotinus’ Enneads*

Abstract The paper presents the ontological aspects of the conception of al¯eth¯es anthr¯opos and the problem of relations between individual human being and hypostases Psyche and Nous. According to Enn. I. 1 [53] the nature of man is twofold – man is z¯oon on the one hand, and man is psuch¯e on the second. But in the light of Plotinus’ monopsychism the genuine dimension of our being owns a beyond-individual character. The real capability of unification with Nous is one of the activities inherently connected with dynamical nature of Soul. The levels of human consciousness are identical with the gradation of activities of Psych¯e taken as hypostasis and al¯eth¯esanthr¯opos represents the epistrophical return to Intellect.

Preface The penultimate in chronological order, the 53rd tractate of the Enneads, being the opening text in the Plotinian work by Porphyry of Tyre, is entirely devoted to anthropological issues. The title question: What is the living being, and what is man?, introduces a tangle of problems connected with defining the relationships between the body and individual soul, Soul-hypostasis [psuch¯e] and intellect [nous] which are discussed in consecutive treatises. This tractate somewhat determines predominant issues in the Enneads wherein anthropo-psychological problems are constantly present, over a third of the whole Plotinian work being directly ded- icated to them. It would be difficult to indicate a treatise which utterly omits the aforementioned questions, considering that frequently Plotinus’ writing style is switching from even the most abstract problems or logico-metaphysical discus- sions to remarks on man and the world of his inner experience.1

* The original version published in Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, 4 [4] (2009), pp. 61–70 1 See e.g. Enn. VI. 7 [38] wherein the discussion on the difference between the One and Intellect and the applicability of cataphatic predicates to the One, is enriched by digressions on self-knowledge and mystical experience. It is not an exception but a rule for the Plotinian style. Greek and English from the Enneads as per the edition: Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. A.H. Armstrong, vol. 1–7 (London 1966–1988).

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The intricacy of the Plotinian disquisition, and the frequent contradictions which occur among particular approaches, make the answer to the question of human nature appear as a highly problematic issue. It is reflected in researchers’ disputes over such problems as the conception of soul, ideas of individual beings,2 the difference between Intellect and Soul3 or mystical union.4 They show a num- ber of specific problems which with the Plotinian anthropology is involved. In this context it is worth mentioning that the Plotinian conception of man and Soul5 was already perceived in a critical way by the next generations of Neo-Platonic philoso- phers, which found expression inter alia in Iamblichus’6 and Proclus’ stances. Ap- parently, the need was discerned to define Plotinus’ vision7 more precisely, which amounted to the separation of an individual soul from the intellect – entering into a polemic against the view on the natural, as resulting from the very essence of the soul, possibility of unifying with the higher ontic layers – Intellect and the One [hen].8 However, grasping the Plotinian conception of man is not possible without establishing the theoretical implications connected with the notion of al¯eth¯esan- thr¯opos. This notion seems to be crucial, based on the fact that it highlights the crucial assumption of Plotinus’ method, that the path of the inner experience of man leads to an encounter with the hypostatic structure of reality, which is the object of theoretical reflection. Because an object of philosophical examination is also the reality which is able to apprehend a specific experience crowned by the act unio mystica. The conception of the “true man” shows that in Plotinus’ depiction, a human being is distinguished by a multilayer structure, furthermore it touches on the problematic issue of merging of what is immaterial and material, modes of presence of what is bodiless in what is bodily. In the article, only the ontological aspect of the conception al¯eth¯esanthr¯opos will be considered, whereas ethical and mystical aspects of this problem will be omitted.

2 See H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Did Plotinus believe in Ideas of Individuals?’, Phronesis 11 (1966), pp. 61–80; J.M. Rist, ‘Forms of Individuals in Plotinus’, Classical Quarterly, 63 (1963), pp. 223– 231; P. Kalligas, ‘Forms of Individuals in Plotinus. A Re-Examination’, Phronesis, 42 (1997), pp. 206–227. 3 See H.J. Blumenthal, Soul, World-Soul and Individual Soul in Plotinus, [in:] Le N´eoplatonisme (Paris 1971), pp. 55–66. 4 See J.M. Rist, ‘Back to the Mysticism of Plotinus. Some More Specifics’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 27 (1989), pp. 183–197. 5 H.J. Blumenthal (Plotinus in Later Platonism, [in:] H.J. Blumenthal, R.A. Markus (eds.), Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought. Essays in Honour of A.H. Armstrong (London 1981), pp. 212–222) claims that it is in the realm of the psychological conception that one of the most important differences between Plotinus’ neoplatonism and late neoplatonism is revealed. 6 See Iamblichus, De Anima, J.F. Finamore, J.M. Dillon (eds.) (Leiden–Boston–K¨oln2002), pp. 30, 365. 2–366. 20. 7 Although it is certainly not the only motive for abandoning Plotinian findings in the realm of psychological theory, the fact of Iamblichus’ acceptance of theurgy is sometimes recognized as its main reason. It implied the rejection of the thesis of integral affinity of man to noetic dimensions in order to justify the value of theurgical practices. See R.T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London 1995), pp. 118–123; G. Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul. The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (Pensylvania 1995), p. 11. 8 See Iamblichus, De Anima, 365. 12–366. 20.

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Al¯eth¯esanthr¯opos and the relationship between soul and body In Enn. I. 1 [53] Plotinus determines the relation between the man apprehended as a living being [z¯oion], and the man [anthr¯opos] apprehended as soul [psuch¯e] which uses the body as a tool [organon].9 In Enn. I. 1 [53]. 7, 17–20 he claims that: [. . . ] but we in our presidency over the living being, are what extends from his point upwards. But there will be no objection to calling the whole thing a living being; the lower parts are something mixed, the part which begins on the level of thought is, I supposed, the true man [ho anthr¯opos ho al¯eth¯es] [. . . ].10 That true man has then the bodiless nature, “since man coincides with the rational soul” [ontos tou anthr¯opou t¯eilogik¯eipsuch¯ei],11 as Plotinus maintains further. Thereby he indirectly indicates the separateness of soul related to body of “true man”, which may bring astonishment because it consequently indicates the dual presence of soul in man. For it would not be body without forming activity of the Soul, and every living being is endowed with soul, therefore “mixed” soul [mikton] should be distinguished from “rational” soul12. Body itself, as an element of the material world, that is an element of the order of becoming, [kosmos aisth¯etos] belongs to the sphere ordained by the World-Soul [psuch¯etou pantos],13 and it also possesses a qualitative configuration which is the result of the activity of Soul-Nature [phusis] forming the world, according to the picture of the idea it has of itself, thanks to the World-Soul.14 Hence body is not only the reflection of idea’s reflection possessed by Soul, but also something pertaining to the animate universum, and thereby participating in the life of Soul-Nature [phusis] which represents a certain aspect of Soul [psuch¯e] hypostasis.15 Human body, likewise vegetal and animal bodies, is animated by an actual, individual soul, yet related neotically to Soul-hypostasis.16 In Plotinus’ depiction, the soul which shapes body and gives it a human type of formation does not suffice to explain what man is. In Enn. II. 3 [52] Plotinus, while comparing the myth of the Moirai to Plato’s Timaeus 69 c, presents two dimensions of the soul – actually two souls – one, a subject of cosmic necessity, which he defines as “shadow” and another, free from bodily influence, which pertains to the neotic order: So we must fly from here and separate ourselves from what has been added to us [prosgegen¯emen¯on], and not be the composite thing, the

9 See Enn. I. 1 [53]. 3, 3. 10 Ibidem, pp. 108–109. 11 Enn. I. 1 [53]. 7, 22, p 110–111. 12 I apply the notation of the word soul in lower case when an individual soul is in question and the notation in upper case the Soul for Soul in the general sense. 13 See Enn. III. 7 [2]. 13. 14 See Enn. III. 8 [30]. 3–4. 15 Plotinus repeats after Plato’s Timaeus 36 d that the Soul is not in body, but body is in the Soul, while certainly considering the participation in the causative power of the Soul and not the relations of spatial inclusion; see Enn. III. 9 [13]. 3. 1–4. 16 See Enn. IV. 7 [2]. 14. 1–8, p 390–391.

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ensouled body [m¯eto s¯omaepsuch¯omenon] in which the nature of body [he s¯omatosphusis] (which has some trace of soul [psuch¯esti ichnos]) has the greater power, so that the common life belongs more to the body; for everything that belongs to this common life is bodily. But to the other soul, which is outside the body [t¯esd’ heteras t¯esekso], belongs the ascent to the higher world, to the fair and divine which no one master [h¯onoudeis kratei], but either make use of it that he may be it and live by it, withdrawing himself; or else he is bereft of this higher soul and lives under destiny [en heimarmen¯ei] [. . . ].17 The two types of soul represented here are two different kinds of activity of the Soul-hypostasis: “trace of soul” corresponds to the Soul-Nature, whereas “the other soul”, i.e. a soul external to body, corresponds to the Soul contemplating the intellect. This division of the souls can be described differently in the light of the principle proodos – mon¯e– epistroph¯e, as the division in which “trace of soul” corresponds to “exit” activity – in other words, it is the result of causative causality representing the emanation activity of the Soul. On the other hand, the soul external in relation to body represents the epistrophic aspect, that is, returning to the source, to the essence. It is demonstrated in Enn. IV. 8 [6]. 4. 31–35 where Plotinus presents two poles of a unitary soul – related to the noetic world and the sensible world: Souls, then, become, one might say, amphibious [hoion amphibioi], compelled to live by turns the life There [in Intellect – A.W.], and the life here [in body – A.W.]: those which are able to more in the company of Intellect live the life There more, but those whose normal condition is, by nature or chance, the opposite, live more the life here below.18 The deliberation over those types of the Soul from the side of consciousness dynamics19 is worth emphasizing here. Plotinus remarks in Enn. I. 1 [53]. 3, 1–6 that soul is to body like a craftsman to a tool, thus it does not have to accept its sensations. Thereby he opens the field for analyses of the consciousness which soul possesses in relation to body and the consciousness which belongs to the Soul in its essence, irrespective of the incarnate condition.20 The Soul consciousness, or better still, its self-knowledge, is here implicite treated in a multilevel way. It is confirmed in Enn. I. 1 [53]. 7. 8–10 where Plotinus mentions that “of more value that we are, enter into the composition of the whole essence of man, which is made up of many elements”,21 in order to indicate then differences between 17 Enn.II. 3 [52]. 9. 20–28; Plotinus, Ennead II, pp. 74–75. 18 Plotinus, Ennead IV, pp. 410–411. 19 See G.S. Brett, Historia psychologii [History of Psychology], trans. J. Makota (Warszawa 1969), pp. 179; E. Br´ehier, The Philosophy of Plotinus, trans. J. Thomas (Chicago 1958), p. 57; E.R. Dodds, ‘Tradycja i dokonania własne w filozofii Plotyna’ [‘Tradition and Personal Achieve- ments in the Philosophy of Plotinus’], trans. A. Przybysławski, Edukacja Filozoficzna, 20 (1995), p. 50; E.K. Emilsson, Plotinus and Soul-Body Dualism, [in:] S. Everson (ed.), Companions to Ancient Thought 2. Psychology, (Cambridge 1991), pp. 144–165. 20 Likewise in Enn. I. 4 [46]. 14–15. 21 Plotinus, Ennead I, pp. 108–109.

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the type of perception [aisth¯esis] inherent to soul and the type of perception that soul is present in the body. Likewise in Enn. I. 1 [53]. 10. 6–10 he emphasizes that human self is dual, one when the beast [to th¯erion] is included in man , and another is an extra corporeal element [to huper]: So we is used in two senses [ditton oun to h¯emeis], either including the beast [¯esunarithmoumenou tou th¯eriou], or referring to that which even in our present life transcends it [¯eto huper touto ¯ed¯e]. The beast is the body which has been given life. But the true man [al¯eth¯esan- thr¯opos] is different, clear of these affections; he has the virtues which belong to the sphere of intellect and have their seat actually in the separate soul [en aut¯eit¯eich¯orizomen¯eipsuch¯eihidruntai], separate and separable even while it is still here below.22 Also in this passage the distinction between man in body or soul in body and true man is based on the criterion of the soul’s dependence on bodily sensations, like in Enn. II. 3 [52]. 9. 19–28, Plotinus again indicates specific freedom, inde- pendent of what is bodily as the determinant of the true nature of man.23 Also the distinction between the soul separated from body and the soul living the life of the compound in Enn. I. 7 [54]. 3. 19–22 directs to two types of consciousness of an individual soul. Likewise in Enn. I. 8 [51]. 13–15 Plotinus, while considering the problem of the connection between soul and the genesis of evil, points out the possibility of changes in soul under the influence of contact with matter,24 but at the same time he states that evil appears in soul through something which is not indivisible [dia tou ouk amerous], thus it concerns its relationship with the body. Since evil in soul is the result of its influence on matter, so is a certain state of its consciousness, submitting to false beliefs25 and infirmity.26 The distinction between the types of individual souls, considering the state of consciousness either related to body or free from the sensations of body, in terms of activity types characteristic of Soul-hypostasis, means that man can live the life of reflection, “trace [ichnos] of the Soul” (as an element of Nature) or live the life of the Soul in the substantial sense, only the latter corresponds to being ho anthr¯opos ho al¯eth¯es. Plotinus employs here the model of pattern – projection, proper to his metaphysical conception. The bodily dimension represents what is ontically weaker, what has been “radiated” from the Soul as the causal power typical of hypostasis, but still related to what is substantial.27 Hence the descent 22 Ibidem, pp. 114–115. 23 See S.R.L. Clarke, Plotinus: Body and Soul, [in:] L.P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Com- panion to Plotinus (Cambridge 1996), p. 276. 24 See Th.G. Sinnige, ‘Plotinus on the Human Person and its Cosmic Identity’, Vigiliae Chris- tianae, 56 (2002), p. 293. 25 See Enn. I. 8 [51].15. 19, p. , also in Enn. I. 1 [53]. 9. 21–22 Plotinus distinguishes the consciousness obscured by beliefs from the true consciousness of soul [t¯enge kuri¯ost¯espsuch¯es t¯esal¯ethousdianoian]. Likewise in Enn. V. 1 [10]. 1. 1–17, descent of souls [tolma] is explained in terms of unconsciousness, through the utter lack of knowledge [pantelous agnoias] of the divine nature of souls. 26 See Enn. I. 8 [51]. 14. 27 See Enn. I. 1 [53]. 8.

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of individual souls, living with awareness of what is lower, what is the presence of power in body but not its true, full nature.

Man in Intellect In Enn. VI. 4 [22]. 14. 17–23, Plotinus confirms the affinity of unitary souls to the noetic realm:

But we – who are we? Are we that which draws near and comes to be in time? No, even before this coming to be came to be we were there, man who were different, and some of us even gods [theoi], pure souls [psuchai katharai] and intellect united with the whole of reality [nous sun¯emmenost¯eihapas¯eiousiai], we were parts of intelligible, not marked off or cut off but belonging to the whole [mer¯eontes tou no¯etououk aph¯orismenaoud’ apotetm¯emena]; and we are not cut off even now. But now another man [anthr¯opos allos], wishing to exist [. . . ].28

Whereas in Enn. I. 1 [53]. 8. 1–8 after the prior statement that man is the rational soul29 and determining how to understand the predicate logistikon with respect to a unitary soul and its relation to Intellect, Plotinus remarks:

I mean by Intellect not the state of the soul, which is one of the things which derive from Intellect, but Intellect itself [auton ton noun]. We possess his too, as something that transcends us. We have it either as common to all, or particular to ourselves both common and particular; common because it is without parts and one and everywhere the same, particular to ourselves because each has the whole of it in the primary part of the soul [hekastos outon holon en psuch¯eit¯eipr¯ot¯ei]. So we also possess the forms in two ways, in our soul, in a manner of speaking unfolded and separated, in Intellect all together.30

In this excerpt, man is understood as soul in body from a perspective of the bodily dimension31 and the relationship of soul and Intellect, although distin- guished from the reasoning capacity, it is connected to what is common and not unitary. One should remember here that the previous chapter – Enn. I. 1 [53]. 7 – contains the aforementioned passage on “true man” which could be easily connected with the conception, present in Enn. VI. 4 [22]. 14, of the affinity of unitary souls to the substance of Intellect. Especially with respect to the difference between anthr¯opos allos and souls in Intellect which brings to mind ho anthr¯opos

28 Plotinus, Ennead VI. 1–5, p. 317. 29 See Enn. I. 1 [53]. 7. 21–24. 30 Plotinus, Ennead I, p. 111. 31 It is pointed out in further considerations in Enn. I. 1 [53]. 8, in which Plotinus sticks to the tripartite division of reality in accordance with the order: the One, kosmos noetos, incarnate souls, and afterwards defines man as “the next but two” and composed of – he refers here to Plato’s Timaios 35a – from “the indivisible substance, that from above and from the substance divisible in bodies”.

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ho al¯eth¯es, “Other man” would refer to the incarnate condition of soul and “true man” to its affinity to the noetic order. Furthermore, the mention of “primary soul”, which is, as one may infer from the context, something which is “above us”, also substantiates the connection of this excerpt of Enn. I. 1 [53]. 8 with the conception of “true man” and souls in Intellect. However, in contradistinction to Enn. VI. 4 [22]. 14, in Enn. I. 1 [53] Plotinus does not mention the affinity of uni- tary souls to Intellect and he rather shows them in relation with Soul-hypostasis. It may be suggested by the already quoted statement from Enn. I. 1 [53]. 10. 5–10, which is about the virtues of the soul separated from body, and obviously Plotinus combines virtues with the Soul and not Intellect,32 which indicates that true man is combined here with the third hypostasis. Whereas the definition of soul as “separate and separable”, as well as the expression al¯eth¯esanthr¯opos point out that Plotinus employs here the distinction between the soul itself and the soul in body. “True man” then pertains here to the order of hypostasis psuch¯e and not to nous. Nevertheless, in Enn. V. 7 [18]. 1. 15–25, while considering the ideas of individuals, Plotinus claims that it is not possible for various entities to be the realisation of only one and the same pattern (idea), and similarly it is not possible to explain all the differences which occur between them solely by the individuative activity of matter. Those statements may confirm the affinity of ideas of individual beings to Intellect, but Plotinus precedes them with the following observation:

But if the soul of each individual possesses the rational forming princi- ples [tous logous] of all the individuals which it animates in succession, then again on this assumption, all will exist there [pantes au ekei]; and we do say that each soul possesses all the forming principles in the uni- verse. If then the universe possesses the forming principles, not only of man but of all individual animals, so does the soul [. . . ].33

The first sentence from the quoted passage refers to, as one may presume, the incarnation cycle of a unitary soul. It goes through many entities because it animates many entities, and yet each of them has certain individual features which Plotinus does not want to explain only by means of the discriminant function of matter. The phrase pantes au ekei is the indication that these determinations originate from the noetic source. The author of Enneades, as John Michael Rist remarks, opts for the assumption of ideas of individuals but it does not mean that this individuality is to be implied in personal terms – on the contrary, it is only the individuality guaranteed by a specific type of determination.34 However, it is worth putting those statements in the context of the assumption of monopsychism35 which seems to be preponderant for the explanation of the relationship of a unitary soul to Intellect. Plotinus begins Enn. VI. 4 [22]. 14.

32 See Enn. I. 2 [19]. 3. 31. 33 Enn. V. 7 [18]. 1. 8–12; Plotinus, Ennead V, pp. 222–223. 34 J.M. Rist, ‘Back to Mysticism of Plotinus...’, pp. 189–190. 35 See P. Merlan, Monopsychism. Mysticism. Metaconsciousness. Problems of the Soul in the Neoaristotelian and Neoplatonic Tradition (Hague 1963).

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from the question: how it is possible that the Soul is only one and at the same time specific in every living being.36 The assumption of monopsychism is backed up here by the argument of the lack of spatial limitations in the Soul, which entails different comprehension of parts or multitude from that in reference to physical things.37 This characterization also applies to Intellect, thus the conception of monopsychism is connected with the assumption of the unity of the neotic world and the affinity of the Soul to this order38. Plotinus – which is worth emphasizing in both tractates On the presence of being, one and the same, everywhere as a whole (Enn. VI. 4 [22] and Enn. VI. 5 [23]) – does not discuss the Soul from the viewpoint of otherness of its hypostatic nature in reference to the nature of Intellect. Quite the contrary, he highlights that its inherent type of one-multiplicity is the same as in case of Intellect and the psychic order is identical with the neotic order. However, he emphasizes differences which determine the division into the noetic sphere [kosmos no¯etos] and the sensible sphere [kosmos aisth¯etos] with respect to the criterion which is the type of relation occurring between the parts and the whole. For as long as things pertaining to the sensible world cannot be identical with one another, considering the spatial39 and temporal40 delimitations, then in reference to bodiless beings, the condition of identity of being entails the extinction of separation based on the differences of the parts because:

[. . . ] that All [noetic realm – A.W.] the first and existent, does not go looking for place and is not at all in anything. It is certainly not possible for the All, being all, to fall short of itself, but it exists as self-fulfilled, and as being equal to itself. [. . . ] And there is nothing surprising in everywhere meaning in being and in itself [. . . ].41

Moreover:

If then God [noetic realm – A.W.] is everywhere, it is not possible that he should be divided; for then he would not still be everywhere, but each part of him would be on here and another there, and he would not still be one, as if one cuts a magnitude into many parts, it will be destroyed and all the parts not longer be that whole; and besides, he will be a body.42

One should take just those reservations into consideration while making an at- tempt to determine the nature of unitary souls and the presence of “true man” in

36 See Enn. VI. 4 [22]. 14. 1. 37 Plotinus repeats here in an abridged form what he justified more widely in the initial parts of this tractate. See Enn. VI. 4 [22]. 1–4. 38 See Enn. VI. 4 [22]. 14. 2–16. 39 See Enn. VI. 4 [22]. 3–4. 40 See Enn. VI. 5 [23]. 2. 41 Enn. VI. 4 [22]. 2. 13–25; Ibidem, p. 279. Plotinus in Enn. VI. 5 [23]. 2–7 warns against transferring the comprehension of actual division with regard to the sensible sphere into the neotic sphere. 42 Enn. VI. 5 [23]. 4. 5–10; ibidem, pp. 334–335.

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Intellect. The conclusive point is depiction of the Soul in terms of power [dunamis], for example in Enn. IV. 8 [6]. 2, while analysing the Soul’s entry into bodies. With reference to Plato’s Timaeus, Plotinus writes about various powers of soul, where- from only “ultimate power” [dunamin eschat¯en] is sent by the Soul to the interior of the world.43 The same Soul is then present in the world and also manages the world “from outside” to some extent, whereas all spatial expressions are here solely metaphors. What is “external” represents the power of providence of the World-Soul, and what is “internal” the activity of unitary souls. Therefore, parts of the Soul, or in other words individual souls are powers of the Soul, and actu- ally the power revealing in fragmentation, considering the fact that it is regarded from the side of bodies distinguished by spatial divisibility.44 Thus, nature kosmos aisth¯etos implies the vision of the Soul from the angle of what is both bodily and spatial. The Soul remains one, although its powers manifest themselves in many bodies, just like Intellect is one, despite the multitude of ideas present in it.45 Returning to the quoted passage of Enn. VI. 4 [22]. 14. 16–23, the unity with the noetic reality or fusion of individuals with the substance of Intellect may be understood, in the light of the conception of monopsychism, as the substan- tial unity of the psychic sphere in kosmos noetos and also the possibility of the renewed experience of unity with Intellect, thanks to the eternal contemplation activity of Soul-hypostasis. The accession of “other man” means the decline of actual self-knowledge and replacing it with the perception of man through bodily divisions. The unity with Intellect is, however, the experience of generality and not individuality, and this thread also appears in Enn. V. 3 [49]. 4. 5–17 where Plotinus conceives the vision of substantial unity with nous exceeding the nature of soul:

43 See ibidem, pp. 400–405. 44 “[. . . ] but soul is inseparable and indivisible There [in Intellect – A.W.], but it is in its nature to be divided. For its division is departing from Intellect and coming to be in a body”. Enn. IV. 2 [21]. 1. 8–10; ibidem, pp. 20–21. This passage seems to be at variance with Plotinus’ utterances about the unity of all souls and the statements of dissimilar nature of soul in relation to body. Plotinus adds, however, that he considers here not soul, but what is represented in body from soul, that is its certain power. Furthermore, soul “For even here it is not only divisible, but also indivisible; for that of it which is divided is indivisibly divided [to gar meridzomenon aut¯es amerist¯osmeridzetai]. For it gives itself to the whole body and is not divided in that it gives itself whole to the whole and is divided in that it is present in every part”; Enn. IV. 2 [21]. 1. 18–22; ibidem, pp. 22–23. 45 Enn. VI. 4 [22]. 4. 34–46: “The soul’s being one, then, does not do away with the many souls, any more than being does away with beings, nor does the multiplicity there in the true All fight with the one, nor does one need to fill up bodies with life by the multiplicity, nor ought one to think that the multitude of souls came into existence because of bodily magnitude, but souls were both many and one before the bodies [pro t¯ons¯omat¯on]. For the many are already in the whole, not in potency [hai pollai ¯ed¯eou dunamei], but each and every in active actuality [all’ energeia hekast¯e]; for neither does the one and whole hinder the many from being in it, not do the many hinder the one. For they stand apart without standing aloof and are present to each other without being made other than themselves; for they are not bounded off [. . . ] by limits, as neither are the many bodies of knowledge in one soul, and the one is of such a kind as to have all of them in it [h¯emia toiaut¯e,h¯osteecheinen heaut¯eipasas]”; Plotinus, Ennead VI. 1–5. pp. 288–289.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, Suplementary Volume 2012, © for this edition by CNS 36 A. Woszczyk, The Conception of al¯eth¯esanthr¯opos...

And we know ourselves by learning all other things by such a vision [sc. vision of Intellect – A.W.], either learning a vision of this kind according to the knowing power, by that very power itself, or ourselves becoming it; so that the man who knows himself is double, one know- ing the nature of the reasoning which belongs to soul [t¯esdianoias t¯es psuchik¯esphusin], and one up above this man, whose knows himself [ton gin¯oskontaheauton] according to Intellect because he has become that Intellect; and by that Intellect he thinks himself again, not any longer as man, but having become altogether other and snatching him- self up into the higher world, drawing up only the better part of soul [to t¯espsuch¯esameinon] which alone is able to be winged for intellection, with which someone there keeps by him what he sees.46

It is characteristic here that the unity with Intellect, which is the fulfilment of the contemplative power of a unitary soul possessed owing to the epistrophic activity of Soul-hypostasis, means losing the awareness of humanity, which may be interpreted as the loss of awareness of one’s own individual separateness. In other words, the possibility of experiencing the reality of the Soul and Intellect cannot be given alongside the awareness of one’s own individuality, hence a specific ontic transformation is accomplished which consists in the real being of what is supraindividual. Therefore, unitary souls are also particles of Intellect, although they cannot experience their own partitive nature in the unity with nous.

Implications of the metaphor of the centre of the soul. Summary In Enn. VI. 9 [9]. 8. 2–13 Plotinus writes:

[. . . ] its [soul – A.W.] natural movement is, as it were, in a circle around something, something not outside [ouk eks¯o] but a centre, and the centre is that from which the circle derives [. . . ]. For a god [theos] is what is linked to that centre, but that which stands far from it is multiple human being or a beast [anthr¯opos ho polus kai th¯erion]. Is then this, as it were, centre of the soul [t¯espsuch¯esoion kentron] what we are looking for? Or should we think it is something else [¯eallo] in which all such centres coincide [ho panta hoion kentra sumpiptei]?47

The metaphor of concentric circles contains the key elements of the Plotinian conception of “true man”. It demonstrates that man is a single manifestation of hypostases which is vested in the real capability, that is the substantial auto identification with Being-Truth, and its source – the One. The One causes every being form to be marked with a certain type of unity, which Plotnus describes as “one” of a given thing.48 The quest for this unity leads Plotinus to distinguish the primary strata of man’s being, in fact based upon the criterion of unity, which are: 46 Plotinus, Ennead V, pp. 82–83. 47 Plotinus, Ennead, VI.6–9, pp. 330–331. 48 See Enn. VI. 6 [34]. 5. 34–47.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, Suplementary Volume 2012, © for this edition by CNS Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, Suppl. vol. (2012) 37

– soul united with body, i.e. man in body, i.e. the soul accomplishing a causative function of Soul-hypostasis bound up with proodos movement, – true man, i.e. pertaining to the neotic world, accomplishing functions of the Soul bound up with epistroph¯e movement which does not reveal features of the en- tity with its variable, casual and temporarily determined attributes characteristic of the incarnate condition. This metaphor also shows the spectrum of experience as a field of the possible states of consciousness of a unitary soul, which can be both something which is lower as well something which is higher. In accordance with Br´ehier’sstatement, Plotinian psychology is the study of various levels on which the self may dwell; those levels are stretched out between the One and the sensible world. Whereas typically human psychic attributes (like memory, emotions, sensations, compre- hension) appear merely as a certain level in the life of the soul.49

49 See E.´ Br´ehier: The Philosophy..., pp. 54–55.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, Suplementary Volume 2012, © for this edition by CNS