S t udia Philosophica Wratislaviensia Supplementary Volume, English Edition 2012 AGNIESZKA WOSZCZYK University of Silesia Katowice The Conception of al¯eth¯esanthr¯opos in Plotinus’ Enneads* Abstract The paper presents the ontological aspects of the conception of al¯eth¯es anthr¯opos and the problem of relations between individual human being and hypostases Psyche and Nous. According to Enn. I. 1 [53] the nature of man is twofold – man is z¯oon on the one hand, and man is psuch¯e on the second. But in the light of Plotinus’ monopsychism the genuine dimension of our being owns a beyond-individual character. The real capability of unification with Nous is one of the activities inherently connected with dynamical nature of Soul. The levels of human consciousness are identical with the gradation of activities of Psych¯e taken as hypostasis and al¯eth¯esanthr¯opos represents the epistrophical return to Intellect. Preface The penultimate in chronological order, the 53rd tractate of the Enneads, being the opening text in the Plotinian work by Porphyry of Tyre, is entirely devoted to anthropological issues. The title question: What is the living being, and what is man?, introduces a tangle of problems connected with defining the relationships between the body and individual soul, Soul-hypostasis [psuch¯e] and intellect [nous] which are discussed in consecutive treatises. This tractate somewhat determines predominant issues in the Enneads wherein anthropo-psychological problems are constantly present, over a third of the whole Plotinian work being directly ded- icated to them. It would be difficult to indicate a treatise which utterly omits the aforementioned questions, considering that frequently Plotinus’ writing style is switching from even the most abstract problems or logico-metaphysical discus- sions to remarks on man and the world of his inner experience.1 * The original version published in Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, 4 [4] (2009), pp. 61–70 1 See e.g. Enn. VI. 7 [38] wherein the discussion on the difference between the One and Intellect and the applicability of cataphatic predicates to the One, is enriched by digressions on self-knowledge and mystical experience. It is not an exception but a rule for the Plotinian style. Greek and English from the Enneads as per the edition: Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. A.H. Armstrong, vol. 1–7 (London 1966–1988). Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, Suplementary Volume 2012, © for this edition by CNS 28 A. Woszczyk, The Conception of al¯eth¯esanthr¯opos... The intricacy of the Plotinian disquisition, and the frequent contradictions which occur among particular approaches, make the answer to the question of human nature appear as a highly problematic issue. It is reflected in researchers’ disputes over such problems as the conception of soul, ideas of individual beings,2 the difference between Intellect and Soul3 or mystical union.4 They show a num- ber of specific problems which with the Plotinian anthropology is involved. In this context it is worth mentioning that the Plotinian conception of man and Soul5 was already perceived in a critical way by the next generations of Neo-Platonic philoso- phers, which found expression inter alia in Iamblichus’6 and Proclus’ stances. Ap- parently, the need was discerned to define Plotinus’ vision7 more precisely, which amounted to the separation of an individual soul from the intellect – entering into a polemic against the view on the natural, as resulting from the very essence of the soul, possibility of unifying with the higher ontic layers – Intellect and the One [hen].8 However, grasping the Plotinian conception of man is not possible without establishing the theoretical implications connected with the notion of al¯eth¯esan- thr¯opos. This notion seems to be crucial, based on the fact that it highlights the crucial assumption of Plotinus’ method, that the path of the inner experience of man leads to an encounter with the hypostatic structure of reality, which is the object of theoretical reflection. Because an object of philosophical examination is also the reality which is able to apprehend a specific experience crowned by the act unio mystica. The conception of the “true man” shows that in Plotinus’ depiction, a human being is distinguished by a multilayer structure, furthermore it touches on the problematic issue of merging of what is immaterial and material, modes of presence of what is bodiless in what is bodily. In the article, only the ontological aspect of the conception al¯eth¯esanthr¯opos will be considered, whereas ethical and mystical aspects of this problem will be omitted. 2 See H.J. Blumenthal, ‘Did Plotinus believe in Ideas of Individuals?’, Phronesis 11 (1966), pp. 61–80; J.M. Rist, ‘Forms of Individuals in Plotinus’, Classical Quarterly, 63 (1963), pp. 223– 231; P. Kalligas, ‘Forms of Individuals in Plotinus. A Re-Examination’, Phronesis, 42 (1997), pp. 206–227. 3 See H.J. Blumenthal, Soul, World-Soul and Individual Soul in Plotinus, [in:] Le N´eoplatonisme (Paris 1971), pp. 55–66. 4 See J.M. Rist, ‘Back to the Mysticism of Plotinus. Some More Specifics’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 27 (1989), pp. 183–197. 5 H.J. Blumenthal (Plotinus in Later Platonism, [in:] H.J. Blumenthal, R.A. Markus (eds.), Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought. Essays in Honour of A.H. Armstrong (London 1981), pp. 212–222) claims that it is in the realm of the psychological conception that one of the most important differences between Plotinus’ neoplatonism and late neoplatonism is revealed. 6 See Iamblichus, De Anima, J.F. Finamore, J.M. Dillon (eds.) (Leiden–Boston–K¨oln2002), pp. 30, 365. 2–366. 20. 7 Although it is certainly not the only motive for abandoning Plotinian findings in the realm of psychological theory, the fact of Iamblichus’ acceptance of theurgy is sometimes recognized as its main reason. It implied the rejection of the thesis of integral affinity of man to noetic dimensions in order to justify the value of theurgical practices. See R.T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London 1995), pp. 118–123; G. Shaw, Theurgy and the Soul. The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus (Pensylvania 1995), p. 11. 8 See Iamblichus, De Anima, 365. 12–366. 20. Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, Suplementary Volume 2012, © for this edition by CNS Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, Suppl. vol. (2012) 29 Al¯eth¯esanthr¯opos and the relationship between soul and body In Enn. I. 1 [53] Plotinus determines the relation between the man apprehended as a living being [z¯oion], and the man [anthr¯opos] apprehended as soul [psuch¯e] which uses the body as a tool [organon].9 In Enn. I. 1 [53]. 7, 17–20 he claims that: [. ] but we in our presidency over the living being, are what extends from his point upwards. But there will be no objection to calling the whole thing a living being; the lower parts are something mixed, the part which begins on the level of thought is, I supposed, the true man [ho anthr¯opos ho al¯eth¯es] [. ].10 That true man has then the bodiless nature, “since man coincides with the rational soul” [ontos tou anthr¯opou t¯eilogik¯eipsuch¯ei],11 as Plotinus maintains further. Thereby he indirectly indicates the separateness of soul related to body of “true man”, which may bring astonishment because it consequently indicates the dual presence of soul in man. For it would not be body without forming activity of the Soul, and every living being is endowed with soul, therefore “mixed” soul [mikton] should be distinguished from “rational” soul12. Body itself, as an element of the material world, that is an element of the order of becoming, [kosmos aisth¯etos] belongs to the sphere ordained by the World-Soul [psuch¯etou pantos],13 and it also possesses a qualitative configuration which is the result of the activity of Soul-Nature [phusis] forming the world, according to the picture of the idea it has of itself, thanks to the World-Soul.14 Hence body is not only the reflection of idea’s reflection possessed by Soul, but also something pertaining to the animate universum, and thereby participating in the life of Soul-Nature [phusis] which represents a certain aspect of Soul [psuch¯e] hypostasis.15 Human body, likewise vegetal and animal bodies, is animated by an actual, individual soul, yet related neotically to Soul-hypostasis.16 In Plotinus’ depiction, the soul which shapes body and gives it a human type of formation does not suffice to explain what man is. In Enn. II. 3 [52] Plotinus, while comparing the myth of the Moirai to Plato’s Timaeus 69 c, presents two dimensions of the soul – actually two souls – one, a subject of cosmic necessity, which he defines as “shadow” and another, free from bodily influence, which pertains to the neotic order: So we must fly from here and separate ourselves from what has been added to us [prosgegen¯emen¯on], and not be the composite thing, the 9 See Enn. I. 1 [53]. 3, 3. 10 Ibidem, pp. 108–109. 11 Enn. I. 1 [53]. 7, 22, p 110–111. 12 I apply the notation of the word soul in lower case when an individual soul is in question and the notation in upper case the Soul for Soul in the general sense. 13 See Enn. III. 7 [2]. 13. 14 See Enn. III. 8 [30]. 3–4. 15 Plotinus repeats after Plato’s Timaeus 36 d that the Soul is not in body, but body is in the Soul, while certainly considering the participation in the causative power of the Soul and not the relations of spatial inclusion; see Enn. III. 9 [13]. 3. 1–4. 16 See Enn. IV. 7 [2]. 14.