Mediation Arguments No. 5 the DOG THAT DIDN’T BARK: the ABSENCE of SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION in the SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSITION to DEMOCRACY

MEDIATION ARGUMENTS

Mediation Arguments no. 5 THE DOG THAT DIDN’T BARK: THE ABSENCE OF SIGNIFICANT INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

Chris Saunders

April 2014

Copyright © Chris Saunders, 2014 Mediation Arguments is a working paper series of the Centre for Mediation in Africa, based in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria (www.centreformediation.up.ac.za). The series explores the G\QDPLFVDQGRXWFRPHVRIPHGLDWLRQHIIRUWVWRSUHYHQWPDQDJHDQGUHVROYHKLJKLQWHQVLW\FRQÀLFW7KHVHULHV editors are Chris Ankersen, Laurie Nathan and Maxi Schoeman. The copy editor is Di Kilpert. The mission of WKH&HQWUHLVWRFRQWULEXWH WRHQKDQFLQJ WKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIPHGLDWLRQLQPDMRUFRQÀLFWVLQ$IULFDWKURXJK teaching, training, research and supporting the UN, the AU, sub-regional organisations and African governments. The Centre is funded by generous grants from the governments of Belgium and Norway. Requests for permission to reproduce this paper, and proposals to submit a paper, should be sent to [email protected]

Centre for Mediation in Africa. University of Pretoria ISSN 2306-8078 (print) 3ULYDWH%DJ;+DW¿HOG6RXWK$IULFD ,661 RQOLQH 7KHGRJWKDWGLGQ¶WEDUN7KHDEVHQFHRIVLJQL¿FDQW international mediation in the South African transition to democracy Chris Saunders*

The struggle to overthrow apartheid came to an end in the early 1990s in a negotiated settlement WKDWSURYLGHGIRUDWUDQVLWLRQWRPDMRULW\UXOHDQGWKHQHZHUDZDVXVKHUHGLQE\6RXWK$IULFD¶V¿UVW democratic election, held in April 1994, the outcome of which was widely accepted. The large literature on this ‘miracle’ transition, which few had expected to be successful since only a few years previously WKHFRQÀLFWKDGDSSHDUHGLQWUDFWDEOHQHJOHFWVWKHSULPDU\TXHVWLRQWKDWWKLVSDSHUDGGUHVVHVZK\ZDV WKHUHQRVLJQL¿FDQWLQWHUQDWLRQDOWKLUGSDUW\PHGLDWLRQ"7KHSDSHUDUJXHVWKDWZKLOHWKHDQVZHULVQRW VLPSOHWKHFRQ¿GHQFHEXLOGLQJDPRQJWKHPDLQDGYHUVDULHVWKDWWRRNSODFHEHIRUHIRUPDOQHJRWLDWLRQV EHJDQZDVVXI¿FLHQWWRPDNHH[WHUQDOPHGLDWLRQXQQHFHVVDU\DQGERWKWKHPDLQSDUWLHVWKRXJKWWKH OLNHO\RXWFRPHZRXOGEHEHWWHUIRUWKHPZLWKRXWVXFKPHGLDWLRQ

Introduction

'HWHFWLYH,VWKHUHDQ\RWKHUSRLQWWRZKLFK\RXZRXOGZLVKWRGUDZP\DWWHQWLRQ" +ROPHV7RWKHFXULRXVLQFLGHQWRIWKHGRJLQWKHQLJKWWLPH 'HWHFWLYH7KHGRJGLGQRWKLQJLQWKHQLJKWWLPH +ROPHV7KDWZDVWKHFXULRXVLQFLGHQW1

,QDOPRVWHYHU\FDVHRIDPDMRUFRQÀLFWLQUHFHQWWLPHVLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQKDVSOD\HGDVLJQL¿FDQW role in attempts at resolution. We have only to think of such relatively recent cases as, say, the mediation by Richard Holbrooke of the US in the negotiations that led to the signing of the Dayton Accords on Bosnia in 1995, or the mediation by former US Senator George Mitchell that helped produce the Good Friday DJUHHPHQW LQ 1RUWKHUQ ,UHODQG LQ 7KRXJK WKH ,VUDHOL3DOHVWLQLDQ FRQÀLFW UHPDLQV XQUHVROYHG this is not for want of international mediation, by, inter alia, President Jimmy Carter at Camp David in 1978, the Government of Norway in the early 1990s and the present US Secretary of State, John Kerry, in 2013. There are, in addition, numerous examples of international mediation helping to resolve FRQÀLFWVLQ$IULFDVRPHRQDFRQWLQHQWDOEDVLVVRPHDUHJLRQDORQHIRUH[DPSOHIRUPHU6RXWK$IULFDQ 3UHVLGHQW7KDER0EHNLKDVPHGLDWHGLQFRQÀLFWVRQEHKDOIRIERWKWKH$8DVLQWKHRQJRLQJGLVSXWHV EHWZHHQ6XGDQDQG6RXWK6XGDQDQG6$'&LQWKHLQWHUQDOFRQÀLFWVLQWKH'HPRFUDWLF5HSXEOLFRIWKH &RQJRLQWKHHDUO\VDQGWKHQLQ=LPEDEZH HJ6KLOOLQJHU :KLOHVLJQL¿FDQWLQWHUQDWLRQDO third-party mediation is most commonly conducted by the representatives of a state or group of states, such as the Western Contact Group (WCG) on Namibia in 1977/8, NGOs sometimes play a major role LQVHWWOLQJDFRQÀLFWDVWKH&RPPXQLW\RI6DQW¶(JLGLREDVHGLQ5RPHGLGLQ0R]DPELTXHLQWKHHDUO\ 1990s (e.g. Hume 1994).

0\UHYLHZRIWKHOLWHUDWXUHRQPHGLDWLRQKDVUHYHDOHGQRVWXG\RIDFDVHZKHUHDPDMRUFRQÀLFWZDV UHVROYHG WKURXJK QHJRWLDWLRQV ZLWKRXW VLJQL¿FDQW LQWHUQDWLRQDO PHGLDWLRQ HJ 6WHQHOR 0LWFKHOO :HEE7RXYDO =DUWPDQ&KDQ -DEUL.ORW]$]DU %XUWRQ .OHLERHU&URFNHUHWDO1DWKDQ=DUWPDQ )DXUH3ODQWH\=DUWPDQ 7RXYDO=DUWPDQ%HUFRYLWFK%HUFRYLWFK -DFNVRQ 6LVN%HUFRYLWFK 6LPSVRQ 7KLVPD\VXJJHVWWKDWWKHDEVHQFHRIVXFKPHGLDWLRQLVRIQR importance. I argue that this is not so.

&KULV6DXQGHUVLV(PHULWXV3URIHVVRU8QLYHUVLW\RI&DSH7RZQDQG5HVHDUFK$I¿OLDWH(QYLURQPHQWDODQG*HRJUDSKLFDO Sciences, University of Cape Town. He can be contacted at [email protected] 1 From Silver Blaze, in 7KH0HPRLUVRI6KHUORFN+ROPHV, Arthur Conan Doyle, 1894. April 2014

,QWKLVSDSHU,¿UVWDVNZKHWKHUWKHUHZDVLQGHHGQRLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQLQWKH6RXWK$IULFDQFDVH, WKHQH[SODLQWKHDEVHQFHRIVLJQL¿FDQWH[WHUQDOPHGLDWLRQZLWKUHIHUHQFHWRFHUWDLQVSHFLDOIHDWXUHVRI WKH6RXWK$IULFDQFDVH7KLVFRXQWU\¶VFRQÀLFWDQGWUDQVLWLRQZHUHGLIIHUHQWIURPWKRVHRIRWKHUFRXQWULHV LQWKHUHJLRQ7KHWUDQVLWLRQZDVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\FRQ¿GHQFHEXLOGLQJDSDUWLFXODUEDODQFHRIIRUFHV and a strong belief by the main parties, the African National Congress (ANC) and the ruling National Party (NP), that there should not be international mediation. I argue that these are the main reasons why WKHWUDQVLWLRQZDVDFKLHYHGZLWKRXWVLJQL¿FDQWH[WHUQDOPHGLDWLRQ

Was international mediation absent in the South African case?

7KRXJKWKHZRUGµPHGLDWLRQ¶LVRIWHQXVHGLPSUHFLVHO\WKHUHLVJHQHUDODJUHHPHQWLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHWKDWLW LQYROYHVDWKLUGSDUW\\HWVKRXOGQRWEHVREURDGO\GH¿QHGDVWRFRYHUHYHU\NLQGRIWKLUGSDUW\LQYROYH- PHQWLQDFRQÀLFWVXFKDVJLYLQJDGYLFHWRWKHSDUWLHVRUDWWHPSWLQJWRH[HUWOHYHUDJH,IROORZWKRVHZKR GH¿QHPHGLDWLRQDVDZD\WRPDQDJHRUUHVROYHDFRQÀLFWLQZKLFKµDWKLUGSDUW\KHOSVWKHGLVSXWDQWV ZLWKWKHLUFRQVHQWWRUHDFKPXWXDOO\VDWLVIDFWRU\DJUHHPHQWV¶ 1DWKDQ WKRXJKPHGLDWLRQPD\ also be involved in implementing an agreement. Mediation may, then, take place in any or all of the three SKDVHVLQWKHSURFHVVOHDGLQJWRUHVROXWLRQRIDFRQÀLFWWKHSUHQHJRWLDWLRQSKDVHZKHUHWKHSDUWLHV come to an agreement to sit down at the table and negotiate, the negotiation phase itself, and the imple- PHQWDWLRQSKDVHZKHUHZKDWZDVQHJRWLDWHGLVSXWLQWRDFWLRQ HJ0DXQGLHWDO

,QWKH6RXWK$IULFDQFDVHWKH¿UVWSUHSDUDWRU\SKDVHLQFOXGHG\HDUVRIµWDONVDERXWWDONV¶WKDWKHOSHG lay the ground for the 1990 commencement of formal negotiations. At least 141 meetings took place in the pre-negotiation phase between representatives of the ANC in exile and people from within South Africa.2 The second phase, the formal negotiations, began with the bilateral meeting between the government and the ANC in May 1990 and continued in multilateral negotiations, at what was initially FDOOHG WKH &RQYHQWLRQ IRU D 'HPRFUDWLF 6RXWK$IULFD &2'(6$ DQG ODWHU NQRZQ DV WKH 0XOWL3DUW\ Negotiating Forum (MPNF) (e.g. Haysom 2002). In those negotiations the main parties were the ANC and the NP. In November 1993 a new constitution was agreed on, along with mechanisms for holding a democratic election, and efforts were then made to ensure that the election was as inclusive as SRVVLEOH7KHWKLUGSKDVHRSHQHGZLWKWKHKROGLQJRIWKDWHOHFWLRQLQODWH$SULOWKHHOHFWLRQRXWFRPH ZDVDFFHSWHGE\DOOSDUWLHVDQGWKH¿QDOFRQVWLWXWLRQZDVGUDZQXSLQ,WFDQEHVDLGWKDWE\WKHQ WKHFRQÀLFWZDVUHVROYHGLQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKHIRUPDOSURFHVVRIPRYLQJIURPDSDUWKHLGWRDGHPRFUDWLF constitution had taken place, and the political violence of the transition period had died down. We can WKHUHIRUHWDONRIDµVXFFHVVIXO¶HQGWRWKHSURFHVVHYHQLIWKH¿QDOFRQVWLWXWLRQVWLOOKDGWREHSXWLQWR HIIHFWDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VPDQ\DQGPDVVLYHVRFLRHFRQRPLFSUREOHPVUHPDLQHGWREHDGGUHVVHG

,VLWLQGHHGWKHFDVHWKDWWKHUHZDVQRVLJQL¿FDQWLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQLQDQ\RIWKHVHWKUHHSKDVHV of the South African transition? Throughout the process we saw intense international interest and LQYROYHPHQWRIYDULRXVNLQGVLQFOXGLQJPDQ\DWWHPSWVWRLQÀXHQFHWKHWUDQVLWLRQ3 but very few examples of formal third-party mediation.

,QWKH¿UVWSKDVHOHDGLQJXSWRWKHIRUPDOQHJRWLDWLRQVYDULRXVH[WHUQDOSOD\HUVWULHGWREULQJWKHSDUWLHV together. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia held two secret meetings with South African President 3:%RWKDEHIRUHKRVWLQJLQ6HSWHPEHUDPHHWLQJLQ=DPELDEHWZHHQ$1&RI¿FLDOVDQGH[HF- XWLYHVRIWKH6RXWK$IULFDQEDVHG$QJOR$PHULFDQ&RUSRUDWLRQ &KDQ:DOGPHLU

2 A chronology of meetings between people from South Africa and the ANC in exile, from 1983 to 1990, is available from Michael Savage, retired sociologist, University of Cape Town ([email protected]). 3 7KHDWWHPSWVDWLQÀXHQFHUDQJHGIURPRIIHULQJDGYLFHDQGSURYLGLQJLQIRUPDWLRQWRH[HUWLQJSUHVVXUH7KHEHVWGLVFXVVLRQ LV/DQGVEHUJ HVSHFLDOO\&KDSWHU VHHDOVR/DQGVEHUJ

3 Mediation Arguments

That meeting was followed by numerous others between various groups of South Africans from within WKHFRXQWU\DQGPHPEHUVRIWKHH[LOHG$1&$VWKHFRQÀLFWLQ6RXWK$IULFDZRUVHQHGDQGYLROHQFH escalated in the mid-1980s, some of those outside South Africa attempted to bring the two sides together DQGFUHDWHDFOLPDWHIRUQHJRWLDWLRQV0LFKDHO

6XFKLQLWLDWLYHVLQEULQJLQJWKHWZRPDLQFRQÀLFWSDUWLHVWRJHWKHUKHOSHGEXLOGWUXVWEHWZHHQWKHPDQG WKHUHZHUHRWKHUDWWHPSWVE\RXWVLGHUVLQWKHODWHVWRFUHDWHWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRUQHJRWLDWLRQV([DPSOHV of these were the training workshops held by Roger Fisher, director of the Harvard Negotiation Project and co-author of the famous *HWWLQJWR

The single most important case of an international effort at mediation in the 1980s was that of the &RPPRQZHDOWK(PLQHQW3HUVRQV*URXS (3* ZKLFKYLVLWHG6RXWK$IULFDLQ0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU was resisting the imposition of Commonwealth sanctions on South Africa and, as a way to continue to GRWKDWVXSSRUWHGWKHLGHDRIDQ(3**LYHQ7KDWFKHU¶VSRVLWLRQWKH6RXWK$IULFDQJRYHUQPHQWUHOXF- tantly allowed the group to enter the country. Led by Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Malcolm Fraser RI$XVWUDOLDWKH(3*HQJDJHGZLWKERWKWKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHLPSULVRQHG1HOVRQ0DQGHODDPRQJ RWKHUV%XWZKHQWKH(3*SURSRVHGDµSRVVLEOHQHJRWLDWLQJFRQFHSW¶RXWOLQLQJKRZWKHFRXQWU\FRXOG PRYHWRIRUPDOQHJRWLDWLRQV &(3*HVSHFLDOO\± %RWKDDOORZHGWKH6RXWK$IULFDQ'HIHQFH Force to attack the capitals of Commonwealth countries in the region, Lusaka, Harare and Gaborone, in 0D\ZKLFKDERUWHGWKH(3*¶VPLVVLRQ HJ6SDUNV± %RWKDZDVQRWUHDG\WRHQWHULQWR negotiations with the ANC and was strongly opposed to any outside interference in South African affairs. 6RPHRIWKHLGHDVWKH(3*KDGVHWRXWZHUHWDNHQXSE\%RWKD¶VVXFFHVVRU3UHVLGHQW):GH.OHUNLQ 1990, under pressure that in part came from the international community, especially the UK (Renwick 1997), but without any strong pressure for international mediation (cf. Giliomee 2012).

,QWKHFUXFLDOVHFRQGSKDVHWKDWRIWKHIRUPDOQHJRWLDWLRQVDW&2'(6$DQGWKH031)WKHUHZDVQR WKLUGSDUW\PHGLDWLRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVZHUHSUHVHQWDWWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVRQO\DVREVHUYHUV On occasion their presence helped keep the process on track, and Princeton Lyman, the US ambassador to South Africa in the early 1990s, has stressed the importance of the advice given by outsiders in LQÀXHQFLQJWKHRXWFRPH /\PDQ

When the negotiations broke down in mid-1992 the UN became involved, with the consent of the main parties, but not to mediate between them. UN Security Council Resolution 772 of 17 August 1992 authorized the Secretary-General to deploy personnel urgently in a mission to South Africa (known as 81206$±8QLWHG1DWLRQV2EVHUYHU0LVVLRQLQ6RXWK$IULFD WRVWUHQJWKHQWKH1DWLRQDO3HDFH$FFRUG WKDWKDGEHHQVLJQHGE\DOOWKHPDLQSDUWLHVLQ 1GXOR$QJOLQ/DQGVEHUJ 7KRXJK 81206$UHPDLQHGVPDOO±RQO\SHUVRQQHOZHUHGHSOR\HGE\'HFHPEHU±LWWRJHWKHUZLWK other small observer missions from the Commonwealth and the OAU, may well have prevented greater

4 6HH)LVKHU 8U\ &0,&RQFRUG*URXS 7KH(FRQRPLVW

4 April 2014

YLROHQFHDQGVRKHOSHGWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVWRUHVXPHE\DPRQJRWKHUWKLQJVLQWHUYHQLQJLQORFDOFRQÀLFWV In December 1992, for example, UNOMSA helped negotiate a peace accord between rival ANC and ,QNDWKD)UHHGRP3DUW\ ,)3 IROORZHUVLQWKH3RUW6KHSVWRQHDUHDRI1DWDO *HOGHQKX\V Yorke, 1998). But UNOMSA was not involved in any mediation directly related to the MPNF negotiations. The only example of international mediation in the early 1990s occurred in April 1994, immediately EHIRUHWKH¿UVWGHPRFUDWLFHOHFWLRQ$IWHUDJUHHPHQWKDGEHHQUHDFKHGDWWKH031)RQDQHZLQWHULP constitution, the ANC and IFP engaged in discussions about the use of international mediation to deal with issues the IFP said prevented it from approving the interim constitution and participating in the HOHFWLRQ7KH,)3VRXJKWVLJQL¿FDQWDXWRQRP\IRUWKHSURYLQFHRI.ZD=XOXDQGKLJKHUVWDWXVIRUWKH=XOX monarchy.

7KH$1&DQG,)3GHFLGHGµLQDKDSKD]DUGPDQQHU¶ 'H.OHUN WRLQYLWHWZRHPLQHQW¿JXUHV who had both been involved in previous international mediations in southern Africa, Henry Kissinger of the US and Lord Peter Carrington of the UK, to head a seven-member team of international heavy- weights to mediate in the matter (personal communication, Paul Kevenhörster, Institute of Political Science, University of Muenster, October 2013).5 This attempt at international mediation was a signal failure because its terms of reference had not been agreed to in advance of the arrival of the mediators, who found that while IFP leader Mangosutho Buthelezi wanted the 27 April election date to be post- poned, the ANC and the NP were adamant that it could not be (Sparks 1994, 224). The mediation attempt collapsed and Kissinger and Carrington left the country after only two days, ‘without ever KDYLQJ EHHQ SXW LQ D SRVLWLRQ ZKHUH WKH\ FRXOG HYHQ EHJLQ ZLWK D PHDQLQJIXO PHGLDWLRQ SURFHVV¶ (De Klerk 1999, 325).

,WZDVWKHQOHIWWRDQLQGLYLGXDOWRSOD\DNH\UROH:DVKLQJWRQ2NXPXDIULHQGRI%XWKHOH]LDQGWKHRQO\ African member of the mediation team, was able to persuade the IFP leader to participate in the election, even though the date had not been changed, on the basis of an agreement between the IFP and the $1&WKDWµDQ\RXWVWDQGLQJLVVXHV¶LQFOXGLQJWKHVWDWXVRIWKHSURYLQFHRI.ZD=XOX1DWDODQGWKH=XOX PRQDUFK\ZRXOGEHVHWWOHGE\LQWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQµDVVRRQDVSRVVLEOH¶DIWHUWKH$SULOHOHFWLRQ 6LVN 6WUDQG ,QWKHHYHQWQRLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQPDWHULDOL]HG7KH,)3DFFHSWHG the election result, but continued to press for such mediation during the Constitutional Assembly phase RIWKHWUDQVLWLRQSURFHVV 7KH$1&KRZHYHUKDYLQJUHMHFWHGWKHLGHDRIPHGLDWLRQGXULQJWKH negotiation phase, continued to oppose it as unnecessary, and none took place.

While it is therefore not correct to say that there was no international mediation at all in the South African WUDQVLWLRQWKHUHZDVQRQHLQWKHIRUPDOQHJRWLDWLRQVDQGWKHUHODWLYHDEVHQFHRIVLJQL¿FDQWLQWHUQDWLRQDO PHGLDWLRQ LQ WKH ZKROH SURFHVV OHDGLQJ WR WKH UHVROXWLRQ RI WKH FRQÀLFW LV VWULNLQJ DQG QHHGV WR EH H[SODLQHG,QRZDWWHPSWVXFKDQH[SODQDWLRQXQGHUIRXUPDLQKHDGVWKHDW\SLFDOQDWXUHRIWKH6RXWK $IULFDQFRQÀLFWWKHFUHDWLRQRIWUXVWDQGWKHEDODQFHRIIRUFHVWKHDEVHQFHRIDQREYLRXVPHGLDWRUDQG the rejection by the two main parties of the idea of having a mediator.

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International mediation might have been expected in South Africa because there had been prior cases RIVXFKPHGLDWLRQHOVHZKHUHLQVRXWKHUQ$IULFDLQUHVROYLQJFRQÀLFWVQRWDOWRJHWKHUGLVVLPLODUIURPRU XQUHODWHGWRWKH6RXWK$IULFDQFRQÀLFW,QDVHQVHWKDWFRQÀLFWZDVDFRQWLQXDWLRQRIWKHSURFHVVRI GHFRORQL]DWLRQWKDWOHGWRWKHLQGHSHQGHQFHRI=LPEDEZHLQDQG1DPLELDLQ7KH$1&¶V

5 The other mediators were Leon Higginbotham, a retired judge from Philadelphia, Judge HK Bhagwati from India, Judge Antonio La Pergola from Italy, Jean-Antoine Laponce from Canada and Washington Okumu from Kenya. )RUGHWDLOVRIWKH,)3¶VPRWLYDWLRQIRUPHGLDWLRQDQGWKH$1&¶VRSSRVLWLRQWRLWVHHHVSHFLDOO\.RW]p

5 Mediation Arguments liberation struggle can be seen as part of a broad movement to bring about majority rule in all the countries of the region. But the South African case was also different from the others in the region, and the experience of what had happened elsewhere did not encourage the use of external mediation here.

At the negotiations held at Lancaster House in London in 1979, which paved the way for the independence of Zimbabwe, the mediator, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, had acted with a very KHDY\KDQGLQVKDSLQJWKHVHWWOHPHQWDQGWKH¿QDODJUHHPHQWVZHUHQRWFRQVLGHUHGIDLUDQGMXVWE\WKH Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the liberation movement under Robert Mugabe that came to SRZHULQ 'DYLGRZ6WHGPDQ=DUWPDQ )DXUH

,Q WKH FDVH RI 1DPLELDQ LQGHSHQGHQFH WKHUH KDG EHHQ WZR LQVWDQFHV RI VLJQL¿FDQW LQWHUQDWLRQDO mediation. In 1977 and 1978 the WCG had negotiated separately with the South African government DQGWKH6RXWK:HVW$IULFD3HRSOH¶V2UJDQL]DWLRQ 6:$32 QHLWKHUKDGEHHQSDUWLFXODUO\NHHQRQWKH PHGLDWLRQEXWERWKFDPHXQGHUVXI¿FLHQWSUHVVXUHWRDJUHHWRLW7KHRXWFRPHRIWKH:&*PHGLDWLRQ ZDVDURDGPDSWKDWERWKSDUWLHVZHUHSHUVXDGHGWRDFFHSW 6SLHJHO.DUQV-DEUL %URZQ9HUJDX ,QWKHVHFRQGPDMRUURXQGRIQHJRWLDWLRQVKHOGLQ86$VVLVWDQW Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker was the main mediator. He brokered an agreement between South Africa, Angola and Cuba that provided for the withdrawal of the Cuban military IRUFHVIURP$QJRODLQSDUDOOHOZLWKDSURFHVVOHDGLQJWRWKHLQGHSHQGHQFHRI1DPLELD %HUULGJH &URFNHU*OHLMHVHV 7KH6RXWK$IULFDQJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOVLQYROYHGLQWKHQHJRWLDWLRQV VDZ&URFNHUZKRKLPVHOIFKDUDFWHUL]HGWKHEHKDYLRXURIWKH6RXWK$IULFDQRI¿FLDOVDVµDGROHVFHQW¶DV DUURJDQWDQGVHOIVHUYLQJ 3DSHQIXVHJ± 7KH1DPLELDQQHJRWLDWLRQVRIµLQWHQVL¿HG 13OHDGHUV¶GHVLUHWRH[FOXGHLQWHUPHGLDULHVIURPSURVSHFWLYHQHJRWLDWLRQVLQ6RXWK$IULFD¶ /LHEHUIHOG D EHFDXVHLQWKHZRUGVRIDOHDGLQJ6RXWK$IULFDQRI¿FLDOµQHJRWLDWLQJZLWKWKH$PHULFDQVDQG the Russians watching from the high seats … was quite a humiliating experience … Those who were negotiating on behalf of South West Africa/Namibia were not South West Africans/Namibians them- VHOYHV¶ LELG :KLOHWKH$1&ZDVQRWLQYROYHGLQWKH1DPLELDQQHJRWLDWLRQVRQHGHFLVLRQWKDWFDPHRXW of those negotiations was that the ANC had to move its military bases from Angola. And though there was no possibility of the ANC being excluded from the South African negotiations, as SWAPO was from the Namibian negotiations in 1988, it is probably true that the Namibian negotiations ‘reinforced ANC OHDGHUV¶DYHUVLRQWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\VSRQVRUHGQHJRWLDWLRQVRYHU6RXWK$IULFD¶IRUIHDUWKDWµWKLUGSDUWLHV ZRXOGSUHVVXUHLWWRDFFHSWDQLQDGHTXDWHVHWWOHPHQW¶ LELG

While the agreement over Namibian independence helped make the South African transition possible (e.g. Saunders 2011), negotiations between three sovereign countries were clearly very different from WKRVHEHWZHHQSDUWLHVLQDQLQWUDVWDWHFRQÀLFW,Q1DPLELDWKHRFFXS\LQJSRZHU 6RXWK$IULFD ZLWKGUHZ like the Cuban military forces from Angola, whereas in South Africa the issue was the ending of apartheid and a transition to democracy. Another difference between the South African and Namibian cases was that Namibia had been a mandated territory under the League of Nations, so the UN as successor assumed responsibility for it. The South African government eventually accepted, after its plans to incor- porate some or all of the territory into South Africa fell away, that Namibia had international status. And the new Namibian constitution was drawn up in late 1989/early 1990 by a Constituent Assembly of those HOHFWHGLQWKHFRXQWU\¶V¿UVWGHPRFUDWLFHOHFWLRQZLWKRXWDQ\H[WHUQDOPHGLDWLRQ

7KH6RXWK$IULFDQFRQÀLFWLQFRQWUDVWWRWKH1DPLELDQRQHHVVHQWLDOO\FRQFHUQHGDWUDQVIHURISROLWLFDO SRZHUZLWKLQWKHFRXQWU\LWVHOI7KRXJKWKH6RXWK$IULFDQFRQÀLFWZDVLQWHUQDWLRQDOL]HG±ZLWKDSDUWKHLG being declared a crime against humanity by the UN General Assembly, and numerous calls being made IRUWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\WRLPSRVHPDQGDWRU\HFRQRPLFVDQFWLRQV±LWZDVQHYHUWKHOHVVIXQGD- PHQWDOO\DFRQÀLFWWKDWLQYROYHG6RXWK$IULFDQVWKHPVHOYHVZLWKRXWDQ\OLQNWRDQH[WHUQDOSOD\HUDV VD\LQWKHFDVHRI1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG FI/LHEHUIHOGE ,QUHVROYLQJWKH6RXWK$IULFDQFRQÀLFW there seemed no reason to draw on what had happened elsewhere in the region. But that in itself does

6 April 2014

QRWRIFRXUVHH[SODLQWKHDEVHQFHRIVLJQL¿FDQWLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQLQWKHUHVROXWLRQRIWKLVFRQÀLFW so we need to look for other reasons.

Creation of trust and balance of forces

$PDMRUUHDVRQZK\WKHUHZDVQRH[WHUQDOPHGLDWLRQLQWKH6RXWK$IULFDQQHJRWLDWLRQVLVWKDWVXI¿FLHQW WUXVWKDGGHYHORSHGEHWZHHQWKHWZRPDLQSOD\HUVWKH$1&DQGWKH13WKDQNVWRWKHSURFHVVRIFRQ¿- dence-building that took place in the late 1980s. As mentioned earlier, there were numerous encounters LQ(QJODQG=DPELD6HQHJDODQGHOVHZKHUHVRPHVHFUHWRWKHUVQRWEHWZHHQZKLWH6RXWK$IULFDQV and members of the ANC in exile. Because of apartheid, the two main parties had previously had very little contact with each other. When they did meet, most found that, on a personal level, they had a ORWLQFRPPRQLQFOXGLQJDVHQVHRIEHLQJ6RXWK$IULFDQDQGDFRQ¿GHQFHWKDWWKH\FRXOGQHJRWLDWHD settlement on their own, without outside interference. Afrikaners and Africans found they shared a resentment of imperialism and a belief that Western countries had imperialist designs on South Africa and continued to adopt a paternal and arrogant attitude towards the country. Patti Waldmeir has written RIZKDWVKHFDOOVµP\VWHULRXVERQGVEHWZHHQ$IULNDQHUVDQG$IULFDQV¶WKDWGHYHORSHGYHU\UDSLGO\DQG of how Mbeki in particular ‘pulled off a monumental feat of seduction … the liberation of the white tribe RI$IULFDIURPWKHLUUDWLRQDOIHDUVRIFHQWXULHV¶ :DOGPHLUDOVR±IRU0EHNL¶VRZQDFFRXQW VHH6$'(7± %\WKHJRYHUQLQJ13DQGWKH$1&WKHQUHWXUQLQJWRWKHFRXQWU\IURP GHFDGHVRIH[LOHKDGVXI¿FLHQWFRQ¿GHQFHLQHDFKRWKHU¶VJRRGIDLWKWRREYLDWHWKHQHHGIRUDWKLUGSDUW\ mediator, despite the long and bitter antagonism that had existed and the new bitterness caused by the escalation of political violence from 1990.

:HPXVWDOVRUHPHPEHUWKHRYHUDOOSROLWLFDOFRQWH[WWKHODWHVVDZWKHZLQGLQJGRZQDQGWKHQ the ending of the Cold War, so ideological feuds had become less intense (Saunders 2011). The Soviet Union began to withdraw its military and material support for the ANC even before the collapse of the FRPPXQLVWUHJLPHVLQ(DVWHUQ(XURSHLQ7KRXJK6RXWK$IULFDZDVQRORQJHULPSRUWDQWLQ&ROG :DUWHUPVLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQFHUQWRUHVROYHWKHFRXQWU\¶VFRQÀLFWGLGQRWOHVVHQ,IDQ\WKLQJSUHVVXUHRQ WKHUHJLPHLQWHQVL¿HGLQSDUWEHFDXVHWKH8.DQG86VDZDUHVROXWLRQRIWKH6RXWK$IULFDQFRQÀLFWDV a way of stabilizing much of sub-Saharan Africa (personal communication, Niel Barnard, former head of the National Intelligence Service, Cape Town, November 2013). At the same time, what happened in (DVWHUQ(XURSHLQSHUVXDGHG):GH.OHUNWKDWWKHPRPHQWZDVULJKWWRRSHQWKHGRRUWRDQHJR- WLDWHGVHWWOHPHQW 'H.OHUNFK +HGLGWKLVZKHQWKHUHZDVDVWDOHPDWHLQWKHFRQÀLFWZLWK neither side able to end it unilaterally, and because he thought he could seize the moment and remain LQFRQWURORIWKHSURFHVVRIFKDQJHKHKDGVHWLQPRWLRQ7KHVLWXDWLRQWKHQEHFDPHµULSHIRUUHVROXWLRQ¶ through negotiations (Zartman 1989). We will explore below why the NP believed, in the early stages of WKHQHJRWLDWLRQVWKDWLWFRXOGUHWDLQVXI¿FLHQWSRZHULQWKHQHZRUGHUDQGZK\WKH$1&ZDVFRQ¿GHQWLW had majority support and would come to power if there was a free and fair election. The key point is that the balance of forces was such that both main parties thought they could emerge from the negotiations with basically what they wanted, without international mediation.

The absence of an obvious international mediator

The government and the ANC had very different allies abroad. There was no obvious international third SDUW\HLWKHUVXI¿FLHQWO\µQHXWUDO¶RULPSDUWLDOWREHDFFHSWDEOHWRERWKRUZLWKVXFKSRZHUWKDWLWFRXOG impose itself as a mediator.72IWKHVRFDOOHGQHXWUDOFRXQWULHVLQ(XURSH6ZHGHQKDGJLYHQPDVVLYH ¿QDQFLDO VXSSRUW WR WKH$1& ZKLOH 6ZLW]HUODQG¶V SURFODLPHG µQHXWUDOLW\¶ ZDV VHHQ E\ WKH$1& DQG others as a disguise for its de facto support of the South African government, which was helped out of LWVHFRQRPLFGLI¿FXOWLHVE\D6ZLVVEDQNRI¿FLDOZKRIURPKHOSHGPHGLDWHEHWZHHQ6RXWK$IULFD and foreign banks holding South African debt (Kreis 2007). In 1989 the idea was mooted of a joint

7 The US had such power in the Israeli-Palestine case, where it was far from impartial. See Falk (2013).

7 Mediation Arguments

8.6RYLHW8QLRQLQLWLDWLYHRQ6RXWK$IULFDZKLFKPLJKWKDYHLQYROYHGPHGLDWLRQ 5RVHQWKDO3DSHUV8 personal communication, Robin Renwick, former British High Commissioner in South Africa, Cape Town, January 2014 ). The South African government saw Margaret Thatcher, who had held out against the imposition of sanctions on the apartheid regime, as one of its main allies, and she had seen Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union as someone she could work with. The ANC was closely aligned to the Soviet Union, which had supplied the resources for it to conduct its armed struggle. But the idea RIDMRLQW8.6RYLHWLQLWLDWLYHZDVQHYHUWDNHQXSE\WKHPDLQSDUWLHVWRWKHFRQÀLFWEHFDXVHERWKPDGHLW clear they did not want any such external involvement or mediation (for reasons explored further below).

The only South African party that did call for external mediation in the negotiations was the Pan-Africanist &RQJUHVV 3$& %\ WKH 3$& ZDV D UHODWLYHO\ LQVLJQL¿FDQW SOD\HU KDYLQJ EHHQ FRQVXPHG E\ LQWHUQHFLQHVWULIHLQWKH\HDUVRIH[LOH .RQGOR ,WKDGUHPDLQHG¿UPO\RSSRVHGWRDQ\QHJRWLDWLRQV with the apartheid government until, at a consultative conference in Harare in March 1990, it agreed WR µFRQGLWLRQDO DFFHSWDQFH¶ RI QHJRWLDWLRQV ,W WKHQ VXJJHVWHG$GGLV$EDED DV D µQHXWUDO¶ YHQXH DQG the OAU as the mediator (Front FileFI:ROIHUV ,WDOVRFDOOHGRQWKH2$8WRIDFLOLWDWHWKH FUHDWLRQRIDXQLWHGIURQWEHWZHHQWKH3$&DQGWKH$1& 2¶0DOOH\QG %XWQHLWKHURIWKHPDLQSOD\HUV LQWKHUHVROXWLRQRIWKH6RXWK$IULFDQFRQÀLFWJDYHDQ\VHULRXVWKRXJKWWRWKHLGHDWKDWWKH2$8PLJKWEH an external mediator. For the government, the OAU was associated with the funding that its Liberation &RPPLWWHHKDGSURYLGHGIRUWKHOLEHUDWLRQVWUXJJOH7KH2$8¶VDGKRFFRPPLWWHHRQVRXWKHUQ$IULFDZDV involved in the Harare Declaration drawn up by the ANC in August 1989, setting out the conditions for negotiation, and the ANC leadership was prepared to continue to report to this committee (e.g. Mandela 1990), but the ANC was aware of the limitations of the OAU and was automatically opposed to anything proposed by the rival PAC. In 1990 the ANC leadership, anxious to return to South Africa now this had DWODVWEHFRPHSRVVLEOHFODLPHGWKDWWKH3$&ZDQWHGDµQHXWUDOYHQXH¶RXWVLGH6RXWK$IULFDEHFDXVHLW was so uncertain of the extent of its support within the country (ANC n.d.).

7KHUHZDVWKHQQRµXQDYRLGDEOH¶PHGLDWRU 0DXQGLHWDO LQWKH6RXWK$IULFDQFDVHXQOLNH say, that of Namibia, where the parties involved could not avoid having the WCG as mediator, given the role the Western powers played in the UN Security Council and in the region. President George Bush and US Secretary of State James Baker told some leading South Africans visiting Washington in µ\RX¶YHJRWWRKDYHDPHGLDWRUZHUHDOO\ZDQWWRKHOS¶DQG%XVKLVWKHQVDLGWRKDYHWHOHSKRQHG Mandela on the issue (Thomson 2012, 380), but both Mandela and De Klerk rejected the idea. The ANC in exile was strongly anti-imperialist and after being unbanned believed that any Western mediator would be biased against it. On the other hand, the NP, which had become a diplomatic pariah in the years of DSDUWKHLGKDGORQJUHVHQWHGDQ\H[WHUQDODGYLFHRQKRZWRVHWWOHWKH6RXWK$IULFDQFRQÀLFW,WWKRXJKWLW could gain the upper hand in the negotiations, especially if there was no external mediation.

:HQRZWXUQWRWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWUHDVRQZK\WKHUHZDVQRVLJQL¿FDQWLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQLQWKH South African case.

Rejection of international mediation by the two main players

Throughout the South African transition the ruling NP and ANC were the main protagonists, even if both recognized that they could not exclude others and make a deal on their own. The Harare Declaration drawn up by the ANC in August 1989, setting out the conditions for negotiation, made no mention of any international mediation and instead stated that ‘discussions should take place between the liberation movement and the South African regime to achieve the suspension of hostilities on both sides by agreeing WRDPXWXDOO\ELQGLQJFHDVH¿UH1HJRWLDWLRQVVKRXOGWKHQSURFHHGWRHVWDEOLVKWKHEDVLVIRUWKHDGRSWLRQ RIDQHZ&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶ $1&SDUD 7KH$1&FRQWLQXHGWRVWUHVVWKDWLWZDVµDEVROXWHO\FRPPLWWHG

8 These papers are in the private possession of Richard Rosenthal, Cape Town.

8 April 2014

WRD6RXWK$IULFDQQHJRWLDWLRQVSURFHVVIUHHRIRXWVLGHLQWHUIHUHQFH¶ $1&QGDOVR0DORND Mandela told the OAU ad hoc committee on southern Africa soon after his release that ‘the democratic forces inside South Africa have both the will and the capacity to ensure that the regime subjects itself to JHQXLQHGHPRFUDF\¶ 0DQGHOD

7KH13KDGORQJRSSRVHGDQ\H[WHUQDOLQWHUYHQWLRQLQ6RXWK$IULFD¶VDIIDLUV7KHUHZDVQRTXHVWLRQRILWV now accepting external mediation, especially by the OAU. Niel Barnard, the head of the National Intelli- JHQFH6HUYLFH 1,6 ZKRZDVWKHNH\RI¿FLDOLQFRQWDFWVZLWKWKH$1&LQWKHODWHVPDGHFOHDUKLV opposition to any external mediation. At his second meeting with Mandela in Pollsmoor Prison in 1988 KHWROGKLPµWKHUHDUHDORWRISHRSOHZKRZDQWWRWHDFKXVKRZWRQHJRWLDWHDQGWRJHWLQYROYHG±WKH %ULWLVKWKH$PHULFDQVWKH)UHQFKDQGWKH2UJDQLVDWLRQRI$IULFDQ8QLW\7KH\DOOZDQWD¿QJHULQWKHSLH WREHLQDJRRGSRVLWLRQZKHQ\RXWDNHRYHUSRZHU&DQZHSOHDVHGRLWRXUVHOYHV±QHJRWLDWHZLWKHDFK RWKHULQVWHDGRIWKURXJKIRUHLJQHUV"¶%DUQDUGDGGHGµ0U0DQGHODZDVYHU\UHFHSWLYHWRWKLVWKLQNLQJ¶ 6$'(7±IRUDYDULDQWVHH'X3UHH] 7KH6RXWK$IULFDQJRYHUQPHQWKDGDFFHSWHG American mediation in the Namibian negotiations in 1988 as inevitable but, as noted above, had not welcomed it. In those negotiations, Barnard told an interviewer that ‘Russia and America determined WKHUXOHV±WKH\ZHUHSXOOLQJRXUVWULQJV¶ 6$'(7 ,QWKH6RXWK$IULFDQFDVHWKH1,6WKRXJKWLW could control the process if it engaged the ANC directly without external mediation. When two members of the NIS met two ANC leaders, Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, in Lausanne in September 1989 it was without any external assistance, even if the Swiss authorities knew that the meeting was taking place (cf. Spaarwater 2012, 182).

:KLWH6RXWK$IULFDQVHVSHFLDOO\WKRVHRI$IULNDQHUEDFNJURXQGKDGORQJUHMHFWHGH[WHUQDOµPHGGOLQJ¶ in South African affairs. In 1989 Barnard told a would-be private mediator, working with the Swiss government, that the issue of bringing the government and the ANC together was ‘of such a delicate and FRPSOH[ QDWXUH¶ WKDW WKH JRYHUQPHQW ZRXOG µFHUWDLQO\ QRW SXUVXH LW WKURXJK WKLUG SDUWLHV OHDVW RI DOO ZLWKWKHFRQQLYDQFHRIDIRUHLJQSRZHU¶DQGWKHIROORZLQJPRQWKKHDGGHGWKDWµWKHLQYROYHPHQWRI PHGLDWRUVDQGHYHQDIRUHLJQSRZHULQDQ\HYHQWSUHGHWHUPLQHVDFODVKRILQWHUHVWVDQGSURFHGXUHV¶ 5RVHQWKDO3DSHUV ,QWHUYLHZHGPRUHUHFHQWO\%DUQDUGTXLSSHG

1HJRWLDWLRQVDUHOLNHPDNLQJORYH±\RXKDYHWRGRLW\RXUVHOI%ULWDLQDQGWKH86FRXOGQRW negotiate on our behalf, not even tell us what to do and which way to go. When people ask me the reasons for our so-called miracle, our negotiated settlement, I tell them that one of the SULPDU\UHDVRQVZDVWKDWZHGLGLWRXUVHOYHV±6RXWK$IULFDQORRNHG6RXWK$IULFDQLQWKHH\H DQGPDGHDGHDO 6$'(7

That neither the government nor the ANC gave any serious thought to allowing external mediation was in part because they both believed they could achieve what they wanted without such mediation. 7KH$1&¶VJRDOZDVPDMRULW\UXOHZKLOHWKH13VRXJKWSURWHFWLRQIRUPLQRULWLHVDQGDQDUUDQJHPHQW WKDWZRXOGHQDEOHVXEVWDQWLDOZKLWHSULYLOHJHWRUHPDLQLQWDFW%RWKSDUWLHVWKRXJKWWKDWHYHQDµQHXWUDO¶ H[WHUQDOPHGLDWRUPLJKWLQWHUIHUHLQWKHSURFHVVDQGVHHNWRLQÀXHQFHWKHRXWFRPH

'H.OHUNZURWHWR3UHVLGHQW%XVKµ,WFDQQRWEHH[SHFWHGWKDW6RXWK$IULFDQVVKRXOGVXUUHQGHUUHVSRQVL- ELOLW\IRUGHWHUPLQLQJWKHLURZQIXWXUH¶ /\PDQ DQGKHODWHUUHÀHFWHGWKDWµRQHRIWKHVWUHQJWKV of the South African transition to non-racial constitutional democracy is precisely the fact that ours was D³KRPHJURZQ´VROXWLRQ:HGLGQRWVHHN±RUUHTXLUH±LQWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQRIDQ\NLQG¶ 7KRPVRQ 2012, 380). De Klerk knew he had the security forces behind him, and probably expected the ANC to VSOLWDVWKHIRUPDOQHJRWLDWLRQVEHJDQKHZDVFRQ¿GHQWWKDWKHFRXOGFRQWUROWKHSURFHVVDQGHPHUJH IURPLWZLWKVXI¿FLHQWJXDUDQWHHVRISURWHFWLRQIRUWKHZKLWHPLQRULW\)RULWVSDUWWKH$1&NQHZWKDWLW enjoyed mass support in the country and could use that support to win what it wanted in the negotia- WLRQVLIQHFHVVDU\WKURXJKZKDWLWFDOOHGLQPLGµUROOLQJPDVVDFWLRQ¶RUE\JHWWLQJWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO

9 Mediation Arguments community to exert strong pressure on the government (Maloka 2013, 142, quoting Chris Hani, leader of the South African Communist Party). Like the NP leadership, however, the ANC did not want to see WKHFRXQWU\FROODSVHLQWRFKDRVDQGWKHIHDURIWKDWZDVVXI¿FLHQWLQFHQWLYHIRULWWRDJUHHLQWKHHQGWR make the necessary compromises. Both parties believed that having an external mediator would entail interference in what should be a domestic process, one that could not be fully understood by outsiders and which involved at least a measure of reconciliation between the various groups in South Africa, who should be left to themselves to negotiate their own future dispensation.

7KDWWKHUHZDVQRVLJQL¿FDQWLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQWKHQZDVQRWSULPDULO\EHFDXVHWKHUHZDVQR agreement on who such a mediator should be, the conditions under which such a mediator would work, or where the mediation should take place. The lack of such mediation was principally for two other reasons. )LUVWO\DµKRPHJURZQ¶SURFHVVZRXOGDSSHDUPRUHOHJLWLPDWHDVUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHYLHZVRI6RXWK$IULFDQV UDWKHUWKDQRXWVLGHUV%RWKWKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKH$1&WKRXJKWWKH\VKRXOGMRLQWO\µRZQ¶WKHSURFHVV and not outsource it in any way (personal communication, Aziz Pahad, former ANC negotiator, November 2013). While international mediation could have led to assistance in ensuring implementation, it could also, it was realized, have worked against binding the other party to abide by what was agreed, since ‘it is easier to walk away from an agreement or a process if it is owned or managed by an interna- WLRQDODJHQF\RUDIRUHLJQSRZHU¶ +D\VRP $QGVHFRQGO\WKHUHZDVQRLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQ in this case because the two main parties, both wishing to exert as much control over the process as possible, did not want it. They thought they could achieve at least as much, if not more, without a mediator than with one. Neither wished to lose control of the process to an outsider because that outsider PLJKWVHHNWRLQÀXHQFHWKHSURFHVVRUHYHQDWWHPSWWRLPSRVHDVSHFWVRIDVHWWOHPHQW

1XPHURXVLQWHUQDOSDUWLHVKHOSHGWRUHVROYHFRQÀLFWVEHWZHHQWKHPDLQSURWDJRQLVWVEXWGLGQRWWDNHRQ mediation, and during the formal negotiations the negotiators themselves sometimes took on mediatory UROHV FI$QVWH\ 6LVN DQG HVSHFLDOO\ 2GHQGDDO LQ SDUWLFXODU ± ,Q HVSHFLDOO\&\ULO5DPDSKRVDRIWKH$1&DQG5RHOI0H\HURIWKH13IRUPHGDµFKDQQHO¶WKDWKHOSHGEULQJ the parties back to the negotiation forum (e.g. Strand 2000, 252), but there were other trusted groups RI SHRSOH ZKR LQWHUDFWHG ZKHQ GLI¿FXOWLHV DURVH SHUVRQDO FRPPXQLFDWLRQ 1LHO %DUQDUG 1RYHPEHU SHUVRQDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQ$]L]3DKDG1RYHPEHU 7KHHPHUJHQFHRIWKHVHIRUPVRILQWHUQDO mediation was a further reason why there was no external mediation. When the process seemed to be heading towards breakdown in mid-1992, the UN was called upon to assist, but that was to create the conditions for the resumption of negotiations, not for mediation in the negotiations themselves.

Conclusion

:KDWLPSOLFDWLRQVÀRZIURPWKLVFDVH",WVKRZVWKDWLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQLVQRWDOZD\VQHFHVVDU\IRU WKHUHWREHDVXFFHVVIXOQHJRWLDWHGVHWWOHPHQWLQDQLQWUDVWDWHFRQÀLFW7KHLGHDWKDWVXFKPHGLDWLRQLV DOZD\VEHWWHUWKDQLWVDEVHQFHLVFOHDUO\LQFRUUHFW7KHUHDUHQRJHQHUDOUXOHVIRUUHVROYLQJFRQÀLFW:H cannot know for certain whether international mediation might have produced a more satisfactory result, and sooner, but it seems highly unlikely that it would have done. Here was a case in which the context DQGQDWXUHRIWKHFRQÀLFWZHUHQRWFRQGXFLYHWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQ7KDWWKHUHKDGEHHQLQWHUQDWLRQDO mediation in Zimbabwe and Namibia did not mean that the same had to happen in the South African case, which was not one of decolonization by a foreign power. Those other cases, in which there had been external mediation, helped persuade the South African players to avoid it in resolving their own FRQÀLFW$QGLQWKH6RXWK$IULFDQFDVHWKHUHZDVQRREYLRXVPHGLDWRUDVWKHUHKDGEHHQLQWKRVHRWKHU cases.

10 April 2014

:KLOHDOOQHJRWLDWHGVHWWOHPHQWVUHTXLUHDWOHDVWVRPHFRQ¿GHQFHEXLOGLQJLQWKHSUHQHJRWLDWLRQSKDVH in the South African case there was considerable building of trust between the two main parties before the formal negotiations began. This was only to a limited extent facilitated by external players, who helped provide venues for meetings and funding to enable some of the meetings to take place. The YHU\VHSDUDWLRQEURXJKWDERXWE\DSDUWKHLGDQGWKHH[LOHH[SHULHQFHRIWKH$1&±DORQJZLWKJXLOWIHOW by many on the government side for what they had done and preparedness on the ANC side to forgive SDVWDWURFLWLHV±PHDQWWKDWVXI¿FLHQWWUXVWZDVFUHDWHGLQWKHSUHQHJRWLDWLRQSKDVHWRREYLDWHWKHQHHG IRUH[WHUQDOPHGLDWLRQLQWKHQHJRWLDWLRQSKDVH,WLVVLJQL¿FDQWWKDWWKHRQO\DWWHPSWDWVXFKPHGLDWLRQLQ the early 1990s occurred not during the negotiations themselves but when a potential spoiler, Buthelezi and the IFP, threatened the successful implementation of what had been agreed in the negotiations.

A key reason why there was no international mediation in the South African case is that the two main players were opposed to it, and the reasons for this have been explored above. Though the ANC had, by 1990, a wider range of close connections with the international community than the NP government had, its reasons for not supporting the idea of international mediation were similar to those of the JRYHUQPHQW QDWLRQDO SULGH LQ UHDFKLQJ D KRPHJURZQ VHWWOHPHQW DQG IHDU RI ORVLQJ FRQWURO RI WKH SURFHVVWRDWKLUGSDUW\7KDWULYDOSROLWLFDORUJDQL]DWLRQV¿UVWWKH3$&DQGWKHQWKH,)3DGYRFDWHGLQWHU- QDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQUHLQIRUFHGWKH$1&¶VUHMHFWLRQRIWKHLGHD)RULWVSDUWWKH13JRYHUQPHQWKDGORQJ opposed any form of outside intervention in South Africa, and, like the ANC, it believed it could get what it wanted without international mediation, which might mean losing control of the process. A home-grown product was considered to confer greater legitimacy on the process.

,WZDVWKXVFUXFLDOO\LPSRUWDQWWKDWE\WKHWLPHWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVEHJDQVXI¿FLHQWWUXVWKDGEHHQEXLOW XSEHWZHHQWKHWZRPDLQSOD\HUV±GHVSLWHWKHRQJRLQJSROLWLFDOYLROHQFHZKLFKHVFDODWHGLQWKHHDUO\ V±IRUWKHPWRDJUHHWKDWWKHUHVKRXOGEHQRLQWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQ:KHQWKHLGHDRILQWHUQDWLRQDO intervention in the negotiation process came up, it was to help deal with the violence, not to provide mediation in the negotiations themselves.

Whether or not one can have a successful resolution without an international mediator would seem to GHSHQGWKHQRQWKHQDWXUHRIWKHFRQÀLFWDQGZKHWKHUWKHPDMRUSDUWLHVDFFHSWWKDWWKHUHVKRXOGQRWEH such mediation. In the South African case there was no direct superpower involvement or interest, other than to see the end of apartheid, and both parties rejected international mediation.

&DQFRQGLWLRQVEHFUHDWHGHOVHZKHUHVRWKDWDQH[WHUQDOPHGLDWRULVQRWQHFHVVDU\"&OHDUO\FRQ¿GHQFH building measures should be put in place and efforts made to increase trust between the parties. As ZHKDYHVHHQLWZDVVLJQL¿FDQWLQ6RXWK$IULFDWKDWWKHUHZHUHRQO\WZRPDLQSOD\HUVDQGWKDWERWK accepted that there should be no external mediation. They entered into negotiations willingly, even if under pressure to do so, believing that they would be able to exercise enough control over the process WRPDNHWKHRXWFRPHRQHWKH\FRXOGOLYHZLWKDQGWKDWWKH\ZHUHQRWOLNHO\WRGHULYHDQ\JUHDWHUEHQH¿W IURPH[WHUQDOPHGLDWLRQ7KH$1&¶VJRDOZDVPDMRULW\UXOHZLWKDVIHZFRQGLWLRQVDVSRVVLEOHZKLOHWKH NP wanted to preserve as much white privilege as possible in post-apartheid South Africa. Though both parties declared themselves happy with the outcome, with the hindsight of two decades we can see that WKH13PDGHPRUHVLJQL¿FDQWFRPSURPLVHVWKDQWKH$1&7KDWUHÀHFWHGWKHZD\WKHEDODQFHRIIRUFHV was moving, but the legitimacy of the settlement, though now questioned in some quarters, continues WRGHULYHPXFKRILWVZHLJKWIURPLWVKDYLQJEHHQWKHUHVXOWRIDQLQWHUQDOSURFHVVZLWKRXWVLJQL¿FDQW external mediation.

11 Mediation Arguments

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%HUFRYLWFK- 6LPSVRQ/,QWHUQDWLRQDOPHGLDWLRQDQGWKHTXHVWLRQRIIDLOHGSHDFHDJUHHPHQWV ,PSURYLQJFRQÀLFWPDQDJHPHQWDQGLPSOHPHQWDWLRQPeace and Change ±

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