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The Rollback of South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare

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The Rollback of South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare The Rollback of South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Program Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt US Air Force Counterproliferation Center Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama THE ROLLBACK OF SOUTH AFRICA’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM by Dr. Stephen F. Burgess and Dr. Helen E. Purkitt USAF Counterproliferation Center Air War College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama The Rollback of South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Program Dr. Stephen F. Burgess and Dr. Helen E. Purkitt April 2001 USAF Counterproliferation Center Air War College Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm . Contents Page Disclaimer.....................................................................................................i The Authors ............................................................................................... iii Acknowledgments .......................................................................................v Chronology ................................................................................................vii I. Introduction .............................................................................................1 II. The Origins of the Chemical and Biological Warfare Program.............3 III. Project Coast, 1981-1993....................................................................17 IV. Rollback of Project Coast, 1988-1994................................................39 V. Transition to ANC Rule, Proliferation Concerns and Efforts to Conceal Project Coast Details: 1994-1996.........................................57 VI. Basson’s Arrest and Trial and TRC Hearings, 1997-2000.................65 VII. Conclusion.........................................................................................81 Appendix A................................................................................................83 Appendix B................................................................................................85 Appendix C................................................................................................97 Notes..........................................................................................................99 Disclaimer The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation Center. i The Authors Stephen F. Burgess is Assistant Professor of International Security Studies and an Associate of the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center, U.S. Air War College. He completed his Ph.D. at Michigan State University, was chosen as a Fulbright-Hays Dissertation Research Abroad fellow, and was a Research Associate at the University of Zimbabwe. Dr. Burgess was a Lecturer at the University of Zambia, an Instructor at Vanderbilt University, and an Assistant Professor at Hofstra University, New York where he taught courses on democratization, international political economy, and international organizations and law. Dr. Burgess has been an active scholar for more than a decade, presenting papers at conferences of the African Studies Association, American Political Science Association, and International Studies Association. In 1997, his book, Smallholders and Political Voice in Zimbabwe, was published by the University Press of America, and he is under contract with Scarecrow Press to write The United Nations under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992-97. Dr. Burgess has published several book chapters and journal articles, including “African Security in the 21st Century: The Challenges of Indigenization and Multilateralism,” African Studies Review (September 1998). His research interests include international organizations, peacekeeping, and African politics and security. Helen E. Purkitt obtained her Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Southern California. She is Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Naval Academy. Her research and teaching interests include African politics, environmental politics, international relations theory, and political decision-making. Past INSS/NARC sponsored research includes developing a system to monitor environmental threats in African regions (1997) and “The Politics of Denuclearization: The Case of South Africa" (1995). She is currently completing an on-line introductory Political Psychology textbook and a book-length manuscript on South Africa’s past, present, and future defense policies. Recent publications include, “A Problem Centered Approach for Understanding Foreign Policy: Some Examples from U.S. Foreign Policy toward Southern Africa” in S. Nagel (Ed.) Handbook of Global International Policy (New York: Marcel iii Dekker, 2000), Editor, Annual Editions: World Politics 00/01 (Dushkin/McGraw Hill, 2000); “Bridging Gaps: The Experiences of Two Members of the First Generation of Civilian Women Professors at USNA,” in F. D’Amico and L. Weinstein (Eds.) INSIDE/OUTSIDE: Women & the U.S. Military (New York University Press, 1998); and, “Problem Representations and Political Expertise: Evidence from ‘Think Aloud Protocols of South African Elites,” in D. Sylvan and J.F. Voss (Eds.), Problem Representation in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 1998). iv Acknowledgments This research was supported by the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), U.S. Air Force Academy, and the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center (CPC), Maxwell Air Force Base, and the Naval Academy Research Council (NARC) at the U.S. Naval Academy. v Chronology 1939-1945 South Africa produces mustard gas during World War II. 1946 South Africa dumps mustard gas out to sea. 21 March 1960 The Sharpeville Massacre incident brings international condemnation of South Africa. 1962-1967 Egypt uses chemical warfare in North Yemen. 1963 South Africa accedes to the 1925 Protocol to the Geneva Convention, banning chemical and biological warfare (CBW). UN approves a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa. 1964 South Africa begins to assist Portugal and Rhodesia in counter-insurgency campaigns against guerrilla forces. 1967 South African Police (SAP) intervene in Rhodesia against guerrillas. 1972 South Africa signs the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the BWC). 1974-1975 “Détente” between South Africa and Zambia leads to cease-fire and SAP withdrawal from Rhodesia. 1975 South Africa ratifies BWC. 25 June 1975 Mozambique becomes independent under a revolutionary communist regime. 11 November 1975 Angola becomes independent under a revolutionary communist regime. Cuban troops stop South African offensive. December 1975 Clark Amendment stops U.S. aid to UNITA and leads to isolation of South Africa in Angola. vii February 1976 Defense Minister P.W. Botha delivers a speech to the South African Parliament, warning of a Soviet-led “total onslaught” campaign, which could involve NBC weapons. 16 June 1976 Soweto Uprisings begin and last until 1977, leading to a call for more effective crowd control CBW agents. 1976-1979 War in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) intensifies and leads to accusations of South African involvement in CBW attacks. Preparations proceed for a sophisticated CBW program. 1978 P.W. Botha becomes Prime Minister. May 1978 Cassinga Raid on guerrilla camp in Angola leads to accusations of South African CW. 1980 Gen. Magnus Malan becomes Defense Minister. April-May 1981 Project Coast is launched, with Dr. Wouter Basson as Director. August 1981 Operation Protea is launched by SADF in Angola. 1982 Delta G Scientific Company begins work on CW agents. December 1982 Dr. Basson allegedly arranges killing of 200 SWAPO prisoners. 1983 Roodepoort Research Laboratories (RRL) begins work on BW agents. P.W. Botha becomes State President under new constitution. 1984 A new wave of uprisings begins and lasts until 1986. CDC, Atlanta, sends samples of Ebola, Marburg and Rift Valley viruses to South Africa. June 1985 State of Emergency is declared in South Africa. 1985 Plans for a chemical and biological weapons program are devised. 1986 Covert negotiations begin between the regime and the ANC. viii 1985-1989 Both sides in the Angolan war raise claims of rival use of CW. October 1987 Both sides claim CW used by other in battle of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola. 1988 Surgeon General Nieuwoudt dies and is replaced by Dr. Knobel. Negotiated settlement concluded for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and South African forces from Namibia. January 1989 P.W. Botha suffers a stroke and is replaced by F.W. de Klerk on an interim basis. April 1989 The Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) attempts to assassinate Rev. Frank Chikane with poison. 30 July 1989 President de Klerk announces the formation of the Kahn Committee to investigate covert activities by security forces. Project Coast is not investigated. September 1989 F.W. de Klerk is elected and assumes office as President. November 1989 President de Klerk orders rollback of nuclear weapons program. January 1990 U.S. issues warning to South Africa, calling for nuclear disarmament, or else the U.S. would consider South Africa to be “hostile” to the U.S. February 1990 Ban on ANC is lifted, and Nelson Mandela is released. 26 March 1990 Dr. Knobel briefs President de Klerk on Project Coast as a “defensive” CBW
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