Constructive Engagement": U.S
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GUNTHER HELLMANN The Collapse of "Constructive Engagement": U.S. Foreign Policy in Southern Africa* 1. Introduction During the Reagan Administration, U.S. foreign policy in southern Africa acquired new significance in American politics. Political elites and subse- quently the American public were increasingly polarized as the conflicts among and within the states of southern Africa escalated. The Reagan Administration meanwhile was unable either to exercise a moderating influ- ence on the contending parties in southern Africa or to win public support with a convincing policy. In January 1987 an independent report ordered by President Reagan in September 1985 bluntly stated that the Administration's policy had failed.1 Yet initially its southern Africa policy had seemed most apt to live up to the Administration's claim to rebuild U.S. global leadership. How was it that a policy which in 1981 was regarded by nearly all sides as a coherent and reasoned whole2 could six years later be issued such a devastating judgment under the seal of the State Department? And is it valid to maintain that this policy was really "doomed to fail" from the start?3 This essay seeks to show that the Administration's policy failed in two respects. First and most fundamentally, the Administration failed to devise a coherent and effective policy transcending the tension between anti-commu- nism on the one hand and anti-apartheid on the other. This conflict of goals had been evident, though largely latent, in policy toward southern Africa since the 1970s. Second, and more important, this essay will argue that it * For their valuable and stimulating ideas I would like to extend my special thanks to the editors and, in particular, Winrich Kühne and Ambassador Donald F. McHenry. 1 A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa. The Report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa: January 1987. United States Department of State, Washing- ton, D.C.: G.P.O. April 1987, p. vi. 2 Cf. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Nomination of Chester A. Crocker (Senate Executive Report No. 97 — 98), 97th Congress, 1st Session. April 27, 1981, Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. 1981. 3 Sanford Ungar, Peter Vale, "Why Constructive Engagement Failed," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Winter 1985/86), p. 242. 266 Gunther Hellmann was already apparent in the spring of 1981 that the Administration's foreign policy for southern Africa rested on faulty premises and could succeed only under extremely favorable but highly improbable circumstances. 2. Determining Factors of Foreign Policy toward Southern Africa Following the independence of Angola, Mozambique and later Zimbabwe, American foreign policy has attached increasing importance to southern Africa. This growing concern was precipitated in 1975 by the Soviet-sponsered airlift of Cuban troops to Angola. In American eyes Angola became the symbol of an alleged Soviet betrayal of detente; what is more, it became the geographical fulcrum of various U.S. designs for southern Africa. What for Kissinger was first solely a test case of the Soviets' desire for global detente prompted the Carter Administration to embrace a regional strategy of preven- tive diplomacy: U.S. mediation was to help resolve the conflicts over Rhode- sia/Zimbabwe and South-West Africa/Namibia. While Zimbabwe achieved its independence during the Carter years, the continuing efforts to reach a negotiated settlement on Namibian independence have thus far been unsuc- cessful. The interests of the U.S. in southern Africa are many and varied, though compared with other regions, by no means "vital".4 American experts on Africa largely agree that southern Africa in general and South Africa in particular, owing to the rich deposits of raw materials, are of great, though not critical importance to the American economy. Similarly, the shipping route around the Cape of Good Hope assumes strategic importance as one of the "lifelines" of the Western world. Finally, because of its own history the U.S. feels a special political and moral responsibility toward the black majority in South Africa and for a settlement of the outstanding issues of colonialism such as in Namibia. In light of this large measure of agreement on basic U.S. interests in southern Africa,5 it is therefore surprising how controversial the Africa policy of practically every administration since Eisenhower has been. One reason for 4 Cf. inter alia, South Africa: Time Running Out. Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, Berkeley: University of California Press 1981; also, Helen Kitchen, U.S. Interests in Africa. The Washington Papers/98, Vol. 11, New York: Praeger 1983, as well as Robert Jaster, Southern Africa in Conflict: Implications for U.S. Policies in the 1980s. American Enterprise Institute, Special Analyses, Washington, D.C.: AEI 1982. 5 Cf. Helen Kitchen, Michael Clough, The United States and South Africa: Realities and Red Herrings, Significant Issues Series, Vol. 6, No. 6 ,Washington, D.C.: CSIS 1984, pp. 12-18. U.S. Foreign Policy in Southern Africa 267 this may be that the political center is normally preoccupied with other foreign policy issues and thus leaves the field of public discussion of policy toward southern Africa to an "Afrocentric," predominantly black lobby on the one hand and a doctrinaire anti-communist circle of conservatives on the other.6 This, however, does not entirely explain the continued controversy surrounding U.S. policy, or why since the mid-1970s no administration has come even close to realizing its objectives. Rather, the central problem of U.S. foreign policy in southern Africa seems to be that no administration has been able to reconcile and integrate into a coherent policy not only the often diametrically opposed views of vocal minorities, but also the usually more subdued conflicts of interest reflected in public opinion as a whole.7 3. Constructive Engagement: Premises, Objectives, Dilemmas The Reagan Administration faced a familiar dilemma: with admittedly limited influence on regional developments, it had to formulate a policy that took into account both the often contradictory interests of the U.S. and the political conditions in southern Africa itself. At the outset things looked promising for the Reagan Administration, for Chester Crocker was the first proven expert on Africa to head the State Department's division for African Affairs.8 After several months of reviewing U.S. Africa policy at the beginning of his tenure, Crocker announced in the summer of 1981 the principles of a "constructive engagement."9 The primary objective was to strengthen the 6 Cf. ibid., pp. 16/17. 7 Public opinion polls make the whole dilemma clear. For example, in a Harris poll conducted in 1981 nearly three-fourths of the U.S. population condemned apartheid as an immoral system, yet in the same survey 54% of those polled agreed with the statement that the U.S. ought to support the South African government because it is an ally in the battle against Russian-style communism and is of vital importance for the national security of the U.S. Cf. William Foltz, "United States Policy toward South Africa: Is One Possible?" in Gerald J. Bender, James S. Coleman, Richard L. Sklar (eds.), African Crisis Areas and U.S. Foreign Policy, Berkeley: University of California Press 1985, pp. 38-42. 8 During the Nixon Administration the Africa specialist Crocker worked on Kissinger's staff in the National Security Council. As director of African Studies at the influential Center for Strategic and International Studies Crocker then made himself well known in Republican circles during the Carter Administration. On Reagan's campaign team and later on the "transition team" Crocker was responsible for Africa policy. 9 Cf. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Africa, U.S. Policy Toward Namibia: Spring 1981. Hearings, 97th Congress, 1st Session. June 17, 1981, Washington, D.C.: G.P.O. 1981. Cf. also Chester Crocker, "Strengthening U.S. African Relations," Address before the African-American Institute Conference in Wichita, Kansas, June 20, 1981, as well as Chester Crocker, "Regional Strategy for Southern 268 Gunther Hellmann influence of the U.S. in southern Africa. In Crocker's view, three main obstacles had to be overcome: 1) the Cuban-Soviet presence in Angola and Moscow's influence on both the government of Samora Machel in Mozambi- que and the Namibian liberation movement SWAPO; 2) the extremely strained, dependency-ridden relationship between the "Frontline States" of Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Botswana and Mozambique, and the region's dominant power South Africa; and 3) the existence of the apartheid regime itself, which made it practically impossible for any administration to cultivate the kind of close political and economic contacts with South Africa that American interests seemed to call for. Crocker was convinced that constructive engagement integrated all the essen- tial elements for a successful strategy. In its official reading, the constructive engagement of the U.S. would help build a network of mutually reinforcing links to replace force as a means of resolving conflicts in southern Africa and thereby strengthen the security of the region as a whole. Concretely, Crocker was thinking of a) a negotiated settlement on Namibian independence; b) the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola; c) the resolution of conflicts between and within states (above all in and over Angola) through talks between the parties involved — if need be and desired, with U.S. mediation; d) the determined but, if at all possible, nonviolent elimination of apartheid in South Africa, so that in the long term e) the complementary development goals of the states of southern Africa and the economic and political aims of the U.S. might be realized.