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THE WASHrNG T ON OFFI C E ON AFRICA 1 1 0 M ARYt_ ANO AVENUE. N _E WASHIN GTON. 0 C 2 0002 P HONE 1202 1 5 4 6 -7961 FAX 1202! 5 46 - 1545 Au gust 26. 1991

Dear Friend,

I am writing to u rge you to r eview the e n closed press c lips and Washington Office on Africa resources, and, if p ossible, to write a brief articl e or letter f or p u blication in iour loca l newspaper . Since Preside n t Bush announc e d the termina tion of many South African sanctions on July 1 0, n e w informatio n ha s discredited hi s justificatio n for this action. However, the premature abandonment of these h ard-won sanctions has produced little response . Consequently, many observers fear t hat the Preside nt may lif t the r ema ining economi c sanctions as early as October. We. mu st the refore use every avai labl e means--including l oca l a nd national media--to i mprove publ ic unde rstandi ng of the current situation in and t o generate renewed pressure f o r the mainte nance of sanctions a gainst South Africa's racist regime .

In his eagerness t o find some pretext for the repeal o f s~ncti o ns , President Bush overlooked the South African government' s obvious failure to comply with the conditions set down in the Comprehensive Anti- Act for the termination of sanctions. He gave the de Kl erk administration credit for initiating recent politic a 1 reforms and claimed that these demonstrated its sincere commitment to desegregation and democracy.

Less than two we eks later, a barrage of dramatic disclosures shattered these illusions and revealed the minority regime's true agenda. Using leaked documents, eyewitness accounts, and the testimony of forme r South African security agents, journalists in South Africa and Britain compiled a chilling record of 's involvement in promoting political violence. Their reports exposed the duplicity of the de Klerk administration, whose feigned good will and professe d desire to negotiate had been used to obscure an all-too-familiar program of propaganda, promotion of surrogate groups, intimidation, and terrorism.

President Bush's justification also ignored the fact that recent reforms were not initiatives of the government--which has consistently r e sisted any diminution of white privilege--but concessions forced upon the government by popular anti-apartheid organizations. They represented the desperate attempt of a government, under siege at home and abroad, to jettison the most visibly offensive features of its policies, in order to consolidate its control over key aspects of social order . International sanctions played a significant role in eroding the government's will to withstand and to suppress its domestic opposition. Now , President Bush has alleviated the pressure on the minority regime to make substantial c o ncessions.

SPONSORS OF THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA: AFRICAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH· AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION • THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFR ICA • CHRISTIAN CHURCH (DISCIPLES OF CHRIST) • CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN • EPISCOPAL CHURCH . COALITION FOR HUMAN NEEDS AND PUBLIC AF FAIRS OFF IC E. EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AN D THE WASHINGTON OFFICE· EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMER ICA" MARYKNOLL FATHERS AND BROTHERS • MI SS IONARIES OF AFRICA • PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (USA) • PROGRESS IVE NATIONAL BAPTIST CONVENTION . HOME MI SS ION BOARD· THE REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA· SACRED HEART FATHERS· SOCIETY FOR AFRICAN MISSIONS (SM .A FATHE RS) · UNITED AUTOMOBILE . AEROSPAC E AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA. UAW· UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTRIES. OFF ICE FOR CHURCH IN SOCIETY AND COMMI SS ION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE • UNITED METHODIST CHURCH. BOARD OF GLOBAL MINISTRIES AFRICA OFFICE AND WOMENS DIVI SION " UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA. So far, the response to thes e deve lopments has been minimal. The American press has hailed the " e nd of apartheid" without emphasizing tha t dai ly lif e for South Africa's disenfranchised black majority (and i ts privi l eged white minority) remains very much the same. Few journalists hav e questioned the objectives of a man forme rly considered a leader o f the National Party's right wing. Similarly, Co ngress , which s h o uld hc:i.ve bee n outraged a t President Bush' s mis interpretation of the CAAA, ~ffe red hardly a whimper of protest. Confronted with the issue, many members either defend the "good intentions " of the de Kl erk administration or, mo re cynically, insist that their constituents are no longer concerned about South Africa.

It is therefore most urgent for us to draw attention to th ~ secret agenda behind de Kl erk' s effort to give white supremacy a more benign profile. We must recognize the contribution which sanction s have made to the s uccesses of the South African struggle against apartheid. We ~ust call for remaining U.S. sanctions, espec ially those restricting IMF and Export-Import Bank loans ~o South Africa--to be sustained until South Africa has made truly irreversible progress toward non-racial democracy. We must refuse to let the Bush administration turn back the clock to the days of "constructive engagement" and tacit U.S. support for the intransigence and aggression of the South African government.

Local newspapers offer a vital means of raising these issues. The enclosed press clips and tips for preparing material for publication are intended to help you to make your voice heard effectively. Please take the time to look them over and to draft a brief article or letter to send to your local paper. If your work is published, I urge you to send copies to your members of Congress and to the Washington Office on Africa.

Sincerely,

Imani Countess Acting Director Check the opinion/editorial page of your local newspaper(s) to see if it indicates the paper's restrictions on opinion 1 columns. If not, call the newspaper offices and ask to speak to the opinion page editor. Tell him or her that you would like to submit an opinion column to be considered for publication. Ask what criteria the paper uses in seiecting opinion articles for publication. Be sure to find out the paper's rules concerning format (e.g., word length, spacing, etc.). Generally, newspapers expect opinion pieces to be roughly 600-800 words and double-spaced.

Prepare your article according to the paper's guidel ines. Try to keep your comments focused on one specific issue 2 (i.e., supporting or opposing a particular action of the U.S. government, responding to an event in southern Africa, etc.). If you wish, you may borrow freely from resources written by the Washington Office on Africa. A pointed, provocative opening sentence will appeal to the editor and entice people to read your column.

The final draft should clearly show your name, address, daytime telephone number and, if appropriate, your 3 organizational affiliation. Newspapers are often more inclined to publish opinion columns submitted by individuals prominent in the community. If you are affiliated with an organization concerned with civil or human rights issues but are not known as a spokesperson for the group, you may wish to ask the group's president or other officer if you may submit your article in his or her name.

If the newspaper does not contact you within two days, call the opinion editor. Check to make sure that he or she received your article and ask if the newspaper is interested in publishing it. If you are rejected, try to determine what you should do differently in future to improve your chances of publication. Also ask if the editor would be willing to shorten you article for publication as a letter to the editor.

If you do not feel able to prepare an opinion column, you 5 could write a letter to the editor. These are typical 1 y only 200-300 words long. Newspapers usually print the address to which letters should be sent on the editorial/letters page. Other guidelines for letters may also appear.

If your article or letter is published, draw attention to 6 it! Send copies to your Senators and to the U.S . Representatives for the area. Indicate that the column appeared in a newspaper in their constituency. If you wrote about a topic which involves state or local government--such as an article supporting local sanctions--send copies to these officials, too. Also, please send a copy to the Washington Office on Africa. Tuesday 13 August 1991 Tribal chiefs are marching in tune with Pretoria WASHINGTON TIMES, 20 August 1991 The Soutl1 African government is looking to African tradition in its fight against the ANC, writes Chris McGreal from Masemola Inkatha raids against ANC

CHIEF Maoe Masemola's sub- role: "The ANC are the ones caus­ jects, rejecting . custom, have Ing the trouble. They keep a low reportedly backed by police marched In protest against cir· profile In the village because they ru11.1cision, unpaid . labour and know about us here. We're here to even having a woman a.S·le.ader. help keep control, to show the But If the 14 villages under her way. The ANC cause trouble, and By Allister Sparks country indicate that, far from being rule do not see value In tradition; · we're here to make sure It doesn't LONDON OBSERVER brought under control, joint police- 1nkatha operations against ANC Pretoria clearly does. happen. People feel they've got se- .JOHANNESBURC;. South Africeople at•· katha and the ANC, with a code of ·m. -mumty tell the sto.ry of how the Cass· helps suppress ANC activity. Al- tending. ~C gatherings; . ., , . · conduct and a mechanism for inves­ thongh the South African ' De- :.,When an ~F 'Pl"CSe!lCC alone pirs drove around Kwadela that night, dropping off armed men to tigating complaints. fence Force began moving into ls not snflJde.iit, or Where the·.v11; [Meanwhile, Mr. de Klerk. in an attack the homes of members of the Tral1S1'1l8l villages as far back as liige." Ch,lef ls, S'Olidly behind. the effort to defuse the crisis, appointed 1986, the practice . has become ANc; the secnrlty police move ln. local African National Congress branch committee. then picking a four-man committee yesterday to widespread since Nelson · ?dan· ~ ~ !igo, the chief 9f Ga­ monitor the secret spending of gov­ dela's release in February last .Mapliopha was the first to put his them up again. year and Is increasingly effective. name to an ANC signature cam- It was the night of July 26. one ernment cash. The SADF has set up camp lm- palgn demanding an interim gov­ week after the exposure of what has [Mr. de Klerk said in a statement mediately behind Chier Mase- emment. The security police come to be called the "lnkathagate" he expected the committee of two mola's kraal The 20 black sol- picked him up for qaestiouing. scandal. Despite damning disclo· academics, a retired newspaper edi­ diers led by a white officec are Chief Masemola has asked the surcs and government assurances tor and a retired chartered account· shielded from view by a mountain SADF to remain for at least two that followed, here again were re­ ant to' start work Sept. 2.] of rocks, but their presence Is only more years. "I can't accept ports of the police acting in collusion But South Africa's problem is the too evident. While the military hi- threats to the chlers powers," she with Inkatha in a campaign against widening gap between what is said erarchy says the force ls deployed said. "My relationship with the at the top and what is done down to keep the peace, the young offi- SADF Is very good. lnltlally the the ANC. below, observers say. Not only is the Kwadela is not believed to be an cer seems not to have grasped villagers were not happy. People violence getting worse, it is getting that the ANC ls no longer offi- stoned the trucks and the SADF isolated incident. Reports arriving at ANC headquarters in Johannes­ more systematic. dally the enemy. would retaliate. But they are here • Distributed by Sc ripps Howard The lieutenant spelled out his to prote<:t me and my people." burg front branches all over the THE GU/\RDl/\N Monday August 5 1991 P· 3 The man who pointed the way to lnkatha-gatetells David Beresford about Pretoria's security culture Clique in control of DeKlerk·

OUTH Africa has says it "falls into one piece. like long been a country a puzzle", with the hit squads of the banished, and and the •broader question of a Britain has long been "third force" working to derail · the preferred home the.peace process In South Af­ ofS Its exiles. But few of them rica. He insists that the third have been like Captain Dirk force is a loose alliance between otiatlons between the ANC and into neighbouring stales. How Coetzce. a self-confessed killer, the dirty tricks departments of U1e government. The military, high would a securitv force con· would-be informer, and pen­ the military and the police. In· he suspects, is also using in a spiracy to control the political sioned security branch officer volvlng personnel and equip­ similar role soldiers trained lo direction of the country reach now holed up ln'a'north Lon­ men t from South Africa's fight with Renamo in the Mo· into the De Klcrk adminislra­ don fiat. Front-Line wars, notably In zamblque conOict. lion? Capt Coetzce insists that It was nearly two years ago Rhodesia, Mozambique, and He recalls how when he vis· the lnkalha-gale payments that Capt Coetzee was panicked . He says the strategy, ited a fann run by the armr would have been approved at - by the Guardian's disclosure based on that used by the secu· outside the town of Phalaborwa cabinet level, almost certainly of a death-row confession by a rlty forces against Swapo, Is in the Northern Transvaal lo by De Klerk himself. fie says former security branch col­ one of undermining the ANC gel some supplies for viak- U1e security branch runs a "se· league - into revealing South and i:>oosling Its political oppo­ plaas. he found it wa~ a training curity fund" to pay agents and Africa's so-called "hit squad nents in order lo cheat It at camp for the Mo1.ambique civil finance covert operations. but scandal", with its disclosures least of overall political control war. "They had 170 Rena1110 such expenditure would about police and army assassi­ of the country. guys at that stage," he says. amount al most lo 20,000 rand a nation groups. Capt Coet1.ee offers a wealth "Now lhar President De Klerk month. Single payments of up In retrospect it can be seen of detail about kty personalities has given his oath that South to R\50,000, such as those made that the confession by Almond In the security establishment Africa will not attack Frelimo to lnkalha. would have Nofemcla - he Is still awaiting and their movements, as well as anymore. or permit raids into required the :tpproval of r .e execution for the unrelated his personal experience in the Mozambique, what do they do head or the security branch, murder of a white farmer - force. He points out, for exam· wiU1 all those trained Rcnamo Basic Smit. tore open what might be de­ pie, that Koevoet, the notorious guys? What does do "Basie would not authorise a scribed as the belly of the beast: police counter-Insurgency unit with all those renegade Ovam· thing like that without the per· It began the whistle-blowing In Namibia, was started by a bos? Whal do they do with all . sonal permission of the Com· process. culminating most Brigadier "Long" Hans Dreyer. those arms caches'" missioner of Police, General recently In the lnkatha-gnle who had been a regional seeu­ Capt Coetzee emphasises th;il Van der Merwe," the captain scandal, which is exposing the rlty branch commander In !he to understand the third fom~ says "And I can promise you regime of savagery and man­ lnkatha heartland of Natal. and the role of the security that in the present political cir. ipulation that for so long has Dreyer had created Koevoet branch in South Africa. rou cumstanccs. Van der Merwe underpinned Nationalist con­ with a.core of Zulus from Natal, ha~c to appreciate wha~ he dc· 1would not have the guts to have trol of the country. whom he later supplemented scn~~s ~s "the sccur'.'y cul· ;rnthorised it on his own: he has Since making his own ap­ with Ovambo tribesmen lure : t111s. 011ds expn;;siun. for 1 only nn<' i;uy to t.:o to, anti that pearance In this long-running, recruited In Namibia Itself. The example. 111 the donnnancc of ! is the rninistm-." scandalous tale, Capt Coetzee entire operation, Coetzee says, former security branchmen in ., As for the township violence, has been living a life of frus­ fell directly under the authority the police force as a whole. The Capt Coetzee ls less certain trated exile. Discredited by one of security headquarters In present Police Commissioner. I· about cabinet responsibility. al· South African judge during a Pretoria. General Johan Van der Merwe. though he is convinced that the commission of inquiry into the One of the senior officers In he points out, was previously strategy would have been hit squads, his credibility was J.{·oevoct, a Lieutenant Jean de head of the security branch. as agreed al the top. "Thev did not restored by another judge who Kock, was later lo become Capt were most of his predeccessors '! unban the ANC without dL'Cid· believed the captain's story as Coelzce's successor as com­ and most of the heads of the ing that they would be able to opposed to that of a police gen­ mander of the SC!Curity branch Crimi na I In vest i gat ion I· steer the course: the outcome or eral seeking to sue over Coct­ farm. "Vlakplaas", near Pre· llepartmcnt. the eventual elections, as in zee's allegations that he was a loria. which was used as a base Namibia," he says. They would professional poisoner. by police assassination squads. RICADE:H Jack Ouch- not necessarily be party to the Capt Coetzee has been surviv: "When they disbanded Koevoet ncr, Commissioner or "dirty work" on the ground - Ing on the charity of the Afrl­ [al U1e time of Independence)," Pulice in Chief Dutile- "they would not say, OK. we 'll ca n National Congress, the according to Coetzcc, "De Kock B lczi's homeland of slaughter people on the trains very people he had been trained went to Namibia with some of KwaZulu. is another security with AK-47s" - but they were to kill and on whose mercy he his men from Vlakplaas and branch veteran, according to prisoners of the generals where threw himself after Oeelng came back with truck-loads or Capt Coetzee. He rememl>crs carrying out the strategy was South Africa. From a succes­ Russian arms from Koevoet­ !he hrigadier as liaison officer concerned. sion of safe houses in Lusaka captured arms caches: unregis­ l>ctwcen Ian Smith's SL'Curity '"fhe security clique. the s•:c· and London - he survived an tered weapons, landmines, forces am! the South Afril:an urity culture, controls nol only assassination aUempt by con· SKSs (assault rifles). AK-47s, police duri11~ lhc llhotll!sian !he South African police forr.c. lemptuously refusing to open a and bullets by the million. They war. An.,r Hi'1rnl<'sia's inrll'pen· they also control the South parcel-bomb - he has been Im· also brought the core or Koe­ tlcnce lluch11l!r joinctl Capt African cabinet," he says. "The patiently watching the scandal voet and housed them in a tent Coctzcc in "S<'ctiun C" of sccu· mini~ters have lo depend 011 unfold, occaslonaly firing off village near Rustcnburg (in the rity hc;.dqu;:irlcrs in l'rctuna. their generals. What does Her· impassioned letters to South Af. Western Transvaal]." tlw .unit resp•msibl" ror con · manus Kricl [the new Minister rica's leaders, Including Presi· It is these men, using those duct . ~11i; the war against the of Law and Order with respon· dent F. W. de Klerk, begging to arms. who the captain believes ~NI. ;111d l',\C . " terrorists·. sibility for police) know' lie has be allowed home to help as an arc responsible for much of the I here. 1111· caplain ~ays. Huth· never been in a charge oflkc in informer. or investigator. township violence, including 11cr - pl«yed ~ key liaison role his life. except l}f'rhaps to lay a lnkatha-gate comes as little the random massacres that \\'1111 1111ltl:1ry 1ntelligc ~ 11n· i11 Ico mµl;'lint . Hr has to rely on - . ...•. •. \.-~ tn fhf'\ r:'lnl::ilt, u rho h"ve heen lhrealenlnE nc~ · 11l :11 11 H11,. 0....: .. 11 !11 !\l"ri1 ·:111 r :1 :t1" 1l1i s rlinue lilt ..:; rollf·11 l'iifllH' .. T Hl : l<:-ilJAY I AliCllSTl~J91 ¥ THEINDEPENDENT · ~ THE INDEPENDENT Saturday 3 August 1991 South African Townships still intelligence service '.built up Inkatha' butt of Inkatha

From Chris McGreal in Lusaka he said. As Umkhonlo kaShakit's strength grew. so Chief Buthclezi prn- SOUTH AFRICA.'l in1clligence p\a\'ed 1cs1ed ii was u tool or the government, warrior attacks a derisive role in huilding rhe crcdibiliry Boss 1h~n leaked copies of Umkhonto AT A red-brick community cenlre armoured vehicles sranding by of 1hc ma inll' Zulu lnkarha movemenr kaShaka 's hank accounts 10 lhe press. in lhis mosl inapproprialely From John Carlin when !he first shacks were burn I from irs incep1ion in 1974, according in hringin~ uown the organisation i1 had named area or Soweto, 170 refu­ in White City, Soweto on 19 July; he recalled having rried rhe fnrmer intelligence officer who im · promulcd and al the same time raising gees while away the day longing to 10 douse the names al one shack plemenrc:d the opcrarion. The intelli· Chid' Bu1hclezi's s1a1ure. Mr Dolinchek return to the squalid squaller set­ down homes, 1001 and kill, tar­ and being ordered to go away by gence service drew Zulu Chief said kec1)ing Chief Hlengwa in th~ dark tlement !hey call home bul unable getting ANC sympathisers; and policcmeo standing by; he re· Mangosuthu Buthelczi inro long·lerm was crucial because he was led 10 believe to do so because, lhey say, Inkatha the poLice stand idly by. called having complained ar a supporten backed by the police Human righls organisations an: meeting chaired bf'Mr Mn1ambo collahoraiion with rhe white regime . the h~ wns heing promoted as an al1erna1ive have established a reign of !error in possession of a sworn affidavil !WO days af1er that. officer, Marl in Dolinchek. claims. 10 the lnka1ha leader. Chief Bu1helezi 1here. by one man whose identity they do On the day a!1er Mr Tualo was The CIA panicipared on rhe fringes was aware of 1he plan. The firsl shacks were bum! nol wan! revealed yel who de­ altacked, 1he local organisation of rhe scheme, building Chief Al 1he same lime Chief Bulhclezi was down at Mshenguville on the scribed whal he saw al aboul Spm for the homeless, HOMHLE, pul Buihelezi's image among policymakers meeting regularly with Edward Fugill, nigh! of 19 July, a matter of hours on the night of 21 July. The story pressure on the police 10 raid Mr in the Uni1ed S1a1cs and securing funds the CIA slation chief in Durban. Ac­ after the South African goyern­ has been heard so often before it Motimbo's home, which lhey did. for him . cording 10 Mr Dolinchek, the CIA ment had admiued the security has almost become a clicM. There they found, according 10 In his first interview on !he operation loosely co.·operaled wi1h Boss in 1he police had paid mooey to lnkatha, The man said he saw some 25 HOMHLE workers who ac· since leaving !he now defunct Bureau of a rcvelalion which reinfo=d the people wearing red headbands ..,. companied the poLicc, one s1ra1egy, providing valuable promotion view in the townships that . the th1> Inkatha warriors' trademark Makarov pislol, two borne-made S1a1e Sccuriry (Boss), Martin Dolinchek for Chief Buthelezi abroad. state has spoosored the "black-Lice guns, spears. lead pipes and two said Chief Buthelezi's main rival was set Umkhonto kaShaka was buried wi1hin black" violeocc of the past year. armoured vehicle carrying spears, fuU pohcc uoitonns. Mr Mntambo up to challenge him and then deliber­ a year of its birth, but by 1hat time Chief Oo that veiy same night two clubs, knives and pangas (ma­ was arrested and within '24 hours a1ely brought down in order 10 promote Bu1helezi had already increased his col· , weeks ago was the first death - a chetes). They were dropped off released on J.500 Sou th African the Zulu leader as a force 10 be reckoned laboration with the intelligence services. ' well-known Mshenguville African oulside the l)ome of Mshengu­ rand (£300) bail wi1h . Al abou1 the same lime Chief "Boss established an office in Empan· National Congress (ANC) mem­ ville's Inkatha chief, a man called A Catholic pries!, who hap­ Bu1helezi began co-operation wilh Boss geni with the specific purpose or servic­ ber, a worker at an organisation Mntambo. They marched down a pened to arrive al the refugee-Lil­ 10 !he ext ent !ha! a scrambled telex line ing Chief Buthelezi's Inka1ha office in for the homeless, was hacked lo path singing war soogs and shortly tered White City coromuniry ce!'· death. Since then more than 30 thereafter lbe wi1ness - who was lre yesterday afternoon lo prepare was installed berween the intelligence (lhe KwaZulu capital) Ulundi. It only shacks have beeo burnt down and standing on ·a nearby mouod - for a funeral; wryly surveyed the service and the lnkatha leader's office. undertook any investigation of an intelli­ hundreds of people have fled - saw flames rise oul of 1he squatter scene. "It's the same old story - The aim or the strategy, drawn up by gence nature which emana1ed from most of them to relatives in camp. whatever De Klerk says. The po­ the Staie Security Council under Prime Chief Buthelezi's office," he said. Soweto i1sclf. The names of five Four days later the shack of lhe lice are working hand-in-band Minister John Vorster, was essentially The. telexes that passed across Mr people who have been lcilled are Mbatha family was burnt down. with lnlcatha. And just to add to the same as the policy to undermine the Dolinchek's desk ranged from requests known but the ·CXllct figure is Zanele Mbalha and her rwo-year­ a!J ·the usual evidence, now we ac· African National Congress exposed hy for assistance in dealing wi1h political thought by community Icade!'$ to old daughler Linda wen: alone in­ tuaUy have uniforms!" , ., 1he recenl revelations of secrel govern­ opponen1s anu 01her individuals 1ha1 be closer to 10. side at aboul 9pm when they • RIO DE JANEIRO - Nel­ The tales told by the refugees al heard some men oulside and then son Mandela, the ANC leader, menl funding or lnkarha. It cen1red on Chief Bu1helezi wanled in1elligence on White City yesterday offered a re­ saw that !heir home was on fin:. said on Thursday 1ha1 1he Soulh Chief Burhelezi's main poli1ical rival. 10 aspec1s or his personal security. minder that, for all the public Why did it happen? "It musl have African go.ve=enl could . DO Charles HJengwa, his number 1wo in the The 1it-r.. con1inucd af1cr Boss was scandals, all !he d:imning new dis­ been because my husband Yusi is lo ager be trusted and · 1old ii lo KwaZulu Territory Adminis1ru1ion and reorganised as the Na1ional Intelligence closures and tHen all the denials an ANC commiltee member at s1ep aside in frivour of an in1erim chief of Mbumbulu. Boss es1ablished an Service. When Mr Dolinchek lefl in 1981 by lhe government - nolably by lhe camp - aU the shacks they've governmeol or face lbe , end of office in Durban, and Manin Dolinchek afler working for Boss in. Durhan for F W de Klerk on Tuesday - of auacked have belonged to people lalks with his m ovemeo~ 'Reuter was delega1ed 10 help Chief Hlengwa nine years to panicipa1e in the South Al· allegations that lhe security forces who suppon lhe ANC." Did she rtports. "The ooly way to .a oon­ fo rm a rival 10 lnkatha, called rican governmcn1's disaslrous Seychelles had been involved in the township go 10 lhe police stalion? "Yes, but racial democracy in South Africa slaughter, the pattern or the vio­ they 10\d me !hey were 100 afraid is thal of an interim governJDenl. Umkhonlo kaShaka. coup plot, he said 1he rela1ionship be ­ lence has remained eerily un­ lo go lo Mshenguville." If de Klerk and bis regime are 001 "l ran Umkhon10 kaShaka on behalf iween the in1elligence service and 1he changed since it all -started in the That is whal the police !old prepared lo accepl this dema~ d of military intelligence and Boss. We lnka1ha leader was still strong. Johannesburg area a year·ago. Barry Twalo, who was stabbed they musl learn Ibero:can ·be no printed their membership cards, we Mr. Dolinchek was imprisoned in the lnkatha supporten arrive at a seven times by lnkalha auackers further discussion belWeeq lbOI!l bough! them a Volkswagen minibus, we Seychelles. Aller his release and return previously peaceful area; they on the nigh! after the Mbalhas and ourselves," Mr Mandela !old, ran their bank accounts. Hlengwa 's 10 South Africa. he Oed to Zambia threaten people, order them lo were forced cul of 1he camp. He a news conference on lhe f~ t ·day speeches arrived by telex from Pretoria," where he co-operated wi1h lhc ANC. join lnlcalha or leave; lhey burn recalled having seen !WO police of a visit lo Brazil. A32 SL 1\0,\\, JULY 28, l 1!91 . .. R 1 Tm: W,1s111:-;cT11:-< P1hr Pretoria Alleged to Have "Total .. , Strategy' to Undermine ANC

Eh David B. Ottawav W-1.: speech legalizing all antt­ rican military who are feeding his former South African army major on information Basson had ob­ apartheid groups and offering to organization with mfonnation and who ran a disinformation campaign tained. negotiate with them for a new non­ documents_ "There's quite a big ,1gainst the South West Africa Peo­ Questions put to Basson at his racial constitution. Basson said this. group in the Defer.se Force that's pli- ·, Organizatinn (SWAPOl during news conference Friday illustrated jnformauon came from high-ranking very disillusioned," he said. Namibia's 1989 independence elec- just how complicated the cloak-and­ army officers. He denied that he is part of an 110n has made new allegations that Disclosures of secret govern­ anti-military fsction of the govern­ the Pr<'loria government is using ·dagger game of disclosures-and ment but conceded that his allega­ similar tactics here to attempc to possible disinformation-has be­ ment funding for the staunchly anti­ undermine the African National come as local and foreign journalists ANC lnkatha Freedom Party of tions "fit the picture" of someone Congress and its allies_ seek to authenticate allegations Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi with an agenda of ousting the "se­ Nico Basson, a whistle-blower on such as his. One of the worries is and for its affiliated labor union was curocrats" in the cabinet. covert activities of the South Afri­ that some of the fonner police and only "a small part of the story," he As if to demonstrate that he is can military, charged at a news con­ army security operatives who "tell added. not anti-military, Basson said he ~reMe h ~9 all" about their covert activities According to Basson, ® Klerk'h does not believe the allegations of a rt:derik W. de Klerk and his cab­ may be •plants." According to local grand strategy for the •new Sout fonner Special Forces member, inet had out together "a rural srrat.:. press reports, the government is Africa• involves an attempt to put Mozambican-born Felix Ndimene, egy." modeled on the Namibian engaged in its own campaign to dis­ together an alliance including who told the pro-ANC New Nation campaign to discredit the ANC \l!e the lridlari ffilXed-raced newspaper last week that he had credit d~ractors. lrikatha, and cnuntry·~ main anti-apartheid heard some of his fellow soldiers For example, Basson was asked COIOred parties now part1c1patmg m group. Their aim. he said, was to discussing their involvement in about his .sexual preferences and the wfute"dOlliinated Parliament, build an alternative moderate alli­ massacres carried out last year on why he was operating from such a alid.oTet anti=ANC pO!itical groups. £\ce ·so they can eventually win Iriclu would be parties in the commuter trains between Johan­ electtons m the future" non-racial luxurious home in the northern sub­ homelands, the 10 black tribal areas nesburg and the black township of government that constitutional ne­ urb of Dunkeld West where the set up under the apartheid system Soweto. gotiations are expected ·to create. press conference was held. Other of racial separation and nominally He said the soldier's allegations Basson is .the latest of a growing reporters wanted to know whether number of disaffected South African independent of South African con: were "hearsay" and added, ·rm not he was acting secretly on behalf of trol. supporting Ndimene on this"-even mH1tary officers. many from covert elements in the cabinet seeking to De Klerk also has been courting though Basson's Soldiers of Peacf and counter-insurgency units, to force out the "securocrats," namely the vote of the conservative African organization has sent Ndimene out make allegations of past and pres­ Defense Minister Magnus Malan churches. to which millions of of the country for safekeeping. ent secret operations to subvert, and Law and Order Minister assassinate and discredit the gov­ blacks belong, in a bid to draw off Basson hedged his answers tc Adriaan Vlok. questions about whether he thougb1 ernment's 0111><>nents. Basson, in Basson, a media specialist, said enough of the black vote from the ANC to get a majority for such an secret army security operative: fact . has established a watchdog he was assigned by army intelli­ ·organization. Soldiers of Peace,..that alliance_ were directly involved in the town gence in early 1989 to map out and i; s..-ekmR to persuade other mem­ Basson, 35, said he decided sev­ ship Violence wracking South Afri implement a media strategy against bers ni the defense establishment eral months ago to go public and ca, saying, •Maybe they are not d1 SWAPO. He said it was part of an 10 come iorward with testimony and expose covert military security ac­ rectly involved but they create thi documents to expose these alleged overall covert plan code-named Op­ tivities here and in Namibia after he violence, they stir it." activities. eration Agree, whose objective was reached a $45,000 out-of-court set­ As for allegations he had mad• The recent avalanche of allega- to help the moderate Democratic tlement with the anny over back earlier that the anny was supplyin; 11on:; has had the effect of forcing the Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) win the wages. arms to lnkatha, Basson repliec government to admit to a wide va­ election partly by discrediting "The only reason why we're do­ "People told me they are supplyin. net y of .:overt activities and, thus, SWAPO. ing this is we want to clean up the to lnkatha, but I don't have any d: throwing de Klerk onto the defen­ He held up a printout of Tum­ government," Basson said, refer­ reel proof of that." s1v,._ 1arn1shing his reputation as a halle's 1989 election campaign bud­ ring to his Soldiers of Peace watch­ Replies such as this have helpe sinceri> reiormer and raising doubts : get, which amounted to almost dog group. "We don't want to topple confuse the search for the trut about his methnds and ob~ctives . · $25.6 million. Of that, he said, the F.W. (de Klerk}. I think we want to here about the real extent of sect Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha South African government had pro­ strengthen F.W. so he can clean up rity force involvement in the vi< disclosed Thursday that the govern­ vided $22_8 million; in addition lo his cabinet. It's wrong to use secret lence and the government's cove1 ment had spent "well over" $35 mil­ "massive logistical support." funds to back the political agenda of activities on behalf of its potenti. allies and against the ANC. lion to bolster seven parties oppos­ The operation eventually failed, a certain group." ing SWAPO in Namibia's indepen­ but Turnhal!e made a surprisingly Basson said he is not an ANC Basson himself said in an earlit dence election. SWAPO, an anti­ strong showing. SWAPO won only member but supports its call for an interview that he is treating wit of former guer­ 57 percent of the vote, well under interim government to oversee a extreme caution the allegations of rillas. won the election but by a far the two-thirds majority needed to transitional period 'letween consti­ former member of the anny's no\ narrower margin of victory than give it a free hand to rewrite the tutional negotiations and elections defunct Civil Cooperation Bure; many had anticipated. Namibia constitution. for a majority government. who had approached Basson with ii gained its independence from South The government and military "How can the government run formation about the secret agency Africa in March 1990. made an after-election assessment the transitional phase when they activities in Namibia and told hi of Operation Agree and then drew It is believed that ·Botha went are supplying massive funds and he was responsible for four mu up a "whole strategy about the new public with the disclosure because state resources for the political de rs. South Africa" to deal with the ANC agenda of the [ruling] National Par­ Basson said be was not yet soi the government suspected that the and its allies here, Basson said. Ac­ Weekly Mail and other publications ty and its allies?" he said. whether the man was a securi· cordmfe to Basson this was done_ Basson said he is in contact with "plant" sent to discredit him by pr· even fore de Klerk 's Fehrnary 40 active members of the South Af- viding information that would lat• WASHINGTON POST, 24 July 1991 NEW YORK TIMES South Africa1 s Secret-funding ~candal 25 July 1991 Challenges Credibility of de l(lerk~ Covert Action

ibility is at stake seems widely the reports said. on the Rise By David B. Ottaway shared across the political spec­ The total amount given to the W1;~on POOlt Foreica Scrvic.:c trum. The president met Monday ·account over the last five years was UnderdeKlerk JOHANNESBURG. July 23-A and today with his cabinet to dis­ put at 1.5 billion rand ($526 mil­ storm of protest over secret gov­ cuss how to react to uie scandal. lion), with a steady growth in the budget from 29.5 million rand By CHRISTOPHER S, WREN ernment funding for Chief Mango­ De Klerk refused to say tonight Spec1•~U1T-...N

Allister Sparks A POLITICAL storm hugely image. Now he has com­ nesburg another soldier - the the ANC, · which the unit's damaging to the credibility of pounded that with a denial that second in a month - claimed he white commander described as both President F. W. de Klerk puts his credibility. further in had inside knowledge of mili­ 'still the enemy'. tary involvement in the town­ and Chief Mangosuthu Buthe­ question. While the govern­ His alle~tioris came a month lezi has erupted here with the ment has publicly admitted the ship violence. after a -Rtired white officer disclosure that the security payments, Buthelezi declared: A report by the 's Major Nico Basson, told report~ police secretly funded the Inka­ . 'I swear before the Lord God Repression Monitoring Group ers he had been involved in a tha Freedom Party to boost it as that I am not aware of the police reveals that the level of violence military campaign to destabilise a rival to the African National ever depositing money into an in Natal has continued to esca­ Swapo before Namibia's inde­ Congress. · Inkatha account.' late since Buthelezi's high-pro­ pendence elections in 1989, and There have been calls for Yet a letter written by Briga­ file peace meeting with Mandela that a similar operation was now Buthelezi's resignation and the dier J. A. Steyn, deputy last January - and that 'more being 'conducted against the dismissal of the two Security regional chief of the security and more allegations of the ANC in South Africa. Ministers, Adriaan Vlok and police in Natal, which is in the security forces playing a pro­ Magnus· Malan. But most seri­ possession of the Weekly Mail vocative role' have been The impression is inescapable ous of all is the damage to De newspaper, which broke the received. that while the De Klerk govern­ Klerk's image as 'Mr Clean', scandal, declares: 'Chief Buthe­ Police and military units were ment is dismantling apartheid the 'man of integrity', as Nelson lezi was very emotional when a accused of repeatedly failing to and preparing to negotiate a Mandela called him, whose copy of the receipt was given to intervene when Inkatha impis, new non-racial constitution for honesty was seen as crucial to him. He could not say thank or regiments, attacked ANC South Africa, it is following a the negotiations. you enough.' settlements. The latest of these 'double agenda'. It is simulta­ Now it appears he knew Although the government has allegations came last Monday, neously conducting a campaign about, and approved, an act of admitted paying a total of when witnesses described how to destabilise the ANC and political double-dealing and the 250,000 rands (£55,000) to police stood by and watched build Inkatha into a strong alli­ gross abuse of public funds. Inkatha and its trade union arm, while 300 armed Inkatha men ance partner for the National Asked in parliament last May Uwusa, the explanation given attacked residents in Boipa­ Party when the country's first whether the police were fund­ by Law and Order Minister thong township, 35 miles south post-apartheid elections are ing Inkatha, De ~!erk replied Adriaan Vlok is hardly less dis­ of Johannesburg, then escorted held. that to answer such. a question ingenious than Buthelezi's them back to their hostel. wo.uld be to. . 'defeat the legal denial. The aid was 'non-party­ In addition to this passive There is open talk in National protection oLsecurity informa­ political', Vlok said. The money connivance, the Black Sash Party circles that the leadership tion'. That evasion now looks as was drawn from 'funds ear­ reports a number of allegations believes it can build a winning . though was aware of what was marked by the government for · of direct attacks on ANC sup­ alliance with Inkatha and vari- · going on and was party to a cov­ combating sanctions'. . · porters by police· and troops ous conservative black religious er-up. The damage to these key wearing Balaclavas to hide their groups, and so keep the ANC The damage to his credibility political figures aside, the dis­ identities. out of power. is bound to strain his relation­ closure of the payments to Inka­ The soldier, Sergeant Felix But in its excessive zeal and ship with Mandela, whose trust tha also tends to substantiate Ndimene, said members of a with its seemingly irrepressible in him was in any case begin­ months of allegations that the special services unit he had instinct for political trickery, it ning to wear thin, and put the security forces hl\Ve been served in, called Five Reece, may have achieved the oppo­ whole negotiating process in involved in the black violence had carried out a massacre of26 that has wracked the country. site, and driven a nail in Buthe­ jeopardy. As the angry ANC passengers in a Soweto-bound lezi's coffin. leader said at Johannesburg air­ Police. and the defence force train last September. The train port before leaving for a tour of have vehemently denied this, massacre, one of the most noto­ Latin America: 'This puts us on but now·the credibility of those rious killings of the political a collision course. If the govern­ denials is blown. Significantly, even as the disclosure of the conflict, set off a wave of fight­ ment continues with its criminal clandestine funding was made ing between ANC and Inkatha operations, it is doubtful that a there were new allegations of supporters that raged for complete breakdown in rela­ -police and army involvement in months in the townships around tions can be avoided.' the fighting between Inkatha Johannesburg. The damage to Buthelezi is ·and ANC supporters. Ndimene said black col­ even greater. To have accepted Monitoring groups reported leagues in the commando unit money from the hated security an increase in allegations of who had taken part in the oper­ police, who have detained and police connivance on the side of ation told how they had been wnured thousands of blacks, Inkatha in the continuing vio­ instructed to kill passengers in mt.:st be fatal to his political lence in Natal, while in Johan- the train as part of a war against Tuesday ~ii July l::i:il 19 July 1991 ¥ THE INDEPENDENT Army 'involved Inkatha funding in township 'was authorised by De Klerk' !'RESIDENT F W de Klerk sign­ train massacre' ed un uudir authorising the trans· From Chris McGreal fer of state funds to the ANC's in Johannesburg ON 14 September la.st year Nelson' the Alexandra hostel& with AK· main opponent, the lnkatha Free­ Mandela declared that indiscrimi· From John Carlin 47s," he said, adding thal mem· dom Party, South Africa's audi· has indicated. We audit those nate attack.I on black people were in Johannesburg be rs or One, Two and Three Com• the work of highly professio nal mandos of Five Reece were still tor-general has disclosed. funds, and our reporting is sub· and well·trained killers. "We are South African languages, and with operating out or Johannesburg Peter Wronsley said at leas! milted lo ... the Minister of Fi­ not dealing with amateurs," he non·Sourh African features, have and Pretoria. . · four cabinet ministers knew In· nance in consultation with the •nid. The Jay before, 13 Septem• been seen 01 the scenes of killinas, · Mr Ndimene's credibility will bcr. 26 people wore mussacrcd on os well o• in.idc the single ·men's no doubt be: q ucallonod by tho k.atha was being helped from a State President and myself," Mr a Soweto·bound train . hostels where lnkatho have had SADP, but mllltary expelU uy tho slush fund In a scandal already Wronsley said. Felix Isa ias Ndimenc, a former their Johannesburg strongholds. Interview revealed convincing ·dubbed "lnk.athagatc" in South President de Klerk was un· South African army sergeant, said A number of former South AI· knowledge of the workings or Five yesterday that the attack was in· rican Defence Force officers have Reece. He al&o gave the names of Africa. The revelation threw Into available for comment, but a deed the work of state·hired assas· been saying tha1 the violence in u colonel, a commandant and a confusion government efforts to spokesman said he was unsure if si ns: One Commando of Five Re· the black townships of the last sergeant-major who delivered the contain the crisis as the cabinet the President knew at the time the connaissance Regiment, crack year, in which more than i,ooo weekly "political meetings", and went into a three-day session at a funds were traiiUerred. "Hell, It's troops of "Special Forces", the people have died in the Johannes­ the names of six soldiers who took operational arm of Souih Africa's burg area alone, has been orches· part in the train massacre. secret location in the northern very difficult to say. I think we Direc1ora1e of Military lntelli· 1ra1ed by Military Intelligence, As iJ well known to militlll)' ex· Transvaal. should pose him that specific gen.cc. with Special Forces doing the perts, and Mr Nclimene con­ Chier Mangosuthu Burhelezi, question. 'When did be know, etc.• ''They to ld us we are not here 10 killings. firmed, Five Reece is a multi-na­ lnk.atha's leader, continued to Unfortunately he's not here. I'm a defend the government. We are The same officers had sug· tional - effectively mercenary - here 10 defend . the s1a1e." This gesled 1ha1 "Five Reece", nolori· regiment. He said that amdng the describe suggestions that he knew bit hesitant to say when exactly he meant doing ba1tle against the ous in the 1980s for their counter­ nationalities represented by the or the funding of his organisation knew," he said. ANC and siding with lnl

recruited 11s an informer by the rvilice Special Brunch in 1977. His ~ ' ~• k led 10 This is an Inkatha mob vurious arrests of underground ANC operatives. He claims that in the mid· 1980s his Special Branch handler gave on the move. They are the ao·ahead to a military Intelligence man, a Sergeant Grobler, to take over his charge on a sallll)' of 750 Rand the gTeatest threat to (£160) a mon1h. He WM living in Dur· ban 01 the time. The statement 54/d that in 1986 Sgt Grobler referred the ANC. Who is behind Mandia to a securiiy branch officer In. Pietermaritzburg - the capltaJ.of Na· tal - by the name of Werber and that them? John Carlin in Warner asked him to track and eventu· ally kill n politically active black school teacher. Mandia claims he was given a Durban investigates hired rar and a gun but he failed to carry out his mission. l'1 )II UfflJI. ;1110 1·u1h· 2.11011 poli11cal killi ngs in the Mandia said he moved back to Dur· k_·,..; .'!illl' 'CCU f![V mil· wwnships since lasi Ju ly be ing ban where he rook up full·time employ· \·h1n. L' 1, pl;1~ing ;1 t.lc'Cl.t ru c:1urc ._.,·11 c\· 1I J'-,,.ll I. which receive' massive groups: . valved in the assassination - which from has been provided back in spreading from the 1op decisinn·ma k- 'l. \. r\.·1 ltt ndt11i: from ll H' gov1;rnrn!.!nl. • 10 convey 1he no 11 on 10 blacks, took place on the night of 25 Februlll)' Natal, from where, according 10 ing body, the Slate Securi1x Council, 1u , ; \. 111\.·11h thL stale hav1,: . ilS par! 10 whites and 10 1he interna· ,, · 1 11l~n as Chief Maphumulo was arriving evidence gathered from affida· every region and town , Parlia men1 was •I ihl'lf rr11~ r 11nlmC . dc:liherillely Or· 1ional community 1h a1 Sou1h home in his Mercedes car - bur he African blacks cannol be 1rust· vits and witnesses, members of almost irreleva nt. h·,1r :nn! Ihl· t11wnship vi1..1!en~· c of 1hc identified four men who participated a notorious criminal gang have The power base of F W Jc Klcrk, 1,1 ,.l·,1r In 1h1.: townsh ips of Joh:rn ncs· eel 10 run a government. and said he was present when Wnrb~r AJI of 1hese objectives ha ve been shipped up to Johannes· however, is the National Party unJ his ·- . 11~ ,,nJ ,'\,,1;11, c .I K~l people h;1ve been gave them guns to carry out the mis· burg to fight fim moves on coming to powe r las1 1n a significanl degree been, met ., rl: \.~d Ill ] hill {lllh: . sion. "Sgi Grob/er thanked us for the It has been established that year indicated a willingness 10 rc s1orc ! t1\.· SPulll i\!m:;..i n polil'l' havl· ht.:cn in 1he paSI year, ANC ofl1c1als · h;1ving hecn ob liged to.ponder job done and he gave each of us RS,000 the gang, the AmaSinyoras, arc . , parliamentary rule and dishand Secur- ·• . 11 .i l\c1111pl1(l'' in thl' 'ilrilll!_b'Y· whil'h cash," the statement said, lnkatha members; that they ocrat slruclures. Bui th e evidence is . 1() lives, or the two AK-47 attacks on wi1hin [)M/ disguise 1he ir ac1iv· 1989, identified himself ns an revelations of the existence of SADF funernl vigils where the victims were SADF instructor, It has no t hit squads operating wilhin 1he DMI ities, employing high ly train~d associated with lhe ANC In most Cllscs been established whether the machine. More significantly, 25 per "projec1 officers", experts in the altackers were identified as Zulus AmaSinyoras have collectively cent of the Defence Force huuge 1 - ·or Winni ng Hearts µnd Minds (W HAM) coun1er·in su rgency who spoke with the Natal, and not lhe recc:ived military training, but ii R5U0m - goes inw a secrcl "spcci;i l 1hcory, whu opcru1e on .a Johannesburg, dialect and accent. has been widely alleged that defence accoun t" to lund 1he comp kx Such voices were heard when, on 27 other Inkalha supponers ha ve . military intelligence s1ructure . "need-10-know basis ·· - 1he1r Former SADF officers, politi· Whal has been es ta blished is 1h a1 superiors 1cll 1hem 1he bare March this year, gunmen attacked a fu· neral vigil in Alexandra township, on cians, trade unionists and jour· there are tensions wi thin the SADF hc- minimum abou1 the s1ra 1eg1c nalists have identified 1hc !ween s1raigh1forward, prolc>- mak ing links lo 1he tha1 1he SADF trnincd 200 1.·11 hir11.:1 hct w1..'l' 11 the 111ili1ar i:-. 1s. wh t1 1op ;ilmoers. public in statements 10 la wyers di culous a11y sugges1ion thal 1he ""'''is the clefence budget is 1hc secur ity forc es, has been al by Jnkathn member.; and con· call ing lh< lnkulh a lune . Bui 1cnsi\lns w 11 r wilh 1he ANC and i1s allies firmed by a former operntive of exisl wi 1h in Jnkalha, generu1ed hy lhc devo ted to intelligence si nce 1986, a1 1hc cost of some a SADF hit squad, perce ption among 1he struigh1 pulili· S 000 livc1, It ia from here th• t 1hc so-cu lled "black-on·black" violence But perhaps the 11ronaest indication ciuns thal people in th eir mius1 arc be- n u 1~1 pO \\ ' \.•r f~ I p111ili~1tl rivul .iti ini:e lhi.: ef o connection berwcen the state und Ing u~ed hy tho At•I• to pu rsu e ·un , 11 · ~;i1 11 ~a1 111n w;1:i. 1111hanncd IX months wus "exported " to lhe Johanne1bura lnka1ha is evidence that 5ecret slule ugenda not necessarily in the l><:sl lung· arcu lusl Jul y. The collusion between .l ~ ! I funds have been used to finance Chief 1crm Interests or the party, • Thl' 111v i.:s1 iy111i1ln irwolvud ~lozcns o( Jnku1hu •nd the police Is not •l ISlue Buthclezl'1 Zulus, The ollegatlon, ulbe· 11 Is widely hel leved 1hu1 this w11s •tu ..:rv i!.!ws ln JohunncKhu r", Cupu h•r• - ii I• lncontrovertlble, Whut /1 al I.s ue is the que1tlon of wheihor the re It implicit, cmcr~eu in pnrliumcnt this wh;11 leu lnkalha's f\l rmc·r gcn crn l- s,-r· 1 1 11 ~ 11 11nd Durhan wi th former SADF ycur when u Democrutlc l'urly Ml'. ,,:iury llllll numl1'·r IWll Ill c111,-f is 11 ,truclurcu politic11/ agenda hehlnd ,,1·111.·i,.'r .... . n11 li1Hrv cxpcns. mcmhcr:-; l)( Kohus Joruaun, ucclureu th ul he hull lluthdczi, Osc-ar i)h h11 1u 1, '" 'I"'' p.11 1!11mc111. lnk;llh'.1 uffi.ci;ils_. ANC 1.l~· 1his collusion, M11ch may be inferred hy common . information the state was giving help to lnkatha a y~ar ago. 11 1.·i ;d ~. 1rn d 1,,· unio111s1s. lldl- 111111! mon1 · "a political party in one qf the self- Al DMJ 1he only difference 1hey sc11~c. Roy Ainslie, a Dcm~x.· ru1u,: ~~uty 11 11" :n1d ,.i,·tim,. 11f 1hc \' inknn•. In governing homelands", He mode ii perce ive between 1he De KJcrk u11u 1hc 1:ll1'l l'il)C :i. they spoke 011 ~on~ition Of Ml', is Rn111zed hy the conmtcn1,fuilur,c of 1h c police to defend township res1· clear It WM lnkatha he had in mind, Botha erus is thut the enemy, 1he "cum- .l!H 11wmil), fcH ring for 1h~1r livc:s. President de Klerk responded that he munis1"' ANC, is now within 1he coun - On< whn hii s reccive J death thrcrk fnr tlwm . He has :dkgcu that the Front, emerged as a threat to the sla · ANC succeed despite everything in 'lilll' l:O. rundinb ln ku tllil and training its oh 1a ined by The /11depe11dcn1 on Sun· clui· last week made by a black man who bility of the state, while the pro·ANC taking power through elections, a te rr i· mcn1hc·r>. .ind subtlv fanning the town· trade union grouping, Cosatu, was fying conlingency plan exists: thu1 says he is an employe~ of military in tel· ,J 1ip ,.i,1lc 1"''" Other former SADF tif­ gaining a foOll)old in the .workplace, thousands o( highly rrain~d men in lin:r~ an tJ i11.·11c1t!mics whc~ s1udy th.e Jigcnce. supports claims. o.f n connec· 1ion. For legal reasons. h1s 1dent1ty may The time was ripe for counter-revolu· Special Forces, togeth_er wuh lnka tha <; 1\D F h;i,·c •11nfirmed Ma1ur lla..son s tion, Besides, under the former presi· . _ and lhe KwaZulu police, will be in u .dl q!Hlions. . . not he made public. In 1he st 11 1emen1 , the man - whom dent, PW Botha, the ~ovemmeni w~: . ' · posilion to render an ANC government Th,- evidc' nl'C roin1s tn n ca mp;ugn dominated by the military, · utterly ineffective or to overthrow 11. ,,f pnl1t 1c:al persuasion on •II fronts, the we shall call Mandia - says he was Tuesday 23 July 1991 " ~THE INDEPENDENT FOREIGN NEWS · - --~· - · -· · · ·-···- - · -- · -· ------~-- -· - ·- --. --- · - · - . · - · ··· ..•.. ·-··-. --:--~ : · •-:• · .... ··-·· - · 11 A desire to undermine the AN C has led !J1embers of the security fore es into a sinister alliance with Inkatha South Africa's 'partners in crime' kill to keep control ('I llt.:F M:1111!11.,uthu Hu1hl.'k 1.11ir.;, fl:)!u l;.ir \'isi· hlr 111 th\' Whi1..: I f1lll"4.' lllhl Ill J)11w11 i n~ SlrL'L' I . Pl'etoria last week admitted that it has funded the Zulu Wh"'' " l),111ttl;111 I furJ \'i11111.'. tl S1H11h ·"·rri ~ · u n,•. ,·l·111lv, lh' 1n:H"·~ I ; h:m~ hi N:11 ;1/ 111 "'"ii him. movement Jed by Chief Buthelezi. But money is not the S11uii1 .i\/rn:..in ~uv1.· rn1111.•111 min isti:r!rl rnai:i1c: his ·Chris1ioin principlc1". South A.rricun whircK only link between Inkatha and the South African state. lldigh1 in his •llvoc••'Y nr free marke1 cconnm· In a special investigation, John Carlin discovers that il' '.( and _mulli·pany dcnmcrary. They M!C hi~ Jnk111ht1 movt:m'-'nl. whk•h they hclic v1.· ;,, !C up· their collaboration involves murder, torture and abduction purled by .dx mill ilin lululii, il.'i u nux.Jcrn tc: hlock countcrweighl In Nelson Mo nJcla and are ddending lnkatha nnd then when we get ANC. his senior wh ite officers delivered 1hc African Nutionol Congre~<. which Ihe y •cc urre"cll we can produce these cards to confirm weekly political instruction lo the regimen I "' un1rusrwor1hv. viulenl onll commun i•I. 1hK1 we arc members of lnkatha. We arc then telling them thal !nkalha wu the ir ally anJ In privKle PrtsiJenl f W Ile Klcrk. who hu rclcosed." Bheki said the KwaZulu police of· Buthelezi wu Mman to be trwled. The ANC ne ver cri1iciscd Jnku1h;i for ii• involvement in rcred more lhun immunity from prosecution. wu still regarded u lhe enemy. 1he 1ownship violence of 1hc pas1ycar . ha• said Off·du1y policemen joined raids against ANC More evidence emerged last week of links he •ccs Jnkoth• as 11 valuable pul i1icul ully. His •uppor1crs 11 nd two senior lnkatha members; . between the South African sl1le and the war in N;11iun11I Par1y is pl11nni11g, uccnrding In reli· Shozi and Thom•s Tsh•b•lula, gave them Natal when Jocques van der Merwe, a former ;1 lllc l'tJUrcc:s. h1 tllll:r 1hc: fiu1 p<1.11il •Upur1hcid tiuns. - member or the Civil Ccropcration Bureou «kl'lions in ;1cn :llili<:d 1011 ycu No1ionali!I hope is thu1 Jnkatha will deliver Natal - ANC killers sre arrelled with un· and has since been closed down. sufficicn1 black vote" 10 ob1ain Iheir poli1ical canny sp<:ed - but we found occulons when Mr Yan der Mcrwc said lhal he 1ook part in o>hjec1ive - re1cn1ion orwhi1e polilical conlrol the police joined in the murders. A man called the hil·squad killings - "laking ou1", he c•lled 'We were in 1hc "new South Africa' '. Sipho Madlula, who has been in hiding for the ii - of four people in Namibia during 1989. !-le Thus 1.. 1 week" admission by lhc Soulh Ar· lilSI IWO months, soid in an interview thnl he identified the omcer who "handled" him as u rican govcrnmen1 lh•l lnka1ha hud been re- hnd worked for military intelligence in Natal, colonel. Mr Van der Merwe lefJ the CCB last told just cciving iOcrcl fundina from 1hc police - "10 lhal he hsd been seconded 10 the security po· year but he said that the colonel had ap· promote mbiliry" - came as no gre.i •ur· lice ond lhal he had taken pan In hit-squad proached him and offered him "work" in Ne · pri•c. Since 1hc wor in Nml be1wecn lhc ANC killings of senior ANC official&. Jal. He declined the offer, but rhe colonel has to attack .1ru 1r"n ~c~ins in N:11 :i l ·· 1h,• power- · A~uin lh< government culled ii "black-On· of bucking the rivuls or ii. enemies. In Numihio l•:oSl' uf lnka1h:1. KwaZulu , 1hc palchwPrk .,r hl:i•·k" violence. They.called it u 50-50 power the fsvourcd pulitlcal grouping was the Demo· Sipho - ht ""'uld not rlvt his ruli name - said ht was on• of la nd wh rch fo rms lh< Zulu hnmclanll wi1hin wuggle ~elwecn lnkalha and the ANC. The cnitic Tumhalle Alliance, lhe rlvol lo Swapo. unral youn1r men ~m rural .\1:01:1 1. is onc ur 1hc 10 block "homclonds" ere· im preso

PRETORIA'S SECRET WAR AGAINST THE ANC

In the past month, new evidence has verified the ANC's long-standing charge that the South African government is playing a central role in instigating and orchestrating political conflict. Through the perpetuation of this conflict, the government hopes t o weaken the ANC, to promote rival black organizations more likely to enter into an electoral alliance with the National Party, and, ultimately, to extend white political control beyond the abolition of apartheid laws.

Covert political contributions Nine days after Bush lifted sanctions, Johannesburg's Weekly !1ail published details of secret South African government payments to Chief Buthelezi's . Through the security police, Pretoria gave nearly $100,000 to Inkatha to finance two rallies in late 1989 and early 1990. The money was intended to increase the visibility of Inkatha's anti-sanctions stance and to enhance its ability to compete with the ANC. More recently, Martin Dolinchek, a former South African intelligence officer, revealed that the defunct played an integral ~ole in promoting Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi from the party's inception in the mid-1970s. The government also donated $525,000 over five years to build up the Inkatha­ aligned United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) as a rival to the more popular Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). UWUSA's formation was accompanied by a series of at tacks on COS ATU members. According to press reports, some of the government money was used to hire vigilantes to intimidate other union activists. The grants to Inkatha and UWUSA came out of a special "Secret Services Account", set up in 1978 to finance political "dirty tricks." Over the past five years, the government has channeled more than $500 million through the slush fund to a variety of sympathetic groups. The recipients of most of this money remain unidentified. Although President de Klerk tried to distance himself from the scandal, he is clearly implicated. He was among the top government officials who signed documents authorizing the payments. Moreover, government expenditures on secret proJects increased significantly under his administration as Pretoria pursued a duplicitous policy of negotiating publicly with the ANC while waging a clandestine war against it.

Beyond propaganda: The securi.!..Y__fQr~~~_j_l}_!:_~A.?.H. Y._t_ h~ __ yj_o~-~n-ce The South African security forces are integral to this secret war. Even before President Bush announced the premature termination of most sanctions, township residents and independent monitoring groups had repeatedly accused the military and police of routinely siding with vigilantes or Inkatha members in attacks on political oppone nts. Major Nico Basson and other defectors from the South African intelligence ser vices have stated that the South African government has provided arms and training to Inkatha in an effort to intensify the violence. Pretoria has consistently denied these reports, insisting that it has only trained Inkatha members to act as b~dyguards for party officials. In early August, however, former Inkatha members told the Weekly !1ail that they were trained by the SADF in urban and guerrilla warfare. They were later directed to assassinate anti-apartheid activists. Military personnel also appear to have been directly involved in instigating attacks, often in the guise of Inkatha supporters. A former SADF sergeant recently revealed that members of the notorious Five Reconnaissance Regiment ( 5 Reece) had executed several indiscriminate attacks on township residents, including last September's assault on a Soweto commuter train which left 26 dead and 137 wounded. Five Reece carried out a number of cross-border raids against exiled ANC acti vi sts in the 1980s. It is one of a number of brutal and semi-clandestine units for me rly deployed in South Africa's war of destabilization against the Front Line States. According to Captain Dirk Coetzee, the former security branch officer who blew the whistle on government-sponsored death squads two years ago, these returning troops, in a loose affiliation with the "dirty tricks" departments of the SADF and police, make up the core of a "third force" working to demoralize its opponents and to obstruct negotiations.

De Klerk 's ·~total strategy" Some •observers--including President Bush--insist that President de Klerk is committed to genuine ,reform and democracy . They argue that he is trying to stop the violence so that it will not scuttle negotiations. Others, like former insiders Nico Basson and Dirk Coetzee, claim that the violence and the government's attempts to promote "moderate" black leaders are essential components of a sophisticated "total strategy , " designed to protect the long-term interests of South Africa's white minority. De Klerk' s earlier (and now virtually forgotten) position in the conservative wing of the National Party, and his decision to retain all of the major cabinet ministers from the Botha administration, support the view that he has undergone a change ~of style , rather than a change of heart. He remains dedicated to defending white privilege, but he is shrewd enough to realize that, to do so, he must accommodate some black demands. By making concessions on a range of political issues , he hopes to defuse or to suppress economic demands which more directly threaten white interests . According to Basson, the de Klerk government and the military formulated their strategy for a "new" South Africa in late 1989, shortly after de Klerk came to power and before he announced the first wave of reforms. This planning was based on an assessment of "Operation Agree," South Africa's $35 million covert initiative to promote the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) over the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia's 1989 independence elections. The resulting strategy envisions the creation of an electoral alliance--including Inkatha and an array of smaller black, "coloured," and Indian political parties--in which the National Party would be the most influential (but probably least visible) member. However, in order for such a coalition to win a non-racial general election, the government must weaken its leading opponent, the ANC. The continuing violence furthers this objective by intimidating political activists, encouraging ethnic divisions, and discrediting black leadership. These revelations contradict de Klerk's professions of good faith and demonstrate that his government cannot be trusted to play a neutral role in the process of reform. If de Klerk is genuinely committed to democratization, he must negotiate with the ANC and other popular organizations to form an interim government capable of overseeing the drafting and implementation of a new constitution.

Present U.S. poli~ In his eagerness to reward de Klerk, President Bush prematurely lifted the sanctions imposed by Congress under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA) on July 10. These included the ban on new U.S. loans to and investment in South Africa, trade restrictions , and the withdrawal of landing rights for South African air lines . However, several key sanctions , independent of the CAAA, remain in effect:

* A ban on U.S. support for the extension of International Monetary Fund credit facilities to "any country engaging in apartheid," except in certain limited circumstances.

* A ban on Export-Import Bank financing for: a) any export which contributes to the maintenance of apartheid, b) any export to the South African government until the President certifies that significant progress has been made toward the elimination of apartheid, and c) any export to other South African purchasers which have not implemented specified fair employment practices. (An exemption, contained in the CAAA, is still in effect for black-owned South African businesses.)

* A ban on all exports to the South African police and military. (The Export Administration Act, to which this measure was attached, expired at the end of 1990 . It has been extended by Executive Order, pending Congressional action on a new law. The South African-related provisions of the act needed to be extended by the President each year.)

* A ban on arms trade with South Africa.

* A ban on cooperation or intelligence-sharing between U.S. and South African intelligence agencies.

In addition, many state, county, and municipal governments have imposed their own restrictions on transactions with companies doing business in South Africa. These were not directly affected by the President's move, although the administration hinted that it may initiate legal action to nullify local sanctions.

August 19 , 1991