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Dear Friend, August 26. 1991 I Am Writing to U Rge You to R

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Dear Friend, August 26. 1991 I Am Writing to U Rge You to R THE WASHrNG T ON OFFI C E ON AFRICA 1 1 0 M ARYt_ ANO AVENUE. N _E WASHIN GTON. 0 C 2 0002 P HONE 1202 1 5 4 6 -7961 FAX 1202! 5 46 - 1545 Au gust 26. 1991 Dear Friend, I am writing to u rge you to r eview the e n closed press c lips and Washington Office on Africa resources, and, if p ossible, to write a brief articl e or letter f or p u blication in iour loca l newspaper . Since Preside n t Bush announc e d the termina tion of many South African sanctions on July 1 0, n e w informatio n ha s discredited hi s justificatio n for this action. However, the premature abandonment of these h ard-won sanctions has produced little response . Consequently, many observers fear t hat the Preside nt may lif t the r ema ining economi c sanctions as early as October. We. mu st the refore use every avai labl e means--including l oca l a nd national media--to i mprove publ ic unde rstandi ng of the current situation in South Africa and t o generate renewed pressure f o r the mainte nance of sanctions a gainst South Africa's racist regime . In his eagerness t o find some pretext for the repeal o f s~ncti o ns , President Bush overlooked the South African government' s obvious failure to comply with the conditions set down in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act for the termination of sanctions. He gave the de Kl erk administration credit for initiating recent politic a 1 reforms and claimed that these demonstrated its sincere commitment to desegregation and democracy. Less than two we eks later, a barrage of dramatic disclosures shattered these illusions and revealed the minority regime's true agenda. Using leaked documents, eyewitness accounts, and the testimony of forme r South African security agents, journalists in South Africa and Britain compiled a chilling record of Pretoria's involvement in promoting political violence. Their reports exposed the duplicity of the de Klerk administration, whose feigned good will and professe d desire to negotiate had been used to obscure an all-too-familiar program of propaganda, promotion of surrogate groups, intimidation, and terrorism. President Bush's justification also ignored the fact that recent reforms were not initiatives of the government--which has consistently r e sisted any diminution of white privilege--but concessions forced upon the government by popular anti-apartheid organizations. They represented the desperate attempt of a government, under siege at home and abroad, to jettison the most visibly offensive features of its policies, in order to consolidate its control over key aspects of social order . International sanctions played a significant role in eroding the government's will to withstand and to suppress its domestic opposition. Now , President Bush has alleviated the pressure on the minority regime to make substantial c o ncessions. SPONSORS OF THE WASHINGTON OFFICE ON AFRICA: AFRICAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH· AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION • THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON AFR ICA • CHRISTIAN CHURCH (DISCIPLES OF CHRIST) • CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN • EPISCOPAL CHURCH . COALITION FOR HUMAN NEEDS AND PUBLIC AF FAIRS OFF IC E. EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AN D THE WASHINGTON OFFICE· EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMER ICA" MARYKNOLL FATHERS AND BROTHERS • MI SS IONARIES OF AFRICA • PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (USA) • PROGRESS IVE NATIONAL BAPTIST CONVENTION . HOME MI SS ION BOARD· THE REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA· SACRED HEART FATHERS· SOCIETY FOR AFRICAN MISSIONS (SM .A FATHE RS) · UNITED AUTOMOBILE . AEROSPAC E AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA. UAW· UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTRIES. OFF ICE FOR CHURCH IN SOCIETY AND COMMI SS ION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE • UNITED METHODIST CHURCH. BOARD OF GLOBAL MINISTRIES AFRICA OFFICE AND WOMENS DIVI SION " UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA. So far, the response to thes e deve lopments has been minimal. The American press has hailed the " e nd of apartheid" without emphasizing tha t dai ly lif e for South Africa's disenfranchised black majority (and i ts privi l eged white minority) remains very much the same. Few journalists hav e questioned the objectives of a man forme rly considered a leader o f the National Party's right wing. Similarly, Co ngress , which s h o uld hc:i.ve bee n outraged a t President Bush' s mis interpretation of the CAAA, ~ffe red hardly a whimper of protest. Confronted with the issue, many members either defend the "good intentions " of the de Kl erk administration or, mo re cynically, insist that their constituents are no longer concerned about South Africa. It is therefore most urgent for us to draw attention to th ~ secret agenda behind de Kl erk' s effort to give white supremacy a more benign profile. We must recognize the contribution which sanction s have made to the s uccesses of the South African struggle against apartheid. We ~ust call for remaining U.S. sanctions, espec ially those restricting IMF and Export-Import Bank loans ~o South Africa--to be sustained until South Africa has made truly irreversible progress toward non-racial democracy. We must refuse to let the Bush administration turn back the clock to the days of "constructive engagement" and tacit U.S. support for the intransigence and aggression of the South African government. Local newspapers offer a vital means of raising these issues. The enclosed press clips and tips for preparing material for publication are intended to help you to make your voice heard effectively. Please take the time to look them over and to draft a brief article or letter to send to your local paper. If your work is published, I urge you to send copies to your members of Congress and to the Washington Office on Africa. Sincerely, Imani Countess Acting Director Check the opinion/editorial page of your local newspaper(s) to see if it indicates the paper's restrictions on opinion 1 columns. If not, call the newspaper offices and ask to speak to the opinion page editor. Tell him or her that you would like to submit an opinion column to be considered for publication. Ask what criteria the paper uses in seiecting opinion articles for publication. Be sure to find out the paper's rules concerning format (e.g., word length, spacing, etc.). Generally, newspapers expect opinion pieces to be roughly 600-800 words and double-spaced. Prepare your article according to the paper's guidel ines. Try to keep your comments focused on one specific issue 2 (i.e., supporting or opposing a particular action of the U.S. government, responding to an event in southern Africa, etc.). If you wish, you may borrow freely from resources written by the Washington Office on Africa. A pointed, provocative opening sentence will appeal to the editor and entice people to read your column. The final draft should clearly show your name, address, daytime telephone number and, if appropriate, your 3 organizational affiliation. Newspapers are often more inclined to publish opinion columns submitted by individuals prominent in the community. If you are affiliated with an organization concerned with civil or human rights issues but are not known as a spokesperson for the group, you may wish to ask the group's president or other officer if you may submit your article in his or her name. If the newspaper does not contact you within two days, call the opinion editor. Check to make sure that he or she received your article and ask if the newspaper is interested in publishing it. If you are rejected, try to determine what you should do differently in future to improve your chances of publication. Also ask if the editor would be willing to shorten you article for publication as a letter to the editor. If you do not feel able to prepare an opinion column, you 5 could write a letter to the editor. These are typical 1 y only 200-300 words long. Newspapers usually print the address to which letters should be sent on the editorial/letters page. Other guidelines for letters may also appear. If your article or letter is published, draw attention to 6 it! Send copies to your Senators and to the U.S . Representatives for the area. Indicate that the column appeared in a newspaper in their constituency. If you wrote about a topic which involves state or local government--such as an article supporting local sanctions--send copies to these officials, too. Also, please send a copy to the Washington Office on Africa. Tuesday 13 August 1991 Tribal chiefs are marching in tune with Pretoria WASHINGTON TIMES, 20 August 1991 The Soutl1 African government is looking to African tradition in its fight against the ANC, writes Chris McGreal from Masemola Inkatha raids against ANC CHIEF Maoe Masemola's sub- role: "The ANC are the ones caus­ jects, rejecting . custom, have Ing the trouble. They keep a low reportedly backed by police marched In protest against cir· profile In the village because they ru11.1cision, unpaid . labour and know about us here. We're here to even having a woman a.S·le.ader. help keep control, to show the But If the 14 villages under her way. The ANC cause trouble, and By Allister Sparks country indicate that, far from being rule do not see value In tradition; · we're here to make sure It doesn't LONDON OBSERVER brought under control, joint police- 1nkatha operations against ANC Pretoria clearly does. happen. People feel they've got se- .JOHANNESBURC;. South Afric<l Across the huge expanse of the curlty with US• We're w0rldng with - It was shortly before midnight.
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