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House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee

Fifth Report of Session 2003–04

HC 117 Reports and Evidence from the Foreign Affairs Committee since 2001

The following reports and evidence have been produced in the present Parliament.

Session 2003–04 REPORTS Fourth Report Human Rights Annual Report 2003 HC 389 Third Report Iran HC 80 Second Report Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against HC 81 (Cm 6162) Terrorism First Report Foreign Affairs Committee Annual Report 2003HC 220 First Special Report Implications of the Work of the House and its HC 440 Committees of the Government’s Lack of Co- operation with the Foreign Affairs Committee’s Inquiry into The Decision to go to War in Iraq MINUTES OF EVIDENCE Written Evidence Overseas Territories HC 114 Written Evidence The Biological Weapons Green Paper HC 113 Written Evidence Private Military Companies HC 115 Written Evidence Turkey HC 116

Session 2002–03 REPORTS Twelfth Report Foreign & Commonwealth Office Annual HC 859 (Cm 6107) Report 2003 Eleventh Report Gibraltar HC 1024 (Cm 5954) Tenth Report Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against HC 405 (Cm 5986) Terrorism Ninth Report The Decision to go to War in Iraq HC 813 (Cm 6062) and (Cm 6123) Eighth Report Zimbabwe HC 339 (Cm 5869) Seventh Report Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for HC 474 (Cm 5943) 2001, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny Sixth Report The Government’s proposals for secondary HC 620 (Cm 5988) legislation under the Export Control Act Fifth Report The Biological Weapons Green Paper HC 671 (Cm 5857) Fourth Report Human Rights Annual Report 2002 HC 257 (Cm 5320) Third Report Foreign Affairs Committee Annual Report 2002 HC 404 Second Report Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against HC 196 (Cm 5739) Terrorism First Report The Biological Weapons Green Paper HC 150 (Cm 5713) First Special Report Evidence from Mr Andrew Gilligan to the HC 1044 Committee’s Inquiry into the Decision to go to War in Iraq

House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee

South Africa

Fifth Report of Session 2003–04

Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence

Ordered by The House of Commons to be printed 27 April 2004

HC 117 Published on 18 May 2004 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £23.00

The Foreign Affairs Committee

The Foreign Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and its associated public bodies.

Current membership Rt Hon Donald Anderson MP (Labour, Swansea East) (Chairman) David Chidgey MP (Liberal Democrat, Eastleigh) Fabian Hamilton MP (Labour, Leeds North East) Eric Illsley MP (Labour, Barnsley Central) Rt Hon Andrew Mackay (Conservative, Bracknell) Andrew Mackinlay MP (Labour, Thurrock) John Maples MP (Conservative, Stratford-on-Avon) Bill Olner MP (Labour, Nuneaton) Greg Pope MP (Labour, Hyndburn) Rt Hon Sir John Stanley MP (Conservative, Tonbridge and Malling) Gisela Stuart MP (Labour, Birmingham Edgbaston)

The following Members were also members of the Committee during the Parliament.

Sir Patrick Cormack MP (Conservative, Staffordshire South) Richard Ottaway MP (Conservative, Croydon South)

Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publications The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at : www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/foreign_affairs_committee.cfm. A list of Reports produced by the Committee in the present Parliament is printed in the inside front cover of this volume.

Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Steve Priestley (Clerk), Geoffrey Farrar (Second Clerk), Ann Snow (Committee Specialist), Kit Dawnay (Committee Specialist), Kevin Candy (Committee Assistant), Julia Kalogerides (Secretary) and Chintan Makwana (Senior Office Clerk).

Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerks of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Committee Office, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone numbers for general enquiries are 020 7219 6106/6105/6394; the Committee’s email address is [email protected].

Contents

Report Page

Conclusions and recommendations 3

Introduction 9

Background: challenges facing South Africa 12 Economy 12 Inequality 15 HIV/AIDS 16 Crime 18 Land reform 19

UK–South African relations 21 ‘Broad and deep’ 21 ‘Periods of turbulence’ 22 Trade liberalisation 22 War in Iraq 24 Changes in development assistance priorities 25 ‘Brain drain’ 26

South Africa’s role in its region 27 A regional superpower? 27 Peace-making and peace-keeping 30 United Kingdom support 30 Southern African Development Community 31

South Africa and Zimbabwe 34 Background 34 United Kingdom policy towards Zimbabwe 35 South African policy towards Zimbabwe 35 Reasons underlying South Africa’s policy 36 Signs of change 38 The way forward? 38

South Africa’s international role 41 The African Union 41 Commonwealth 43 United Nations 45 UNCHR 45 UN Reform 46

South Africa and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 48 NePAD 48 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 49 Response of the United Kingdom and the G8 50 What difference will NePAD make? 51 Value of NePAD 51 Importance of the APRM 51 Response of the G8 53 Conclusion 54

South Africa and the war against terrorism 55

Work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in South Africa 58 Consular work 59 Visa entry clearance 59 Trade and investment (UKTI) 61 British Council 62 BBC World Service 64 Estate management 65

Conclusion: a special relationship? 67

Annex A 69 List of abbreviations 69

Annex B 71 Visit to South Africa 71

Formal minutes 73

Witnesses 75

List of written evidence 77

Conclusions and recommendations

1. We conclude that, while there remains a number of difficult challenges to be faced, the prospects for the South African economy are generally very positive. If it is to deliver the employment and increased national prosperity the country needs, however, a significant increase in direct foreign investment will be needed. We recommend that the Her Majesty’s Government continue to strive to stimulate and encourage private investment in South Africa. (Paragraph 15)

2. We commend the South African Government for its work in tackling so boldly the lack of economic opportunities experienced by many black people in the country. We recommend that the British Government continue to work with its South African counterpart to promote a better understanding of ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ among British investors, and potential investors, and to assist them in seizing the opportunity that it represents. (Paragraph 21)

3. We conclude that the British Government is playing a key role in the fight against the scourge of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, and throughout the world. As always, though, more could be done and we recommend that the Government maintain an active dialogue with the South African Government on this subject in order to assess what further assistance could be given. (Paragraph 28)

4. We conclude that the fight against crime, especially violent crime, is one of the most serious, and difficult, challenges facing South Africa at this time. We recommend that the British Government continue to offer significant assistance to South Africa in this field, and that co-operation projects currently in place are strengthened and improved, particularly those relating to improving the professional training of police officers. (Paragraph 32)

5. We conclude that, at this time, the South African Government appears to be pursuing a sensible and considered policy of land reform, that seeks to address the historically unequal distribution of land in the country. However, we consider it is critical to South Africa’s future prosperity that any moves towards land expropriations similar to those seen in Zimbabwe are firmly resisted. (Paragraph 37)

6. We are pleased to conclude that, in general, South Africa and the United Kingdom enjoy excellent bilateral relations on a very broad front of activities and interests. We recommend that the FCO, in its Response to this Report, sets out how it considers bilateral relations between the United Kingdom and South Africa could be strengthened further in the future. (Paragraph 40)

7. We recommend that, within the constraints imposed on it by the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union, the British Government should do more to make clear its commitment to opening up trade to the developing world and reforming the CAP at all opportunities. (Paragraph 48)

8. We conclude that the reputation of the United Kingdom in South Africa has undoubtedly been seriously weakened by differences in the two countries’ approach towards Iraq. We recommend that the Government seek to repair the damage done

to the relationship by this disagreement, at every possible opportunity. (Paragraph 51)

9. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Foreign Office sets out how the cut in DfID’s assistance to middle-income countries will affect the Foreign Office’s work in South Africa, and whether alternative sources of funding will be available to carry on some of the very valuable work being done there. We further recommend that the FCO set out what inter-departmental consultation took place prior to the re-allocation being announced. (Paragraph 54)

10. We recommend that the Government ensure that the United Kingdom, while respecting the rights of individuals, does not denude South Africa of its much- needed skilled professionals and continue to monitor developments in this area. (Paragraph 57)

11. We conclude that South Africa has played a crucial and very welcome role in its conflict resolution work across the continent. It has brought new energy and focus to attempts to settle long-running disputes such as those in Burundi and the DRC. We recommend that the United Kingdom continue to offer every assistance to South Africa to strengthen its work in this vital field, while remaining fully involved in the continent itself. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the FCO set out how it sees further co-operation in the field of peace-keeping work and training of regional forces developing in the long–term. (Paragraph 68)

12. We conclude that SADC has the potential to play a very valuable role in helping to solve many of the challenges facing its region. If it is to realise this potential, however, and to be taken seriously as a respected international organisation, it must be willing to recognise the failings of member states whose behaviour does not meet the expectations placed upon them by SADC’s high aspirations. (Paragraph 74)

13. We recommend that the British Government continue to work with South Africa, as a key player in the organisation, to support SADC’s work generally and encourage it to take seriously its role in promoting good governance and respect for human rights. (Paragraph 75)

14. We conclude that: (Paragraph 96)

a) South Africa and the United Kingdom unquestionably share the same objective for Zimbabwe—the return to a fully-functioning and economically vibrant democracy that respects the human rights of its citizens; (Paragraph 96.a)

b) South Africa is acting in the manner it sincerely believes to be the most effective and the most likely to bring about the desired goal identified above; (Paragraph 96.b)

c) the situation of the Zimbabwean people will continue to deteriorate unless effective pressure is brought to bear on the Government of Robert Mugabe to change its disastrous and self-seeking policies, and South Africa is the best placed external force to stimulate that change; and (Paragraph 96.c)

d) South Africa, and the region more generally, will continue to suffer from Zimbabwe’s plight until such a change takes place, not least by deterring much- needed foreign direct investment. (Paragraph 96.d)

15. We recommend that the British Government: (Paragraph 97)

a) continue to maintain the strongest possible pressure on the Zimbabwean Government to respect the human rights of its citizens and to call free and fair elections, especially through multilateral means; (Paragraph 97.a)

b) recognise the importance of South Africa in achieving a long-term solution to the severe crisis affecting Zimbabwe; (Paragraph 97.b)

c) seek the closest possible co-operation with South Africa on achieving the mutually desired outcome of a peaceful and democratic Zimbabwe; and (Paragraph 97.c)

d) seek to promote a greater understanding of its genuine concerns about Zimbabwe in South Africa, and elsewhere on the continent, and the facts about the land reform issue. (Paragraph 97.d)

16. We conclude that the African Union holds the potential to deliver significant improvements in the standard of life for Africans, and should be fully supported by the United Kingdom and the EU. The recent creation of an African court of human rights and the agreement on a continental peace-keeping force are to be particularly welcomed, demonstrating, as they do, a commitment to tackle some of the most fundamental problems facing Africa at this time. South Africa has played a crucial role in all these developments. (Paragraph 106)

17. We recommend that the Government continue to work with South Africa, and all its African partners, to assist the AU in realising the impressive ambitions it has set for itself. (Paragraph 107)

18. We conclude that South Africa plays a crucial role as a leading member of the Commonwealth, actively supporting the organisation’s aim of bridging the gap between the developed and developing worlds and supporting global respect for human rights. The recent disagreements over Zimbabwe at Commonwealth meetings—the issue that “poisons everything it touches”—should not be allowed to damage the organisation’s very valuable work, nor the UK’s working relationship with South Africa within the body. We recommend that the British Government seek every possible opportunity to restore any damage done to inter-Commonwealth relations by the recent disagreements at the Abuja CHOGM, while maintaining the organisation’s tough stance on Robert Mugabe’s continuing human rights abuses. (Paragraph 113)

19. We conclude that the role South Africa has played at the UNCHR to prevent even the discussion of resolutions that address the appalling human rights situation in Zimbabwe is deeply regrettable, especially in light of the very positive involvement it has with the rest of the UN’s work, and could be damaging to South Africa’s wider interests. (Paragraph 116)

20. We conclude that the arguments for reform at the United Nations, particularly at the Security Council, are undeniable. We also conclude that were there to be an ‘African seat’ on the Council, South Africa would be amongst the strongest African candidates, filling nearly all of the criteria for such a position. We recognise, though, that this will be a matter for African nations themselves to settle when the time arises. (Paragraph 121)

21. Given the evidence that we have seen during this inquiry, we conclude that NePAD has the potential to deliver significant, and important, changes within Africa and to its relationship with the rest of the world. Both sides of the Partnership, though, need to understand fully both the challenges and the opportunities that it presents. African nations have to recognise that good governance and respect for human rights are central to their development prospects, and to how they are perceived by both foreign governments and potential private investors. The G8, in turn, needs to see beyond the confines of the peer review mechanism and recognise the progress that African nations have already made in delivering on their commitments. (Paragraph 140)

22. We recommend that in partnership South Africa and the United Kingdom work together to ensure that it is not simply left to ‘wither and die’ as so many previous programmes have been. The British Government needs to impress upon South Africa, and its fellow AU members, the importance of a rigorous peer review mechanism for spreading good governance in the continent, and for attracting much-needed foreign investment. At the same time, it should use every opportunity, especially its forthcoming Presidencies of the G8 and the EU, to ensure that the developed world delivers on its commitment to support genuine African growth and development. Mutuality is the basis of the relationship. (Paragraph 141)

23. We conclude that South Africa has an important role in the war against terrorism, especially by helping to prevent international terrorists using the continent as a base for their activities elsewhere in the world. South Africa has a particularly crucial role to play, as an influential African nation in disseminating best practice in anti- terrorism activity across the continent. We recommend that the United Kingdom continue to offer substantial assistance to ensure that South Africa can both combat international terrorism within its own borders and act as a catalyst for improving Africa’s ability to respond to the threat. (Paragraph 149)

24. We recommend that, in the light of the importance of the United Kingdom’s relationship with South Africa and the crucial work being done by the Post there, the level of staffing and resources allocated to the United Kingdom High Commission in South Africa be at the very least maintained, if not increased, in the long-term. (Paragraph 152)

25. We recommend that UK Visas continue to monitor closely the demands on staff and resources at the United Kingdom High Commission in South Africa resulting from the increasing numbers of entry clearance applications being received there. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the FCO set out what extra resources and personnel have been allocated to visa entry clearance work in South Africa since 2003. (Paragraph 159)

26. We conclude that the trade and investment section of the High Commission in South Africa is performing to a high standard in assisting British businesses to operate there and exploit new opportunities. (Paragraph 165)

27. We conclude that the British Council is carrying out very important work in South Africa, both in promoting a deeper relationship between the two nations and in providing crucial educational support to the South African Government. We are also convinced that the Chevening scholarship scheme is a vital part of the British Council’s work, and a very important way in which the United Kingdom can influence future decision-makers. We recommend that the FCO give serious consideration to increasing the number of scholarships available to South Africans in the near future. (Paragraph 171)

28. We further recommend that the British Council continue actively to support civic organisations and to train their leadership. (Paragraph 172)

29. We conclude that the BBC World Service’s Bureau in Johannesburg is carrying out excellent work in producing high-quality and informative programmes for both radio and television. We recommend that the Bureau continue to be given the funding it needs to carry on this important work. We further recommend that the BBC World Service give serious consideration to increasing the resources it allocates to its Swahili service in the future. (Paragraph 179)

30. We strongly recommend that the FCO does not repeat the gross error it has made in so many other locations of exchanging a valuable and appreciating property—the High Commissioner’s Residence in Cape Town—which is clearly greatly assisting the promotion of United Kingdom interests, for rapidly depreciating ICT assets. (Paragraph 181)

Introduction

1. On 27 April this year, South Africa celebrated the tenth anniversary of its first fully democratic, non-racial, elections. On that date in 1994 the vile apartheid regime formally ended, and Nelson Mandela, after spending twenty-seven years of his life as a political prisoner, took his hard-won place as President of the Republic. Since that time, South Africa has grown in a way that was inconceivable during the dark days of the previous regime. The country has become an example of good governance and respect for human rights in Africa; it has sought to heal divisions caused by past injustices without recourse to the blood-letting or interminable detentions and trials seen in so many similar situations; it has assumed a leading role in the United Nations, the Commonwealth and many other international fora; it has injected new vigour and resources into the resolution of long- running conflicts in Africa, and has achieved many other positive changes.

2. Given the significance of this landmark in South Africa’s history, we felt that it was an opportune time to review the strength and vitality of the United Kingdom’s very important relationship with South Africa, a key strategic partner in both regional and international affairs. The breadth of this relationship is considerable, including significant two-way flows of trade, investment, tourism and migration. The two governments also work closely together on a range of issues and share a significant number of mutual global concerns and ambitions. We felt it important, therefore, to assess how these ties could be strengthened and improved as South Africa celebrates its achievement. We also noted that neither we nor our predecessor committees had reported on South Africa in detail since 1991.1

3. On 24 July last year, therefore, the Committee officially launched its inquiry into ‘South Africa’, with the following terms of reference: “to inquire into the role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in relation to South Africa, in the light of the strong historical connections that link the United Kingdom and South Africa, and its important role in the Commonwealth, in the region and in Africa as a whole.”2 In particular, we agreed, the inquiry would examine:

x the UK’s diplomatic and political relations with South Africa, both bilaterally and as a member of the EU;

x South Africa’s role in the region of Southern Africa, including Zimbabwe, and the continent more widely;

x South Africa’s role within relevant regional and international bodies, most notably the African Union, the Commonwealth and the United Nations;

x the impact of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NePAD) and the G8 African Action Plan on South Africa;

1 Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report of Session 1990–91, United Kingdom Policy towards South Africa and the other states of the region, HC 53-I. Also relevant is: First Report of Session 1995–96, The Future Role of the Commonwealth, HC 45–I. 2 “Announcement of a new inquiry: South Africa”, Foreign Affairs Committee press release 2002–03/37, 24 July 2003. All post-1997 Committee publications and press releases are available at the Committee’s home page, which can be accessed via: www.parliament.uk.

x South Africa’s contribution to the war against terrorism; and

x the effectiveness of the Foreign Office’s work in South Africa, including the entry clearance operation, the work of UK Trade International, the British Council and the BBC World Service.3

In this Report we set out our findings of our inquiry into these six main areas, and the conclusions and recommendations we have reached as a result of our deliberations.

4. In the course of our inquiry, the Committee received a large number of useful memoranda from a range of individuals and organisations.4 We took oral evidence on three occasions, from five sets of witnesses: on 9 December from Professor James Barber, University of Cambridge, Professor David Simon, University of London, Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld, Brunel University, and Mr Alastair Fraser, Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA—the successor to the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the UK);5 on 27 January from Mr Richard Dowden, Royal African Society, Dr Steve Kibble, Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), Mr Christopher Paterson, Macmillan Publishers Ltd., and Mr Ashley Roe, Severn Trent Water International Ltd.;6 and on 2 March from Mr Chris Mullin MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Mr Andrew Lloyd, Head of Africa Department, Southern, and Mr Andy Sparkes, former United Kingdom Deputy High Commissioner, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.7 All the evidence we received is printed in full at the end of this volume.

5. As part of our inquiry, we also visited South Africa from 8 to 13 February. While there we met a number of key interlocutors from across a wide spectrum of society and gained a great deal of very valuable information for our final report. A copy of our programme is annexed to this Report. We should like to thank all those who have assisted us during our inquiry, both here and in South Africa.

6. We extend our especial gratitude to our Specialist Adviser for this inquiry, Professor Jack Spence OBE, King’s College, London, whose assistance throughout our proceedings has been invaluable.

3 Ibid. 4 p 77, List of Written Evidence 5 Ev 7, Ev 34 6 Ev 51, Ev 60 7 Ev 82

11 Figure 1: South Africa

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30 35 25 Map No. 3768 Rev. 5 UNITED NATIONS 3768 Rev. Map No. January 2004

Source: UN Cartographic Section8

8 UN Cartographic Section (South Africa, no. 3768 Rev. 5, January 2004), www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/ english/index.htm

Background: challenges facing South Africa

7. During our inquiry, and especially during our visit to South Africa, we have been repeatedly impressed by the tremendous progress that the country has made since its first democratic elections in 1994 in so many areas of life. As The Times columnist, Mr Matthew Parris recently observed:

Fitfully but unmistakably, the new South Africa is working. The country today is richer, happier, more powerful, fairer and more secure than it was a decade ago. And the direction is still up.9

This view has been echoed by much of the evidence we have received, stressing how the pessimists who, prior to the elections in 1994, predicted a dire future for South Africa have been confounded.10 One submission stressed the triumph of democracy, in particular:

Since 1994, South Africa has been grappling with the daunting task of unravelling institutionalised racism in every sphere of society. The greatest single tribute to the success of that struggle is the fact that South Africa is one of the most democratic countries in the world. Democratic in the formal sense, with a free and fair electoral system, an independent judiciary, a free press and one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. But democratic also in the sense that millions of people, in their communities and workplaces, are actively engaged in grassroots political activity.11

During the course of our inquiry, South Africa successfully held its third fully democratic and multi-racial election.

8. Inevitably, however, since 1994 South Africa has had a number of tremendous challenges to overcome, not least the bitterly divisive legacy of an apartheid policy that affected every aspect of people’s life. A number of these issues have been drawn to our attention during the inquiry and we comment on some of them below. Where appropriate, we also comment on how the United Kingdom is working in partnership with the South African Government to help it face them.

Economy 9. As can be seen from the graph below (figure 2), in comparison to its Southern African neighbours South Africa’s economy is a ‘giant.’ It has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of around $120bn, relatively low inflation and a growth rate of around 4% per annum at present. After two serious crashes, in 1996 and 1998, the Rand appears to be stable and slowly gaining value. In general, the South African Government has followed strictly the guidelines of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on economic policy, and has won praise from it and other international financial institutions.

9 “A pessimist recants: the new South Africa is working”, The Times, 25 October 2003 10 See, for example: Q 170 [Mullin] 11 Ev 18, para 2.3 [ACTSA]

Figure 2: total GDP of Southern African states 2002–04

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0 Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mozambique South Africa SwazilandTanzania Zambia Zimbabwe

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database12 10. In a recent paper, two commentators highlighted South Africa’s economic dominance of the southern half of the continent, generating 45% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP and 75% of the South African Development Community’s (SADC). They also stated that the economy:

stands out in Africa not only in terms of its size, but also in terms of depth of expertise, technology and management. Macroeconomic fundamentals and their management remain sound. Fiscal policy is robust ... Monetary policy is healthy.13

11. However, it should be noted that, while South Africa’s economy is much larger than its African neighbours, when it is compared to other middle-income nations, it is not so outstanding. The graph below (figure 3) gives a few comparisons—Argentina and Columbia are probably the closest to South Africa in terms of population.14

12 www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2004/01/index.htm 13 Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, “The Future of Africa: A New Order in Sight?”, Adelphi Papers 361 (November 2003), p 42 14 Latest population figures: South Africa – 42,768,678; Argentina – 38,740,807; and Colombia – 41,662,073 (Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook 2003, January 2003, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook).

Figure 3: GDP of South Africa compared to other middle-income nations

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0 Argentina Brazil Colombia India Mexico Pakistan South Africa

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database 12. Commentators also highlighted a number of significant challenges faced by the economy. For example, Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld, of Brunel University, stated in his memorandum to the Committee that:

inherited serious structural deficiencies and developmental backlogs have continued to inhibit growth and undermine confidence. The requisite restructuring will take more time to achieve, and will continue to present the government with difficult political choices. ... The key economic policy challenges remain the low levels of fixed investment, the ‘jobless’ nature of economic growth, the shortage of skills, privatisation, and South Africa’s failure to become a major exporter of manufactured goods.15

These views were echoed in Mr Blumenfeld’s oral evidence, where he described the process of tackling some of the structural deficiencies in the South African economy as, “like turning a super tanker around; it is a very slow process.”16 The problem of unemployment, which currently stands at around 35–40%, is a particularly pressing one and was a dominant issue in the recent election campaign. Geographically, South Africa is at the tip of an under-performing continent away from the dynamic growth markets of the world. The legacy of apartheid on the education of the black majority remains a major barrier to growth.

13. Those to whom we spoke all agreed that the South African Government had made some very difficult decisions in order to achieve stable, long-term economic growth. They also all believed that one of the keys needed to unlock the country’s potential was increased foreign investment, something which has not always been forthcoming since 1994.17

15 Ev 33 16 Q 54

17 See, for example: Q 59 [Blumenfeld].

14. Britain is already one of the largest investors in South Africa, and there is considerable two-way trade between the countries (see para 38 below for more details). We heard from the UK Trade and Investment section of the High Commission in Johannesburg how they were encouraging even more British businesses to invest in the country, bringing much- needed foreign capital, skills transfers and employment opportunities. It is in this area that the United Kingdom can probably be of greatest assistance in supporting South Africa’s economic growth and development.

15. We conclude that, while there remains a number of difficult challenges to be faced, the prospects for the South African economy are generally very positive. If it is to deliver the employment and increased national prosperity the country needs, however, a significant increase in direct foreign investment will be needed. We recommend that the Her Majesty’s Government continue to strive to stimulate and encourage private investment in South Africa.

Inequality 16. Linked closely to the issue of economic growth is that of the unequal benefit which different sections of the population have derived from the country’s success. The total GDP figures given above hide dramatic differences in the incomes of the very rich and very poor in the country. For example, although per capita income in South Africa was around $2,300 in 2002, 2% of the population were still living on less than a dollar a day.18 South Africa also ranked 111th out of 175 countries in the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI), between Syria and Indonesia.19 ACTSA’s submission described South Africa as: “the world’s second most unequal country.”20

17. Given South Africa’s past, it is unsurprising that it is the black population who suffer worst from poverty, joblessness and social deprivation. In 1998, when the first properly- researched figures for inequality and poverty in South Africa were published, the sharp contrasts between the living standards of the different ethic groups was revealed.21 For example, 61% of black South Africans were ‘poor’, compared with only 1% of whites, and the infant mortality rate for whites was 7.3 per 1,000 births, while that for blacks was 54.22

18. To tackle this problem in 1995, the South African Government introduced a range of initiatives and programmes under the heading, ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ (BEE), which aimed to encourage the redistribution of wealth and opportunities to black and other previously disadvantaged communities. This policy has steadily developed since that time and, following a 2001 report by the Black Economic Empowerment Commission (BEEC), the Government agreed a target strategy for ensuring that companies become

18 UN Statistics Division www.unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_series_results.asp?rowID=580 19 The Human Development Index (HDI) measures a country's achievements in three aspects of human development: longevity, knowledge, and standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge is measured by a combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined gross primary, secondary, and tertiary enrolment ratio; and standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita. For more details, see: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/faq.html#21. 20 Ev 19, para 2.10. Also see QQ 185–6 [Mullin]. 21 “Poverty and Inequality in South Africa: Report prepared for the Office of the Executive Deputy President and the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality”, May 1998 www.gov.za/reports/1998/poverty 22 Ibid., pp 20 and 29

more representative of the population as a whole. For example, the Commission called for 25% of the top-listed companies to be black-owned by 2010.

19. BEE faces a number of very difficult obstacles before it is to succeed. Possibly the greatest is the lack of an educated and skilled black workforce, after years of official Government neglect before 1994. The policy has also been criticised for being seen, at least in its initial stages, to be merely creating a new black elite.23 A recent article in The Financial Times on this subject, made clear the imperative for the policy to achieve tangible results:

South Africa needs to get black empowerment right, for the sake of both the economy and its nine-year-old non-racial democracy. In a country with some of the world’s starkest social contrasts, broader economic participation by black people could cement faster economic growth and enhanced political stability.24

20. However, progress is slowly being made: black ownership of public companies, for example, was 9.4% in 2002 compared with 3.9% in 1997 (and virtually non-existent before 1994).25 The British and South African companies we spoke to during our inquiry were also very positive about the way in which the Government was handling this matter, calming fears of BEE being imposed from ‘on high’; indeed most of them saw it as more of an opportunity than a threat. The FCO, through UK Trade and Investment (UKTI), has assisted in the process of promoting understanding of how BEE works in practice, by organising seminars on the subject for concerned businesses.

21. We commend the South African Government for its work in tackling so boldly the lack of economic opportunities experienced by many black people in the country. We recommend that the British Government continue to work with its South African counterpart to promote a better understanding of ‘Black Economic Empowerment’ among British investors, and potential investors, and to assist them in seizing the opportunity that it represents.

HIV/AIDS 22. South Africa has a bigger HIV-positive population than any other country in the world at present.26 Approximately five million South Africans, 11 per cent of the population, are HIV-infected; it is estimated that 600 people die every day from the disease in South Africa.27 In its memorandum to the Committee, Save the Children estimated that the pandemic has created around 700,000 orphans, with 34.5% of pregnant women aged 25 to 29 being infected in 2002.28

23 See, for example: Q 61 [Blumenfeld]. 24 “The emergence of a black business class”, Financial Times, 5 November 2003 25 South African Government, Towards ten years of freedom: progress in the first decade, challenges of the second decade, October 2003, www.gov.za 26 UNAIDS, Report on the Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic 2002, July 2002 http://www.unaids.org/en/default.asp 27 Q 43 [Fraser] 28 Ev 114

23. While in South Africa, we also heard of the significant impact that the disease was having on businesses, particularly on the extractive industries. The high infection rate was inevitably leading to a greatly increased turnover of staff. One interlocutor suggested that in five years time some firms could face the prospect of having to replace one third of their workforce every year.

24. The response of President Mbeki’s Government to HIV/AIDS has been controversial, particularly with regard to the provision of anti-retroviral drugs (ARDs) to sufferers. There was a concerted public campaign last year, led by a well-organised group of AIDS activists, known as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), protesting against the Government’s policy at that time. On 17 November, the Government agreed to provide ARDs in state hospitals. It estimates that more than 50,000 people will receive the drugs in the first year, and up to a million by 2007.29

25. During our visit to South Africa, we were privileged to visit the ‘Hospice in Soweto’, one of a very few such institutions in South Africa. Around 75% of its patients suffered from HIV/AIDS, and the majority of the much-needed palliative care was carried out in the community by trained carers. We were told that there was still a great stigma attached to HIV/AIDS, and many families would deny that the patient had the disease. Poverty also forced some families literally to ‘dump’ patients in the street or at a local clinic because they simply did not have the resources to pay for their care.

26. The UK, along with other international donors, provides some support to the hospice. It has received limited funds for the past five years from the Small Grants Scheme, which is DfID funded but administered by FCO. We were concerned to be told by the Foreign Office, therefore, that, “the future of the Small Grants Scheme beyond March 2005 is uncertain.”30 The Office promised, however, to work with DfID to look for alternative sources of funding. We shall monitor progress on providing funds for this project.

27. On the whole, however, the United Kingdom can be extremely proud of the assistance it has provided to combat HIV/AIDS. The Minister informed us that the Government had provided around £30 million towards combating the disease in South Africa alone.31 Globally, Britain is now the second largest bilateral donor on HIV/AIDS after the USA, providing more than £270 million in 2002–03.32 As the Minister recognised, though: “It is not enough of course, and it is never going to be enough.”33 Our colleagues in the International Development Committee have examined this subject in detail in their recent report.34

28. We conclude that the British Government is playing a key role in the fight against the scourge of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, and throughout the world. As always, though, more could be done and we recommend that the Government maintain an

29 “Pretoria Aids drug decision wins wide approval”, Financial Times, 21 November 2003 30 Ev 81 31 Q 230 32 HC Deb, 9 December 2003, col 914 33 Q 230 34 International Development Committee, Third Report of Session 2002–03, The Humanitarian Crisis in Southern Africa, HC 116

active dialogue with the South African Government on this subject in order to assess what further assistance could be given.

Crime 29. The high prevalence of crime, particularly violent crime in the inner-cities, is one of the most significant and well-publicised problems facing South Africa at this time. This is not only an extremely serious issue in respect of individual citizens’ everyday life, but also has a very detrimental economic impact through its deterrence of much-needed tourism and trade. Mr Blumenfeld observed in his oral evidence:

The crime problem is serious, it creates difficulties for any firm wanting to send skilled personnel there because they have a responsibility for their welfare, and there is both a perception but also a reality that crime levels are high particularly in certain areas. There is no question that it does have an impact on investment.35

We believe it is important to note, however, that the prevalence of crime in South Africa, as in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, varies greatly from area to area and it is misleading to view the entire country as being especially dangerous or crime-ridden. Much of the most violent crime is, sadly, confined to the township areas, mainly affecting the urban black population.

30. While in South Africa we visited a local police station in Alexandra and met some of the officers who work there. We also met a secondee from the Metropolitan Police who was working there at the time, supporting their work. We heard and saw at first hand some of the difficulties they face everyday. We were also very pleased to have the opportunity to discuss some of these issues with Mr Charles Nqakula, Minister of Safety and Security, who was able to give us a broader insight into how the Government is tackling the problems.

31. In his oral evidence to us, Mr Chris Mullin MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, recognised the scale of the problem, but was unable to offer any significant strengthening of this bilateral assistance:

The maintenance of the rule of law is a prerequisite for stability and economic success, particularly if you wish to attract foreign investment. The South Africans are as well aware of that as we are. Do I see any possibility of expanding the assistance we already give? Modestly, I think. We are talking about capacity building here, things like training. Sir John Stevens, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, I know has personally taken an interest in the Met’s operation there and I think he is in South Africa at the moment. At the end of the day it comes down to providing them with effective training and resources, and perhaps bringing some of them over here to see how we do things. I can see scope for modest expansion but, at the end of the day it is the South Africans who are going to have deal with this problem; it is a very serious problem. We can just do our best to help and advise in all capacities.36

35 Q 67 36 Q 228

32. We conclude that the fight against crime, especially violent crime, is one of the most serious, and difficult, challenges facing South Africa at this time. We recommend that the British Government continue to offer significant assistance to South Africa in this field, and that co-operation projects currently in place are strengthened and improved, particularly those relating to improving the professional training of police officers.

Land reform 33. Since 1994, the South African Government has been struggling with the issue of land reform. The Land Affairs Department announced recently that some 700,000 people had received almost three million hectares of land through the Government’s restitution and redistribution programme since the end of apartheid.37 The Department recently reported a “remarkable increase” over the past year in the number of land claims settled, but said it would be a major challenge to complete all claims by its deadline of 2005. Only land that was unfairly expropriated under apartheid is eligible for redistribution.

34. Many South Africans have been frustrated at the slow pace of reform, however, and the apparent “foot dragging” by some of those involved in the process. In 1994, the ANC promised to redistribute 30% of farmland in 10 years. So far only around 3% has changed hands, and 90% of commercial farmland remains in the hands of approximately 50,000 white farmers.38 Earlier this year, President Mbeki, therefore, announced amendments to the land restitution law, which would, in the Government’s opinion, “expedite land reform and reverse the legacy of apartheid.” 39

35. There has been strong criticism of this move from some groups, with critics claiming that they will allow the Minister of Land Affairs to expropriate land without a court order and without the landowner’s agreement.40 Unsurprisingly, references to what happened in neighbouring Zimbabwe, and recent developments in Namibia, are frequent.41

36. We were reassured, therefore, to hear from a number of sources within and without South Africa that what was happening there was a genuine, well-managed programme of land reform. Both Mr Richard Dowden, of the Royal African Society, and Dr Steve Kibble, of the Catholic Institute of International Relations (CIIR), told us that, while there was a land movement in South Africa, it was nothing like the “state-sponsored ... violent” force seen in Zimbabwe. Indeed, Mr Dowden observed:

I would have thought there was far more threat from modernisation and mechanisation to the livelihoods of rural South Africa and the general process of globalisation than there would be from taking over farms in the way it has been done in Zimbabwe.42

37 News24.com, 25 November 2003 38 “Mbeki to join land grab club”, Sunday Times, 4 January 2004 39 See, for example: “Mbeki can seize white farms”, The Times, 31 January 2003. 40 See, for example: Ev 135 41 “Namibian Workers To Seize Land From White Farmers”, Independent, 6 November 2003 42 Q 109

37. We conclude that, at this time, the South African Government appears to be pursuing a sensible and considered policy of land reform, that seeks to address the historically unequal distribution of land in the country. However, we consider it is critical to South Africa’s future prosperity that any moves towards land expropriations similar to those seen in Zimbabwe are firmly resisted.

UK–South African relations

‘Broad and deep’ 38. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), in its initial memorandum to the Committee, described the relationship between the United Kingdom and South Africa as, “broad and deep”.43 It highlighted a few of the significant ties that bind the two countries together: x £5 billion of two-way trade in goods and services; x £12 billion of United Kingdom investment in South Africa, making it the largest foreign investor there (nine of the top twenty foreign employers in the country are British);44 x around 275,000 South African visitors to the United Kingdom each year, making it the country’s most popular long-haul destination (accounting for almost 40% of all overseas departures), with well over 400,000 Britons going the other way, a number that is steadily rising year-on-year;45 and x approximately 750,000 Britons living in South Africa, one of the largest communities of British expatriates anywhere in the world. Around 350,000 South Africans currently live in the United Kingdom.46

39. The Foreign Office stated that the United Kingdom and South African Governments work together on a wide variety of issues and at all levels of the two administrations. The Office highlighted the “mutual interests” the countries share, such as the promotion of sustainable development, support for the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and a commitment to fighting poverty in Africa.47 It detailed, in particular, bilateral co-operation on peace-keeping activities, promotion of the New Partnership for African Development and the strengthening of trade links, all of which we examine in further detail below. There have been frequent high-levels visits, including those by HM The Queen in 1999 and President Mbeki in 2001. Cultural links are also very strong, with a recent highlight being the visit of the England football team and especially Mr David Beckham, which had done a great deal to raise awareness of Great Britain in the country. Other evidence we have received has similarly emphasised the strength and diversity of the ties that bind the two countries together.48

43 Ev 67, para 6 44 Ev 71–72, paras 45, 47 and annex E 45 Ev 117, paras 4.1 and 4.4 [VisitBritain]. Figure for UK visitors to South Africa supplied by the South African Tourist Board. 46 Ev 112 [Mills] 47 Ev 67, para 6 48 See, for example: Ev 99 [LGIB].

40. We are pleased to conclude that, in general, South Africa and the United Kingdom enjoy excellent bilateral relations on a very broad front of activities and interests. We recommend that the FCO, in its Response to this Report, sets out how it considers bilateral relations between the United Kingdom and South Africa could be strengthened further in the future.

‘Periods of turbulence’ 41. Although, on the whole, bilateral relations between South Africa and the United Kingdom are very good, there will always be aspects of the relationship which serve to create tension and occasional discord. During this inquiry, a number of key issues were brought to our attention as being such irritants in Britain’s relationship with South Africa, which had helped to engender ‘periods of turbulence’ in the recent past. Some were long- term issues that included a wide variety of factors and players, others were specific problems that had arisen only recently. We wish to address four of these issues in our Report: trade liberalisation; the impact of the war in Iraq; development assistance to South Africa; and the perceived ‘brain drain’ from South Africa to the United Kingdom.

Trade liberalisation 42. On 14 September last year, the latest negotiations in the Doha round of world trade talks, organised by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), collapsed without agreement being reached.49 No country or national grouping would take responsibility for the failure of the talks. The developing nations pointed the finger of blame at the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU), in particular, for being unwilling to cede ground on the vexed issue of subsidies for agricultural produce. On the other hand, many European countries were critical of African and Asian nations who had been unwilling to discuss restrictions on investment and competition. South Africa took a crucial role in the negotiations as a leading member of the G20+ (or G22) group of developing nations, along with the People’s Republic of China, India and Brazil.50

43. Many of our memoranda and witnesses during the inquiry have highlighted the collapse of the talks, and the wider issues it raised of the inequalities in world trade, as being one of the biggest problems dogging South Africa’s relations with the United Kingdom, and indeed the rest of the developed world.51 Professor James Barber, of the University of Cambridge, for example spoke of the imperative to create a far more, “even field” in international trade.52 Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA), in its memorandum, went so far as to say that South Africa’s relations with the EU had been “poisoned” by its

49 For details of the collapse of the talks see, for example: “Investment row causes WTO talks to collapse”, Financial Times, 15 September 2003. 50 At Cancun the G20 (sometimes known as the G20+ or G22) consisted of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela. Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, Ecuador and Guatemala have left since Cancun, and Nigeria, Indonesia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe have joined. 51 See, for example: Ev 110 [Mills] and Ev 17 [ACTSA]. 52 Q 11

failure to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), in particular.53 We also noted a recent article by the head of the South African delegation to the WTO, Faizel Ismail, in which he specifically makes clear South Africa’s anger at the EU’s agricultural subsidies in particular:

The EU is the world’s largest subsidiser of agriculture and thus causes the greatest harm to the livelihoods of the world’s poorest people in developing countries. Through a combination of high subsidies and high tariffs, the EU’s policies stimulate agricultural overproduction in Europe, fuels artificially low world prices, and constrains and often prevents the access of developing country products to its markets. ... agricultural negotiations are the centrepiece of the DDA [Doha Development Agenda]. Failure to produce movements on this issue will slow down the entire process, bring the negotiations to a halt, and threaten the future of the WTO itself. EU member states are confronted with a choice between maintaining their protectionist positions on agricultural reform and their commitment to the multilateral trading system and development. How will the EU member states confront this reality?”54

44. In general, it was reported to us, the United Kingdom was seen as being more reasonable and progressive on the subject of trade liberalisation, and on reform of the CAP especially, than some other EU member states. However, with particular reference to Cancun, Professor David Simon, of the University of London, suggested that: “there was evidence that Britain did not dissent from the overall EU position which has caused some consternation among people in South Africa and others.”55 Mr Richard Dowden similarly commented:

That is really what South Africa and other African countries would like to see us doing: Britain being a much stronger voice in favour of a better deal on debt, on reducing agricultural subsidies, allowing Africa and other countries to earn their place rather than have to wait on aid.56

45. In his oral evidence to us, Mr Mullin acknowledged that this was an issue about which the South Africans felt strongly.57 He believed, however, that they recognised the United Kingdom had played a “fairly honourable role” at Cancun, where the United Kingdom had been:

pressing very hard for trade liberalisation and the fact there was a failure was no fault of ours. I think that is widely recognised. Similarly within the EU we have played a leading role in campaigning for doing away with the CAP and reforming the agricultural subsidies.58

53 Ev 20, para 3.7 54 Faziel Ismail, “An Insider’s Insight”, Africa after Cancun: Trade Negotiations in Uncertain Times, South African Institute of International Affairs, November 2003 55 Q 12 56 Q 124 57 Q 173 58 Ibid.

46. The Minister also highlighted the EU–South Africa Trade, Co-operation and Development Agreement (TDCA), which had been signed in 1999 but which was yet to be ratified by all parties.59 The Agreement covers trade relations, financial aid and development co-operation between the Community and South Africa, as well as a number of other areas. Mr Mullin told us that, thanks to the Agreement, “by 2010 95 per cent—by value—of all South African exports to the EU will be free of tariffs.”60

47. Despite this significant step forward in liberalising trade between the EU and South Africa, it is clear to us that the intransigent position adopted by some other member states towards trade liberalisation and CAP reform is undoubtedly continuing to damage the EU’s relations with South Africa, and other developing nations, and with it the UK’s bilateral relationship. From what we heard while in South Africa, we also fear that the Government is over-estimating the extent to which South Africa, and other developing nations, distinguish the United Kingdom as a “good guy” on this issue, compared to other EU member states.

48. We recommend that, within the constraints imposed on it by the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union, the British Government should do more to make clear its commitment to opening up trade to the developing world and reforming the CAP at all opportunities.

War in Iraq 49. As in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, the recent military action in Iraq aroused strong passions in South Africa. The majority of South Africans were strongly opposed to the war in Iraq and many government ministers put their objections on the record. In January 2003, President Mbeki himself said that: “We are not aware of any information that would suggest that Iraq has been in serious material breach of the Security Council resolution.”61 He also criticised what he saw as the hypocrisy of the United States: “They say nothing whatsoever against Israel’s weapons of mass destruction. ... Of course, from their point of view, the matter has nothing to do with principle. It turns solely on the question of power.”62

50. While visiting South Africa, we heard this opposition to the war repeated by a large number of interlocutors. Criticism focused particularly on what was perceived to have been the unilateralism of the USA and, it was argued, the consequent undermining of the role of the United Nations (UN). As Mr Mullin observed:

... it was the issue over the lack of a second resolution for the invasion at the United Nations. The South Africans, rightly, have a very high regard for the United Nations and they felt that the alliance should have received United Nations’ endorsement before the actual invasion.63

59 Q 174. At the time of writing, 14 of the 15 EU member states had ratified the agreement, leaving only one member state and South Africa (Ev 80). 60 Q 174 61 “Mbeki broadsides Bush with tough anti-war vow”, Saturday Star, 24 January 2003 62 Ibid. 63 Q 182

He believed, however, that the relationship with South Africa was sufficiently “mature” that such differences could arise and be discussed sensibly.64 He felt that it was no more than a “temporary phenomenon.” We hope so too.

51. We conclude that the reputation of the United Kingdom in South Africa has undoubtedly been seriously weakened by differences in the two countries’ approach towards Iraq. We recommend that the Government seek to repair the damage done to the relationship by this disagreement, at every possible opportunity.

Changes in development assistance priorities 52. In its supplementary memorandum to the Committee, the FCO noted a recent change in development assistance priorities of the Department for International Development (DfID):

Hilary Benn announced in January 2004 that DfID’s programme of work in the middle-income countries of Southern Africa (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland) would reduce from £35 million in 2004/5 to £25 million in 2005/6, in compliance with DfID's commitment to spend 90% of its resources in low-income countries by that year.65

This reduction in the assistance being given to South Africa will impact on a number of the projects the British Government currently has in place in South Africa. It was made clear to us in South Africa that this reduction in the funds allocated to the country was deeply regretted, and that many co-operation projects would suffer as a result.

53. While the aid budget is wholly the responsibility of the DfID, this shift in priorities will inevitably impinge on the FCO’s work in maintaining and improving strong diplomatic ties with South Africa. We were disappointed to learn from the Minister, therefore, that there had apparently been little prior consultation between DfID and the FCO on this matter, and to hear Mr Mullin dismiss the reduction as a “fairly minor irritant.”66 We believe that, although the reduction is relatively small in terms of the Government’s overall spending on development assistance, this re-allocation of funds will have a significant effect at a micro-level, in South Africa. On crude indices, South Africa is indeed a middle- income country but these figures shield gross disparities income within the country (see paragraph 16). Money spent in the Republic is likely not only to be used more effectively but could also have a positive regional impact.

54. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Foreign Office sets out how the cut in DfID’s assistance to middle-income countries will affect the Foreign Office’s work in South Africa, and whether alternative sources of funding will be available to carry on some of the very valuable work being done there. We further recommend that the FCO set out what inter-departmental consultation took place prior to the re- allocation being announced.

64 Q 184 65 Ev 80 66 Q 176–7

‘Brain drain’ 55. Professor David Simon, and others who gave evidence to the Committee, highlighted the targeted recruitment by some United Kingdom employment agencies of South African doctors, teachers and nurses as a significant annoyance to the relationship. He questioned whether this was “ethical and/or appropriate” given the UK’s concern for South Africa’s development.67 Mr Alastair Fraser, of ACTSA, echoed this concern:

it is something which enormously annoys both South Africans and the South African Government. It is quite a complex issue to try and find a solution to ... but there are numerous issues, some of them to do with the operation of British employment agencies which recruit in South Africa, both their recruiting techniques and what they are telling people the situation will be in the UK.68

It was noted by other witnesses, however, that South Africa itself has benefited from an inflow of skilled labour from other parts of the continent.69

56. Mr Mullin, in his oral evidence to us, recognised the seriousness of this problem.70 He highlighted a recent memorandum of understanding that had been signed by the South African Health Department and the National Health Service on the subject but accepted that this would not stop the aggressive tactics of some individual agencies. The Minister concluded that:

We can certainly try to make sure that some ethical standards apply and we can try to make sure that there is a two-way fertilisation between out two health services, which is one of the things which this Memorandum of Understanding attempts to address.71

57. We recommend that the Government ensure that the United Kingdom, while respecting the rights of individuals, does not denude South Africa of its much-needed skilled professionals and continue to monitor developments in this area.

67 Ev 6, para 3 68 Q 70 69 Q 70 [Blumenfeld] 70 Q 178 71 Ibid.

South Africa’s role in its region

A regional superpower? 58. Nearly all of those who gave evidence to our inquiry agreed that South Africa was undoubtedly emerging as the principal regional power in Southern Africa, and perhaps the continent as a whole. Keith Somerville, of the BBC World Service, stated that it was: “the dominant military and economic power in Southern Africa, and the most influential nation in sub-Saharan Africa.”72 Dr Jakkie Cilliers, of the South African Institute for Security Studies (SAISS), similarly said that the nation “had emerged from political and economic isolation to become the dominant power in the region.”73

59. Professor Barber highlighted three particular reasons why South Africa was able to “punch above its weight” in regional affairs: it had the “momentum of the past” (its liberation struggle) which had drawn it to the world’s attention and given it leverage with both Western and African leaders; it had the personal resources of men such as ex- President Mandela; and it was a “giant” in economic terms in comparison to its African neighbours.74 (See graph above for comparisons of the South African GDP with some of its neighbours—figure 2.) In South Africa, the economic and communications infrastructure also functions far better than in its neighbours.

60. However, all of these submissions cautioned against becoming complacent about South Africa’s ability, or willingness, to act as a regional ‘superpower’. They highlighted a number of factors, including the relative weakness of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the pressure on politicians to deal with many of the country’s domestic problems first. Perhaps most importantly, South Africa is understandably unwilling to be seen as, in the words of one commentator, “a regional bully or hegemon” seeking to dictate to the rest of the continent.75 Keith Somerville observed:

The country was also made cautious regionally by the role of the country, its armed forces and intelligence services during the end of apartheid era. South African forces had carried out raids against or intervened militarily or in support of rebels in Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana and Zimbabwe—as well as being an occupying power in Namibia.

72 Ev 106 73 Ev 109 74 Ev 4 75 Gerrit Olivier, “Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s saviour?”, International Affairs 79/4 (2003), p 822 76 Ev 107

61. It is also arguable that, following the dramatic events of 1990–94, the world community expected too much of South Africa’s ability to tackle both its own significant domestic challenges and those of the continent as a whole. In his memorandum, Professor Barber expressed this succinctly:

World leaders hurried to South Africa to bathe in its reflected glory, to identify with Mandela, and to encourage it to accept continental leadership. In the West, South Africa was hailed as Africa’s best hope of securing peace and prosperity in that troubled, poverty-plagued continent. A burden of expectation descended on the new government’s shoulders, which was enhanced by Mandela’s personal prestige—by assuming that he could achieve ends that eluded others.77

This fear of raising expectations too high was echoed in a recent speech by the Deputy President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, when he said that initial expectations of the country in 1994 were so high that a more realistic appraisal of what the country could achieve was needed.78

77 Ev 2. See also: Q 5 [Barber] 78 Q 116 [Kibble]

Figure 4: South Africa in its wider region

M e d i Algiers t e r Tunis r TUNISIA a Rabat n e Madeira Is. a n S e a (PORTUGAL) MOROCCO Tripoli

Canary Is. Cairo (SPAIN) ALGERIA LIBYAN Laayoun ARAB JAMAHIRIYA EGYPT Western Sahara R e d

S e MAURITANIA a

CAPE VERDE Nouakchott NIGER MALI ERITREA Dakar CHAD Khartoum Praia SENEGAL Lake Asmara GAMBIA Niamey Chad Bamako SUDAN den Banjul BURKINA FASO of A N'Djamena ulf Socotra DJIBOUTI G (YEMEN) Bissau Ouagadougou GUINEA-BISSAU GUINEA Djibouti B NIGERIA G E T Conakry H N ETHIOPIA

CÔTE- A I

G N Abuja Freetown N A

D'IVOIRE O SIERRA A CENTRAL Addis Ababa I LEONE Yamoussoukro L Monrovia Accra AFRICAN REPUBLIC A e Porto LIBERIA m Novo CAMEROON Bangui M Abidjan o L O Malabo S Yaoundé Lake EQUATORIAL GUINEA UGANDA Turkana Principe Lake O Albert SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE Kampala Mogadishu Sao Libreville G KENYA Tome N Sao Tome GABON O DEMOCRATIC C RWANDA Nairobi Annobón REPUBLIC (EQUATORIAL GUINEA) Kigali Lake OF THE Victoria INDIAN OCEAN Bujumbura Brazzaville CONGO BURUNDI Kinshasa Lake Pemba Amirante Is. Cabinda Dodoma Victoria (ANGOLA) Tanganyika Zanzibar ATLANTIC UNITED REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES Ascension TANZANIA (UK) Luanda Aldabra Is. Providence Is. Lake Farquhar Is. OCEAN Nyasa Moroni Agalega Is. ANGOLA COMOROS (MAURITIUS) Lilongwe ZAMBIA MALAWI E Tromelin St. Helena Lusaka U R (FRANCE) (UK) Q A I Cargados Harare B C Lake S Carajos Kariba M Antananarivo MAURITIUS ZIMBABWE A A Z G Port Louis A O NAMIBIA D Réunion BOTSWANA M A (FRANCE)

Windhoek Gaborone M Pretoria Maputo Mbabane AFRICA SWAZILAND Bloemfontein Maseru SOUTH LESOTHO AFRICA

Cape Town

0 500 1000 km

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used 0 500 1000 mi on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Map No. 4045 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS Department of Peacekeeping Operations January 2004 Cartographic Section

Southern African Development Community (SADC) Member States (Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe)

Source: UN Cartographic Section79

79 UN Cartographic Section (Africa, no. 4045 Rev. 4, January 2004), www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/index.htm (amended to highlight SADC member states)

Peace-making and peace-keeping 62. Since 1994, the South African Government has undertaken a number of initiatives, some unilateral, some in the context of regional groupings, to try to bring peace to long- standing African disputes. These have included interventions in Lesotho, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The South Africans have also becoming increasingly involved in regional peace-keeping operations, despite the weaknesses in the SANDF noted above.

63. The two largest operations South Africa is currently involved in are in Burundi and the DRC. South Africa has played a key role in helping to broker peace in the latter country, both between the internal factions and the external players involved (primarily Rwanda and Uganda). It currently has around 1,400 troops stationed there as part of the UN Mission, and its reputation is not tarnished as is that of the military forces of Zimbabwe.

64. In Burundi, South Africa is currently leading an AU peace-keeping mission in the country, along with Ethiopia and Mozambique—African Mission in Burundi (AMIB)—the first ‘African Mission’ for the AU. South Africa is supplying 1,600 of the total force strength of 3,235.80 The United Kingdom, EU and US are all supporting the peace-keeping mission, but it is undoubtedly proving a significant strain on South Africa’s financial and military resources. While in South Africa, we were told that it was hoped that the UN might be able to take a more active role in supporting the mission to reduce the burden on the participating nations.

65. The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, recently reported to the Security Council on the situation in Burundi, praising the Mission’s work there:

Despite the financial constraints that have plagued AMIB from the outset, the force has performed to the highest standards in implementing its mandate in Burundi. It has played a key role in providing an atmosphere of security and in assisting the parties to achieve progress in the disarmament process. 81

He went on to recommend strongly that the UN’s role in Burundi be expanded, to “provide the support required to consolidate the peace process.”82 The Secretary-General envisaged that the AMIB force would remain the core military component of any future mission.

United Kingdom support 66. Given the terrible impact that many long-running African conflicts have had on its peoples and the continent as a whole, South Africa’s willingness to take on the burdens of peace-keeping duties is extremely welcome. We were very pleased to note the long-term assistance that the United Kingdom has been giving to support South Africa’s emerging peace-keeping role. A British military assistance and training team (BMAT) has been working with the SANDF for eight years now.

80 African Union Document PSD/206/B/2387, www.au.org 81 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on Burundi, 16 March 2004, para 62 82 Ibid., paras 63–4

67. The supplementary memorandum we received from the FCO also noted the most recent joint exercise to take place:

Exercise AFRICAN SHIELD, a UK/South Africa joint Command Post Peace Support Operation took place from 6-26 November 2003. Around 850 personnel drawn from both countries participated and it was the largest ever bilateral military exercise on South African soil. The objective of the exercise was to practise the command and control of a peace support operation in Africa. The exercise scenario concerned a fictional country abutting South Africa, riven by civil war, needing a Chapter 7 mandated coalition of the willing to turn a fragile cease fire agreement into a permanent peace.83

Such exercises are clearly very valuable for both sides, and do much not only to strengthen capabilities but to help cement the two nations’ close working relationship. Given what we have said earlier about South Africa’s reluctance to assume the mantle of regional ‘superpower’, however, the United Kingdom must clearly guard against giving the impression that it is withdrawing from the continent and leaving the burden of such work on the shoulders of South Africa.

68. We conclude that South Africa has played a crucial and very welcome role in its conflict resolution work across the continent. It has brought new energy and focus to attempts to settle long-running disputes such as those in Burundi and the DRC. We recommend that the United Kingdom continue to offer every assistance to South Africa to strengthen its work in this vital field, while remaining fully involved in the continent itself. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the FCO set out how it sees further co-operation in the field of peace-keeping work and training of regional forces developing in the long–term.

Southern African Development Community 69. South Africa is a key member of the regional Southern African Development Community (SADC). This organisation was originally established in 1980, in part as an attempted counterweight to apartheid South Africa, and its original membership of nine has now grown to fourteen: Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa (which joined in 1994), Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.84 SADC’s objectives include the promotion of development and economic growth, the alleviation of poverty, the enhancement of the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support for the socially disadvantaged through regional integration.85

70. Since its foundation, SADC has developed a number of different institutions and embraced a wide range of ambitious programmes and targets. For example, the member states aspire to create a free trade area by 2008, a customs union by 2012 and a common

83 Ev 80 84 The Seychelles is due to leave the organisation in July 2004. 85 For further information, see: www.sadc.int.

market by 2015.86 One recent development was the signing of a Mutual Defence Pact in August last year, which aimed to promote regional co-operation in politics, defence and security. This followed on from the establishment of the SADC’s Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, which is intended to prevent conflicts and breakdown of law and order, both between and within member countries.

71. Critics, however, frequently point to the gap between protocols signed in SADC and their subsequent delivery. In a recent article, Ms Anne Hammerstad, of the South African Institute of International Affairs, highlighted this growing “credibility gap” between the rhetoric and actions of SADC, particularly in the field of security co-operation. She identified a number of key weaknesses with the organisation, including, in her opinion, its failure to engage fully with civil society and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and its lack of a common vision and identity. This was echoed by Dr Kibble who spoke of the need for a greater “SADC consciousness.”87

72. Another key weakness of the organisation highlighted in our inquiry, has been SADC’s inability to deal effectively with situations where member states disagreed or refused to be bound by majority opinion. Keith Somerville highlighted the destabilising role played by Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe in the DRC, despite the protestations of fellow SADC members such as South Africa. A number of memoranda also highlighted SADC’s unwillingness to recognise the problems in Zimbabwe or to reprimand President Mugabe in any way.88

73. Mr Mullin expressed his particular frustration at SADC’s reticence on Zimbabwe:

We are rather disappointed; they betray a level of ignorance that disappoints us. For example, last August they put out a statement calling for the EU to end its economic sanctions against Zimbabwe; there are no economic sanctions. Following the Commonwealth Conference they put out another unhelpful statement which, again, did not demonstrate a detailed knowledge of the situation.89

The Minister stressed, though, that the United Kingdom was anxious to encourage SADC, and had offered them considerable support as an organisation. This included the donation of a quarter of a million pounds to help restructure its secretariat and a further £11 million, over the next four years, towards supporting the secretariat’s regional trade and investment in integration work. The FCO was also supplying a senior adviser on tax policy for three years.

74. We conclude that SADC has the potential to play a very valuable role in helping to solve many of the challenges facing its region. If it is to realise this potential, however, and to be taken seriously as a respected international organisation, it must be willing to recognise the failings of member states whose behaviour does not meet the expectations placed upon them by SADC’s high aspirations.

86 Anne Hammerstad, “Defending the State or Protecting the People? SADC Security Integration at a Crossroads”, South African Institute of International Affairs, Report number 39, p 1 87 Q 117 [Kibble] 88 See, for example: Ev 109 [Cilliers]. 89 Q 195 [Mullin]

75. We recommend that the British Government continue to work with South Africa, as a key player in the organisation, to support SADC’s work generally and encourage it to take seriously its role in promoting good governance and respect for human rights.

South Africa and Zimbabwe

Background 76. The deteriorating human rights situation in Zimbabwe has been well-reported elsewhere.90 As time has gone by, President Robert Mugabe’s regime has shown an even greater, and more ruthless, determination to remain in power, regardless of the cost to the Zimbabwean people. Latest reports indicate that inflation there is running at almost 700% and the unofficial exchange rate is now around 5,500 Zimbabwean dollars to the US dollar.91 The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that almost 40% of the population are malnourished and it is providing food for around four million people (out of a total population of around 12½ million).92 The crackdown on the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party and all voices critical of Mr Mugabe’s government— including the last independent newspaper, The Daily News—also appears to be continuing unabated.93

77. This Committee has been involved in an ongoing inquiry into Zimbabwe since 2001, and we have produced three Reports on the country in recent years.94 In our latest Report, produced in May 2003, we devoted a section to the issue of ‘Zimbabwe in its region.’ We concluded that:

if Zimbabwe’s neighbours were fully to assume their responsibilities—for example, by imposing targeted non-trade sanctions similar to those already imposed by the EU, by some Commonwealth countries and by the United States—Mugabe's regime would be further isolated, his opponents would be encouraged and his days would be numbered. We further conclude that the Government would be entirely right to accept such a step, if it is taken, as evidence of the intention of the countries concerned to adhere to the principles to which they have committed themselves under NePAD and other international agreements, qualifying them to receive the benefits of those programmes. We recommend that Ministers take every opportunity to make this point clear to their counterparts in southern Africa.95

78. In its reply, the Government simply stated that:

The Government fully agrees. We make this point in our regular dialogue with Zimbabwe’s neighbours and other African states.96

90 See, for example: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights Annual Report 2003, Cm 5967, September 2003, pp 49–52. 91 “How Zimbabwe defies economic collapse”, Financial Times, 10 March 2004 92 See WFP website: www.wfp.org. 93 See, for example: “Zimbabwe paper off the streets”, BBC News, 6 February, 2004; “Mugabe's foes 'face constant attacks': MPs tell of threats and violence from ruling party support”, The Guardian, 9 March 2004; and “Mugabe suspends last of independent judges”, The Times, 1 March 2004. 94 Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2001–02, Zimbabwe, HC 456; Tenth Report of Session 2001–02, Zimbabwe, HC 813; and Eight Report of Session 2002–03, Zimbabwe, HC 339 95 Foreign Affairs Committee, Eight Report of Session 2002–03, Zimbabwe, HC 339, para 48 96 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Eighth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Zimbabwe, Session 2002–03: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 5869, July 2003, p 5

United Kingdom policy towards Zimbabwe 79. The policy of the United Kingdom Government towards Zimbabwe continues to be, “to maintain pressure on the Zimbabwe government to bring about a return to respect for human rights and the rule of law in the country.”97 The British Government has sought to achieve this through a variety of peaceful means. As we have noted in a previous Report, the United Kingdom’s status as the former colonial power in Zimbabwe makes any attempt to influence the situation in the country on a purely bilateral basis very difficult.98 President Mugabe has become adept at using any British criticism of his regime as an excuse for a tirade against the United Kingdom. Recently, for example, he even accused Britain and the USA, of maliciously using the internet to undermine his country’s independence and “to foment instability”.99

80. The British Government has, therefore, increasingly tended to attempt to apply pressure on President Mugabe’s Government through various international fora, a policy for which we have expressed our support.100 Most notably it has sought to garner international support for its position in the Commonwealth—from the Councils of which Zimbabwe was suspended in 2002—and the EU. In February this year, the latter organisation agreed to renew its sanctions regime against Zimbabwe and extend their scope, raising the number of senior members of President Mugabe’s regime subjected to a travel ban and asset freeze from 79 to 95.101

South African policy towards Zimbabwe 81. South Africa has taken a very different attitude from the United Kingdom towards the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe. Since the crisis began to unfold in its northern neighbour, the South African Government has pursued a policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ to achieve the same desired ends as the British Government—a return to democracy and respect for human rights. This it contrasts unfavourably with what it perceives to be the ‘megaphone diplomacy’ of the United Kingdom and the EU. South Africa, and President Mbeki in particular, have consistently refused to criticise the policies of Robert Mugabe’s that are steadily bringing his country to its knees.

82. Much of the evidence we have received for this inquiry has been highly critical of what commentators see as South Africa’s “kid glove handling” of President Mugabe, who is clearly damaging not only Zimbabwe but the whole region.102 There have been significant refugee flows out of Zimbabwe to most of its neighbours. It is estimated that there are approximately 2–3 million in South Africa alone, and that the country’s steady collapse has already cost the South African taxpayer over £1 billion.103 There is also the damage being

97 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights Annual Report 2003, Cm 5967, September 2003, p 52 98 Tenth Report of Session 2001–02, Zimbabwe, HC 813, para 43 99 Speech delivered by President Mugabe at the World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva, Switzerland, 10 December, 2003, www.itu.int/wsis. (“Internet a tool of British imperialism, says Mugabe”, The Daily Telegraph, 11 December 2003.) 100 See, for example: Foreign Affairs Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2001–02, Zimbabwe, HC 813, para 48. 101 “Zimbabwe sanctions extended by EU”, BBC News, 23 February 2004 102 Ev 110 [Cilliers]. See also: Ev 6 [Simon] and Ev 106 [Somerville]. 103 Gerrit Olivier, “Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s saviour?”, International Affairs 79, 4 (2003), p823

done to the region’s, and indeed the continent’s, reputation amongst overseas government and investors.104 As we discuss below, Zimbabwe has also soured relations within the Commonwealth and the UN.105

83. In the light of these considerations, it is even more surprising, therefore, that South Africa has almost gone out of its way to support President Mugabe’s regime in recent years. The country has repeatedly defended it at various international gatherings and meetings, and resisted all pressure to apply further pressure on the country. Most recently it did this at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Abuja late last year, which was dominated by the issue.106 He expressed his anger at the organisation’s unwillingness to agree to this request in a strongly-worded public letter, in which he blamed the United Kingdom and its protection of its white “kith and kin” for the situation in Zimbabwe. 107 He also stated that the land issue was central to the crisis, even going so far as to say that: “With everything having failed to restore the land to its original owners in a peaceful manner, a forcible process of land redistribution perhaps became inevitable.”108

Reasons underlying South Africa’s policy 84. A number of those who have provided evidence to this inquiry, and to whom we spoke while in South Africa, attempted to explain why South Africa had failed to take a tougher line with Zimbabwe. Some of the reasons given included:

x regional solidarity—President Mbeki’s pride in being an African and his strong belief in ‘African solutions to African problems,’ makes him unwilling to be seen as bending to the demands of the West over an African issue (being the “West’s poodle” as one memorandum observed).109 As noted above, South Africa is also constrained by its fears of being seen as a regional superpower, dictating to its smaller neighbours.110

x shared history—the West has arguably failed to recognise the impact of the two nations’ shared struggle for freedom. ACTSA highlighted the fact that up to 80,000 Zimbabweans died during the country’s independence struggle, and it also provided much-needed aid to those fighting for freedom in South Africa and Namibia.111

x land reform—this is still an extremely contentious issue in both countries, with a great deal of resentment over the past unequal distribution of land and resources.112

104 Ev 109 [Cilliers]. See also: Ev 44 [Kibble] and Q157 [Paterson]. 105 See paras 111–2, 115 106 Ev 44 [Kibble] 107 President Thabo Mbeki, “We will resist the upside-down view of Africa”, ANC Today, volume 3, no. 49 (12-18 December) www.anc.org.za 108 Ibid. 109 Ev 44 [Kibble], Ev 3 [Barber] and Q 19 [Barber] 110 Ev 21, para 4.8 [ACTSA] 111 See, for example: Ev 21 [ACTSA] and Q 96 [Dowden]. 112 See, for example: Ev 44 [Kibble], Ev 17 [ACTSA] and Q 96 [ Dowden].

x the West’s ‘double standards’—there is anger that the West appears to be so active on the issue of Zimbabwe, while apparently ignoring issues of, arguably, far more pressing importance for Southern African nations, such as the adverse impact of globalisation.113

x popularity of Mugabe—surprisingly, the ZANU-PF Government and Robert Mugabe, in particular, remain very popular among large sections of South Africans. In some quarters he is even viewed as the only African leader to have really stood up to the West and to have actively reversed the legacy of colonialism.114

85. The domestic implications for the ANC Government of criticising President Mugabe and the dangers of regional destabilisation following any change of government in Zimbabwe were similarly raised as possible considerations.115 While in South Africa we were also told that, while publicly South African ministers refused to criticise Mugabe, meetings were frequently held in secret between representatives of the two governments at which far more frank exchanges of views took place.

86. It is difficult to assess which of these reasons, if any, are the most compelling for the South African Government. The evidence we heard during our inquiry suggested that it was the first of the suggestions given above—the strength of African solidarity—that was the most important factor in President Mbeki’s stance on Zimbabwe. Professor Barber described an unwritten law, whereby “African states do not turn on each other in international fora, but close ranks when attacks are made against one of them.”116 Professor Gerrit Olivier, of the University of Pretoria, went further in a recent article, stating that the South African Government, “meticulously respects the sovereignty of African countries, viewing judgement on their human rights records, however odious and harmful, as unwarranted interference in their domestic affairs.”117

87. Alternatively, though, it was suggested to us while in South Africa, that the Government’s view was strongly shaped by the country’s own experiences of national reconciliation and rebirth from 1987 to 1994. During that period two almost implacably opposed groups—the ANC and the ruling National Party—had sat down together in private talks (initially in completely secret negotiations) and slowly thrashed out the agreement which eventually brought apartheid to an end. The current ANC Government, it is suggested, sees similar private talks between the two main parties in Zimbabwe— ZANU-PF and the MDC—allowing them to resolve the situation gradually and in their own time, as the only real way to make progress.

88. Our visit to South Africa also showed us, at first hand, the strength of feeling that exists over the third point identified above: land reform. Many of the interlocutors to whom we spoke, clearly believed sincerely that what was happening in Zimbabwe primarily centred on the issue of righting colonial wrongs and restoring land to those from whom it had been

113 See, for example: Ev 44 [Kibble] and Q 15 [Hamilton]. 114 See, for example: Ev 1 [Barber] and Q 15 [Barber]. 115 See, for example: Ev 44 [Kibble], Ev 1 [Barber], Q 96 [Dowden] and Q 102 [Kibble]. 116 Ev 5 [Barber] 117 Gerrit Olivier, “Is Thabo Mbeki Africa’s saviour?”, International Affairs 79/4 (2003), p 817

taken seventy-odd years previously. In addition, many argued strongly that the United Kingdom, instead of concentrating on criticising Mugabe, should be looking to pay its fair share for land reform.

89. Parenthetically, it is worth noting that we investigated the issue of land reform in Zimbabwe thoroughly in our previous reports on Zimbabwe and identified clearly that the United Kingdom had been keen to fund equitable land re-distribution, but was unwilling simply to pour money into the pockets of Mugabe’s henchmen.118 It is clear, however, that this conclusion has not been accepted by many in South Africa, nor on the continent more widely.

Signs of change 90. There are indications that while President Mugabe remains popular among many South Africans, domestic concern is growing over the damage he is doing to his own country and the region. Most of Southern Africa’s churches have spoken out against South Africa’s support for Mugabe, for example. Archbishop Desmond Tutu recently made a veiled criticism of the Government for ignoring the human rights violations in Zimbabwe.119

91. Some of South Africa’s fellow African states also appear to be losing patience with Robert Mugabe. Relations between Zimbabwe and Botswana, in particular, have steadily declined in the past few months and the Botswanan Government is currently building a security fence along its 500 km border with Zimbabwe, which will have the effect of impeding the flow of refugees.120 The Nigerian President, President Olusegun Obasanjo, made clear to President Mugabe that he would not be welcome at the recent CHOGM in Abuja.121

The way forward? 92. At present, it is difficult to see how South Africa’s handling of Zimbabwe will develop in the future. On the one hand, the majority of our evidence suggests that if any outside force has influence on the thinking and actions of Robert Mugabe’s Government, it is South Africa. It has been argued that, were it willing, South Africa could use a number of levers on President Mugabe’s regime, not least through its supply of the vast majority of Zimbabwe’s power:

They do not even have to turn off the lights, just remind them that all their electricity comes from South Africa by turning them off for an hour in the evening from time to time. There are a 1,001 ways: they could tighten the border, they could put patrols on the border to pick up Zimbabweans coming across. There are 1,001 ways in

118 Foreign Affairs Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2001–02, Zimbabwe, HC 813, para 7 ff. 119 “Tutu hits out at Mugabe’s African supporter”, Daily Telegraph, 16 December 2003 120 See also: SA 6 [Somerville] and Ev 112 [Lemon]. 121 Ev 44 [Kibble]

which neighbouring countries, where one is very big and powerful, can send messages very simply.122

93. On the other hand, many South Africans we spoke to argued that the United Kingdom, and the West generally, was over-estimating the influence they had over Zimbabwe; if they spoke out too strongly, they would simply be ignored. They also felt that there was a lack of understanding for their situation as a neighbour. Their position has been summed up by one commentator thus:

A tightening economic squeeze, which only South Africa had the capacity to impose, would have hastened the political and economic implosion of Zimbabwe, might have rebounded on Pretoria to disastrous effect via a mass influx of refugees, disrupted trade links and caused generalised chaos on the borders.123

Also, given what we have already said about the constraints on South Africa’s freedom of action owing to its history and political outlook, such radical options as turning off the lights would appear to be ruled out in practice.

94. As to how the United Kingdom should act on this very difficult issue, our witnesses were generally clear:

one of the mistakes we could make would be believing that British pressure on South Africa to put pressure on Zimbabwe would be a positive thing ... South African quiet diplomacy should be more balanced, much clearer condemnation of human rights abuses in Zimbabwe for example. But South Africa being seen to act in response to a United Kingdom demand for it to do so is likely to be extremely counter-productive. ... Every time the megaphones come out in the UK, it tends to have an unfortunate result, whatever the intention.124

We also received this impression during our visit to South Africa from those to whom we spoke.

95. In his oral evidence to us, Mr Mullin made clear the United Kingdom’s doubts about South Africa’s policy of ‘quiet diplomacy:

I cannot, at the moment, point to any seriously positive outcome and previous predictions that there would be a positive outcome have not so far born fruit, but I do not necessarily put that down to any lack of effort on President Mbeki’s part but to a particular stubbornness on the part of Mr Mugabe125

He stated explicitly, though, that he did not believe that South Africa was neglecting its responsibility toward Zimbabwe:

if anybody has influence over Mr Mugabe then President Mbeki would be the one, but Mr Mugabe is a very stubborn man and he has brought his country to the edge of

122 Q 107 [Dowden] 123 James Hamill, “South Africa and Zimbabwe”, Contemporary Review, July 2002, vol 281 (1638), p36 124 Q 71 [Fraser] 125 Q 202

ruin. There is cause to doubt whether he would listen to anyone: his former comrades in South Africa, let alone advice that comes freely from Western Europe or America or somewhere else. ...

It is certainly not our position ... that the South Africans are doing nothing to help in Zimbabwe; they are.126

96. We conclude that: a) South Africa and the United Kingdom unquestionably share the same objective for Zimbabwe—the return to a fully-functioning and economically vibrant democracy that respects the human rights of its citizens; b) South Africa is acting in the manner it sincerely believes to be the most effective and the most likely to bring about the desired goal identified above; c) the situation of the Zimbabwean people will continue to deteriorate unless effective pressure is brought to bear on the Government of Robert Mugabe to change its disastrous and self-seeking policies, and South Africa is the best placed external force to stimulate that change; and d) South Africa, and the region more generally, will continue to suffer from Zimbabwe’s plight until such a change takes place, not least by deterring much- needed foreign direct investment.

97. We recommend that the British Government: a) continue to maintain the strongest possible pressure on the Zimbabwean Government to respect the human rights of its citizens and to call free and fair elections, especially through multilateral means; b) recognise the importance of South Africa in achieving a long-term solution to the severe crisis affecting Zimbabwe; c) seek the closest possible co-operation with South Africa on achieving the mutually desired outcome of a peaceful and democratic Zimbabwe; and d) seek to promote a greater understanding of its genuine concerns about Zimbabwe in South Africa, and elsewhere on the continent, and the facts about the land reform issue.

126 QQ 201 and 204

South Africa’s international role

98. One of the most dramatic signs of South’s Africa post-apartheid ‘rebirth’ has been the country’s reappearance on the world stage. Before 1994, South African foreign policy was largely concerned with defending and justifying apartheid abroad. The result was the country’s exclusion from a host of international organisations and the imposition of boycotts and sanctions, such as the ban on sporting contacts, the UN arms embargo and EU sanctions. However, since the holding of the first free and fair elections under universal suffrage, South Africa has assumed a key role in nearly all the major continental and international organisations. We have discussed its role in SADC above (paras 69–75) and here concentrate on its work within three key fora: the African Union, the Commonwealth and the United Nations.

The African Union 99. The African Union (AU) replaced the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) at the Durban Summit of African leaders in July 2002.127 In the Sirte Declaration, which called for the establishment of the AU, African heads of state and government argued that a revitalised body was needed to accelerate: “the process of integration in the continent to enable it play its rightful role in the global economy while addressing multifaceted social, economic and political problems compounded as they are by certain negative aspects of globalisation.”128 There are currently 53 members of the African Union. The ‘vision’ of the Union is described as follows:

x The AU is Africa’s premier institution and principal organization for the promotion of accelerated socio-economic integration of the continent, which will lead to greater unity and solidarity between African countries and peoples.

x The AU is based on the common vision of a united and strong Africa and on the need to build a partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector, in order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion amongst the peoples of Africa.

x As a continental organization it focuses on the promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent as a prerequisite for the implementation of the development and integration agenda of the Union.129

100. The AU has inherited a number of institutions from the old OAU, and developed several others, partly modelled on those of the EU. These include the Assembly, Executive Council, Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Commission, which is based at the AU’s Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. On 18 March this year, the Pan-African

127 “The African Union legally came into being in May 2001 but its formal launch took place in Durban in July 2002. The last Assembly of Heads of State from the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was held on 8 July 2002. It was immediately followed by the Inaugural Summit of the African Union from 9-10 July 2002.” Ev 69, para 24 128 For further details, see: www.africa-union.org/home. 129 Ibid.

Parliament also held its inaugural meeting. This assembly is made up of five Members (at least one of whom is a woman) from the legislatures of each member state of the Union which has ratified the relevant protocol. 130 One of the Union’s key policies has been the New Partnership for Africa (NePAD), which is discussed at length below (see paragraphs 122–41). The organisation is currently headed by President Joaquim Chissanó of Mozambique.

101. Two recent developments have also strengthened the Union’s commitment to promoting human rights and conflict resolution in the continent. In January this year, 15 AU members (including South Africa) agreed to create an African Court of Human and People’s Rights.131 This move has generally been welcomed by human rights organisations as an important step forward in tackling human rights abuses on the continent. However, they stress that the court will need ‘teeth’ and the co-operation of member states if it is to be effective.

102. Meeting in February in Libya, AU leaders also agreed to the creation of an African peace-keeping force. This will eventually consist of five brigades of soldiers, policemen and military observers—in total approximately 15,000 people—to be led by South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt. The force will be directed by the PSC, which came into being last year, and has 15 members drawn from across the Union’s membership. It is hoped that the new body will be able both to tackle present conflicts in the continent, such as that in Uganda, and help prevent future clashes arising.132 It is also part of the Union’s wider commitment to create ‘African solutions to African problems’, without having to resort to outside nations for assistance.

103. As the FCO noted in its memorandum to the Committee, South Africa (and President Thabo Mbeki in particular) has played an “active role in taking forward change” in the revitalisation of the OAU and participates fully in all the activities of the new African Union.133 President Mbeki served as the Union’s first Chairperson from July 2002 to July 2003, and has been especially active in the creation of the African peace-keeping force discussed above.

104. In his oral evidence to the Committee, Mr Mullin stated that he was “mildly optimistic” about the new organisation, and the change from the old OAU:

It has changed from an organisation that was mainly concerned with African solidarity and sweeping problems under the carpet to an organisation that now genuinely acknowledges the problems on their continent and the recognition that Africans must increasingly take responsibility for resolving them.134

The Minister had previously outlined to the House, in answer to a written question, how the United Kingdom was supporting the organisation: £1,089,745 to the AU Conflict

130 “Inaugural and the First Session of the Pan-African Parliament”, Africa Union press release No. 019/2004, 19 March 2004 131 See, for example: “African rights court’s slow start”, BBC News, 25 January 2004. 132 “Coping with conflict,” The Economist, 17 January 2004; “Africa leaders agree joint force”, BBC News, 28 February 2004; and “How to put the house in order—an African peacekeeping force”, The Economist, 13 March 2004 133 Ev 69, para 24 134 Q 208

Management Centre and the its wider peacekeeping work (£5.9 million to the African Mission in Burundi), plus some small-scale support to the Union’s administrative work.135

105. Some commentators have, however, questioned whether the Union’s worthy ambitions will bring about genuine change on the continent. Concerns have been expressed that the aspiration of promoting genuine continental integration is somewhat over-ambitious. Professor Simon, for example, told us, that: “My sense is that in many parts of the region, there would be greater support for the more geographically-specific regional economic initiatives, like SADC and ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] because they are more coherent.”136

106. We conclude that the African Union holds the potential to deliver significant improvements in the standard of life for Africans, and should be fully supported by the United Kingdom and the EU. The recent creation of an African court of human rights and the agreement on a continental peace-keeping force are to be particularly welcomed, demonstrating, as they do, a commitment to tackle some of the most fundamental problems facing Africa at this time. South Africa has played a crucial role in all these developments.

107. We recommend that the Government continue to work with South Africa, and all its African partners, to assist the AU in realising the impressive ambitions it has set for itself.

Commonwealth 108. Under Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd—architect of ‘Grand apartheid’—South Africa left the Commonwealth in 1961, shortly after the country had become a republic.137 This voluntary departure pre-empted the country’s anticipated expulsion from the organisation, following the growing revulsion of the world community at the policies of Verwoerd’s administration. It was with great joy, therefore, that the Commonwealth welcomed South Africa back into its councils in 1994, under the leadership of Nelson Mandela—the man who had done so much to fight the evil of Verwoerd’s legacy.

109. South Africa is now a key member of the Commonwealth, taking an active role in all aspects of the group’s work. It served as Chair of the Commonwealth from 1999–2002. South Africa was also a member of the ten-country High Level Group of member states, which was established at the 1999 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Durban to review the role of the Commonwealth in the 21st Century.138

110. Professor Simon told us that South Africa valued its role within the Commonwealth:

135 HC Deb, 22 January 2004, col 1417W 136 Q 22 137 Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd (1901–1966) was Prime Minister of South Africa from 1958 to 1966, when he was assassinated. During his premiership the Sharpeville Massacre took place, the African National Congress and Pan- Africanist Congress were banned, South Africa became a republic and Nelson Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment. He is chiefly remembered as the ‘architect of apartheid’. 138 The group also included Australia, India, Malta, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Trinidad & Tobago, the United Kingdom, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. For the Group’s final report, see: “Report by the Commonwealth High Level Review Group to Commonwealth Heads Of Government, Coolum, Australia”, March 2002, www.chogm.org/chogm2002.

President Mbeki himself sees it very much as one of a suite of global multilateral institutions where South Africa can play a pivotal role, often as a broker between if you like the old Commonwealth and the new Commonwealth.139

He felt that South Africa had particularly welcomed the accession of Mozambique and Cameroon in 1995, neither of which had been British colonies or protectorates, as a sign of the Commonwealth assuming a “wider role than simply a former British ex-colonial club.”140 Professor Barber agreed with this assessment and stressed the role that South Africa sees itself playing in the Commonwealth, and other such international fora, as that of “a bridge-builder between the first and third worlds.”141 This view of the Commonwealth as a valuable means of allowing developed and developing nations from across the globe to interact was also echoed during our visit to South Africa.142

111. As noted above (para 80), the most recent high-profile Commonwealth meeting, the CHOGM held at Abuja in December last year, once again brought differences in opinion to the fore on the vexed question of Zimbabwe.143 Although the meeting eventually agreed on continuing Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Council of the Commonwealth for another year, this result was not achieved without considerable acrimony. President Mbeki himself was reported to have been particularly angry at the decision, and the weekly public letter he wrote shortly after the meeting’s conclusion reflected fully his views on the subject.144 (President Mugabe announced that Zimbabwe would leave the Commonwealth with immediate effect, following the meeting’s decision.145)

112. We agree with Mr Mullin, who stated in his evidence to us that, “the entire Zimbabwe issue poisons everything it touches.”146 He was confident, however, that the situation was not irredeemable:

What I took heart from was that actually most African countries went along—it was done by consensus in the end, as you know—with maintaining the suspension. However, there were some fairly tough arguments and if it did do any damage I think it was only temporary.147

He also rejected strongly the criticism, which had been reported to us, that the United Kingdom delegation to CHOGM could have achieved more in relation to Zimbabwe, with better preparation and a greater willingness to engage fully with other partners.148

139 Q 29 140 Ibid. 141 Q 29. Also see: Ev 110 [Mills]. 142 All the states of the immediate region are now members of the Commonwealth, with the exception of Angola. Namibia only had a narrow connection with the Commonwealth previously, through the responsibility of the Cape Colony for the administration of Walvis Bay. Mozambique is the only totally non-English speaking member of he association, although Cameroon is predominantly Francophone. 143 For further details of the Abuja meeting, see: www.chogm2003.info. 144 President Thabo Mbeki, “We will resist the upside-down view of Africa”, ANC Today, volume 3, no. 49 (12–18 December), available at: www.anc.org.za. 145 “Zimbabwe quits Commonwealth” BBC News, 8 December 2003 146 Q 210 147 Ibid. 148 Q 211

113. We conclude that South Africa plays a crucial role as a leading member of the Commonwealth, actively supporting the organisation’s aim of bridging the gap between the developed and developing worlds and supporting global respect for human rights. The recent disagreements over Zimbabwe at Commonwealth meetings—the issue that “poisons everything it touches”—should not be allowed to damage the organisation’s very valuable work, nor the UK’s working relationship with South Africa within the body. We recommend that the British Government seek every possible opportunity to restore any damage done to inter-Commonwealth relations by the recent disagreements at the Abuja CHOGM, while maintaining the organisation’s tough stance on Robert Mugabe’s continuing human rights abuses.

United Nations 114. South Africa has similarly played a full role as member of the United Nations. The Foreign Office described it as a “major player”, both in the Group of 77 nations at the UN (the G77) and in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), of which it was chair from 1998 to 2003. 149 South Africa has also hosted two major recent UN conferences: the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) in Durban, in 2001;150 and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg in 2002—the biggest meeting ever organised by the UN.151

UNCHR 115. In 2003, South Africa was the co-ordinator for the African Group at the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). In our Report on the FCO Human Rights Annual Report 2002, the Committee noted that:

The UNCHR is the UN’s main forum for the discussion of human rights. It has 53 members, elected by the wider UN membership, and meets annually in Geneva in March or April each year to, “examine, monitor and publicly report either on human rights situations in specific countries or territories or on major phenomena of human rights violations worldwide.” The 2002 plenary session of the Commission was not a successful one. The FCO described it as: “a highlycharged, confrontational session with voting... split between developed and developing countries.” It reported that many resolutions regarded by the United Kingdom and EU as important were defeated and that much use was made of procedural devices to inhibit the Commission’s work.152

The latest FCO Annual Report on Human Rights stated that although prospects for the 2003 session of the Commission “seemed even less promising,” it was “less politicised than

149 The Group of 77 (G77) was established in 1964 by seventy-seven developing countries at the end of the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It gradually developed into a permanent institutional structure. Although the membership of the organisation has increased to 135 countries, the original name has been retained. For further details, see: www.g77.org. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was established in 1955, and aims to represent the political, economic and cultural interests of the developing world. It now has 116 members, drawn from across the globe. 150 For further details, see: www.un.org/WCAR. 151 For further details, see: www.johannesburgsummit.org. 152 Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2002–03, Human Rights Annual Report 2002, HC 257, para 79

many had expected.”153 The Commission successfully passed motions on the situation in countries such as Burma, North Korea and Turkmenistan. However, once again, and this time under the co-ordination of South Africa, the African Group of nations prevented all discussion of an EU resolution on Zimbabwe by means of a procedural motion.154 The “poison” of Zimbabwe disrupts the work of yet another important international body.

116. We conclude that the role South Africa has played at the UNCHR to prevent even the discussion of resolutions that address the appalling human rights situation in Zimbabwe is deeply regrettable, especially in light of the very positive involvement it has with the rest of the UN’s work, and could be damaging to South Africa’s wider interests.

UN Reform 117. South Africa, like many UN member states, argues that the organisation is in need of fundamental organisational reform. The United Kingdom shares this concern and has set out its proposals for possible improvements on a number of occasions.155 Both nations stress that any reform should encompass the whole organisation, but public attention on this issue has largely been focused on reform of the Security Council.

118. At present, the UN Security Council reflects the post-war balance of power. It has five permanent members—the Peoples’ Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the USA—plus ten other, non-permanent, members on a rotating basis. The five permanent members have the power of veto over all business. Many commentators feel that the permanent membership fails to reflect the realities of the world in the twenty-first century. The dominance of European nations among the five has caused particular annoyance.

119. The British Government has committed itself to expanding the Council to include “new permanent members who represent the regional realities of the modern world.”156 Such “realities” are largely interpreted as adding, at least, one new permanent member from South America, Africa and an additional one from Asia. In a recent debate in the House, the FCO Minister Bill Rammell indicated that the United Kingdom supported the principle of India and Brazil’s permanent membership of a reformed Council.157

120. It is generally accepted that South Africa would be, as one witness described, the “natural inheritor” of any African seat in the Security Council.158 It has demonstrated repeatedly that it would have the necessary resources, international respect and commitment to multilateralism to fully justify a place at the table. Chris Mullin indicated that the Government certainly supported an African seat on the Security Council and that South Africa would be an “obvious candidate.”159 However, he recognised that this was not

153 FCO, Human Rights Annual Report 2003, Cm 5967, September 2003, pp 111–2 154 Ev 70, para 27 [FCO] 155 See, for example: FCO, The United Kingdom in the United Nations, Cm 5898, September 2003. 156 Ibid., p 44 157 HC Deb, 11 November 2003, col 205 158 Q 33 [Barber] 159 Q 212

for him to determine. As we were told during meetings in South Africa, this will be a matter for African nations to settle amongst themselves. They may well compromise on a rotating seat for the continent.

121. We conclude that the arguments for reform at the United Nations, particularly at the Security Council, are undeniable. We also conclude that were there to be an ‘African seat’ on the Council, South Africa would be amongst the strongest African candidates, filling nearly all of the criteria for such a position. We recognise, though, that this will be a matter for African nations themselves to settle when the time arises.

South Africa and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NePAD 122. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NePAD) was officially launched at a meeting of African Heads of State and Government in Nigeria in October 2001. It had developed previously under a number of different names, including the New African Initiative (NAI) and the Millennium African Renaissance Programme (MAP).160 From the outset, NePAD has aspired not to be simply another funding mechanism, but more an “agenda for change” within the continent.161 NePAD’s founding document states:

This New Partnership for Africa’s Development is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world. ...

We are convinced that an historic opportunity presents itself to end the scourge of underdevelopment that afflicts Africa. The resources, including capital, technology and human skills, that are required to launch a global war on poverty and underdevelopment exist in abundance and are within our reach. What is required to mobilise these resources and to use them properly, is bold and imaginative leadership that is genuinely committed to a sustained human development effort and the eradication of poverty, as well as a new global partnership based on shared responsibility and mutual interest. ...

We will determine our own destiny and call on the rest of the world to complement our efforts.162

123. The stated aims of the programme are:

a) to eradicate poverty;

b) to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development;

c) to halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process and enhance its full and beneficial integration into the global economy; and

d) to accelerate the empowerment of women.163

160 For further details, see: www.nepad.org. 161 Ibid. 162 NePAD Framework Document, October 2001, p 1, www.nepad.org/en.html 163 “NePAD in Brief”, www.nepad.org

These ambitions will be achieved through a number of means, including: good governance, African ownership and leadership, partnership within and without the continent, regional and continental integration, and increased competitiveness of African countries and the continent. In July 2003, African leaders agreed that, as a reflection of the programme’s ‘African-ness’, NePAD would be integrated into the newly-formed AU within the following two to three years.

124. South Africa, and President Thabo Mbeki in particular, has been at the forefront of NePAD’s development, chairing its Steering Committee and the sub-committee on Peace and Security. South Africa also supplies NePAD’s secretariat, which is currently based in Pretoria. The FCO described the country as “a founding nation” of NePAD, and stated that “President Mbeki has mobilised support for NePAD among African and international leaders.”164 In an article on NePAD, Mr James Hamill, of the University of Leicester similarly stressed President Mbeki’s crucial contribution to NePAD:

The strong ‘Africanist flavour of NePAD, with its emphasis on restoring African pride and responsibility, coupled with an astute grasp of global dynamics and the desire to position Africa within the international mainstream, perfectly captures the political philosophy of South African President Thabo Mbeki.165

African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) 125. One element of NePAD that sets it apart from many previous schemes is that progress towards the aspirations of NePAD by individual African countries will be monitored by peer review: the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The mandate and purpose of the APRM are set out clearly in the Memorandum of Understanding signed by participating nations:

the mandate of the African Peer Review Mechanism is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance. ...

the primary purpose of the APRM is to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building.166

126. The reviews will be overseen and directed by a panel of seven “Eminent Persons”— Africans who have distinguished themselves in relevant fields. Only those countries who volunteer to undergo the process will be scrutinised under the APRM. To date, sixteen African nations have volunteered: Algeria; Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Republic of Congo; Ethiopia; Gabon; Ghana; Kenya; Mali; Mauritius; Mozambique; Nigeria; Rwanda; Senegal;

164 Ev 70, para 29. See also: Ev 109, para 2 [Cilliers]. 165 James Hamill, “Despots or Aid “, The World Today, vol 58 (6) (June 2002), p 17 166 Memorandum of Understanding on the African Peer Review Mechanism, paras 6 and 8, www.nepad.org

South Africa; and Uganda.167 Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius and Rwanda will be among the first countries to be reviewed.

Response of the United Kingdom and the G8 127. In its memorandum to this inquiry, the Foreign Office stated emphatically that:

the United Kingdom Government strongly supports NePAD. We recognise that NePAD is a long-term agenda requiring substantial engagement and political commitment.168

Like other members of the G8, the UK’s response to NePAD is primarily channelled through the G8 Africa Action Plan.169 This document was agreed at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, in July 2002.170 It welcomed NePAD as a “bold and clear-sighted vision of Africa’s development,” and agreed that it provided “an historic opportunity to overcome obstacles to development in Africa.”171

128. While the G8 nations set out a range of responses to NePAD in areas such as peace and security, governance, trade, health and education, it is noteworthy that the Partnership was primarily seen by the member nations as:

first and foremost, a pledge by African Leaders to the people of Africa to consolidate democracy and sound economic management, and to promote peace, security and people-centred development. African Leaders have personally directed its creation and implementation. They have formally undertaken to hold each other accountable for its achievement. They have emphasized good governance and human rights as necessary preconditions for Africa's recovery.172

Progress on the Action Plan was reviewed at the G8’s next summit in Evian, in June 2003, and is due to be discussed again later this year at the Sea Island Summit, in the USA.173

129. As the FCO notes in its submission, the United Kingdom has been strongly involved both in drafting the G8’s original response to NePAD and in ensuring that it remained on the Group’s agenda for future meetings. Indeed many commentators, both inside and out of Africa, see the United Kingdom, and the Prime Minister in particular, as NePAD’s principal ‘champion’ in the West.

167 Angola recently indicated that it too wished to participate in the APRM (Q 216 [Mullin]) but it has yet to sign the Memorandum of Understanding. 168 Ev 71, para 38 169 The other seven members of the G8 are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States of America. 170 G8 Africa Action Plan, agreed at the G8 Summit, Kananaskis, Canada, on 27 June 2002, available at: www.g8.gc.ca. 171 Ibid., para 1 172 Ibid., para 3 173 For further details, see: www.g8.fr/evian/english/home.html and www.g8usa.gov

What difference will NePAD make?

Value of NePAD 130. The evidence we have received for this inquiry reflects a wide range of views on NePAD, and the G8’s response. ACTSA, in its written evidence, told us that it represented: “a unique opportunity for the leaders of the world’s richest nations to turn their grand rhetoric into concrete change for poor people in Africa.”174 Mr James Hammill, in his article on NePAD, similarly believed that, at least initially, the scheme had encouraged “cautious optimism,” in the developed and developing worlds, as it represented a much greater commitment from the richest countries toward Africa than previously shown. It was also “essentially an indigenous scheme formulated by African leaders themselves,” far better than previous, “externally imposed, often paternalistic and certainly deeply resented ‘solutions’.”175

131. However, NePAD seems to suffer severely from being different things to different people (one of our witnesses used the simile of the “elephant being investigated by blind men”176). To African nations it is, arguably, seen as a way of securing much-needed development assistance, inward investment and better access to global markets. To the G8 it is seen as a way of achieving their principal objectives for the continent: better governance and improved respect for human rights. As Professor Simon observed:

Since its inception, NePAD has struggled both to establish effective structures for the achievement of its strategic objectives, and to combine the need to win donor support with the variety of alternative visions of African development that have the support of various governments.”177

Importance of the APRM 132. In particular, much debate has focused on the viability and effectiveness of the APRM. As noted above, it was this innovative feature of NePAD that drew much attention from the G8, as a sign that African leaders were finally serious about ‘putting their own house in order’. Indeed, Mr Mullin, in his oral evidence to us, went so far as to describe the “rigour” of the APRM as the “key test” for NePAD as far as the British Government was concerned.178

133. While G8 members have been stressing this element of the Partnership, though, the evidence presented to us suggests that African leaders have been growing less enthusiastic, stressing that the Mechanism is voluntary and steadily limiting its scope of scrutiny.179 One memorandum stated, for example, that: “there is little doubt that it [NePAD] has met with resistance in much of Africa, where its good governance message is seen as a threat in some

174 Ev 24, para 7 [ACTSA] 175 James Hamill, “Despots or Aid “, The World Today, vol 58 (6) (June 2002), p 17 176 Q 90 [Dowden] 177 Ev 6 178 Q 216 179 See, for example: Ev 98 [Taylor].

quarters.” 180 The President of Senegal, Mr Abdoulaye Wade, was recently reported as calling into question the peer review mechanism. He apparently believes that it will be undermined by the length of time needed, the absence of objective norms and the lack of any sanctions to make countries comply.181 As Mr Dowden told us, in his oral evidence:

[NePAD] will not do anything for the ones who do not want to change themselves. It is a key, but the individual countries have to turn that key in the lock.182

134. It has also been suggested to us that South Africa has contributed to confusion among donor states by arguing that the AU would now be responsible for political peer review, confining NePAD’s APRM merely to the economic field. Dr Ian Taylor, of the University of Botswana, in his memorandum stated that:

Such a position contradicts both one of the main selling points of the NePAD and what Mbeki had postured previously. ... NePAD was sold to its Western partners on the basis that it would advance democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance and that such principles would be guided and monitored through the establishment of a ‘peer review mechanism.’ ... serious questions as to what exactly is the point of NePAD if all it is going to do is review economic progress in Africa are now being asked.183

He went on to argue that this apparent revision of the role of the APRM would result in the programme being seen merely a ‘rubber stamp,’ and that it has already led to a “palpable cooling off of the world’s community for the NePAD.”184 This concern has been echoed by others.185 This is unfortunate. Africa has to prove itself attractive to the world investor community at a time of intense competition.

135. A number of critics have highlighted the failure of NePAD, and South Africa in particular, to tackle its first serious challenge: Zimbabwe. Dr Cilliers stated that:

South Africa’s kid glove handling of Zimbabwe’s governing elite has served as a reality check for many of Africa’s development partners in terms of their expectations of NePAD and prospects for the African Peer Review Mechanism.186

This view was echoed by Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld in his oral evidence:

NePAD is about improving good governance and the South African Government almost seems to be saying, ‘Zimbabwe is such a special case we just cannot deal with that under NePAD, it is too complicated.’187

180 Ev 112 [Mills] 181 “Senegal’s president questions 'peer reviews'”, Financial Times, 29 November 2003 182 Q 91 183 Ev 98 184 Ibid. 185 See, for example: Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, “The Future of Africa: A New order in Sight?”, Adelphi Papers 361 (November 2003), p55 186 Ev 109 187 Q 75

Another observer summed the situation up succinctly: “Africa can embrace the requirements and benefits of the NePAD programme, or it can embrace Mugabe, but it cannot embrace both.”188

Response of the G8 136. Criticism has, however, also been levelled at the response of the G8 to NePAD. Professor Simon suggested that the 2003 G8 Evian Summit was:

felt to be disappointing by both sides. NePAD and the African communities were looking for some concrete evidence of G8 commitment ... and, vice-versa, they were looking for progress on peer review mechanism, but at the moment there is this kind of dancing around but nobody is prepared to take the first step and say, ‘We are going forward.’189

137. ACTSA, in its oral and written evidence, went further. It warned against NePAD, and the APRM in particular, “being used as yet another form of conditionality, shaping African societies and economies for the benefit of the G8, instead of Africans.”190 Mr Fraser, of ACTSA, also told us that NePAD set out an, “ambitious challenge,” to the EU and USA to reform the unfair trading conditions which prevent access to the developing world to overseas markets:

The interesting thing about the G8 response to NePAD is that it has attempted to ignore entirely that structural debate and to shift focus on to the issues which interest us.

He also went on to say:

The G8 has within its power to completely kill NEPAD off and I think it is doing a good job of it so far, because its response to the structural challenges has been so disappointing, on debt, on trade, and even on the promises it has made on aid or aid for AIDS specifically, it is either “No Comment” or it is an empty promise.191

These concerns were echoed in part by Mr Dowden. He highlighted the progress that had been made in improving governance in a number of African states (Ghana and Botswana), which were, he argued, not being recognised by the G8 as something that should be rewarded.192

138. Doubts were also raised about the level of commitment to NePAD from different members of the G8. Dr Steve Kibble told us, for example, that Americans had “more or less abandoned” NePAD.193

188 James Hamill, “Despots or Aid?”, The World Today, vol 58(6) (June 2002), p19 189 Q 40 190 Ev 24 191 Q 79 192 Q 95 193 Q 90. See also: Q 90 [Dowden]; and Q 94 [Dowden].

139. The Minister for Africa, Chris Mullin MP, recognised some of these doubts about the G8’s response to NePAD:

I am sure there is possibly some concern that all members are not pulling in the same direction at the same speed. I think everyone is pulling in the same direction but not necessarily at the same speed.194

He did, however, stress that the Government, and especially the Prime Minister, remained “hopeful” of NePAD’s prospects and was determined that “this potentially worthwhile initiative,” should not be allowed to “drift into the sand.”195 He also stated that the Government intended to make full use of its forthcoming presidency of the G8 to “boost our commitment to Africa.”196

Conclusion 140. Given the evidence that we have seen during this inquiry, we conclude that NePAD has the potential to deliver significant, and important, changes within Africa and to its relationship with the rest of the world. Both sides of the Partnership, though, need to understand fully both the challenges and the opportunities that it presents. African nations have to recognise that good governance and respect for human rights are central to their development prospects, and to how they are perceived by both foreign governments and potential private investors. The G8, in turn, needs to see beyond the confines of the peer review mechanism and recognise the progress that African nations have already made in delivering on their commitments.

141. We recommend that in partnership South Africa and the United Kingdom work together to ensure that it is not simply left to ‘wither and die’ as so many previous programmes have been. The British Government needs to impress upon South Africa, and its fellow AU members, the importance of a rigorous peer review mechanism for spreading good governance in the continent, and for attracting much-needed foreign investment. At the same time, it should use every opportunity, especially its forthcoming Presidencies of the G8 and the EU, to ensure that the developed world delivers on its commitment to support genuine African growth and development. Mutuality is the basis of the relationship.

194 Q 219 195 Q 218 196 Q 219. The United Kingdom will act as President of the G8 in 2005. From July to December 2005, it will also hold the six-monthly rotating Presidency of the European Union.

South Africa and the war against terrorism

142. In November 2001, this Committee launched a rolling inquiry into ‘The Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism.’197 Since that time we have taken a large amount of evidence on the subject and produced four substantial Reports to the House. These have covered a wide range of issues including the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the USA, the work of Al-Qaeda and the recent war in Iraq.198 During this inquiry, we have been struck repeatedly by the all-embracing and global scale of this conflict against terror. Although South Africa does not appear to be on the ‘front-line’ of the war against terrorism, given the international scale of the struggle, we felt it to important to examine this element of UK-South African relations in our Report.

143. In its memorandum, the Foreign Office stated that South Africa had responded swiftly to the September 11 attacks in the USA, condemning terrorism without equivocation, and offering to the USA both humanitarian support and the full co-operation of its security agencies.199 In a follow-up statement, the South Africans cautioned that the USA’s reaction to terrorism should be coupled with a longer term response of isolating terrorists through international co-operation, “to eradicate poverty and underdevelopment”.200 The FCO also noted that South Africa had taken a number of concrete steps in the war against terrorism: joining the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti- Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), for example. It is working closely with the United Kingdom to tackle money-laundering activities that can help fund terrorism. It has also presented three comprehensive annual reports to the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC).201

144. Mr Charles Nqakula, Minister of Safety and Security, whom we met while visiting South Africa, informed us that the country enjoyed good co-operation on terrorist-related issues with both the United Kingdom and the USA. He was very conscious of the need to ensure that South Africa did not become a ‘safe haven’ for terrorists evading justice. The Minister noted, however, that, at that time, domestic terrorism, particularly from those groups based on ‘gangsterism’ and drugs, was a more pressing concern for the Government. In its memorandum, the Foreign Office provided some information on this issue:

The South African Government’s intentions and actions on countering terrorism are laudable. The Counter Terrorism Bill is working its way through Parliament ... The work of South African agencies involved in countering terrorism is not always fully co-ordinated, but is improving. The South African Police Service is confident that it

197 “Launch of new inquiry: Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism”, press release No. 7 (Session 2001–02), 13 November 2001 198 Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2001–02, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 384; Second Report of Session 2002–03, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 196; Tenth Report of Session 2002–03, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 405; and Second Report of Session 2003–04, Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism, HC 81 199 Ev 71, para 41 ff. 200 Ibid. 201 The UN CTC was established in September 2001 by Security Council Resolution 1373, to strengthen the capability of states to combat terrorism. For further information, see: www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/index.html.

is on top of recent domestic terrorist threats from domestic groups, including People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and the Boermag (a white far-right organisation). 202

Dr Jakkie Cilliers commented in a similarly positive manner on the Government’s response to this domestic threat.203

145. Other evidence we have seen stressed the danger of ignoring the terrorist threat in Africa. In a recent article on this subject, Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills highlighted the fact that the largest terrorist atrocities prior to 11 September 2001 took place on the continent—the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people and injuring 574.204 They also referred to the US’s National Security Strategy of September 2002, which stated that 9/11 had:

taught the United States that weak states ... can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.205

During his 2003 visit to Africa, President Bush stated that he would “not allow terrorists to threaten the African peoples or to use Africa as a base to threaten the world.”206

146. There have been attempts to improve and co-ordinate the African response to terrorism, most notably through the AU.207 However, many states in the continent lack the resources and expertise to cope with the demands the international war against terrorism places upon them. In his evidence to us, for example, Dr Mills stated that:

Most African police forces are extremely weak and cannot combat day-to-day crime, much less be the front-line forces in combating instability. Intelligence collection is also very poor in most African countries.208

147. In the light of the difficulties faced by many African states in meeting their commitments, Dr Cilliers suggested that:

South Africa’s contribution to the global war against terrorism lies primarily in passing on this experience in intelligence-driven policing operations to their counterparts in Tanzania, Kenya and other neighbours.209

202 Ev 71, para 43. People Against Gangsterism and Drugs, a Western Cape Muslim-based group, was formed by local people in response to gang violence on the Cape Flats. However, it turned into its own terror group, almost indistinguishable from the other gangs. The Boermag is an extreme right-wing, white supremacist group. 203 Ev 109 204 Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, “Africa and the War on Terror”, South African Journal of International Affairs, vol 10 (Winter/Spring 2002), p 29 ff 205 Ibid., p 29 206 Ibid., p 34 207 Ibid., p 34 208 Ev 111 209 Ibid.

We agree. As in so many areas, South Africa, with its well-established police and intelligence structures, can act as a good example of best practice, which can be disseminated across the continent.

148. However, the United Kingdom, and the wider global community, needs to recall at all times that the fight against terrorism, vital as it is, should not lead us to neglect our broader commitments to nations not directly affected by the conflict. As Dr Steve Kibble observed in his oral evidence:

Africa’s problems have very little to do with terrorism, except possibly as a kind of marginalisation, because so much effort of the world is concentrated on those areas where there is terrorism, or thought to be the potential for terrorism. Africa suffers, but indirectly and not by engagement.210

149. We conclude that South Africa has an important role in the war against terrorism, especially by helping to prevent international terrorists using the continent as a base for their activities elsewhere in the world. South Africa has a particularly crucial role to play, as an influential African nation in disseminating best practice in anti-terrorism activity across the continent. We recommend that the United Kingdom continue to offer substantial assistance to ensure that South Africa can both combat international terrorism within its own borders and act as a catalyst for improving Africa’s ability to respond to the threat.

210 Q 111

Work of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in South Africa

150. The United Kingdom’s representation in South Africa is one of the largest British Posts in the world, reflecting the country’s size and importance, both bilaterally and within the region. Like most Posts it has a number of different responsibilities for a number of different areas, such as consular work, visa entry clearance and promoting trade and investment with the UK. This is in addition to the Post’s purely political work and the promotion of wider bilateral links. The BBC World Service and the British Council (the FCO’s two largest agencies) also have significant ‘regional hubs’ in South Africa.

151. There are four principal FCO offices in South Africa: the High Commission in Pretoria; the Consulate-General in Cape Town, where the South African Parliament and the largest body of British expatriates are located; the United Kingdom Trade and Investment (UKTI) Office in Johannesburg; and the Consulate General in Durban, which will handle purely trade matters from the middle of this year. There are also two Honorary Consulates in Port Elizabeth and East London. The figures for staff numbers are given in the table below, with comparisons to diplomatic representation of other nations.

Figure 5: diplomatic representation in South Africa

UK-based staff Locally-engaged staff

Pretoria 36 122 Johannesburg 6 29 Cape Town 4 17 Durban 1 10

United Kingdom total 47 178

France 30 20

Germany 47 39

USA 250 450

Source: FCO211

152. In his oral evidence to us, Mr Mullin stated that:

There is a review of all our operations going on at the moment so it would be very rash of me to make too many long-term commitments, but I do expect our staffing in South Africa to remain broadly as it is for the foreseeable future.212

211 Ev 76 212 Q 223

The Minister was referring to an internal review of staffing and resources worldwide currently being conducted by the Foreign Office, in the light of its new strategy: “UK International Priorities.”213 We recommend that, in the light of the importance of the United Kingdom’s relationship with South Africa and the crucial work being done by the Post there, the level of staffing and resources allocated to the United Kingdom High Commission in South Africa be at the very least maintained, if not increased, in the long-term.

Consular work 153. Like all Posts overseas, one of the prime responsibilities of the British High Commission in South Africa is to offer assistance to United Kingdom nationals travelling and working there. The figures below illustrate the scale of some of the work this section of the High Commission undertakes (all figures are approximate): x 750,000 United Kingdom nationals live in South Africa—making it the fifth largest British expatriate community in the world;214 x over 400,000 British visitors to South Africa each year; x 50,000 personal callers to United Kingdom consular offices in 2003; x 200,000 telephone enquiries; x 17,000 postal/fax/e-mail enquires; and x 23,000 passports issued (90% in less than five working days).215

154. The consular section of the High Commission employs five UK-based officers and eighteen locally-engaged staff, in Pretoria and Cape Town. In addition to the work outlined in the figures above, the staff undertake hospital and prison visits, and offer assistance to the families of British nationals who have died while in South Africa. In 2002, the High Commission was closely involved with the provision of assistance to British tourists affected by the Piet Retief coach crash in Mpumalanga province, in which five Britons were killed.216 This incident illustrated the vital importance of having competent staff on the ground, with good local knowledge, who can respond quickly to crises as they arise.

Visa entry clearance 155. Although South Africans do not require prior entry clearance to visit the United Kingdom, this is necessary if they intend to work or settle, do. Last year, the High Commission in Pretoria (which handles all the Post’s visa work) dealt with around 29,335 visa applications, of which 93.1% were approved. 217 The Visa Section currently consists of

213 FCO, United Kingdom International Priorities: A Strategy for the FCO, Cm 6052, December 2003 214 For information, the largest ten British expatriate communities are: Canada - 3.2 million; Hong Kong - 3 million; Australia - 2 million; USA - 1.2 million; South Africa - 750,000; Spain - 620,019; New Zealand - 400,000; Republic of Ireland - 375,000; France - 130,000; and Italy - 60,000 (all figures approximate). 215 Ev 78, annex D 216 “Fifth SA bus Briton dies”, BBC News, 31 October 2002 217 Ev 77, annex C [FCO]

one Entry Clearance Manager (ECM), five Entry Clearance Officers (ECOs) and twenty- two locally-engaged staff.

156. As the table below indicates, last year the Post met all three of the Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets set for it:

Figure 6: performance of the High Commission in South Africa against PSA targets for visa entry clearance work

PSA Target Actual

Tier 1 and Tier 2 (straightforward non-settlement/residence applications) resolved 90% 92% within 24 hours.

Average waiting time for a Tier 3 (non-settlement applications) interview. 10 working One day days

Average waiting time for a Tier 4 (settlement applications) interview 12 weeks One week

Source: FCO218 157. Last year, the Post saw an increase of 28% in the number of applications it dealt with compared to the previous year.219 This reflected the steady increase in demand for United Kingdom visas seen across the world.220 The Post attributed the increase in demand it had experienced, in part, to South Africa rejoining of the Commonwealth in 1994. Since that time, South Africans have been able to apply for working holidaymaker (WHM) visas— these allow Commonwealth citizens aged between 17 and 30 to come to the United Kingdom for an extended holiday of up to two years, during which time they can seek employment to support themselves. They can also apply for permit-free employment on the grounds of British ancestry.

158. The FCO’s entry clearance operations worldwide are run by UKVisas, which is managed by the FCO and the Home Office jointly.221 In its memorandum, the FCO noted that, as from 13 November 2003:

South African nationals will be affected by the United Kingdom Government’s implementation of the EU-wide Residence Permits scheme, i.e. those who wish to stay in the United Kingdom for more than six months will need to apply for Entry Clearance before arrival.

Based on IND [Immigration and Nationality Directorate222] statistics for the number of South African nationals admitted to the United Kingdom in 2001-2 for more than 6 months, we estimate that this change in policy will generate around 19,000 visa

218 Ev 78, annex C [FCO] 219 Ev 78, annex C 220 FCO, Foreign & Commonwealth Office Departmental Report 2003, Cm 5913, p 123 221 For further information, see: www.ukvisas.gov.uk. 222 The Immigration and Nationality Directorate is an agency of the Home Office. It is responsible for immigration control at air and sea ports throughout the United Kingdom and for considering applications for permissions to stay, citizenship and asylum. For further information, see: www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk.

applications in the first year following its introduction. UKVisas have agreed the additional deployment of 3 locally-engaged staff.223

The FCO told us that: “Additional staff and resources will be deployed if necessary.”224

159. We recommend that UK Visas continue to monitor closely the demands on staff and resources at the United Kingdom High Commission in South Africa resulting from the increasing numbers of entry clearance applications being received there. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the FCO set out what extra resources and personnel have been allocated to visa entry clearance work in South Africa since 2003.

Trade and investment (UKTI) 160. As noted above (paragraph 38), the UK’s commercial relationship with South Africa is a very significant one, with over £5 billion in two-way trade each year.225 The main focus of the FCO’s commercial work in the country is the UKTI offices in Johannesburg, which employs around 35 staff (locally-engaged and UK-based). Commercial work is also carried out at the posts in Durban and Cape Town. In an average year, the Post sees over 500 visiting United Kingdom business people and assists 12–15 trade missions and 4–5 visiting exhibition groups.226

161. Between 1998 and 2000 the FCO ran a major campaign, entitled ‘Britain and South Africa: Partners in Opportunity’, to raise awareness in the United Kingdom of the opportunities in the South African market. In recent years, particular emphasis has been placed on helping United Kingdom companies take advantage of opportunities arising from the South African privatisation programme and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). These include opportunities in the water, airports, ports, healthcare, telecommunications and railways sectors.

162. One of the most significant recent commercial undertakings between South Africa and the United Kingdom was the contract won by BAe Systems to supply 52 aircraft to South Africa, with which UKTI was closely involved.227 The contract is worth around £1.5 billion to BAe. While the purchase has not proved to be without controversy,228 we were pleased to note the ‘offset’ commitment negotiated as part of the deal. This promises to deliver much-needed additional investment in South Africa of nearly £5.5 billion. Both Governments are monitoring the delivery of this commitment closely, and at present BAe appears to be on track to meet its commitments.

223 Ev 78, annex C, paras 7–8 224 Ibid., para 9 225 Ev 71, para 45 [FCO] 226 Ibid. 227 Ev 72, paras 49 and 51 228 See, for example: Ev 122 [CAAT]; and Ev 131 [Corner House].

163. During our inquiry, witnesses from British companies that operated in South Africa gave very positive reports of the work of UKTI. One stated that they had been “extremely helpful,” and “very knowledgeable.”229 Another told that us that:

From our point of view they have been very, very supportive in South Africa. We had a lot of contact with them; they have provided us with leads, with contacts and been very supportive ...

I believe that they do create an environment which enables us to get access to key decision makers within government.230

164. These views were echoed by nearly all the business people we met while visiting Johannesburg and Cape Town earlier this year. They had all received valuable assistance from staff at the High Commission, who had developed expertise in a wide range of business sectors.

165. We conclude that the trade and investment section of the High Commission in South Africa is performing to a high standard in assisting British businesses to operate there and exploit new opportunities.

British Council 166. The British Council has a significant presence in South Africa. Its memorandum for this inquiry stats that the Council’s aims in the country are to:

x enhance the UK’s reputation with the authority generation by supporting their transformation agenda;

x demonstrate United Kingdom creativity and innovation to the young South Africans who will influence the country’s future; and

x strengthen civil society though developing access to information and through developing leadership.231

167. The Council works though a main office in Johannesburg, which we saw during our recent visit, and three smaller offices in Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban. It receives around £2.35 million per annum in Grant-in-Aid from the FCO, with extra funding coming from other sources.232 This represents the budget for the whole Southern African region of the British Council, though, which also includes Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland. There are currently five UK-based staff in the South African office, and thirty-seven locally engaged personnel.

168. As its memorandum notes, the British Council runs a number of schemes in South Africa. One of the most important of these is its ‘training for change’ programme. This involves a variety of initiatives, including working with the South African Department of

229 Q 138 [Paterson] 230 QQ 137–138 [Roe] 231 Ev 102 232 Ibid.

Education, overseeing university and schools links and the management of the Chevening scholarships.233 Given the difficulties South Africa is facing at present in the field of education, particularly further education, it is clear that the work of the British Council in this area is extremely valuable and greatly appreciated. We were pleased to note that Mr Paterson, of Macmillan Publishers, believed the “Council’s reputation is very good in South Africa.”234 This was echoed by the other interlocutors whom we met while in South Africa.

169. We were concerned, however, to hear that one witness had been informed, that the Chevening scholarships, which are managed by the British Council, might be “reduced in number, [and] that the higher educational links might be discontinued.”235 However, when questioned on this matter, Mr Mullin assured us that he was unaware of any planned cuts and that the number of scholarships available to South Africans was anticipated to be broadly similar to previous years. The Minister subsequently, in a written answer to the House, provided details of the number of scholarships awarded between 2000 and 2004 on a country-by-country basis. 236 As can be seen from the table below, the number of scholars from Southern Africa has been relatively stable.

Figure 7: Chevening scholarships awarded in Southern Africa, 2000/01– 03/04

Country 2000/01 2002/03 2003/04

Botswana 4 6 8

Lesotho 2 6 4

Mauritius 6 5 7

Mozambique 6 6 4

Namibia 4 6 6

South Africa 31 26 33

Swaziland 3 6 4

Source: FCO237 170. The myriad of active non-governmental organisations which flourished in the apartheid era, particularly in the townships, provided much of the grass roots democratic infrastructure at the time, representing the majority of South Africans. The British Government, at least in the later years of the apartheid regime, had a creditable role in funding and generally encouraging their work. It is still of importance that such Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs) continue to work as intermediary bodies, as checks

233 Chevening scholarships, are funded by the FCO and administered by the British Council. They enable overseas students to study in the United Kingdom. The scholarships are named after the Foreign Secretary’s official country residence: Chevening House. For further details, see: www.chevening.com. 234 Q 153 235 Q 11 [Simon] 236 HC Deb, 18 March 2004, 415W 237 Ibid.

and balances, against any authoritarian temptations of government. They should be encouraged and their leaders given appropriate help and training.

171. We conclude that the British Council is carrying out very important work in South Africa, both in promoting a deeper relationship between the two nations and in providing crucial educational support to the South African Government. We are also convinced that the Chevening scholarship scheme is a vital part of the British Council’s work, and a very important way in which the United Kingdom can influence future decision-makers. We recommend that the FCO give serious consideration to increasing the number of scholarships available to South Africans in the near future.

172. We further recommend that the British Council continue actively to support civic organisations and to train their leadership.

BBC World Service 173. The BBC World Service (BBC WS) operates its Africa news-gathering co-ordination centre for radio and TV from Johannesburg. It is one of the Service’s seven major ‘hubs’ located round the world and provides news coverage for World Service radio, BBC World television and the BBC’s International Facing Online News Site.238 During our visit to Johannesburg, we were glad to be able to visit the Bureau and meet some of the staff who work there.

174. The BBC WS’s Bureau in Johannesburg is very active, producing a wide variety of high-quality, informative programmes for both radio and television. For example, ‘Focus on Africa’, which offers evening news and analysis from the region, and the recently- launched Africa Live programme that encourages listeners to interact with the broadcasters by phone, e-mail and text message with comments on specific African issues and problems.

175. In its memorandum to our inquiry, the BBC WS noted that it had a comparatively small radio and TV audience in South Africa, where there is strong local market competition.239 However, a number of its news items, both radio and TV, are now being rebroadcast by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), and some other companies, which has helped to increase its profile. We were particularly pleased to note that the BBC WS had replaced CNN in providing selected news items to SABC 3.240

176. During our visit to the Bureau, we raised the issue of broadcasts in Swahili by the BBC WS in Africa. The BBC WS estimated that there are approximately 100 million speakers of Swahili in Africa, of whom about 25 million speak it as their first language.241 At present, the World Service transmits five programmes a day in Swahili for a total of two hours and twenty minutes (two hours and two and a half hours on Saturday and Sunday respectively).242 It is estimated that these programmes attract an audience of approximately

238 Ev 126. The other six centres are in: Delhi; Singapore; Jerusalem; Washington; Moscow; and Brussels. 239 Ibid. 240 Ibid. 241 Ibid. The exact number of Swahili speakers is, however, not completely clear. Ethnologue, for example estimates that Swahili is spoken by 5 million people as their first language, and by 30 million as their second. For further details, see: www.ethnologue.com/show_language.asp?code =SWA. 242 Ev 130 [BBC WS]

18.4 million people (primarily in the DRC, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda).

177. We questioned the World Service as to whether, in light of the large number of Swahili speakers and the competition from other national radio services, this was sufficient. We were reassured, however, that despite rival services being offered by a number of other providers, the BBC WS was still attracting larger audiences in the three countries with the largest Swahili-speaking populations than its two “traditional competitors”—Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany) and Voice of America (VOA). These figures are set out in the table below:

Figure 8: Percentage of total adult population listening to broadcasts in Swahili in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda

Broadcaster Kenya Tanzania Uganda

BBC World Service 31 59.8 7.5

Deutsche Welle 8 57 1

Voice of America 7 28 1

Source: BBC World Service 178. In response to our question as to whether the World Service had any plans to make changes to its Swahili service in the near future, the BBC WS replied that it was, “planning to improve its audibility still further by increasing the number of FM transmissions in most of the target areas especially Southern Tanzania and other major towns in Kenya.”243

179. We conclude that the BBC World Service’s Bureau in Johannesburg is carrying out excellent work in producing high-quality and informative programmes for both radio and television. We recommend that the Bureau continue to be given the funding it needs to carry on this important work. We further recommend that the BBC World Service give serious consideration to increasing the resources it allocates to its Swahili service in the future.

Estate management 180. An issue that this Committee has addressed on a number of occasions in recent years, has been that of the FCO’s asset recycling programme. In our report on the Office’s 2003 Annual Report we stated that:

The Foreign Office’s overseas estate consists of over 4,300 properties. Although 70% of these are leased, the Office still owned assets worth approximately £960 million worldwide as at March 2002. Since 1998, the FCO, in agreement with HM Treasury, has been engaged in an ‘asset recycling programme’, under which future investment, primarily in ICT [Information and Computer Technology] and the estate, is funded by the sale of FCO property at home and abroad. The process involves the Office

243 Ibid.

identifying and selling properties that have become, “surplus through re- prioritisation, or which are not operationally effective or good value for money.” ...

We conclude that there are very grave concerns about the long-term impact the asset recycling programme is having on the FCO's overseas estate. There is a real danger that, in its attempts to take full advantage of the scheme agreed with HM Treasury, the Foreign Office is selling properties below their real value in order to meet a short- term target. 244

181. Given our deep concern about the long-term viability of the asset recycling programme, we were very disappointed to hear from Mr Mullin, therefore, that the FCO is actively considering selling the High Commissioner’s Residence in Cape Town.245 This is a large and very attractive property that can accommodate a wide variety of functions— conferences, hosting visiting delegations, receptions, etc. While visiting Cape Town, we attended a reception at the Residence held to mark the opening of the South African Parliament for a new session. The event attracted a large number of senior opinion formers, including several Government ministers, and it was clear that the location had played an important part in making the event such a success. We strongly recommend that the FCO does not repeat the gross error it has made in so many other locations of exchanging a valuable and appreciating property—the High Commissioner’s Residence in Cape Town—which is clearly greatly assisting the promotion of United Kingdom interests, for rapidly depreciating ICT assets.

244 Twelfth Report of Session 2002–03, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003, HC 859, paras 57 and 64 245 QQ 224–5

Conclusion: a special relationship?

182. It is clear that the United Kingdom’s relationship with South Africa is an extremely important one, as we have described in detail in the paragraphs above. A question that has often arisen during our inquiry, though, is whether this is a ‘special relationship.’ South Africa, for many good reasons, enjoys excellent relations with nearly every country in the world. It is the ‘partner of choice’ for most non-African nations working in the continent and is much sought after as a key regional player, both on a continental and international basis. The United Kingdom is not alone, therefore, in seeking South Africa’s friendship. Moreover, there exists an ‘ambivalence’ in some quarters of South African society towards Britain, owing to such factors as the history of colonialism and to arguments over the commitment of the United Kingdom to combating apartheid in the past.

183. However, given what we have seen and heard during this inquiry, we feel confident to conclude that the relationship is indeed a special one. The co-operation that we witnessed at all levels of government; the very significant flows of trade, investment and tourism between the two nations; the shared values and aspirations, on both a continental and global scale; the large diasporas of expatriates in both countries; and perhaps even the shared admiration for the talents of sporting heroes such as David Beckham. All of these point to a mature, honest and many-layered understanding, with both nations able to work together in a spirit of equality and mutual trust, and a relationship that is well able to weather the ‘turbulence’ of occasional disagreements.

184. As we have noted in our Report, South Africa faces a number of major challenges and opportunities in the years ahead. Challenges such as the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic; opportunities such as the chance of securing long-term peace and prosperity for Africa through NePAD. It is our sincere hope that the United Kingdom can work in genuine partnership with South Africa to help it tackle both, and that this relationship will continue to flourish and grow for many years to come.

Annex A

List of abbreviations

ACTSA Action for Southern Africa AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome AIPPA Access to Information and Privacy of Information Act AMIB African Mission in Burundi ANC African National Congress APRM African Peer Review Mechanism AU African Union BBC WS BBC World Service BEE Black Economic Empowerment BMAT British Military Assistance Team CAP Common Agricultural Policy CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions DDA Doha Development Agenda DfID Department for International Development DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ESAAMLG Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group EU European Union FATF Financial Action Task Force FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office FDI Foreign Direct Investment G8 Group of Eight G77 Group of Seventy-Seven GBU Governing National Unity GDP Gross Domestic Product HDI Human Development Index HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus IFIs International Financial Institutions IMF International Monetary Fund LGIB Local Government International Bureau (UK) MAP Millennium African Renaissance Programme MDC Movement for Democratic Change MEPP Middle East Peace Process NAI New African Initiative NAM Non-Aligned Movement NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council NePAD New Partnership for African Development NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations OAU Organisation of African Unity OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PAC Pan African Congress PAGAD People Against Gangsterism and Drugs PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers PSC Peace and Security Council RDP Reconstruction and Development Program RSA Republic of South Africa SA South Africa/n SACP South African Communist Party SADC South African Development Community SALGA South African Local Government Association SANDF South African National Defence Force SARPCCO Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation TAC Treatment Action Campaign TDCA Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement UK United Kingdom UKUZA United Kingdom Unites with South Africa UN United Nations UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) US United States WCAR Word Conference Against Racism WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development WTO World Trade Organisation ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front ZCTU Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions

Annex B

Visit to South Africa Monday 9 February Meeting with HE Ms Ann Grant, High Commissioner and her Board of Management

Discussion with representatives of civil society: Dr Chris Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies; Mr Eddy Maloka, Africa Institute; Mr Moletsi Mbeki, Mr Molefe Tsele, General Secretary, SA Council of Churches; and Willie Hofmeyer, Director, Assets Forfeiture Unit

Tuesday 10 February Meeting with representatives of the UK media in South Africa

Visit to BBC World Service Bureau, Johannesburg

Discussion with representatives of UK and South African businesses at UKTI offices, Johannesburg

Meeting with Mr Ayanda Ntsaluba, Director General, and senior officials, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria

Visit to British Council, Johannesburg

Wednesday 11 February Visit to ‘Hospice in Soweto’, Johannesburg

Visit to Alexandra Police Station, Johannesburg

Thursday 12 February Discussion with civil society groups in Cape Town

Meeting with Mr Charles Nqakula, Minister of Safety and Security

Meeting with Dr Nkosanza Dlamini-Zuma, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Joint meeting with Mr Jordan Zweledinga Pallo, Chairperson, and Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, National Assembly, Cape Town

Friday 13 February Discussion with representatives of UK businesses, Cape Town

Meeting with Members of the Democratic Alliance

Formal minutes

Tuesday 27 April 2004

Members present: Donald Anderson, in the Chair Mr David Chidgey Mr John Maples Mr Fabian Hamilton Mr Bill Olner Mr Eric Illsley Mr Greg Pope Mr Andrew Mackay Sir John Stanley Andrew Mackinlay Ms Gisela Stuart

The Committee deliberated.

Draft Report [South Africa], proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the Chairman’s draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 148 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 149 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 150 to 158 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 159 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 160 to 171 read and agreed to.

Paragraphs 172 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 173 to 184 read and agreed to.

Annexes agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Fifth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chairman do make the Report to the House.

Several Papers were ordered to be appended to the Minutes of Evidence.

Ordered, That the appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee be reported to the House.—(The Chairman.)

[Adjourned till Tuesday 4 May at half past Two o’clock.

Witnesses

Tuesday 9 December 2003 Page

Professor James Barber, University of Cambridge Ev 7 Professor David Simon, University of London Ev 7 Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld, Brunel University Ev 34 Mr Alastair Fraser, Policy Officer, Action for Southern Africa Ev 34

Tuesday 27 January 2004

Mr Richard Dowden, Director, Royal African Society (RAS) Ev 51 Dr Steve Kibble, Africa Advocacy Officer, Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) Ev 51 Mr Christopher Paterson, Executive Director, Macmillan Publishers Ltd Ev 60 Mr Ashley Roe, Business Development Director, Severn Trent Water International Ltd Ev 60

Tuesday 2 March 2004

Mr Chris Mullin, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 82 Mr Andrew Lloyd, Head of African Department Southern, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 82 Mr Andy Sparkes, former UK Deputy High Commissioner, South Africa, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 82

List of written evidence

Professor James Barber, Centre for International Studies, Cambridge Ev 1 Professor David Simon, Centre for Developing Areas of Research, Royal Holloway, University of London Ev 6 Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) Ev 17 Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld, Brunel University Ev 32 Dr Steve Kibble, Africa/Yemen Advocacy Officer, Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), London Ev 44 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ev 67; Ev 79; Ev 80; Ev 81; Ev 94; Ev 97 Dr Ian Taylor, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana Ev 97 Local Government International Bureau (LGIB) Ev 99 The British Council Ev 102 Mr Keith Somerville Ev 106 Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies Ev 109 Dr Greg Mills, National Director, SA Institute of International Affairs Ev 110 Dr Anthony Lemon Ev 112 Save the Children UK Ev 113 VisitBritain Ev 116 Confederation of Employers of Southern Africa (Cofesa) Ev 118 Professor Gerrit Oliver Ev 120 Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) Ev 122 The Royal Institute of International Affairs Ev 125 BBC World Service Ev 126; Ev 129 The Corner House Ev 131 Ms Adriana Stuijt Ev 134 TAU SA Ev 135 Mr Basil T Hone Ev 138

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Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 1 Oral evidence

Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee

on Tuesday 9 December 2003

Members present

Donald Anderson, in the Chair

Mr David Chidgey Mr John Maples Mr Fabian Hamilton Richard Ottaway Mr Eric Illsley Mr Greg Pope Andrew Mackinlay Sir John Stanley

Written evidence submitted by Professor James Barber, Centre of International Studies, Cambridge

THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS In this paper I tempt to give a broad overview of South Africa’s (SA) external relations over the past decade—its international activities and roles, its position in international organisations and its relations in Africa—and the settings in which it has operated. It is unusual for a society to experience fundamental domestic change. It is equally unusual to face a major change in its international setting. Yet SA during the past decade has experienced both. The new government, most of whose members initially had little or no administrative experience, has struggled to develop a society undergoing a political revolution at home while establishing itself in a disordered international setting. However, two provisos may be added. First, revolutions are usually not ﬁxed points in time, but rather (as in SA) are processes stretching over time. Second, although there has been great change in SA, it has been uneven and much remains from the past. While there has been profound political upheaval; internal social and economic relations have altered more slowly and superﬁcially. Measured in terms of resources SA is a small/medium state. Yet it has gained greater international attention than states with greater resources. As a result it has—in a phrase which Nelson Mandela would savour from his early boxing days—been able ‘to punch above its weight’ in global aVairs. There are a number of reasons for this, including the momentum of the past.

The Momentum of the Past:Cold War and New World Order In the decades following WWII South Africa’s racial policies became a matter of international concern. As the struggle against apartheid developed into a “great moral cause”, SA became a pariah state; sanctions were imposed on it, and the anti apartheid campaign absorbed into the fabric of international organisations. At the same time a low intensity war developed between the white government and the liberation movements (African National Congress and Pan Africanist Congress). Several neighbouring black states, by supporting the liberation movements, brought down Pretoria’s wrath on themselves, in the form of e a cross border “destabilisation” policy. Harold Macmillan had made clear in his “Wind of Change” speech (1960) that he—and by implication other Western leaders—were concerned not only about racial issues, but whether post colonial Africa would turn to East or West in the Cold War context. However, the West’s response to the situation was characterised by vacillation and ambivalence. In Britain’s case successive governments sought the middle ground in a situation were the contending parties saw no room for compromise. The liberation movements accused Britain of putting its material interest before its moral concerns by failing to give them support and refusing to impose further sanctions against SA. For its part the apartheid government saw itself as the target of a Moscow inspired “total onslaught”, and accused the West, not only of failing to give support, but kowtowing to the Afro-Asian states by imposing sanctions. Pretoria dismissed the British as “wish wash liberals” at best, and communist fellow travellers at worst. In contrast with the West the Soviet bloc gained prestige in black Africa by supporting the armed liberation movements—including the ANC’s armed wing (Umkhonto we Sizwe). This military support— together with its alliance with the Communist Party (SACP)—drew the ANC towards the Soviet bloc and its socialist ideas; while rejecting Western capitalism. 9573971001 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Ev 2 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

A New World Order and the SA “Miracle” The demise of the Soviet bloc was greeted with joy the in the West, but consternation in the ANC. Internationally the tension of Cold War gave way to the short lived hopes of a New World Order. President George Bush (Snr) spoke of a world free from threats, of states living in harmony under the rule of law; and Francis Fukuyama trumpeted the triumph of the West by declaring “the end of history”. At the UN Butros- Butros Ghali published his “Agenda for Peace”. The hope was that persistent international problems— whether in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, the Balkans, or Southern Africa—could be resolved peacefully. In the event only in SA were such hopes realised, where a UN negotiated settlement was achieved in 1989, followed by the SA “miracle”. It started in February 1990 when President F.W. de Klerk seized the initiative—conﬁdent that with the collapse of the Soviet Union the ANC had been seriously weakened and the threat of the total onslaught had disappeared. He lifted the ban on political parties and released Nelson Mandela. Four years of negotiation followed—with the National Party (NP) Government and the ANC as the major players—before a new SA was born. The international community strongly supported the negotiating process and to an extent saw itself as midwife of the new democratic state. Furthermore, the hope was that the successful outcome of negotiations in SA, and the earlier Namibia settlement would act as models for others to follow. Therefore, although the end of apartheid and the emergence of a new democratic polity had been achieved by South Africans themselves through negotiation, the international community was involved and the momentum of the past ensured its continuing interest in the future.

The New South Africa: Self Identity and the Burden of Expectation For all his charm and bonhomie Mandela proved to be a formidable negotiator, and although the outcome of the negotiations had elements of compromise it largely favoured the ANC. The agreement was for the introduction of a five year interim constitution, with a Government of National Unity (GNU) at the helm. At the same time principles—strongly influenced by Western liberal values—were laid down for a permanent constitution. At the 1994 election the ANC gained more than 60% of the national vote, followed by the NP with 20% and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 10%: with seats in the National Assembly distributed in direct proportion to the national votes cast. Like all major parties the ANC is a broad church. Under its banner at election time it forms the main element of a tripartite alliance with the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions. When the GNU was formed, it consisted of the ANC, which was the dominant element (with Mandela as President and Mbeki as a Deputy President): together with the NP (led by de Klerk as Second Deputy President) and the IFP led by Chief Buthelezi who became a cabinet minister. After two years the NP followed a disgruntled de Klerk out the GNU. World leaders hurried to SA to bathe in its reflected glory, to identify with Mandela; and to encourage it to accept continental leadership. In the West SA was hailed as Africa’s best hope of securing peace and prosperity in that troubled, poverty plagued continent. A burden of expectation descended on the new government’s shoulders, which was enhanced by Mandela’s personal prestige—by assuming that he could achieve ends that eluded others. The new government identified itself with “the South” and more especially Africa; (whereas the white regime had presented itself as an outpost of European/ Western civilization in an alien continent). However, it could not ignore the changes in the international setting. If it wanted help and support, or to increase its trade and economic development, it had to turn to the West. This was reflected in the overseas trips of Mandela and Mbeki. Both have made many visits to the West, where they have paid court to business and financial institutions, sometimes at the expense of anti apartheid groups. Only once did Mandela visit Moscow and that no more than a Swan song, at the end of his Presidency. Furthermore, when the ANC agreed principles for the conduct of foreign policy, they were peppered with the ethical values of the West: respect for human rights, commitment to peace; promotion of democracy; support for international organisations; and “universality” (prepared to work with all)—with “human rights” as the corner stone. The new government soon discovered that such values were open to challenge and diVerences of interpretation— as, for instance, in its failed attempt to apply “universality” in the “Two Chinas Policy” (PRC and Taiwan). Soon SA was accused by radical critics that while it claimed a 3rd World identity it had succumbed to Western ideas and values. Pretoria denied this, and pointed to its continuing good relations with states which the West branded as “rogues”. One of the clearest cases of the new government’s dilemma came from the first Commonwealth conference that Mandela attended—in New Zealand in 1996. At the time there was concern at breaches of human rights by a military regime in Nigeria led by General Sani Abacha. The breaches included the detention of Chief Abiola, who had won the last election, but was now a political prisoner. A further case concerned the treatment of the Ogoni people, from whose land in the Niger delta, large quantities of oil had been extracted. While the government and Shell had profited from the oil, the Ogoni, led by Ken Sarow-Wiwa, claimed that they had gained nothing and instead had their territory ruined. The regime responded by arresting Sarow Wiwa and a number of his follower. Thy were brought before a military court, accused of conspiring to plot a coup, and of rioting leading to the death of a chief, and were sentenced to death. With increasing 9573971001 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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international concern about Nigria the SA government became actively involved—in line with its stated principles. In its attempts to mediate it employed quiet diplomacy—with visits by Mbeki and Archbishop Tutu among others. When, on his is arrival in New Zealand Mandela was questioned about Nigeria, and the fate of the Ogoni prisoners in particular, he was sanguine, believing diplomacy would be eVective. He was wrong. While the conference was still in session news was received that Saro Wiwa and his colleagues had been executed. Mandela was furious and humiliated. He accused the Nigerian regime of “judicial murder”. He called for the severance of diplomatic ties, Nigeria’s expulsion from the Commonwealth, he urged the UK and USA to impose an oil embargo; and he recalled the SA High Commissioner. On his return home he called a special meeting of the Southern African Development Community (comprising SA and all its neighbours) to decide on further action. In the event Mandela’s proposals led nowhere. He ran into a wall of silence and indiVerence. The Western states continued to buy oil, and the rest of Africa refused to act. The other African states saw Nigeria, not as human rights oVender but as a major continental power that had loyally supported the liberation struggles against colonialism. The Liberian Government thought it was “was very shocking” for Mandela to allow SA “to be used in the division and undermining of African solidarity”. The Nigerians themselves described Mandela’s attitude as “horrific” and they too called for African solidarity. A Nigerian minister described Mandela as the black leader of a white state—implying that white oYcials and Western ideas were too influential. Even at home Mandela found little or no support. The cry for African unity was echoed from the Department of Foreign AVairs to the ANC (which also remembered Nigeria’s contribution to its election campaign—rumoured to be US$10m). In parliament Mbeki spoke of the dangers of acting alone and of over estimating SA’s strength. SA, he said, was not involved in exploiting Nigerian oil or acting as her bankers, whereas those that were and had real power (ie Western states) instead of directly challenging Nigeria had used and humiliated Mandela. They had left him out to dry. Mbeki had succeeded in regaining ground by steering the government away from an attack on a fellow African state to criticism of the West. The case had underlined the problems of SA acting as a custodian of the continent’s morals. It was a lesson that became imprinted in the government’s memory. One of the West’s hopes was that SA would take the lead in continental peace making and peace keeping. Yet, while Pretoria was ready to play an active international role, it resented being branded as the West’s poodle. Thus Mandela was not prepared to cut links with old allies and more recently Mbeki has refused to make public attacks on Mugabe. The government saw the Western pleas to act as Africa’s peacekeeper as an attempt to shuZeoV their own responsibility. In any case, although SA’s armed forces were better trained, experienced, and disciplined than elsewhere in Africa, they had been trained and were experience in fighting, not to keep the peace. With British help, the old rivals—the forces of the liberation movements and those of the white government—have undertaken the diYcult tasks of merging together and being trained in new roles. Yet, even when the government has been prepared to involve itself in peace making it has discovered that its eVorts are not always welcomed and produce mixed reactions (eg in the vast Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the tiny Lesotho).

The Economy The economy inherited by the new government was “mixed” in a double sense—with segments of the 1st and 3rd worlds; and with private and state controlled sectors. (Under the apartheid government the state sector had been used to counter sanctions and to protect white workers). In the new debate all are agreed of the desirability of both growth and redistribution of wealth and income. In broad terms, those who emphasise growth favour a strong private sector, whereas those whose priority is redistribution support greater state control. This continues to be a divisive issue within the ANC. The new government’s first eVort produced the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). This went through several drafts, starting like a socialist blueprint but finishing with its emphasis on a mixed economy. Within a couple of years the RDP was pushed aside as the government—with increasing emphasis on growth and the private sector—introduced the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR). Naturally SA has tried to use economic circumstances to its advantage. It identifies itself with the Third World, and has served as chair in the Non Aligned Movement (which has reinvented itself since the end of the Cold War as the voice of the Third World). However, not everybody has been prepared to accept SA’s own self evaluation. This was discovered when it applied for Lome terms of trade with the EU—its major trading partner. The EU view is that SA was too developed and advanced to qualify for Lome. Prolonged, tough negotiations followed, which resulted in a bilateral Trade Development and Cooperative Agreement (TDCA). This fell short of SA’s early hopes, but was claimed to oVer benefits to both sides. During Clinton’s presidency, SA has also established a mutually beneficial relationship with the USA, through the establishment of a Binationall Commission and the African Growth and Opportunity Programme. On other occasions Pretoria has been prepared to play its 1st World card. For example, in seeking direct foreign investment it has stressed the strength and high standards of the business community, the excellent communications, financial and transport services, the government’s financial sobriety, and in opening up the economy. 9573971001 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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There have been economic progress—initially there was a peace dividend, the lifting of sanctions and external development aid. Since then further advances can be attributed to sound government financial policy, plus its preparedness to open up parts the economy. This has led to the extension of trade, the growth of tourism and some investment by foreign companies. A recent report (Africa Investor October 2003) underlined the positive aspects of the economy—claiming that as a financial centre Johannesburg is nw to Africa what New York is to the Americas, and by pointing to industrial successes, including the motor industry. However, progress has been slower than the government had hoped or assumed. Direct investment has been disappointing, and unemployment remains a major problem. A number of explanations can be found for the disappointments. They include: local crime which continues to flourish deterring tourist and external investors, as well as undermining existing economic activity (eg with the murder of white farmers damaging the agricultural industry); b) the adverse impact of HIV/aids; which is ravishing the society and economy; and c) the fag ends of apartheid with its inbred prejudices and its complex layers of ineYcient bureaucracy. Added to these internal issues are regional problems, over which SA has little control but are of major consequence for her. Most of the neighbouring states are poor—some among the poorest in the world; others are unstable (eg Zimbabwe); and some have been torn apart by civil wars (eg Angola). As well as the general recognition that SA cannot flourish in a sea of poverty, its relative wealth acts as a honey pot for immigrants (legal and illegal) from neighbouring states, exacerbating the problems of unemployment and crime. Nobody knows the true number of illegal immigrants but estimates range from 2 to 8 million (the oYcial SA population is c 40 million).

The International Bridge Builder and “Go Between” Alec Erwin, the Minister of Trade and Industry, at a meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), claimed that “South Africa is a bridge between and developed and the developing worlds”. He was a recognising that SA’s mixed economy and society create an opportunity to play a linking/facilitating role between the First and Third worlds. However, to play such a role requires not only willingness on SA’s part, but the acceptance and trust of others who are involved. The frequency with which SA has been invited to play this role is a sign of the trust it has gained in international organisations. For example Erwin was elected as president of the WTO, SA was invited to take the chair of NAM; and it was in the same spirit that SA has been invited to the World Economic Forum at Davos; and when, as chairman, Mbeki broke previous NAM practice by inviting the developed states to send observers to the meeting in Durban. It is not only in an economic/development setting that SA has sought act as a “go between”. It has also been active at international gatherings concerned with nuclear developments and the campaign to ban land mines, and it has helped to initiate the formation of a new grouping of states around the Paciﬁc rim. Further and more controversially it has sought to act as a bridge between Western values and ideas and those of Africa and more generally the 3rd World. Inevitably there has been controversy about SA’s stand on some issues, and its interpretation and application of principles. Nor have all SA’s eVorts achieved their desired outcome, as witnessed by the recent WTO failure to reach agreement at Cancun. However, a further example of trust, this time at a personal level, is the success of Mandela and Professor Jakes Gerwel (Director General of Mandela’s OYce)” in persuading Colonel GadaY of Libya to seek a settlement with the US and UK governments of the long standing Lockerbie air tragedy.

South Africa in Africa Relations with the rest of Africa have been the most intense and challenging of all the new SA’s external relations. The ANC came to power emphasising its commitment to the continent. It spoke of its “great pride in being African”, and recognised the particular debt it owed to its neighbours who had contributed to and had suVered in the liberation struggle. In the years that have followed the government has reiterated again and again its African identity, its debt to the continent, and eagerness to play a full part in its development. In its attempt to reassure fellow Africans it has underlined that it has no intention of using its resources and strength to impose a new hegemony. Its aim is simply to co-operate with others on equal terms as sovereign states. Pretoria also realises that SA’s self interest and future are tied to the continent—that it cannot achieve either security or prosperity if it is surrounded by poor, unstable and violent neighbours. As Alfred Nzo, then Foreign Minister told a meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1995: “We cannot be an island of prosperity surrounded by a sea of poverty”. Yet, while there is no reason to doubt Pretoria’s commitment to the continent, there are problem of realising its ends. To start with SA is simply not just another African state. It is so much more advanced and developed than the rest of the continent that it cannot avoid playing aleading role. The question is not whether it will be a prominent actor but how and in what may. In the Southern African region it is a giant. When Pretoria works in harmony with another state, all is well—as in the case of the massive Highlands Water Project in Lesotho, and more widely in the relationship with Mozambique (doubtless aided by Mandela’s marriage to Graca Machel). In Mozambique’s case both sides have recognised the advantage of co-operation, with results such as the development of the Maputo corridor. Yet in other places matters have not gone smoothly. SA’s strength has produced jealousy and suspicion. Seen from SA the expansion of trade 9573971001 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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and investment has been beneficial to the whole continent. That view is not always shared by others. Some complain that SA gains most of the advantage (with a large balance of trade surplus), that its major companies have forced local companies out of business and that the control of business still lies in white hands. Nor have the complaints been confined to economic aVairs. Some of the strongest criticism has come from Zimbabwe, which, much to Mugabe’s chagrin, was ousted by the new SA as leader at the Southern Africa’s major organisation—the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Following Mandela’s election as SADC chairman there was a clash over control of a security body chaired by Mugabe. Mugabe claimed that it could act independently, whereas Mandela claimed it was subordinate to SADC. More generally Jonathan Moyo—now a Minister in Zimbabwe—criticised South Africans for their arrogance and their assumption that they could speak for all Africa. SA has also encountered obstacles in its peace making eVorts, as in the DRC, where Laurent Kabila snubbed it, and in Lesotho—where in 1998, despite an appeal for help from the Lesotho Prime Minister. As in the case of the Commonwealth and Nigeria (see above) SA was accused of bullying a small neighbour, of absorbing too many Western ideas of whites in the society. Among SA’s leaders Mbeki has been especially prominent in committing himself to the continent—as witnessed by his famous “I am an African” speech in welcoming the new constitution, his advocacy of an African renaissance, the leading part he played in negotiating NEPAD, and his support the new African Unity. Yet even Mbeki cannot brush aside diYculties and disappointments. In Africa it appears that a step forward in one area is countered by a reverse elsewhere. Thus while the recent elections in Kenya went reasonably well, that is countered by the chaos that reigns in Zimbabwe. Hopes of the end of fighting in Angola are matched by a continuing conflict in the DRC. Yet for all the problems Mbeki retains his faith, and that faith helps to shape some of his controversial views. Thus in relation to HIV/Aids he resents what he sees as Western attempts to attribute the disease largely to the continent and to see Africans as primitive people, who are unable to control their sexual behaviour. For Mbeki, the wretched living conditions in which many Africans are forced to live is a major factor explaining the dreadful death toll. Further controversy surrounds Mbeki’s reaction to developments in Zimbabwe. Mbeki has followed the path of quite diplomacy. He has resisted pressure both domestic and internationally to pursue a much tougher line. Why? First, he realises that Mugabe has a strong following among Africans (including SA)— from his role in overthrowing the white Rhodesian regime; and from his seizures of white farms to restore the land to, what many Africans regard as its rightful owners. Second, and arising from the first, is his concern that a tougher line against Mugabe would create political rifts at home (including the ANC). Finally, with the Nigerian case in mind (see attachment) he wants to avoid condemnation by other African states as acting as the West’s poodle. He was not prepared to break what Maxi van Aardt has called the “unwritten law” by which “African states do not turn on each other in international fora, but close ranks when attacks are made against one of them”.

Summary SA’s international relations over the past ten years can be summarised as follows: — It has gained greater international attention than its resources appear to warrant. — because of: (a) the past concern re apartheid; (b) its position in Africa; (c) the peaceful, negotiated settlement; and (d) the personality of Mandela. — The new SA identiﬁes itself with the Third World, and and seeks to act as a bridge between 1st and 3rd Worlds. Its mixed economy is the foundation for the latter claim. — On coming to power the ANC agreed a set of “idealistic” foreign policy, principles but in oYce discovered that they were often diYcult to implement. — Somewhat reluctantly it recognises the current strength of the West, has accepted many of its values (perhaps unconsciously—absorbing the dominant values of the time) and in trade and economic activities West is major partner. However, is eager to avoid being branded as West’s agent in Africa. — Supports a variety of international organisations, and is widely respected in them. While an active UN member it favours reform of the Security Council, with SA gaining permanent membership. — A strong commitment to Africa, based on a combination of sentiment and hard headed interest— recognising support in the liberation struggle, and for the future, recognising the SA cannot ﬂourish surrounded by poverty and instability. — In an age of globalisation and powerful regional blocs, it seeks co-operation with other African states (eg NEPAD) and is eager to extend economic links, but has mat a mixed response. 9573971001 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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— Is ready to play a part in peacemaking and peacekeeping but not to over extend itself, or isolate itself (as in Nigeria case), or let the powerful Western states oV the hook. Professor James Barber

Written evidence submitted by Professor David Simon, Centre for Developing Areas of Research, Royal Holloway, University of London

NEW INQUIRY INTO SOUTH AFRICA: ISSUES RECOMMENDED FOR INCLUSION 1. Thank you for the personal invitation to submit this memorandum. Clearly the range of issues that could potentially be examined is vast, but I believe that the six broad but closely interrelated themes identiﬁed in the Announcement of the Inquiry cover the principal ground well. I will group my suggestions for issues to address using the relevant of these headings.

The UK’s Diplomatic and Political Relations with South Africa

Bilaterally 2. How eVectively has the FCO’s engagement with post-apartheid SA reﬂected the changing circumstances in SA and the region, in the sense of seeking genuine partnership and recognising South Africa’s leadership role in southern, and indeed, the rest of Africa? Here it would be important to ascertain perceptions in South Africa as well as in the UK. 3. The impact of current British recruitment campaigns for skilled health and education workers, in particular. The key issue requiring attention here is the known (and on occasion recently even admitted) ‘brain drain’ eVect of such recruitment in sectors where South Africa itself has serious shortages of skills as it attempts post-apartheid transformation by providing more equitable access to appropriate levels and qualities of social services and human capacity development. Are such campaigns therefore ethical and/or appropriate at a time when the UK is also—and quite correctly—funding various initiatives in health and education in SA, especially at the level of tertiary skills? 4. UK asylum policy in respect of South Africans: South Africa’s recent addition to the so-called ‘White List’ of countries from where asylum seekers will be presumed to have unfounded cases already appears to be making it yet more diYcult for people with very plausible fears of persecution to have their claims assessed fairly. Even before this recent development, South Africans claiming asylum were being treated with great scepticism. I have personal experience of this through the provision of expert evidence for asylum appeals. Although asylum policy falls under the Home OYce, there are clear ramiﬁcations for perceptions of the UK abroad and hence for important aspects of FCO work. Accordingly, is there adequate liaison and ‘joined up thinking’ between the two departments?

Multilaterally 5. Is the UK being suYciently proactive and successful in ensuring a fair and equitable dispensation for South and southern African trade with the UK and the EU as a whole? Many South African perceptions of the Free Trade Agreement and the process of its negotiation are very critical and are far from any sense of equitable partnership.

South Africa’s role within the Southern African region 6. How eVective has communication and collaborative eVort between the ECO and SA been with respect to addressing the Zimbabwe crisis? The rather diVerent approaches adopted by successive ministers of state appear to have made little diVerence in terms of headway, either with the South African or Zimbabwean governments. At the same time, the SA government’s softly-softly approach has also had little success. Can a way be found to promote joint and productive eVorts that escape charges of non-African (even neocolonial) interference and also provide evidence for North-South partnership?

South Africa’s role within international bodies 7. Akin to the question in para 5 above, is the UK maximising its eVorts within the EU, but also bilaterally, to ensure equitable outcomes to regional and global negotiations on trade and development issues, such as the Doha Round of WTO negotiations? There was little evidence of British dissent from the hardline approach of the EU at Cancun, for instance. At the heart of these issues are the twin questions as to what substance there is to the government’s claimed “ethical foreign policy”, and whether there is adequate “joined-up” thinking and action between the ECO and DEID to ensure eVective coordination and mutually reinforcing activities? 9573971002 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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8. What is the British government’s perception of the African Union in comparison to its predecessor, the OAU? How well placed does the UK perceive South Africa, especially President Mibeki, to be to promote an eVective agenda within it?

The impact of NEPAD 9. Has the UK government’s open enthusiasm for NEPAD been translated into appropriate support beyond rhetoric and a “wait and see” attitude? Certainly, the outcome of the Evian Summit was most disappointing in this regard. 10. Is the UK government suYciently attuned to diVerences of opinion within Africa to the NEPAD as the most appropriate instrument for promoting development and, in that light, what steps are being taken to maintain support for SADC initiatives and bilateral programmes? Is support for South Africa’s leadership role being balanced suYciently by eVorts to ensure that all member states beneﬁt from its programmes, not just SA and the other continental powers (see Attachment 2—from International AVairs 2001). Again, both the FCO and DfID have roles here.

The EVectiveness of the FCO in South Africa 11. Is suYcient being done through the Chevening Scholarships and related schemes to provide the essential longer-term support for the education of a highly skilled leadership corps? These play very valuable roles and should not be subject to short-term changes in priorities or political dynamics. Similarly, if the current suspension of the British Council’s Higher Education Institutional links scheme, pending a review of its global operation, were to be extended or the scheme dropped, it would impede generally positive interuniversity and other tertiary institutional collaboration. 12. I conﬁrm that I would be happy to provide further details, or to answer questions, regarding these or related issues during the forthcoming oral hearings. Professor David Simon September 2003

Witnesses: Professor James Barber, University of Cambridge, and Professor David Simon, University of London, examined.

Q1 Chairman: Gentlemen, may I welcome the two the country—happily for many reasons, not least of you to our Committee. Professor James Barber, the wonderful example of the first President, Emeritus Professor of Durham University currently Nelson Mandela, things have been very diVerent advising the University of Cambridge’s Centre of and if we want a text, I was struck with what International Studies, who worked in the field of Matthew Parris said recently in an article in The South African studies for very many years, and Times on 25 October which was called: “A published extensively; and Professor David Simon pessimist recants: the new South Africa is of Royal Holloway, University of London, working”.1 The quote is: “Fitfully but specialising in Southern African regional issues, unmistakably the new South Africa is working. The again published extensively on foreign policy and country today is richer, happier, more powerful, development. We welcome you to what is the first fairer and more secure than it was a decade ago, of the sessions of the Committee in respect of South and the direction is still up . . . Tremendous Africa. As a Committee we decided in the middle problems remain: HIV/AIDS, unemployment, the of July to undertake an inquiry into South Africa unrealistic aspirations of the poor. Party and to inquire into the role of the Foreign and allegiances clustered around racial and tribal Commonwealth OYce in relation to South Africa groupings continue to stunt real democracy. Can in the light of the strong historic connections which these things be solved?” Are you gentlemen link the United Kingdom to South Africa. We have optimists or pessimists? three planned sessions. The first is today; the Professor Barber: I think what has been said by second is due to take place on 3 February with Matthew Paris is very fair. It is a much more another panel of experts, and then, finally, on 9 attractive place to visit and much fairer but, of March with a Foreign OYce minister before, as course, it has enormous social problems as all usual, we produce our report. Gentlemen, I had the societies have, particularly in South Africa with privilege personally of being almost ten years ago HIV/AIDS as you mentioned, and crime and at the remarkable election in South Africa: I was unemployment, but overall, if you have to take a supervising the international observers in Port broad balance of one side or another, yes, it is a Elizabeth and there was a great euphoria. Prior to much better place now. I, too, was at the 1994 that there had been dire predictions about South Africa going the way of Algeria with the 1 “A pessimist recants: the new South Africa is working”, infrastructure collapsing, with the minority fleeing The Times, 25 October 2003. 9573971003 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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9 December 2003 Professor James Barber and Professor David Simon election and it was a marvellous up-lifting personnel from South Africa which has an adverse experience. Since then, of course, things have not eVect on public services, education and health. been perhaps as uplifting but overall I think that is Where do you think the major failings are? a fair judgment of Matthew Parris. Professor Barber: There has been but this is a Professor Simon: I would concur with that and mixed picture because South Africa gains from particularly, if you take as the baseline the period of some countries of the region. The brain drain is not intense violence and intimidation that led up to that all one-way. For example, it has gained from election, the transformation which followed is truly Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has a fine educational remarkable. I guess the longer-term answer depends structure and regional movements out of in a sense on whom within what position in South Zimbabwe have been helpful to South Africa in African society you speak to. There are many who some ways, but I remember the health services in would argue that the change has been quite this country were starting to recruit largish remarkable; that the achievements are legion. If you numbers of nurses and doctors and therefore in talk to many of the historically disempowered or that sense we gained at South Africa’s expense— unempowered, particularly in rural areas or urban and not just us but Australia and New Zealand as townships, you get a diVerent picture, and I have well. A fair number of doctors moved there. So heard it said quite recently that, “Very little has there has been movement but it is a mixed picture. changed, our lives are much as they were before”. It is an area I have read about rather than Personally I find that hard to believe—precisely researched myself, but I do believe there is a mixed because of the substantial change to the political picture. South Africa has gained some of the brain economic climate, the overall situation, the repeal in drain from the region as well as losing some to many profound ways of the legal apparatus that more advanced countries. apartheid initially underpinned. Even though the legislation has been gone now in some cases for Q4 Chairman: So it has been disadvantageous to sixteenorsoyears,itisaquestionofstructural Zimbabwe? change as much as superficial change whereby hangs Professor Barber: That is right. the conundrum between the appearances of goodwill and progress and peace to all men and women, and Q5 Mr Illsley: Could I introduce a few questions the ability to address the fundamental, deep-rooted on South Africa’s role within the region? Already and historical legacies of inequality and deprivation. South Africa has been described to the Committee by a number of sources as the principal economic Q2 Chairman: But the legacy of the Group Areas and military power in sub-Saharan Africa. I think Act is still there? the World Service talked about it being the Professor Simon: Yes. It is much more diYcult to dominant military and economic power in southern recast concrete, bricks, mortar and steel and glass Africa. Professor Barber referred to South Africa, than it is to amend legislation, and that, I think, is a “punching above its weight”. To what extent would very good illustration of how change can only come you agree that South Africa is the dominant about in diVerent ways, at diVerent speeds and in economic and military power within the region, diVerent contexts. People can move and the extent and would you add any caveats to that? to which there has been residential integration Professor Barber: No, I am sure it is. In almost reflects in the first instance the working of the every respect South Africa is more advanced and private property market because that is the larger than its neighbours, but the South Africans principal means by which people can escape from are conscious that they cannot prosper fully as an their previous group area since the legislation was island in a sea of desperation, and they are repealed. But only a small proportion of people surrounded by diYculties. Angola, the Democratic have the wherewithal to do that and therefore are Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe are all in people who do not remain trapped either in high diYcult circumstances at the moment, and this has density townships or shanties or squatter areas or a drag eVect. There may be a brain drain, as I have some other form of social housing. Even the million mentioned, but overall the picture is not a good one or so RDP2 houses which were built in the first six in the region. This has an adverse impact on South years of the post-apartheid period, one of the few Africa which is the giant, and there is this burden RDP targets achieved, people speak disparagingly of expectation. We all somehow think that South about because they are smaller than their Africa can solve the regional problems and I do not predecessors, the so-called matchbox houses of the think it can by itself: it needs help internationally, apartheid era, many of them built in a way that has and so, returning to your question, it seems to me given way to a rise in structural faults and so on. there is too much a burden of expectation on South So it does depend whom you spoke to in what Africa in the region. context, but there are many targets which are being achieved now and take longer to gestate. Q6 Chairman: Do you agree? Professor Simon: At one level yes, at another no, Q3 Chairman: Finally from me, Professor Barber, and again I think it reflects the duality because we which areas, if any, disappoint you? I have heard cannot talk about the rest of the Southern Africa a number of concerns about the exodus of skilled or sub-Saharan Africa in such singular terms. Last year I found myself in the space of about six weeks 2 RDP—Reconstruction and Development Programme. in South Africa, Ghana and Uganda on separate 9573971003 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 9

9 December 2003 Professor James Barber and Professor David Simon business, and the contrasts in terms of what people Defence Force of a lack of equipment and so on were thinking and talking about and particularly and so forth, does South Africa have the necessary their view, for example, of the NePAD3 programme capabilities to be putting itself forward for these as a whole and South Africa’s role within it, roles? Coming back to your burden of expectation, illustrate the tensions and these conundrums very are we expecting too much of South Africa in well. Even within South Africa, which is one of the accepting these roles and, if that is the case, what leaders of the programme, there are many people further help should we and the rest of the western who are extremely sceptical and, indeed, critical of nations be giving to South Africa in that peace- Mbeki’s personal role and the Government’s keeping monitoring way? position overall. Why? Largely, not entirely, Professor Barber: Some of the situations like the because of the tension—and this is the big caveat DRC rely on everybody’s ability to handle them that I would add to what James just said—and frankly. The early dilemma after 1994 for the South there is a direct sense within black South Africa, to African armed forces was bringing together very the extent one can generalise, of a trade-oV between disparate elements and merging them into one the use of resources and energy to redress the national force—a very diYcult job. I think it has historical inequalities and the poverty within South gone reasonably well towards the end but with Africa and the use of the skills and the resources many earlier diYculties because you had to merge of the investment to address similar disparities the liberation forces together with the old South internationally within southern and sub-Saharan African forces and the Bantustan forces, which had Africa. In Ghana and in Uganda for slightly to be formed into one coherent force. It was a diVerent reasons, but broadly because they are remarkable achievement to do it at all but there what you might call second-string economies and were lots of diYculties in doing so, of course, and powers within sub-Saharan Africa, the perception while that was taking place South Africa was was very critical because they feel they are likely to reluctant to involve itself in peace-keeping get very little out of the NePAD deal, and they operations. I think that phase is largely over, and point to the big four or five, if you like, who are they are more prepared to involve themselves in the main drivers behind NePAD as the ones who peace-keeping, but to equip yourself in peace- will gain mainly from the investment and the new keeping is diVerent from other situations for the opportunities from abroad. armed forces. There has been a big debate about the arms purchase. You need to know what you are Q7 Mr Illsley: Just taking that a little bit further, going to use them for before you buy your arms, the “burden of expectation”, and looking at South and the arms purchase was mainly on the primary Africa’s peace-making and peace-keeping role, role of defence of the borders. Whether that is good since 1994 South Africa has attempted to broker for peace-keeping or not is an open debate, so there peace in a number of African conflict areas. In has been uncertainty both about the peace-keeping which of these areas do you think it has seen role and about the arms purchase. greatest and least success, and for what reasons? Professor Simon: The period immediately after Professor Barber: I think the overall picture has not 1994 was characterised by a deliberate rundown of been particularly bright. It has improved slightly in South Africa’s military capacity in every sense: the 4 the DRC. It was at first virtually rejected in the scrapping of conscription, which had been in many DRC but I think it has got some peace-keepers senses the backbone during the apartheid period; there now. Angola is quieter. Mozambique is the the planned obsolescence of some of the materiel; one big success story in relation to South Africa and the reduction in the standing army and there it has been a combination of what has notwithstanding the reintegration issue, with happened in Mozambique itself. South Africa has 5 V assistance from BMATT as had been the case in been able to o er Mozambique substantial help. Zimbabwe and Namibia before, got to a point The Maputo corridor and the help it gave when where it was realised that some re-equipment was there were floods in Mozambique was very useful required and also retraining, hence the so there it has had direct help, but also the controversial arms deal. But I would like to add at combination of political change in Mozambique this point a fundamental dilemma for South Africa which has gone along similar lines at the same time and, indeed, other countries in Africa in respect of as South Africa’s. Also the personal connection South African peace-keeping or any other military between Nelson Mandela and Joachim Chissano I form of intervention, and that is simply this: until am sure has helped. the early 90s, the experience of the rest of Africa in terms of South Africa’s military was as a Q8 Mr Illsley: Given that the South African destructive, destabilising force, invading and government has shown an increased willingness to occupying part of Angola and so on, sabotaging as involve itself in regional peace-keeping duties part of that whole period of conflict, and that is still beyond the DRC, and bearing in mind the very firmly embedded in the minds of many people memorandum which you probably have not seen which we received from the BBC World Service in South Africa and beyond. So the thought of that pointed out problems within the South African seeing South African soldiers in uniform and bearing arms as part of some other presence is still Y 3 NePAD—New Economic Partnership for African adi cult one. That is waning with time and, as Development. 4 DRC—Democratic Republic of Congo. 5 British Military Advisory and Training Team. 9573971003 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Ev 10 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

9 December 2003 Professor James Barber and Professor David Simon

James alluded, the role in DRC has been quite The Committee suspended from 3.33 pm to 3.43 instrumental. The other success I would point to, pm for a division in the House of Commons. that he did not mention, is Nelson Mandela’s role in brokering agreement, however fragile it remains, Q11 Sir John Stanley: As you know, the remit of in Burundi, which received much less attention this Committee is to scrutinise the foreign policy of than the DRC, Zimbabwe and Angola. the British government, and I would like to ask you both what you consider to be the top priorities for Y Q9 Mr Illsley: Turning to brief questions on the the British Foreign O ce in relation to South Southern Africa Development Community which it Africa. joined in 1994, what useful role does the SADC Professor Barber: Let me try. One of them will be plays in facilitating economic and political to help in the quest for trade. You will never get development within southern Africa? an absolutely level field, so far as I can see, but to help get it as level as possible. It is one of the things Professor Simon: It played a far more useful and 6 active role until the conflict in the DRC broke out that Alec Erwin mentioned when he was over here recently—they want fairer trade situations and Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola became particularly in parts of the agricultural structure. directly involved. They are three of the SADC They have an agreement, of course, with the members and their involvement was, in eVect, European Union on a free trade arrangements, but unilateral without going through the appropriate the implementation of that is important. It is not SADC channels, which exist for multilateral just having an agreement but it is how it is agreement before such involvement commences, implemented, and I think it is in British interests to and that eVectively emasculated the organisation help South Africa as much as possible in that. So for several years—in fact, it damned nearly brought that is certainly one area. In another area, if SADC it to its knees. Another element of the dilemma is is going to be eVective, HIV/AIDS should be one that there are at least three regional institutions of the areas which it addresses because you cannot with increasingly overlapping membership and in contain this to one country, it spreads over the the post-Cold War period also increasingly similar whole region, and if we can give them any aims and objectives. SADC is arguably the assistance and help in that we ought to do so. foremost; then there is COMESA, the Common Professor Simon: I would draw attention to several Market for Eastern and Southern African which things. The first and perhaps most problematic is stretches all the way up to Djibouti and Eritrea, the ambiguous, ambivalent relationship between and the oldest of them all, the Southern African South Africa and the United Kingdom which in a Customs Union dating from the period of the sense we saw coming to a head again at the union of South Africa in 1909–10, which now links weekend at CHOGM7 over, in this particular up South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland instance, Zimbabwe, but that is one—albeit very and Namibia and is the only real customs union important—illustration of the diYculty and the to date of the three, although the others have now way in which particular problems can cloud common markets and free trade areas on their otherwise very productive and broadly co-operative agendas. But progress has been slow. The free trade relations that have existed since the transition in area within SADC is being implemented very South Africa. In that sense the diYculty is that gradually. It is supposed to have an eight-year South Africa finds itself, as we were saying earlier, implementation period, but that has been delayed, in a leadership role on the one hand and also in the and the individual countries are struggling with the role of a recipient of aid and transitional assistance old dilemma of, “Do we lower and remove the in various guises of the sort that we have alluded to. barriers to trade amongst the membership for the In that particular context, things like the Chevening common good relative to what we as country X, Y studentship awards are profoundly important, and or Z might gain or lose individually?”, and the role of the British Council, which comes under especially for the smaller, weaker countries that is the Foreign OYce. Here I would like to enter some a very real dilemma. concerns regarding the current view of those activities. One hears that the Chevening Q10 Mr Illsley: Regarding what you said about the studentships might be reduced in number, that the countries which paralysed SADC for several years higher educational links might be discontinued and because of their inability to continue, what then is a variety of those other mechanisms which are both the significance of the recently signed Mutual of direct benefit to Britain but also crucially Defence Pact by SADC members? important to that longer term support, not least in the context of expanding the skillbase, Professor Simon: Potentially it is part of the compensating for the loss of people through HIV/ resumption of progress. There used to be AIDS and so on. But the bigger issue of trying to something called the Organ for Politics, Defence find accommodation with a country like South and Security which was a semi-detached institution Africa over joint foreign policy and World Trade headed by Robert Mugabe, and a few years ago Organisation-related issues is very complex. The was part of the restructuring after South Africa diYculty is how to find a strategy that works, and joined SADC that was given a diVerent status and brought in, and this Mutual Defence Pact is part 6 Mr Alexander Erwin, South African Minister of Trade of the political programme of SADC and this and Industry. reconfigured organ. 7 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. 9573971003 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 11

9 December 2003 Professor James Barber and Professor David Simon here I could draw attention to the contrast between and it is very clear from that work that there is a the policy of at least one former minister of state large category of people, not necessarily for party for African aVairs and the South African political reasons but nevertheless through well- government. One tried very upfront, full-on founded individual fears of persecution in terms of tackling of the issue; the South Africans, as they the scope of the UN declarations on refugees and still do, prefer quiet African unity, supposedly associated legislation, who should not behind-the-scenes role, and yet when you talk to automatically be assumed to have no bona fide case oYcials on both sides it is clear that they feel and should be seen and heard on their merits. equally frustrated at the lack of progress. So this is a real dilemma and it is not easy to say, “That was Q14 Chairman: Professor Barber, have you had any right, this was wrong”, but it is a critical issue further thoughts? which is now likely to complicate the relationship Professor Barber: No, I do not think so. The last between South Africa and the United Kingdom, time I wrote about this I said it was ‘a comfortable particularly after CHOGM at the weekend. relationship’. Professor Barber: I would like to add international crime. South Africa, after 1994, became a centre for Q15 Mr Hamilton: I wanted to move on to the international crime including the drugs trade. We subject of Zimbabwe, South Africa’s neighbour have given some help, I know, but that is another and the problems in that benighted country. As you area in which we could help. may know, this Committee has had an on-going Sir John Stanley: Following on from what you have interest in Zimbabwe; we have published three both said, can you tell us whether there are any reports to date, the latest was in May, and we particular policies that the British Government is devoted a section of our report to Zimbabwe in its currently following that you would like to see region.8 May I just quote a small paragraph from altered, or any policies not being followed now that that report? We said that, “if Zimbabwe’s you would like to see being adopted? neighbours were fully to assume their responsibilities—for example, by imposing targeted Q12 Mr Maples: In relation to South Africa! non-trade sanctions similar to those already Professor Barber: I think we could do probably imposed by the EU, by some Commonwealth more in training people, for police and, as David countries and by the United States—Mugabe’s mentioned, universities. I know our universities, regime would be further isolated, his opponents dare I mention it, here at the moment are would be encouraged and his days would be controversial and under-funded maybe but numbered”.9 The Government fully agreed with us, compared with South Africa we are very well oV by the way, in its response to our Report. However, and it is the staV and post-graduates that would be some people who have submitted evidence to this useful for us to help. I will try to think of others inquiry have said that one of the reasons that South as we go along. Africa is doing very little about Robert Mugabe is Professor Simon: The one I would urge most that there is this belief that the West has double strongly is that beknighted term, “joined-up standards; there is anger that the West appears to thinking” and, crucially, joined-up action to follow be so active on the issue of Zimbabwe yet the joined-up thinking, particularly in the interface apparently ignores the adverse impact of between the FCO and DfID, the Home OYce or globalisation on countries like South Africa. the Department of Trade and Industry in respect Firstly, why do you think that President Mbeki has of negotiations at the World Trade Organisation, been so reluctant to criticise the Mugabe regime in the problems encountered at Cancun, and the way Zimbabwe, given the damage he is doing to that in which South Africa is again emerging as a country and to the whole region, and to what significant player. But there was evidence that extent is South African policy on Zimbabwe a Britain did not dissent from the overall EU position reflection of demand for African unity as opposed which has caused some consternation among to an unwillingness to tackle the problem of people in South Africa and others in that group Zimbabwe? of players. Professor Barber: I think President Mbeki has problems both at home and abroad if he takes too V strong a line. Robert Mugabe is not regarded in the Q13 Sir John Stanley: You are referring to the tari same light by many blacks in South Africa as we issue, are you? regard him. For example, when the foreign Professor Simon: In particular yes, but the wider minister, Dr Zuma, was here recently, she talked agenda as well. Secondly, in respect of FCO and Y about righting an historical injustice—that is the Home O ce co-operation, or collaboration, in land question. Now, we do not perhaps see it as terms of policy towards asylum seekers and strongly as “an historical injustice”, so there is that migrants from South Africa. South Africa was side. I am told when Robert Mugabe was in Fort recently added to the so-called “White List” of Hare some months ago he was greeted as a hero countries from which asylum seekers will normally because he challenges the old colonial structure, so be presumed to have no bona fide case and are internally there are people in the ANC who would therefore subject to the new accelerated process that has been introduced. I have personally been 8 Foreign AVairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session involved over the last year in a number of asylum 2002–03, Zimbabwe, HC 339, paras. 44–48. claims and appeals as a provider of expert evidence, 9 Ibid., para 48. 9573971003 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Ev 12 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

9 December 2003 Professor James Barber and Professor David Simon be critical of Mbeki if he took too strong a line perhaps the issue I was alluding to earlier in respect against Mugabe. Equally internationally, and the of the Foreign OYce versus the South African case I quoted in my paper was that some time ago relationship and what we saw at CHOGM at the when Mandela tried to take a very firm stand on weekend. But again, as James has said, it is by no Nigeria in the Saro Wiwa case, that isolated South means a universal sentiment; there are many in Africa from the rest of Africa. It burnt its fingers South Africa who feel just as desperate as the very badly on the Saro Wiwa case, and I do not MDC10 supporters in Zimbabwe and many others, think they have ever forgotten it. Do I need to particularly on the part of Africa, but again there remind you of the case? are diVerences. In west Africa my experience is that many people are much more openly critical of what Mugabe is doing and will say he is putting all of Q16 Mr Hamilton: No, I remember it very well, but us under a cloud, giving us all a bad name. In east my question then further to what you have said is Africa there is much more of the sentiment that this: surely, when pictures are broadcast—and they James mentioned where people respect Mugabe as must be broadcast in South Africa—of the having the guts to stand up against the vested repression of the Movement for Democratic interests and the existing power structures of the Change, of the economic disaster that has been international architecture. brought about, is it simply the case that the South African government blames the West in some way for what is happening economically to Zimbabwe Q17 Mr Hamilton: Surely it is one thing to stand and does not see Robert Mugabe as the cause of up against those structures and, as Professor that economic damage and the repression that he Barber said, to challenge the old colonial structure, is using against opposition? Is that seen simply as that is accepted, but when you see Africans a way of putting down people who are supporting starving, when you see that starvation and food western ideas, or white ideas. being used as a weapon against African opponents, Professor Barber: It is not that simple. I am sure surely that is very diVerent to dismantling the old there is criticism and I am sure Mbeki himself colonial structures? I still fail to understand why recognises the dilemma and the damage Mugabe is that is not condemned. doing, but I am trying to explain how he faces that Professor Simon: I would agree, and that is why publicly. They have tried to do it by quiet people I talk to in various parts of west Africa diplomacy which has failed, of course—and there increasingly are taking the more openly critical are some very strong critics including Mbeki’s view, and we saw President Obasanjo at the brother. He leads a campaign against Mugabe in weekend at CHOGM, but I think in east and South Africa and there was a meeting at the South V southern Africa, the areas where white colonial African Institute of International A airs which I settlement was profound and therefore land attended that was very strongly against what was expropriation most widespread, that historical happening in Zimbabwe, so there are very strong consciousness is rather diVerent and there is a critics, but if you ask me why Mbeki behaves as he sense, perhaps ironically, in keeping with the UN does, I try to understand. and OAU11 charter that these are domestic aVairs Professor Simon: I would distinguish three elements of fellow member states in which you do not to the answer. One is the issue you have already intervene, at least not publicly in that way. alluded to, the allegations of double standards, and here we do not even need to look to relationships or treatment of diVerent countries but diVerent Q18 Mr Hamilton: Can I ask either of you whether stages in respect of Zimbabwe, and Rhodesia you think there is any sign that South Africa’s before that, and people draw attention to the fact policy is now changing as things get worse in that, even though there were international Zimbabwe? sanctions against the Smith regime in Rhodesia, as Professor Simon: I have seen little evidence thus far, it was at the time, they were not strongly enforced at least on the public side of the policy. I think despite appearances, and some of the key economic there are some intense debates and diVerences of linkages were maintained, that notwithstanding. opinion fairly high up in Government, and The second element is the historical debt that certainly the flip side of that is that there has been Mbeki personally, and the ANC in general, feels growing concern within South Africa, and also towards Zimbabwe and the other frontline states Namibia, that if the land questions in those two for the sheltering and support during the struggle countries are not successfully dealt with, then against apartheid, and in some cases Mozambique Zimbabwe’s style scenario is no longer beyond the and sometimes Zimbabwe using the territory as a realm of possibility in South Africa and Namibia. forward base, certainly giving asylum and refuge to There is great concern, and a couple of weeks ago many South Africans. The third one is that in the Namibian government intervened very Africa as a whole, some would say, although others forcefully to forestall a threatened land invasion by would draw more tight geographically regionally people who were members, as it happens, until very specific boundaries, there is a sense that you do not recently of the SWAPO12 aYliated trade union. fall out in public, you do not attack a fellow African leader at these sorts of international fora 10 Movement for Democratic Change. but you deal with this quietly within the confines 11 OAU—Organisation of African Unity. of your collective home, as it were. That was 12 SWAPO—South West Africa Peoples Organisation. 9573971003 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 13

9 December 2003 Professor James Barber and Professor David Simon

Q19 Mr Hamilton: Do you think that the Foreign complex social, political, economic problems which OYce and the British government has failed to are set out in its constitution as its major role. Is this a understand the reasons why the South African realistic approach? government cannot act more strongly against Professor Simon: It is a very good question. The Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe? answerisdiYcultbecauseitisprobablyshadesofgrey Professor Simon: I think there has been an attempt and matters of degree, at least in the short term. One to understand them. Whether that understanding is of the key issues that some would find problematic is fully fledged, I am not sure, but it also reflects the rolethat Libya’s presidenthas played inthe whole diVerent positions and the whole question of the transformation from the OAU to the AU, and the universality of human rights, of the balance way in which it is alleged in some quarters that he was between individual human rights and collective and attempting to do this to create something, as it were, social rights mediated by these historic inequalities. in his own image and perhaps another way of looking That is the nub of the disagreement. at it would be to counter the increasing influence of Professor Barber: One may add to it Mbeki’s South Africa and the southern cone, if you like, particular pride in being an African. He is the one within the pan-continental movements. It is not quite who launched the African renaissance idea and he clear how much of the resourcing he is providing but thinks that too often black people have been certainly during the transitional process and the blamed when whites have done wrong. He is a man negotiations that followed it was substantial, so I who is proud of his ancestry and does not want to think there is a little bit of concern there. My sense is be seen as somebody trying to undermine the black that in many parts of the region there would be side, black unity, so there is a personal element greater support for the more geographically specific coming into it as well. I am sure he has tried to regional economic initiatives, like SADC and 14 change Mugabe but he does not want to be seen as ECOWAS because they are more coherent . . . a leader standing out against another black figure who, as David said, was a major liberation figure. Q23 Mr Chidgey: Support from whom? Professor Simon: The member states themselves, and they would see those as more potentially useful Q20 Mr Hamilton: And, of course, you could vehicles for the economic collaboration than the pan- understand that more if the opposition in Zimbabwe continental. At the continental level, the question was white but it is not—well, it is partly but it seems to becomes the relationship between the African Union be mainly black. and NePAD and, again, there is still some definition Professor Barber: Yes. that we need to have there. Professor Simon: Very much so. Professor Barber: It is rather early to judge, that is the dilemma. It isa new initiative and the hopeis that new Q21 Mr Hamilton: Finally, do you think the British initiatives improve things, but SADC itself has government, the Foreign OYce here, can in any way reorganised itself recently with the hope that it will be more eYcient. In the past it gave out segments to a influence South Africa’s attitude towards particular state to carry out, for example, South Zimbabwe? What should the FCO do now to Africa had health as one of its segments, but it was influence future events or from what you say, done by civil servants in South Africa. Now there has Professor Barber, is Thabo Mbeki’s position really been a change in SADC and they have six areas in pretty solid and he is not going to change? which they operate as a central unit, and the hope is Professor Barber: He is not going to change publicly, that that will be more eVective. I do not think. The hope is that he will put some personal pressure, but I cannot see Mugabe moving because of the sort of pressure that South Africa has Q24 Mr Chidgey: On that point, particularly your exerted so far. If you really wanted to pull the plug reference to SADC, has the disappearance of youcouldstopsupplyingnot justfoodbutelectricity, Zimbabwe damaged the AU and, particularly, transport and so on, but South Africa has not done it SADC? so far and I cannot see it doing it in the future, so we Professor Barber: Oh, I should think it has damaged just have to go on and hope, that somehow Mugabe most things, yes. There was a big argument earlier between Mugabe and Mandela over SADC’s Organ will be removed. for Defence and Security because Mugabe had been rather cock of the walk before the South Africans Q22 Mr Chidgey: I would like to raise some questions arrived. When the South Africans arrived Mandela concerning South Africa and the African Union. As became the dominant personality and Chairman of you know President Mbeki was a very strong SADC. Mugabe, put out by this, wanted to have a supporter of the OAU, and also first president of the separate area of his own and he tried to take over the AU13. We all know, of course, that relations between Organ, so they had quite a substantial clash. the AU and the west, particularly the United Professor Simon: I would agree with that. Kingdom,wereattimesmorethanalittlestrainedbut what I am particularly interested in is how does the Q25 Mr Chidgey: You, of course, know that South new African Union diVer from the old? What Africa was very strongly for the creation of a Peace potential do you think it has to tackle eVectively the and Security Council within the AU. I really want to

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Ev 14 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

9 December 2003 Professor James Barber and Professor David Simon ask you whether you think the scheme will come to it has quite a strong civil society and it has a press fruition and what it could achieve, bearing in mind that is reasonably free and critical. When it comes they see this as a vehicle to produce an African to the OAU I have only once visited it and I found stand-by force, rather along the lines of the EU it rather depressing experience so I am a poor model, I suppose. But I want to link that question to advocate of it. Whether the AU will be better, I do something you alluded to earlier which is the not know. controversy over the arms deals in South Africa which go right up to the Vice-President. It is a matter Q27 Mr Chidgey: We have touched on this already of record that Mbeki decided he will not be but it relates to our relations in this area with South prosecuted even though there seems to be quite a lot Africa and, of course, those of the EU, looking of evidence that suggests a prosecution should have particularly at the AU’s aims for the continent gone ahead, and this involves two major very large which involve peace-keeping forces as well. Really companies, if not entirely British they certainly have what I want to ask you is, in short, what more a very large British involvement in their operations. could we be doing in the United Kingdom and the So really I am asking, first, how can South Africa EU to assist the AU in achieving its aims, and do have any credibility in a programme such as we suVer at all from the fact that this arms deal in NePAD, which is linked to the AU which Mbeki is South Africa has been a huge controversy, and they a great supporter of and which is out there to drive are the key players in trying to establish a regional against and eliminate corruption, when at the very peace-keeping force? Does that rebound in any way highest level within their own Government there are in the assistance that the United Kingdom can huge questions about the propriety of arms oVer? Is that rather tarnished by this because of the purchases? If you then link that to whether they have involvement of British firms? any credibility in sponsoring a pan-African peace- Professor Barber: I doubt it. It seems to me the AU keeping force, does it not all seem a bit of a mess? is a broader issue than the arms deal. Now the EU That is one way of putting it, but it does not have relationship with Africa generally is one that, as I much credibility, does it? mentioned before, I would like to see more Professor Simon: I can understand that view and I sympathy with in terms of freedom of trade and so think the central diYculty to grapple with is, on the on, and encouragement of the people of Africa to one hand, the sense that I think does have genuine be able to sell us their goods, so it is that general roots at least in some quarters amongst African level, that Britain can play a role in the EU helping governance that there is a need for some such the AU in that sense. institution and, on the other hand, increasing Professor Simon: I would underline that last point. concern which has been reflected in some of the Many people in South and southern Africa see critiques oVered by South Africa and other African Britain as potentially one of the main allies within states that ultimately what is driving this is a western the EU context, particularly over fishing rights and attempt to devolve international peace-keeping other resources, where Spain or other countries down to the continental and subcontinental region. have taken quite hardline positions. My sense, to Particularly they would point to the role the US has answer your question more directly, is that the taken on in the post-Cold War period as global FCO and the British government more generally policeman and enforcer, in the sense that, as we have have been far more positive in responding to heard in recent weeks, the American government has NePAD than thus far to the African Union, but realised even it has limitations of resourcing and even there I would characterise it largely as personnel to do this in too many conflict zones something like, “Make encouraging noises but let’s simultaneously, and really what is driving this is an wait and see; let’s look for evidence of progress attempt to devolve that responsibility and the risks before committing ourselves.” and so on on to Africans. Q28 Mr Chidgey: But NePAD is an AU Q26 Mr Chidgey: But is not that the wish of the programme. African countries themselves? Professor Simon: That relationship is not as Professor Simon: Well, there is support in some straightforward as it may seem. circles but not unanimously. There is great concern about this and therefore the balancing act to be Q29 Mr Maples: I want to look at South Africa in trodden is how to support, train, facilitate and to a slightly bigger context. How does it see the resource this without, again, being seen to be the Commonwealth, its role in the Commonwealth, “sugar daddy” to something that is “going to dance how it might use it, whether it feels it gets used by to the pay master’s tune”. the Commonwealth? How do they see that? Professor Barber: What I would say is that South Professor Simon: I think Mbeki’s take on that Africa has been more open than most places. There would be rather diVerent today from a week ago, is corruption, of course as in all societies, but at for very obvious reasons. Let me answer it in an least in South Africa there is reasonably free press, indirect way. I think the kind of perspective we had it investigates things, and we know about the portrayed by Mugabe at the weekend of nothing degree of corruption. So in that sense it is rather but a talking shop and a club does it a disservice hard to say that it is like other African states. I and demeans it. That said, Zimbabwe’s departure think South Africa in some ways is diVerent from probably does not demean the Commonwealth in other African states, and one of the elements is that the short-term because there are precedents that if 9573971003 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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9 December 2003 Professor James Barber and Professor David Simon there is a change of Government the country could Africa certainly does, to quote the phrase, “punch be invited to rejoin, and that gets us out of that above its weight.” That depends obviously on particular problem. In specific relation to South maintaining and retaining support within Africa and Africa, I have little doubt that President Mbeki again there is that slight ambivalence because of the himself sees it very much as one of a suite of global historical role and the sense on the part of many of multilateral institutions where South Africa can the smaller and weaker countries that South Africa play a pivotal role, often as a broker between if you stands to gain much more than they do from many like the old Commonwealth and the new of these pan-African and global movements, so that Commonwealth—Europe, Australasia, Canada, is a tension line I would draw attention to. and Africa, Asia. The trouble is, what happened at the weekend has probably been something of an Q33 Mr Maples: Do you think in both these implicit or indeed explicit rebuke to Mbeki’s contexts, the Commonwealth and the United envisaged role. I think broadly speaking there is Nations, South Africa has fully bought in? To what still fairly solid support for South Africa’s extent has it bought into the good governance, membership and role, and South Africa has been democracy, human rights, rule of law agenda? That greatly encouraged by the accession of seems to be going pretty well within South Africa, Mozambique, more recently of Cameroon, in the but has it bought into that agenda as far as the rest sense that, in that respect, it might assume of the Third World is concerned? Do we see them as something more of a wider role than simply a an absolutely essential ingredient, that it is not going former British ex-colonial club, because after all to work for them if they do not have these things Mozambique was never a British colony, in place? protectorate or anything else. Professor Barber: If I may go back, in terms of the Professor Barber: South Africa sees itself as a UN, they may not say it openly to you but they bridge-builder between the first and third worlds, would like to see a reform of the Security Council and in that sense it has been reasonably successful. with permanent seats for an African or African When it first came into the world of multilateral states, and they see themselves of course as the institutions, after 1994, there was great enthusiasm natural inheritor of the seat for Africa. Others do not of course. A friend of mine was at one of the necessarily share that view. meetings, on fisheries I think, and he said that when the South Africans came in everybody stood up Q34 Mr Maples: Would they see that as something and cheered; he said it was like the Second Coming. they could use to promote this agenda, or is our They have managed to build on that and I think agenda fundamentally diVerent from theirs in this one of the successes of South Africa has been in respect? things like the World Trade Organisation, in the Professor Simon: I think it also depends, in the sense NePAD movement and so on, to be a bridge of chronology, which interests predominate within, between the First and Third worlds, and they see say, the Department of Foreign AVairs. Certainly in it that way. I will again quote Alec Erwin who said, the first few years after transition in 1994 there was “We have both the First and Third Worlds here, remarkably little change of key personnel except at therefore we are in a position to help.” I can only the very top. So they had a strong continuity of, if agree, I think it has been one of the most successful you like, old guard people who had served under the areas of South Africa’s international eVorts to National Party government, and that played a quite bridge-build. important role in terms of South Africa’s response on a number of these sorts of initiatives and the Q30 Mr Maples: Can they be both a bridge-builder relatively uncomplicated way in which South Africa and a leader of Africa, or sub-Saharan Africa? signed up to some of these apparently universal, Professor Simon: They are attempting to be, yes. individualised rights. Gradually as personnel change was eVected, as the Mandela regime has yielded to Q31 Mr Maples: Are those things at some point the Mbeki regime and his very diVerent vision, that going to come into conflict? has become a little more complicated, and there is Professor Barber: They have not always been this balance which I alluded to in response to an welcomed by African states. Some African states earlier question, between the sense of a more, as it have said, “They are trying to speak for us and they were, communalist, collective African perspective do not understand”. They did not get full support on rights rather than the kind of Western focus on for their Olympic bid from some Africans, so there the principal priority of individual rights, and that is uncertainty. diYculty again, that conflict, I think is beginning to come out in some of the apparently divergent views Q32 Mr Maples: The same question really in relation and responses to diVerent initiatives, often in quite to the United Nations. The United Nations might be rapid succession. a better place to play that role of bridge-builder. Professor Simon: Again, there is evidence in several Q35 Mr Chidgey: Just a few questions on NePAD. respects, one of which, perhaps most conspicuously, We have touched on it so I will try and be succinct. was South Africa’s role in promoting the Ottawa You have already made clear to us that there is a Treaty banning landmines in 1997. There are other feeling that NePAD suVers from being diVerent examples where the bridge-builder role has been things to diVerent people, both within and outside played very successfully and in that case South the continent. Some see it as a tool for securing 9573971003 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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9 December 2003 Professor James Barber and Professor David Simon better governance, particularly donors, and others question the Peer Review Mechanism. He see it as a means of securing more aid for African apparently believes it will be undermined by the nations. Can those two needs be satisfied, or is it a length of time needed, the absence of objective game of chess? norms and the lack of sanctions to make countries Professor Simon: Yes, as they say. comply. That is very interesting because South Chairman: A good game of doubles—not a ball Africa and Ghana are the first two countries to between you! volunteer to be subject to this, so are we going to see South Africa as an example of best practice? Will it Q36 Mr Chidgey: Let me be specific. Really it is a mean that, in fact, eVectively it will not change question of whether you believe Western donors will significantly poor governance in African countries? continue to support NePAD without an eVective Will it be in eVect toothless? Is this a huge challenge Peer Review Mechanism. I want to couple that with for South Africa or will it just pass by? an interesting contrast and that is that the United Professor Barber: Yes, I think it is a big challenge. States administration does not support NePAD, it has its own Millennium Fund which has a rather Q39 Mr Chidgey: Is there anything we can do in the more commercial approach to assisting Africa. UK as British foreign policy to aid this process? Professor Simon: Yes. Professor Simon: Assisting South Africa to play a leadership and catalytic role in respect of Q37 Mr Chidgey: I would like your views on, will we mechanisms like that could bear some fruit. support that Peer Review, and is the American approach the best way for Western donors? Q40 Mr Chidgey: Should we be using the carrot and Professor Simon: I think the answer to the latter is stick through the G8 Action Plan in the UK’s policy probably no. There is an important role for a towards Africa? multilateral approach and the broad strategy of Professor Simon: I would be tempted to say that trying to co-ordinate an EU policy is probably right. putting some funds and some commitment up-front The critical question, which I alluded to earlier, is to would be as useful as that. Certainly, as you will see what extent the EU in general or Britain in particular in one of the attachments to my memorandum, the is prepared to put something up-front beyond Evian Summit earlier this year was felt to be saying, “We are waiting for evidence of development disappointing by both sides. NePAD and the on the ground”, and this Peer Review Mechanism is African communities were looking for some precisely one of those thresholds which people are concrete evidence of G8 commitment or OECD carefully waiting to be crossed. There again we see commitment and, vice-versa, they were looking for diVerences within NePAD as to how readily the progress on peer review mechanisms, but at the individual member countries are prepared to sign up moment there is this kind of dancing around but to that sort of thing. It comes back to this earlier nobody is prepared to take the first step and say, diYculty which many governments have, about “We are going forward.” being seen publicly and especially now through some kind of formally instituted African mechanism to be Q41 Mr Chidgey: Very specifically then, are you rebuking and reprimanding other countries. I think saying you do not agree with the principle that G8 the one glimmer of hope is that they would probably support should be withheld until improvement in prefer to do it in that more specifically African- good governance can be demonstrated? centred forum than either the Commonwealth or the Professor Barber: I think in South Africa there is UN, which is a kind of north-south global forum evidence of good governance; enough to encourage where the pressure to stand united might be even us. stronger. Professor Barber: All I would add is that the Q42 Mr Chidgey: Enough to unlock the support American view since Bill Clinton’s time has been to from G8? emphasise private enterprise not aid. They have been Professor Barber: Yes. pushing that very hard. Professor Simon: And in a growing number of other Professor Simon: And the principal beneficiaries of countries. Certainly some support up-front with the African Growth and Opportunity Act in the first caveats as a reserve position, but crucially being seen year or two of its operation have been only two or to be willing to commit some resources and move three countries—South Africa, Nigeria and to a forward on that basis and not stand back. lesser extent Kenya—which again reflects minerals Professor Barber: Yes, I agree. and mineral-based manufacture. Chairman: A perfect note on which to end. Gentlemen, you have been most helpful to the Q38 Mr Chidgey: On this Peer Review Mechanism, Committee. I call this first session to an end and we you will be aware that President Abdoulaye Wade of will begin in ten minutes’ time with the next Senegal was recently reported as calling into witnesses and Mr Illsley will begin. 9573971004 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Written evidence submitted by Action for Southern Africa

1. Summary 1.1 Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) is the successor to the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the UK. Since 1994, ACTSA has been challenging decision-makers in the UK and Europe to support peace, democracy and development across Southern Africa (as defined by membership of SADC—the Southern African Development Community). 1.2 ACTSA is a campaigning organisation with a membership of roughly 3000 individuals and 250 aYliated organisations—trade unions, church groups, local ACTSA groups, and others. Our membership is based in the UK and most of our funding comes from membership fees, aYliate fees and donations. 1.3 ACTSA works in solidarity with the governments and people of the region to raise awareness of their perspectives, needs and priorities. Our main focus is on educating and mobilising the British public, and on lobbying the British government and the EU to secure progressive policies towards the region. 1.4 ACTSA’s work builds on its close ties with South Africa’s liberation movement. We have also developed close relationships with mass-based movements emerging to tackle South Africa’s new challenges. We believe that, wherever possible, the people of the region should directly represent themselves, and have organised for delegations of South African representatives, including government ministers, regional premiers, MPs, trade negotiators, representatives from Jubilee South Africa, South African Churches, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and various of its aYliate unions, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and community groups aVected by UK owned asbestos mines, to: — address public meetings; — brief the media; — lobby parliamentarians, ministers and oYcials representing the FCO, DTI and DfID in the UK, the EU and the Commonwealth; and — build relations with civil society groups in the UK, including churches, trade unions and NGOs. 1.5 ACTSA’s campaigns include: lobbying for fairer trade deals between Southern Africa and Europe; calling for the cancellation of apartheid-caused debt; campaigning for greater international commitment to the war on AIDS; and building support for peace and democracy in countries including Angola and Zimbabwe. 1.6 ACTSA welcomes the Foreign AVairs Select Committee’s decision to carry out an inquiry into UK foreign policy towards South Africa. We would like to submit, for the Committee’s consideration, the following comments. These comments do not purport to represent the views of the above-mentioned South African organisations, although they are informed by ACTSA’s relationships with them. We would encourage the committee to seek submissions of evidence directly from South African governmental, political, civil society and academic sources. We would be happy to advise on potential sources of information and witnesses for the committee’s investigation. 1.7 This submission: — Provides a brief sketch of political and economic progress as South Africa approaches its first decade of freedom (Section 2); — Considers the role of international actors in shaping and constraining the choices open to the newly free South Africa as it seeks to overcome the legacy of apartheid, including through the EU’s Trade and Development Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa, (Section 3); — Reflects briefly on South Africa’s response to this international environment, and its foreign policy, including South Africa’s approach to the crisis in Zimbabwe (Section 4) and its promotion of a new partnership between Africa and the rich world (Section 5); — Asks whether the UK has a diplomatic or political strategy towards South Africa, and what that might involve, (Section 6); — Looks in some depth at the UK’s response to calls for a new partnership between Africa and the rich world, and at the G8’s “Africa Action Plan”, (Section 7) focusing on what the UK should do to promote a more just global trade regime (Section 8), achieve debt cancellation (Section 9), de- link aid from structural adjustment conditions (Section 10) and meet the challenge of the AIDS pandemic (Section 11); and — Concludes that if, as the FCO claims, NEPAD is a “key plank of the foreign policy of Tony Blair’s Government,”1 that policy and government have failed decisively. We propose a number of policy recommendations to the FCO that we hope the Foreign AVairs Committee will support (Section 12).

1 Baroness Amos, “Co-operation, not Colonialism”, South Africa, March 2003. 9573971004 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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2. South Africa’s First Decade of Freedom 2.1 The South African people fought a long and bitter battle for the sovereign right to mandate their own political authorities, to shape their own futures and for a fair share in the wealth generated by the country’s farms, industries and resources. 2.2 During apartheid, racism and inequality were enshrined in law and aVected every aspect of life. Black South Africans could not vote, own land or property outside certain designated areas, could only work in certain areas and in certain jobs, and could not marry outside their racial group. State institutions—the police, army and public administration—were geared towards the protection of white privilege at all costs. 2.3 Since 1994, South Africa has been grappling with the daunting task of unravelling institutionalised racism in every sphere of society. The greatest single tribute to the success of that struggle is the fact that South Africa is one of the most democratic countries in the world. Democratic in the formal sense, with a free and fair electoral system, an independent judiciary, a free press and one of the most progressive constitutions in the world. But democratic also in the sense that millions of people, in their communities and workplaces, are actively engaged in grassroots political activity, mobilising, educating, protesting, sometimes denouncing, and certainly influencing the government, the rich and the powerful. South Africa’s three trade union federations between them claim almost 3 million members. South Africa’s streets are often witness to the mobilising capacities of a diverse range of social movements—against debt, privatisation, evictions and war, and for worker’s rights, a basic income grant, land redistribution and the free public provision of electricity, water, housing and healthcare. 2.4 As a result of the power and diversity of these and other social movements, major political decisions in South Africa are subject to heated public contest and negotiation. For example the recent announcement of a national AIDS treatment plan comes after many years of bitter struggle, led by groups representing people living with AIDS, supported by the trade unions and a wide-ranging political coalition. TAC and its supporters piled pressure on their Government, using every democratic tool in the box. They mobilised and educated communities across the country, targeted the media, established their constitutional rights through the courts, exercised their rights to civil disobedience, and engaged with and influenced the local structures of the ANC. In the end, a majority cabinet decision over-ruled well-documented resistance to the plan. We should welcome this development and act to support the implementation of the plan. 2.5 Sceptics have discussed the ongoing struggle between factions within the ruling “tripartite alliance” as if the contradictions within the alliance represent a weakness of South Africa’s political system. However, it could equally be argued that the alliance itself, between the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the countries biggest trade union federation, COSATU, and the dissent and open debate that it generates, tolerates and mediates, represent an almost unique, and triumphant, expression of democracy. 2.6 South Africa’s National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) also provides an innovative statutory forum within which government, business, union and community representatives engage in a form of social dialogue. Although this process has its weaknesses and will not always deliver concrete results, NEDLAC has played a role in negotiations over the recent Growth and Development Summit (GDS), which debated the Government’s controversial privatisation strategy, and in discussions over the national AIDS treatment plan. 2.7 Despite the incredible political achievements of the new South Africa, the comparable economic “miracle” that many dreamed of, has not been fully realised. Since 1994 there have been many advances for South Africa’s poor majority. In November 2002, Statistics South Africa released a major report comparing household earnings and spending for October 1995 and October 2000.2 The report finds that Government led social investments and programmes have delivered a major expansion in free or subsidised basic services, including health care and schooling. The proportion of people with access to clean water climbed from 79% to 83%. Those with access to electricity for lighting rose from 64% to 72%. Those with access to telephones rose from 29% to 35%. People living in formal housing rose from 66% to 73%. Further gains have followed since 2000. 2.8 However, in each of these areas, significant percentages of the population still do not have access to the essentials of a dignified life. Furthermore, ordinary workers and poor communities face an ongoing economic crisis. Unemployment is approaching 40%. One million formal sector jobs have been lost in five years; work has been casualised and informalised. 2.9 The Statistics South Africa report finds that, in terms of income, the average South African household became significantly poorer between 1995 and 2000. The poorer half of South African households slipped backwards in these five years relative to the richer half, and while the average African household experienced a 19% fall in income over the period, the average white household experienced a 15% increase. The report also found that operating profits exceed the entire wage bill going to labour as a proportion of GDP.

2 Statistics South Africa, “Earnings and spending in South Africa: Selected ﬁndings and comparisons from the income and expenditure surveys of October 1995 and October 2000”, November 2002. 9573971004 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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2.10 These dry statistics do little to bring to life the desperate situation in which millions of South Africans continue to subsist. However, the social tensions that they inevitably generate are everywhere to be seen in the world’s second most unequal country. While wealth and land remain heavily concentrated in the hands of a minority, factory workers, miners, farm labourers, rural and urban communities, facing rampant unemployment and a massive AIDS crisis, struggle to support themselves and their families. As in most poor countries, poverty in South Africa disproportionately aVects women, children, the elderly and the disabled. 2.11 Whilst few underestimate the enormous challenge of overcoming the legacy of apartheid, it is unsurprising that South Africans continue to debate the wisdom of government policies to do so. For example, trade unions have argued that most progress has been made in those areas where the Government has pursued policies explicitly condemned by the neo-liberal economic model. These include: the maintenance of parastatal companies with clear development mandates, such as electricity and telecommunications; freely provided services such as water and electricity, and active social subsidies, such as housing policy. 2.12 Critics add that, in many areas, progressive advances in social services have been undermined by policies more attuned to international pressures for “labour market flexibility”, and “liberalisation”—short hand for low-wage, insecure work, and privatisation of state monopoly companies. For example, guided by its public sector developmental mandate, and assisted by its temporary fixed line monopoly, Telkom has built 2.67 million new telephone lines, many to poor communities. However, over two million of those lines have been cut-oV because the poor communities to which they had been delivered could not pay for the service. This was related both to the income poverty of the general population, and to pressures on Telkom to reduce international call prices (the niche market most likely to face competition under a planned privatisation package), a policy that has been balanced by hiking call prices in the domestic market. 2.13 The Government recently responded to fierce criticism of their privatisation policies by convening the Growth and Development Summit. The summit saw some shift away from an economic development strategy premised on privatisation, liberalisation and attraction of FDI as the principal drivers of growth, and an increased focus on the mobilisation of domestic resources. It also announced increased investment in infrastructure, expanded public works programmes and the building of co-operatives. As President Mbeki put it, “It is sometimes argued that higher rates of economic growth, of 6% and above, would, on their own, lead to the reduction of the levels of unemployment in our country. This is part of a proposition about an automatic so-called trickle-down eVect . . .None of this is true. . . To get to this point will require sustained government intervention.”3

3. International Pressures and Constraints 3.1 Whatever one thinks of the economic, social and foreign policies being pursued by the South African Government, it is clear that they are the subject of a legitimate process of democratic debate within the country. However, it is similarly clear that this process is subject to a range of illegitimate pressures and constraints. These pressures are similar to those imposed on all theoretically sovereign African countries by the international economic system and the institutions tasked with running that system—including the World Bank, IMF and WTO. They militate not only against the “sustained government intervention” in the economy advocated by President Mbeki, but also, by eliminating alternative economic and political models, against democratic decision making. Both the international economic system and these institutions are significantly influenced by UK government policy, and by the EU. 3.2 South Africans have been extremely closely attuned to these dangers since before the transition to democracy. The ANC’s “Reconstruction and Development Programme” (RDP) of 1994, reads, “Relationships with international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund must be conducted in such a way as protect the integrity of domestic policy formulation and promote the interests of the South African population.”4 However, the IFIs themselves have also been well aware of South Africa’s riches, and have been extremely keen to influence the country’s development strategy to secure maximum openness to international financial flows and investors. From the mid-1990s, IFI “reconnaissance missions” made regular visits to South Africa, seeking to influence decision-makers and policy. 3.3 And indeed, the IFIs have many reasons to be pleased with the progress of their agenda in South Africa. Corporate taxes have dropped from 48% to 30% from 1994 to 1999, while import tariVs have also dropped, as have controls on capital flight.5 This integration into the global economy has delivered significant international investment in the South African economy. However, it has also led to much greater vulnerability to unpredictable trade, investment and financial flows. In 2000, President Mbeki noted, “The

3 Mbeki, T, Bold steps to end the “two nations” divide, ANC Today, 22 August 2003. 4 African National Congress, The Reconstruction and Development Programme, Johannesburg, Umanyano Publications, Section 6.5.16, 1994. 5 Bond, P, “Against Global Apartheid”, UCT Press, South Africa, 2003, pp vii. Particularly significant was the abolition, in March 1995 of the “financial rand” exchange mechanism, which acted as a tax on financial outflows. 9573971004 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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globalisation of the economy, resulting from among other things rapid movements of huge volumes of capital across the globe, objectively also has the eVect of limiting the possibility of states to take unilateral decisions.”6 3.4 South Africa’s new vulnerability, and resulting economic instability, was exposed particularly cruelly by the currency crash of February 1996 (emanating from a “sell” report from Zurich bankers who falsely believed Mandela to be ill). A direct result of the crash was the adoption by the government, under pressure from investors and the IFIs, of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy in June 1996. The policy introduced a “homegrown” structural adjustment programme for South Africa, eVectively replacing the RDP. In March 1998 a second crash hit the rand and in recent years the currency has experienced continuing instability. 3.5 At the same time, it must be recognised that South Africa has remained considerably more independent of the international financial institutions than any other sub-Saharan African state. Making sure that it remains that way requires international policies that allow South Africa to avoid the slope to dependence on heavily conditioned aid and trade deals down which so many other African countries have slipped. 3.6 A major opportunity for European countries to support South African eVorts to establish its economic independence was provided by negotiations, concluded in 1999, for the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA). Europe is South Africa’s main trading partner, with around 40% of South Africa’s exports sold to European countries, so this deal was of enormous significance. The European Council described the agreement as “a symbol of the strong links of friendship and solidarity between the people of Europe and Southern Africa.” 3.7 The deal contained a number of welcome elements, including the elimination of tariVs on most of South Africa’s industrial goods, special protection for sectors South Africa considers sensitive, and EU support for the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries who are suVering serious adjustment costs as a result of the deal. However, the process of negotiations, and the final agreement, far from meeting the promises made to South Africa at the end of apartheid, illustrated the self-interest and aggressive promotion of narrow interests that dominate the EU’s trade negotiating process and agenda. — In 1995, the EU refused South Africa’s request to negotiate trade relations alongside the 71 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries with which the EU negotiated under the Lome´ Convention (now Cotonou Agreement). The EU insisted that South Africa negotiate a Free Trade Area. Such bilateral deals, negotiated between partners of unequal strength, rarely deliver significant development benefits. By splitting South Africa oV from the wider Southern African region, in which it is already significantly integrated economically, the deal has also increased tensions between South Africa and her poorer neighbours. — South Africa also wanted to include European commitments to reform the Common Agricultural Policy as part of the agreement. The EU refused to negotiate on this issue. The refusal of the EU to negotiate an end to the CAP continues to poison trade discussions in the WTO and under the Cotonou Agreement. — The negotiations promised to improve access to European markets for South Africa’s agricultural products. However, Europe insisted that certain products be put on an “exclusion list”, meaning they would not be discussed, and South African goods would continue to face the high tariV barriers that were a legacy of the apartheid era, and are higher than those paid on goods entering Europe from more wealthy middle-income countries. — Other diYcult issues during the talks included the insistence, mainly by Spain, on linking the deal to a separate agreement on fisheries. In the final stages the most contentious issue was the appellation of South African port and sherry. 3.8 It is markedly diYcult to dis-aggregate the impacts of any particular trade deal on growth and development. However, the EU has claims that the TDCA helped stimulate a 50% increase in South African exports to the EU since 1999. However, factoring in movements in commodity prices and exchange rate fluctuations tells a diVerent story. For example, the price of platinum, which accounts for 7% of SA exports to the EU, has gone up 40% in the last 2 years. Secondly, most of South Africa’s major exports are denominated in dollars. Between 1999 and the end of 2001, the value of the Euro against the dollar fell 24%, generating an automatic increase in the Euro value of South African exports. A realistic assessment of the TDCA requires moving beyond headline figures to look at the impact of the deal on the restructuring of production. The questions we should be asking are: does “free trade” enable South African industries to add more value to products locally, create employment, and move away from dependence on declining commodities towards new products with higher demand growth and higher price trends? Only by achieving this can we expect to transform the basis of South Africa’s integration into the world economy, and thus tackle poverty and promote sustainable development.7 Finally, despite some compensation, the Southern

6 Mbeki, T. (2000), “Keynote Address to the ANC National General Council”, Port Elizabeth, 12 July, quoted in Bond, P, “Against Global Apartheid”, UCT Press, South Africa, 2003, pp vii. 7 See paper by Paul Goodison, ERO, to ACTSA conference, “The Cotonou Trade Negotiations: Building European Solidarity for Southern Africa”, October 2002, ACP House, Brussels. www.actsa.org/shop 9573971004 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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African Customs Union (SACU) countries have suVered severe losses of customs revenue under the deal. For Swaziland the customs duties collected from European imports and shared out between the customs union members accounts for up to 40% of government revenue.

4. South Africa in the World—Diplomatic Policies,Including Towards Zimbabwe 4.1 South Africa has recognised that one African country cannot tackle a hostile international context alone. South Africa has thus sought to engage with the diplomatic challenges of its region and to strengthen institutions and agendas capable of facing the rich world in a united manner. 4.2 South Africa has engaged energetically with the multilateral system since the isolation of the apartheid years, re-entering the Commonwealth in 1994, taking over the Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1998, and playing a prominent role in both the Organisation for African Unity, the African Union and the Southern African Development Community. South Africa has also played an active diplomatic role in African conflicts, notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi. 4.3 However, South Africa’s policy on the crisis in Zimbabwe has been extremely controversial. Many British MPs have argued that South Africa bears the heaviest responsibility for a solution to the Zimbabwean crisis, and appear to expect Zimbabwe’s neighbour to adopt draconian tactics—from switching oV the power supply, imposing widespread economic sanctions, or even sending in troops—to tackle the regime. We believe that all of these options are both unrealistic and would prove counter- productive in the struggle for peace, economic recovery and democracy to Zimbabwe. If the Foreign AVairs Committee wish, through this enquiry, to contribute to this struggle, they will need to approach this issue with caution. 4.4 In order to understand, and to engage constructively with South Africa, the UK Government will require a sensitive understanding of the debate on Zimbabwe within Africa, and much of the rest of the developing world, where Mugabe’s rhetorical stand against the imperialistic west is frequently applauded. It is also important to understand the historical roots of the crisis—and the responsibilities and lessons for future policy which this history implies. ACTSA’s May 2002 submission to this Committee’s ongoing enquiry into UK Foreign Policy on Zimbabwe goes into significant detail on this issue.8 However, here we draw out just four key issues that should be considered. 4.5 Firstly, the overthrow of white minority rule in Rhodesia was not only a victory for the Zimbabwean liberation movements, but a critical turning point in the other struggles in the region. Up to 80,000 Zimbabweans died in the fight for freedom. Independent Zimbabwe’s continuing solidarity with the struggles in South Africa and Namibia cost it dear in more lives and economic hardship. This history stands in stark contrast to many of the western nations who stood by or actively supported the apartheid regime, and cast a heavy shadow over international attempts to promote democracy and human rights. 4.6 Secondly, from 1987, Zimbabwe’s donors, led by the UK and US, used independent Zimbabwe’s debt crisis and aid dependency to pressure for economic liberalisation. The subsequent process of adjustment and recession imposed on Zimbabwe reversed post-independence social and economic gains, and sowed the seeds of the current political crisis. 4.7 Thirdly, while land is only one element of Zimbabwe’s complex crisis, it lies in some ways at the root of the problem. As the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition recently noted, an equitable land reform process continues to be “stuck between the British dodging of its commitments, government’s lack of transparency, the commercial farmers” blinkered view of the issue, and a large but voiceless majority in favour of redressing the ills of the past.” 4.8 Finally, it must be recognised that South Africa’s size, wealth and diplomatic strength concern many African countries, including Zimbabwe. South African diplomatic eVorts are constrained by suspicion of a potential regional hegemonic power. 4.9 As a result, ACTSA believes that UK should adopt the following principles in its engagement with the Zimbabwean crisis, and thus in its dialogue with South Africa on these issues: — Respect the need for a negotiated solution to the crisis that results from an internal political process reflecting the needs and perspectives of Zimbabwean people. — Recognise the deep suspicions within the region towards British motives in Zimbabwe, resulting from its colonial legacy and its continuing economic stake in the minority white domination of key parts of the economy. — Recognise that a solution to the crisis will not be achieved through Euro-American pressure, or indeed through bilateral South African interventions, and that regional actors and multilateral bodies must lead international engagement with Zimbabwe.

8 ACTSA, Zimbabwe: Evidence for the Foreign AVairs Select Committee, 2002.www.parliament.uk/parliamentary— committees/foreign—aVairs—committee.cfm 9573971004 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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— Recognise that inequality and underdevelopment, for which international actors bear a significant responsibility, must be addressed if a lasting solution is to be found. Future economic support for equitable land reform, reconstruction and development should be provided without attaching the kind of strict economic conditions that have contributed to Zimbabwe’s economic collapse and political crisis. 4.10 In recognition of these realities, South Africa has opted for what it describes as “quiet diplomacy” throughout Zimbabwe’s current crisis. Happily, British ministers have also broadly recognised these realities, and have generally respected the fact that careless rhetoric can have damaging diplomatic and political outcomes. Ministers have also recognised the importance of taking a multilateral approach to dealing with Zimbabwe. The Foreign Secretary stated in May 2003, “I welcome the eVorts of South Africa to deal with the problems of Zimbabwe. Last week’s visit to Harare by Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo and Muluzi was an important event. Like those Heads of State, we want to see resumption of dialogue between ZANU-PF and the opposition; an end to intimidation and violence; a tackling of the major issues in Zimbabwe of governance, human rights and the rule of law; and a path back to a democratically elected and accountable government, pursuing policies that benefit all the people of Zimbabwe. We will work with South Africa and the region to achieve this.”9 4.11 Whilst ACTSA is broadly supportive of these lines, neither South Africa nor the UK have always got it right on Zimbabwe. 4.12 South Africa has not always been consistent or balanced in its quiet diplomacy (keeping disappointingly silent on human rights violations while oVering loud support for land redistribution). What is needed from both South Africa and the UK is more consistent diplomacy that is even-handed and balanced. South Africa is in a unique position to play the role of a trusted facilitator in negotiations, and to support more active engagement by SADC, the AU and other African actors. To play this role eVectively, South Africa needs to acknowledge that the crisis is multifaceted, and is not just about land. South Africa should then promote dialogue and negotiations without preconditions or preconceived notions of the best solution, and in the firm belief that it is Zimbabweans who will need to lead and design the way forward. 4.13 ACTSA believes that the UK should do all it can to avoid a bilateral exchange with Zimbabwe— such exchanges play into Mugabe’s characterisation of the country’s deep crisis as resulting solely from a spat with Britain. Just as South Africa needs to regionalise its response to Zimbabwe, the UK needs to continue working internationally, including through the Commonwealth. Despite domestic pressures for megaphone diplomacy, this should be done quietly, not through the media. Where pride, a sense of moral superiority or defence of perceived British interests in Zimbabwe have been allowed to influence policy and presentation, damaging mistakes have been made, splitting international organisations. The UK must explicitly and publicly refuse to increase diplomatic pressure on African mediators by threatening Western support for Africa, through NEPAD or any other mechanism. Similarly, it would be self-defeating for Britain to put pressure on South Africa to resolve the issue. In order to retain influence within African forums, South Africa cannot be seen to be heeding such pressure, and in any case does not agree with an interventionist approach. 4.14 Finally, and crucially, the UK must recognise its historic contribution to the crisis and announce a genuine and significant package to support land reform and unconditional support for reconstruction. This would strengthen the UK’s credibility with African mediators.

5. South Africa’s Response to the International Context—Economic Policies 5.1 Beyond the immediate Southern African context, the South African government has also recognised that South Africa will not ﬂourish unless it plays a part in revolutionising patterns of international economic relations that have disempowered the African continent. In August 2003, South African President Thabo Mbeki wrote passionately of his concerns about the ability of African governments and people to develop and pursue their own political and economic projects. He argued that following the vibrant political and civil debate that emerged at the end of the colonial period, “It seems to have happened that the African period during which the hundred ﬂowers bloomed came to an end. The contending voices representing the hundred schools of thought fell silent. . . So dependent did we become on foreign donors that we felt obliged to proclaim as loudly as we could, the messages, the words and phrases the donors needed to hear, so that they could approve oYcial development assistance for the following year. And so we studied the textbooks and the manuals, to understand what the benefactors wanted of us. . . we end up as the voice that gives popular legitimacy to decisions we neither made, nor intended to make, which our “friends” made for us. . . The matter in contention is—who will set the national and continental agenda!”10 5.2 At least rhetorically, British politicians accept the power of this challenge. Speaking in South Africa, Baroness Amos recently argued, “At the heart of our foreign policy, therefore, is co-operation, not colonialism. . . Colonialism is about the imposition of values by force, the exploitation of resources by force,

9 Jack Straw, South Africa is making a diVerence for good in the world, May 2003. 10 Mbeki, T, “Letter from the President: A hundred ﬂowers under the African sun”, ANC Today, Volume 3, No. 30. 1–7 August 2003. 9573971004 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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the domination of one race by another. Those days are gone.”11 Whether or not we accept that “those days are gone”, Baroness Amos” statement also begs a question: does the absence of force in relations between countries imply that values are not being imposed, that sovereignty is respected, that there is an absence of coercion? 5.3 As President Mbeki suggests, the imposition of values continues not only by force, but through economic coercion. In particular, the imposition of conditions on aid and debt relief, and unfairly negotiated trade rules, narrow the policy space available to African governments. And “capacity building” programmes for governmental and non-governmental actors can be designed to generate consent, even active support for Northern agendas. This is also a critique that the UK Government seeks to pre-empt. In January 2002, Baroness Amos described the objectives of the Africa Action Plan thus, “We want to address the policy constraints that inhibit Africa’s development. This means taking concrete measures in the areas of trade and investment, aid and debt.”12 This is an agenda that ACTSA fully supports. However, it is far from clear that it either reﬂects the Africa Action Plan or UK policy. The question that we believe the committee should seek to answer is whether these laudable objectives are reﬂected in UK Government policy and practice in relation to both South Africa and NEPAD. We now move on to examine these questions in turn.

6. UK Strategy Towards South Africa 6.1 Naturally, this committee’s principle concern is with FCO policy and practice. However, we believe that eVective engagement with South Africa implies that the FCO will need to develop pro-active policies across a wide range of issues, including investment, trade, aid and debt. FCO will also need to promote cross- departmental coherence with DfID, DTI, the Treasury, No 10 and in some cases, DEFRA. This section talks to these diverse agendas. 6.2 The UK is the single largest source of both tourism and foreign investment into South Africa. 750,000 UK citizens are also resident in South Africa. The UK imports 7.6% of South Africa’s exports and UK exports make up almost 10% of South Africa’s incoming goods. Relations between our countries are both close and historic. 6.3 British investment is thus very important to South Africa, particularly in two key sectors: tourism and mining. Tourism is a fast growing industry, contributing to the South African economy through job creation, foreign exchange earnings and infrastructure development. It is estimated that, for every 8 tourists who visit South Africa, one new job is created. However, although British tourism to South Africa is booming, much of the money spent by British travellers to the region never reaches the South African economy. It is British tour operators, airlines and multinational hotel chains that benefit the most with much of the holiday money “leaking” out of South Africa. Because of the type of holidays that they go on, British visitors contribute less per day to the local economy than visitors from other European countries, and only half that contributed by visitors from other parts of Africa. 6.4 While investment in tourism and mining has created employment, many British companies pay poverty wages, adopt the lowest possible health and safety standards, and do little to promote black empowerment, training and education. The mining industry in particular is notorious for its lax employment conditions. ACTSA recently campaigned in support of a legal battle that eventually forced British company Cape plc to pay compensation to South African workers dying from asbestos-related diseases. As Archie Palane of the South African National Union of Mineworkers told ACTSA, “Too many multinational companies neglect the health and safety of their workers in the raw pursuit of profits. This case should oVer a valuable lesson to those companies who continue this form of exploitation.” 6.5 British investment has real potential to contribute towards South African development. However, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission“s final report called for business to do more to overcome the legacy of apartheid. UK policy appears at the moment so concerned with the “rights” and “opportunities” available to British capital that the rights and opportunities of South African people are ignored. — The Government should encourage economically beneficial and socially and environmentally responsible investment by British companies in South Africa. Furthermore, as global leaders, British companies investing in South Africa can and should do more than the legal minimum to contribute to addressing the legacies of apartheid and building a more equal South Africa. — The UK Government should encourage British companies that profited from apartheid, and ensured that it lived longer than it would otherwise have done, to acknowledge their historic responsibilities and contribute towards community reparation funds. 6.6 Nonetheless, a reading of key policy documents of various UK government departments with responsibility for relations with South Africa does not give any clear sense of how the government understands its strategic objectives for the relationship.

11 Baroness Amos, “Co-operation, not Colonialism”, South Africa, March 2003. 12 Baroness Amos, Speech the Royal Commonwealth Society, London, 30 January 2002. 9573971004 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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6.7 One does not have to read very far beneath the headlines of the Foreign OYce website’s description of UK relations with South Africa to understand that the FCO understands its strategic objectives in South Africa primarily in terms of the corporate interests of UK multinational companies. The FCO expresses considerable concern about the generation of “economic opportunities” through the promotion of an aggressive privatisation strategy, and maximum economic openness towards European investors. The Foreign OYce shows some awareness of the highly political nature of its agenda, commenting, “Political diYculties in pushing privatisation forward have been reﬂected mainly through the left-leaning and union elements within the ANC Government, who are strongly opposed to handing control of state assets to what is still a white dominated business sector. The ANC’s alliance partner, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), has pledged to resist any move on restructuring that the Government is likely to make.” 6.8 Despite this, the FCO is happy to report, “There has been a strong emphasis in our activities on the opportunities likely to arise from the privatisation programme and the promotion of PPPs (Public Private Partnerships) in South Africa. These include amongst others the water, airports, ports, healthcare and railways sectors. Other priority sectors include education & training, IT, and the automobile industry. The free trade provisions of the EU/South Africa Agreement came into force on 1 January 2000. The UK is the second largest European trader with South Africa (after Germany). The Agreement has already boosted South Africa’s prospects in Europe, and liberalisation towards free trade over the 12-year transition period will strengthen the UK’s commercial position in South Africa.” 6.9 In contrast, DfID claims that its £30 million annual budget in South Africa is focussed on poverty elimination. This objective, and certain elements of DfID’s new 5-year strategy, agreed in 2002, are to be welcomed. This includes the commitment of up to 30% of DfID-SA’s budget to an AIDS programme designed to broaden and strengthen the responses of key South African institutions to AIDS, aiming towards a reduction in the number of new HIV infections and of the impact of AIDS on individuals, families and communities. 6.10 ACTSA does not believe, as some have argued, that a “poverty focus” in aid programming necessarily implies reduced assistance to “middle-income countries” like South Africa. Rather, aid to South Africa should be targeted at pockets of deep poverty. We also do not accept that aid to middle income countries, or anywhere else should focus on “policy inﬂuence”. There is a clear danger that doing so diverts from humanitarian objectives and towards the economic or strategic self-interest of donor states. 6.11 In this context, we are concerned that the single largest contract issued by DfID in its January 2003 contracts round was worth £6,363,435 (the next largest was just over £1.3 million and no others topped the £1 million pound mark). The contract was issued to the Adam Smith Institute (International Division), to “Support Services for Public Enterprise Restructuring in South Africa”13. We believe that the committee would be well advised to investigate this award more closely, and to question Ministers as to its value and contribution to a South African led development strategy. This contract could do with being tested against Baroness Amos’ claim that, “The days when the UK’s aid was supply driven are over. We no longer say— Britain will give you this because we think you need it.”14

7. UK Strategy Towards the African Continent 7.1 Prime Minister Tony Blair has provided eVusive backing for a “new partnership with Africa”. The engagement of the G8 with this proposal, and the production of an “Action Plan on Africa”, represents an historic opportunity for the leaders of the world’s richest nations to turn their grand rhetoric into concrete change for poor people in Africa. 7.2 The crucial test for the G8, and thus for the UK, is whether they can deliver on their own responsibilities, rather than blaming Africa for its poverty. Any plan for “African development” must redress the policies that create and sustain an unequal relationship between Africa and the G8. Otherwise, rather than ending the failed international supervision of African development, a “new partnership” risks being used as yet another form of conditionality, shaping African societies and economies for the beneﬁt of the G8, instead of Africans. 7.3 The G8’s Action Plan on Africa is their response to the “New Partnership for Africa’s Development” (NEPAD), an initiative by African leaders, headed by the Presidents of South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Senegal. NEPAD is a “call to the rest of the world to partner Africa in her own development on the basis of her own agenda and programme of action”. 15 7.4 Africa has paid a high price for the imbalances of its relationship with the rich world. The continent has become a laboratory for a series of social, economic and political experiments, directed by international institutions. These experiments are widely recognised to have failed. Africa has lost out in the globalisation process. International negotiations have established unfair rules for trade and international institutions have enforced inappropriate policies on African countries. Africa’s dependence on international aid has enabled rich country donors to force on African governments economic policies that have reﬂected the

13 From “contracts” section of DfID website (www.dﬁd.gov.uk), accessed 25 Sept 2003. 14 Baroness Amos, “Co-operation, not Colonialism”, South Africa, March 2003. 15 NEPAD, October 2001 www.nepad.org 9573971004 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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interests of the rich world and their multinational companies rather than the interests of Africa’s people. These policies have contributed to economic collapse and massive increases in poverty in Africa. By the year 2000, average income in Africa was 10% below the level in 1980.16 48% of the continent’s population live in absolute poverty.17 Sub-Saharan Africa is the home to two thirds of the people in the world living with HIV/ AIDS, and because of AIDS, average life expectancy in Africa has been cut by 15 years, currently standing at just 47.18 7.5 The approach of blaming Africa for its problems, thereby ignoring its exploitation by the rich world, has been all too evident in the G8’s engagement so far. The G8 now need to recognise and address their historic and contemporary contributions to underdevelopment, corruption, conflict and undemocratic politics. We believe that the UK should push the G8 to move beyond a generalised debate on governance, and hazy promises of aid, and to deliver concrete change to: — Secure the benefits of trade for Africa; — Make real progress on debt cancellation; — End structural adjustment conditionality; and — Kick start the war on AIDS. As part of their response to NEPAD, the G8 should provide significant new aid funding for Africa. But NEPAD is too important to become yet another tool that is used to enforce the Washington consensus on Africa. The UK should act bilaterally: — to support the NEPAD process with substantially more funds, — do so without adding yet more political or economic conditionality. The UK should encourage other G8 states to follow its lead.

8. Securing the Benefits of Trade for Africa

8.1 From colonialism to the present time, Africa has been heavily involved in the global economy. The continent’s plantations, farms and mines have exported raw materials (primary commodities) to the rich countries, where processed products are made and then sold back to Africa. This ensures that the rich countries receive the vast majority of the wealth generated by an international economic system that relies on African raw materials and low wage labour. 8.2 This system has been enforced by the IMF and the World Bank. They have encouraged African countries to focus on producing a narrow range of “cash crops” for export. Because they give the same “one size ﬁts all” advice to many countries, there has been a huge increase in the supply of commodities such as tea, coVee and cocoa as well as minerals such as copper. When the supply goes up, the price goes down. The system has ensured a steady supply of cheap products to the rich North, but repeated declines in world prices for commodities have done huge damage to the aspirations which people had for development at the time of independence. Africa generates nearly 30% more exports today than in 1980, yet their value has crashed by more than 40 percent.19 It is scarcely credible that these consequences were not predicted by institutions that are staVed mainly by economists. 8.3 African farmers have also been badly hurt by the subsidies which G8 countries pay to their farmers. These subsidies encourage G8 farmers to grow more food than is needed in their domestic markets. The resulting surpluses, like the EU’s “butter mountain”, are then exported to Africa (dumped) at prices lower than those for locally produced food.20 The plight of African farmers forced oV their land by such unfair competition has been largely ignored in the slanging match between the US, the EU and Japan over whose system of subsidies is the worst. The value of agricultural subsidies by the OECD, the “rich countries club”, is greater than the entire GDP of sub-Saharan Africa.21 8.4 To add insult to injury, the G8 use international trade rules to encourage African nations to open up their markets, stopping them from defending themselves against dumping. African governments were well aware of the limitations of exporting primary commodities and, at independence, many countries tried to “diversify” their economies by moving into manufacturing. To get oV the ground, new African industries needed protection against foreign imports, because of the disadvantages they had against international

16 UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa: Performance, Prospects and Policy Issues, New York, 2001, pp 7 www.unctad.org 17 World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2002. 18 UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update, 2001. 19 Quoted in Patrick Bond, “What is Pretoria Planning for Africa?”, Sangonet Newsletter 45, December 2001. 20 FAO, Agriculture, Trade and Food Security, Volumes I and II, Rome, 2001. 21 OECD, Agricultural Policies in OECD countries: Monitoring and Evaluation, OECD, 2001. 9573971004 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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competitors in terms of transport, scale and lack of infrastructure. But the G8 countries’ insistence on market openness meant that African countries were unable to protect new industries. Rapid reductions in tariVs and quotas decimated the new industries, leading to massive unemployment.22 8.5 Building a base of internationally competitive industries is essential for African nations. It is a long- term challenge that needs active government involvement. But the G8 are denying African countries the rights to use policies that have been tried and tested both in East Asia and in the G8 countries themselves. There are few, if any, examples of countries that have developed simply by “getting the prices right”. 8.6 However, African governments are now facing more and more restrictions in their development options through IMF and World Bank conditions and WTO agreements. These restrictions include: — limiting the use of import barriers; — prohibiting the use of conditions on investment (for example, requiring textile factories to buy locally grown cotton);23 — limiting the copying of products from overseas;24 and — limiting the preferences that can be given to local industries over foreign multinationals.25 8.7 This list will get longer if the EU is successful in overcoming the opposition of African trade negotiators to start WTO negotiations on issues such as investment. African resistance to this agenda caused the collapse of the 2003 WTO Ministerial in Cancun. If the multilateral trading system is to regain the trust of African negotiators, the EU must re-think its approach. The UK could play a pivotal role here, bringing European trade negotiators back under the guidance of member states, and re-working their negotiating mandate. 8.8 Meanwhile, the EU, and other rich nations are protecting their own companies from competition from more eYcient African producers. Import barriers in the EU concentrate on agricultural produce such as dairy products, vegetables, nuts, fruits, wheat and rice and on labour intensive industries, such as textiles, clothing and footwear. These are exactly the goods that African producers could export competitively. The barriers which prevent them from doing so include:26 — high duties (“tariV barriers”) that raise the cost of exports from Africa and other developing countries trying to enter the European market; — quotas that control how much African produce can enter EU markets; and — “non-tariV barriers” such as technical requirements or unnecessary product standards. 8.9 Shamefully, the structure of the EU’s trade barriers also inhibits Africa’s eVorts to industrialise and diversify. Processing or manufacturing the food that African farmers grow within the region, the timber extracted and the minerals that are mined could provide a significant number of local jobs and foreign exchange earnings. Yet, tariV barriers on processed goods entering the EU countries are often higher than on raw products. For example, the European tariVs on orange juice are much higher than those on oranges. Similarly, there are low tariVs on cocoa beans, high tariVs on partly processed cocoa butter and prohibitive tariVs on chocolate. 8.10 A recent report by the UN Conference on Trade and Development shows the way that African and other developing countries are marginalised in world trade through the combination of tariV escalation and the domination of commodity industries by a small number of multinationals.27 Their bargaining power ensures that most of the profits are captured by the multinationals and the well paid, skilled jobs remain in the rich nations. 8.11 The EU have repeatedly broken their commitments (such as those made under the last round of trade negotiations—the Uruguay Round) to open up to agricultural imports from the developing world. One exception is the EU’s “Everything but Arms” initiative which provides duty free access to Least Developed Countries, covering approximately 93% of their exports—and has been a useful step forward. However, the poorest countries are the least well placed to take advantage of such preferences. And many other countries, like Zimbabwe and Namibia, that might be able to benefit, are not classified as “least developed”, and are thus excluded. The EU says that it cannot extend the Everything But Arms initiative to all developing countries because it wants to stay within existing WTO rules. But such a scheme would be hugely welcome, and forthcoming negotiations on regional integration agreements present an opportunity to change the WTO rules themselves. These are examples of concrete policy initiatives that the UK should seek to promote within both the WTO and the EU.

22 ShaVaeddin SM, The Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Export and GDP Growth in Least Developed Countries, UNCTAD Discussion Paper 85, Geneva, 1994; and BuYe E, Trade Policy in Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press. 23 WTO agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). 24 WTO agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 25 Such as under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 26 See for example, ACTSA, Freedom to Grow: bringing down the barriers to Southern Africa’s trade with Europe, Action for Southern Africa, London, Jan 2002, www.actsa.org/shop.htm 27 UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2002, Geneva. 9573971004 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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8.12 The hollowness of rich country promises to reform their agricultural policies have been consistently revealed by the lack of progress in reforming the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. This is an area where the UK shares an agenda with development campaigners—but has so far failed to deliver concrete results. 8.13 The UK and the EU are already devoting considerable political energy to securing access to Africa’s markets for their multinational companies. The range of institutions and policies used to promote this agenda includes: — the IMF and World Bank; — the EU’s Cotonou Agreement; — bilateral trade and investment treaties; and — WTO negotiations on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); and — Proposed new WTO agreements on issues such as investment and government procurement. 8.14 NEPAD was conceived to challenge the logic of a system that has driven Africa into poverty. The UK must resist the temptation to use the Action Plan for Africa as a means to make NEPAD into yet another tool to achieve its market access aims. 8.15 The UK must recognise that trade rules are unfair to the poorest nations and must convince rich countries within the WTO to act unilaterally to redress the imbalances. They must ensure that their trade policies promote genuine development. Recent rounds of trade negotiations have been based on the refusal of the rich nations to make concessions unless developing countries agree to allow foreign companies more access to their markets. The WTO must be reformed to give Africa an equal place at the negotiating table and stop undermining Africa’s eVorts build a stronger regional bloc. The UK should energetically pursue an agenda in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations that: — allows Africa to develop its ability to trade by protecting key sectors and promoting diversiﬁcation; — tackles the crisis in commodity prices; — agrees an ambitious timetable to phase out subsidies that result in dumping of agricultural products and subsidised over-ﬁshing in Africa’s waters; — ends tariV escalation that prevents Africa processing its raw materials; and — removes the barriers that stop Africa selling to G8 markets.

9. Making Real Progress on Debt Cancellation 9.1 During the late 1980s, Africa’s inability to trade its way out of poverty led to a crisis of debt payments. The prospect of debt default presented a serious threat to the survival of high street banks and significant Wall Street players. In response, the World Bank and IMF played a central role in supervising African economies to ensure that the debts were paid. 9.2 The costs were high to Africa’s people. Debt repayments are having a devastating impact on African development. African countries are forced to spend almost $15 billion per year repaying debts to G8 countries and the international financial institutions, crippling development programmes, health and education investments and eVorts to cope with the devastating impact of the HIV/AIDS crisis. 9.3 In many cases, the debts which African governments are repaying can be described as “odious” in the first place. According to international law if a loan is “used against the interests of the local populace” then it is “odious” and need not be repaid. In 1973, the United Nations began to describe apartheid as a crime against humanity. Nevertheless, the international financial community continued to make loans to South Africa’s apartheid regime. The Archbishop of Cape Town has said that South Africa’s debt “should be declared odious and written oV”. 9.4 The apartheid regime not only oppressed its own people, but waged a full-scale war against Mozambique and Angola, made raids into all the neighbouring states, and imposed an economic blockade on Lesotho, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi. The suVering was immense. Faced with a sudden loss of income and the need to protect their people, the governments of the region borrowed heavily from international agencies like the IMF and the World Bank. Campaigners in Southern Africa have called for recognition that this £28 billion of “apartheid caused debt” is illegitimate and should be written oV completely.28 A movement is now growing to call for reparations for the impact of loans to support apartheid and corrupt regimes. 9.5 The tyranny of compound interest rates resulted in huge repayments on Africa’s debts. Sub-Saharan Africa’s foreign debt rose from US$60 billion to US$206 billion between 1980 and 2001. Over the past three years, debt repayments by sub-Saharan African countries has been US$16 billion greater than incoming loans. 29

28 Action for Southern Africa , The debt of apartheid, ACTSA, London, May 1998. 29 Quoted in Patrick Bond, “What is Pretoria Planning for Africa?”, Sangonet Newsletter 45, December 2001. 9573971004 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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9.6 The world-wide Jubilee movement emerged in response to this immense human crisis, and the mobilisation of millions of people succeeded in focussing the minds of the G8 on debt. Unfortunately, the G8’s response to the debt crisis, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC), is woefully inadequate and under-funded. 9.7 HIPC is based on the idea of writing oV that part of a country’s debt that the governments will never be able to aVord to pay oV. The macro-economic calculations involved fail to recognise either that many countries have now paid back the original loan several times over, or the illegitimacy of much African debt. Many African campaigners therefore argue that it is not a question of “can’t pay, won’t pay”, but rather “don’t owe, won’t pay”. 9.8 Even if it was working, HIPC would provide just enough debt reduction for African countries to meet their debt service payments, but no extra money for the poorest nations to invest in their people and their economy and to escape from the vicious cycle of debt and poverty. 9.9 But the World Bank and the IMF have acknowledged that the HIPC is failing, even according to its own criteria: — of the five countries that have passed Completion Point (i.e. the point where countries receive final debt stock cancellation), the debts of at least two will not be “sustainable”. — 8-10 of the 21 other countries that have passed Decision Point (i.e. those that have qualified to enter the HIPC process and received initial reduction in their debt service payments) will not have “sustainable” levels of debt even after Completion Point. 30 9.10 The current “top-up” approach to the HIPC Trust Fund merely acts as a temporary measure for those countries that have already failed the debt sustainability ratio. It is far below the level of relief needed for the poorest countries to achieve sustained economic growth. And it is even further from the full cancellation that many African campaigners demand and that is required to achieve the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals, such as halving the proportion of the world’s population living in absolute poverty.31 9.11 The initiative for NEPAD emerged largely from African civil society demands for debt cancellation. In 1999 the OAU kicked oV the NEPAD process by tasking Presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo and Bouteflika to seek a renegotiation of the debt deadlock. In the eyes of African campaigners, the G8 will have failed if it does not deliver unconditional debt cancellation. The UK should represent these demands within the IFIs and the Paris Club meetings: — endorsing the principle of full debt cancellation, — providing a financing plan for its achievement.

10. Ending Structural Adjustment Conditions 10.1 Africa’s relationship to the rich world was transformed by the debt crisis. During the 1980s and much of the 1990s, the World Bank and IMF attached more and more strings to new loans, aid and debt relief. These Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) assumed that liberalisation policies would stimulate economic growth, which would reduce poverty. Since publication of the UNICEF report, “Adjustment with a human face” in 1987, NGOs and researchers have revealed the high costs of structural adjustment on the lives of African people. 10.2 UN agencies have also criticised SAPs and exposed the degree to which they have failed, even according to their core criteria of promoting economic growth. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recently reported that “while structural adjustment programmes have been applied more intensively and frequently in Africa than in any other developing region, barely any African country has exited from such programmes with success. . . This is true not only for countries which are said to have slipped in implementation of stabilisation and adjustment programmes. . .but also most of the core and good adjusters.”32 10.3 African governments have been forced to adopt these policies because they desperately need new loans—not least to pay back previous debts. The pressure to comply with structural adjustment policies is also increased by the fact that the IMF has come to act as a “gatekeeper” for all international aid. All other major national aid donors, like USAID, the UK’s DfID and the EU look for the IMF’s “seal of approval” before providing assistance. 10.4 This conditionality has also led to the globalisation of African politics and has had a corrosive impact on democracy.33 Until very recently, new loans from the World Bank and IMF to African countries were negotiated under conditions of secrecy. The documents, which were devised and written in

30 HIPC Review 2002, World Bank. 31 Jubilee Research and the Jubilee Debt Coalition “The Unbreakable Link—Debt Relief and the Millennium Development Goals” London, February 2002. 32 UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa: Performance, Prospects and Policy Issues, New York, 2001, pp 5. 33 World Development Movement, States of Unrest—Resistance to IMF Policies in Poor Countries, WDM London, 2000 www.wdm.org/Cambriefs/Debt/unrest.pdf 9573971004 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Washington, were rarely prepared in local languages, and have not normally been disclosed, let alone subjected to parliamentary scrutiny or public debate. The hollowing out and globalisation of African politics has contributed to political decay in many countries. This lies at the root of much poor governance in Africa. The G8 would do well to remember this when berating Africans for their lack of attachment to democracy. 10.5 Facing popular resistance to austerity policies imposed by the IMF, many African governments have resorted to authoritarian means to suppress civil society and trade union movements. Until very recently Western donors congratulated these governments for showing the “political will” to impose policies which did massive harm to the poor. In the face of massive popular resistance to adjustment in poor countries, the World Bank have argued that adjustment has failed, not because of they had misdiagnosed Africa’s economic illness, but because the patient was refusing to swallow the medicine. 10.6 So in 1999, the World Bank and IMF announced that SAPs would be replaced by Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The new PRSP framework focuses on “building ownership” by giving developing country governments the initiative in designing programmes and insisting on the involvement of civil society organisations in the process. These reforms have been widely welcomed by some, including the UK, which has adopted the PRSP as the centre-piece of its development assistance strategy. 10.7 However, we believe that this enthusiasm for PRSPs is misplaced. The real choices that developing country governments are “allowed” to make remain constrained by orthodox prescriptions, with core macroeconomic policies still mandated by the IMF. Some PRSPs had to go back and forth between the HIPC countries and the IMF/WB up to six times before they were to be finally approved. New-found concerns with “ownership” and “poverty” appear to have more to do with spin than delivery. 34 10.8 The internal governance of the IFIs is also an issue of significant concern. Within the World Bank, all sub-Saharan African countries are represented by just two directors, while eight rich countries enjoy a director each and the US maintains veto power by holding more than 15% of the votes. The IMF/WB chief executives are chosen from, respectively, the EU and US, with the US treasury secretary holding the power of hiring and firing. South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel has argued, “We simply do not seem to have the right sort of institutions for eVective multilateral discussion and agreement between states. While the Bretton Woods Institutions nominally operate by consensus, they are steered quite convincingly by their major financial backers. This can have significant implications, for example, in deciding which countries the Fund should assist when financial contagion breaks out in several regions at once. Another example, and one that is especially pertinent in Africa, is how conditionality is applied to adjustment loans to a country hit by a decline in commodity prices.”35 10.9 The UK is a major shareholders in the IMF and the World Bank. The UK should publicly acknowledge the failures of past conditions attached to aid and loans. They should argue and vote for: — removal of the powers of veto of the IMF over economic policy; — policies that ensure that future aid and loans support development priorities established through internal, democratic processes; and — Proposals to rebalance voting shares and governance structures to ensure the accountability of these institutions to poor countries.

11. The War on AIDS

11.1 In the West medical care for people with HIV/AIDS is continually improving, but in Africa people are dying because they cannot aVord to invest in the healthcare or medicines that could save their lives. AIDS is spreading fast, with 3.4 million new infections in Sub-Saharan Africa in 200136, the equivalent of an estimated 7,000 new infections per day in Zimbabwe alone.37 11.2 The crisis presents a fundamental challenge to the international community. In response, the richest countries in the world agreed at their Group of Eight (G8) meeting in June 2001 to support The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria. The announcement raised high expectations that rich country politicians were ﬁnally enlisting themselves in a “war on AIDS” of the scale needed to stop the disease in its tracks. Two years on, the Global Fund is up and running. It is the best vehicle we have to mobilise a concerted global campaign against AIDS. And yet, while world leaders vie for the title of “Africa’s best friend”, the Global Fund has everything it needs—except the funds.

34 World Development Movement, Policies to Rollback the State and Privatise, WDM, London, April 2001, www.wdm.org.uk/ cambriefs/DEBT/PRSPcrit.htm 35 Manuel, T, Minister of Finance, Republic of South Africa, Globalisation, Income Distribution and the Role of the State, Comments delivered, 24 March 2003 in Geneva, to the ILO Commission on the Social Aspects of Globalisation. 36 UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update, 2001. 37 “Estimated Worldwide HIV/Aids Infections: 47 002 057”, Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), May 31, 2002. 9573971004 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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11.3 The Global Fund has already delivered positive changes. It has mobilised significant new financial resources and funded high-quality proposals from developing countries. It has allocated over $1.5 billion over two years for innovative, life-saving projects. The Fund’s success has transformed expectations. AIDS activists, doctors and community workers in rich and poor countries have started to talk confidently about humanity’s capacity to tackle the pandemic. 11.4 Nonetheless, rich countries, and the UK in particular, are now putting the Fund’s achievements in jeopardy. The Global Fund is in financial crisis. President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania argues, “the real problem is lack of political will among the rich countries and corporations. If they can spend over $300 billion to subsidise agriculture . . . they can surely spare $10 billion for the Global Fund.” 11.5 The Global Fund needs to raise at least $2.5 billion in 2003, $3.8 billion in 2004, over $8 billion in 2005, and almost $9 billion every year from then on. In order to raise these huge totals, each rich country will need to contribute a proportion consistent with their share of global wealth, as measured by its gross domestic product.38 On this basis, the UK should provide 4.5% of these annual targets. Most rich countries are nowhere near providing their fair share. HIV/AIDS operates as a vicious circle—the more people are infected, the harder it becomes to provide treatment and to prevent future infections. As a result, the longer we leave tackling the disease, the more it will cost to do so in the future. We need action now. 11.6 The fact that the Fund receives and responds to applications from recipient countries makes it hard to project how much money it will need. However, on the basis of the two rounds of applications processed so far, we can assume that the Global Fund will need to raise at least $2.5 billion in 2003, $3.8 billion in 2004, and over $8 billion a year from then on.39 11.7 The current funding crisis presents a major moral challenge to all donors. If they do not secure the long-term future of the Global Fund, people who have moved onto life-saving anti-retroviral treatments will have to come oV them again. This raises the spectre of drug-resistant strains of the virus emerging in aid-dependent countries that establish treatment regimes on the basis of aid flows, only to see the same programmes dry up. 11.8 The injustice of the current situation is causing outrage around the world. Stephen Lewis, UN envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, found on a recent trip to Southern Africa that, “it is impossible to overstate how strongly people feel—from Cabinet Ministers to People Living With HIV/AIDS—that the Global Fund is the best vehicle we have to finance the struggle against the pandemic. Every country yielded the same questions: When will the money come? Does the Global Fund have enough money? Why don’t governments contribute to it? What happens if it goes bankrupt?. . . It’s legitimate to ask: what’s wrong with this world? What’s wrong with the rich countries? Why are they willing to jeopardise the integrity of the most hopeful financial instrument we have to combat the cruellest disease the world has ever seen?”40 11.9 In January 2003, President Bush announced a new AIDS initiative, providing $15 billion over five years, and signing a bill with the potential to increase the US contribution to the Global Fund to $1 billion a year. This funding is conditional upon the US providing no more than one third of the Global Fund’s total funds. In other words, the US has laid down a powerful challenge to the rest of the world, which must contribute at least $2 billion a year in order to release America’s full contribution. 11.10 In response, at the June 2003 G8 Summit, French President Jacques Chirac, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and European Commission President Romano Prodi have all said that they would like to see Europe contributing $1billion to the Global Fund—to match the US funding. However, there is considerable disagreement as to where that money should come from. One potential source is unspent European Commission aid money. However, the EU’s administrative procedures are complex, and there are a number of other claims being made on the money—for projects on water, education and debt relief. This is also not “new” money, having already been earmarked for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. 11.11 France has therefore suggested that the bulk of the money should come from the European member states, and has provided an example for the rest to follow, tripling its contribution to the Global Fund to $177 million a year. This is more than four times the UK commitment, though the two countries have very similar sized economies. Italy and Germany have also made recent announcements of new funds. 11.12 In May, Britain’s new Minister for International Development, Baroness Valerie Amos, announced that the UK was to contribute a further $80 million to the Global Fund. This money, if delivered this year, could have made a massive diVerence. However, this “new money” (which will come out of existing aid budgets) will only be handed over to the Global Fund in two instalments of $40 million in 2006 and 2007, and even then will represent a cut in the UK’s annual donations. In fact, by 2006, the UK should be aiming to providing ten times this amount.41 This dismal record brings into question the sincerity of Tony Blair’s leadership role in increasing European donations. The UK seems to be relying on the European Commission

38 A table showing recommended pledges from the G8 to the Global Fund based on an equitable contributions framework is available from the aidspan website. www.aidspan.org 39 These ﬁgures have been generated largely from the Fund’s own spending projections. See “How Much Money Does the Global Fund Need? How Much Does it Have?” by Bernard Rivers, 24 March 2003 www.aidspan.org 40 Dollar equivalent ﬁgures are from the Global Fund website, as updated 30 June 2003. www.globalfundatm.org 41 ACTSA, Funding the War on AIDS, May 2003, www.actsa.org 9573971004 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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to provide the bulk of new European money. However, if this does not happen, there is currently no indication that the UK is willing to increase its own contribution. In other words, the UK wants Europe to match America’s $1 billion, as long as it doesn’t have to pay for it. 11.13 Africa’s poor health infrastructure should not be used as an excuse to do less. The international community can easily aVord to declare a comprehensive war on AIDS that includes investment in prevention, care and treatment. — The UK should aim to ensure that the Fund receives at least $2,521 million in 2003. — The UK should give at least an extra $72 million this year, at least a further $124 million in 2004, and $315 million in 2005. — From 2006 the Global Fund needs to be raising almost $9 billion a year. The UK should encourage the Global Fund’s donors to commit to annual, dues-based contributions. 11.14 Beyond increased funding, global trade rules also place major constraints on the ability of poor countries to respond to the AIDS crisis. Most African countries have no home-grown drug industry, so they need companies in other countries to supply them with cheaper versions of expensive western drugs. Almost two years ago developing countries won a great victory against the pharmaceutical lobby when trade ministers at the WTO signed the “Doha Declaration” agreeing that health needs should override the “intellectual property” rights of pharmaceutical multinationals. 11.15 But from that moment on, the US blocked a solution and backtracked on the promises made at Doha. The European Parliament proposed a neat 52 word agreement. However, when on 30 August 2003, the US ﬁnally agreed to new rules, the deal negotiated with the European Commission created a complex 3,200 word text. Developing countries successfully stopped the US from excluding many diseases from the deal. However, the new compromise places enormous obstacles in the way of aVordable medicines actually being made available where they are most needed. Poor countries without their own drugs industry will now have to ask another country to license a local company to produce and export cheap generic copies of patented drugs. But any country oVering to assist still risks retaliation from rich countries. The agreement provides so much scope for interpretation that the only likely winners are the army of lawyers the EU and US will employ to tie up any attempt be developing countries to make use of the agreement. 11.16 The new deal missed a massive opportunity to establish clear and simple rules that would deliver cheap drugs and bring the bullying tactics of the EU and the US to an end once and for all. 11.17 Despite these limitations, Canada has recently announced that it plans to introduce legislation to allow generic drug manufacturers to make generic versions of anti-retrovirals for export to developing countries. The move could substantially increase the volume of generic production and help African countries to source the stable, high quality supply of generic anti-retrovirals to meet its massive needs. 11.18 This contribution should also encourage governments around the world to use the compulsory licensing route to develop production, and shows that it is possible for governments to stand up to pressure from the pharmaceutical industry and the US government. The move is important, because as producing countries (such as India and Brazil) implement their TRIPS obligations and provide full patent protection for pharmaceutical products, the supply of generics will inevitably dwindle. To ensure a sustainable supply of generics, more countries must be able and willing to produce for export. The greater the number of producing countries, the more likely generics will be available for import. 11.19 The UK should follow Canada’s lead and do it all to provide practical support for the production of signiﬁcant volumes of generic drugs for export.

12. Conclusion 12.1 ACTSA strongly welcomes the Foreign AVairs Select Committee’s decision to hold an enquiry into UK policy towards South Africa. The imminent tenth anniversary of freedom provides an excellent opportunity to meditate on how far South Africa has come since the end of apartheid, and how far the country still has to travel. It also oVers countries that would hope to count themselves among South Africa’s friends to consider the nature and health of their relationship. 12.2 ACTSA argues in this submission that the UK needs to focus its assistance to South Africa more closely on humanitarian considerations, and needs to exercise extreme caution when considering an “inﬂuencing” agenda towards policy issues that ought to be decided according to internal democratic processes. 12.3 We also urge that the UK’s most energetic engagement should be with the wider continental campaign for a new partnership between Africa and the rich world. 12.4 Both the UK and the G8 have paid unprecedented lip-service in recent years to tackling Africa’s crisis. Our Prime Minister, and other global leaders have promised; development focused trade-rules, an end to the debt crisis, more aid with fewer strings and a real engagement with the global AIDS crisis. But when the media circus surrounding set-piece international conferences has died down, Africa has been quietly forgotten. Promises made on extra aid to Africa (G8 2002) and extra money for the Global Fund to Fight 9573971004 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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AIDS, TB and Malaria (G8 2003) have been conspicuous only for the manner in which they have been broken. African complaints that the G8’s Africa Action Plan fails to engage with key structural issues of trade, debt relief and aid conditionality have simply been ignored. 12.5 Despite this reality, Baroness Amos repeated in March 2003, “the Prime Minister’s determination to help Africa to help itself is as strong now as it has ever been. Our commitment to NEPAD, in which South Africa is such a key driver, is a major plank of the foreign policy of Tony Blair’s Government.”42 If a commitment to Africa is truly a major plank of British foreign policy, the Foreign AVairs Committee will find it diYcult to deliver anythingbut a damningverdict on the FCO’s attempts to pursue that policy. 12.6 The G8 have so far eVectively ignored NEPAD as proposed by African leaders, developing their own plan, centred on their own priorities. NEPAD is first and foremost an appeal to the rich world to alter the unequal basis of North-South relations. It notes, “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development calls for the reversal of this abnormal situation by changing the relationship that underpins it. Africans are appealing neither for the further entrenchment of dependency through aid, nor for marginal concessions.” 12.7 The Africa Action Plan ducks this challenge entirely, as the G8 argue that NEPAD is, “first and foremost, a pledge by African Leaders to the people of Africa to consolidate democracy and sound economic management, and to promote peace, security and people-centred development.” (Para 4, Africa Action Plan) The G8 have thus chosen to use NEPAD as another opportunity to lecture African nations on their failings. They refuse to recognise that the current trade and debt arrangements are unjust, and require change per se. Rather they are using miserly debt relief, trade concessions and aid promises as bargaining chips for which they will demand a high price—the opening up of African markets to Western multinationals, privatisation of essential services and further cuts in state spending. 12.8 Furthermore, theinsistence ofthe G8 countriesthat asa group theycannot adopta co-ordinated platform, but will each act alone eVectively begs the question, what is the point of the G8? The G8 commit to “mobilise and energise global action, marshal resources and expertise, and provide impetus in support of the NEPAD’s objectives.” (Para 6) They also state that, “We will pursue this Action Plan in our individual and collective capacities, and through the international institutions to which we belong.” (Para 10) 12.9 The UK has so far done little to challenge the limitations of the G8 Africa Action Plan, urging campaigners to recognise the realities of global power politics, and to focus on winning “deliverables”. The concept of deliverables recognises in eVect that the biggest blockage to eVective change is a lack of political will within the G8 to take the major structural challenges presented by NEPAD seriously, and a determination to pursue business on the usual agenda, through the usual channels and institutions. 12.10 The UK’s response has been to focus attention on what the UK can and has achieved bilaterally. Some of this is welcome. However, if the G8 has a useful function in relation to Africa, it is that it provides an opportunity for leadership. The UK needs not only to lead by example, but to punch above its weight for Africa, committing negotiating capital in international forums in which the UK has influence, to make trade fair, end the CAP, cancel third world debt and transform the international role of the IFIs. 12.11 The leaders of the rich world eVectively abrogate responsibility for their own political power, announcing themselves constrained by frameworks and agreements made by political and technical institutions like the WTO, the World Bank and the EU. They do so in denial of the fact that the G8 are the eVective masters of each of these institutions. If the G8 itself has any useful function it is in recognising global challenges and in developing new agendas for these institutions which G8 members commit to pursuing energetically. October 2003

Written evidence submitted by Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld

Policy Objectives Economic policies in South Africa since 1994 have had two broad objectives: — economic regeneration; and — “empowerment” of “historically disadvantaged” citizens. These two objectives have been accorded diVerent weights at diVerent stages. For both, the achievements of the ﬁrst post-apartheid decade have been mixed.

42 Baroness Amos, “Co-operation, not Colonialism”, South Africa, March 2003. 9573971005 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Regeneration Positives: (modestly) increased growth, fiscal stabilisation, lower inflation, tax reform, increased exports, independent monetary policy, trade policy liberalisation, progressive elimination of exchange controls, growth of public-private partnerships in infrastructure development. Negatives: low fixed investment levels (domestic and foreign); low savings ratio, rising unemployment, balance of payments weakness, currency volatility, slow privatisation progress. Overall performance has arguably been disappointing. However, expectations of significantly more rapid growth—the “lion economy” scenario—were unrealistic because the inherited serious structural deficiencies and developmental backlogs have continued to inhibit growth and undermine confidence. The requisite restructuring will take more time to achieve, and will continue to present the government with diYcult political choices. One major lesson of the first decade is that while the creation of a “market-friendly” policy environment is a necessary condition for faster growth, it is not a suYcient condition. The key economic policy challenges remain the low levels of fixed investment, the “jobless” nature of economic growth, the shortage of skills, privatisation, and South Africa’s failure to become a major exporter of manufactured goods.

Empowerment Empowerment policy focused initially on the labour market, with measures to eliminate racial and gender discrimination and promote equity, rather than to alter the inherited pattern of ownership and control of productive resources. AYrmative action programmes combined with wide-ranging legislation in an eVort to render the composition of the labour force more “representative” at all levels, but these measures were widely perceived by business as cost-raising. A wave of privately-driven corporate black economic empowerment (BEE) equity deals in the late 1990s failed to raise the black-owned share of market capitalisation significantly due to a number of high-profile failures caused by flawed financing structures. The prime objective of BEE was also widely perceived as the creation of a small get-rich-quick black capitalist elite. The subsequent BEE Commission argued that lack of “meaningful” empowerment and “ingrained racism” were fundamental structural impediments to faster growth, and called for a state-driven national BEE strategy incorporating mandatory “de-racialisation” targets. However, the government’s new “broad- based” BEE strategy has largely eschewed heavy-handed intervention in favour of negotiated sectoral BEE “charters”, incorporating a “scorecard” approach for measuring progress towards agreed targets. Hitherto, despite generous financial incentives, small-business growth has been disappointing. AYrmative procurement procedures, in both the public and private sectors, are now spawning numerous empowerment joint ventures. However, it remains unclear how many of these ventures will prove sustainable. Market incentives and government policies are now combining to render BEE—broadly defined—both inevitable and desirable for business. BEE, in all its guises, has also helped enlarge the new black “middle class”. However, little attention has so far been paid to the additional costs and risks of BEE and the consequent eVects on growth and job creation. BEE strategies have to balance two overriding—but also potentially conflictual—needs: to remain internationally competitive, while visibly promoting domestic socio-economic equity. Whether the short-term costs of accelerated empowerment will be outweighed by the longer-term benefits remains highly uncertain. Against the background of increasing levels of absolute poverty, if BEE fails to lift economic growth on to a higher plane, profound political and economic consequences could ensue.

Implications for UK Policy In addition to seeking reduced industrialised country protectionism towards developing countries in general, the UK should continue to promote bilateral trade with, and investment in, South Africa; focus development assistance on poverty relief, HIV/AIDS programmes, training and skills transfers, and capacity development in South Africa; and encourage further development of an investor-friendly policy framework. Jesmond Blumenfeld is Associate Senior Lecturer in Economics at Brunel University, London and Africa Region Head at Oxford Analytica Ltd. He was formerly Chairman of the Chatham House Southern Africa Study Group. Jesmond Blumenfeld 9573971006 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Witnesses: Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld, Brunel University, and Mr Alastair Fraser, Policy OYcer, Action for Southern Africa, examined.

Chairman: Gentlemen, I welcome our two new In other words, it will slow the rate of growth, for witnesses, Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld of Brunel example, but will not do much more than slow it. University, University of Oxford and Oxford Even a one percentage point slow-down in the rate Analytica, who, as I know personally, was one of the of growth is serious but we are not talking about a key figures in the Chatham House Study Group on catastrophic melt-down, or at least that is what the southern Africa for very many years. I welcome also research suggests. One of the reasons for that is that Mr Alastair Fraser, a Policy OYcer for the Action although the majority of people who are HIV- for Southern Africa, which is a successor positive and who will die from AIDS are unskilled, organisation of the anti-apartheid movement in the poor people, there is a great pool of other unskilled UK. Gentlemen, welcome. I can assure you that we labour available to replace them. Much more are unlikely during the course of your session to be diYcult, of course, when you come to replacing summoned by the bells to vote, so you can relax on skilled personnel, professional people and so on. So that. Let us move straight into business and I call one can look at a whole series of areas in which there Mr Illsley. are clear costs which would be incurred and try to come to some understanding of what the impact would be. The other thing I would say which has Q43 Mr Illsley: One issue which a lot of people who been evident, not only in South Africa and other do not make a study of southern Africa would African countries as well but particularly in South recognise is the incidence of HIV/AIDS in South V Africa, is that having seen the inability or Africa. My two questions to kick o this session are, unwillingness of the Government to take active steps what impact has the HIV/AIDS pandemic had on V to deal with the problem, a substantial number of South Africa’s domestic politics and what e ect will employers, particularly large employers, have done it have on the country’s future? One interest I have in their own kind of cost benefit analysis and worked that is that I have been to meetings in the past where out it is actually more cost eVective for them to South African and other countries’ politicians have provide free treatment for their own workers, and in mentioned the number of key personnel—teachers, some cases for the families of their employees as well, doctors, etcetera—who have died from AIDS, rather than sit back and do nothing. So we are seeing substantial numbers, where those countries simply a two-pronged approach to the problems from both were not able to train the people to replace the ones the public and the private sectors. who died. Your comments on that please. Mr Fraser: I think obviously the most significant Mr Blumenfeld: It has had a profound impact on the impact in South Africa is on the people who are politics of South Africa, mainly because, in a rather dying. It is estimated there are 600 people dying maverick kind of way, President Mbeki has clearly Y every day in South Africa alone from AIDS. One of had some personal di culties with the whole the major political impacts has been to reveal concept of the HIV/AIDS virus. There has been a essentially the strength of South African civil society great reluctance on the part of the South African in terms of its response to that, the emergence of the government to take active steps to deal with the Treatment Action Campaign and its ability to pandemic. That has changed quite dramatically in mobilise the unions, parliamentarians, the media the last 18 months or so, first with an undertaking to and almost the whole country in order to secure the provide anti-retrovirals to all pregnant women, that pressure required to bring about the five year plan, was about 18 months ago, on a universal basis, the national treatment plan and the budget to although the roll-out of that is very slow. More support it. I agree with some of what Mr Blumenfeld recently, first in August, an undertaking to provide has said but if I could pick up a couple of things. The anti-retrovirals for people in an advanced stage of first one is on the companies. As he has suggested the disease, and much more recently than that an some companies have noticed treating their workers undertaking to have a universal programme over a may be one way of cutting their costs but there is a period of time, which would make anti-retroviral tension in there in that the level of unemployment in treatment available to everyone who was HIV- South Africa means that the workforce is essentially positive. So it has been a very delayed process and replaceable, so we are talking about a minority of very controversial and it has infuriated, exasperated, companies there. There is a lot of work which could and alienated a great many constituencies both be done particularly with British investors or with domestically and internationally. As I say, it is in the British companies to ensure that treatment plans go process of changing which means we will now have out to both the workers and to members of their an attempt to deal with the issues of prevention and families. the issues of treatment. As far as the future is concerned, on the economic side it is very diYcult to oVer any clear answers. There are a number of Q44 Mr Illsley: Is there any obvious reason why models which have been used in an attempt to Mbeki took the attitude he did? Was it economic, measure the demographic and macro-economic that he did not want to pay for the drugs, or did he eVects. There are disagreements amongst scholars simply refuse to acknowledge the extent of the about the validity of those results. What research epidemic? there has been has tended to suggest that in macro- Mr Blumenfeld: It is diYcult to say without asking economic terms, oddly enough, the impact of the President Mbeki himself, but insofar as one can HIV/AIDS pandemic is probably relatively limited. understand how his mind has worked on this, I think 9573971006 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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9 December 2003 Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld and Mr Alastair Fraser it goes back to his deep, passionate concern and might like to look at almost its presentation there. pride in being African and a perception, rightly or There seems to be an approach that there is an wrongly, on his part that there were people in the economic debate within South Africa about what West, in the industrialised world, who were in his model should be followed, and the UK it appears to view blaming Africa for the emergence of this new me is putting itself very firmly on one side of that disease, and it was a kind of visceral reaction on his debate in a way which could be seen as interference part to that. It is very diYcult to explain. I do know, in a domestic economic debate. I find that worrying because I have spoken to people who at the time and would be interested in the UK taking a diVerent were in close correspondence with him about the line. In terms of the policies the UK should pursue issue, that he got some of his information in the first more vigorously, debt cancellation for the region of instance from the internet and picked up the notion southern Africa, although not such a big issue for of the dissident view about HIV/AIDS and the South Africa but for the southern African region, argument was that there is no such thing as the HIV there has been a lot of talk and very little action on virus, or certainly if there is it is not that that causes eVective debt cancellation. Similarly, on trade both AIDS, that the problem is social deprivation, within the WTO and the EU CAP talks as well as in poverty and the susceptibility of poor people and the review of the South African Free Trade deprived people to all kinds of infectious illnesses, Agreement which is coming up, I think the UK and that is where the eVorts should go. It is that sort could take a much more aggressive role with the of understanding of the problem which led the European Commission whose position is distinctly Government to focus particularly on diet and other unsympathetic. issues as the means of dealing with the problem. Mr Blumenfeld: I think I said in my memorandum Mr Fraser: On the pricing issue, I do not think it is that obviously there are certain policy issues that the necessarily helpful to try and pry into the President’s UK should be pursuing in relation to developing mind on those issues. There is a Cabinet decision to countries in general, and you have been round this go ahead on a new track and that is what we should particular course before on the issues of agricultural focus on. I think the issue of drug pricing is key and protectionism in the Common Agricultural Policy it does restrict South Africa’s ability to roll out an and so on, which I think is harmful to the eVective treatment plan. There has been a recent development prospects of not only South Africa but agreement within the WTO to make production of other countries as well. I would take a slightly drugs an easier thing for developing countries to do. diVerent approach from Mr Fraser in saying that the There are steps though which the UK could still take South African government has been striving very to move the agenda forward. Canada, particularly, seriously in the past decade to regenerate economic has been looking at whether as a G8 country it growth, to regenerate the economy and in so doing should be considering the production of generic to tackle all the challenges that the country faces. In drugs for export to African countries. The UK could my view, the most straight forward and obvious task do a similar thing which would require some for the British government is to give every support to legislative change but I think it would be one of the that process. It has been a painful process for South things the UK could do to win some goodwill where Africa because there has been a huge degree of a lot has been lost through the pharmaceutical structural adjustment which has been needed to the challenge to the South African Medicines Act and a economy, it is politically diYcult in some cases to less than helpful approach from the WTO. achieve those policies, and they are slow to deliver benefits. Every support that the UK government can give to the creation of an environment that is Q45 Sir John Stanley: Can I start by asking you the favourable for investment, that tackles the skill same question which I asked the two previous shortage, which is a fundamental constraint on witnesses. Could you tell us whether there are growth and development in South Africa, that looks particular British government and particularly towards the relief of poverty, assistance with Y British Foreign O ce policies which are being combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, all those kind pursued now which you would like to see altered, of issues that is where the focus certainly of and whether there are policies which are not being economic policy on the part of the UK government adopted now which you would like to see followed? should lie. Mr Fraser: I tried to work out what the Foreign OYce policy was towards South Africa as part of the process of responding to your inquiry, and it was not Q46 Sir John Stanley: Can I turn to a specific issue. easy to see it. I do not think there is a coherent South When I was in South Africa in September, I was told Africa strategy, as it were, and there is certainly no to my surprise that the number of white farmers who coherence between departments. Reading some of have been murdered in South Africa is greater than the Foreign OYce website documentation, one of the number who have been murdered in Zimbabwe. the most worrying things from my perspective is the Do you believe that is factually correct or not? heavy focus on business opportunities for UK Mr Blumenfeld: Yes. companies as almost the Foreign OYce’s primary Mr Fraser: No idea. concern in South Africa. Given the history and the relationship between our two countries, I do not Q47 Sir John Stanley: Am I right in saying that the think that should be our primary concern, also given overwhelming preponderance of the farm attacks the situation of poverty and AIDS and those kind of and murders which are taking place have been in the issues in South Africa. I think the Foreign OYce Transvaal in the north? 9573971006 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Mr Blumenfeld: I am not au fait with the particular safety or union rights, which we take to be quite geographic distribution. I am aware of the problem standard here, is just not there and it is very diYcult but not the distribution of it. to follow through. Mr Fraser: I could not help you on that. Q50 Sir John Stanley: Do you see any prospect in Q48 Sir John Stanley: I believe they are South Africa of the aspirations of black people in overwhelmingly in the north. Do you have any South Africa for land ownership being able to be comments on this particular issue? Do you believe matched in terms of the voluntary availability of this high level of attacks and indeed of murders suitable land? which are taking place is basically motivated by Mr Blumenfeld: The land reform programme in criminals who are seeking to rob etcetera, or do you South Africa has been slow to develop. Again this is believe there is a racist element behind it? not particularly an area of expertise on my part but Mr Fraser: I am afraid you are asking me to delve I am aware of the fact that it has moved up the into the mind of somebody committing the act. I political agenda in the wake of the developments in could not do that. Zimbabwe. I am not sure that the land issue in South Mr Blumenfeld: I am not really in a position to Africa has quite the same fundamental political speculate. I have seen the various reports, I am salience as it has certainly in Zimbabwe and possibly aware of the inquiries that the South African other countries as well. That is because that is not government instituted into the problem and the where it seems, from the point of view of the main conclusion that it reached, that these were political parties, their constituent interests predominantly criminal acts. I have to say that the predominately lie. I think they lie elsewhere. There prima facie evidence, the anecdotal evidence, one are competing issues to do with land reform in terms sees and hears about the nature of many of these of ownership and tenure. There is one school of attacks gives rise to certain questions about that. But thought which would argue that land reform ought I would not have suYcient expertise to be able to to be redistributive in nature, and there is another give you a clearer answer than that. school of thought which would argue that land reform should be productivity-enhancing in nature, Q49 Sir John Stanley: I wonder if either of you saw and they do not necessarily lead to the same kind of the BBC report which I saw a few months ago, it was policies. I would suspect that the proponents of the only a relatively short clip and it may have been second view, the productivity-enhancing view, representative or completely unrepresentative, but it probably have the ear of Government more than the was a piece about the attacks on white farms in the others simply because they are probably better north, and it showed first of all a group of black organised. In South Africa it might be slightly more labourers at least one of whom had been very balanced in that I know there are NGOs which are severely beaten up by the white farmer, and it was concerned about landless people in South Africa, then followed by what I have to say was a quite but I would suspect the productivity-enhancing view appalling interview with the white farmer who took would probably have a stronger purchase on this. the line that physical beating up was basically the But, I have to repeat, this is not an area of expertise only language which his workers understood. If that I would claim. was in any way representative, that would suggest to Mr Fraser: The only thing I would add to that is that me there is a singularly unreconstructed apartheid, access to land and secure tenure is at least as much Afrikaner type view amongst certain sections of the an issue in urban areas as it is in rural areas in white farming population. Does what I am saying South Africa. and what you may or may not have seen on the BBC Sir John Stanley: I agree, there are crucial issues in ring true, or do you think that was very relation to housing and the ever-expanding shanties unrepresentative? in Johannesburg and Cape Town. I understand that. Mr Blumenfeld: All I can say is, if, as you say, it is representative I would be as appalled as you are. I Q51 Chairman: Gentlemen, on the economy I recall am unable to give you an answer as to whether it is some years ago, Anglos commissioned one of their representative or not. Certainly we know that there senior members to write why the economy was are plenty of issues around farming, rural under-performing. Clem Sunter—you may development, land issues, employment issues, which remember the book—said one of the conclusions have aVected agricultural employment over many was not remarkable, it was that South Africa was decades. It would be surprising—welcome but placed in an unfavourable geographical position at surprising—if attitudes had changed in the rural the end of a continent which was under-performing outposts of South Africa as radically as they have generally, it did not have growth economies as its changed elsewhere. neighbours, and therefore nothing much could be Mr Fraser: The only comment I would have is that done about that. However, it did say that the other I think a lot of people are aware South Africa major component of the poor performance was the implemented some very progressive labour laws education of the black majority, that at the time of early on in the transition but obviously following up the Bantu Education Act the blacks were hardly and implementing labour standards and union taught science, there was a minuscule number of rights in far-flung farms has been very challenging, black engineers, and that meant private companies as it is in workplace factories in far-flung areas. The had to educate their own engineers and scientists size of the civil service required to do the health and from the majority. Has that changed? Is there a 9573971006 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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9 December 2003 Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld and Mr Alastair Fraser fundamental change in the South African education programme, partly ideological opposition but partly system so that black men and women can hope to also a pragmatic recognition that there would be achieve in science? Are the resources going there? thousands more jobs lost. I think one should bear in Can we expect any serious change? mind that from the time of the onset of the recession Mr Blumenfeld: The allocation in the annual budget in South Africa in 1989 and from then until the time to education is the highest share of any category of of the political transition in 1994, half a million jobs expenditure. So within the resources available there were lost, and since 1994 until now another half a seems to be no question that the Government is million jobs have been lost. So one is looking at very, putting considerable emphasis on education. very fundamental structural problems.

Q52 Chairman: And the results? Q55 Mr Chidgey: Carrying on from the Chairman’s Mr Blumenfeld: We are looking at a very long-term comments, we have tackled the business of skills programme. It is a generation before it has any really shortages and the educational issues, but this whole significant eVect. To go back to your preamble, I business of structuring the economy is worth more think that the explanation for slow growth in South examination. There is a concept we hold that the Africa and the diYculties of regenerating the South African economy is capable of being the economy is much more complicated than simply powerhouse of the region, and yet you have already that it sits at the end of a continent which is far away set out there is resistance to privatisation as a way of from world markets and the skills issue, though the bringing in the investment presumably needed to skills issue is absolutely crucial. I think there is a modernise industry and make it competitive within whole raft of factors which have been constraining the African continent, and I am conscious that Mr economic development in South Africa, which was Fraser’s paper sets out a view which opposes part of the inheritance of the ANC when it came to privatisation. Is this not the conundrum? Unless you power. It is the most advanced economy in Africa do get a step change in the African economy to certainly, but it was beset by a whole host of enable it to benefit from a much invigorated export problems. You have mentioned the skills deficit market, you are not going to bring in the changes which I think was absolutely crucial . . . which will eventually lead to mass employment even if you have increased the education opportunities for Q53 Chairman: And science education for blacks. the majority of the population. Whilst I do not hold Mr Blumenfeld: Absolutely, because blacks under a flag up for the privatisation policy we have been apartheid were denied any kind of useful and through in this country, it is a fact that a decade or technological education like that. But there were so after they were introduced, or two decades, we do also very serious developmental backlogs in terms of have more or less full employment, and the two housing, infrastructure, access to water and so on, things are not inseparable. Is there not an issue here all of which are part of the social wage, if you like, of a knee-jerk reaction to something which which helps to build productivity. There were philosophically sounds unacceptable, yet evidence extreme degrees of poverty and inequality in the elsewhere shows it does perhaps provide a solution country, there were very serious structural to the problem? deficiencies to the economy and I would mention Mr Fraser: Three points on those comments. The three in particular. First, a very seriously first is, our submission does not oppose uncompetitive manufacturing sector; South Africa privatisation, what it says is that economic decision- was not competitive in world markets in making should be the business of the South African manufactured goods. Secondly, a severe balance of people, and there is a highly heated debate in South payments constraint which eVectively precluded the Africa between the trade unions, various wings economy from growing at a more rapid rate on a within the ANC . . . . sustained basis. Thirdly, a very poor employment generating capacity, so when investment did take Q56 Mr Chidgey: So you are reluctant to have place it tended to add very little to employment. foreign investment because that may mean foreign These are characteristics which go way back in control? South Africa’s history. Mr Fraser: No, foreign investment is absolutely key to growth in South Africa. The point is, is there a Q54 Chairman: How successfully have these factors policy prescription which follows, either from the been addressed? Foreign and Commonwealth OYce or even this Mr Blumenfeld: They are in the process of being Committee of MPs, towards South Africa. If we talk addressed, some of them more successfully than about UK policy towards South Africa, is it the others. But I think ten years is a relatively short time business of the Foreign OYce to be attempting to to turn that round, because it is like turning a influence the economic policy followed by the South supertanker around, it is a very slow process. It is a African government, or is that a question for the politically painful and diYcult process because South African people? That is the question I wanted structural adjustment, which is what it is—it is self- to ask in the paper. Any conjecture I might have on imposed in this case rather than externally imposed whether privatisation works for South Africa is to by the IMF or the World Bank but the solutions are some extent irrelevant, I am not a South African fundamentally the same—destroys jobs. That is why citizen, neither are you, neither is anybody who there has been such resistance within the unions and works in the Foreign OYce. The second point on the the left wing of the ANC to a privatisation idea, and this may seem contradictory, that we can 9573971006 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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9 December 2003 Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld and Mr Alastair Fraser export a model of privatisation which may or may of the collapse in international markets. But in not have worked in the UK to the conditions in practical terms, if you look at the flow of foreign South Africa I think is highly contestable. There is direct investment into South Africa since 1994, there an assumption within a lot of UK policy towards are only two years in which there was very significant South Africa that South Africa is a normal country, foreign direct investment: one was I think the partial a bit like us only poorer. It is not; it is nothing like privatisation of South African Airways, and the us. The legacy of apartheid, the position within the other was the first partial privatisation of Telcom. global economy, the position and relationship to the What does it do? It brings in foreign currency, it international financial institutions, are completely contributes to tax and Government revenues and diVerent and makes the situation in South Africa thereby assists the budgetary problem, and it also completely diVerent. The idea that we can help to brings with it new technologies, access to new export a model there which will work there by techniques and technologies and know-how. That is default is I think completely flawed and something South Africa’s own, home-grown privatisation we should get away from. policy. It has been diYcult for them to implement it for political reasons and they have suVered as a Q57 Mr Chidgey: I think that is a very fair point, but result of their slowness in doing so. it does beg the question, what model would work in South Africa and how we, as outsiders, how our Q60 Mr Chidgey: Is by any chance, and I am not sure Government through its policy, could help the on this at all, within this equation, within this appropriate model for South Africa. controversy, this opposition, whatever, is there a Mr Fraser: There probably is not an appropriate factor there that there is a concern that the model for southern Africa. The countries of South privatisation exercise might result in the creation of Africa— a new elite, a new ruling class to replace the old, white-based elite? Q58 Mr Chidgey: I am interested in South Africa. Mr Blumenfeld: No, I would not say that, because all Mr Fraser: Even in South Africa, to my mind, there privatisation transactions would, like most other is not a model; it is almost a fallacy of economics that investment transactions, be subject to the whole new there is a model which must be applied to this approach which ensures there is a substantial black country. There is a political process, a very diYcult empowerment element within the investment. political process, which relates to all kinds of legitimate demands within society. That process and Q61 Mr Chidgey: Could it be a black elite which was the democracy in South Africa, which is its greatest created out of this process? achievement since the transition, are to some extent Mr Blumenfeld: A black elite has been created, and contingent on South Africans being allowed to make again this is a contested issue and one of the decisions for themselves, and for that debate being problems around the whole black economic allowed to happen as it happens in developed empowerment programme. In the second half of the countries. 1990s there was a privately-driven, market-driven process whereby corporations sold oV stakes to Q59 Mr Chidgey: I would like to pose the next black empowerment groups, the terms on which question. Surely the continuous stability and they were done, the financial structures underlying development democratically of South Africa those deals, were often not very sound, they were depends upon reaching the population right down to based on black groups borrowing substantial funds levels which were previously excluded under the old in the hope that both capital gain on the stock regime? So you cannot just say, “We have no market and organic growth within the companies solution”, because if we have not got a solution then would enable them to repay those loans, and the the stability of South Africa is at risk. stock market then collapsed. So what one got was a Mr Blumenfeld: I would argue there is a home-grown perception of black economic empowerment, which South African policy on this. In 1996 when the was the creation of a get rich quick, capitalist elite. Growth, Employment and Redistribution That led to the appointment of the Black Programme, known as GEAR, was introduced, Empowerment Commission which deliberated for privatisation (which was not called privatisation but two or three years, produced a report which has called restructuring of state assets) was a key element formed the basis of the new legislation which is within that. It is a contested policy, there is no currently going through Parliament for the question about that, and for that reason, and one establishment of what is called the broad-based need hardly tell you, it is diYcult for governments black economic empowerment strategy. There is when they are opposed by their own party members concern about the fact that a relatively small number on important policies to carry those policies of elite people are benefiting from this to the forward. We do not have to go far away to find that. exclusion of others; that is very much part of the So it has been a diYcult process for the Government debate in South Africa. to go through, but in August 2000 the Department Mr Fraser: Just on that, there is an important point of Public Enterprises finally came up with a very about the idea of a home-grown adjustment process coherent, substantial agenda for privatisation. It in South Africa, because although I have said unfortunately was still a bit slow in implementing economic policy should and is being made by South that and therefore, particularly in the case of the Africans, the key focus both for the Foreign OYce telecommunications corporation, Telcom, fell foul and for this Committee should be on the 9573971006 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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9 December 2003 Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld and Mr Alastair Fraser international constraints on South African policy therefore if one empowered blacks one would get making. We need to be aware that, for example, the much more rapid economic growth. That has yet to shift from RDP to GEAR was heavily informed by be seen. the currency crisis in South Africa, itself in many ways a result of the international financial system Q63 Richard Ottaway: What is the logic in that? over which the UK has significant influence, and Mr Blumenfeld: If something is a constraint and you therefore it is something we can do something about. remove the constraint, presumably you are Similarly, the World Bank and IMF advisers, who expecting— ultimately answer to the board members in the UK to some extent, were oVering so-called expert advice in South Africa right through the transition and Q64 Richard Ottaway: Why was lack of black through the RDP/GEAR period, and we need to be economic empowerment a constraint? aware of that. We need to be aware of what our Mr Blumenfeld: That was the argument of the Government is selling to the World Bank and IMF Commission, it is not my argument, I am simply reporting the findings of the Commission. I am just to sell to other countries. South Africa is also trying to say that I think the reasons why South constrained by the rules in the Trade Development Africa has problems growing at a much more rapid Co-operation Agreement with the EU, and it is rate are very complex and there are a wide range of constrained by the rules of the WTO, and South them. For one thing the market is relatively Africa itself is very aware of these problems and has constrained because you have had for four laid out an ambitious challenge to it in the form of generations a relatively small number of people who NePAD, which you talked about earlier. It runs owned assets, had access to income-enhancing through all these issues. The interesting thing about educational opportunities and so on, and the vast the G8 response to NePAD is that it has attempted majority did not, so by definition you have a to entirely ignore that structural debate and to shift restricted domestic market. The more that market focus on to the issues which interest us. So there is a grows the greater the economic opportunities which real problem there and if we are not able to pick up are there. The more blacks are acquiring assets and on that, we are not really saying anything to the UK property and marketable skills, the greater the government. benefits which will come from that. My concern is that it is being seen as the key policy aspect at the moment, and whilst there are certainly strong Q62 Richard Ottaway: May I touch on the point Mr commercial arguments for firms to take account of Blumenfeld touched on, black economic the pressures for black empowerment, some of this empowerment. You seemed to be suggesting a is being induced. It reminds me in a way of the era of second ago that you did not think it was making the Reconstruction and Development Programme much progress. Is that right? If so, what can be done immediately after 1994. The Reconstruction and to speed it up? Development Programme was the ANC’s policy Mr Blumenfeld: What I was suggesting was it did not manifesto and when you spoke to South Africans, it make much progress in the first phase of this, which did not matter who you spoke to, you could not find anybody who did not believe in the Reconstruction was in the late 1990s, and it became a rather and Development Programme, but it proved not to discredited strategy. In a way, black economic be a coherent strategy and it was dumped very empowerment has now become almost the new quickly, by early 1996 the RDP oYce had been religion in South Africa, and that I have to say closed down and the RDP has been abandoned in all worries me somewhat. There is no quibbling with the but name and replaced by this new Growth fact that blacks need to be empowered, that a much Employment and Redistribution strategy. One greater share of ownership and control of resources senses the same sort of thing happening now in ought to be exercised by black South Africans, my relation to black empowerment. Everybody is on the concern about the current policy is that it comes out black empowerment wagon. Without in any way of the report of the Black Empowerment denigrating the need for greater empowerment, I Commission which came up with the key conclusion think there is insuYcient attention being paid to the that economic growth in South Africa is being risks and the costs which are involved. Insofar as the fundamentally held back by the lack of perceptions of those risks inhibit new investment, empowerment and by engrained racism within the that is a factor which ought to be taken into account. control of the economy. My point about that, and I Mr Fraser: My only comment would be about UK spelt it out earlier, is that I think one should not be companies and investors and again focusing on what looking for simplistic explanations for why growth contribution we can make to black economic in South Africa has been slow. It is a very empowerment. There is an obvious need for black complicated story, there are huge structural economic empowerment. In 1995-2000 the average problems which need to be addressed or are in the household income for an African family in South process of being addressed, and lack of Africa dropped 19 per cent, for a white family it rose empowerment of blacks is only one element of that. 15 per cent, so there is an obvious need. There is the But the conclusion of the Commission was that this issue of a mass consumer market amongst the black was a fundamental constraint on economic growth, population which is essential to have a balanced economic development. I would come back to the 15 Reconstruction and Development Programme. point that South Africa is not normal, it is one of the 9573971006 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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9 December 2003 Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld and Mr Alastair Fraser world’s most unequal societies, and that does dramatic eVects. There was a whole series of something distorting not just to society but to the aYrmative action programmes which had the same economy, and whatever it means, black economic consequences. empowerment is a necessary rejoinder to that situation. For UK companies, I guess our investors Q67 Chairman: How significant is crime, or the need to be looking at what they can do to make the perception of crime, as a deterrent in terms of inward maximum contribution to the society and the investment and skilled personnel at a senior level communities they are investing in. For example, in moving to South Africa? fields like tourism and mining, and a lot of the Mr Blumenfeld: It is one of a number of factors investments are in those fields, it is very easy to which inhibit inward investment. There is no getting repatriate profits very quickly without any away from it. The crime problem is serious, it creates significant impact on the local environment. So it is diYculties for any firm wanting to send skilled thinking through what the UK companies can do to personnel there because they have a responsibility go beyond the legal minimums, which in South for their welfare. There is a perception but also a Africa compared to the UK are fairly basic—they reality that crime levels are high particularly in are not legally required to leave very much in the certain areas. There is no question that it does have communities—and they need to think, “Do we need an impact on investment. It is of course one of the to hit the legal minimums or do we need to become reasons why one of the most rapidly growing model employers and model investors”, and there industries in South Africa is the security industry, it are questions about what the UK government could is an ill wind which blows nobody any good, but do to encourage that. there is no getting away from the thrust of your question. Mr Fraser: It is diYcult to know what is going on in Q65 Richard Ottaway: Has black economic the mind of investors, it is rather like knowing what empowerment filtered down into the education is going on in the mind of criminals. I suppose the system at all? two most useful comments I can add are that the Mr Blumenfeld: It depends what you mean by black latest crime statistics suggest there is some economic empowerment. If you are asking whether downward trend and that there is a new plan for the the composition of the labour force or the regeneration of central Johannesburg. composition of the school teaching force within education has changed, the answer is yes, dramatically. But it really depends what you mean Q68 Chairman: Is that an area where the UK can by empowerment. I would understand help—in training? empowerment in that sense to mean eVective control Mr Fraser: There are already police exchanges and and direction and ownership of productive that kind of thing, so I imagine so, yes. The situation in Johannesburg is interesting because it is the resources. location where big investors, both South African and foreign, will look, and having a city of that size ˜ Q66 Richard Ottaway: Has this been discussed? Is it which has a CPD16L in the situation it is in at the part of the national curriculum? I am sure there is no moment is bizarre. such thing as a national curriculum but is it becoming part of everyday life? Q69 Chairman: Is the Carlton Hotel still Mr Blumenfeld: I would answer that rather mothballed? diVerently by saying there was a whole series of Mr Fraser: There is a lot of property still mothballed legislative measures in the mid-1990s, some of the but there is a plan which has emerged for the state first legislative actions that the Government legislature and the state Government to take over undertook, which were to redress what it regarded as significant land and some of the empty buildings in the inequities and imbalances in the labour market, Johannesburg city centre—they are trying to turn it and that is where the empowerment thrust was in the into a pedestrianised area—and there may be some first three to four years of the new Government. It hope that the atmosphere in that area could be was to begin a process of correcting the legacy of turned around. discrimination and inequality in the labour markets. So there were a number of employment equity laws Q70 Chairman: How significant a constraint is the and related laws which were passed that sought to exodus of trained people? We may be benefiting our ensure that the composition of the labour force at all own National Health Service, for example, at the levels and in all occupations and across all firms and expense of South Africa. Is that a significant factor? sectors more accurately reflected the composition of Mr Fraser: It is a huge factor and it is something the population. It was not quite a quota system but which enormously annoys both South Africans and it was informed by the same idea, that the the South African government. It is quite a complex composition of the labour force, not just at the issue to try and find a solution to in that you cannot unskilled level but at the middle management level stop people travelling or taking individual decisions and senior management level and the board of about how to lead their lives. There has been, as I directors level and so on, should reflect more understand it, a deal struck recently to do with the accurately both the gender composition of the operation of British employment agencies which population and the racial composition. That was where the thrust was initially. That is having very 16 Central Police Department. 9573971006 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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9 December 2003 Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld and Mr Alastair Fraser recruit in South Africa, both their recruiting Q72 Mr Hamilton: I understand that and I think you techniques and what they are telling people the are right, Professors Simon and Barber expressed it situation will be in the UK. There is then the very clearly, but I wonder this: surely South Africa situation for nurses when they arrive in the UK, and as a sort of beacon of democracy in the region would it is something UNISON has done quite a lot of enhance its own reputation by being seen to come work on, the situation for migrant nurses arriving down fairly hard on an African leader who is here and finding it is not quite what was advertised. oppressing many more of his own people than any Mr Blumenfeld: I would not dissent from that at all. perceived colonial influence or white influence? I would add of course that the opposite is happening Mr Fraser: I think it rather depends what you mean within Africa, in that South Africa is denuding many by “come down very hard”. other African countries of their skilled personnel and professional people from teaching, universities Q73 Mr Hamilton: Well, be very critical and try and and professions. You find people from every corner support a democratic change in Zimbabwe as well as of the African continent in South Africa at the economic change. It seems to me the people who are moment, and they have gone there because the suVering are the very people who cannot aVord to opportunities seem to be better there than in their suVer, not that anyone can aVord to suVer. home countries. So it is a complex issue. Mr Fraser: Nobody disagrees with that. I think the question of what South Africa’s best role could be is adiYcult one. Its current approach is claiming to be Q71 Mr Hamilton: I think both of you were in the a mediator between the two parties, and obviously room when I asked Professors Simon and Barber for anyone attempting to act as a mediator, overt about Zimbabwe and South Africa, and South bias is a problem. One of the comments we have Africa’s relations with Zimbabwe and the attitude of made is that South Africa is in danger of being seen leaders in South Africa. I wanted to explore some of to be overtly biased in favour of the regime, and it those points with you. You will have heard me say needs to balance this position, but balancing this that we have published three reports as a committee position does not mean coming out in favour of the into Zimbabwe, the latest being in May of this year, opposition, taking a very strong public line. It is a and one of the points we drew attention to in our very diYcult balancing act. most recent report was the fact that South Africa could have enormous influence on the Mugabe Q74 Mr Hamilton: Is there not enough evidence regime in Zimbabwe but seems very reluctant to be made public of the severe oppression of anybody at all critical. In the light of the worsening situation who opposes Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe? in Zimbabwe, especially the economic spiral V Mr Fraser: Of course there is. Everybody recognises downwards and the e ect that has not on the white that. The question is how useful is it to shout that farmers who are left but on the Zimbabwean from the rooftops as compared to announce you population, the African Zimbabweans, I wonder believe there are human rights abuses in the country, whether you would concur with Professors Simon announce you believe it is a complex crisis which and Barber in their views that there were many involves the economy, governance, AIDS, famine, complex reasons why South Africa and especially etcetera, you understand the breadth of the issue and Thabo Mbeki refused to be critical openly of Robert that you want to be a mediator and a neutral Mugabe despite the gross violation of human rights mediator. It simply depends on how you want it in Zimbabwe? done. I never quite know what people mean. When Mr Blumenfeld: I do not think I would be able to add you say “South Africa should come down very very much beyond what they said. I think they hard”, if you mean South Africa should cut oV the summed it up fairly accurately. power, you will not find a mass-based democratic Mr Fraser: I have submitted comments to your legitimate movement in Zimbabwe which agrees Zimbabwe inquiry as well. Particularly given the last with you, so why say it? That is the dilemma for few days, one of the mistakes we could make would South Africa. be believing that British pressure on South Africa to put pressure on Zimbabwe would be a positive thing. Q75 Mr Hamilton: I know, Mr Blumenfeld, you South Africa has its reasons which have been wanted to come in but let me finish oV by asking you discussed for its approach to Zimbabwe, some of this: is there any sign that South Africa’s oYcial which we would disagree with—South African quiet policy is changing to become, as you say, Mr Fraser, diplomacy should be more balanced, much clearer more balanced between the parties so it can be a condemnation of the human rights abuses in genuine mediator and ensure the very people who Zimbabwe, for example. But South Africa being are suVering have their suVering alleviated? seen to act in response to a UK demand for it to do Mr Fraser: None that I have seen. so is likely to be extremely counter-productive. So in Mr Blumenfeld: No, I do not think so, though the terms of FCO policy, there are real questions about pressure is on and I think that pressure should be how much is done in the background and how much maintained. As a UK citizen I would hope very is done in the foreground. Our consistent advice to much that the UK government will at every the FCO is, yes, they should be talking but they opportunity, not necessarily in public but certainly should be talking in the background. Every time the in private, make clear to the South African megaphones come out in the UK, it tends to have an government that it is in South Africa’s and Africa’s unfortunate result, whatever the intention. own interests that this problem be dealt with, that 9573971006 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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9 December 2003 Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld and Mr Alastair Fraser the South African government in my view made an one thing you can say about the Peer Review error of judgment to begin with in not distancing Mechanism is that it is a remarkable thing to talk itself suYciently from what was going on. The about doing. Nobody else in the world does it. I reasons for that were partly explained by Professors think that we need to be careful about how we chivvy Simon and Barber, but I think also because there people along and saying, “Come on, everybody must was a poor judgment made by South Africa’s policy get into this thing”; though we are a supporter of the makers on the nature of the problem and the issues idea I think there has to be a certain level of that it was going to raise, and I think they are understanding about what people are committing to backing themselves into a corner. It is very diYcult and what kind of achievement that would be. to change policy in that way without losing face. NePAD is about improving good governance and Q78 Mr Chidgey: I wonder if the EU nations would the South African government almost seems to be be happy to have a peer review mechanism, but that saying, “Zimbabwe is such a special case we just is an aside. We have looked at NePAD already, how cannot deal with that under NePAD, it is too significant is it, what can it potentially deliver for complicated.” My personal view is that this is a case South Africa and for the Continent as a whole? Have of a naked attempt to retain power, and I do not buy you anything you want to add? all the arguments that the key issue is land reform; I Mr Fraser: NePAD as a whole? do not dismiss the importance of land reform but I look at the consequences of the land reform policy introduced and I am appalled. So I do think there is Q79 Mr Chidgey: Yes, what can it deliver? an onus on the UK government to recognise this and Mr Fraser: I think it is enormously significant, even to push for change. It is very diYcult from the if it is diYcult to work out what it is. The fact that outside to bring about change, it can only come from a large group of African countries are able to agree inside, but every support should be given to that. to a programme which lays out particularly the structural challenges within the international system and sets that out as a challenge to the rich Q76 Mr Chidgey: You were both here to listen to the world, “What are you going to do about this, we earlier evidence and you may remember I asked a are serious about this, we are going to come to the number of questions about NePAD, so I will try and G8 meetings and ask you what you will deliver”, I do this fairly shortly as you must know the think is enormously significant. The G8 has within questions. There is one I did not ask before and I its power to completely kill NePAD oV and I think would like to run by you, and this is concerning the it is doing a good job of it so far, because its Peer Review Mechanism which we are all familiar response to the structural challenges has been so with. I understand that so far 16 countries have disappointing, on debt, on trade, and even on the volunteered to be reviewed, and Ghana and South promises it has made on aid or aid for AIDS Africa are the first two. I wonder whether you could specifically, it is either “No Comment” or it is an give me your view on recognising that some empty promise. I think that is enormously countries in Africa are less enthusiastic than others dangerous for the whole idea of a North-South about the process, and perhaps do not quite see the partnership, which for me is the most exciting thing relevance as others might do. Can you give me your about NePAD. What it looks like will happen is view on what might be a critical mass in getting that they will go away from a series of G8 meetings universal acceptance throughout the continent? You enormously disappointed, African leaders will say have 16 countries so far out of a total of 53/54 to themselves, “Let’s just get on with this thing countries in Africa. What is the critical mass for ourselves. It was a challenge to the West, the West getting the concept of peer review universally has failed the challenge, let’s get on with a variety accepted throughout the AU? Coupled with that, are of programmes, peer review mechanisms, etcetera, there any key players who by signing up to the Peer we will do it ourselves”, and that is great, but it is Review Mechanism would give this authenticity or an enormous missed opportunity on our part. authority which would make others willing to join Mr Blumenfeld: I also think it is enormously and accept this is the way forward? significant—or I would add the word “potentially” Mr Blumenfeld: Your comments began with “we are enormously significant—but for very diVerent all familiar with it”, I am glad you are familiar with reasons from Mr Fraser. I think the appeal of it because my problem with the Peer Review NePAD was that it was sold as an African-owned Mechanism is trying to work out exactly what it is. and African-produced solution to Africa’s I know in principle what it is but where is the beef? problems, and the undertaking was, “We in Africa I think the answer to your question is, they need to will do X, Y and Z in relation to economic reform get it going. I do not think the critical mass is an and governance and the establishment of peace and issue. security, in return for which we seek a partnership with the international community.” The fact it is Q77 Mr Chidgey: So you agree with President Wade, already being interpreted as “going cap-in-hand to that it is taking too long and if it takes much longer the G8 for more aid” I think simply undermines it will drift away? completely the innovative aspects of NePAD and Mr Blumenfeld: Absolutely. if that line continues will consign NePAD to the Mr Fraser: I do not have a strong view on it. same dustbin as every other programme of African Although it is hard to work out exactly what it is, attempts to put the Continent back on the world’s which I find true of NePAD in general, I think the agenda. African leaders know what it is they need 9573971006 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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9 December 2003 Mr Jesmond Blumenfeld and Mr Alastair Fraser to do in order to attract the attention of the world the Foreign OYce on what the British government again and to get the world to be committed to can do. I hear what you say about debt relief and sharing in a partnership with them in moving aid but the Government will say that they are the forward. second largest provider of help for HIV/AIDS in Mr Fraser: Can I come back on that? I honestly the world and the initiatives for debt relief have think that is a crazy position. The arguments for come from HMG. Leaving aside the World Trade engagement with Africa, debt relief and fair trade, Organisation and the World Bank, how can we as stand with or without NePAD. The idea that Africa a country best intervene in co-operation with South needs to prove itself worthy, when much of the debt Africa to assist positively its development? One or is what is described as odious debt, when much of two quick final comments. the debt has been repaid twice over; the idea that Mr Fraser: Are you asking me to leave aside the Africa needs to prove itself again in order to get structural issues? anything in an unjust global trade system or Andrew Mackinlay: He is asking you to give us through debt or through the World Bank and the some meat for this report we are going to produce IMF, is ridiculous. The arguments for those because at the moment it is a bit flimsy! initiatives stand whether or not African leaders are demanding them, which they are, and our response is not dependent on them playing tricks to the Q82 Chairman: You have given the grand, high audience. level ones like debt relief, we as the UK and the FCO can do things to help bilaterally in South Q80 Mr Chidgey: You made a comment earlier that Africa, give us some examples where it can most the UK government was doing a good job in killing profitably be done? oV NePAD. Is that a sin of omission of Mr Fraser: I do not mean to be obtuse but I guess commission, in your view? the problem for me is that we have had hundreds Mr Blumenfeld: I think the Africa Action Plan was and hundreds of initiatives, much of South Africa’s partly the G8 saying to the African countries, “You problems and much of Africa’s problems are have undertaken to do these things, let’s see the structural and so for all the goodwill and initiatives colour of your money as it were and then we will and training exchanges, for me that is not the meat deliver.” Having said that, there is no question in of the debate, and that is not where you should my mind that there is a lack of firmness in the focus your advice. commitment, I put it that way, on the part of the Mr Blumenfeld: I agree it is structural but I suggest G8 countries to bring forward resources, but I I am using “structural” in a slightly diVerent sense think it was a wait and see message to Africa. from Mr Fraser. I suspect Mr Fraser means the Mr Fraser: I think the sin of omission is the answer, problem lies with the global economy, of course in that G8 countries basically want NePAD to there are problems with the global economy— work, they want it to work without them having to do anything particularly on debt relief. Debt continues to be used as a lever to win economic Q83 Chairman: At the bilateral level. reform, and one of the reasons why they do not Mr Blumenfeld: At a bilateral level, I think it is the want to cancel debt, which is what they should do promotion of trade and investment underpinning and which they have committed themselves to all the initiatives that African governments numerous times, is they can continue to use it as a themselves have to produce for sensible lever for economic reform. improvements in governance, reform of their economies, promotion of economic growth and Q81 Chairman: Gentlemen, one very last question, targeted assistance for poverty relief. revisiting what Sir John asked earlier. This Chairman: Thank you, gentlemen, very much Committee will have to make recommendations to indeed. 9573971007 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Ev 44 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

Tuesday 27 January 2004

Members present

Donald Anderson, in the Chair

Mr David Chidgey Mr Bill Olner Mr Fabian Hamilton Richard Ottaway Mr Eric Illsley Sir John Stanley Andrew Mackinlay

Written evidence submitted by Dr. Steve Kibble, Africa/Yemen Advocacy OYcer, Catholic Institute for International Relations, London

UK, South Africa and Relations with Zimbabwe The question of Zimbabwe and how South African policy towards the “failing state” manifests itself is both a cause for concern and to some extent bewilderment. There has been an assertion for some time that South Africa was the key to the problem but “quiet diplomacy” (along with the previous “megaphone diplomacy” of the West) has failed to bring a return to stability for Pretoria’s troubled neighbour. However the situation, as with the stalemate inside Zimbabwe, is far from static, although until recently South Africa appeared to be moving towards stronger overt support for President Mugabe. Not only does the three way relationship of London/Pretoria/Harare complicate matters, but there is a great deal of rhetorical grandstanding and much no doubt happening behind the scenes. Once the Harare government had embarked on the “fast track” land occupation exercise, with its abuses of human and property rights and the rule of law, it was clear that the West, particularly the British government, would act. Following the unfree and unfair general and presidential elections in 2000 and 2002 respectively, and against a background of violent land seizures, the EU and the US imposed targeted sanctions on the ruling party. In 2002 Zimbabwe was also suspended from the Commonwealth for one year, during which time a Troika comprising the heads of state of South Africa, Nigeria and Australia, was tasked with persuading President Mugabe of the need to restore democracy to Zimbabwe. When no agreement could be reached over what democratic progress if any had been made, Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth was extended to the end of 2003. For many in the West/North and elsewhere there are straightforward human rights, humanitarian and economic reasons why South Africa (and its partners in the Southern African Development Community— SADC) should act decisively to solve the crisis in Zimbabwe. The chaos in land and economy obviously has a destabilising knock-on eVect and many expect Pretoria to act (although often in ways unspeciﬁed) not least in its own interest. The viability of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) initiative, decline in foreign investment, solidarity with oppressed Africans, worries over refugees in terms of crime, economic and other forms of regional destabilisation, xenophobia etc, sensitivities over the land question have all variously been put forward as reasons why South Africa should act1. Instead despite occasional critical statements, spasmodically better recognition of the claims of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and human rights activists” concerns, visits to “help out” (rather than engage with Zimbabweans especially civil society), and denial of the SADC vice-chair to Zimbabwe in 20022,we have had “quiet diplomacy”—seen by Zimbabwean activists as support for the Mugabe regime. The emphases have been regional solidarity and “African solutions to African problems”. In essence there has been no concerted regional pressure, but occasional voices of protest. Why does South Africa, seem unable or unwilling to act in a decisive (and to some, rational) manner? For those seeking to investigate the dynamics of South Africa—UK relations and its implications for policy there needs to be a move beyond the simple ahistorical assertion of a long lasting and unproblematical link between the two nations based on language, shared democratic values etc. Recognition is needed of the underlying historical structures stemming from the repressive and highly inegalitarian experience of settler colonialism and apartheid. The peculiar intensity of these experiences for South Africa (and Zimbabwe) now supposedly superseded by notions of nation-building, rainbow nation and reconciliation are tied into questions of identity, sovereignty, overcoming past inequalities and injustices and building a multicultural but African nation within an unevenly developed region. In particular there are strong (and often not fully

1 And critics can point to no particularly strong historical relationship between the African National Congress (ANC) and Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)—historically the ANC was linked with Zimbabwe African Peoples Union—ZAPU), a history of personal antagonism ﬁrstly between Mugabe and Mandela and then Mbeki,, and disagreements over certain foreign policy matters such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and indeed NEPAD. 2 And therefore to the Chair of SADC in 2003. 9573971007 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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understood by outsiders) resonances especially when questions of land, race and restoration from historic injustice are brought together within a Pan-African perspective. Furthermore these fundamentals are overlaid by the way that the globalisation agenda of the North has exacerbated the extremely uneven way that southern Africa, its states and peoples were historically integrated into the world economy and polity. In a further complication, the process recently has been marked by the emergence of new social forces, often referred to as civil society. These have arisen in part in reaction to new global trends such as structural adjustment and the failure of the African state to continue its legitimate postcolonial task of ending colonial and racial practices and structures (even if one can fundamentally critique the working out of this project3). States which have only recently emerged from liberation struggles against colonialism or apartheid now find themselves challenged by such new social forces, not all of which are coherent and united. For South Africa, events in Zimbabwe have entered the crucial (and for Pretoria, vulnerable) domain of Pan Africanism and African solidarity. As the ZANU-PF government attempted to deal in its violent and repressive way with the opposition (and largely urban) forces4 it knew that it would face widespread national and international condemnation in relation to human and property rights, governance, the rule of law and the illegitimate use of violence. To combat this the Mugabe government successfully appealed to a wider Pan Africanist position in order to legitimise itself. This positioned the land occupation process in terms of redress for colonial injustice, and African marginalisation in the globalisation process. Leading Zimbabwean academic and activist Brian Raftopoulos sees Mugabe’s oVensive against the opposition as formulating an alternative discourse around redress for colonial injustice, especially land—“the land question became the symbol that could distill a simplistic political binary, in which the ruling party could attempt to conceal all its post-colonial failings”.5 By defining the Zimbabwean crisis as one of anti-colonial redress and legitimate land redistribution, President Mugabe set the parameters of the subsequent debate, helped by Western, particularly British, intervention that appeared unaware of the African and to some extent Third World impact of its statements. In 1997 the new Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, enunciated the view of the new British government that it saw itself unbound by previous governments’ acceptance of any responsibility for past colonial injustices in Zimbabwe and elsewhere. This was then compounded by the Blair government’s subsequent embrace of what has been defined as “liberal imperialism” in response to “failed states”6. “Amongst ourselves we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle we must also use the laws of the jungle”7. This remained at the theoretical level until the 2003 war in Iraq with its rhetoric and indeed actuality of enforced regime change. While Zimbabwe was never the specific target of “liberal imperialism”, its implications were not lost on authoritarian states, with President Mugabe in particular asserting the doctrine was an attempt at recolonisation of independent-minded Third World states8. South African receptivity to this in terms of world racism, Western selectivity/ hypocrisy and its irritability at being asked to deal with what was seen as a “British problem” is compounded by the view of regional leaders that the MDC is the catspaw of white and imperial interests9. There are also more practical reasons for South Africa’s stance towards Zimbabwe: — South Africa (and indeed South Africans) has tended to see Zimbabwe through its own prism of experience—of drawing back from the brink through the “miracle” of its own transition, negotiated settlement, and truth and reconciliation process.

3 The challenge of turning liberation movements into governments has emerged throughout the region eg South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique. “Social transition in these Southern African societies shaped by a settler colonial brand . . . can at best be characterised as a transition from controlled change to changed control. The result is a new ruling political elite operating from commanding heights shaped in and based upon the particular context of the post- Apartheid societies by selective narratives and memories related to the war(s) of liberation and hence constructing or inventing new traditions to establish an exclusive post-colonial legitimacy under the sole authority of one particular agency of social forces”. Henning Melber (2003) Liberation Movements as Governments: Southern African Experiences—with special reference to SWAPO and the post colonial political culture in Namibia. Paper for “Futures for Southern Africa” symposium organised by CIIR, Institute for Commonwealth Studies, Nordic Africa Institute and the Southern African Catholic Bishops’ Conference. Windhoek 15–17 September 2003. 4 Such forces such as students, trades unions, churches etc were once part of the nationalist coalition. 5 Institute for Democracy in South Africa (2003) Zimbabwe: Movingtowards a NegotiatedTransition? Issue Brieﬁng, July. See also Raftopoulos and Phimister (2003) Zimbabwe Now: Challenging the Political economy of Crisis and Coercion, forthcoming. 6 R. Abrahamsen Blair’s Africa: The Politics of Securitisation and Fear (forthcoming), M. DuYeld (2003) “Human Security: Privatisation, Soft-Power and Global Governance” in Refugee Studies forthcoming. 7 Robert Cooper The Observer, 7 April 2002—Raftopoulos and Phimister (2003) provided this quotation. 8 See for instance The Herald, 9 April 2002. See also The Star, 2 Sept 2002 for Mugabe’s address to the Johannesburg World Summit on Social Development in September 2002 presenting his land policies as part of a continuing struggle against colonialism in defence of independence. “We are not Europeans. We have not asked for any inch of Europe, any square inch of that territory. So Blair, keep your England and let me keep my Zimbabwe !”. See New African, April 2003 for Mugabe’s speech at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Kuala Lumpur in February 2003, “no longer willing to subject . . . [its] actions to international law, rationality or the force of morality, the United States had one yardstick for its own behaviour and one for the Third World”. See also Cape Times, 5 Aug 2002 and 25 Feb 2003 for similar attacks. 9 Africa Institute of South Africa study conducted by Che Ajulu. News 24 14.8.03. 9573971007 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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— Worries over the performance in oYce of trade union led parties such as the Movement for Multiparty Democracy which came to power in Zambia in 1991 defeating the ANC’s longtime ally President Kenneth Kaunda. The trade union federation in South Africa (Congress of South African Trades Unions—COSATU) is part of the tripartite alliance with the ANC but has considerable unease over much of the latter’s governing programme—see point below. Worries over a split in the alliance with the possible emergence of a trade union and populist opposition mean that a successful trade union led government in Zimbabwe is not welcome to Pretoria. — Pretoria’s vulnerability to criticism from trades unions, churches, NGOs and civil society in general over lack of transformation (including land reform10), increasing unemployment, attacks on the “failure” of its economic GEAR policy deemed neo-liberal, particularly in relation to privatisation of such assets as water. — Reliance on alliances with other nation states (particularly middle level/ “regional hegemons” such as Brazil, India, the Group of (now) 22 at the Cancun World Trade Organisation talks, and indeed in NEPAD with Nigeria, Algeria and Senegal) rather than popular movements to change global unfair economic structures.11 — South Africa wishes to pursue African renewal and solidarity—which makes NEPAD an extremely paradoxical (and for how long sustainable?) moment. It wants to engage constructively with Zimbabwe for reasons of solidarity etc without jeopardising “African Renaissance” principles. — South African foreign policy prioritising expedient predictability rather than promoting democratic values12. In theory the formation of the African Union (AU) with its commitments to human rights, and its limiting the absolute nature of state sovereignty may see forms of intervention arising, but present performance would not indicate this, given the southern African representative role given to President Mugabe at the July 2003 AU Maputo summit and the failure of the AU to get its Peace and Security Council oV the ground. Nor does the recent agreement at the 23rd SADC summit in late August 2003 to set up a mutual defence force seem likely to help bring democratic change in Zimbabwe, given that the same summit committed itself to opposing sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the Commonwealth, the European Union and the USA.13 Indeed in the NEPAD document arguments for interventions on behalf of oppressed populations have been superseded by notions of intervention to protect states’ legitimacy and sovereignty. Both the ANC and ZANU-PF see themselves as the legitimate inheritors of the anti-colonial struggle with any other parties (even new ones like the MDC) tainted by association with previous regimes. For this reason it and other southern Africa states have been only too ready to accept ZANU-PF’s policies as in some way Pan-African and “anti-imperialist”. Strangely, given the support received by the ANC in exile—hardly quiet diplomacy—Pretoria has never supported human rights groups and opposition forces within societies whose governments are undemocratic and/or human rights violators. Instead, it seems to rely on notions of the legitimacy of heads of state and of sovereignty, key African Union (and formerly Organisation of African Unity) positions, but formalistic concepts nonetheless (especially for Zimbabwe which cannot feed its own people). Pretoria has less trouble with the idea of “a just world order” which means equity amongst nations. Recent events at the failed WTO meeting in Cancun in September 2003 and the response from the “Group of 22” of which South Africa is a member illustrate this strongly. South Africa at least initially believed that its model of negotiated settlement and compromise was transferable to Zimbabwe. It insisted on “quiet diplomacy” for reasons of regional solidarity and because it would not jump at the behest of former colonial masters. It pointed to misconceptions about the extent of its power as the “regional hegemon” saying it cannot unilaterally reorder the region. Rather it vaunts a united regional approach based on avoiding confrontation and promoting multilateralism. Keen to

10 South African market-based land reform has since 1994 managed to transfer 2% of agricultural land as opposed to a target of 30%. 11 Although rather playfully, President Mbeki did say at one point that maybe the Group of 22 should join the anti-globalisation protesters on the streets, an interesting diVerence to the treatment of demonstrators at the World Summit in Johannesburg in 2002. 12 Even when its observer group at the 2002 elections was physically attacked, the oYcial South African government position was that the elections were “acceptable”—a hitherto unknown take on being fair and/or free. South African foreign policy- making has often been held to be split between “realists” and “idealists”—a somewhat sterile distinction that Stephen Gelb believes the NEPAD initiative has gone some way to resolving—S. Gelb (2001) South Africa’s Role and Importance in Africa and for the Development of the African Agenda. Prepared for DfID. The Edge Institute, South Africa. 13 IRIN 26.8.03. “SADC rallies around Zimbabwe with a call to lift sanctions”. Reports quote Tanzanian (and new SADC) President Benjamin Mkapa strongly supporting Zimbabwean land reform and deeming the Zimbabwean media overly critical of the government (Mail and Guardian 29.8.03) and IRINttp//www.irinnews.org/report/asp?ReportID%36210. President Mpaka, somewhat missing the point it would seem, stated “I ﬁnd it insulting that there are powers and people who believe food shortages in the region can only be averted when Africans become servants on white people’s land” (SARDC 23.0803). Bizarrely, he continued that the summit’s support for Zimbabwe’s land reform should not be “interpreted as [an apology] for arbitrary, illegal, unlegislated and economically unproductive and unbalanced restitution”. The SADC statement was despite the EU insisting that sanctions only aVected top government oYcials and that the suspension of bilateral development programmes was due to the Zimbabwean government’s non-compliance with conditions. IRIN 18.9.03. See also Amnesty International statement AI AFR46/027/2003 on SADC leaders needing to place Zimbabwe on the agenda of the August summit, plus previous ones on repression in Zimbabwe such as AFR46/012/2003). 9573971007 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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maintain the position of solidarity promoted by SADC and the AU, President Mbeki was particularly sensitive to accusations that South Africa played the role of hegemon, only too aware that Mandela’s penchant for unilateral human rights-based foreign policy initiatives e.g. towards Nigeria and Congo had for a time isolated Pretoria within SADC. Simultaneously, President Mbeki has balanced the politics of solidarity (aware of considerable internal support for Mugabe) with establishing the “good governance” credentials of NEPAD, the project partly under his leadership for Africa’s development through partnership with the West. This has led to him negotiating tricky terrain, not rejecting outright Western attempts for him to play a central role in helping end the crisis in Zimbabwe, but not promoting their message either. He also appears to be able to ignore the constant prevarications and broken promises (to him) emanating from President Mugabe. That he has managed so far to do this without losing either American or British (public) support testifies both to South Africa’s regional importance and to Mugabe’s astute appreciation of this geo- political fact14. Additionally, while South Africa has leverage over Zimbabwe in areas of finance, energy and oil, it asserts that the economies are too closely linked to impose sanctions. Many Zimbabweans appear to believe that South Africa is not unhappy as seeing the drying up of investment north of the Limpopo and South African business being able in the future to get bargains when Zimbabwean reconstruction occurs (all of which may be incorrect, but certainly illustrates the bitterness at “quiet diplomacy”). From the end of 2002, President Mbeki seemed to have moved perceptibly from “quiet diplomacy” towards Zimbabwe, shown by electricity and fuel subsidies to open endorsement of its land reform policies15. Sustained attempts were made to gain Zimbabwe’s readmission to the Commonwealth despite Harare not even attempting to hide its non-compliance with the reasons for its year’s suspension16. At the annual meeting in Geneva of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) on 16 April 2003 a “no action motion” on Zimbabwe was moved by South Africa and passed by 28 to 24 votes17. Additionally South African oYcials attempted to portray land reform as a great success, suggested that Zimbabwe’s government was genuinely representative and that Zimbabwe’s problems could not be resolved by removing Mugabe from oYce since such problems stemmed from a benevolent elite committed to overturning colonial injustice, but running into unsustainable social spending18. Raftopoulos and Phimister see this as Mbeki sending a signal to those “restive elements within the Tripartite Alliance (of the ANC, COSATU and the South African Communist Party—SACP) calling for a relaxation of the government’s neo-liberal economic policies, even as he bolstered his pan-Africanist credentials by supporting ZANU-PF”19. For Raftopoulos and Phimister, the high point for South African freedom to pursue its own agenda was ironically enough President Bush’s visit to South Africa in July 2003. With no vital American interests at stake, and with the AU standing four-square with Mugabe in the face of any Western criticism, Bush and Powell left it up to Pretoria, despite rhetoric from the latter politician. President Mbeki, described to his delight by Bush as “an honest broker” and the “point man on Zimbabwe”, put a pro-Mugabe gloss on events. He claimed (in defiance of the known facts) that the Zimbabwe crisis was on the way to being resolved through South African—sponsored talks between ZANU-PF and the MDC20. Since then, matters have moved again, seeming to necessitate some rethinking in Pretoria.

Changes: — The internal opposition has become more eVective and coherent with several successful stayaways called by MDC and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions—ZCTU. The situation though remains at stalemate (although not stasis as the balance has swung back and forth); the opposition in its diVerent elements—MDC, civil society, trade unions, independent press, farmworkers has gained increased mass support in the past three years, but its short term strength seems unable to match the government’s hold over political power and the administrative, bureaucratic and military arms of the state. Government has not found it possible to crush the opposition. But democratisation through opposition activity on its own still seems unlikely. The ZCTU is planning further protests on cash shortages aVecting workers21.

14 Raftopoulos and Phimister (op cit) p 23. 15 Eg with South African Foreign Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (seemingly the most openly pro-ZANU-PF minister), endorsing ZANU-PF claims that Britain had to compensate white Zimbabwean farmers for land seized by “war veterans”, because of colonial land theft (Financial Gazette 14 Nov 2002). See also Natal Mercury, 20 Dec 2000 on the ANC inviting ZANU-PF to its Stellenbosch conference in December 2002. See also Argus, 21 March 2003). 16 Or with the fact that the Nigerians and South Africans were not charged with being “honest brokers” but attempting to persuade Zimbabwe to comply with the Harare Principles etc. Harare was supposed to ensure the ﬁnalisation of the land reform process, begin a dialogue with white commercial farmers over compensation, assist farm workers gain citizenship, reduce violence; look into concerns over AIPPA, and begin inter-party dialogue. With the exception of point 3, none of this has happened in any substantial way. 17 See Africa Rights statement africarightswhotmail.com 20.4.03. Note also Human Rights Watch statement that blamed Western governments for not pushing hard enough at the UNCHR. IRIN 28.04.03. 18 ANC Secretary-General, Kgalema Motlanthe, Star, 22 Jan 2003, Thabo Mbeki ANC Today, 9 May 2003 and The Guardian, 29 May 2003. Needless to say this is not an analysis easily recognised by Zimbabweans outside ZANU-PF. 19 Raftopoulos and Phimister, op cit p 26. 20 There were also denials from President Mbeki that he had ever said that Mugabe had promised to leave oYce by the end of the year. 21 Daily News 4.9.03. 9573971007 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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— There are increasing regional (non-governmental) concerns from civil society, trade unions, and churches. Whilst Mugabe retains a populist constituency inside South Africa and the region, there is an increasingly better-organised regional opposition to events inside Zimbabwe. Recent events have been the African Civil Society Consultation on Zimbabwe 6 August 2003 in Botswana22 and the Johannesburg Symposium on Zimbabwe from 11-13 August 2003. These highlight the fact that the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) visited Zimbabwe in June 2002. Its report was due to be published in October that year, and was then rescheduled for the AU summit in Maputo in July 2003. Activists at the two meetings above want it released at its next meeting in October 2003 and want decisions to be made in line with Article 58 of the ACHPR charter on whether violations have occurred which would mean a consequent report to the Chair of the AU23. Such steps are important, firstly because the report is believed to have been blocked to protect Zimbabwe’s image ahead of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) and, secondly, because other human rights organisations’ reports such as those from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been rejected by African states who accuse the two of “Western bias”.24 — Inside South Africa links to regional constituencies have spread to members of the Tripartite Alliance with SACP and COSATU questioning “quiet diplomacy” on behalf of regional allies such as ZCTU. It may be that the strategy pointed to above by Raftopoulos and Phimister of showing the internal critics of its neo-liberal international posture its regional pan-Africanism is beginning to unravel. — From being merely a few prophetic voices there has been a manifest growth in churches engagement,25 witness against human rights abuse, commitment to peace, reconciliation and the process of negotiation (especially from the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ pastoral Lenten letter of spring 2003 onwards). Their attempts at mediation were, however, eventually cold shouldered by the government and ruling party. — The Zimbabwe church has been backed by powerful regional churches. South African and Zimbabwe church leaders at a recent meeting in Johannesburg jointly condemned Pretoria and other African leaders for silence on human rights abuses in Zimbabwe and called for the dismantling of the national youth service training programme which as South African bishop Kevin Dowling highlighted has meant major human rights abuses, corruption of youth including engagement in the 30,000—50,000 tortures, rapes etc.26. — The South African Council of Churches central committee recently called on the South African government to be more proactive on Zimbabwe27. — Increasing evidence that the Harare government has no idea on how to right matters and is only intent on staying in power at whatever cost to nation and region. The recent supplementary budget defied belief. There is a growing regional awareness that the alternative to immediate significant political pressure will be eventual military intervention when the Zimbabwean economy has almost entirely collapsed. Whilst not unhappy at seeing investment increasingly switch to south of the Limpopo, Pretoria realises this is not just a zero-sum game, but there is a wider regional economy and strategy for its progress at stake. Can this any longer be ridden out with extra international, regional, and domestic pressure adding to this burden? — In political terms Mugabe is not helping out President Mbeki, by concentrating on how ZANU P-F can retain power and how to orchestrate a succession whilst guaranteeing himself safety and wealth. Various forces are jockeying for advantage in any post-Mugabe settlement; important players in ZANU-PF with no independent power base except Mugabe have been the strongest voices against any deals with the MDC and outside, preferring to believe they can tough it out until the next elections in 2005. — There is strong civil society resistance inside Zimbabwe for any (Mbeki-preferred) government of national unity (GNU) that assumes national consensus when there is none, that is aware of the history of ZANU-PF in swallowing up opposition voices in the name of national unity as in 1987, and which instead calls for a broad-based alternative to the present repressive and corrupt structure of governance and for “transition” not spurious national unity governments28.

22 ConcludingStatement of the African Civil Society Consultation on Zimbabwe AfricaFiles 12 August 2003 infowafricaﬁles.org 23 There are also calls for regional countries party to the Convention Against Torture to investigate and that SADC should investigate if Zimbabwe has violated the Windhoek Declaration and other measures (see Concluding Statement op cit). 24 Zimbabwe Independent 22 August 2003. 25 See “Crisis Point” and “Churches Speak out” CIIR News Summer 2003. www.ciir.org. 26 National Youth Service in Zimbabwe—a report on the youth militia, Oct 2000 to August 2003 Solidarity Peace Trust and others IOL News 7.9.03. 27 News 24 14.8.03. 28 See “Talks about Talks? Or merely a Waste of Time?” Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition Discussion Paper. July 2003. 9573971007 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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— The MDC has warned that time is running out for talks given that their court case on challenges to the 2002 presidential election is scheduled for 3 November 2003. There is a lack of movement inside Zimbabwe in terms of talks29 linked to divisions within ZANU-PF (Young Turks with no independent power base eg the information and justice ministers, Jonathan Moyo and Patrick Chinamasa, versus the old guard division). It is also possible that this posturing is to gain more leverage internally, and regionally, persuade President Mbeki that negotiations are still possible. The question is how much longer can Mbeki believe this when he has other pressures? (Oddly, party chair, John Nkomo, having along with the rest of ZANU-PF called MDC puppets of the West said the former should “call oV sanctions first”)30. The seeming belief in Pretoria that Mugabe was genuinely promising to go by the end of the year appears contradicted by events such as the building of a new presidential palace31. Civil society also wants wider participation in any talks especially the inclusion of women—disproportionately aVected by the violence32. — The undermining of the supposed Pretoria ultimatum to Harare for it to engage in talks by November 2003 so the former can report tangible progress at CHOGM or otherwise the latter will face expulsion33. Constant South African newspaper criticism points out to Mbeki that Mugabe has broken every promise the latter has made to Thabo, with many pointing out that there is a need for stronger sanctions not lifting the existing ones. — Increasing awareness that the region has lost millions in aid because of Zimbabwe including funds for a regional peacekeeping training centre. — Perhaps the final straw for “quiet diplomacy” was the Harare government forcibly shutting down the Daily News. This dramatically contradicted promises (including those made to President Mbeki earlier in the year) on reforming AIPPA34 and hopes that Pretoria could show movement by Harare by CHOGM. This closure of the only daily alternative to the government-controlled press and media followed several community papers and Joy TV being forced to close, and foreign journalists forbidden to practise. The shutdown was the culmination of a process that had seen incessant state provocation against the newspaper, bombing of its printing presses, harassment of its journalists and others from the independent press, de facto banning of the paper in many areas of Zimbabwe due to sellers being beaten up by youth militia and lorry shipments disrupted. — The Supreme Court already under suspicion of being at the beck and call of government showed its supineness in a worrying endorsement of AIPPA whose constitutionality was greatly under question including from influential voices in the region35. The swiftness of the court and subsequent police reactions were equally worrying given that the Independent Journalists Association of Zimbabwe case against AIPPA was still being heard, that there was an immediate forced closure of the Daily News building, and detention of oYcials and closure of business without police producing a court order or explanation of the legal foundation for their actions. Cynics also point to the increasing economic unviability of the government-controlled press given that the Daily News and other independent newspapers were gaining an increasing market share despite the harassment. The Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA—a regional media freedom watchdog) as well as the South African Press Association and the South African National Editors” Forum have all protested loudly. The only South African public response so far has been from Ronnie Mamoepa in the Department of Foreign AVairs that “we believe in freedom of the press36”. Did this hide a wider concern? — Time is running out for any movement in Zimbabwe towards democratisation to be apparent by December in Abuja. Whilst it is not impossible for Mugabe to pull a rabbit out of the hat at the ZANU-PF congress just before the Abuja meeting this is not likely to impress Commonweath heads). — More interestingly the Nigerian government (for reasons that were not immediately clear at the time of writing) appears to have pulled out of the coalition with President Mbeki and said that neither Zimbabwe nor Pakistan as suspended nations would be invited to CHOGM. This left the South Africans saying limply that it was entirely a matter for Abuja as if they had not been working to get the Zimbabwean government invited to CHOGM.

29 The agenda for talks is seemingly the same as it was before talks between MDC and ZANU-PF broke down in May 2002 and are on conﬁdence-building measures, the constitution, political violence, multipartyism, sovereignty and economic recovery. Supposedly Mbeki and Obasanjo were to “underwrite” the deal that emerged and the USA and other donors would provide a reconstruction package. 30 Personal communication from evangelical church activist in Bulawayo. 31 Although it remains possible that he will de jure retire but rule de facto behind the scenes. One could also point out that funds for this palace could probably only have come from mining in the Congo. 32 www irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID35963. 33 Financial Gazette 7–13 August 2003 citing South African ambassador to Zimbabwe, Jeremiah Ndou. 34 The apartheid-era sounding Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act of June 2002. 35 Harare is a signatory to both the African Carter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. 36 Star 17.9.03. 9573971007 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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— There may with the point above be an awareness that the rhetoric of Mugabe attempting to make his policies a black and white issue37 is increasingly under strain—indications from Ghana, Kenya and the Caribbean nations show the rhetoric wearing thin. It is thus an interesting moment for the House of Commons Foreign AVairs Committee to be asking questions about the whole nature of UK-South Africa-Zimbabwe relations. I have no speciﬁc policy recommendations on the matters I raise above, rather the need for all concerned to understand better the current dynamics of this very complicated relationship.

Recommendations for FAC: 1. It will be important to establish the current nature of oYcial South African thinking in terms of policy towards Zimbabwe and what Pretoria thinks it can and cannot do given the points raised above. This would include its discussions within the region, the African Union, SADC. 2. How does Pretoria assess the viability of its “quiet diplomacy” in terms of its vaunted backing of direct ZANU-PF—MDC negotiations in the light of such events as the Harare government stalling on talks, dismissing church initiatives on peace and negotiations, and the closure of the Daily News? 3. What credibility does Pretoria think its assurances given to the outside world, including Washington, London and Abuja that Mugabe would step down and serious negotiations would commence still hold? 4. In relation to these delicacies, there is obviously a concern North and South over NEPAD, its peer review mechanism and good governance criteria. What are Pretoria’s strategies on overcoming the reluctance of donors to engage fully with NEPAD while (rightly or wrongly) many see Zimbabwe as a test case (even if Zimbabwe generally opposes NEPAD)? 5. There is a need to establish from Pretoria what it is about a transition to democracy inside Zimbabwe that worries them more than the “chaos that they know”. 6. It would be useful to ascertain if Pretoria thinks it helpful for the African Commission on Human and Peoples” Rights report on Zimbabwe to be released in October 2003 as called for by Zimbabwean, regional and human rights organisations (as above). 7. What is the current future of the Mbeki/ Obasanjo/ Muluzi initiative given stalling inside Zimbabwe on talks and Nigeria not inviting the Zimbabwe government to the Abuja CHOGM? 8. There needs to be outside support for those in Zimbabwe and the region who are providing information about the human rights and general situation inside Zimbabwe, and those under threat standing up to repression. This in terms of oYcial British positions is obviously a delicate matter given what was described in the memo in terms of sovereignty, suspicions of both “neo-colonialism” and “liberal imperialism”. Other channels do exist, however. 9. In terms of the British government, our Zimbabwean partners concur that it has been useful recently to have had a period of silence as opposed to the previous megaphone diplomacy and for initiatives to have been multilateral and not seeming like bullying from the ex-colonial master. There are several matters in which London could help Pretoria if indeed the latter is shifting its policy. HMGneeds to assure all southern Africans of its support for a transparent, equitable, gender conscious land reform strategy—ﬁnancially, in the provision of expertise, and in engagement with multilateral and other donors. It may be argued that such potential support is already on record, but the opportunity to reiterate should not be lost. It would also be useful to suggest that London’s policy in terms of the eventual reconstruction of Zimbabwe should be imaginative and not restricted to Bretton Woods formulae rigorously implemented. Continuing food aid will be vital.

Outline of Crisis in Zimbabwe According to Chris Alden, Zimbabwe faces multiple crises—a crisis of legitimacy as its postcolonial consensus crumbles, a crisis of expectations stemming from the failure of its economy and polity, a crisis of conﬁdence in the impartiality of the institutions of the state. Since the defeat of the Harare government in the February 2000 constitutional referendum, it is clear that ZANU-PF has attempted to reimpose its control through a number of inter-related strategies: — A violent land occupation process with logistical and coercive support from the state, but without resolving contradictions in the rural economy by dealing with questions of access by communal farmers, especially by women (the majority of such farmers), and former farmworkers to credits and inputs, tenure questions, the role of chiefs in agrarian transformation. There also needs to be serious debate on collective forms of ownership and control. — The overt and targeted use of a compromised police and security apparatus against its opponents, including the use of sexual violence as a tool of retribution (with obvious implications given the HIV/AIDS pandemic). This is overlaid by de jure and de facto impunity for formal and informal agents of the state.

37 Saying on a number of occasions that it would split the Commonwealth into black and white sections. 9573971007 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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— The use of terror and judicial intimidation as well as ideological demonisation of the opposition to shut down space for independent and opposition voices and for access to justice to be denied to the politically unconnected (helped in this by the reactions of the Western and ex-colonial powers with their selective approach and strong echoes of colonial lecturing). — Widespread torture and intimidation as national and international human rights bodies have documented. More than 555,000 cases of serious human rights violations have been recorded in recent years. In April 2003 there were reports of 278 cases of unlawful arrest, 75 cases of torture, four death threats and two attempted murders38. To choose one recent moment—following the mass national strike in June 2003, around 800 supporters of the MDC were arrested, two were reported to have died and 150 were injured.39 — The “restructuring” of the judiciary, using threats by the state, the “Green Bombers” and sections of the war veterans movement. — The co-option or denigration of religious leadership. — The re-organisation of ZANU-PF structures to ensure the promotion of a provincial leadership committed to a strategy of coercive mobilisation. — Constant harassment of the independent media, and legislation to consolidate the monopoly of the ruling party over the electronic media. — The continued use of violence as an election strategy; and the destabilisation of the ZCTU and other civic bodies. — Theuseofthelandreformprocess,theindigenisationstrategyandthepoliticallypartisanuseoffood as a tool to create a new economic bloc stripping state assets in order to form a new economic bloc based on party aYliation and loyalty (although its sustainability is open to question). — An authoritarian economic nationalist (“anti-imperialist”) rhetoric that has resonance in the region bringing together race, land and historical injustice in order to demonise the internal opposition and legitimise/ maintain ZANU-PF’s rule through repression. — Latterly an inconsistent and reversible call for some form of dialogue under the rubric of “a government of national unity”, whilst continuing the repression and demanding extremely tough pre-conditions.ItisclearthatthisrelatestodivisionswithinZANU-PFinturnlinkedtothequestion of succession to President Mugabe and under what terms. Steve Kibble Catholic Institute for International Relations, London October 2003

38 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum. Political Violence Report. April 2003. 39 Amnesty International Press Release AFR 46/027/2003 22 August 2003.

Witnesses: Mr Richard Dowden, Director, Royal African Society (RAS) and Dr Steve Kibble, Africa Advocacy OYcer, Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), examined.

Q84 Chairman: This is the second of three planned became Director of the Royal African Society. The sessions of the Foreign AVairs Committee in our Society seeks to: “strengthen links between Africa inquiry into the role of the Foreign and and Britain and encourages understanding of Africa Commonwealth OYce in relation to South Africa. and its relations with the rest of the world”. We also This takes place before the visit to South Africa welcome Dr Steve Kibble. You are the Advocacy planned by the Committee from 9 February to 13 OYcer of the Catholic Institute for International February. Today’s session will divided into two Relations. The CIIR is a small, campaigning non- parts. The first was to be on trade and investment; governmental organisation working in the field of the second more general with certain regional issues. development. We know that you have published Gentlemen, as you have probably heard, one of our extensively on Africa, particularly on southern witnesses in the first session is stuck on a train; you Africa. Thank you also for your memorandum to have kindly agreed that we reverse the order. the Committee. Gentlemen, it is fitting that we have Therefore, may I, on behalf of the Committee, this appraisal now of our links with South Africa welcome first Mr Richard Dowden, Director, Royal because it is ten years since we had that landmark African Society and I believe an adviser to the All- election there. I am not sure whether I met you then: party Africa Committee. Mr Dowden, you have I was in Port Elizabeth heading the international worked as an African journalist covering various team. I should be grateful to start with to hear from parts of the continent from 1983 to the present. I both of you what you see as the principal have had the privilege to meet you in various parts of achievements of the country over those ten years. Africa. You have worked for The Times, been Africa Mr Dowden: The most obvious one is the final Editor of The Independent, Africa Editor at The ending of Apartheid. Even though Apartheid started Economist latterly from 1995 to 2001, when you coming apart probably at the end of the 1960s as a 9573971008 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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27 January 2004 Mr Richard Dowden and Dr Steve Kibble grand scheme and was in retreat then for a long time, NePAD standard. It is not compulsory and I am that election ten years ago put the gravestone on it. told it will not be punitive, but this is still being Since then, there was an expectation that South worked on. Africa might simply overturn the economic system Dr Kibble: The exemplary element in NePAD is the which had existed and instead one of the one which is constantly being stressed now. Many Government’s achievements has been to put people in South African and other civil societies do economic stability not before the empowerment of have a problem with its lack of consultation, its black people but slightly ahead of it, and has not in top-down approach, its reliance on one particular any way tried to destabilise the economy. That has form of neo-liberalism. They doubt very much on been the main achievement. the one hand that the African leaders who are human rights abusers can be brought on board and on the other hand that it will make much significant Q85 Chairman: Do you think the balance of the diVerence, when the G8 is a little hesitant about Government has been right? funding it at this precise moment, when there are Mr Dowden: Indeed. At the same time it has, if so many provisos, so many qualifications to be slightly erratically, provided housing, running worked out, not least the peer review mechanism water, education and other things which were to which Richard is referring. lacking before and begun on its programme of black empowerment. Those are the main domestic ones and across the continent they have given the Q89 Mr Olner: It really does mean something for rest of Africa a boost through their idea of the all people. One side says it is securing better African renaissance and, secondly, through the governance and the other side says it is a means of construction of NePAD, the programme for securing more aid for African nations. You cannot economic development in Africa and carried that have it one way on a Tuesday and the next way on through. Those are the main achievements of a Wednesday. South Africa. Mr Dowden: As I see it, all the ingredients in NePAD are elements of the existing relationship between the rich world and Africa and NePAD is Q86 Chairman: Dr Kibble, could you take that the packaging which has been put round them. This further? is both good and bad. It does not oVer anything Dr Kibble: The maintenance of peace and stability new. Everything has already been worked out, but in certain parts of the region, not all parts of the if NePAD falls apart, the actual ingredients of region, has certainly been a successful part of the NePAD will remain, perhaps in a more bilateral South African strategy. One can point to a number way, but they are not going to change. They are: of failures obviously, but with the inter-Congolese more aid from rich countries and better governance dialogue, the attempt to negotiate, with some from Africa. That is the deal. It is both. success, in Burundi and after some uncertainties over Nigeria and Lesotho, South African foreign Q90 Mr Olner: How is NePAD viewed by the policy is certainly becoming rather more coherent, diVerent “rich” nations? Do the French have a except in the specific case of Zimbabwe, which I diVerent view on what NePAD should provide suspect we may touch on later. from us, or the EU, or America? Do all the countries have a diVerent perspective of what Q87 Mr Olner: When we are talking about NePAD is? NePAD, it has been described as an agenda for Dr Kibble: The way I hear it, the Americans have change. Is that fairly accurate? Is it for change in more or less abandoned it. They do not think it has South Africa, or is it for change in southern Africa? any legs on it whatsoever. In a sense it reverts back Which is placed higher? to a kind of European ownership within the G8 and Mr Dowden: It is a programme for change in the that is unfortunate in some ways. In a sense whole of Africa, but originally it was conceived as NePAD was very much geared to having a those countries which signed up to it. At the AU sympathetic audience inside the G8 and many summit in 2000, the whole continent adopted it, people say it actually arose from discussions which which meant you had governments like initially took part in the G8 rather than an internal Zimbabwe’s and Libya’s, which obviously had not African conversation. Richard may have a slightly read the small print, signing up to it. That slightly diVerent view here. weakened it in a way. Mr Dowden: No, that is right, certainly what you say about America. The problem with it is, that it is like that elephant being investigated by blind men Q88 Mr Olner: Having not read the small print, and some hold the tail and some hold a leg and what are the other countries in NePAD able to do some hold the trunk. It is a bit like that. The against those countries which did not read the French see is as water; that has been their great small print? contribution to it, which was already one of the Mr Dowden: We are finding this out at the moment things they were doing in Africa and they pursue with the peer review mechanism. This is a concept it like that. Britain sees it as good governance. of a group of countries going around and African nations see it as a chance for more aid. investigating countries which are willing to be They are all in there, just being selective in the way investigated to see whether they come up to the they pick out what they want from it. 9573971008 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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27 January 2004 Mr Richard Dowden and Dr Steve Kibble

Q91 Mr Chidgey: President Wade has recently to it, if it were seen to be pushing a Western shown a great deal of concern about the agenda, that might lay the way open for Mbeki eVectiveness of the peer review mechanism, which particularly to resist it. I find rather surprising, as he was, of course, one of the original promoters of the whole concept of Q94 Mr Chidgey: It is fascinating. On the one hand NePAD. Does the African peer review mechanism you are saying, and the perceived view is, that we actually hold the potential to change significantly in the West should go very softly on this whole poor governance in African nations or will it prove issue, yet the view from the United States, who are ultimately toothless in your considered opinion? obviously a very major player here, is not just to Mr Dowden: It will not do anything for the ones abandon NePAD, but positively to oppose it, as who do not want to change themselves. It is a key, you confirmed a moment ago in one of your but the individual countries have to turn that key in answers. What sort of reaction does that provoke the lock. That would be my image of it. For those in Africa as a whole and South Africa as a key countries which are having problems turning the player when the Americans are producing their key and bringing good governance, but want to do version, which I think is the Millennium Challenge? it, it will be very helpful. Countries which have This means, “You allow American investors in and done well will say “We did this. We did that. This we’ll look after the bottom line”; never mind good is how you should do it”. It will not do anything governance, never mind any of the other issues we at all for the countries which really just do not want are talking about. You know where I am coming to turn it. from on this. Here we have a key player, the USA, Dr Kibble: It does slightly remind me of the barons actually positively undermining this attempt by in 1066 And All That, that there will be this peer African nations to work out their own destiny? review in front of people who will understand. The Mr Dowden: I would confirm that the Americans lesson of African solidarity, or more precisely are backing what they see as winners, American- African leadership solidarity, means that there will friendly policies, which would include good not be a significant civil society input into that peer governance and a lot of what is in NePAD. For review mechanism and it will be as much about those countries who do not follow that, there is resisting regime change as it will be about good nothing whatsoever. It is sorting out sheep and governance. That might be a slightly cynical view, goats and that has been the problem with a lot of but I remain to be convinced to the contrary. African policy, trying to sort out sheep and goats in Africa, because, like human beings, most African leaders and countries are a bit of both. Q92 Mr Chidgey: That is very interesting. May I Dr Kibble: May I just pursue something here? just pursue your point about regime change for a Many people have called for a twin approach, moment? One of the Western viewpoints on which is on the one hand addressing issues of global NePAD and its enthusiasm for it is good inequality, debt, trade and the rest of it, which is a governance and tackling corruption, which is not kind of positive, at the same time as stressing good necessarily the same thing as preventing or governance and democratisation on the other hand; encouraging regime change. How do you see that to be absolutely equitable in both kinds of ways, dichotomy? both human rights and democracy, but also Dr Kibble: In a sense I was being slightly economics. mischevous by talking about regime change. If I were going to be more precise, I would probably Q95 Chairman: How would you answer those who say changing the patterns and economic say that NePAD was in essence a contract? There accumulation strategies, the corruption of certain were reciprocal obligations. We, the Africans, African leaderships, not necessarily changing the deliver good governance: you, the West, deliver government in power in whatever culture it might trade investment and aid in various forms. The be, Kinshasa, Harare, Mogadishu. The good degree of delivery on either side will coincide. That governance aspect is still something where people is that if we deliver one to that extent the other side say “Come on board and there are benefits”. There will deliver. Manifestly, by certain actions in certain are no sanctions, no ways by which you can force parts of Africa, Africa is not delivering and people to change except by saying “If you go down, therefore cannot expect that same full-hearted we go down” and there is a kind of regional input response from the West, the other party to the into that. I think those mechanisms are very, very contract. How would you answer that? under-strength. Mr Dowden: I would agree that it is not written into the NePAD document, but there is a sort of deal there. Do not forget that the donor countries are Q93 Mr Chidgey: Is there anything we, Western also held to account in NePAD, in that there nations, could do to make this aspect of NePAD should be a peer review of the donor policies, more eVective, the peer review mechanism? getting them co-ordinated and so on. Frankly, I Mr Dowden: We may come onto this a bit later on, have not seen a great deal of that. If Africans say but the character of Mbeki is such that anything he “Well, if you fulfilled your side of the bargain”, is told to do, or he thinks the West is telling Africa they have a point. To some extent, if you look at to do, he resists quite vehemently. Therefore, while countries like Botswana, like Malawi, which is a bit Western governments could help provide assistance more complicated but the president has not gone 9573971008 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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27 January 2004 Mr Richard Dowden and Dr Steve Kibble for the third term and tried to change the to tell him to put the knife into his old colleague constitution, there is some progress in parts of and he simply will not do it. I think that is what it Africa on these. Kenya is now on a completely is about. diVerent track; Ghana. They could say that there has been quite a lot of movement in Africa. The Q97 Richard Ottaway: It is that bad, is it? problem is that the only sanction is that nothing Mr Dowden: It is not bad, but we see it as happens and that is what I fear: nobody is actually contradictory in relation to what he is trying to do saying “Come on. Let’s keep it rolling. Let’s get on NePAD and what he is trying to do on Burundi on”. and Congo and we see it as crazy and inconsistent. Dr Kibble: There is always a great concern in Africa If you actually understand the character of the about Western selectivity and certain human- man, it is not inconsistent at all. rights-abusing governments are not sanctioned1 and others are. We are not naı¨ve enough to believe that human rights always take a primary part in Q98 Richard Ottaway: Is there anything we could any foreign policy dialogue, but it is certainly a be doing to change it? handle for those who wish to use that to berate the Mr Dowden: I am told that he will not say this in West. From that stems the mere ability to have the dialogue with Britain but he is very, very critical of conversation, particularly with rural Africans, as to ZANU-PF and Mugabe. He is not as totally what NePAD could possibly give to them. What supportive as he appears to be. How do you move does it mean in terms of trickledown or ending him to try to change things? It is ironic that he did corruption or developmental economics, apply incredibly powerful levers on all the other empowering women, combating HIV/AIDS and SADC countries at the CHOGM to vote in favour the rest of it? I do not think that conversation has of re-admission. He was quite prepared to use really even started yet. levers brutally on them, but he says when it comes to Zimbabwe that he has no levers, there is nothing he can do, what do we want him to do, invade? He Q96 Richard Ottaway: This Committee has taken just simply will not apply any pressure. What can quite a close interest in Zimbabwe. President Mbeki be done from the outside? Britain keeping quiet was has quite consistently not criticised Zimbabwe. A probably a good policy and should remain so, number of reasons have been given: solidarity, because Mugabe was so clever at turning round shared history, Western double standards. Why has every time Britain spoke and playing the old he taken it? Given that the relationship with imperial colonial race card. That means that Zimbabwe is costing his country money, why has Britain should do things quietly rather than he taken this line when countries like Botswana are publicly. quite prepared to criticise Zimbabwe? Mr Dowden: There are several reasons, some of them to do with his personality, some of them to Q99 Richard Ottaway: Tony Blair, Jack Straw, do with his politics. He fears a broadly “Africanist” racist, imperialist? group in South Africa, the rhetoric which Winnie Mr Dowden: I agree. Mandela has used on occasions and others. In addition, because of his own history, that he was Q100 Mr Hamilton: May I just explore this slightly not involved in the struggle, but was a diplomat further? I accept what you say about Mbeki and and here in Britain much of the time, he feels his role in the struggle against Apartheid and vulnerable to that, that he was not as much part of oppression and that he was very much a diplomat. I the struggle as others. He is therefore very accept also that Mugabe was helpful to the struggle vulnerable to attack from that side. That is one against Apartheid and was a great ally of the black thing. There is an issue of land in South Africa as majority and the black majority leaders. However, well and he did not want to exacerbate that. There ordinary South Africans must be seeing an awful is a feeling about Mugabe. Mugabe supported them lot of the refugees streaming across the border. One very strongly over the years and it is hard to put estimate is that it has cost over £1 billion so far to the knife into someone who has been one of your look after Zimbabwean refugees. Surely, when main supporters. That is another reason. What somebody who, like Mugabe, has been a very good several people told me it came down to at the recent friend, has turned the way he has against his own CHOGM was that he just did not want to be told people, black people, who have been oppressed by what to do in Africa by outsiders and it came down the white regime under Ian Smith, who are now to that. If you read the letter which he published supposedly in control of their own destinies yet are on the ANC website the following week—I think 2 opposed to Robert Mugabe and are being it is called An Upside-down View of Africa —all that murdered, beaten, arrested and starved to death, I bitterness; the words “kith and kin” are repeated cannot understand why, in spite of everything you over and over again. Basically, he sees racist have said, Mbeki cannot show some leadership, not Britain, which protected Ian Smith for so long and under pressure from the West or from the UK, but protected Apartheid for so long and is now trying simply against that kind of oppression of a black majority. This is the very thing, the very tyranny he 1 Sanctioned as in “subject to sanctions” rather than “approved”. fought against now being practised by somebody 2 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2003/ whom he regards as a brother. I just wonder at49.htm£preslet whether you can comment on that. 9573971008 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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27 January 2004 Mr Richard Dowden and Dr Steve Kibble

Dr Kibble: South Africa had initial problems in the South African Government that they may split trying to break from seeing Zimbabwe within the oV into some kind of populist new alliance. There prism of its own experience of negotiations, of the are both domestic worries and regional worries and Mandela miracle and the rest of it. It took quite the South African government do not, as the some time to transform perceptions that way. At Zimbabweans do, make the kind of analogy the same time there is undoubtedly a populist between their separate struggles, which the constituency inside South Africa which does see the Zimbabweans say is just like the struggle against coincidence of white economic interests and Apartheid. The South African ruling party sees no Western desires as being congruent. All that is a analogy whatsoever and sees that the two liberation backdrop and there is an historical context as well, movements have always been historically united which one has to take into account, of colonialism and thus they should remain. and expropriation and the rest of it. To some extent, the way that Mugabe transformed the Q103 Sir John Stanley: Do you have any views as debate from one of human rights and governance, to what more the British Government could into a very signiﬁcantly charged debate inside reasonably do in terms of exercising pressure or southern Africa with the resonances of land, applying pressure on President Mbeki to get him historic injustice and race, then it became very hard to be more proactive in relation to Zimbabwe? We for people we work with in South Africa to say to are all very, very conscious, indeed there was a people that this is not about land, this is about report on the news today, that something like six governance, it is about democracy, it is about million Zimbabweans are going to be dependent on people being killed. The perceptions we have are external food aid. that signiﬁcant sections of the southern African Mr Dowden: Eight million and a grain shortage in civil society are moving. There have been meetings southern Africa generally this year. The answer is in Gabarone in the last year, there have been that I think the personal break between the Prime meetings in Johannesburg, there has been pressure Minister and President Mbeki was so deep at Abuja from the churches both in Zimbabwe and solidarity that several people have said to me that it is not from South African churches and to a lesser extent recoverable, which is very worrying both for some of the other regional churches. That has been NePAD and other aspects of British policy on occurring. If you want a rather provocative Africa. viewpoint, some people, particularly those inside Zimbabwe and far Left critics of Mbeki, say that Q104 Sir John Stanley: Do you think that break Mbeki is not actually interested in peace. What he was avoidable? is interested in is picking up the Zimbabwean Mr Dowden: Up until now I have simply tried to economy and Zimbabwe skilled labour very explain the way it seemed, I was not making cheaply. I am not saying I agree with that, but the judgments. I declare my hand and say that I think fact that people think that inside southern Africa Mr Blair was absolutely right, but the way Britain in response to Mbeki’s failure to move, is quite handled it there was not very sensitive. I was in symptomatic of some of the breakdowns in Abuja and found that the British had managed to relationships which have occurred within alienate a lot of allies, who were in favour of southern Africa. maintaining the suspension of Zimbabwe, but Mr Hamilton: I hope that is not the cynical white found themselves being ordered around by the media which is putting that view forward. British in a way they found unacceptable, not being treated as equals as the Commonwealth likes to Q101 Chairman: Is the attitude of President Mbeki maintain. In the end, no, it was not avoidable. to the Movement for Democratic Change perhaps Mbeki was not going to move, but the intensity of coloured by the fact that it might be a precedent it, the almost make or break attitude from both for trade unions in South Africa and the role of sides, may have been preventable. Fortunately I COSATU? think the relationship between Britain and Nigeria Mr Dowden: My understanding is that while things now is strong enough to make up for that in that have gone a little better recently Mbeki and President Obasanjo has supported the British Morgan Tsvangirai do not get on at all— position quite strongly and within the Commonwealth as well. Q102 Chairman: So it personal. Mr Dowden: It is personal. He does not rate him Q105 Sir John Stanley: Could you just elaborate? as a potential leader. He is very suspicious of the Who do you feel was doing the ordering around at fact that the MDC was bankrolled by the white Abuja which was causing such resentment? farmers and yes, there is that precedent that Mr Dowden: I do not know. As a journalist I have COSATU in South Africa could produce a leader certain names which were mentioned to me oV the like Tsvangirai who was formally a trade union record, but I think the British team there were not leader. as well prepared for the Commonwealth summit as Dr Kibble: There were also concerns when the they might have been and they did not spend as Zambian Movement for Multi-party Democracy much time as they might have done in trying to came in. There are worries that COSATU at some woo their allies or just “schmooze” them, which is point down the road may well become so what the Commonwealth summits are all about. disenchanted with the kind of neo-liberal thrust of They are about heads of government meeting and 9573971008 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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27 January 2004 Mr Richard Dowden and Dr Steve Kibble getting to know each other better and not enough freezing out of the Zimbabwean leadership would time was put into making sure that at least Britain’s be a start. You are not welcome here, if you come allies were happy and had had their five or ten here you come for talks and you are met very minutes, half an hour, talking to the Prime formally rather than with the warm solidarity Minister. which is what is shown at the moment. That would Dr Kibble: The concentration still needs to be on be a start: a public disapproval of what is democracy, good governance, it needs to be happening there, the breaking of the rule of law, multilateral, it needs to be through institutions the human rights abuses. That would go quite a which have respect inside Africa and it needs to long way. Yes, there are levers. They do not even involve things like citizen to citizen relations, have to turn oV the lights, just remind them that strengthening civil society organisations which are all their electricity comes from South Africa by talking about human rights, laying open human turning them oV for an hour in the evening from rights abuses. To some extent there needs to be a time to time. There are 1,001 ways: they could much stronger push to internationalise this tighten the border, they could put patrols on the situation inside such organs as the United Nations. border to pick up the Zimbabweans coming across. We keep hearing that the UN would not accept There are 1,001 ways in which neighbouring something on Zimbabwe. I think the time is coming countries, where one is very big and powerful can when there needs to be a much stronger push on send messages very simply. trying to internationalise it in that specific direction. We just need to be aware, in the words of Desmond Tutu, that South Africa needs to act, Q108 Sir John Stanley: May I now turn to the very because if it does not act for its neighbours, when important issue of land reform inside South Africa? is it going to act if things happen at home. It is a Could you help the Committee to try to get to an stark kind of comment, but Desmond Tutu often objective assessment of the significance of the new puts things in a context one can respond to. proposed amendments to the land restitution law, which President Mbeki has come forward with? We understand, as reported in The Independent on 12 Q106 Sir John Stanley: When you talk about the January, that this is going to empower the Minister internationalisation of it, particularly inside the for Land AVairs to expropriate land without a UN, who do you feel should be taking a lead in court order and without the land owner’s that? Obviously Britain has some historical agreement. The South African Government has baggage of considerable variety, but it appears suggested that this is basically beneficial and is pretty clear to us in this Committee that Zimbabwe designed to head oV the sort of situation which has is a pretty low priority against the totality of issues occurred in Zimbabwe: whereas others have taken around the world, for example in the EU. The US completely the reverse view and said this is just the administration has quite a degree of focus on it, but start of a Zimbabwean type process. Could you it does not score very highly in the EU, it does not help the Committee? What is your judgment as to score very highly elsewhere in the rest of the world. the implications of these particular legislative Dr Kibble: I admit that is a problem and I think amendments? that is why there has not been the push which might Dr Kibble: I thought it was interesting that the have helped earlier on. Whether the time is not yet Financial Mail, which might be said to be the house right or whether we can start to put some pre- organ of South African capital, was extremely conditions together with sympathetic African states relaxed about it and said that this was a measure is something to be seriously considered. I am not which would actually help speed up, that it would saying that I think it would work immediately, but provide equity along with restitution. That is quite there needs to be a slightly paradigmatic shift in interesting. There certainly is a danger that the that sense, from saying that the UN is not going to political economy of South Africa will not deal with this, to saying let us pursue it with rather necessarily see a land grab such as ZANU-PF have more vigour than we have done, inside the EU, undertaken, but will see continuing local violence. with a number of Scandinavian states who There are far more South African farmers killed in historically have been big allies of some of the “criminal violence” than there are Zimbabwean southern African states and do not have the farmers for instance. All deaths of course are to be colonial baggage. There are various options to regretted. The landless movement inside South pursue in that way. There is a “Third-Worldist” Africa has the potential to create a stir, but is option possibly as well. nowhere near anything like the state-sponsored, informal, violent, third force kind of violence we Q107 Chairman: If South Africa chose, what are saw in Zimbabwe. That is not to say that does not the principal levers it could use to bring pressure remain as one of a number of options, but moving to bear? Presumably there are substantial debts and to a situation where you can speed up the historic among those would be the debt to Eskom and dispossession of the black majority in South Africa energy generally. South Africa, if it wanted, could can only be advantageous. The procedure for the presumably turn oV the energy taps. ministry to intervene is only a last resort, as I Dr Kibble: That is true. understand it. South Africa, having proclaimed it Mr Dowden: But so far they have not even publicly would transform 30%, has only managed to process criticised them. Every time Mbeki and Mugabe land claims for 2%. Something needed to happen meet they embrace, there are big smiles. Just a and this legislation is probably not perfect and 9573971008 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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27 January 2004 Mr Richard Dowden and Dr Steve Kibble there are constitutional implications with the South everybody knowing about them. I also disagree African constitution which would stop a wholesale that even countries which have an Islamic issue like expropriation anyway, assuming that South Africa Nigeria or Kenya or Somalia can somehow be still continues to follow the legal and constitutional brought into the al-Qaeda agenda. When I have route, which I have every expectation it will do. spoken to people there, they say no, that this is a Mr Dowden: A lot of white farmers have been killed Middle East thing, it is about Palestine, it is about there, but that was not part of a land grab in any Saudi Arabia, it is nothing to do with Africa. I have shape or form: it was for whatever was in the safe. not met many Africans who have any sympathy or Whilst there is a land movement in South Africa, anything but condemnation for what is going on. it in no way has any oYcial sanction and is not Dr Kibble: I think they would ﬁnd it diYcult, given supported by the government, which seems, on the the criminality of some of the African elites, to contrary, rather than breaking up the land and provide a basis for any form of international giving everybody a little piece of land, which is the terrorism. There are certain areas of instability emotive feeling in Zimbabwe, to be much more which do involve an Islamic element; very few in wanting to empower black commercial farmers, southern Africa, with the possible exception of the who would farm in a similar way to the way the Cape Flats. What we are looking at here is a very farming has been done up until now. It could, localised situation in South Africa and the main however, build in the long run, depending on how focus is undoubtedly across into the Middle East. South Africa goes, into quite a big issue and it is Africa’s problems have very little to do with one which we would do well to keep a close eye on. terrorism, except possibly as a kind of marginalisation, because so much eVort of the Q109 Sir John Stanley: What is your view as to the world is concentrated on those areas where there is degree of fairness of the compensation which is terrorism, or thought to be the potential for oVered when land is taken compulsorily? What is terrorism. Africa suVers, but indirectly and not by your view as to the adequacy of the safeguards for engagement. the employment and the houses of those who are the existing farm workers in white farms which are Q112 Mr Hamilton: So you do not feel that the then transferred to black ownership? global terrorists of the kind represented by al- Mr Dowden: If it is a straight transfer from a white Qaeda, who want to destroy the West, will have commercial farmer to a black commercial farmer, any comfort or home anywhere in Africa, especially presumably he would also need the workers. I in southern Africa? would have thought there was far more threat from Dr Kibble: I cannot see why al-Qaeda would go modernisation and mechanisation to the there rather than more congenial places, to be livelihoods of rural South Africa and the general honest. process of globalisation than there would be from Mr Dowden: I fundamentally disagree with the idea taking over farms in the way it has been done in that because people are poor, they will therefore be Zimbabwe, where the farm workers are just driven anti-West. My experience in Africa is that they tend oV. In terms of compensation, I do not know the to identify local elites, diVerent ethnic groups, as details, so I am not really qualiﬁed to speak on the source of their problem, not the West. that. Obviously Somalia was diVerent and they ended up very, very angry with the Americans, but even there Q110 Sir John Stanley: Dr Kibble, can you help us now, there is no . . . A Somali summed it up the on compensation? other day when he said “If al-Qaeda is about Islam, Dr Kibble: I am afraid I cannot either. I have then we are all al-Qaeda. But it is not: it is about studied some of the broad outlines of this bill and an Arab cause and we are not Arabs. It is nothing I must admit that it is still in my reading pile. to do with us”.

Q111 Mr Hamilton: Susan Rice, the former Q113 Mr Hamilton: Do you think South Africa Assistant Secretary of State under Bill Clinton, itself has the resources, the police, the intelligence once referred to Africa as the world’s “soft and the wherewithal to deal with international underbelly” for global terrorism. Do you think the terrorism in the unlikely event, from what you say, West’s war on terrorism has paid insuYcient of those terrorists wanting to use South Africa as attention to Africa in general and South Africa in a base for any particular reason? Do they have the particular? resources? Do they do enough to help the struggle Mr Dowden: Not really. I think she is very against international terrorism globally? mistaken. If you think of all the liberation Dr Kibble: They had a large problem in the post- movements right across Africa, some terrible things independence period where lots of military happened, but they were never involved in the type spending was downgraded, where they had to of terrorism that al-Qaeda pursues and even when reconcile six diVerent kinds of forces, where there things have been extremely bad, for example was a desire for the military and security forces to hijacking planes and killing civilians has never been reﬂect the population groups as they were. Until part of political opposition in Africa. Even in the Jackie Selebi came in to the DFA, until there were Horn of Africa, in Somalia, which is an amazingly signiﬁcant moves, the South Africans would open society, it would be extremely diYcult for certainly have been on the back foot if those kinds foreign movements to work there without of threats had existed, as they are now. I still think 9573971008 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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27 January 2004 Mr Richard Dowden and Dr Steve Kibble that southern Africa is not the site for future Q116 Mr Illsley: Should we be giving that expertise, terrorist operations, although one could say that that resource to South Africa? the Gulf of Guinea, which is coming up as a major Dr Kibble: There was an interesting recent speech oil producer to the West, could possibly fill that by Jacob Zuma, the Deputy President, saying that role sometime in the future. For the moment, I do expectations on South Africa—and I think he was not consider that a high priority. South Africans implying internal as well as external and regional— have been buying arms; they are a major arms were so high from 1994 in moral, economic and supplier. Of course they are also in a region which, political terms, that they got a bit carried away. whilst awash with small arms, is certainly not This speech was last September. He said that there geared up to security considerations and to military really has to be a downgrading of their expectations operations outside their borders. The South and other people’s expectations of them. In a sense Africans have probably stretched themselves that is probably the answer. enough in terms of the kind of peace-keeping areas in which they are already involved, the DRC and other places. Q117 Mr Illsley: What role does the Southern African Development Community (SADC) play in promoting regional economic and political Q114 Mr Hamilton: Does either of you feel that developments? South Africa could have a role in helping the rest of Dr Kibble: SADC has certainly attempted to move the world fight international terrorism? Especially forward in a number of ways: free trade area, when you mention its role in arms production and agreements on human rights, on gender, on a purchase. number of diVerent aspects. The overwhelming Dr Kibble: They have not shown that they have the impression is that they have a capacity problem. expertise to deal with it, because they have not had Even when the EU was funding possibly more than to deal with it really. The only terrorists they had it does now, there has never been any sign that the to deal with was the white Right in South Africa nation states have really accepted a form of and some of the horrible things which went on regionalism which moves SADC forward. It has there. In terms of that being terror, yes, but it is been very much a nation state and bilaterals, rather also true that the ANC was not a particularly than necessarily SADC consciousness. In fact eVective military organisation whilst quite eVective SACU has probably worked rather more politically. To be honest, the answer to your coherently and consistently than SADC which was question is no. probably opposite to the hopes of many of us in 1994. That is history for you. Q115 Mr Illsley: A couple of quick questions following on from what you have just mentioned Q118 Chairman: You mentioned the quality of the about South African defence policies and a foreign policy direction in South Africa. Can you question about South Africa in its own region. The comment on the quality of the diplomatic Committee has received evidence in written form personnel? Blacks were eVectively excluded from suggesting that South Africa has been able to the diplomatic service until the change of punch above its weight and has been able to do so government. Many of those in the ANC had because it had the momentum of the past, in experience only in the non-aligned movement and particular figures such as Mandela. In the same opposition-type work, hence the link with Libya evidence we have also been warned that there is a and others; clearly the Soviet Union as a sponsor risk that we are perhaps asking too much of South faded from the picture in the early 1990s. Many of Africa, and the West is expecting too much of those who were put in high positions were those South Africa. Given that the country is who were owed debts arising from the liberation undoubtedly the principal regional power, do you struggle. Is that a constraint on the ability of South believe there is that danger that the UK and others Africa to play a greater role overseas, the training, are over-estimating South Africa’s ability and the quality of the personnel in the diplomatic willingness to act as the regional policeman? service? Mr Dowden: I would make two points here. One is Mr Dowden: My experience here and visiting South that because Mbeki was Mandela’s foreign minister African embassies and high commissions in Africa and now Mbeki is his own foreign minister, the V is that sometimes you meet extremely good, hard- foreign a airs department of South Africa is weak. working, well-informed diplomats who are doing a The second point is that the military expenditure, brilliant job and the South Africans have many like the recent huge arms purchases, seem to me to be that. At a secondary level, they do not have the totally inappropriate for anything other than systems in place to provide the backup which is fighting a conventional war. Exactly who is South needed for a really serious diplomatic eVort. They Africa going to fight? It seems the wrong sort of are weak in that department and that may be equipment for the peace-keeping role which is the something Britain could help them with, with only one South Africa could be called upon to do. training them how to run a foreign service. They have spent their money, in terms of that intervention as a peace-keeping role, very badly. I do not think they have the diplomatic and Q119 Chairman: Would they be reluctant to look intelligence clout sometimes to fulfil that other role for such training in the UK, or would they look of knowing how to go into a place in the first place. elsewhere? 9573971008 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 59

27 January 2004 Mr Richard Dowden and Dr Steve Kibble

Mr Dowden: I do not see why they should be. It explicitly a bone of contention between South is simply training. It is just the sort of thing, Africa and Britain, although Britain is quite critical with the language and so on, that they might of the way the government has handled it. pick up. Dr Kibble: There are several key problems here. Dr Kibble: You are pointing to two things here: South Africa aspires to a leadership of the non- one is a personal thing about the diplomats’ aligned movement and places a lot of emphasis on experience and quality and education; the other multilateralism, on the reform of global architecture is a structural inheritance from when the ANC like the IMF and WTO. Whilst the UK is probably came into power of debts from people who had one of the good guys inside the G8 in terms of helped the liberation struggle and an ambivalent receptivity, at least listening about debt, trade, aid, relationship with the West, but knowing that etc., it finds it diYcult to break from that kind of their economic future lay with the West. This solidarity. There is a kind of symbiosis in that they kind of much vaunted idea that South Africa is a need each other, but they do not necessarily have to bridge between the developed and undeveloped like each other. There are obviously historic links; world, or the developing world, is an interesting there are links between people who emigrated to one to pursue. I am not sure that it completely South Africa and the liberation movement, works all the time, but the diplomats in a sense emotions which still continue. There is the bedrock are geared towards that kind of bridging end in there for good relationships, but they need to their minds, of trying to bring African discourse understand that each comes from a diVerent into the West and to some extent western ideas perspective, that South Africa is still finding its way into Africa. I, like Richard, have met some andthatitisonlytenyearssincethefirstdemocratic extremely capable ANC or black diplomats, elections. Sometimes we expect rather a lot too soon, many of whom were of course involved in the whilst at the same time forgetting to remember the liberation struggle abroad and cut their teeth on whole of the history which has preceded it. There how to wheel deals in a number of international are diYcult shoals to negotiate and some are fora, where the ANC was rather more widely ideological, some are political and some are recognised than the then South African structural to deal with the prestige and the viewpoint Government. of each, of their particular place in the world.

Q120 Chairman: Here is an area where you think the UK would be able to help. Q122 Mr Chidgey: You both touched on the multilateral issues such as the reform of the CAP. Dr Kibble: I think so; it would be extremely useful. I am not quite sure whether you are saying to us that South Africa recognises that we are one of the Q121 Mr Chidgey: May I take us a little further on good guys, in your words, or whether they are UK/South African relations, if I may? In some of expecting more from us. Do they accept that we the written evidence we have had from the FCO, only have a limited amount of control over the the relationship between the UK and South Africa CAP, for example, and the WTO? Or do they think has been described as broad and deep and the two we should be batting more strongly for them and nations have shared diplomatic aspirations. In is that souring the relationships in any way? Or are other memoranda, we have seen the highlighting of they being very mature about it and acknowledging the detrimental eVect that the failure of recent trade that we are doing our best? negotiations between the developed and developing Dr Kibble: I would say that South Africa learned a worlds has had. In our last evidence session all of great deal from the negotiations with the European us agreed that this is a major issue aVecting UK/ Union over the Free Trade Agreement from 1995 South African relations and there was a need to onwards. It was horrified at how hard-nosed the create more even terms, an even field—I hate to use southern Europeans were inside the EU and the phrase level playing field, but that is more or desperately looking for allies in the north. To some less what we were talking about—in trade terms. extent Denmark, Germany, Britain did rally round With that background and given your experience, and try to push through a rather more liberal and how would you assess the state of UK/South accessible agenda, but were obviously handicapped African relations at present? by the CAP, by the particular agricultural Mr Dowden: I think they agree on a great deal, even producers inside the European Union. That on the issues which caused the breakdown of experience has still stayed with them in terms of Cancun. Britain was on the side of the good guys, what they expect from the West, from the but maybe did not speak out loudly enough at the European Union, which is not that much, to be time. Maybe they should almost have crossed the honest. floor and joined the group of 20. Obviously they Mr Dowden: I certainly think next year, with cannot do that for other reasons, but support for Britain being chairman of G8 and the EU at the that position was very strong. Alec Irwin is a major same time, an extraordinary position of influence player in the group of 20, so in that sense Britain’s in the world, that they could use that to make some connections to South Africa are going to be of these points and pick up the issues of agricultural important there. The issues which have created the subsidies and trade and debt and really push them problems are Zimbabwe and AIDS, which is less in both those fora. 9573971008 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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27 January 2004 Mr Richard Dowden and Dr Steve Kibble

Q123 Mr Chidgey: That leads quite neatly onto my Mr Dowden: That is a very unfortunate term. On final question. What should the FCO be doing to the contrary, recognising Africa’s independence strengthen the UK’s political, cultural and and its strengths and treating them as equals far economic relationship with South Africa? Do you more would be a better way of helping them. see the coming presidency in terms of being the route by which we could do much more, or are Q126 Mr Olner: The UK has done a large amount there other issues? in leading the international community in reducing Mr Dowden: The route being through South Africa. some of the debt of southern Africa and other developing countries and if other countries came on board as far as we have come on board, then the Q124 Mr Chidgey: To South Africa, yes. Are the situation might be a little diVerent. Could you positions coming up as president of the Union and briefly tell us how South Africa plays with the chairman of G8 the most opportune positions in United Nations and bigger global packages which which we could strengthen our relationships with are on oVer from the UN? South Africa. Mr Dowden: My understanding is that the South Mr Dowden: Yes, indeed. It is partly that, but it is Africans are very strong supporters of the UN and also being the voice of countries like South Africa players there. I am trying to think of any area in the other fora. That is really what South Africa where they have any problems with the UN. I and other African countries would like to see us cannot think of any. doing: Britain being a much stronger voice in favour Dr Kibble: One of their beefs about the Iraq war of a better deal on debt, on reducing agricultural was the fact that they very much took the illegality subsidies, allowing Africa and other countries to view on that. The UN is in a sense a protector for earn their place rather than have to wait on aid. All a middle level nation and when they feel that the those sorts of issues are the things which Britain strong nations may be ganging up, there is not a should do as chairman of the G8 and the EU. lot in this forum which provides any form of legal Dr Kibble: And be sympathetic on achieving the protection to nations and groupings like the South millennium development goals and, if I may add Africans and they find the UN a bulwark in a one note, helping South Africa to stage its bid for troubled world. They were very, very upset when the World Cup in football. the constitutionality of the United Nations was under threat, or so it would seem to them. Chairman: May I say on behalf of the Committee Q125 Mr Chidgey: So making sure that we really that you have used your expertise for our benefit? do recognise that South Africa or Africa generally Thank you very much indeed. We will now move should be a scar on our conscience. on to the second group of witnesses.

Witnesses: Mr Christopher Paterson, Executive Director, Macmillan Publishers Ltd, and Mr Ashley Roe, Business Development Director, Severn Trent Water International Ltd, examined.

Q127 Chairman: Mr Paterson and Mr Roe, I Mr Paterson: Thank you very much for this welcome you on behalf of the Committee; the first opportunity. As Macmillan we have been trading shall be last. Mr Paterson, we understand you had in southern Africa for more than 25 years. During a problem with the train today. Mr Roe, we thank the Apartheid years we set up a regional you for being understanding and waiting on. To organisation based in Swaziland and set up introduce the both of you, Mr Christopher curriculum publishing organisations in all countries Paterson, you are the Executive Director of around South Africa. We did publish English Macmillan Publishers Ltd, the Oxford publishing language teaching courses for South Africa at that house, Chairman of Macmillan Education, time, but did not enter into the general curriculum Chairman of Macmillan’s southern Africa business. Since change in 1994, we have invested companies in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, very heavily in South Africa and have become a Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe major player in that South African educational since 1983. You are also Deputy Chairman of the market. We have been developing books for the South African Business Association (SABA) and a new curriculum over ten years now and we are member of the Royal African Society. Mr Ashley involved in all aspects of education in every Roe, you are the Business Development Director, province in South Africa. Severn Trent Water International Ltd. You are also Chairman of the British Water Overseas Forum and a Director of British Water, the UK’s water Q128 Chairman: Any particular obstacles special to industry trade association. You have worked in a South Africa which you could draw to our attention? number of relevant fields. Gentlemen, we welcome Mr Paterson: There were enormous obstacles at the you both. May I ask whether you could state what beginning. I suppose historically there was fierce involvement your respective companies have competition in the market in any case and the large recently had in South Africa and what particular Afrikaans press groups were dominant players in obstacles, perhaps peculiar to South Africa, you that market with sometimes rather old-fashioned have met in your business operations? school books. With the new curriculum, the market 9573971008 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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27 January 2004 Mr Christopher Paterson and Mr Ashley Roe became open. Our biggest problems have been is about 40 per cent—it is a huge market. For a gauging the pace of curriculum reform and long time it was under-funded because the history educational funding. Huge promises were made at before 1994 was to fund more pupils, but not to the beginning and we, like other publishers, made fund them to a very great amount. The funding huge investments and then the funding collapsed total has now caught up with the 1994 levels and for a while and we slowed down. We probably got that makes it a market for publishers of perhaps a better result in the end but we had huge problems £100 million, compared with the UK which varies in those years and the educational publishing between £200 million and £300 million. It is a industry as a whole had to lay oV perhaps half its substantial market for us. staV from 1996 through to 1998. Q132 Mr Illsley: Would you say that is the same Q129 Chairman: Are you back on track and into not just for educational publishers, but for other proﬁtability? companies as well? Would the same advantages be Mr Paterson: Back on track and the governance there for anybody who wished to sell any product standards on which educational publishing depends which would appeal to that population? are improving. Although books are approved Mr Paterson: I would think so. It is a substantial nationally, the buying is a provincial business. economy and British companies, because of Books are bought at provincial levels so there are history, the long establishment of British businesses diVerences locally. Mr Roe: Severn Trent have been involved in South and the high level of British investment historically, Africa since about 1999. We are involved in a very can make it a very large market in almost anything. small way compared with Macmillan and we have Mr Roe: I would concur with that, although we taken the view that we are going to continue to be viewed it as more of a hub for our business in small until such time as the market opens up. We southern Africa and we saw the fact that there was saw opportunities in 1999–2000 in the development a workforce there which we could tap into as of private sector involvement in delivery of water something we could use to go into other parts of supplies. They have not really come about. One Africa. In terms of a market for water services, signiﬁcant contract has been let. there are 50 million people and over the next 10 to 20 years there is going to be considerable investment. We see that as a good opportunity Q130 Chairman: Is this a privatisation project? for us. Mr Roe: No, not necessarily. It is private sector involvement in the delivery; it is not privatisation as we would know it here. It is more like an Q133 Mr Illsley: What sort of timescale are you operating-type arrangement. The contract we were looking at in terms of that? I know you just said looking at was for Johannesburg. We decided not you were waiting and you have been there since to bid for that but since that time we have stayed 1999 waiting for the market conditions to be right there undertaking small consultancy work. We for you to bid for certain contracts. What is the have managed to utilise that to fund our oYce in timescale you are looking at before you get into a South Africa and we will continue to do that until system where you can take advantage of the we see the opportunities beginning to arise. In opportunities there? terms of the reasons why those opportunities have Mr Roe: We believe that the projects are going to not come about, there has been some reluctance start moving in the next three or four years, from the union side, in terms of getting large something like that. When I talked to the Minister Western businesses involved in service delivery. for Water about this time last year, he was saying There has been a change in the way in which service that they needed to develop the water sector, they is being provided, from a centrally directed could not do it all and the government needed the arrangement through the Department for Water private sector to be involved in that. The V A airs down to the municipalities, who have municipalities were at a point where they should be become responsible for service delivery. That has looking to the private sector to help them. That has taken nearly two and a half years to work through. not come about yet, but it will do in maybe the next They now have a serious lack of capacity at the three or four years. municipal level in terms of service delivery.

Q131 Mr Illsley: The Foreign OYce have given Q134 Mr Illsley: What do you see as the biggest evidence to the Committee to suggest that the UK challenges or problems facing any inward is one of South Africa’s largest trade and investment or training within South Africa? investment partners and that South Africa is one Mr Roe: From my point of view, the thing which of the largest investors within the UK. How large is taxing me most at the moment is black economic a market is South Africa for UK companies at the empowerment. As an international business with a present time and potentially and should some of the brand, we clearly cannot have shareholders in a problems you have just been outlining be removed? company which is managing that brand who are Mr Paterson: For educational purposes, South not ours, if you see what I mean, somebody in Africa is a very large market. Because a very large control. We have to ﬁnd a structure we can work proportion of its population is of school age—I within. We probably are slightly diVerent from the forget the exact proportion under 18, but I think it companies who are going into more of a consumer 9573971008 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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27 January 2004 Mr Christopher Paterson and Mr Ashley Roe market in that we are bidding for government and with them; they have provided us with leads, with municipal contracts where that is an extremely contacts and been very supportive in terms of the important element of our delivery mechanism. British water trade association with trade missions. Mr Paterson: Would you like me to say a few Last year I was involved in a trade delegation: very words? well put together by BTI and the people out in South Africa. So I will say that they have been very, Q135 Mr Illsley: Yes; I am thinking in terms of the very good. private sector as against the public sector. Mr Paterson: We have overcome a lot of obstacles Q138 Mr Chidgey: Thank you for the information in the last ten years and we feel that the thing is about the specific help you have received for your plateauing out. We feel that there are huge company. My question was: to what extent does challenges in the educational system which have to the FCO meet the key objective of helping to be addressed; a lot of them have been addressed advance the competitiveness of companies in the under the very capable Minister of Education. I UK through overseas sales and investments? Can think the challenge in future is going to be when the you look a little broader than just your own politicians decide to gear up educational funding to experience with your own company and take a a higher level, because the standard is not as good mature view across the piece? as it should be, and I am sure everybody is aware Mr Roe: Certainly. I believe that they do create an of that, despite very good expenditure on teachers’ environment which enables us to get access to key salaries and on books. Can we rise to that challenge decision makers within government, from my of the change which will be needed? I think there business’s point of view, which enables us to will be a political challenge in future, which will influence the way in which those governments buy apply to all publishers. One thing to say is that goods and services. They do play a key role in that. South Africa is, like many investment markets, a Mr Paterson: For us—in South Africa we have country where we have to act local; it is particularly been able to plough our own furrow without much so in publishing and school books are a political business in many ways. British companies will help, because we decided, as we were incorporated succeed if they can embrace local employment and in all the countries round about by 1994, that we local shareholding where possible, because there knew the South African market pretty well from are so many capable people around. being regionally based. We were able to go in quickly with local people helping us. When I have come across DTI or Trade Partners UK or Q136 Chairman: One question on distance learning. whatever, they have been extremely helpful and in I seem to recall that the equivalent of the Open South Africa very knowledgeable. From a limited University in South Africa had a very successful point of view, they have been really helpful. There track record. Is that still the case? To what extent would be some questions in territories round about are you able to work with organisations like that? as to how Foreign OYce help actually works in Mr Paterson: The University of South Africa is a practice, but in South Africa it has been good. huge organisation which has been going for many years and is not only a South African institution in terms of its enrolment but people are taking Q139 Mr Chidgey: Are there any areas where you UNISA degrees throughout southern Africa and feel that the FCO and DTI could be more helpful? further afield. It has an extremely good faculty. We You said that the service they do provide is good supply UNISA, like other publishers do, on an and worthwhile, but let us look a little to the future. arm’s-length basis, just as you would supply the We live in a highly competitive world and both of Open University or a big university in this country you are working in a highly competitive and occasionally we have published textbooks for marketplace. To try to concentrate one’s mind on professors at that university. It is a normal arm’s- what more one could do as a government, let us length relationship and a good opportunity with make a comparison between what other countries that number of students. are doing to try to break into what are traditionally Anglophone British markets. I often hear Q137 Mr Chidgey: I should like to pursue with you throughout Africa about the amazed looks on the both the supporting role of government institutions faces of British companies when they see the eVorts in terms of your business in South Africa. You will being made by the French Government to promote be aware that one of the duties of the FCO is to French industry, French business, in areas which promote British business overseas, usually through have traditionally been British. We seem to think agencies such as British Trade International (BTI). that Francophone Africa is just a territory on the I am just wondering, bearing in mind that one of other side of the moon. This must be causing you the FCO’s key objectives is to help enhance the some concern, because you are therefore meeting competitiveness of companies in the UK through much more competition, I suggest, which is from overseas sales and investment, to what extent you areas and countries which you previously did not. have found from your experience that the FCO Do you feel our government agency should be meets that key objective. looking more closely at how you can retain your Mr Roe: We are probably both a bit too polite. competitiveness in what have been traditionally From our point of view they have been very, very British markets, when they are no longer being supportive in South Africa. We had a lot of contact considered that by our competitors? 9573971008 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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27 January 2004 Mr Christopher Paterson and Mr Ashley Roe

Mr Paterson: In terms of South Africa, where the for school books, it comes in and out on a bit of British knowledge of the local scene is very strong, a whim. In general it is providing the books, but it a good job is being done. The threat I have seen is is not encouraging capacity building in those more in the printing industry, where you have seen countries, because the private sector is not working a lot of German investment coming in. It is not so together with the aid sector. I have seen in all sorts much the French as the Germans who are really of countries in Africa the bad eVects of this and it quite aggressive. You see that in other areas as well. is something which, with a little eVort and In the media as a whole, because the South African compromise, could give a huge improvement in the industry itself is so strong, we are not really seeing quality of UK input to those countries. inroads from other European competitors or Mr Chidgey: That is very helpful; thank you. American competitors. Q142 Mr Olner: I agree with you, but have you Q140 Mr Chidgey: Mr Roe, you must be in a actually told the FCO that? particularly interesting position there with the Mr Paterson: From time to time over the years competition from other European companies which we have. are very strong, even stronger than your own. Mr Roe: Yes; very much so, though they tend to have a rather diVerent focus. One of the things Q143 Mr Olner: Is this a polite chat or have you which does concern me is the linkage between trade turned round, UK businesses which are trading in and aid. That is something which has been very Africa, and said you are not playing on a level much split apart at this time. More could be done playing field and some of your competitors globally to link those two things together. I am not saying are doing things which would perhaps advantage that they should be linked in such a way that if you you, if you were able to do them? are given aid you have to buy British goods and Mr Paterson: We have to do more of that. services. What I am saying is that at the moment we have gone a little bit too far compared with our Q144 Mr Olner: All I am asking is whether you competitors. have told them. Mr Paterson: Yes, but perhaps too mutedly. Q141 Mr Chidgey: Many northern European Mr Roe: Yes, we have told them. countries have ceased to have trade tied for many years now. I do not think one could reasonably say Q145 Mr Olner: I know Severn Trent reasonably that in general this is a retrograde step by Britain to well because of my past experience on the executive try to free trade from aid, unless there are specific there and I know of the very good work you do examples where you feel that this is disadvantaging in promoting water industries abroad. One of the you with major competitors from countries which queries I have is whether you tie in with UK have a major aid programme tied to aid. If there academic institutions in getting the water engineers were, then I should like to know which they were. of South Africa and southern Africa trained in the I am not aware that there are any nowadays. UK? It seems to me that when the engineers are Mr Roe: From our point of view the French do link trained in the UK with UK equipment, they then that still and the Americans, as we have seen with transfer that back to their own country. Where are the Iraqi things where they have linked that quite we in those stakes? Are the Americans or the a lot as well. No, I am not saying that it is a bad Germans doing more than we are? thing. It is a very good thing to have done and we Mr Roe: Yes. We do not do an awful lot of that. and the northern European nations are leading Most of our work is actually going out into that. It is just from a trade point of view at this southern Africa and helping people change and time that there are odd disadvantages here and providing them with expertise and knowledge. We there. are looking at setting up training arrangements in Mr Paterson: This is not a specifically South South Africa with a couple of South African African comment, but trading across the world as 3 companies at this time, mainly for the Department we do, a great opportunity is missed by DfID . of Water AVairs in terms of the operation and Educational publishers like us—and we are not maintenance of their treatment plants. In terms of unique—have lots of pairs of feet on the ground, academic institutions, Severn Trent works with a we have 300 or 400 in Africa, and we have number of them: Loughborough, Cranfield and so representatives and seminarists going out to on. They run a series of courses which people can schools in the poorest parts. We have great come on, but we do not get involved in knowledge of publishing conditions locally. If there promoting that. is a poverty agenda, which DfID has—and it often does cover educational needs, there are great areas of knowledge which British companies have on the Q146 Mr Olner: Do you think it would be more ground which could be shared. If there were more advantageous if you did? co-operation (not particularly directed at Mr Roe: It could well be. The only thing in which contracts), UK Plc, talking in the round, would do we see a lack of capacity is the on-the-ground a lot better. In African countries where there is aid training which is necessary; not necessarily the academic side of things but from our point of view, 3 Department for International Development. the water side. 9573971008 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Mr Paterson: We have a lot of training contact activities and the British Council? Do you feel that going on all the time. The educational possibilities they are engaged in productive use of taxpayers’ in South Africa are enormous and you could put funds in South Africa? Are there things you would any amount of input into them at this stage. I do like to see them doing which they are not doing at have the feeling that if there were more contact at the moment? all levels with the higher level institutions and this Mr Paterson: The first thing to say is that we do was properly funded, it would pay huge dividends not actually see a lot of them. We have a huge to the UK in the long-term. business and it is spread all round the country and the British Council has a limit in resources. The Q147 Mr Olner: I know that a lot of the emerging second thing is that we are trying to say that industrial development in China is going down the although we are an international company, we aim joint venture route. I wondered whether you could to be local. So we often try to form links with local give us a snapshot of what the joint venture route academic institutions rather than the Council. That is looking like in South Africa and in southern said, the Council has programmes in a number of Africa in particular. Are UK firms and UK provinces for teacher training. I think it could businessmen seeking joint ventures? Is that not the possibly do more. I should like to see more British way forward? input into helping educators at a provincial level, Mr Roe: From our point of view yes, we have because that is where the resources are. It is very, looked at it and talked to a number of companies very easy to talk to the Department of Education in South Africa and in southern Africa with a view in Pretoria and to meet the minister and all that to forming joint ventures. The diYculty has been— sort of thing, but it is on the ground where you see and this may go away as time moves on—a lack of the shortage of resources; that is where you see the capacity in South Africa in terms of focusing on educational administrators having great diYculty creating that joint venture, rather than focusing on and need training. I believe that with South Africa’s what they are currently doing. multilingual education policy, although the choice is clearly English and the parental choice in Q148 Mr Olner: Do you think the FCO can have particular is generally English, the Council has a any input into making those joint venture role to fulfil in reinforcing the use of good English proposals a reality, if you see that as the way in the educational sector. It could do more, but it forward? is doing pretty well within the resource it has. Mr Roe: It is a possibility, but they cannot necessarily do much more than make the Q153 Sir John Stanley: Do you have any interface introductions and try to help develop the with the British Council in terms of trying to see networking arrangements; bringing together the whether they can help promote the educational two parties and trying to knock them together materials, books and teaching aids which you would not happen. I do not think that would be produce? something which could happen. Mr Paterson: Not on a regular basis, because we have at the most busy times of year in the Q149 Chairman: The conventional wisdom is that promotional season between 200 and 300 people in if we train water engineers in the UK with UK schools promoting our books and materials. It is plant and expertise, they are more likely to order almost as much as we can do to keep up with them from UK firms in future. If that were the case, have and we tend to do it in our own way. Certainly, as you trained any water engineers from South Africa things calm down, when the market is less in Cranfield, Loughborough or whatever? Have expansionary, there is lots of room for publishers you considered this? to co-operate with the Council. The Council’s Mr Roe: No, we have not considered this. reputation is very good in South Africa, so its reputation could be used to greater eVect. Q150 Chairman: Why? Mr Roe: Mainly because we are oVering our Q154 Chairman: I should like to turn you now to knowledge in country and we would be linking into some more general questions on the South African Cranfield and Loughborough’s arrangements there. economy, but one little question first. You gave I think we would leave it to them to attract those good marks to our trade work aVecting your engineers. company in South Africa, but you seemed more hesitant about the work in some of the Q151 Mr Olner: Are our competitors oVering neighbouring countries. Would you like to expand places in their universities to the young people of on that? South Africa? Mr Paterson: We inevitably come back to Mr Roe: I am not aware of that. Zimbabwe. Talking about business and trading in Zimbabwe, we have been publishing in Zimbabwe Q152 Sir John Stanley: Mr Paterson, this is one for since 1981, we publish more than half the books you, with the huge involvement of your company in published in Zimbabwe for schools, we are the educational area. Could you give us your own managing to hold things together and we have a perspective on how the British Council are viable operation. More cognizance need to be taken performing in South Africa and what sort of of the fact that Zimbabwe will come out of its interface do you have between your educational current woes; just through the passage of time 9573971008 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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27 January 2004 Mr Christopher Paterson and Mr Ashley Roe things will change. Historically, the largest minimum level required. The fact that those growth investments in Zimbabwe by any overseas country, rates have not been achieved has meant that the whether held directly or through South African market expansion just simply was not there. subsidiaries, have been those of the UK. We have a huge commercial stake in that economy and I do believe that people need to be thinking about what Q159 Chairman: A final thought from me on black is going to happen after change—how there is to economic empowerment policy. Is it your view that be re-investment in that country. For sure, when the generality of British business accepts this as a things change there will be more aid, I have no worthy objective? Or is it something which is doubt of that, but there needs to be more planning viewed negatively as a brake on investment? for the overall situation. I know it is not a priority Mr Paterson: A large number of companies regard country. South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt are much it negatively. However, a good number are coming bigger countries in Africa but after those to terms with it and certainly as far as our own Zimbabwe has one quarter of the population of operation is concerned, we will espouse those South Africa, the economic structure is still there, policies and work out what to do. We are espousing and we have quite big investments there. I do not them already of course but there is more work to see anything happening to try to work out what do. should happen in the longer-term. Q160 Chairman: Mr Roe, you are not perhaps as Q155 Chairman: Are you getting paid there at the directly involved as a consultancy, but what is your moment? perception of the eVect on business and investment Mr Paterson: Yes. arising from that policy? Mr Roe: The policy is right, it is the only way they Q156 Chairman: Is the attitude of the South can move forward, but they have to do it in the African Government to Zimbabwe in any way right way. It causes us some diYculty in terms of aVecting your company’s investment? Perhaps to developing our operation in South Africa, but we Mr Paterson, with your Association hat on. Do you will have to come to terms with it if we are going find that the UK companies with whom you deal in to expand and we will find a way of doing it. the Association are put oV from investing in South Africa and its region because of Zimbabwe? Q161 Chairman: As you know, our Committee Mr Paterson: I think not directly, in that most of makes recommendations to government. Where do the people in our Association are experienced you see any failings which might be improved? If investors. However, indirectly, that is surely so, you were making recommendations to the Foreign because the background business climate is badly OYce in respect of their own operation in South aVected by what is going on in Zimbabwe. Africa, where do you think improvements might be made? Q157 Chairman: I recall meeting a serious investor Mr Paterson: Having dealt with the Foreign OYce who argued that there is great world competition V for over 20 years in terms of conversations about for scarce investment. Africa starts o with an our business environment, the thing which worries image problem in any event. That can only be me is not the quality of advice and the helpful exacerbated by Zimbabwe and by South Africa’s attitude of the Foreign OYce, it is that people attitude to it. How would you respond to that? change their jobs so often. I know the reason for Mr Paterson: That is undoubtedly true. We invest that is that the Foreign OYce traditionally feared successfully in all of the countries of southern that people would go native if they stayed on one Africa, but the reason we can do it with confidence patch too long, but I do think that some of the is because we have long-term knowledge and know problems we have got into over the Zimbabwe issue what we are doing. We have German have been the result of the general memory being shareholders—they are our owners since the rather short. I just find it amazing, when one talks Macmillan family disinvested some time ago. to the Foreign OYce, that every three years there Whilst they are committed to what we do, they do is another face and this is in a position of some question it. The climate in Germany towards the power and some influence over what policy should situation was very benign some years ago, but is a be on the ground. I just wonder whether this old great deal less so with the Zimbabwe experience in practice is really helpful in the modern world— the background. when one is spending a lot of energy on a part of the world like southern Africa, which has a history Q158 Chairman: I suppose for some the general but is changing rapidly, if you lose that history, you level of foreign direct investment in South Africa lose a lot of your advantage. has been disappointing. Can you, either from your own company or from your contacts within the trade association say what the negative factors are Q162 Chairman: I suppose they would answer that which discourage such FDI? locally engaged employees provide a degree of Mr Paterson: One has to say when Alec Irwin continuity. announced the GEAR policies five or six years ago Mr Roe: Yes, you are right, locally engaged it was all dependent on a high growth rate. I think employees do. However, there is also the fact that he was talking then about six per cent being the the change is disruptive. On our side we have to get 9573971008 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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27 January 2004 Mr Christopher Paterson and Mr Ashley Roe to know somebody else and they have to get to last year on black empowerment in co-operation know the government people in South Africa and with the South African High Commission. That that continuity is broken. was a persuasive conference; it was very well attended and in fact it was over-booked. We had several ministers there from the South African Q163 Mr Olner: That is an excellent point and a Government and I think many of us who were point it might well be worth the Committee making there were impressed by how benign the policy when we write our report. It does not only apply actually is when you get to describing how it is to South Africa of course. I know Severn Trent’s going to work in practice. We are planning to have core business is water and water management. another one, because we were not able to cover the Severn Trent also have a plethora of portfolios ﬁnancial services charter at that time and one is under the counter. Do you have discussions and planned for after the election. I do think that, given debates on them in southern Africa or other that there are diYculties with the South African/ countries with which Severn Trent are involved? British relationship at the moment, if the Foreign Mr Roe: No, we do not. The reason for that is that OYce felt that it could be more involved in this they have their own focuses. Severn Trent Water kind of initiative it would pay dividends in terms International are there to take the expertise we have of the relationship with the South African in the water industry in the UK outside the UK. Government. Mr Paterson: One thing I should like to say, if I Chairman: That is a helpful suggestion and the may, about black empowerment is that our Committee will bear that and your other comments Association did have a very successful conference in mind. Thank you both very much. 9573971009 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Tuesday 2 March 2004

Members present

Donald Anderson, in the Chair

Mr David Chidgey Mr Bill Olner Mr Fabian Hamilton Richard Ottaway Mr Eric Illsley Mr Greg Pope Andrew Mackinlay Sir John Stanley Mr John Maples Ms Gisela Stuart

Written evidence submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce

UK-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS 1. The Foreign and Commonwealth OYce responds to a request from the House of Commons Foreign AVairs Select Committee for a memorandum in connection with the Committee’s inquiry into South Africa, including reference to South Africa’s role in the region, and within relevant regional and international bodies; the New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the G8 Africa Action Plan; and South Africa’s contribution to the war against terrorism. 2. The memorandum opens by setting out the areas where the UK and South Africa are working together, and summarises South Africa’s influence within Africa and within international organisations. There are five annexes: joint UK-South Africa communique´, June 2003 (Annex A); details of the UK diplomatic presence in South Africa (Annex B); Entry Clearance and Visa operations (Annex C); Consular activity (Annex D); and UK-South Africa trade figures (Annex E).

Introduction 3. South Africa is a parliamentary republic. President Mbeki took oYce in June 1999. The African National Congress (ANC) has been in oYce since the ﬁrst fully democratic elections in April 1994. Next elections are due in 2004. 4. South Africa is an important partner for the UK across a broad spectrum of international issues, but especially those aVecting Africa. Since 1994, South Africa has been fully involved in the international organisations to which it has been admitted or re-admitted. For example, it was Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement from 1998–2003; Chair of the Commonwealth from 1999–2002; Chair of the African Union from 2002–03. South Africa has also been one of the main drivers behind the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The Foreign Secretary visited South Africa (Johannesburg, Pretoria and Cape Town) in May 2003 (a copy of the joint UK/South Africa communique´ issued at the end of the visit is attached at Annex A), and held talks with the South African President and Foreign Minister in the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2003. 5. The UK’s and South Africa’s shared history mean that there are close personal links between the two countries. An estimated 750,000 UK nationals live in South Africa. During 2002, 420,000 Britons visited South Africa, and 282,000 South Africans visited the UK.

UK-South Africa Relations 6. The UK-South Africa relationship is broad and deep. We have mutual interests in a range of international issues. With South Africa, we share: — a strong interest in working together for long-term stability in Africa, supporting South Africa’s peace-making eVorts, through diplomatic and practical measures (a British Peacekeeping Support Team is based in Pretoria); — a strong interest in ensuring progress in Zimbabwe; — a commitment to eliminating poverty in Africa, including through NEPAD, and support for the International Finance Facility (a joint DfID/HMT lead) proposal to help meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015; — agreement on key NEPAD priorities (eg conﬂict resolution, better governance, trade, increased eVectiveness of development assistance); — a strong interest in ensuring progress in the Middle East Peace Process; — a commitment to trade liberalisation in the Doha trade round; 9573971009 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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— an interest in sustainable development issues, including those addressed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002), eg the Renewable Energy and Energy EYciency Partnership (REEEP), and the Sustainable Tourism Initiative (both FCO leads); and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI—DfID lead); — a commitment to work together on crime prevention within South Africa, and to combating international organised crime, drug traYcking, money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing; — a commitment to work in partnership to combat communicable diseases, notably HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis; and — a commitment to developing strong business partnerships and increasing two way trade. 7. Successful UK-South Africa bilaterals at Head of Government level have been held in 1997 (UK), 1999 (South Africa), and 2001 (UK). There have also been recent State Visits: Her Majesty The Queen to South Africa in 1995 and 1999. President Mandela visited the UK in July 1996; and President Mbeki in June 2001. 8. The oYcial resources deployed to promote UK interests and achieve the above are outlined in Annex B.

Development Partnership 9. The UK and South Africa have a substantial development partnership, focussed on poverty elimination in South Africa, and partnership with South Africa in addressing poverty issues across the continent. The Department for International Development is investing £30 million a year to support South African partners’ work in four broad thematic areas—poverty strategy and analysis; governance, democracy and service delivery; growth, jobs and equity; and HIV/AIDS. The UK and South African Governments agreed a new ﬁve-year strategy in October 2002. The EU development budget for South Africa is set at around ƒ120 million per year until 2006. DfID will contribute some £16 million per year to the EU’s programme in South Africa.

Peace Support Partnership 10. HMGis involved in helping to build the South African armed forces’ own peacekeeping skills. After eight years of assisting South Africa to integrate seven pre-democratic armed forces into a single National Defence Force, the British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT) has now been re-mandated as a smaller British Peace Support Team. This aims to prepare South African troops for regional peace support operations.

Support for Law and Order in South Africa 11. High crime levels negatively aVect all South Africans and are a disincentive to domestic and foreign investment. With strong support from the UK, the British High Commission and DfID Southern Africa are helping to tackle these. Our partnership includes a twinning arrangement between British and South African police to explore community/police relations; assistance with oversight and accountability; training oYcers to combat ﬁnancial crime (which also helps in the joint eVorts on counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics); assistance to the elite counter-corruption “Scorpions” force; and a programme to assist in redesigning correctional services in South Africa. These activities are funded, in part, by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce’s new Global Opportunities Fund, to complement and augment DfID programmes.

EU/South Africa Trade Agreement 12. On 11 October 1999, the European Union signed a bilateral Trade, Co-operation and Development Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa. Most of the Agreement’s provisions came into force on 1 January 2000. The remainder will come into force when all 15 EU Member States and the Republic of South Africa ratify the Agreement. To date, 11 EU members have ratified; South Africa has not yet done so. The UK ratified the Agreement earlier this year. The TDCA has an unspecified duration. 13. The TDCA governs trade relations, financial aid and development co-operation as well as a range of other fields, such as socio-cultural co-operation and political dialogue. The Agreement is supplemented by four additional agreements: the Science and Technology Agreement, the Wine and Spirits Agreement, the Fisheries Agreement (still in dispute) and by the existing Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP states. 14. The TDCA contains provisions on, inter alia: establishing a Co-operation Council to oversee the Agreement and to conduct regular political dialogue; creating a free trade area over a transitional period; liberalising trade in services and the right of establishment; liberalising current payments and capital movement; preventing public aid distorting competition; promoting and protecting investment; and development co-operation. 9573971009 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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South Africa’s Role in Southern Africa (Including Zimbabwe) and the Continent more Widely 15. South Africa plays a signiﬁcant role on African peace and security issues. It contributes troops for peace support operations, and is emerging as the most inﬂuential peace broker on the continent. South Africa was a primary architect of the peace and security principles in NEPAD, and helped to ensure these were adopted by the African Union—NEPAD Peace and Security Agenda.

The Region 16. In February 2000, and again in February 2001, Mozambique suVered from flooding that caused widespread devastation. The Mozambican Government issued an appeal for international support. In both years, South Africa provided military forces to rescue people from flooded areas and to fly in humanitarian aid supplies. In addition, South Africa provided food and medical supplies, and medical personnel.

Zimbabwe 17. South Africa was a member of the Commonwealth Troika that took the decision in March 2002 to suspend Zimbabwe from the Councils of the Commonwealth for a year. On 16 March 2003, the Commonwealth Secretary General announced that Zimbabwe would remain suspended from the Councils of the Commonwealth, pending discussions by Heads of Government in Abuja (5-8 December 2003). 18. Following Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Councils of the Commonwealth in 2002, South Africa and Nigeria appointed facilitators in April 2002 to encourage inter-party dialogue between the Government of Zimbabwe and the Opposition. South Africa continues to encourage the resumption of dialogue between ZANU(PF) and the MDC. South Africa is also providing humanitarian support to Zimbabwe.

The Continent 19. South Africa has been instrumental in brokering peace in the Great Lakes Region. As well as leading the diplomatic initiative, South Africa has provided peacekeeping forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo and is leading and commanding the ﬁrst African Union multinational force, which is deployed in Burundi. 20. As President of the African Union, President Mbeki attended the January 2003 Paris summit on Coˆte d’Ivoire. 21. He also travelled to Liberia in August 2003 to attend the ceremony organised by Charles Taylor to mark the latter’s departure from the country. South African forces helped to secure the airport.

South Africa’s Role within Relevant Regional and International Bodies, most Notably the African Union, the Commonwealth and the United Nations 22. Following the holding of the ﬁrst free and fair elections under universal suVrage in South Africa in April 1994, South Africa was admitted or re-admitted to a number of international organisations. Since then, South Africa has played its part within those bodies in promoting internal restructuring in order to make them more eVective. 23. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1992 and currently has 14 members1. South Africa joined in 1994, and has played an active role, with its partners, in the formulation of SADC’s Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, which was adopted by SADC Heads at its Summit in Dar-es-Salaam in August 2003. The Plan is geared to enhance regional economic development. 24. The African Union legally came into being in May 2001 but its formal launch took place in Durban in July 2002. The last Assembly of Heads of State from the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was held on 8 July 2002. It was immediately followed by the Inaugural Summit of the African Union from 9-10 July 2002. The Constitutive Act of the African Union puts greater emphasis on good governance, democracy and constitutional rule than did the Charter of the Organisation for African Unity. Again, South Africa played an active role in taking forward change. President Mbeki was the ﬁrst President of the new Union. 25. South Africa assumed the Chair of the Commonwealth at the Heads of Government Meeting in Durban in November 1999. The meeting established a ten-country High Level Group (chaired by South Africa). The Group’s mandate was to review the role of the Commonwealth and report to the next Heads of Government Meeting (Coolum, Australia, March 2002) on how best the Commonwealth could respond to the challenges of the new century. South Africa remains a member of the Commonwealth Troika.

1 Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 9573971009 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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26. Recently, South Africa has hosted two major United Nations conferences. In 2001, the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) was held in Durban. In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) was held in Johannesburg—the biggest meeting ever. As host on both occasions, South Africa played a key role in the pre-conference preparation, chairing the meetings and producing conference documents. 27. South Africa is a major player in the G77 and Non-Aligned Movement. As Chair of the NAM from 1998 to 2003, they played a key role in guiding the input of that movement in multilateral fora. In 2003, they were co-ordinator for the African Group at the UN Commission on Human Rights, which voted against a number of EU initiatives, including a proposed resolution on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe.

South Africa and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)

28. South Africa is a founding nation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative and continues to play a leading role in its development and implementation. At its Summit meeting in July 2003, the African Union agreed that the NEPAD Secretariat should continue to be based in South Africa. 29. NEPAD is a long-term strategy for Africa’s sustainable growth and development. It evolved from earlier African strategies and was further developed by a small group of African leaders2. Working with others, President Mbeki has mobilised political support for NEPAD among African and international leaders. 30. President Mbeki’s contribution to NEPAD’s development came from his own initial strategy for Africa’s regeneration, the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP). MAP was inspired by President Mbeki’s concept of African Renaissance3, which features in South Africa’s domestic and foreign policies. As such, President Mbeki is regarded as one of the chief architects of the NEPAD strategy and a leading proponent of a regenerated African Union, Africa’s primary continental body. 31. Endorsed by the OAU (now African Union) in 2001, NEPAD is African owned and led. It recognises African responsibility for creating the conditions for the continent’s development. It also calls on developed countries to enter into a new partnership with Africa, based on mutual responsibility and trust, with commitments and obligations on all parties. 32. South Africa is a member of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee. The Committee sets NEPAD policies, priorities and programmes and reports to the annual summit of the African Union Assembly (at Heads of State and Government level). 33. South Africa chairs the NEPAD Steering Committee, which comprises personal representatives of the initiating Presidents of the five founding NEPAD countries4. The Steering Committee is responsible for developing terms of reference for programmes and projects and for overseeing the NEPAD Secretariat. South Africa also chairs the NEPAD sub-committee on Peace and Security, and has been instrumental in converging the African Union (AU) and NEPAD peace and security objectives into what is now referred to as the AU—NEPAD Peace and Security Agenda (APSA). 34. The centrepiece of APSA is the AU Common African Defence and Security Policy. Implementation at regional and continental levels should lead to a defence and security architecture, including the establishment of an African Standby Force. At the AU Summit in Maputo in July 2003, President Mbeki (the outgoing Chair) urged AU members to ratify the protocol that will enable the Peace and Security Council to be legally established. So far less than 20 countries have done so. 35. The Democracy and Political Governance Initiative includes the establishment of an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a voluntary process to review and raise governance standards in Africa. South Africa was among the first countries to volunteer for the APRM and seeks to encourage other African states to do the same. The UK welcomes the development of the Review Mechanism. Sixteen countries have now agreed to be reviewed. The first reviews are expected to start in autumn 2003. 36. South Africa contributes to the development of NEPAD policy and programmes in other priority areas by supporting studies and hosting seminars. To popularise the African Union and NEPAD within South Africa, President Mbeki initiated an AU/NEPAD Outreach Programme in 2002. 37. The importance attached to NEPAD by South Africa is also reflected in its foreign policies. The Department of Foreign AVairs Strategy Plan for 2003–05 lists implementation of NEPAD as a priority.

2 Presidents Bouteﬂika of Algeria, Mubarak of Egypt, Obasanjo of Nigeria, Wade of Senegal, and Mbeki of South Africa. 3 African Renaissance can be described as a social and economic development agenda for the revival and renewal of Africa, recognising the continent’s culture and history while setting out a path to address the challenges of globalisation. 4 South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Egypt and Algeria. 9573971009 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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NEPAD and the G8 Africa Action Plan 38. The United Kingdom Government strongly supports NEPAD. We recognise that NEPAD is a long- term agenda requiring sustained engagement and political commitment. The Government played an active role in developing the G8 Africa Action Plan, announced at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in 2002, as a response to support NEPAD. The Action Plan sets out G8 commitments in a range of areas such as peace and security, governance, trade, health and education. The Government is implementing its commitments through its wider development programme. 39. NEPAD and G8 leaders and representatives have met regularly to discuss NEPAD and the G8’s response since the G8 Summit in Genoa 2001. South Africa has played a key role in these meetings.

UK Support for NEPAD 40. British High Commission oYcials, with their DfID colleagues, have been in regular contact with the NEPAD Secretariat to oVer support and to gauge progress. Similarly, there has been constant dialogue with South Africa at political and senior oYcial level.

South Africa’s Contribution to the War Against Terrorism 41. South Africa responded swiftly to the attacks in New York on 11 September 2001. The Government condemned terrorism without equivocation, oVering the US humanitarian support and the full co-operation of its security agencies. In a follow-up statement, the South Africans said they recognised the right of the US Government to track down the culprits and bring them to justice, though this should be coupled with a longer term response of isolating terrorists through international co-operation “to eradicate poverty and underdevelopment”. 42. South Africa has just joined the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body that sets the global standards in combating money laundering and terrorist ﬁnancing. South Africa is also a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), the only FATF-style regional body in Africa.

Domestic Terrorism 43. The South African Government’s intentions and actions on countering terrorism are laudable. The Counter Terrorism Bill is working its way through Parliament, but faces obstacles over the detention without trial of suspected terrorists, owing to objections to similar repressive Apartheid-era legislation. The work of South African agencies involved in countering terrorism is not always fully co-ordinated, but is improving. The South African Police Service is conﬁdent that it is on top of recent domestic terrorist threats from domestic groups, including People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and the Boermag (a white far-right organisation).

UK/South Africa Co-operation 44. The British High Commission has worked with the South African authorities to mutual beneﬁt, particularly in anti-money laundering activities. It has been active in supporting South Africa in the creation of a Financial Intelligence Centre to monitor and police money-laundering activities by both terrorist and organised criminal groups. Further co-operation continues and is aimed at jointly encouraging neighbouring countries to strengthen their anti-money laundering regimes.

UK-South Africa Trade and Investment 45. The UK is one of South Africa’s largest trade and investment partners with over £5 billion in two- way trade in goods and services and £12 billion of UK investment in South Africa (see statistics at Annex E). Strong business ties are an important element of the overall bilateral relationship. The UK Trade and Investment operation is headquartered in Johannesburg, with additional commercial coverage in Cape Town and Durban. Collectively, we see over 500 visiting UK business people a year, and assist 12–15 trade missions and 4–5 exhibition groups visiting South Africa.

Trade 46. Following the end of apartheid and the opening up of South Africa’s economy, a major campaign, “Britain and South Africa: Partners in Opportunity”, ran from 1998–2000, to raise UK awareness of the opportunities in the market. This has evolved into a sector-focused approach, with strategies currently drawn up in 12 sectors to help UK companies take advantage of speciﬁc opportunities. There has been a strong emphasis on those expected to arise from the privatisation programme and the promotion of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). These include opportunities in the water, airports, ports, healthcare, 9573971009 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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telecommunications and railways sectors. Education and training, IT, tourism, creative industries, agriculture and automotive are also key areas. Since 1999 UK trade in goods and services with South Africa has followed an upward trend, with the latest ﬁgures (2002) showing UK exports of goods at £1,597 million. This is an increase of 25% over 1999. The UK share of world exports to South Africa is 9.1% (up from 8.7% in 2001).

Investment 47. The UK is the largest foreign investor in South Africa, estimated at £12 billion and covering a wide range of sectors. Nine of the top 20 foreign employers are British, and UK companies employ more than 40% of those working for foreign ﬁrms. Lonrho is the largest foreign employer, while BP, Shell, GSK, Barclays, BAE Systems, Unilever, HSBC, British Airways and Rio Tinto are other important investors. 48. South Africa is the 18th largest investor in the UK in net book value, with investments of £757 million recorded in 2001. Over 200 South African companies are in the UK, with ICT, light engineering, creative industries, ﬁnancial services and consultancy being the most prominent. Large investors include Old Mutual, SAB Miller, Investec and Sasol. Several companies have listed on the London Stock Exchange in recent years.

Defence Package 49. Following a 1996 Strategic Defence Review of post-apartheid South Africa’s changing defence priorities, the South African Parliament agreed in 1997 to a comprehensive Strategic Defence Procurement Package. Primary contracts for the aviation element of the package were subsequently awarded in 1999. The lion’s share went to a BAe Systems bid (with SAAB Aeronautical alongside) to supply 24 Hawk trainers and 28 Gripen light ﬁghter aircraft. The value of the Hawk/Gripen contract to BAe Systems was approaching £1.5 billion, with an overall “oVset” commitment to generate additional investment in South Africa of nearly £5.5 billion. 50. Other purchases included Agusta A109 helicopters (from 2004), four German corvettes (2004–05), three French submarines (2005–07) and 15 domestic Rooivalk attack helicopters (delivery underway). The total value of the package was £3.3 billion. The UK’s share of the package has recently been increased by an order for four Lynx helicopters. 51. The UK oVset commitment of £5.5 billion was split between Defence Industrial Participation and National Industrial Participation (NIP). The oVset programme has to be achieved over eleven years. MOD oYcials are keeping a close eye on BAE Systems eVorts and form part of the Joint Monitoring Team that oversees the oVset obligation.

Black Economic Empowerment and Commerce 52. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is the strategy initiated by the South African Government in 1995 to improve black participation in the ownership and management of the economy and the highly unequal distribution of wealth inherited from the apartheid era. The South African Government has attempted to drive BEE by encouraging the private and public sectors to demonstrate an increase in black participation in ownership, management, employment equity, skills development, aYrmative procurement and income levels. Following concern over the way that the Mining Charter was handled before agreement was reached with industry last year, other sectors have been given the ﬂexibility to decide how to take BEE forward. UKTI staV urge UK companies to consider BEE as a competitive advantage and provide advice on how this can be done well, including identifying local partners with access into the previously disadvantaged communities.

The UK-SA SME Partnership Programme 53. In 1999 Trade Partners UK launched the pilot UK/SA Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) Partnership Programme, which aims to develop long-term business partnerships between UK and South African small and medium sized companies, with particular emphasis on SMEs in South Africa owned and managed by previously disadvantaged groups. Thirty-two partnerships were achieved in 2002.

The Southern African Commercial Hub 54. Southern Africa oVers signiﬁcant business opportunities—from huge infrastructure projects to regional distribution networks—and South African-based companies are well placed to take advantage of them due to their location, cost, structures, local knowledge and access to donor funding. Since 2001, the Southern African Commercial Hub, located in the Johannesburg oYce, has worked with colleagues in regional posts to help UK companies, both in the UK and the region, trade and invest in Southern Africa, 9573971009 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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often in partnership with companies based in South Africa. This has included introducing companies that have formed a consortium to bid for infrastructure projects. This approach also provides a good ﬁt with the NEPAD agenda.

ECGD 55. The full range of ECGD export credit facilities is available to support UK exports of capital goods and services to South Africa, including ﬁnancing in Rand. Total ECGD exposure to South Africa stands at about £1.78 billion which largely reﬂects the cover agreed for the large defence deal won by BAE Systems and SAAB of Sweden. South Africa is regarded as an acceptable risk, and the Medium Term Case Indicator is £80 million. Along with 10–15 of its most concentrated markets, ECGD is introducing its Active Portfolio Management (APM) programme to South Africa. This aims to hedge or transfer risks through reinsurance, credit derivatives or structured instruments.

Effectiveness of the Foreign Office’s Work in South Africa 56. The United Kingdom Government’s policy towards South Africa is to create a strong partnership, building on our shared history and major commercial links. This paper demonstrates the wide ranging agenda addressed by the two Governments, and sets out in detail in the annexes the way the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, with its partner Departments, engage with the South African Government, and with British and South African nationals. 57. The Foreign Secretary’s visit to South Africa in May 2003 conﬁrmed agreement on the broad agenda the two governments will pursue together. Foreign and Commonwealth OYce September 2003

Annex A

JOINT COMMUNIQUE´ ON THE OFFICIAL VISIT OF THE RT HON JACK STRAW MP, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, TO SOUTH AFRICA FROM 13 TO 14 MAY 2003 At the invitation of the Honourable Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, MP, and Minister of Foreign AVairs, the Rt. Hon. Jack Straw, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs, paid an oYcial visit to South Africa from 13 to 14 May 2003. Minister Dlamini Zuma was accompanied by Deputy Minister of Foreign AVairs, Mr A Pahad. The British Secretary of State, Mr J Straw was accompanied by Mr Michael Meacher, Environment Minister, Department of Food and Rural AVairs (DEFRA) and Mr Stephen Twigg, Schools Minister, Department for Education and Skills (DfES). Ms Joyce Mabudafhasi, Deputy Minister of Environmental AVairs and Tourism and Mr Michael Meacher as well as Mr Mosibudi Mangena, Deputy Minister of Education and Mr Stephen Twigg held bilateral meetings. Consequent to the bilateral discussions the overall political relationship between South Africa and the United Kingdom have been strengthened with the agreement to enhance and formalise the Joint Bilateral Forum (JBF). In addition oYcials will meet frequently to take forward a common agenda agreed to by the principals. In the political sphere the Ministers discussed issues such as: the African Union (AU) and NEPAD; Conﬂict resolution in the Middle East and Iraq; the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and the Great Lakes as well as other African issues; Co-operation within multilateral fora of the United Nations (UN) and the reinforcement of the UN as the primary multilateral organisation responsible for world peace and security. Minister Dlamini Zuma provided an update of developments relating to NEPAD and the African Union. Foreign Secretary, Mr Jack Straw congratulated South Africa on the establishment of the NEPAD Secretariat and on the leadership of President Mbeki up to and following the launch of the African Union. The United Kingdom remains committed to supporting NEPAD, the African Union, and South Africa. It was agreed that both countries will work together to look for ways in which to implement the NEPAD Agenda and to meet the targets set out in the G8 Africa Action Plan as agreed on at Kananaskis. The Ministers welcomed the invitation extended to the leaders representing the South to the G8 Summit in Evian, France. Furthermore, the Ministers expressed their hope that the Agreements expected to be reached at Evian on NEPAD’S Africa Action Plan be implemented equitably as agreed upon by all parties at the Summit. It was further agreed to pursue meaningful discussions post-Evian. 9573971009 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Foreign Secretary Straw reiterated that the United Kingdom remains firmly committed to supporting South Africa’s democratic transformation. He stated that the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFlD) has recently finalised a new strategy for development co-operation on Southern Africa. This strategy is closely aligned with the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals, and with South Africa’s own development priorities. It commits the British Government to increasing co-operation with South Africa on global and continental issues such as conflict resolution, trade and NEPAD as well as to supporting South African eVorts in four thematic areas: (i) poverty strategy and analysis; (ii) growth, jobs and equity; (iii) democracy, governance and service delivery; and (iv) HIV/AIDS. An annual amount of 30 million pounds for a period of three years, has been allocated for the four thematic areas. Both Ministers acknowledged the burden and challenges facing Africa in the form of communicable diseases such as Malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS etc. The United Kingdom supports South Africa’s National 2000–05 Strategic Plan through its development assistance programme at government to government level, in partnership with civil society, and aiding small, grassroots community organisations. It was agreed that the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID) and South Africa’s National Treasury should work together to bring forward new co-operation programmes for consideration, which will include local government, communicable diseases, land reform, and justice. The Ministers also noted the continued recruitment of skilled South Africans to the UK, and undertook to work together to ensure such recruitment does not undermine the economic and social development of South Africa. The Ministers welcomed the appointment of Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as Prime Minister in the Palestinian National Authority and the appointment of a new Cabinet, as well as the consequent publication of the Quartet’s Road Map. They agreed to share with the parties to this conflict the relevant experience that their respective Governments gained in the democratic transformation process, in the case of South Africa and in Northern Ireland in the case of the UK. The Ministers discussed the aftermath of the war in Iraq. Long-term peace, security, development, and a sustainable solution in Iraq can only be achieved with and by the full participation of the Iraqi people themselves. In this regard it was agreed that the first priority now is to address the humanitarian situation and to work towards the stabilisation of Iraq. In addition to the bilateral discussion held by the Foreign Ministers, two Working Groups met on Africa and Multilateral issues: On the Great Lakes Region, the Working Group on Africa concurred that both South Africa and the United Kingdom share a strong interest in the long-term stability and prosperity of this Region, acknowledging that development and poverty alleviation can only come about through stability and the total cessation of conflict. The United Kingdom warmly welcomed South Africa’s success in July 2002 in brokering a Peace Agreement between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was noted that the United Kingdom has provided practical support for South Africa’s commitment of troops in support of MONUC operations in the DRC. The United Kingdom expressed their government’s readiness to provide further assistance, if requested. The Working Group welcomed the signing of the Final Act of the Peace Agreement on 2 April 2003 at Sun City, as well as the endorsement of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Transitional Constitution. The Working Group welcomed the sterling eVorts of the Facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, and of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Mr Moustapha Niasse, and the spirit of reconciliation displayed by the Congolese parties, which have contributed to this important step towards a united, peaceful and prosperous Democratic Republic of the Congo. Both expressed their concern on recent developments in eastern DRC. They underlined their support for eVorts to stabilise the situation and protect the civilian population. On Burundi the Working Group strongly supported South Africa’s continuing eVorts to narrow the diVerences between the protagonists. The Working Group welcomed the smooth transfer of power and congratulated all the parties for taking the peace process forward. The Working Group welcomed the plan to deploy the Africa mission to Burundi and noted that this was the first African Union multinational force of Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa. On Angola the Working Group shared a strong commitment in ensuring that the progress in the Angolan peace process is maintained and strengthened. Both countries are aware of the development challenges facing Angola in the post-war phase and support policies and programmes aimed at alleviating the suVering of the people and ensuring the long-term stability of the country. On Zimbabwe, the Ministers welcomed the visit of President Bakili Muluzi of Malawi Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, to Zimbabwe on 5 May 2003. While in Harare, the three leaders held discussions with both President Robert Mugabe and the MDC leader, Mr Morgan Tsvangirai, 9573971009 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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in an attempt to remove all the remaining obstacles towards the resumption of Inter-Party Dialogue between ZANU-PF and the MDC. Both countries agreed on the need to encourage the parties to commit themselves to removing the obstacles to the negotiations. They underlined that the longer the problems in Zimbabwe remain unresolved, the more entrenched poverty will become. They stressed their commitment to an outcome in which the people of Zimbabwe enjoy independence, freedom, peace, stability, democracy and prosperity. The Working Group noted unequivocally, that no lasting solution to the challenges that face Zimbabwe can be found, unless that solution comes from the people of Zimbabwe themselves. On Coˆte d’Ivoire the Working Group expressed concern about the continuing unstable situation in Coˆte d’Ivoire, and the delay in the full implementation of the provisions of the Marcoussis Agreement. They welcomed the mediation eVorts undertaken by President Kufuor of Ghana on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which has the support of the African Union. Furthermore, they expressed concern at the ongoing reports of continuing violence in the western parts of Coˆte d’Ivoire. In this regard, the Working Group stated that all parties to the conflict should desist from violent actions, including the recruitment of mercenaries, which could lead to further suVering and commit themselves to a process of negotiation. The Multilateral Working Group stressed their commitment to and the importance of, the multilateral system of governance for peace, sustainable development, and strong and equitable growth. The Working Group had a helpful exchange on the British proposal for the International Financing Facility (IFF), which aims to promote enhanced aid flows to the poorest countries. Both sides agreed to keep in close contact as the idea is taken forward. The Working Group agreed that the United Nations has an indispensable role to play, not only in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in post-conflict situations, but also in assisting with the full range of peace-building, reconciliation and reconstruction activities. On the WTO and International Trade the Working Group noted that the United Kingdom and South Africa share a good understanding of each other’s perspectives on international trade issues and globalisation enhanced by the close interaction between our respective Trade and Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. The Ministers agreed that the lack of progress in talks at the WTO in Geneva is of concern. It was agreed to continue to engage each other at all levels to make progress on the negotiations ahead of Cancun, particularly in the areas of agriculture and TRIPS to meet the mandate of the Doha Development agenda. Both countries noted with approval that the United Kingdom remains the largest foreign investor in South Africa and welcomed the steady stream of inward trade missions from potential British investors. Over 200 United Kingdom companies have now endorsed the principles behind NEPAD as they see South Africa as a country where good governance, transparency and sound business practice thrive. The Working Group welcomed the South African Government’s release of the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) strategy. It noted that the strategy had been broadly welcomed by investors as key to providing both a strong framework and greater certainty for social transformation and economic growth. In order to enhance further co-operation and to promote two-way trade and tourism, the Working Group agreed that air services and other transport issues will be discussed at senior political level in the near future. The Working Group remained committed to the Kimberly process in order to help promote international peace and security. It was agreed that the active co-operation between South Africa and the United Kingdom has contributed to the success of the recently held meeting of the Kimberly Process in Johannesburg. On the WSSD the United Kingdom is targeting its development assistance programme towards achieving the goals set out in Johannesburg regarding access to water, energy and sanitation as part of an overriding objective to alleviate poverty. During the bilateral meeting between Deputy Minister Mabudafhasi and Junior Minister Meacher, the two Ministers agreed to work together to find a satisfactory solution to serious environmental contamination in Kwazulu-Natal concerning Thor chemicals. On Climate Change the two Ministers discussed an urgent need for action to tackle the threat of climate change and emphasised the positive role that new technologies, as well as the business sector, could play in the process. The Ministers also emphasised the need of all countries to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The two ministers agreed that South Africa and the UK could each play a vital role in ensuring that the international community delivered on commitments made in Johannesburg on water and sanitation. The ministers emphasised the importance of mobilising all possible resources at all levels to ensure adequate investments in these sectors, in order to provide the necessary infrastructure, technology and capacity- building. Stephen Twigg, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Schools, participated in an extended programme in Pretoria and Cape Town. Mr Twigg held warm and productive meetings with Education Minister Kader Asmal and Deputy Education Minister Mosibudi Mangena, sharing experiences and identifying a number of areas for follow-up and further co-operation including: IT, tertiary education reform, prompting high learning achievement regardless of race, and the incorporation of sound values and citizenship ideals into education policy. 9573971009 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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On behalf of Secretary of State for Education Charles Clarke, Mr Twigg welcomed Mr Asmal’s participation in the meeting later this year of Commonwealth Education Ministers in Edinburgh, and invited Mr Asmal to take part in a further series of bilateral discussions during his visit to the UK. At the invitation of both National and Provincial Education Departments, Mr Twigg also visited schools in Soshanguve and Mitchells Plain, experiencing ﬁrst-hand the issues facing education in South Africa. At the invitation of both National and Provincial Education Departments Mr Twigg took part in further in- depth discussions of these issues, and the common ground between the UK and South Africa in how these issues are tackled. In conclusion the two parties agreed that the next meeting of the Joint Bilateral Forum will be held in South Africa during 2004 to coincide with South Africa’s 10th Anniversary celebration. The Rt. Hon. Jack Straw MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth AVairs during his visit also had the opportunity to pay a courtesy call on H.E. Mr Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa. June 2003

Annex B

UK PRESENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 1. UK interests in South Africa are dealt with by four principal oYces: our High Commission in Pretoria, Consulate General in Cape Town, British Trade and Investment OYce in Johannesburg and Consulate General in Durban, plus two Honorary Consulates in Port Elizabeth and East London. In managing these assets, the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce has sought to meet high standards of value for money.

Estate in South Africa 2. In Pretoria, the main part of the High Commission is located in a listed building which was gifted to the British Government by a local businessman, of British origin, in the 1930s. Since then extensions have been built to accommodate the High Commission’s management and press and public aVairs sections. Visa and consular services are run out of a separate leased building in Pretoria. UK staV in South Africa are housed in 31 owned and 13 leased properties. The High Commissioner has residences in Pretoria and Capetown. Annual estate expenditure in Pretoria alone is £305,000. 3. The former High Commission buildings in Cape Town, located within the South African Parliament’s compound, were sold earlier this year to the South African Government for R6,350,000 (£530,000). The British Consulate General in Cape Town is located on one ﬂoor of a leased oYce block. The British Consulate in Durban will shortly take on a purely commercial role funded by British Trade International.

StaV in South Africa 4. A comparative summary of staYng is contained in the table below.

UK-based StaV Locally Engaged StaV

Pretoria 36 122 Jo’burg 6 29 Cape Town 4 17 Durban 1 10 UK Total 47 178 France 30 20 Germany 47 39 USA 250 450

5. Since 1994 considerable eVort has gone into increasing the diversity of locally employed staV so that it is more representative of South Africa’s population. A number of initiatives have been employed to ensure that this diverse mix works as an eVective team. All staV attend an employment equity course which aims to give an overview of new employment laws. Specialist trainers from the UK ran a “Managing Inclusion” course in 2002. Team building sessions, mentoring, staV Away-days and induction training for new staV have all been introduced in the last two years. 9573971009 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Annex C

THE ENTRY CLEARANCE AND VISA OPERATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 1. All UK Entry Clearance and visa work in South Africa is centralised in Pretoria. The Visa Section currently consists of one Entry Clearance Manager, 5 Entry Clearance OYcers and 22.5 Locally Engaged staV. 29,335 visa applications were received in the ﬁnancial year 2002-03, an increase of 28% on the previous year. 93.1% of all the applications received were approved.

Performance against PSA Targets 2. In the ﬁnancial year 2002–03, the visa post in Pretoria met all three PSA targets: 92% of Tier 1 and Tier 2 (straightforward non-settlement applications) were resolved within 24 hours (target was 90%) average waiting time for a Tier 3 (non-settlement applications) interview was one working day (target was 10 working days) average waiting time for a Tier 4 (settlement applications) interview was one week (target was 12 weeks)

General 3. Visa work has increased year on year since South Africa rejoined the Commonwealth in 1994. Since then South Africans have beneﬁted from two categories of entry clearance previously denied to them: working holidaymaker and permit free employment on the grounds of UK ancestry. One-half of applications are submitted in person at the Visa Section, One-third through commercial visa agents of the applicant’s choice. The rest are sent by post or courier. 4. Although they do not need prior entry clearance to visit the UK, approximately 85–90% of applications are from South Africans. Most of them are employment or settlement related.

Category Percentage %

Working holidaymakers 66 Permit free employment on the grounds of UK ancestry (plus accompanying dependants) 11 Visitors (mainly third country visa nationals) 8 Settlement 6 Work permit dependants 5 EEA family permits 1 Students 1 Other categories of permit free employment 2

WaitingTime 5. The waiting queue for a tier three interview currently (September 2003) stands at 12 working days, but is usually below the PSA target of 10. The queue is mainly composed of applicants who have not submitted their application in person. Personal callers are usually interviewed on the same day, if this is required. 6. There is no separate queue for tier four settlement applications. Most of these can easily be resolved on paper, as they are usually from long established couples.

EU Residence Permits Scheme 7. From 13 November 2003, South African nationals will be aVected by the UK Government’s implementation of the EU-wide Residence Permits scheme, ie those who wish to stay in the UK for more than six months will need to apply for Entry Clearance before arrival. 8. Based on IND statistics for the number of South African nationals admitted to the UK in 2001–02 for more than six months, we estimate that this change in policy will generate around 19,000 visa applications in the ﬁrst year following its introduction. UK Visas have agreed the additional deployment of three Locally Engaged staV (one of them will be an Entry Clearance OYcer (ECO) on a six month contract initially) and extra funding to pay for new application forms, furniture and oYce equipment (such as computer terminals, cash-tills and printers). 9573971009 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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WorkingHolidaymakers (WHM) Scheme 9. The recent revisions to the Working Holidaymakers Scheme are expected to generate a considerable increase in the post’s workload. For the last ﬁnancial year, 64% of visa applications received by the post were for WHM visas. As the changes only started from 25 August 2003, UKvisas are monitoring the situation closely and maintaining close contact with post. Additional staV and resources will be deployed, if necessary.

Annex D

UK CONSULAR WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA 1. Consular work in South Africa is split into three consular districts. The Consulate General in Cape Town covers Northern, Western and Eastern Cape Provinces. KwaZulu Natal is currently covered by our Durban oYce, although in early 2004 the oYce will handle trade matters exclusively. Straightforward or emergency consular work will then be covered locally by an Honorary Consul but assisted, where required, by consular staV from Pretoria. The remaining five provinces are covered from Pretoria. 2. Pretoria’s consular staYng consists of the Consul, Vice Consul (Passports and Nationality), an LE II Consular Protection OYcer, an LEII Nationality OYcer and 17 other Locally Engaged staV. Cape Town’s consular staYng comprises an LE II Vice Consul and three Locally Engaged consular assistants. There are also Honorary Consuls in Port Elizabeth and East London, mainly to provide assistance to the large numbers of British nationals (including many retirees) residing in the Eastern Cape. The total number of British nationals living in South Africa is estimated at around 750,000, of which 500,000 reside in the Cape provinces. Many of these are dual nationals. 3. Approximately 420,000 British citizens visited South Africa last year. Most visit the coastal areas (notably Cape Town), although South Africa’s tourism authorities estimate that a third of all tourists visit Mpumulanga, primarily to see the Kruger National Park. 4. The last annual return shows approximately 50,000 personal callers to our consular oYces (including collection and delivery of applications), 200,000 telephone enquiries, and 17,000 postal, fax or e-mail enquiries. Over 500 received advice or assistance in respect of financial assistance and repatriation, and assistance was given to 23 detainees (either serving sentences in prison or having been held for more than 24 hours). Twenty nine hospital visits were recorded, although this figure does not fully record the numerous visits made by a number of High Commission staV to the victims of the Piet Retief bus crash over a period of several weeks. Seventy eight deaths were recorded, involving varying degrees of assistance from our staV to the families and relatives. 5. Last year around 23,000 passports were issued, over 90% in less than 5 working days. Documentation anomalies and form filling errors account for nearly all the delayed issues. However, in the recent months Passport Section has achieved a near 100% issue within five working days. 6. Despite the best eVorts of the South African authorities to address the problem, the country’s high crime rate cannot be denied or ignored. This, allied to the large number of British residents and the substantial (and growing) volume of visitors, some, inevitably, become victims of crime.

Annex E

UK—SOUTH AFRICA TRADE IN GOODS & INVESTMENT—KEY POINTS

£ Million 2000 2001 2002 Jan-Jun 2003

Exports of Goods 1,413 1,558 1,597 851 Imports of Goods 2,553 2,861 2,673 1,399 Balance in Goods –1,140 –1,303 –1,076 –548 Exports of Services 952 1,004 n/a n/a Imports of Services 516 520 n/a n/a Balance in Services 436 484 n/a n/a

Trade in goods UK exports to South Africa increased by 2% in 2002 UK imports from South Africa fell by 7% in 2002 South Africa is the UK’s 21st largest export market (2002) 9573971009 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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South Africa is the UK’s 16th largest source of imports (2002) UK is South Africa’s largest export market (2002) UK is South Africa’s 3rd largest source of imports (2002) UK share of world exports to South Africa increased from 8.7% in 2001 to 9.1% in 2002. Main UK exports to South Africa by value during 2002 (with changes over 2001) Non-Metallic Mineral Manufactures (primarily diamonds) £286 million (!29%) Road Vehicles £149 million (!25%) OYce Machines & ADP Equipment £100 million ("24%) Power Generating Equipment £96 million (!83%) Around 91% of UK exports to South Africa are manufactured goods. Main UK imports from South Africa by value during 2002 (with changes over 2001) Non-Metallic Mineral Manufactures (primarily diamonds) £853 million ("12%) Road Vehicles £310 million (!38%) Coal, Coke £269 million ("24%) Vegetables and Fruit £223 million (!13%) South African Investment into the UK South Africa is the 18th largest investor in the UK in net book value, with investments of £757 million recorded in 2001. Over 200 South African companies are in the UK.

LETTER TO THE PARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS AND DEVOLUTION DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFCE, FROM THE SECOND CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE, 29 JANUARY 2004 At its meeting on Tuesday, the Committee discussed the South Africa inquiry and its forthcoming evidence session with Mr Mullin. Given the time that will have elapsed between the session and the receipt of the Foreign OYce’s memorandum for the inquiry (30 September), the Committee agreed that it would greatly value a supplementary note from the OYce to bring the submission up-to-date. There would of course be no need to repeat any of the details provided in the original memorandum, although it would be helpful if the information could be set out under the same headings.If the submission could be received by Monday 23 February, to allow time for circulation to all Members prior to Mr Mullin’s session, the Committee would be grateful. GeoVrey Farrar Second Clerk of the Committe January 2004

LETTER TO THE SECOND CLERK FROM THE PARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS AND DEVOLUTION DEPARTMENT, 23 FEBRUARY 2004 Thank you for your letter of 29 January asking for a supplementary note in relation to the Committee’s current inquiry into “South Africa,” ahead of Mr Mullin’s appearance before the Committee on 2 March. I enclose the memorandum herewith. It should be read in conjunction with our earlier memorandum on South Africa, which we submitted in September. Matthew Hamlyn 23 February 2004 9573971010 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Update to FCO memorandum on UK-South Africa Relations This document refers to the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce’s memorandum for the inquiry of 30 September 2003.

Paragraph 3. Elections President Mbeki announced on 9 February that the 2004 general election would take place on 14 April. A short sitting of Parliament will follow the election to appoint the President and his Cabinet. The new President will be inaugurated on 27 April, ten years to the day after the end of apartheid and the 1994 general election.

Paragraph 9. Development Partnership Hilary Benn announced in January 2004 that DfID’s programme of work in the middle-income countries of Southern Africa (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland) would reduce from £35 million in 2004–05 to £25 million in 2005–06, in compliance with DfID’s commitment to spend 90% of its resources in low-income countries by that year. The EU development budget for South Africa is set at around EUR120 million per year until 2006. DfID will contribute some £16 million per year to the EU’s programme in South Africa.

Paragraph 10. Peace Support Partnership Exercise AFRICAN SHIELD, a UK/South Africa joint Command Post Peace Support Operation took place from 6–26 November 2003. Around 850 personnel drawn from both countries participated and it was the largest ever bilateral military exercise on South African soil. The objective of the exercise was to practise the command and control of a peace support operation in Africa. The exercise scenario concerned a ﬁctional country abutting South Africa, riven by civil war, needing a Chapter seven mandated coalition of the willing to turn a fragile cease ﬁre agreement into a permanent peace. For the British side it was a chance to hone skills developed in Sierra Leone, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq and to share these skills with a South African military which has already conducted peace support work in Lesotho, the DRC and Burundi. The exercise was a model which aVorded scope for the South Africans to provide a reciprocal transfer of expertise.

Paragraph 12. EU/South Africa Trade Agreement Since the original memorandum, three more European Union members have ratified the bilateral Trade, Co-operation and Development Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa, bringing the total to 14. South Africa has not yet done so. The UK ratified the Agreement in early 2003. The TDCA has an unspecified duration.

Paragraph 18. Zimbabwe The issue of Zimbabwe’s continued suspension from the Councils of the Commonwealth dominated the agenda of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Abuja between 5 and 8 December 2003. President Mbeki argued strongly in favour of Zimbabwe’s readmittance, but was supported by only a small number of other countries. Commonwealth Heads of Government ﬁnally agreed, by consensus, to maintain indeﬁnitely Zimbabwe’s suspension. The decision was made after a committee of six Commonwealth leaders (Australia, South Africa, Jamaica, Canada, India and Mozambique) had considered the Commonwealth’s approach to Zimbabwe. The Prime Minister and President Mbeki had discussions during the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. Following Zimbabwe’s decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth, President Mbeki visited Harare on 18 December. He had two meetings with Mugabe and one with opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. Following those discussions, President Mbeki indicated that a formal process of dialogue between ZANU (PF) and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) would shortly start and that an agreement between the parties could soon be announced. According to the MDC, that process of formal dialogue has yet to begin.

Paragraph 34. AU Peace and Security The centrepiece of the AU-NEPAD Peace and Security Agenda (APSA) is the AU Common African Defence and Security Policy. Implementation at regional and continental levels should lead to a defence and security architecture, including the establishment of an African Standby Force. The protocol to establish the AU Peace and Security Council came into force in December 2003 after being ratiﬁed by 27 of the 53 9573971010 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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member states. Its mandate will include promotion of peace and security on the continent, peace-making and peace-building interventions, co-ordination of eVorts to prevent international terrorism, developing a common defence policy and promoting democratic practices as part of eVorts for preventing conﬂicts. Foreign and Commonwealth OYce February 2004

LETTER TO THE PARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS AND DEVOLUTION DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FROM THE SECOND CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE, 25 FEBRUARY 2004 South Africa Thank you for the supplementary memorandum on South Africa, which has now been circulated to the Committee. Following its visit, the Committee have asked me to request clariﬁcation on two further issues related to its inquiry: 1. Could you provide further details of the BRUF scheme? 2. What will be the implications of DfID’s re-prioritisation of assistance to middle-income countries in Southern Africa for the two projects seen by the Committee in Soweto and Alexandra. Were it possible to receive a reply to these two points by Wednesday 10 March, I would be most grateful. GeoVrey Farrar Second Clerk of the Committee February 2004

LETTER FROM THE PARLIAMENTARY AND DEVOLUTION DEPARTMENT, FCO, TO THE SECOND CLERK South Africa Thank you for your letter of 25 February seeking clarification of two points that arose during the Committee’s visit to South Africa. The British Undergraduate Fellowship Training Scheme (BRUFS) began in 1987 with the aim of sending young, disadvantaged black South Africans to the UK for their final year of schooling, followed by a degree course. Unlike the present Chevening Scholarship Scheme, which sends South Africans for a maximum of one year (on a post-graduate course or to gain a post-graduate qualification) beneficiaries of BRUFS typically stayed in the UK for four to five years. The last scholars under this scheme returned to South Africa in 1994. The scheme was a programme which aimed at giving training to those disadvantaged under apartheid. On the question of future funding for two projects visited by the Committee, I will deal with each separately. UK support to the HIV/AIDS Hospice in Soweto is funded from the Small Grants Scheme (DfID funding administered by FCO). Funding has been in place for the past five years, and will continue in the coming financial year. But the future of the Small Grants Scheme beyond March 2005 is uncertain. We will be working with DfID to look for funding and will encourage the project to look for other sources of funding to achieve sustainability. The twelve-month secondment of Detective Superintendent Steve Dennis to the South African Police Service will end as planned this month. DfID is re-examining its approach to work in the justice field, within the wider context of involvement in Middle Income Countries. However, DfID is planning to continue working in the justice field in South Africa, and will be working, inter alia, on violence against women and children. Foreign and Commonwealth OYce March 2004 9573971012 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Witnesses: Mr Chris Mullin, a Member of the House, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Mr Andrew Lloyd, Head of Africa Department, Southern, and Mr Andy Sparkes, former UK Deputy High Commissioner, South Africa, Foreign and Commonwealth OYce examined.

Q164 Chairman: Good morning and welcome to the Mr Mullin: Yes, I think there is and it arises partly Committee. Mr Mullin, will you please introduce from the enormous goodwill that I think exists your colleagues? among people of all shades of opinion in this Mr Mullin: On my left is Andy Sparkes, former country towards South Africa, especially for what Deputy High Commissioner at Pretoria. On my they have achieved in the last ten years. I do right is Andrew Lloyd, Head of Africa Department, not think any of us sitting here, certainly twelve Southern. or fifteen years ago, could have predicted that there would be a smooth transfer of power from the earlier regime that existed there before to a Q165 Chairman: As you know we are conducting an modern, responsible, democratically accountable inquiry into South Africa and our bilateral relations government that exists there today. ten years after the landmark elections of 1994. This is your first time before the Committee in formal Q169 Chairman: If there is a special relationship, in session. As you know, the Committee has been to what way does that manifest itself compared, for South Africa from 8 to 13 February and we thank V example, with the relations between South Africa your colleagues and the diplomatic sta who looked and France or Germany? after us so well during that visit, which, I believe, was Mr Mullin: I think the scale of our historical interest successful. Just to set the scene a little, could you there dictates that under almost all circumstances begin by telling us a little about your assessment of even if there was not this great good will—which I the current state of UK/South African relations? think extends to France and Germany as well—most Mr Mullin: They are pretty good. We have a large outside observers are greatly heartened by the way in common agenda which cuts across a whole range of which the first ten years of democratic government issues: conflict resolutions, poverty reduction, have gone in South Africa. I have been reading combating organised crime, money laundering and recently Anthony Sampson’s biography of Nelson counter terrorism. We have good relations with our Mandela1 and he quotes what our newspapers—and opposite numbers on all those issues. In addition no doubt other people’s newspapers—were there are enormous bilateral trading links, as I am predicting in the immediate run-up to the change of sure you are aware, about £6 billion worth of trade power (bloodbaths, etc). It is easy to forget all that in both directions each year. Britain has about £12 now, but if one reads what much of our press was billion worth of investments in South Africa and predicting—and, indeed, some more serious there are about 750,000 British citizens living in observers—some of the assessments were extremely South Africa. In addition we have strong sporting, pessimistic at that time. tourism and cultural links. I would say our relations are pretty good and comprehensive. Q170 Chairman: I believe Alistair Horne’s book on Algeria, A Savage War of Peace,2 was widely read by Q166 Chairman: We will be coming on to some of the whites. the irritants between our two countries in foreign Mr Mullin: Indeed, and none of it has come to pass relations particularly Zimbabwe, Iraq and Cancun. and that is really a great achievement on the part of What are the diYculties which you see in the those who managed the transition in South Africa. I bilateral relations between ourselves and South think that is one of the reasons for the good will. Africa? Mr Mullin: I think one of the strengths of our Q171 Mr Olner: Perhaps we could not turn to one of relationship is that where diYculties do arise—there the irritants: South Africa probably takes a is obviously a diVerent set of tactics, for example, in diametrically opposed view to ours on the war in relation to Zimbabwe (which no doubt we will get Iraq. I just wondered whether that has done any onto at some stage)—we can talk about them long-term damage to our relationship. frankly. It is quite a mature relationship. There is a Mr Mullin: Not that I am aware of. It is certainly diVerence of opinion over Iraq, for example, but true that there have been some robust exchanges of again it is one we can talk about later. views on that issue, but we do not, by and large, address each other through megaphones which is a sign of a mature relationship. Of course, we have had Q167 Chairman: I would like to focus now on the disagreements with other countries as well on that domestic matters, particularly bilateral UK/South issue. I do not get the impression that it has Africa relations where there are, in your view, irretrievably damaged our relations with South diYculties. Africa. Mr Mullin: I am not aware of any, but try me. Q172 Mr Olner: Having recognised that there are these diametrically opposing views, have you done Q168 Chairman: We do not want to raise diYculties anything special to help to explain the UK position which do not exist. Moving on, we have heard much in Iraq better? about a special relationship between the UK and South Africa. Do we still believe there to be a special 1 Mandela, by Anthony Sampson, (London 1999). relationship and in your judgment do our South 2 A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–62, by Alistair Horne, African colleagues believe there to be such? 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Mr Mullin: I would not say that we have done billion a year that we put into Africa were put into anything special, but I think no day goes by both at South Africa it still would be a relatively small sum home and abroad without us, for one reason or compared with the size of their economy. The another, we have to explain our views on Iraq. reduction as you, yourself, mentioned have mainly to do with the fact that it is DfID’s policy to Q173 Mr Olner: Could we turn to another irritant concentrate on the poorest people in the poorest that we perhaps get a little blame for—although it is countries and South Africa is a middle-income not bilateral, we deal with the EU—and that is the country. However, one thing that we do collapse of the reform of the CAP3 and the talks at acknowledge—and it is a point that the South Cancun. There was a lot of very deep feeling when Africans make—is that South Africa is a middle we were over there a couple of weeks ago. income country and if you divide Gross National Mr Mullin: It is certainly an issue that South Product by the population you get quite a high Africans feel strongly about. On the other hand, I figure, but that disguises an enormous gulf between think there is a recognition that we played a fairly the rich and the poor. The poor of seven or eight honourable role. At Cancun we have been pressing million live at third world standards. All of that is very hard for trade liberalisation and the fact there quite true, but actually the reduction in our aid was a failure was no fault of ours. I think that is budget is quite modest, down from £35 million to widely recognised. Similarly, within the EU we have £30 million over a period. played a leading role in campaigning for doing away with the CAP and reforming the agricultural subsidies. Q177 Mr Hamilton: That was a source of some irritation and clearly, while we were there, we learnt Q174 Mr Olner: Do you think our position is as that a third of Africa’s entire GDP is accounted for widely known as it should be? Does it get fudged by South Africa’s economy. They have four and a with the other EU countries alone the line? half per cent of the population; I think Mr Sparkes Obviously we have an allegiance to both. told us that when we were in Pretoria. Given that Mr Mullin: You would have to ask the South you, yourself, acknowledge that some damage has Africans but in my view it does not and I do think been done here—even though it is a relatively small they recognise that we have played a fairly good role. amount—what are you doing to repair and reverse I have to say that there is an EU and South Africa that damage? Trade and Development Corporation Agreement Mr Mullin: One of the reasons I think it proved to be which will come fully into eVect in April this year. It a slightly larger irritant than it might otherwise have includes a free trade area, financial assistance and been was because some of the media insisted on development cooperation; it has a range of trade- linking it to Iraq which, of course, opened up related measures in it and I am told that by 2010 another front. However, when you calmly explain to 95%—by value—of all South African export to the people what the figures are and the size of our EU will be free of tariVs. If so, that is quite a big relationship with South Africa, I think it is actually step forward. a fairly minor irritant and it will pass.

Q175 Mr Olner: Perhaps we ought to be saying it a Q178 Mr Hamilton: Can I move onto a diVerent bit more loudly. subject, which is the brain drain from South Africa. Mr Mullin: I say it now and no doubt you will reﬂect When Professor David Simon gave evidence to this that in your Report. Committee, he told us of the concern about skilled labour and professionals leaving South Africa to Q176 Mr Hamilton: As you will know, Minister, the come to the UK. What are the Foreign OYce trying Department for International Development to do to tackle this perceived brain drain and, if announced two months ago—in January—that aid necessary, reverse it? would be reduced for the southern African nations, Mr Mullin: There are two brain drains, of course. the so-called middle income-nations. While we were There is the one you did not mention which is that in South Africa we saw projects in Soweto and Alexandra which are going to suVer from the South Africa, being by far the richest economy in reduction in aid and I was wondering what southern Africa—and, indeed, in Africa—is consultations took place between DfID and the drawing in professional people from all over Africa Foreign OYce prior to the announcement being (from as far away as West Africa) to work there made of the reduction. because of the income available. It is a global Mr Mullin: I was actually in South Africa when the phenomenon; it is happening all over the world. announcement was made and I did talk to Hilary South Africa is both a beneﬁciary and, to some Benn at the time. It is quite true to say that the South extent, a loser as well. As you know, there was a Africans were irritated—you were looking for particular issue some years ago over health workers irritants a moment ago—by that. It is possible to being attracted to this country by favourable exaggerate the amount of aid we already give terms—indeed in Sunderland, which I represent in because South Africa, as you will know, is an Parliament, we had some South African nurses— enormous economy and inevitably if the whole and the Department of Health did reach a Memorandum of Understanding (I will not read it 3 CAP—Common Agricultural Policy. out to you but I have it available if you are 9573971012 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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2 March 2004 Mr Chris Mullin MP, Mr Andrew Lloyd and Mr Andy Sparkes interested) with the South Africans on that issue.4 generated so much antagonism and so much heat Indeed, I think the NHS agreed to stop actively towards Britain and the United States in South recruiting from South Africa but, of course, that Africa. does not stop agencies that supply the NHS from Mr Mullin: As it was explained to me during my visit actively recruiting. It is very hard to ban that there in November, it was the issue over the lack of because, as I say, it is a feature of global economy. a second resolution for the invasion at the United We can certainly try to make sure that some ethical Nations. The South Africans, rightly, have a very standards apply and we can try to make sure that high regard for the United Nations and they felt that there is a two-way fertilisation between our two the alliance should have received United Nations’ health services, which is one of the things that this endorsement before the actual invasion. Memorandum of Understanding attempts to address. I will just repeat the point I made at the Q183 Sir John Stanley: So they were taking the view outset, South Africa is, to quite a degree, a that the war was illegal. beneficiary of this trend as well as a loser. On Mr Mullin: No doubt you asked them and they are balance, for all I know, it may be an overall better placed to put their case than I am. However, beneficiary. Certainly there are an enormous it had to do with the United Nations as I number of professional people—for reasons we can understood it. all think about—who come from Zimbabwe who now work in South Africa. Q184 Sir John Stanley: It is always diYcult when you have a very, very concerted view on a particular Q179 Mr Hamilton: It would be quite interesting to policy issue, but are you disappointed at the lack of know whether that was the case and whether they success which our own diplomatic representatives in were a net gain or a net loser, but that is obviously South Africa have had—and no doubt the American not for you. Moving on to my final point, when representatives as well—in trying to get South Professor Simon from the University of London African politicians and ministers to see the case that gave evidence to us he suggested that there may be the British and American governments made out for cuts in the number of Chevening scholarships going to war in Iraq? available to South African citizens. Is that true? Mr Mullin: I am certainly not disappointed in the Mr Mullin: Not that I am aware of. No decision has quality of our representation in South Africa, which, been taken so far as I know. We had a good as you will have seen for yourselves, is of the highest. Chevening programme with South Africa and, Of course, one is always disappointed when a overall, Chevening is expanding rather than government’s arguments are not getting across as contracting so I am not aware of that. well as they should do and in relation to Iraq one could argue that that has been the case domestically Q180 Mr Hamilton: So there are no cuts for South as well as internationally. The one thing I would say Africans envisaged so far as you are concerned. is that our relationship with South Africa is a mature Mr Mullin: I am not aware of that. one and I do not think that has actually clouded the Mr Sparkes: The last information I had was that we generally good relationship we have with South would have about the same number of scholars Africa. I do not see it as any more than a—I would available to us this year as in previous years, which not say “blip” because that would trivialise it— is around twenty. temporary phenomenon. Q181 Mr Olner: What was very, very obvious to us when we visited South Africa a couple of weeks ago Q185 Chairman: You said that the South Africans was the tremendous loss of skilled labour over there make the case in respect of our aid that they are both due to HIV/AIDS. I would hope that we are not a first and a third world country. Clearly anyone recruiting from South Africa those people who are who has seen the northern suburbs of Johannesburg going to do South Africa’s economy a lot of good. It and Alexandra will see that very dramatically. You is a tragedy that when people are at their most went on to say that all of that is true. Can you give an productive age in a society they are being taken away assurance that that first and third world diVerence is from that society with the scourge of this disease. reflected in the way that our aid policies respond to Mr Mullin: I cannot disagree with that. the reality of South Africa? Mr Mullin: It is, but because our aid is focused Q182 Sir John Stanley: Myself and possibly other primarily on the poorest people at the end of the members of the Committee were taken considerably day—and I know this is a very tricky issue, as the by surprise during our visit to South Africa by the South Africans themselves are the first to extent and the intensity of the criticism we ran into in acknowledge—the long-term solutions to South relation to the British Government’s policy towards Africa’s problems are the redistribution of the Iraq. Given that Iraq is geographically far removed considerable wealth that already exists within that from South Africa and given the fact that the society. It is not something that can easily be Muslim citizens in South Africa are a relatively small achieved from outside. We can oVer advice, which minority, I wonder whether you could help us as to they can take or not as the case may be. I must say, why this particular foreign policy issue has I think they have gone about it in a very sensible way during their first ten years in oYce. 4 Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted Expectations were inevitably very high when they by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, Ev 95. were first elected and they have handled the 9573971012 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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2 March 2004 Mr Chris Mullin MP, Mr Andrew Lloyd and Mr Andy Sparkes inevitable disappointments extremely well. I think knowledge of discussions between our military and the South African electorate is very mature as well theirs but it may be that Andy Sparkes can assist and they understand that the huge gulf has to be with enquiries. bridged and also the dangers of going too far too Mr Sparkes: Our commitment to assistance to the fast and collapsing the whole economy. South Africans in this area is on-going and very important to us. You know that the African Peace and Security Council envisages an African peace- Q186 Chairman: Are you confident that our aid keeping capability. What we want to do is to help policies reflect that great distortion and that we are Africa to develop that capability and South Africa is not reducing that volume of aid because we call it a one of the best vectors for this because, as has just middle-income country which shields these vast been said, they are already dealing with peace- diVerences? keeping operations in the DRC and Burundi.5 For Mr Mullin: It is undoubtedly true that the reduction eight years we had a British military assistance and was in part because South Africa is a middle-income training team—40-odd strong—helping the South country. You have to bear in mind that much of our African army to integrate itself. That has now aid budget is directed towards countries where most focused down into a British peace support team people are living on a hundred dollars a year or less which looks at helping them with the capacity in whereas the average in South Africa—and I do their own army to do a good job in Burundi, DRC understand the point about the huge gulf—is or wherever. The idea is that we should be able to use something like over three thousand dollars a year that assistance as a multiplier in the longer term, to per head. We all understand the issue and what hits assist in the region as a whole. any new visitor to South Africa is that a small proportion of the population enjoy Californian— not European, Californian—standards of living and Q188 Mr Chidgey: You made a very interesting they live within a couple of miles of people who comment there when you said that it was very enjoy, for practical purposes, a third world standard important to us and I want to test that out if I can. of living. One of the things that was confusing for us was that on the one hand we were being told by some people in the administration that South Africa was—or was Q187 Mr Chidgey: Minister, I would like to ask you becoming—a military super power in the continent’s some questions in relation to peace-keeping in terms terms; on the other hand some commentators were of South Africa’s role and the assistance the United saying that that was the last thing they wanted South Kingdom may or may not be giving. You sent us a Africa to be (these were local politicians). I want to memorandum setting out details of our assistance to put this in the context that this is important to us and South Africa in helping them develop their peace ask you a bit more about that. I am interested to keeping capabilities. While we were in South Africa know whether or not we provided advice to South we had a lot of diVerent messages about South Africa on its armaments, for example. If South Africa’s capability and its potential role. Just to give Africa is to fulfil a regional peace-keeping role, one you an example, whilst we are obviously aware that might ask the question, why does it need a fleet of South Africa has been instrumental in peace- submarines? Why does it need to have an air force keeping in some of the neighbouring countries, we with the latest up-to-the minute fighter aircraft also heard that out of 160 tanks only four were supplied by this country? When you say that this is operable and that many of the armed forces— important to us, I want to know whether it is particularly the army—were ridden by HIV/AIDS important in terms of exports or whether it is to the extent that it actually made then unable to important in terms of how we see South Africa in its operate. We have had a large interest in South Africa regional role. Obviously we supplied Hawk aircraft; through our post there, through the Ministry I understand that. Can you tell me, did we actually personnel. Apart from the role that we know South bid to supply a fleet of submarines there? Did the Africa has fulfilled in recent years, what further post support the bids from a British organisation? assistance has South Africa asked us to provide and Did we advise that, because I wonder what the how much has that been tempered by the strategic purpose of those submarines might be in professional analysis of our military personnel either terms of a peace-keeping role? I do not understand in post or attracted to these discussions? how they could be relevant to their needs. Mr Mullin: As you know in November we had quite Mr Mullin: I do not think we are supplying a large joint exercise with the South African forces submarines, are we? and our forces have played a part in the past in integrating the various branches of the South Q189 Mr Chidgey: We are not, but did we try? Did African military that needed to be integrated. We we support the eVort? That is my question. have high hopes in the medium-term future that Mr Sparkes: I afraid I cannot remember whether we South Africa will play—as it does already in a couple tendered for the submarines. of countries—a leading role in African peace- Mr Mullin: The fact is—and it may come as a keeping forces. You will know about the role they disappointment to you—we are not supplying play in Burundi and in the Congo. 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Q190 Mr Chidgey: Can we have a note as to whether Q193 Mr Pope: I appreciate that answer and I can or not British companies tendered for the see real merit in a proposition which says that submarines and whether or not we actually advised Africans are going to take the lead. We are all the South Africans on the need for that in terms of conscious of our colonial past and we do not want to their strategic need as a regional peace-keeping be seen to be marching into these places and it really force6. is an African problem and Africans should be taking Mr Mullin: I do want to make one general point the lead in solving it. I certainly agree with that, but about defence in South Africa. South Africa is now is there not a danger in that approach we are oV- a democracy and they have a right to decide— loading the problem? It is politically expedient to say whether we agree with them or not—what their an African solution to African problems, but it defence priorities are. It is not for us to advise them really absolves us of any responsibility for taking whether they need this kind of helicopter, this kind action and are we perhaps expecting too much of a of fighter plane or, indeed, this kind of submarine. country like South Africa? I am sure it has made That is a matter for them. It has been a controversial great strides and we all feel really warm about the matter within South Africa and being a vibrant tenth anniversary of democracy, but are we democracy that issue has been explored in their expecting too much too soon for a country like media and in their parliament as it properly should South Africa to take the leadership in, for example, be. It certainly is not for the British Government to a country like Burundi? start mouthing oV about what is appropriate for the Mr Mullin: I certainly agree with you that we should defence needs of South Africa. not expect too much and we have to recognise that there are limits, especially to the eVort that a young Q191 Mr Chidgey: I did not suggest they did, nation like South Africa can cope with, but I do not Minister, I am merely asking if we gave advice on think the United Kingdom is simply walking away what their needs might be. from this problem. We have contributed £2 million Mr Mullin: I will send you a note about that7. to the AU’s administrative trust fund that supports the Burundi peace force and South Africa is Q192 Mr Pope: Minister, you mentioned Burundi receiving a proportion of this. I mentioned the and the seemingly intractable problems there. When funding of the Mozambique contingent a moment we were in South Africa we heard that the burden of ago; we are contributing £3.7 million to the funding supplying and leading the peace-keeping mission of that. Those are quite substantial sums. In that South Africa has taken on under the auspices of addition, as I say, there has been cooperation the African Union is really quite a diYcult burden between our military and theirs in training precisely for them to bear. My question is two-fold. Is there with a view to carrying out peace-keeping more that we could do bilaterally as a nation to help? operations, so I do think we have stepped up to the Secondly, if Kofi Annan is still speaking to the British Government, could we raise with the UN a plate and it may be for other countries perhaps to greater UN involvement in peace-keeping in join us. Burundi to try to lift some of the burden that the South Africans are finding so diYcult to bear at the moment? Q194 Mr Pope: You mentioned the DRC and I Mr Mullin: As you will know, we already make a think South Africa has about 1,500 troops in the significant contribution to the cost of the Burundi Democratic Republic of the Congo. Can you tell peace-keeping force. We pay for the entire us what help Britain has been in DRC and how you Mozambiquean contingent. Yes, I am sure that in think things are panning out there at the moment? future it will be an issue for the UN. South Africa has Mr Mullin: There is a very cautious stability there played a very valuable role in stepping in there and and I would not put it any higher than that just at taking the lead in a situation which, as you say, was the moment. It is a big step forward from where dire and remains very diYcult to this day. We are we were, which was in a deep, dark hole. In the anxious to get to a point—this is one of the reasons Congo, as you know, over the years in the region why we value our relationship with South Africa— of about three million people have died and where increasingly, as is happening in West Africa, therefore it was a catastrophe of First World War Africans are taking responsibility. We are willing to proportions. There were also a lot of other help and advise and also provide resources where countries meddling in the Congo. Without going Africans are taking primary responsibility for into the details I am glad to say that most of them resolving African problems. We welcome South are no long meddling. We now have to move Africa’s role in Burundi and in the DRC, just as we towards some kind of stability. President Kabila welcome Nigeria’s role and Ghana’s role in West was here the other day. He has various vice Africa. Indeed, the African Union is now talking presidents who represent diVerent factions, not all about setting up its own African peace-keeping of whom are yet talking to each other so we need force. That is another development that we welcome to make some progress on that front. Once again, and it is the way the future lies. the South Africans have made a very useful contribution—as I believe have we—in the Congo. 6 Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted Going back to Burundi, let me just repeat what I by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, Ev 94. 7 Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted hinted at but perhaps did not say explicitly in by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, Ev 94. answer to your first question. We do favour the 9573971012 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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United Nations taking over the mandate in continent by 2010. That is a pretty ambitious Burundi and we think that will come to pass in timetable. What assistance are we planning to give to due course. the African Union as such in respect of this standby force? Q195 Mr Illsley: Could I ask a couple of questions Mr Mullin: I cannot tell you oV the top of my head, 8 on the Southern African Development Community but I will send you a note about that. You are right which, although it has been in existence since 1980 that it is a very big development and it is one we will and has had some substantial aspirations (for want to encourage. The head of the African Union, example, a free trade area, a common market and Mr Konare is a very dynamic man who is busy the idea of a customs union) we have received in injecting a bit of dynamism into that organisation, evidence some suggestion that there is perhaps what which we welcome. has been described as a “credibility gap” as to what Chairman: This Committee has produced a number this organisation can achieve and what it is actually of reports on Zimbabwe. We did ask many questions achieving. Do you have any view on what role the during our visits. I would like Sir John to open now SADC is playing within southern Africa to promote on that basis. the political and economic development on the continent? Q198 Sir John Stanley: Minister, did you see last Mr Mullin: Let me speak in relation to some of the Sunday’s Panorama programme on Zimbabwe?9 statements they have put out regarding Zimbabwe, Mr Mullin: I saw extracts from it; I did not see the for example. We are rather disappointed; they whole programme but I am familiar with the betray a level of ignorance that disappoints us. For contents. example, last August they put out a statement calling for the EU to end its economic sanctions against Zimbabwe; there are no economic sanctions. Q199 Sir John Stanley: I think you might find it Following the Commonwealth Conference they put valuable to see it in full. I am sure you will share the out another unhelpful statement which, again, did acute dismay—to put it at its mildest—that anybody not demonstrate a detailed knowledge of the who saw that programme will have experienced of V situation. We are anxious to encourage SADC, I these young men and young women being sent o to have to say, having said all that. We have oVered the training camps, the young men being subjected them quite a lot of support over the years. Last year to a kind of Hitler Youth type indoctrination and we gave them a quarter of a million to help clearly too many of the young women are being restructure their secretariat and from January this subjected to rape as a means of intimidation. year, over the next four years, we are going to Against that gross violation of human rights and so contribute £11 million towards supporting the many others that have occurred, could you set out secretariat’s regional trade and investment in for us now, so that we are completely up-to-date, integration work. We are also supplying for three what the British Government’s policy is towards the years a senior advisor on tax policy. We were talking South African Government in dealing with the a moment ago about the need to get world trade Zimbabwe issue? What are we saying to the South right for poor countries, but actually there is quite a African Government in terms of what policy we lot that African countries can do to remove trade would want the South African Government to barriers between themselves, not only in southern follow on this issue? Africa but in eastern Africa. Mr Mullin: We share the same objective; that is the first thing. Both countries want a transition towards democracy and the rule of law in Zimbabwe. We Q196 Mr Pope: Are they likely to achieve any of have a tactical disagreement about how to get there, these goals they have set out? This idea of a free trade South Africa tending to argue for quiet diplomacy. area by 2008, a common market by 2015, is there a We have to listen to what they say because they are likelihood of achieving those developments or do the the neighbours after all; they have enormous interest divisions between the various countries that make in a peaceful outcome, rather greater than us and up SADC militate against that? they suVer greatly from living next door to a country Mr Mullin: It is too early to say whether they are which has caused such serious problems. They had going to achieve them or not. You are right that the best part of two million refugees. I have to say, progress so far has been fairly slow. The issue that although there has been a lot of talk of quiet poisons the whole region is the problem of diplomacy and talks between Zanu-PF and the main Zimbabwe and that does distract a lot of energy opposition party, we do not see much evidence of away from the kind of developments that the progress on that front so far. southern African countries need to be addressing— and we do too—but I would not like to say how far advanced they are because, as you say it is 2008 and Q200 Sir John Stanley: Is the British Government’s there is still some way to go yet. position vis-a`-vis the South African Government that the South African Government should abandon Q197 Chairman: You mention the African stand-by its quiet diplomacy policy altogether? force. Over the weekend, meeting in Libya, the 8 Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted African Union took a clear decision that they would by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, Ev 94. have, by next year (2005) such a force to be deployed 9 Panorama “Zimbabwe’s torture training camps”— at five regional centres and to cover the whole broadcasted on BBC 1on Sunday, 29 February 2004. 9573971012 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Mr Mullin: I certainly think we would like to see the because many of their leaders have personally South African Government being robust, given benefited and they feel they would have a great deal what is going on in Zimbabwe. It is not our policy to lose were their monopoly on power to be broken. to engage in megaphone diplomacy with the South V Africans on this issue because there is a di erence of Q203 Sir John Stanley: Two alternative views were view and we do respect the fact that we are both put to us when we were in South Africa as to how aiming for the same things and it is a tactical Zimbabwe might evolve towards a proper disagreement rather than a disagreement of democracy. One was that the best route forward was principle. We do acknowledge that President Mbeki going to be to form some form of government of has been trying quite hard; he has been to Zimbabwe national unity bringing Zanu-PF and the MDC on many occasions and met not just Mr Mugabe but V together and to have that in situ for a considerable also opposition leaders. Even if we have a di erence period. Equally, a completely contradictory view of nuance we do not go engaging in any public was put to us which is that it would be a huge argument with them. mistake to create another basically single monopoly power basis in Zimbabwe and although it may be Q201 Sir John Stanley: The case that was advanced necessary to form some form of government of to us by the ANC in particular was that President national unity on a temporary basis, it was Mbeki had a unique possible degree of influence profoundly important that the country function as a with President Mugabe by virtue of the geographical multi-party democracy with an alternative proximity of the two countries, by virtue of the way government being able to hold the existing in which both have been involved in combating government to account. Does the British racism in their respective countries and the Government have a view between those two liberation of both countries, and if anybody in the alternatives and has the British Government been African continent is going to be able to bring putting either or both alternatives to President influence to bear on President Mugabe it was going Mbeki? to be President Mbeki. Do you believe that is a false Mr Mullin: Our view is that there has to be obviously judgment by the ANC or do you think that has any a transitional government to get us over the degree of resonance and credibility? immediate problem followed as swiftly as can be Mr Mullin: I think the key word is “if”; if anybody decently organised free elections which would result has influence over Mr Mugabe then President Mbeki in a government that enjoys national and would be the one, but Mr Mugabe is a very stubborn international confidence which can then help man and he has brought his country to the edge of reconstruct that shattered country. I have no doubt ruin. There is cause to doubt whether he would listen at all that there will not be significant international to anyone: his former comrades in South Africa, let help for Zimbabwe until there is a government in alone advice that comes freely from Western Europe Zimbabwe which clearly cares about its people and or America or somewhere else. There is a degree of enjoys a democratic mandate. disagreement within South Africa itself which has been widely publicised as you will know. President Q204 Mr Illsley: One of the things that struck me Mbeki has stuck to his policy, because they are during the whole of our visit to South Africa was the comrades going back a long way, of hoping to extreme sensitivity of some South African influence Zanu-PF to quiet diplomacy. All I would politicians regarding our view that South Africa say about it is that we get to see a positive outcome might not be doing enough or perhaps not putting and only this morning I was reading an interview out the right message in relation to Zimbabwe. This that Mr Mugabe conducted on his 80th birthday in is probably best illustrated by a meeting we had with which he fairly brazenly said he had no plans for the South African Foreign AVairs Committee, talking to the MDC whom he described as the devil. where there were some lively exchanges in relation to their view that we took the view that South Africa Q202 Sir John Stanley: Can you point to any specific and President Mbeki were doing nothing in relation tangible results of President Mbeki’s quiet to improving the situation in Zimbabwe. They took diplomacy policy? great exception to that, even though we explained Mr Mullin: I certainly think there have been some that that was not our view, to the point of comparing contacts, probably at a very low level, between the their situation vis-a`-vis Zimbabwe with our situation MDC and Zanu-PF but it is a bit hard to have regarding Northern Ireland. Is the British constructive dialogue when the leader of your main Government aware of this level of resentment that opposition party is on trial for treason and when we might be trying to dictate to South Africa or tell Zanu-PF thugs are smashing up the only them that they should be doing more in relation to independent newspapers. I cannot, at the moment, Zimbabwe? point to any seriously positive outcome and previous Mr Mullin: I am certainly aware of that sentiment predictions that there would be a positive outcome and I would not want to make too much of the have not so far born fruit, but I do not necessarily Northern Ireland comparison, but we did used to get put that down to any lack of eVort on President a bit shirty when outsiders—particularly in Mbeki’s part but to a particular stubbornness on the America—told us how we should sort out our part of Mr Mugabe and I would not wish to problems in Ireland. It is not only South Africans personalise it there; I think Zanu-PF is a pretty who get sensitive when foreigners start oVering free rotten party that has an interest in staying in power advice. It is certainly not our position—as I think I 9573971012 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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2 March 2004 Mr Chris Mullin MP, Mr Andrew Lloyd and Mr Andy Sparkes have made clear already—that the South Africans Q207 Mr Hamilton: I suppose we could not have are doing nothing to help in Zimbabwe; they are. been more impressed by the contrast between South The only thing I would say to any South African Africa and the transition to black majority rule there who said, “It is none of your business at all and you and what has happened in Zimbabwe. I do not know should stay entirely out of it” (not that they do whether you have read a book by Peter Godwin— necessarily say that), is that “You were very happy whose sister gave evidence to us because she worked to have our help when you were fighting apartheid, for SW Radio Africa—about growing up in which was freely given, and we were entitled to have Rhodesia and the transition to black majority rule an opinion about the internal situation in South there, but I wondered whether you and any of your Africa or the internal situation in Rhodesia when colleagues (and I think we had fairly good evidence they were under those racist regimes, and so we think when we were in South Africa from the people we we are entitled to have an opinion now about the spoke to) could imagine that what has happened in internal situation in Zimbabwe. You, of course, Zimbabwe—from the great hopes that everyone have a perfect right to reject our opinion, but we placed in the Mugabe regime and Zanu-PF being in have the right to oVer it.” I would say that in the power there to the dreadful tyranny, starvation, spirit of a free exchange amongst democrats who are murder and disintegration of that country—could used to hearing things with which they do not ever happen in South Africa? necessarily agree and can respond in a dignified Mr Mullin: I do not think it could. One must never fashion without entirely going oV the handle. say never, but I see no sign that it could. I think that the habit of democracy is becoming engrained in Q205 Mr Olner: I am sure the Minister will know South Africa. It has a very vibrant free press, a very that we were not all singing from the same hymn strong civil society and all the things that Zimbabwe sheet when we were opposing apartheid, but we did lacks and never really had on the same scale as South eventually get there. Watching the Panorama Africa anyway. If you recall, in the early years of programme on Sunday evening left me with the view majority rule in Zimbabwe—the first four years that I would not know what on earth was going to certainly—the country was pretty well managed and take place. Zanu-PF is so manipulative of the next they did not make the mistakes that some other generation and to me it hinges around food. I just newly-independent countries had made. If I had to wondered how much thought you had given, spot a moment when it began to go wrong it was the Minister, on food being used as a political weapon massacres in Matabeleland in 1984/5. Again after by Zanu-PF and is there any hope of democracy in that there was still a period when things seemed to be that country at the end of the day if so many of its more or less normal and it was not until the late young people have been indoctrinated in these 1990s when, I think, Mr Mugabe’s economic policies camps? and certainly his social policies were going badly Mr Mullin: Certainly the longer this tragic situation wrong that he began to look around the world for goes on the more diYcult it would be to resolve and scapegoats. Needless to say, he alighted upon us at a it will take more than a change of government to fairly early stage. repair the damage that has been done in Zimbabwe. You are right, Zanu-PF does use food as a political Q208 Chairman: I have a couple of questions on the weapon and it is a sad fact that the outside world is African Union before we move on. Latterly there now feeding more than half the population of have been a series of initiatives with grand sounding Zimbabwe each winter. If I were a proud titles. You will remember no doubt the African Zimbabwean nationalist I would be rather ashamed Renaissance. Then we went through a series of other of the fact that this government that inherited what names, finally we have come to the African Union. was once the bread basket of southern Africa is now Are you surprised if there is a degree of scepticism reduced to a situation where it depends entirely on about this new initiative and that perhaps because it foreigners—like us and the Americans—to feed its means diVerent things to diVerent people, for many own people. in Africa it is a means of channelling additional aid from the west in their direction; for the west it is a Q206 Mr Olner: Do we need to keep supplying the means of looking at human rights and good food? It seems to me that if there is going to be an governance? Do you understand why there is an internal rebellion within Zimbabwe then it has got to element of scepticism about the African Union? be those in Zanu-PF who are no longer being fed Mr Mullin: I think anyone looking at the recent by us. history of Africa would have to be modest in their Mr Mullin: The feeding is done by the World Food ambitions, but I do think there has been a change Programme and it is very carefully monitored to from the OAU. One should not attribute it to any make sure it goes to those in need. It is quite true that particular personality; I do not think it is. It has through the Zimbabwean Grain Marketing Board changed from an organisation that was mainly they do manipulate food, but that is a Zimbabwean concerned with African solidarity and sweeping operation. So far as international aid is concerned, problems under the carpet to an organisation that that is done by the World Food Programme. It is now genuinely acknowledges the problems on their strictly monitored and we do not use humanitarian continent and the recognition that Africans must aid as a weapon because the only people we would increasingly take responsibility for resolving them. I end up hurting are those who are already in a dire think NePAD is a very good example. It is early days situation. yet; we will have to wait and see what it achieves, but 9573971012 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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2 March 2004 Mr Chris Mullin MP, Mr Andrew Lloyd and Mr Andy Sparkes this idea of peer review where the monitoring and Mr Mullin: You have me there, Mr Olner. There are analysis is done by Africans themselves, the idea of 191 countries in the UN and I am sure there are a an African peace keeping force where they make a number of mighty vested interests to be reconciled, contribution—to which we would have to assist but I can only speak for Her Majesty’s Government because these are young nations and they do not and we do favour a reform of the composition of the have the experience or the resources that we have— Security Council and we do favour an African seat and the idea of them increasingly taking the lead I on it. am mildly optimistic about. Q214 Mr Chidgey: Q209 Chairman: And the African Court of Human Minister, you touched briefly on Rights? NePAD a few minutes ago. I would like to ask you Mr Mullin: The jury is out on that one, I would say. a few more detailed questions to get a better feel of the Government’s position. Firstly, you will be aware I am sure that there is a school of thought Q210 Mr Illsley: I have a couple of questions on which believes that NePAD suVers from being Commonwealth issues. To what extent have the diVerent things to diVerent people. For example disagreements over Zimbabwe damaged any inter- some feel it is seen as a tool for securing better Commonwealth relationships that we have, governance by donors and, on the other side, as a particularly between ourselves and South Africa? means of securing more aid for African nations. Mr Mullin: It is true there was a disagreement at Firstly, do you and does the Government subscribe CHOGM10 on the question of whether Zimbabwe to that school of thought? Secondly, whether you do should be suspended or not. What I took heart from or not, do you feel that those two interests can both was that actually most African countries went be satisfied? Or do you have a diVerent slant, along—it was done by consensus in the end, as you perhaps, on that? know—with maintaining the suspension. However, Mr Mullin: I think it is an understanding—I will not there were some fairly tough arguments and if it did say deal—that in return for a higher quality of do any damage, I think it was only temporary. It is governance, democracy, more transparency and yet more evidence of the extent to which, as I say, the proper economic management, the West, through entire Zimbabwe issue poisons everything it touches. the G8, would have a responsibility for addressing That is another reason for wanting to resolve it. issues like trade, debt, aid; both sides a partnership, both sides having responsibilities. Q211 Mr Illsley: How would you respond to the criticism—which I think was published in The Times on 9 December—that the British delegation breezed Q215 Mr Chidgey: But the emphasis perhaps is in, tried to dictate the game and then left early and partnership rather than donor and recipient of aid. that perhaps we could have achieved more had we Mr Mullin: Yes, and I think we all understand these spent more time talking to some of our African days that there is no quantitative aid that can resolve allies?11 Do you accept that criticism? the problems we are talking about. You have to get Mr Mullin: As a member of the British delegation, all sorts of other things right first of all. who breezed in early and spent a lot of time talking to other African delegations (including a number of heads of states), I reject Mr Dowden’s analysis—I Q216 Mr Chidgey: You also said a few minutes ago think you are quoting Mr Dowden—although I take that you are hopeful—I am sure you are—and do Mr Dowden’s views seriously on other matters; he is you feel it is possible to say at the moment what in a serious journalist. I think he is just wrong on that concrete terms NePAD has achieved so far? point. Mr Mullin: At the moment they are putting in place a structure and the key test will come from the rigour Q212 Mr Olner: You mentioned earlier, Minister, of the Peer Review Mechanism. I am told that so far the United Nations. Would you personally—or 17 countries—most recently Angola, I think—have would the Government, do you think—support any signed up to Peer Review. I think the first Peer additional seats on the UN Security Council, and do Reviews will take place this year. I think the first you think that South Africa ought to be a candidate country in line is probably Ghana, which is one of for an African seat? the better managed African countries so no doubt Mr Mullin: I can say that it is certainly our policy to they will get a fairly good report. I suppose the test support an African seat on the Security Council and will come when we get to one of the more diYcult it is not for me to say who would fill it, but South customers, certainly when we get to Angola but Africa would be an obvious candidate, one of the probably before that. There must be an intellectually obvious candidates. “An”, not “the”. rigourous exercise and I am sure that that is what the NePAD secretariat are aiming at. Q213 Mr Olner: Are there any countries who are member states of the UN that are opposing such an Q217 Mr Chidgey: You will be aware, Minister, that enlargement to the Security Council? President Wade of Senegal (who is one of the instigators of NePAD) has recently expressed his 10 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. 11 “We can’t just play boss in Africa any more, Mr Blair”— disappointment on the slow progress of the African article by Richard Dowden in The Times on Tuesday, Peer Review Mechanism. Were you surprised at that 9 December 2003. and do you agree? 9573971012 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Mr Mullin: It is very often that new initiatives— and the diYculty will be spending it, not finding the including many in this country—get oV to a slow money. I think those are areas where the G8 has— start. I think what counts is not so much the speed to use the American phrase—stepped up to the plate. as the robustness of what is put in place and that a proper mechanism is set up and is seen to work, not Q221 Mr Chidgey: I am glad you mentioned the in fits and starts but in a sustained way. We remain United States because that features in my last hopeful of NePAD; I know the Prime Minister does question. It is interesting that you make the point and he has taken a close personal interest in this. As that the USA has been very generous relatively I say, we will have to wait and we do not have that speaking in approaching HIV/AIDS. My reflection long to wait because the first Peer Reviews will take on the meetings we had recently in South Africa did place this year and then we will have a better idea. I not give me any impression that the US had much do not feel qualified to pronounce just yet. credit for doing anything in that regard. I am sure they have done but in the sense that we had quite a Q218 Mr Chidgey: Would it be reasonable to lot of criticism about our position on Iraq, it was a summarise from what you are that the Government mild rebuke compared to the comments that have is reasonably happy; you are not disappointed, you been made about relations with the United States. In are not frustrated and you are recognising that it is relation to NePAD and the way that the United diYcult and it takes time, but so far so good sort of States has almost been seen to abandon the NePAD thing. Is that a fair summary on the Peer Review process—certainly they favour their own Mechanism? Millennium Challenge rather than NePAD—I have Mr Mullin: Yes. It is all moving in the right heard American ambassadors say that they just do direction. I think there is a capacity question about not support NePAD and I wonder whether you have NePAD and we have been helping out in that regard a view on this. It is rather worrying actually that on and there is no harm in outsiders enquiring from the one hand we have NePAD which is an African time to time about progress and keeping up a little initiative in which we are supporting Africa taking pressure. I am sure the NePAD Secretariat would charge of its own issues, problems and destiny; on welcome that. Certainly we must not let this the other hand the Millennium Challenge seems to potentially worthwhile initiative drift into the sand. be a retrograde step where funding and finances are tied into trade with a particular funding nation. Q219 Mr Chidgey: One of the things that has come Rather than letting Africa free it seems to be tying up in our evidence sessions on this issue has been the Africa in to the major trading partner in the world, reaction of the G8. We are getting the message that the US. I think that is a retrograde step and I wonder there is now growing disappointment in the lack of if you have a view on it. commitment that G8 is apparently showing after a Mr Mullin: I cannot speak for whoever you have great deal of initial enthusiasm. Would you agree spoken to, but it is not my impression that there is that G8 is guilty of failing to respond adequately to any lack of enthusiasm for NePAD by the NePAD? There is not enough enthusiasm from the Americans. As I say, the jury is still out. If it is seen G8; too much stick and not enough carrot, perhaps? to be pursuing rigourously I think it will find a lot of Mr Mullin: I am sure there is a great deal more we support amongst members of the G8, including the could do. Cancun has been mentioned and that was Americans. definitely a disappointment. I am sure there is possibly some concern that all members are not Q222 Mr Chidgey: Do you have any views on the pulling in the same direction at the same speed. I Millennium Challenge? think everyone is pulling in the same direction but Mr Mullin: I cannot help you there. You will have to not necessarily at the same speed. We certainly, discuss that with the Americans, I think. before too long, will have the chairmanship of the Chairman: Minister, a key feature of our work as a G8 and we intend to make full use of it to boost our Committee is the focus on the work of your commitment to Africa. I would not like to think that Department in South Africa and I would now like to anyone who was not so keen on the governance ask Mr Hamilton to begin and then Sir John to aspects of NePAD was using any alleged failure by continue on that. the G8 as an excuse for not pursuing that. I hope that is not the case. Q223 Mr Hamilton: I am always struck, when we visit any foreign country, how good our diplomatic Q220 Mr Chidgey: You did say a moment ago that staV are and certainly we would all have cause to you felt there were things that the G8 could be doing. thank our superb staV in South Africa. I notice from Could you give us an example? the statistics that we employ 47 UK-based staV and Mr Mullin: As I say, I think there is scope for a lot 178 locally engaged staV. Bearing in mind my of progress on trade. I think there is scope for further colleague David Chidgey’s previous comments progress on debt. Although we played rather leading about the United States’ role in South Africa, I am role on the progress on both these issues, I think somewhat surprised to learn they have 250 US-based there is the scope for greater bilateral aid. The big staV and 450 locally engaged staV. It makes me one, of course, where I think the G8—particularly wonder what they do all day compared with the the Americans—have responded well is HIV/AIDS. productivity of our staV. Anyway, my question The Americans in particular have made enormous really is, do you envisage any changes to the work sums available for helping to combat HIV/AIDS that Foreign Commonwealth OYce does in South 9573971012 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Africa in the near future, and do you expect to Q228 Sir John Stanley: In the original paper you maintain the current levels of staV or, indeed, sent to the Committee of 30 September last year, you increase them? say that one of the areas in which Britain and South Mr Mullin: There is a review of all our operations Africa are working together is, and I quote, “A going on at the moment so it would be very rash of commitment to work together on crime prevention me to make too many long-term commitments, but within South Africa,” and then at paragraph 11 of I do expect our staYng in South Africa to remain that paper you start by saying “High crime level broadly as it is for the foreseeable future. negatively aVects all South Africans and are a disincentive to domestic and foreign investment”.12 Q224 Mr Hamilton: That is very cautious and I can Whilst we were in Johannesburg we sadly became understand your caution. I hope that in considering aware of the veracity of just that. There was a our work in South Africa that you do not consider terrible murder of a white husband and wife and selling oV the residence in Cape Town. their two children prior to their home being robbed. Mr Mullin: It is funny that you should mention that. We also positively saw the benefits of the partnership We have actually been awaiting the between Britain and South Africa when we visited recommendation of our High Commissioner on that the Alexandra Township Police Station and we saw issue and she has recommended that the Cape Town there a senior oYcer from Lambeth who had been residence to be sold. We have not made a decision seconded there and was being a very substantial help about that, but we are thinking about it. to the South African Police. There are limited resources, but that is demonstrably a highly eVective Q225 Mr Hamilton: Obviously I cannot speak for way in which the British Government can assist the entire Committee, but certainly my view is that South Africa with this very serious particularly it should not be sold. It is a huge asset to us there. We robbery and violence problem. Do you see any scope saw it ourselves and we saw just what extraordinary for being able to expand that sort of cooperation and good eVect it had and how we were able to entertain partnership significantly? virtually half the Parliament there as well as half the Mr Mullin: Firstly, let me say you are absolutely Government. right. The maintenance of the rule of law is a Mr Mullin: I think the Foreign OYce would be very prerequisite for stability and economic success, interested to hear the Committee’s views on that particularly if you wish to attract foreign issue. investment. The South Africans are as well aware of that as we are. Do I see any possibility of expanding the assistance we already give? Modestly, I think. Q226 Mr Hamilton: While we were in Johannesburg We are talking about capacity building here, things we visited UK Trade and Investment (I think it is like training. Sir John Stevens, the Metropolitan Michael Mowlam who runs that) and we heard some Police Commissioner, I know has personally taken very positive comments while we were there about an interest in the Met’s operation there and he is in the role of UKTI and what they are doing to South Africa at the moment. At the end of the day it encourage trade and investment in South Africa. I comes down to providing them with eVective wondered how the FCO intends to build on the training and resources, and perhaps bringing some success—I know it is DTI as well—and strengthen of them over here to see how we do things. I can see the commercial ties between Britain and South scope for modest expansion but, at the end of the Africa. day it is the South Africans who are going to have Mr Mullin: They are already very strong and I was deal with this problem; it is a very serious problem. struck when your business witnesses gave evidence a We can just to our best to help and advise in all few weeks ago, when someone tried to tempt them capacity. into saying that really we were not doing a very good job, they both said that so far as trade and investment were concerned we were doing an Q229 Sir John Stanley: Can I go onto another extremely good job. They resisted all attempts to specific area which we witnessed but is not actually take them down another road. I would tend to stick referred to in the detail of the specific law and order with what they say about us. subjects and related subjects that we are dealing with on this partnership. When we were in the Alexandra Q227 Mr Hamilton: You cannot have a better Police Station we visited the victim support unit and aYrmation than the people who actually benefit a striking feature for all of us in contrast to what you from it. would experience visiting the equivalent units in our Mr Mullin: We do have an enormous trade own constituencies, is that in our own constituencies relationship with South Africa. I think that of the the overwhelming number of cases where victim top twenty-foreign companies in South Africa, nine support units are used are invariably in relation to of them are British-owned. There is quite a burglary and theft. It was quite diVerent in the unit considerable South African investment in this we visited; virtually all the cases they told us about country too, although not on the same scale as we were in relation to domestic violence. When we have investments there. A large part of our thought about this, we could understand why, when operation is directed towards sustaining and you have a huge township with huge quantities of expanding that and it has been very successful up what is euphemistically called “informal housing”— until now, as I think is universally acknowledged. However, there is always scope for improvement. 12 Please refer to memorandum submitted by the FCO, Ev 67. 9573971012 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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2 March 2004 Mr Chris Mullin MP, Mr Andrew Lloyd and Mr Andy Sparkes which is single or possibly double room shanty-type orphans or in administering the anti-retrovirals if housing with large numbers of people living in very and when they are available. I do not think there is close proximity—this can produce a serious level of a need for me to send you a note since I can tell you domestic violence, abuse of children, abuse of now what we are doing. Last year we spent about women and so on. As this particular area is not £30 million supporting HIV/AIDS work in South mentioned, could you give any form of undertaking Africa. We work with the Departments of Health, to the Committee that you will look at that area and Social Development, Education and Defence and a see whether we could provide any additional number of provincial governments and, indeed, with expertise and help in that particular area for the some non-governmental organisations. The Small South African Police if they should wish it? Grants Scheme which is managed by the British Mr Mullin: I will look at that and I will send you a High Commission—and this might be the answer to note13, but I have to say, at the end of the day, this the particular case that you referred to a moment is a problem of which the South Africans are ago—focuses exclusively on supporting HIV/AIDS perfectly well aware and which they are taking steps non-governmental organisations in South Africa. to address as you have seen for yourselves. I have to Globally the UK is the second largest bilateral say, speaking as former Chairman of the Home donor for HIV/AIDS assistance. It is not enough of AVairs Select Committee, that this is an area in course, and it is never going to be enough. However, which the British Police have underperformed in the our assistance is substantial. The American past, although we are gradually realising the scale of assistance is potentially very large indeed; it is the problem. It is still very patchy in Britain, so there targeted on 14 countries including South Africa. So is probably some scope for a two-way exchange on there is money available, but one of the biggest the subject. problems is going to be finding the infrastructure to make eVective use of it. That will be easier in South Q230 Sir John Stanley: Could I just turn to one other Africa than it will be in some of the other countries. area which is in this area of cooperation. In your paper, you refer to a commitment to work in Q231 Sir John Stanley: Can I just follow up the point partnership to combat communicable diseases, I made about accessing charitable funds. There is notably HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. I clearly a deep wish—not only by this Hospice but think it was, for each member of this Committee, probably by others as well—to obtain information one of the experiences and memories which will about how best to access UK charitable funds and always remain with us when we went to the very, possible charitable funds more widely to help them very, small temporary building of the Soweto AIDS with the sort of projects that I have been referring to. Hospice and to see there people, including children, Do you agree that it would be most helpful—and it dying of AIDS. Clearly the scale of the problem is is easily obtainable—if the British High Commission enormous; we were told there are some five million had available within it lists of appropriate charitable people in South Africa who are assessed as being funds in the UK that it could at least make available HIV positive, but there clearly is an enormous to those who are seeking access to that type of requirement to provide more adequate hospice funding in this country? facilities and that sort of help for those who are Mr Mullin: I will check out that point. I agree it terminally ill dying of AIDS. I wonder again might well be helpful. whether you might be able to give a further note to the Committee as to whether the British Q232 Mr Illsley: Following on from that, the AIDS Government feels able to do more. The very small V Hospice that we visited was not, so far as I recall, but wonderful sta at that AIDS Hospice put to us recognised by the South African government that they are in the process of trying to seek funds to because they will not accept that people are dying expand that Hospice and to create permanent from HIV/AIDS and so they will not recognise the buildings for it. If, in a note to the Committee14, you V hospices, and did not recognise that one. Are we can o er suggestions as to suitable sources of doing enough to try to persuade South Africa to charitable funding—possibly even government look upon this problem with the seriousness that it funding—that might be available in the UK I am really requires and to try to persuade them that they sure the Committee will be willing to forward that have to do more in terms of hospice treatment, information to the people concerned. medical treatment and anti-rectrovirals? Mr Mullin: I am not a DfID minister and I think I Mr Mullin: It is true there has been a debate in South would be in trouble if I started to spend DfID’s Africa on the extent of the AIDS problem, but it has funds in front of the Committee here. AIDS is a huge been resolved really in favour of recognising that problem in Africa; of the 42 million people in the there is a very serious problem and I think all world who are HIV/AIDS positive, 30 million are in concerned now acknowledge that. I think it was just Africa. The problem is actually a great deal worse in before Christmas that the South African some respects in some of the other African countries Government agreed its strategy for addressing because, unlike South Africa, they lack the AIDS so I am not sure that it is true to say that they infrastructure to be able to cope either with the do not acknowledge the problem because I am confident that they do now acknowledge the 13 Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, Ev 94. seriousness of the problem. As regards what we are 14 Please refer to the supplementary memorandum submitted doing, I read out a moment ago the areas in which by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, Ev 94. we are involved, the South African Government 9573971012 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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2 March 2004 Mr Chris Mullin MP, Mr Andrew Lloyd and Mr Andy Sparkes departments with which we are involved. Given that Mr Mullin: A lot of our aid is regional. A lot of our the political will exists in South Africa—and I hope overseas aid goes towards capacity building of pan- it now does—for treating this issue with the African institutions. We mentioned NePAD a seriousness that it deserves, then I think South moment ago; we mentioned SADC and, of course, Africa, more than most countries, stands a chance of we have major aid programmes in some of the making inroads into it. Obviously had the problem countries immediately surrounding South Africa V been addressed earlier it would not now be so great. and that actually has a knock-one e ect in terms of limiting the ﬂow of refugees and migration into Southern Africa. We have major programmes in Q233 Chairman: I have one sweep-up question. Mozambique which is one of the poorest countries Anyone who knows the region will recognise in of the world and in Malawi. It is in South Africa’s South Africa a country which works: the interest that those countries are brought up as well infrastructure is of a high quality; the people answer because one of the problems is that there is a huge telephones; it is heavily biased to IT; there is a strong disparity between South Africa and its neighbours civic sub-structure on the social side which is and the faster they succeed in closing the gulf between the wealthiest and the poorest, at the extremely important in terms of local democracy. present moment they are going to suck in people Any investment which is made will beneﬁt not only from the surrounding economies because there is no South Africa itself but that region which it shortage of impoverished people in that region. That dominates to a large extent. I hope when we label is why we have to try to bring the whole region up South Africa a middle-income country with the and not just one country. result that our aid is decreasing, that you can give an Chairman: The message is clear: in partnership we assurance to the Committee that we recognise that can achieve good things in the region of South any aid which assists South Africa will also have Africa. May I, on behalf of the Committee, thank repercussive eVects on the region as a whole and that you and thank your colleagues for a most helpful aid policy should be given within that context. session.

Supplementary memorandum submitted by the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce

LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FROM THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE At the oral evidence session on 2 March, I promised to follow up certain points in a letter to you. At the end of 1994, four Upholder class submarines were withdrawn from the Royal Navy service and became available for sales or lease. South Africa expressed an interest in the submarines and, for a while, was one of the countries in contention for them. In the event, South Africa chose not to purchase or lease the Upholders. HMGdid, and does, support British commercial interests in South Africa. We did not seek to direct or interfere in the decisions of the South African Government in their Strategic Defence Review. The UK Government is supportive of eVorts by the African Union, African sub-regional organisations and members of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to promote peace and security in Africa. The African Union’s commitment to establishing an African Standby Force to carry out peace support operations mandated by the AU Peace and Security Council is welcome. The structure of the force is still to be agreed. It is therefore diYcult to outline the exact size and nature of UK support. In recent years the UK has provided long-term peace support operations training in many countries including South Africa, Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria; all likely to be signiﬁcant contributors to the African Standby Force. This support will continue in future years. In 2005, when we hold the G8 Presidency, we will aim to encourage better international co-ordination in support of both the African Union and African sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS. The British High Commission in South Africa has been involved in a programme of support to Alexandra township police station for the last three years. This has culminated in the secondment of a Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) oYcer to the station to advise on community policing issues, including the policing of domestic violence. Tackling the problem of domestic violence is a priority area for the South African Police and the European Commission in Pretoria has also developed a programme to tackle it and crimes against children. This programme is due to start this year and the MPS has oVered their help to the programme managers. The MPS secondee in Alexandra has already met with the team, who will be using the lessons learned from our work to inform their own. Future work by the High Commission will be dependent on securing funds to continue the twinning project between Southwark Police and Alexandra Police stations. Details of HMG’s funding are advertised on the High Commission and DfID websites (www.britain.org.za and www.dﬁd.gov.uk). There are a number of UK charities operating in South Africa which have HIV/AIDS programmes. And there are several NGOs, eg the Southern African Grantmakers Association (www.donors.org.za) which already produce directories of available funding. 9573971013 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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As requested, I enclose a copy of the UK/South Africa MOU on the Reciprocal Educational Exchange of Healthcare Concepts and Personnel signed on 25 October 2003. Chris Mullin MP 22 March 2004

Annex

Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of South Africa on the Reciprocal Educational Exchange of Healthcare Concepts and Personnel

Preamble The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter referred to as “UK”) and the Government of the Republic of South Africa (hereinafter referred to as “South Africa”) and jointly referred to as the “Parties” and in the singular as a “Party”); Desirous to consolidate and strengthen the friendly ties and reciprocal understanding between the Parties; Conscious of the desirability of promoting to the greatest possible extent the mutual knowledge, experience and understanding of their respective human and development needs in the ﬁeld covered by this Memorandum of Understanding by means of friendly cooperation between them; Considering the Parties wish to enhance their bilateral relations in respect of Public Health and Health Care Policy; Considering the mutual interest of the Parties in exchange programmes for oYcials of each Party, and that professionals selected to join the programme have an opportunity to enhance clinical/technical skills and explore best experiences. Hereby Agree as follows:

Article 1

OBJECTIVE OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING The Objective of this Memorandum of Understanding is to enhance clinical/technical skills and to explore best practice in health care delivery.

Article 2

SCOPE OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING The Scope of this Memorandum of Understanding is as follows: 1. Giving cognisance to the existing commitment of the UK to ethical international workforce policies and practices as clearly outlined in their Department of Health’s Guide to International Recruitment 1999, and the UK Code of Practice for National Health Services (NHS) employers 2001, both parties shall formulate an agreed plan whereby, South African healthcare personnel can spend mutually agreed period of time on education and practice in organisations providing National Health Services; 2. The Memorandum of Understanding will also enable clinical staV from England to work alongside healthcare personnel in the Republic of South Africa, with particular emphasis on the rural areas; and 3. The Parties shall exchange information, advice and expertise in: (a) professional regulation issues; (b) public health and primary care; (c) workforce planning and development, including the National Health Services and academic interface; (d) strategic planning; (e) public-private partnerships, including private ﬁnance initiatives; (f) revitalisation of hospitals, including governance (corporate and clinical) and re-engineering; (g) twinning of hospitals to share best practices and strengthen management; and (h) training in healthcare management. 9573971013 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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4. The Parties shall collaborate with the following institutions: (a) National Institute for Clinical Excellence in Quality issues; and (b) the Health Protection Agency.

Article 3

SPECIFIC PROGRAMMES AND PROJECTS Activities described in this Memorandum of Understanding may be implemented by the Parties through the development of specific arrangements, programmes or projects between the appropriate agencies and oYces of the Parties. Such arrangements, programmes or projects should specify inter alia the objectives, activities, organisation, financial arrangements and other details relating to specific undertakings of all participants involved.

Article 4

COMPETENT AUTHORITIES The competent authorities responsible for the implementation of this Memorandum of Understanding shall be: (a) in the case of the UK, the Department of Health, represented in the Republic of South Africa by the High Commission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and (b) in the case of South Africa, its national Department of Health.

Article 5

TRAINING The Parties shall facilitate mutual access to universities, colleges and schools of training for the health professionals during: (a) scientiﬁc studies; (b) speciﬁc training; (c) postgraduate training; (d) study visits.

Article 6

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES Any disputes between the Parties, which may arise in the course of the implementation and interpretation of this Memorandum of Understanding, shall be settled amicably through consultation or negotiation between the Parties.

Article 7

AMENDMENTS TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING This Memorandum of Understanding may be amended by mutual consent of the Parties through an Exchange of Notes between the Parties through the diplomatic channel.

Article 8

ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION 1. This Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into force on the date of its signature thereof. 2. This Memorandum of Understanding shall remain in force for a period of ﬁve (5) years but may be terminated by either Party giving three months written notice in advance through the diplomatic channel of its intention to terminate it. 9573971013 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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3. If deemed necessary, the Parties, by written mutual consent, may decide to extend the duration of this Memorandum of Understanding. 4. The termination of this Memorandum of Understanding shall not aVect the validity and duration of any ongoing arrangements, programmes and projects undertaken under this Memorandum of Understanding, until the completion of such programmes or activities.

LETTER TO THE PARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS AND DEVOLUTION DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FROM THE SECOND CLERK OF THE COMMITTEE, DATED 17 MARCH 2004

High Commissioner’s Residence in Cape Town You may have seen the following exchange in the Committee’s recent evidence session with Mr Mullin, during its inquiry into “South Africa”: Q224 Mr Hamilton: I hope that in considering our work in South Africa that you do not consider selling oV the residence in Cape Town. Mr Mullin: It is funny that you should mention that. We have actually been awaiting the recommendation of our High Commissioner on that issue and she has recommended that the Cape Town residence to be sold. We have not made a decision about that, but we are thinking about it. Q225 Mr Hamilton: Obviously I cannot speak for the entire Committee, but certainly my view is that it should not be sold. It is a huge asset to us there. We saw it ourselves and we saw just what extraordinary good eVect it had and how we were able to entertain virtually half the parliament there as well as half the government. Mr Mullin: I think the Foreign OYce would be very interested to hear the Committee’s views on that issue. The Committee have asked me to seek clariﬁcation from you as to the exact status of the Residence at this time, in relation to the asset recycling programme, and the timescale for any decisions on its future retention or sale. It also wishes to know how the proceeds of any sale of this property would be used by the Department. I look forward to receiving your reply in due course. GeoVrey Farrar Second Clerk of the Committee 17 March 2004

LETTER FROM PARLIAMENTARY RELATIONS AND DEVOLUTION DEPARTMENT TO SECOND CLERK OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Thank you for your letter of 17 March asking for clariﬁcation of the FCO’s intentions towards the High Commissioner’s Residence in Cape Town. I apologise for the delay in replying to you. We have noted the FAC’s interest in the Residence, and the views expressed during Mr Mullin’s oral evidence session on 2 March. We will let the FAC know when we have reached a decision on the future of the Residence, and the reasons for that decision. Matthew Hamlyn 26 April 2004

Written evidence submitted by Dr Ian Taylor, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana

One of the main promoters of the NEPAD has been South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki, who has taken on an almost personalised stake in the NEPAD’s advocacy. As a result, the NEPAD has been criticised as being overly dominated by South Africa. The implementation process for achieving the NEPAD’s goals might be said to reﬂect South African dominance of the programme, as well as the tensions that this has engendered, particularly as the Secretariat is based in Pretoria under the head of Wiseman Nkuhlu (a South African). Such a set-up has produced a degree of anxiety already within Africa, with the interim president of the African Union, along with foreign ministers and members of the newly launched 9573971014 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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African Union’s secretariat “lambast[ing] South Africa and Nigeria for dominating the NEPAD process”, questioning why the African Union (AU) had been launched in South Africa instead of Addis Ababa and claiming that the AU was “not being kept up to speed with developments on NEPAD”.5 This being so, most focus on the NEPAD has been aimed at the section on Political Governance and Peer Review, which sprang from the March 2002 Draft Report on Good Governance and Democracy and the African Peer Review Mechanism. Unlike the now-defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU), it appeared to some observers that the NEPAD was a qualitatively diVerent document from previous African “declarations”, perhaps for the first time advancing a promise to self-police African leaders and rein in corrupt autocrats. However, it now appears highly improbable that there will be any sanctions or counter- measures against those countries that fail to pass the governance muster. Yet without such measures any review mechanism is largely pointless as it will have no teeth. Problematically, it was President Mbeki who unilaterally claimed that the African Review Mechanism (APRM) would not review the political governance of African countries. This marked a retreat from earlier pronouncements and came after an extended period of time when the NEPAD’s promoters (primarily Mbeki and Obasanjo) not only consistently refused to criticise Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and his party’s behaviour but also supported him. Whilst Mbeki has sought to deny that there should be any link between inaction over Zimbabwe and the NEPAD’s credibility, virtually all observers have stressed the crucial linkage. Mbeki’s position was—and is—is that the NEPAD is simply the AU’s “socio-economic programme”, and that there was never ever any suggestion that the NEPAD peer review process would conduct the work of the AU’s Commission on Human Rights. Such a position contradicts both one of the main selling points of the NEPAD and, what Mbeki had postured previously. It is a fact that when it was launched and in the run-up to its launch, NEPAD was sold to its Western partners on the basis that it would advance democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance and that such principles would be guided and monitored through the establishment of a “peer review” mechanism. Now that this seems to have been abandoned, serious questions as to what exactly is the point of the NEPAD if all it is going to do is review economic progress in Africa are being asked. Innumerable reports on Africa’s economic condition are already regularly issued by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, development agencies and non-governmental organisations, as well as departments and ministries within most African states (as well as publications such as The Economist Intelligence Unit). What value can the NEPAD bring if it is simply going to duplicate such work? Whilst there is now a six-person supervising panel of the peer review mechanism (appointed in May 2003), the whole process is entirely voluntary and lacks any muscle and there is now a suspicion that this panel will restrict itself to rubber-stamping governance reports of countries that were confident of positive evaluations by the panel in the first place. The point of such an exercise is obscure. President Thabo Mbeki has in fact come out badly since the launch of the NEPAD, primarily because many saw him as one of the “new generation” of African leaders. But, his behaviour surrounding the Zimbabwe issue and the NEPAD has served to question his leadership and diplomatic skills. Mbeki’s tactic of labelling anyone he is in disagreement with as “racist” has been particularly disturbing. For instance, in engaging with critics over his back-pedalling regarding the APRM, Mbeki labelled them “self-appointed champions of democracy and human rights in Africa” who were apparently infused with “contemptuous prejudice” for Africans and who dared to suggest that “Africa’s political leaders cannot be trusted to promote and entrench democracy and human rights”.6 Mbeki has also been involved in an acrimonious dispute within the Commonwealth when he labelled leaders within that organisation who expressed concern over Mugabe’s tyranny as racists who were merely “inspired by notions of white supremacy”. Such moves were pursued because white leaders in the Commonwealth apparently felt uneasy at their “repugnant position imposed by inferior blacks”.7 This type of rhetoric, aimed at Prime Minister Blair, is not the type of language expected from an ostensible friend of the United Kingdom, nor from a country that demands increased investment from London. Whilst it is recognised that the NEPAD is a long-term project of renewal, worthy of support, South Africa’s policies with regard to the NEPAD thus far reflect an unmistakable failure to act (or even express overt concern) regarding governance failures on the continent. The debacle in Zimbabwe is perhaps the most high-profile but the situation in Swaziland should also be noted. Both countries are within South Africa’s immediate sphere of influence and a more proactive stance by Pretoria should be expected. The inaction to date invites disappointment vis-a`-vis the NEPAD and makes its more diYcult for its Western promoters (primarily Canada and the United Kingdom) to sell the document to other G-7 members as a serious initiative. The palpable cooling oV of the world community’s enthusiasm for the NEPAD can be seen in part as a result of this failure. The NEPAD has value in placing the question of Africa’s development

5 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 22 September 2002. 6 Quoted in “Critics Ill-Informed About NEPAD Peer Review”, ANC Today, Vol. 2, No 45, 8–14 November 2002, www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at45.htm 7 “Letter from the President: Zimbabwe: ‘Two Blacks and One White’”, ANC Today: Online Voice of the African National Congress, Vol 2, No 10, 8–14 March 2002, www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at10.htm. 9573971014 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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ﬁrmly on the international agenda, but there is a real need for Mbeki to show some degree of leadership, even if this is uncomfortable. Failure to do so risks allowing the NEPAD project to ultimately fade away like other previous pan-African development initiatives. Dr Ian Taylor University of Botswana

Written evidence submitted by the Local Government International Bureau (LGIB), the international arm of the Local Government Association for England and Wales

Introduction There have historically been strong links between South Africa and British local government, with signiﬁcant anti-apartheid campaigns led by UK local authorities. Since 1994 South Africa has faced an unprecedented challenge in redirecting its resources to achieve equity for its very varied communities. Local authority reform has been essential to this process. British and South African local authorities are working together to develop representative services that tackle poverty, while at national level the South African Local Government Association is working with its British counterparts to expand the beneﬁts of such international links.

Local Government in South Africa Since 1994 local government in South Africa has undergone a series of radical reforms. Its role is enshrined in the country’s 1996 Constitution which recognises it as an equal ‘sphere’ of government, working alongside provincial and central government with responsibility for the delivery of municipal services. A series of Acts have set out new guidelines for municipal demarcation and structural modernisation, with the number of local authorities being reduced from 843 to 284 in 2000. These local authorities are set out within nine provinces, each of which has a provincial sphere of government. The South African Local Government Association is recognised by the Constitution as the national voice of local government. As such, SALGA is consulted on all legislation aVecting local government. SALGA itself has undergone substantial changes in response to the rapidly changing landscape of central government in the country. Core to its mandate is the transformation of local government countrywide to fulﬁl its developmental role.

Local Government Association Cooperation While there is much international interest in South Africa, SALGA is not fully capitalising on the opportunities presented through international programmes and partnerships within South Africa. In association with the UK’s Local Government International Bureau, SALGA is currently establishing a new External Relations Unit to map, coordinate and promote international activities for a beneﬁcial impact on local development. A memorandum of understanding has been signed between SALGA and LGIB in commitment to this process of support. The initial phase of the programme saw SALGA and LGIB working together in 2002 to assess the international needs for South African local government. The outcome of this research was the development of a plan for an External Relations Unit, the establishment of which began in April 2003. Over the next three years LGIB will particularly provide support in training a designated partnerships oYcer, and providing technical assistance in communications and establishing new links.

Local Authority Partnerships A varied range of local authority partnerships exist between South Africa and the United Kingdom. While these centre around the sharing of best practice and joint projects for the development of local government capacity, many involve a signiﬁcant community element. It is recognised that each partner has unique experience to share with the other in an environment of mutual learning. Current partnerships are:

6.1 Leeds—Durban This technical link has brought together staV from the two cities on a series of projects which have included security, tourism and regeneration, whilst promoting community-wide learning about each country’s culture. Now in its ﬁfth year, the partnership is increasingly active in extending beyond core city council links to incorporate schools, universities, NGOs and community groups. A delegation from the Leeds Initiative, the city’s public-private partnership, will visit Durban in autumn 2003, alongside oYcers working on a new programme of support for small businesses. 9573971015 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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6.2 Croydon—Kungwini Kungwini municipality has developed an economic department using Croydon as a model. The two counterparts are now exchanging best practice in local regeneration strategies in order to develop an integrated economic regeneration strategy and cross-sector partnership in Kungwini with an emphasis on addressing social and economic inequality. Croydon Council is working with the Borough’s Chamber of Commerce on a second trade mission to South Africa following a successful mission in 2002 which was notable for its high ratio of female and ethnic minority delegates. Like its predecessor, the forthcoming mission will incorporate a wide range of businesses in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban.

6.3 Birmingham—Johannesburg A twin relationship acts as the foundation for these metropolitan city councils to work together on practical issues. The councils, organisations and citizens of Birmingham and Johannesburg are committed to a process of learning from each other. Through the exchange of best practice, information, people and ideas the two cities have become better able to tackle the problems aVecting large, constantly changing multi racial and multi ethnic cities. Focusing on education, governance and job creation both councils continue to collaborate on delivering the vibrant, learning modern cities within which we all want to live and work.

6.4 Lewisham—Ekurheleni This new partnership is in the early stages of identifying areas for council cooperation and community involvement. Areas of interest at present include exchanges of information, skills and expertise among council employees, educational links—between schools and colleges and particularly the possibility of internships, citizenship with regard to young people, and aspects of economic development and regeneration. Lewisham recently hosted a successful study tour from councillors and oYcers of Ekurhuleni who were focusing on the use of new technology for the provision of front-line services.

6.5 Oxfordshire—Nkonkobe This established educational and arts-based partnership is currently expanding into economic development through a tourism and leisure programme.

6.6 Torfaen—Cape Town A good practice partnership was developed in 2000 to assist Cape Town’s Oostenburg section to develop a social exclusion strategy and action plan. A key objective was to develop the management capacity of key staV. The strategy was formally adopted in 2002 and has contributed to the wider agenda being developed across the city. The two partners seek to maintain their relationship through the ongoing exchange of best practice.

6.7 East Grinstead—Dundee This twinning link is based around school partnerships between the two towns. Signiﬁcant activities include staV exchanges and discussions of best practice in education.

6.8 Hackney—Alexandra An informal link administered by Hackney’s International Association, this partnership focuses on educational exchanges between schools in the two inner city areas.

6.9 London—Johannesburg The Greater London Authority has established a “sister city” relationship with Johannesburg.

Building the Capacity of Elected Members: LAACTSA The NGO Local Authority Action for Southern Africa is a forum for over 60 councils in the UK with an interest in South Africa. Founded upon Local Authorities Against Apartheid, LAACTSA was established in 1995 to promote democracy and development throughout southern Africa by working with local communities and their local authorities. In South Africa, activities centre around training placements and capacity building programmes for councillors. 9573971015 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Now hosted by Croydon Council, LAACTSA is promoting a scheme for the development of business entrepreneurship in partnership with local government. This initiative sets out to support local women councillors in rural South Africa, and women entrepreneurs in setting up small businesses, through mentoring and training progammes.

Building the Capacity of Officers and Officials: SOLACE and I&DeA

The UK’s Improvement and Development Agency (I&DeA) has been central in assisting SALGA in the development of their initial three year business plan and strategic review, funded by DfID. I&DeA maintains support for local and provincial government in South Africa through initiatives such as a recent study tour for South African oYcials to the UK on the theme of local government modernisation. The Society of Local Authority Chief Executives (SOLACE) has developed an advisory relationship with its South African counterpart, the Institute for Local Government Management. The current focus of this relationship is support for the establishment of a commercial wing of ILGM, which will be a company built along the lines of SOLACE Enterprises in the UK. An exchange programme for senior local government oYcials is also under discussion.

ACommonwealth Perspective: CLGF

The Commonwealth Local Government Forum, based in the UK, seeks to build the capacity of local government in Commonwealth countries with an emphasis on the exchange of best practice between international partners. CLGF’s current approach in South Africa takes the shape of the Good Practice Scheme, a DfID programme of support for strengthening local government. The Scheme aims to build the capacity of local authorities in South Africa in devising and implementing plans for local economic development in relation to South Africa’s mandatory Integrated Development Plans. Nine international partnerships between South African municipalities and Commonwealth counterparts are designed to share good practice and develop appropriate solutions. Overarching these projects is a programme for developing SALGA’s capacity to exploit such international resources for the development of local government in the country. This programme is involving the LGIB in supporting SALGA in tracking and promoting international input into local government and directing this for strategic impact (see paragraph 4 above).

Funding

As of 2003 there is a designated fund for the development of local government partnerships between South Africa and the Commonwealth in the ﬁeld of economic development, in the shape of the DfID-funded CLGF Good Practice Scheme, to which South African local authorities can apply, requesting partnership with the UK where appropriate. This scheme will fund nine partnerships, some of which will be with UK partners. Individual schemes have also been supported by DfID, the British Council and Westminster Foundation for Democracy. While local authorities are legally authorised to use domestic resources overseas, in practice they favour external funds or community fund-raising for smaller scale projects.

Future Strategy

As the body constitutionally responsible for the development of local government in South Africa, SALGA aims to ensure that the resources to which it has access are directed towards its own strategic objectives. These resources increasingly include local government expertise, experience and commitment from practitioners worldwide. The LGIB will therefore continue to work with SALGA to build capacity for an increasingly strategic approach to international input into local government in South Africa, in order that individual projects and partnerships might reap the most eVective beneﬁt for the country’s development. In the domestic context, the LGIB and its sister local government organisations will work together to encourage the coordinated and strategic input of UK local authorities in accordance with SALGA’s plans for local development in South Africa. Local Government International Bureau September 2003 9573971016 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Written evidence submitted by The British Council

THE BRITISH COUNCIL IN SOUTH AFRICA

The Council’s Purpose in South Africa The Council’s purpose in South Africa is to: — Enhance the UK’s reputation with the authority generation by supporting their transformation agenda. — Demonstrate UK creativity and innovation to the young South Africans who will influence the country’s future. — Strengthen civil society though developing access to information and through developing leadership. Operating through a main oYce in Johannesburg and three smaller oYces in Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban the Council uses the following income to achieve its purpose, (using 2003–04 figures). — Grant in Aid £2.35 million — Higher Education Grant £0.224 million — Other income £0.881 million — Total £3.45 million These resources include income from our enterprise activity, our income from managing development contracts for clients and sponsorship or partnership funding. They exclude the operational value of the development contracts we manage on behalf of clients, which adds a further £1.7 million of expenditure through our accounts. Our overall impact in financial terms is therefore £5.15 million. It is important to realise however that the South Africa operation works with four other countries in a unified regional structure.

The Council’s Programme in South Africa These resources support the following programmes in education and training, governance and the arts and science, organised under three thematic campaigns. Each campaign will use all types of Council activity to achieve its goals.

Trainingfor change We work in partnership with South African organisations to support education and skills development at all levels to meet the challenges of our changing societies and work at all levels of educational provision. We manage a framework agreement with the Department of Education and the Colleges Collaboration Fund (a private sector social investment mechanism) to support national reform in Further Education & Training which accesses Rand 40 million of private sector resource and which has developed long term relationships between South African and UK colleges. The school-linking programme has brought more than one hundred and fifty UK and South African schools together and focuses directly on curriculum development and good practice in schools. We also manage thirty two university links under the Higher Education Links Scheme, funded by the DfID Higher Education Grant (that will terminate in 2005–06). Other areas of activity include assistance to the merging of South African higher education institutions, the development of school leadership and assisting with the institutional development of the South African Higher Education Quality Council and the Qualifications Authority. We include in this campaign the oVer of UK examination opportunities in South Africa, oVering career choice and internationally recognised qualifications to South Africans on a fee-paying basis. Finally but prominently we manage the Chevening Scholarships on behalf, and in conjunction with the FCO, to identify and oVer postgraduate training to young South African future leaders.

Buildingour democracies together We work in partnership with South African institutions to strengthen and promote good governance, a human rights culture and to generate better democratic participation in our two countries. This includes the Strategic Leadership Training Programme for Southern Africa providing leadership training to the South African successor generation, drawing participation from civil society and non- governmental organisations. 9573971016 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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An annual high profile event is UKUZA (United Kingdom Unites with South Africa), a bilateral forum strengthening networks of young politicians, artists, academics and influential personalities from the public, private and civil society sectors, who engage in debate around such issues as identity. The programme achieves a degree of profile that does not target specific sector interests but engenders mutual understanding and common values between people of influence. We also manage a Child Rights Project contributing to research dialogue and capacity development in the areas of the rights of the child. This project specifically draws on experience and expertise from Wales through their Children’s Commissioner. The Access to Information and Whistleblowing Project links South African, UK and Indian civil society and watchdog organisations to promote a more transparent, open and accountable South Africa. The project focuses on two new items of legislation, the Protected Disclosures Act and the promotion of Access to Information Act.

Partners in innovation The campaign focuses on showing UK creativity and innovation in the Arts and Sciences, and is the channel through which we achieve wide spread impact on young people in South African society by direct exposure to events, performances and other interactions that bring the vibrancy of UK cultural life to their notice. Examples of such activity follow. We send young aspiring South African scientists to the London International Youth Science Forum to meet their UK counterparts and in 2003 are circulating an exhibition celebrating the Discovery of DNA throughout the country. We ensure at least one performing arts tour each year focusing particularly on young audiences and have in the last two years provided access to some of the most innovative performers from the UK music scene in rap, hip-hop and other types of product. We manage the New Writing Workshops for Radio Drama in partnership with the BBC and the Performing Arts Network of South Africa, developing skills and opportunities in radio drama. In 2003 we also worked with the Encounters Documentary Film Festival to showcase cutting edge UK work.

Sport Three years ago we started to build a proﬁle in Sport, beginning with the mass appeal Football Nation Exhibition, our participation in the multilateral Dreams and Teams project (developing young people’s leadership and coaching skills, including life skills, in several countries) and forming a relationship with key sporting personalities in the country. Coincident with the ﬁrst ever onshore England-South Africa football match in early 2003 we established and mounted an exhibition on sporting relations between the UK and South Africa, documenting in particular the UK role in the anti-apartheid campaigns of the 70s–90s. At the same time we co-ordinated the presentation of over 5,000 diVerent football strips, all donated by English football fans, for distribution to young footballers in disadvantaged communities. Fan ambassadorship is now an increasingly important part of our South African programme and we have developed a number of relationships between UK and South African fan groups. As the universal sport football oVers a powerful means of building contemporary relationships based on common understanding. Sport is likely to play an increasing role in our programme and will hopefully develop into a full campaign.

Development services We manage a varied portfolio of projects on behalf of major donors in South Africa, including DfID, which contribute directly to the social and economic development of the country. Some examples are: A seminal pilot project to support HIV/Aids prevention in the penal system in South Africa. Starting with Westville Prison, the largest prison in Southern Africa, and the Kwa-Zulu Natal Correctional Services department we used our global network to access expertise and experience form the Uganda Prisons Service, providing capacity development and skills transfer to South Africa. The evaluation determined the project to be highly successful and it is now expected that the programme will roll out nationally under the auspices of DfID’s Safety, Security and Access to Justice programme. For 10 years we have managed the British Investment Scheme, funded by DfID and targeting small and medium sized enterprises in the UK and South Africa to promote successful investment and joint ventures to encourage local economic development, income generation and employment in South Africa. The Support to Economic Reform Programme also invests in high level capacity development in three key Ministries, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Public Enterprises and the National Treasury, making available international experience and expertise to review, assess and reform service delivery within these key institutions. 9573971016 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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The British Council’s Strategy in South Africa In 2000 the British Council corporately implemented a strategy to redistribute its resources according to deﬁned geographical priorities and to transform its impact overseas. In Africa this meant a concentration of resources in two key priority countries, South Africa and Nigeria. In the former our strategy has set out to improve eYciency but also to provide a modern and eVective approach to delivering cultural relations impact for the UK. Its key characteristics are the following.

Integration There are two aspects to integration. The first is how we relate to other UK agencies including our sponsoring department, the FCO, and secondly how we organise ourselves. Through the British High Commission, the Council participates in two structures that provide for “joined up” government. The first is the Director’s membership of the High Commissioner’s regular Board of Management ensuring information transfer and co-ordination among UK agencies working here. The second is participation in the task forces established to keep in touch with priority policy issues for the UK in South Africa. A rewarding consequence of this process is increasing levels of collaboration at activity level, enabling wider exposure of UK HMGsta V to South African networks and better understanding by South Africans of the UK presence in the country. Equally important is a growing understanding the of the diVerent organisational cultures we work in. Internally we have reorganised our team around activity managers who drive an action plan related to each campaign. The team are distributed across the four oYces as we believe this enables us to use talent most eVectively where we find it and to ensure good communication facilities are available. Central teams in Johannesburg operating the programme are supported in the smaller oYces by activity delivery managers who support local delivery as needed. The eVect has been to create a single integrated South African (and regional) programme, in contrast to our earlier disposition which entailed three separate and usually distinct programmes in each of our three oYces (prior to the opening of the Pretoria oYce).

Regionalism The British Council in South Africa operates as the central component of a regional Council network including our activity in Namibia, Botswana, Mozambique and Mauritius. This provides for a network of eight oYces working as one operational unit. The process has several advantages in terms of eYciency and eVectiveness. Feedback from our partners has been universally supportive and enthusiastic for the opportunities it aVords them. On the former we have been able to remove duplicated support services by centralising accounting, personnel and other services to free up resource for programme delivery. Our goal was to improve the ratio of spend between programme and overhead costs programme from around 35% to 50%. By the end of 2003–04 this goal will have been achieved. On eVectiveness we operate a regional programme that enables nationals from all ﬁve countries to interact with each other through regional, cross border activities. This enables economies of scale, better use of our human resource talent across the ﬁve countries and an increase in impact as our target groups appreciate the enhanced access they enjoy to UK networks as well as their professional peers in neighbouring countries. This enriches the content, builds trust and exploits the unique capacity the Council has to build and maintain cross border, multilateral networks of professional interest. The gain in trust is palpable and enables the Council to support the NEPAD agenda in a very direct way. It also presages and builds good practice in advance of the pan African activities we have received new funding for in Africa. The capacity to operate multilaterally is an increasing criteria for success in building positive cultural relations among professional groups and we are developing best practice in this regard.

Human resources The Council in South Africa has changed its staV culture. We reduced the number of UK appointed staV we expatriate to South Africa and increased the number of senior South African staV that manage our programmes. Five years ago there were no South Africans in our senior team whereas now 60% of its membership comprise local staV. Our motives have been ﬁrst and foremost to comply with Equity of Employment legislation and to demonstrate our support to transformation through our own employment practice. Additionally we have recruited local professionals to manage all our programme activity, bringing with them not only local expertise but access to existing professional networks. Employing a full time professional Human Resources Director we focus considerable attention and resource on good employment practice and skills development. We have ﬁve UK staV in South Africa and thirty seven South African staV. Of the total forty two more than half have regional responsibilities. 9573971016 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 105

Programme strategy The Campaign structure of our programme has also brought benefits, both to staV and how they work but also to external stakeholders and target groups. Firstly it enables us to focus resources on a controlled spread of activities that support broader messages about UK culture, ideas and achievements. There are approximately sixty units of activity spread across the three campaigns in our current year action plan. We aim to reduce the number in future years in favour of fewer but larger units of activity achieving higher profile and impact. Secondly it enables interested parties to understand our programme in a more open and transparent way. Thirdly it facilitates the sharing of resources and expertise in such a way that we are able to enhance impact in the smaller countries in our region beyond the level of budget they are able to access. We can get more bang for our buck. The coherence and continuity of message also enable a better marketing platform for extending impact to wider society through communication activities, through the media, through events and through products we disseminate through programmes. A key part of our development is the commissioning of primary market research into our target groups. As a transitional society, South Africa is raising a new generation of adults whose characteristics are not that well understood. They are from the former disadvantaged communities but in the post apartheid period have emerged as well educated, economically powerful consumers with diVerent habits, tastes and interests to their parents who did not enjoy the opportunities they have grown up with. They have not had UK exposure during the exile and scholarship era. They will become the leaders of the future but do not have well formed views about the UK. We need to find out about them and cater to their interests. In this regard there is a superb case study of the BRUFS (British Undergraduates Fellowship Scheme) graduates, a group of about 150 black South Africans who were trained to degree level in the UK in the early 90s. The scheme was funded by DfID and managed by the Council. They have now re-emerged as a self-sustaining, dynamic alumni group who are forming strategically important relationships with Trade Partners International and other FCO colleagues. The relationship provides key access to an important segment of African society through a group of Africans who have an intimate understanding of the UK and its people.

Infrastructure Three million of Africa’s seven million internet users are in South Africa. The country has an eVective electronic infrastructure and associated services enabling us to concentrate on using virtual services for delivery. Consequently we do not provide the public access facilities one would typically associate with a British Council oYce in Africa or Asia. Over 85% of enquiries received are virtual. We have invested in video conferencing, IT, web based and call centre based facilities that enable us to achieve economies and to stand at the cutting edge of communication services in Africa. Our enquiry service is outsourced as is the management of our web services freeing up capacity devoted to better bespoke research services by our information team in support of product and service development in our campaigns. We increasingly invest eYciency savings in bandwidth to cater for increasing communication requirements. These will increase steadily as the Council introduces new online management systems, products and services. A clear priority for the next ﬁve years is to build and deliver a sophisticated information and service delivery system that will enable our customers to access information about the UK rapidly, and increasingly to access services directly through our electronic network, whether registering for an examination or directly accessing study material through the internet.

Evaluation We are now working with a Balanced Scorecard to build up a clear picture of the impact of our work activities and the performance improvements we can achieve year on year. In addition individual project speciﬁc evaluations are carried out to ensure achievement of objectives and to ensure we capture good practice for transfer to other activity. In 2003–04 we will produce baseline data covering a number of indicators which will inform future planning and delivery.

Conclusion The British Council is a crucial element of the UK public diplomacy agenda in South Africa. We work with our HMGpartners to overcome a distinctly dated perception among South Africans of UK society. The large British passport holding community are not a key target group and often not supportive of the ideas we espouse. Diversity, innovation and modernity are not values they necessarily associate with the Britain of their imagination. The new emerging black middle class equally do not share this perception much beyond the icons of Beckham and Buckingham Palace. They are however a group who are amenable to the culture we wish to promote and are a sophisticated customer. Our challenge is to assist their elders to 9573971016 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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progress post-apartheid transformation and to ensure as the next generation inherit the mantle they will turn to UK for opportunity, experience and expertise. Our challenge is to understand their needs and to respond with services that attract and retain their interest. The British Council September 2003

Written evidence submitted by Mr Keith Somerville

SOUTH AFRICA IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Continental and Regional Context South Africa is the dominant military and economic power in southern Africa and the most inﬂuential nation (in global and continental terms) in sub-Saharan Africa. In the nine years since the election of Nelson Mandela as president of a post-apartheid South Africa, the country has outstripped Africa’s stumbling giant, Nigeria, on the world and African stage. The moral force of Mandela and of the reconciliation/Rainbow Nation message from South Africa as a whole, the power of a developed and diverse economy, the sophistication of its politics and the potential of its armed forces have all contributed to this position. But commentators, opinion-formers and critics of the ANC within and outside South Africa have expressed disappointment with the lack of engagement and positive results which have characterised regional and continental policy since 1994. Greg Mills, director of the South African Institute of International Relations, has pointed to the “controversy and confusion” which has surrounded the country’s foreign policy since 1994. While he says that this to an extent is a result of unrealistic international and domestic expectations of the role that South Africa could play in the short-term, it is clear that foreign policy has not been clear, consistent or eVective. In southern Africa, Pretoria has veered from the rather precipitate and clumsy intervention in Lesotho in 1998 (in concert with Botswana and Zimbabwe) to “quiet diplomacy” and non-intervention in Zimbabwe’s political/civil unrest problems and little if any ovious role in Angola (either before or since the death of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002). This inconsistency has a number of sources but sits uneasily with South Africa’s foreign policy rhetoric— as the leading force in Nepad and given President Mbeki’s views on the African Renaissance. When South Africa’s Foreign Minister in an annual address to the SAIIR declared rather pompously that “South Africa, together with its partners, has made remarkable progress in preparing the groundwork for the revitalisation of Africa and prevention of the further marginalisation of the continent”, but was unable to prevent its partners in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) from active and partial military involvement in the DRC (not to mention the looting of DRC resources that accompanied this) and played no meaningful role in supporting democracy in Zimbabwe, then you know that the rhetoric bears little relation to the reality of policy implementation. Similarly, South Africa has declared its support for the UN, international peacekeeping eVorts and multilateral approaches to conﬂict resolution, but has declined to provide personnel for UN operations (in Bosnia, for example), has acted unilaterally or in combination with one or two other states in some cases (Lesotho) and has been non-existent as a player in regional crises in which it could have had a major and positive role.

Constraints It is fair to say that South Africa’s regional and continental failures have been due partly to entirely understandable constraints. The priorities for the country in 1994 were reconciliation, economic redistribution but also continued economic growth and the building of a non-racial defence force. This inhibited concerted action on the foreign policy front in the ﬁrst few years of ANC government— the Mandela government quite rightly and understandably declined a military role post-genocide in Rwanda when this was being suggested within days of the ANC’s election victory in 1994. The country was also made cautious regionally by the role of the country, its armed forces and intelligence services during the apartheid era. South African forces had carried out raids against or intervened militarily or in support of rebels in Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, Botswana and Zimbabwe—as well being an occupying power in Namibia. 9573971017 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Robert Mugabe has been quoted as saying that with the end of apartheid in South Africa, countries in the region did not want to swap being victims of apartheid aggression for being treated by the new government as a province of South Africa—this has inhibited Pretoria’s willingness and ability to exercise influence regionally. Some have described it as leading to a situation of Pretoria being damned if it does something and damned if it doesn’t. As member of SADC, South Africa has wanted to act multilaterally, but SADC, as a report from the Centre for Africa’s International Relations at the University of Witwatersrand points out, has no real history of multilateral action and its members have generally opted for unilateral or bilateral action. This made things diYcult regionally and led to South Africa acting with Zimbabwe and Botswana in its clumsy military intervention after a coup in Lesotho in 1998. The ability to act in a military capacity regionally or in global UN operations—to restore or maintain peace or as part of a multilateral force—has been reduced by the declining power, cohesion and funding of the armed forces. Greg Mills of SAIIR has said that South Africa is now far less able to act in those capacities than it was seven years ago. While denying that the South African army is in crisis and is able to field only small units for limited operations, South Africa’s military chiefs have admitted major problems in the integration of the armed forces, continuing racism, a poor command structure, major issues with the health and age structure of the army and poor maintenance of weaponry and support equipment. A leaked SA Department of Defence document in July 2002 indicated the following as among the major problems: — Only 3,000 of 76,000 troops can be deployed operationally. — Only four out of 168 tanks are operational. — The air force usually runs out of fuel in September. — Seven out of 10 deaths in the army are Aids-related. — Training has been stopped. Defence Minister Lekota denounced the publication of the leaks but was able to provide little or no evidence to refute the details published in South African newspapers and by BBC News Online (links to the reports at the end of this paper). Detailed studies have shown that operational spending in the SANDF has dropped to disastrous levels— the defence budget has declined by more than 50% in real terms in the last 13 years; less than 40% of helicopters are available for deployment; less than 10% of armoured vehicles are deployable and less than 50% of military units could be available for operational use at short notice (http//www.global-defence.com/ 2001/RSpart4a.html). This low-level of readiness has meant that barely 1,200 South African troops could be available for regional or international peacekeeping and logistical support is almost non-existent. South Africa’s small military role in the Burndi peace process has only been made possible by external logistical help and funding for medical support for its troops. This situation explains why despite its vocal role in support of the Liberia peace process and pledges to assist with peacekeeping operations, it has not been able to send troops—Lekota had to decline requests from West African states to send troops to support the peace agreement. The lack of readiness of the armed forces results from budget cuts, slow and poorly implemented integration of ANC, PAC and former SADF personnel and the lack of support for South Africa’s peacekeeping capability from the developed world—typified by the suspension of US military aid to South Africa because of South Africa’s diVerences with the US administration over the operations of the International Criminal Court. South Africa’s declining military capabilities, lack of major logistical capacity and cuts in the military budget have led to the SANDF being a declining asset in SA foreign policy.

Regional Involvement In DRC, South Africa, along with SADC members Mozambique, Tanzania and Botswana, favoured negotiations and diplomatic means to end the civil war, but other SADC members (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) became involved militarily in support of the Kabila government and its allies and also used involvement to gain lucrative access to diamond, mineral and timber resources. South Africa stuck to the diplomatic path and tried repeatedly to forge agreement between the government and rebel groups. This was partially successful with the Pretoria agreement of 2002, but the lack of any strong, neutral African Union or SADC presence on the ground and the inability to deter Uganda and Rwanda from continually meddling has meant that however constructive Pretoria’s role on the diplomatic side, the situation on the ground remains fluid and unsupportive of reconciliation and reconstruction. Pretoria seemed unable to influence its SADC partners (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe) over Congo and having failed to influence them would not criticise them publicly over military intervention in the Congo. 9573971017 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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In Burundi, South Africa supported Tanzania and Botswana in seeking a solution to Hutu-Tutsi violence and has committed some 750 troops and some civilian personnel but has not had any great success in achieving real progress—but that might be too much to ask any outside mediator. This has been the only major South African commitment of forces to peacekeeping (apart from the short-lived Lesotho operation). At one point, the problems within the SANDF flared up in its force in Burundi—resulting in the death of a soldier during a violent row within the South African peacekeeping force. In Angola, South Africa has not been an open player since 1994. Its history of direct military involvement and support for the UNITA rebels makes this diYcult as does the Dos Santos government’s pre-1994 support and provision of bases for the ANC. In the mid-1990s, South Africa failed to prevent the private military company, Executive Outcomes, from direct military involvement on both sides of the conflict, was unable to mediate eVectively between the government and UNITA and seemed to play a wait and see role, hoping that as the government gained the upper hand in the late 1990s, the situation would resolve itself. Since the defeat of UNITA and death of Savimbi, South Africa appears to have played little open role in assisting with reconciliation, humanitarian work or economic reconstruction—although South African commercial interests, such as the electricity giant Eskom, have extensive plans for energy and water utilisation involving resources in DRC and Angola to create a regional power and water grid—mainly to meet an expected growth in demand for power and water in South Africa in the coming decades. When it comes to Zimbabwe, South Africa has disappointed many domestic opinion-formers as well as major western and Commonwealth countries. Mbeki’s stress on quiet diplomacy has gone down badly with the USA, UK and EU, its non-Agfrican partners in the Commonwealth, put it at odds with its neighbours Botswana and Mozambique and appeared in stark contradiction to the aims, principles and rhetoric of Nepad. South Africa has been critical of the declaratory policy of opposition to Mugabe’s land and political policies emanating from the UK, the USA, the EU and non-African Commonwealth members and has opposed criticism of Zimbabwe that has come from Botswana’s government. The SA Foreign Minister’s comment in March this year that under an ANC government there would “never” be criticism of Mugabe and his policies let alone pressure on him to resign or hold new elections made clear the lack of common ground. The strong South African stand on this has been criticised not just by Western governments (even though Bush bowed to it during his visit to Pretoria in July and left the field open for South Africa’s version of diplomacy—perhaps more an indication of Bush’s lack of real interest in Zimbabwe than of his willingness to listen to Mbeki’s arguments) but also by international human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and domestic groups such as the Helen Suzman Foundation. The HSF said in an editorial comment on its website criticising the Mbeki stand on Zimbabwe that “African Renaissance is nothing if it is not built on human rights, democracy and the rule of law”. The Foundation says Mbeki has made a huge error in his policy on Zimbabwe. The Foundation accuses the President of concentrating too much on the land issue and putting himself in a position where any criticism of Zimbabwe would appear to be “a sell out to white interests”. The South African stance and its eVective role as an international voice opposing intervention and repeating Mugabe’s line on the land issue, has also been criticised by the business community, tourist operators and others who see the Zimbabwe crisis as a major obstacle to regional economic development, foreign investment in the region as a whole and investment in and trade with individual countries. One problem for South African policy is that criticism of President Mugabe’s policies from the UK in particular have often seemed to concentrate on the land issue, the protection of white farmers and to have been too obviously pro-MDC rather than eVorts to protect the rule of law and freedom of speech per se. This has then put South Africa in the position of appearing to support such a stance if it criticises Zimbabwe and backs any western sanctions or other means of putting pressure on Mugabe. But, crucially, South Africa has failed to support the principled stand in support of democracy, the rule of law and the general economic well-being of the region taken by Botswana and is believed by many in Botswana to have put pressure on President Mogae to tone down his public criticism of Mugabe.

Conclusion South Africa has disappointed as a regional political/diplomatic player, failing to punch its weight in Africa. While understandable in the years immediately following the end of apartheid, this is less understandable now given Mbeki’s very public championing of Nepad and the African Renaissance. Domestic pressure and the sensitivity of the land issue have led to a position of eVective support for the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe—alienating South Africa’s friends in the West, angering those inside South Africa who want an ethical foreign policy supporting human rights and democracy and disappointing the business community and neighbours such as Botswana and Mozambique who see Zimbabwe as an obstacle to regional economic progress. 9573971017 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 109

South Africa’s own military problems, budget cuts and ambivalent attitude to regional policy have rendered it surprisingly weak as a diplomatic and military force in its own region and sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and prevented it from taking a lead in regional or continental peacekeeping eVorts. Globally, it is in the bottom ten contributors to UN peacekeeping. Keith Somerville is currently Training Editor (News) with the BBC World Service. He has worked as a programme editor, producer, reporter and documentary maker for the BBC World Service and BBC News Online, specialising in African military and political aVairs. A long-time member of the now defunct RIIA Southern Africa Study Group, he has published four books on African political and military issues and been a contributor to other authors’ collections on these topics and to academic journals on African aVairs. The views expressed in this short paper are his own and do not represent the views of the BBC. Web sources used: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2129563.stm http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2131914.stm http://www.sairr.org.za/wscpstory.htx?storyID%162 http://www.hsf.org.za/focus18/editorfocus18.html

Mr Keith Somerville

Written evidence submitted by Dr Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies

Key issues for the Committee’s inquiry include South Africa’s: — role in the region, particularly with respect to Zimbabwe; — engagement in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD); — contribution to the war against terrorism. In the 10 year’s since South Africa’s transition to democracy, the country has emerged from political and economic isolation to become the dominant power in the region. After five years of domestic transformation at all levels of government and society, foreign policy was placed centre-stage after Thabo Mbeki’s election to the presidency in 1999. The level of commitment, energy and resources dedicated to multilateral diplomacy, in Africa especially, has been substantial. How long the South African Government can sustain this policy focus, in the face of national crises of unemployment, crime and HIV/AIDS, is an important consideration for the ambitious plans of the African Union, SADC and NEPAD. NEPAD, with its secretariat based near Johannesburg, has been driven by President Mbeki behind the scenes, even as it is publicly presented as a continental initiative and a subordinate programme of the AU. The success of this grand vision for Africa’s recovery has largely been as an external marketing strategy to keep Africa on the international agenda of organizations such as the EU, the G8 and the UN. In addition, by competing for “brand recognition” with the AU, NEPAD has given momentum to the institutional development of the AU. Under South Africa’s leadership in 2002–03, the AU made progress towards the creation of a Peace and Security Council, drafting a Common African Defence and Security Policy and an African Standby Force for Peace Support Operations, a Pan-African Parliament and an Economic, Social and Cultural Council, amongst other changes. The Ministry of Foreign AVairs, Parliament, the Presidency and South African NGOs and think tanks have been closely engaged in this process. South Africa’s involvement in conflict resolution, including troop commitment to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, has made a significant diVerence to the security dilemma of Africa, where demand far outweighs the UN’s capacity or will to supply peacekeeping. This influence is likely to move closer to home next year, as South Africa has been elected the incoming chair of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation from August 2004. The potential security structure of SADC has not yet been fully realized or implemented, since it was paralyzed by divisions between President Mandela and President Mugabe in the late 1990s. The current leadership troika of Mozambique, Lesotho and South Africa could finally breathe life into this forum. The experience thus far has not been encouraging, however, in that under South Africa’s influence the SADC has yet to take a principled position on the abuse of power in Zimbabwe and another crisis in the making, the impact of the monarchy in Swaziland on national and regional stability. The formal structures of intergovernmental organizations in Africa have provided little more than vehicles for building solidarity in defence of the abuse of power. Leaders within the AU have also taken their cue from President Mbeki on the issue of Zimbabwe. South Africa’s kid glove handling of Zimbabwe’s governing elite has served as a reality check for many of Africa’s development partners, in terms of their expectations of NEPAD and prospects for the African Peer Review Mechanism. The ANC Government has repeatedly rallied to the cause of ZANU-PF, for 9573971018 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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example, when the EU tried to host a follow-up meeting in Lisbon to the 2002 Cairo meeting between African and European leaders, without inviting President Mugabe, or when Australia objected to President Mugabe’s attendance of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting to be held in Abuja, Nigeria in December 2003. Africa’s weak states have been both a safe haven and a stage for terrorist activities long before the events of 11 September 2001. For example, thousands of African lives were lost in the bombing of American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. The South African security services have successfully acted against a wave of terror attacks in Cape Town in the late 1990s, linked to radical Islamic elements within the vigilante organization, PAGAD, and against white right-wing extremists known as the Boeremag, responsible for the Soweto bombings of October 2002. South Africa’s contribution to the global war against terrorism lies primarily in passing on this experience in intelligence-driven policing operations to their counterparts in Tanzania, Kenya and other neighbours, for example, through the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) and Interpol Southern Africa. The South African Government has recently ratiﬁed the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and has supported the AU’s eVorts to implement the Convention. National legislation has been drafted to comply with the requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1373. The draft Anti-Terrorism Bill is currently before Parliament, and has elicited rigorous public debate on its potential to curtail freedoms of speech, association and the right to fair trial. Minutes of the public hearings and deliberations by the Safety and Security Committee are available on the website of the Parliamentary Monitoring Group: www.pmg.org.za For further information, the following publications are available on the ISS website: www.iss.co.za Cilliers, J “From Durban to Maputo: A Review of the 2003 Summit of the African Union”, ISS Occasional Paper 76, August 2003. Cilliers, J “Peace and Security through Good Governance: A guide to the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism”, ISS Occasional Paper 70, April 2003. Kagoro, B, Makumbe, J, Robertson, J, Bond, P, LahiV, E and Cornwall, R (ed) “Zimbabwe’s Turmoil: Problems and Prospects”, ISS Monograph 17, June 2003. BoshoV, H and Schonteich, M “‘Volk’, Faith and Fatherland: The Security Threat Posed by the White Right”, ISS Monograph 81, March 2003. Cilliers, J and Sturman, K (eds) “Africa and Terrorism: Joiningthe Global Campaign” , ISS Monograph 74, July 2002. BoshoV, H, Botha, A and Schonteich, M “Fear in the City: Urban Terrorism in South Africa”, ISS Monograph 63, September 2001. Institute for Security Studies

Written evidence submitted by Dr Greg Mills, National Director, SA Institute of International AVairs

SA-UK RELATIONS

Introduction SA-UK relations are currently deﬁned by four concentric issues: — Trade and Investment Ties. — The UK and SA Diaspora. — The Wider African Role including NEPAD. — Shared International Concerns. Although this short memo will focus on the latter two areas, a number of observations will be made in conclusion with regard to trade and investment concerns and the diaspora, and in so doing will identify a number of areas where the UKFCO and related diplomatic/cultural entities might focus their activities.

The Wider African Role In this, both SA and Africa have focused their activities on Africa in four areas. — First, partnership in conﬂict resolution, peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. — Second, political, technical and ﬁnancial support for NEPAD. — Third, aid and assistance towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals. — Fourth, support for democratisation, the rule of law, economic liberalisation and management, and human rights. 9573971019 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Comment The bilateral relationship has been, in the Mbeki presidency (1999–), defined to a great extent by public disagreement over “what to do” with Zimbabwe. South Africa has preferred to see the crisis in its northern neighbour in terms of its colonial legacy; while the UK (especially Minister of State Peter Hain) has emphasised the rule of law and human rights as key factors in the turn of events. While every eVort should be made to distinguish bilateral relations from wider regional and African issues, such disagreements should not, however, dilute the need for a more active British African diplomatic role. British diplomats have made every eVort not to have the wider relationship held hostage to diVerences over Zimbabwe, and this has been achieved by the UK’s de facto withdrawal from the Zimbabwe debate. This has, however, not assisted in arriving at a resolution of the crisis, and indeed, may well have served to stress the “colonial dimension” to the problem, which is not in British (and African democratic) interests. Paradoxically the shift in South Africa’s foreign policy focus to become African-centric has seen a much more proactive SA role in regional peacekeeping (notably in Burundi and the DR Congo), oVering a number of avenues for partnership. National security apparatuses have weakened in Africa because the international community has ended military assistance, because additional spending on defence is carefully monitored by international organisations, and because domestic financial crises have caused a general weakening of the state. Two types of agencies have suVered particularly during the overall decline in security: the police and intelligence agencies. Most African police forces are extremely weak and cannot combat day-to-day crime, much less be the front-line forces in combating instability. Intelligence collection is also very poor in most African countries. It is particularly hard for leaders to evaluate changing threat environments and the breakout of armed violence often comes as a surprise to national authorities. Aiding police agencies, in particular, so that they can fight crime, deter criminals, and be viable “first responders” to those who might eventually threaten war is absolutely critical. More has to be done so that the African countries that are potentially viable will actually be able to police their territories. A similar strategy would also assist intelligence agencies, particularly important in the light of the war on terror. Finally, the ability of African countries to benefit from wider regional and continental economic integration eVorts remains to an extent dependent on their ability to establish, negotiate and manage tariV reduction schedules, and to facilitate trade through eVective customs agencies. These are important areas for UK aid engagement.

Shared International Concerns These hinge around the EU-African relationship, the war on terror, the war in Iraq, the provision of more equitable and eVective global trading and ﬁnancial architecture (such as in the progress of the WTO Doha Round), and environmental issues.

Comment The divergent positions of the South African and UK governments on the war on Iraq is illustrative that, ﬁrst, the “old” African National Congress (ANC)-Labour Party ties no longer have the irreducible value they once might have possessed. Indeed, as the SA political leadership progresses in generational terms beyond a core group of exiles, this sentimentality may further dissipate. The failure of the Cancun round of trade negotiations is also a setback for SA trade policy, both domestically and in terms of its wider ambitions. This will remain a key objective for Pretoria, and will to a great extent shape the nature and focus of its foreign relations, notably with the G20! and the Cairns Group where ties will likely be deepened and strengthened. This could be at the cost of a chilling in ties with the EU over the CAP, and more emphasis will also likely be placed on concluding bilateral free trade agreements notably with the US and Mercosur, and possibly India, Japan, China, Nigeria and Australia. However, there are shared SA/UK concerns over the liberalisation of agricultural trade, and conversely over the CAP and the failure at Cancun. While the UK should continue to make the case for reform of the CAP within the EU, SA will need to take the lead on emphasising the need for reform in terms of African development and EU-African relations. The Commonwealth has, since 1994, been an important body for Pretoria in terms of providing a platform for North and South to meet on an equal footing. However, while its coherence has suVered over the Zimbabwe issue, it will remain an important platform for SA not least due to President Mbeki’s wider ambitions for African development.

Conclusion:Policy Recommendations A number of policy recommendations are made in conclusion in the four identiﬁed areas: — Trade and Investment Ties: The UK is SA’s third largest trade partner (with a total ﬂow of R42 billion in 2001 comprising R18 billion in SA imports, R22 billion in exports). There is, however, a need to encourage trade and investment ties partly by facilitating business contact, mentoring business ties, and, in so doing, ameliorating the current perception of a high investor risk premium, 9573971019 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Ev 112 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

which currently contributes to low investment growth in the Republic. Conversely, there has been a substantial outﬂow of SA capital mainly via London listings. The largest single investment in SA by UK companies has, since 1994, been around the arms deal. This will remain a controversial issue, and indeed may create a number of political problems not least those around perceptions of enrichment associated with the oVset element of these packages. — The UK and SA Diaspora: The importance of this group in shaping perceptions about both countries cannot be understated. EVorts should be made, in particular, to draw the SA expatriates in the UK (around 350,000) into a constructive Dialogue involving both governments; and using the UK group in SA (around one million) as a source of information and possible avenue for partnership with incoming businesses. — The Wider African Role includingNEPAD : NEPAD is the key policy programme for the SA government. As such, a great deal has been staked on its continued roll-out and success. However, there is little doubt that it has met with resistance in much of Africa where its good governance message is seen as a threat in some quarters. Also, its programmes remain focused overwhelmingly on process rather than the delivery of key priorities. The UK government should identify one or two key areas for involvement such as providing technical assistance for trade negotiations (a key element of NEPAD) and in support for local policing initiatives as identiﬁed above. — Shared International Concerns: There is a need to focus diplomatic eVorts on concluding successfully the Doha Round of world trade negotiations, and in establishing tariV reduction procedures and strategies within African countries, an absence of capability which has constrained eVorts to create meaningful African regional economic communities.

Summary In the nearly 10 years since South Africa’s political transition, the UK-SA relationship has normalised. Beyond the goodwill and warmth of the Mandela period (1994–99), the extent of this normalisation is arguably most evident in the degree of rhetorical disagreement around the war on Iraq and over Zimbabwe. Short of London disengaging from African issues as diYcult (yet as important in human rights terms) as Zimbabwe, this normalisation trend will likely continue. In these circumstances, the UK-SA bilateral commission (and related diplomatic eVorts) should focus on a number of key areas, otherwise it runs the risk of becoming yet another commission (of which there are an increasing number with South Africa, stretching thus its foreign policy capacity) with limited rewards beyond providing a framework for interaction. As a start, the bilateral commission should focus on facilitating bilateral business opportunities, and ﬁnding ways of linking the SA diaspora residing in the UK. Institute of International AVairs September 2003

Written evidence submitted by Dr Anthony Lemon

I would suggest that the following issues be addressed by the inquiry: 1. South Africa’s role in Southern Africa in relation to the crisis in Zimbabwe. Western and UK frustration concerning the reluctance of Thabo Mbeki to go beyond quiet diplomacy needs to be understood in relation to the regional dynamics of the Zimbabwe crisis. South Africa has a strong motivation to maintain stability in relations with Zimbabwe, given that a high proportion of Zimbabwean migrants go to South Africa and much of South Africa’s trade with the rest of the region traverses Zimbabwe. South African reluctance to impose sanctions needs to be understood in terms of the possibility that Mugabe would respond by seeking to isolate South Africa within SADC, thereby gaining leverage within the region. 2. A second critical element of regional dynamics concerns the need for neighbouring countries to retain eVective working relationships with Harare. This demands understanding of the impacts of the situation on each country in the region and individual stances of each sovereign government towards Zimbabwe. In Botswana, for example, key issues that inform foreign policy towards Zimbabwe include cross-border crime, refuges, illegal immigrants, HIV/AIDS, poverty and small arms traYcking. The Botswana President, Festus Mogae, has characterised the crisis in Zimbabwe as a result of a “drought of governance”, but said that “Botswana does not have the inclination or the capacity to impose [its] will on other people”. 3. The impacts of UK foreign policy in other areas, especially the Middle East, on how the UK is perceived and characterised by governments in Southern Africa needs investigation. This may be beyond the remit of the inquiry, but arguably has a fundamental impact on the eVectiveness or otherwise of UK policies in the region. Speciﬁcally, it may help to explain why SADC leaders, despite the NEPAD and African Union ideals of peer review, have refrained from public criticism of Zimbabwe despite mounting criticism from the UK and other Western governments. UK foreign policy options are severely constrained, and the case for quiet rather than ‘megaphone’ diplomacy with governments in Southern Africa is strong. 9573971020 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 113

4. The UK-South Africa bilateral trading relationship, and the regulatory environment governing the relationship, is frequently confusing for many South African civil servants. The Inquiry should consider how the FCO and the High Commission could do more within South Africa to promote a better understanding of the trade competencies of both the European Union and the United Kingdom. 5. The NEPAD partnership needs a more honest and critical evaluation on behalf of the G8 and OECD, with a peer review of G8 states and the approaches and achievements of those states in relation to the promotion of NEPAD goals. Constructive engagement in this critical area could lead to improved perceptions of Western governments, which could (gradually) give them more inﬂuence in promoting good governance and regional stability. Anthony Lemon Mansﬁeld College, Oxford

Written evidence submitted by Save the Children UK

SOUTH AFRICA

Summary

1.1 The major obstacle to fulﬁlling South Africa’s promise, especially for some 11 million poor children of whom 3% are living in child headed households, is the policy implementation gap on socio-economic issues. Save the Children believes that a concerted eVort by government, donors and civil society is needed to close this policy implementation gap, especially at district level on tackling child poverty and HIV/AIDS. There is a huge need for capacity building measures with governmental and non-governmental organisations and their human resource on project management and co-ordination functions to ensure eVective delivery of assistance to vulnerable children in desperate need of support in the communities where they live. 1.2 South Africa has one of the most progressive human rights Constitutions in the world. In the 10 years of transformation immense strides have been made towards a more equitable welfare system such as introducing child support grants, unlike other countries with similar wealth in Africa. However the legacy of apartheid remains apparent in the deepening disparities of wealth and opportunities between racial groups and urban and rural areas since 1994. In South Africa one in ﬁve live on less than $1 a day and one in three adults are unemployed. Poverty is the dominant reality for 22 million South Africans, of whom at least 11 million are children. The extent of poverty is itself undermining social service delivery, utility services are rolled back by disconnections due to lack of income security. 1.3 In South Africa Save the Children works with government and NGOs on addressing the needs of vulnerable children, especially on mitigating the impacts of HIV/AIDS. For example In Thabo Mofutsanyana district of Free State SC is developing community support for children and families aVected by HIV/AIDS. Working with the District Aids Council we are helping to co-ordinate and enhance government initiatives at local level, helping children access their entitlement to government grants and developing community support groups to identify and assist orphans and vulnerable children. Using this experience SC is engaging with policy makers at provincial and national level on improved service delivery and replicating eVective community assistance to vulnerable children.

Poverty Alleviation and Donor Response

2. South Africa does not have a co-ordinated and integrated poverty reduction strategy. The State has relied heavily on social assistance provisioning as its primary response to child poverty. Indeed some 85% of the Department of Social Development budget is allocated to social assistance grants, and only 15% to poverty alleviation programmes. The Interventions appear uncoordinated and fragmented and there has been limited evaluation to determine impact and improve eVectiveness of such poverty alleviation programmes. 2.1 South Africa is categorised as a middle income country. DfID’s development policy for South Africa and for South Africa within the southern African region is aimed at policy development and implementation with government, with a focus on developing eVective national poverty reduction and employment strategies and at a regional level—pro-poor regional trade agreements. DfID seeks broad ranging engagement on poverty rather than a highly focused programme of sector speciﬁc interventions. It is not clear how DfID views the role of South Africa within the southern africa region as a whole. 9573971021 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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The Committee could enquire: (a) How is DfID measuring success of this approach in terms of poverty reduction in South Africa? (b) How is DfID helping the Government of South Africa prioritise and develop a national poverty alleviation strategy? (c) What pro-poor outputs have resulted from DfID intervention or support to regional trade negotiations?

Social Security Measures for Children 3. The Social Assistance Act and Regulations govern the provisioning of social security grants for children. Non-contributory cash transfers aimed at children and “families” include the Child Care Grant which goes to the primary care giver of the child; the Child Disability Grant for severely disabled children requiring home care and the Foster Care Grant. There have been impressive increases in the uptake of the CCGand a very welcome extension of this grant to children under 14 years. Despite this only 2.2 million of the 14.3 million children living in poverty in 2002 were receiving the CCGand it does not meet the needs of children between 14 and 18 years old. There are several legislative processes in place concerning child welfare, of which the following remain the most signiﬁcant and unresolved to date: 3.1 The Taylor report (Consolidated Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive Social Security System for South Africa) released in March 2002 argues for a combined approach to improving income, asset security and services security at household level, through a range of measures including a revenue replacement strategy and extending the existing government welfare provision system of grants to the elderly, disabled and children. The Committee has also made recommendations for improving access to grants for children without adult caregivers, such as those living in child headed households. Most signiﬁcantly, it estimates that a grant of R100 (Basic Income Grant) to all South Africans including children would close the poverty gap by 70%. The Government of South Africa has yet to formally respond to the Report’s recommendations. 3.2 In October 2002 the review of all child-related law by the South African Law Commission resulting in the draft Children’s Bill was completed. The Children’s Bill, gazetted on 19 August 2003, when passed, will replace the 1983 Child Care Act and will regulate the child care system. However since former consultations the Bill has undergone many changes resulting in a reduction on essential social security measures for children, the scrapping of provisions for children in especially diYcult circumstances and the removal of local authorities duties to monitor and address the needs of children. Provision of free education and health services for children unable to live at home have also been scrapped and the proposed children’s court structure has been downgraded.

The Committee could enquire: (a) When will the Government of South Africa formally respond to the Taylor Report recommendations? (b) Will the Government of South Africa give urgent priority to consulting other government departments and NGOs each of whom provide the bulk of services to children, on the gazetted Children’s Bill?

HIV/AIDS 4. The HIV/AIDS pandemic is one of South Africa’s biggest challenges. The entire demographic and social structure of South Africa is rapidly changing as a result of HIV/AIDS. Estimates of the current number of orphans varies from 885,000 down to 660,000. In 2010 the figure is estimated to rise to more than 1.7 million. A study by the Human Sciences Research Council in South Africa in 2002 found that 13% of children aged 2–14 years had lost one or both parents. In addition 3% of households were found to be child headed. 4.1 The National Integrated Plan for children infected and aVected by HIV/AIDS was developed early in 2000, giving eVect to a unique collaboration between three government departments—Education, Health and Social Development. Its stated aim is to ensure access to an appropriate and eVective integrated system of prevention, care and support services for children infected and aVected by HIV/AIDS. It encapsulates a very specific set of activities on lifeskills education, home based care including voluntary counselling and testing and poverty relief. The main funding mechanism is by conditional grants to the provinces. There is a strong child rights movement in the country yet children and young people are not given the space to actively participate in policy decisions at all levels. This will become vital as child headed households become one of the significant family units in the economy. 9573971021 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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4.2 Some 2.6 million women of child bearing age (15–49 years) are HIV positive. The recent Department of Health annual antenatal seroprevalence survey estimated 90,000 infants contracted HIV from their mothers in 2002. Women continue to be the hardest hit population group, approximately 34.5% of pregnant women between 25 and 29 in South Africa were HIV positive in 2002. HIV transmission from mother to child can be reduced substantially through mother and child taking anti-retroviral treatment and ensuring that the mother exclusively breastfeeds or uses infant formula milk. Although South Africa has a controversial history of delaying access to anti-retrovirals, recent policy to make PMTCT (Prevention of Mother to Child Treatment) and HIV anti-retrovirals available to all is to be welcomed. However to what extent the government health and social welfare services can meet this demand is of serious concern. To give an example a district clinic in Limpopo province serving some 30,000 population had just four nevirapine tablets for last year.

The Committee could enquire: (a) Building on commitments made by the Government of South Africa at the Windhoek Orphan and Vulnerable Children Meeting in November 2002, will the Government support and resource the Department of Social Development to take a lead on developing a National Orphan Policy? (b) Will the Government of South Africa create a mechanism to inform stakeholders of targets and progress against the National Integrated Plan for Children aVected by HIV/AIDS, especially ensuring that Districts can engage with the NIP? (c) What provision is the Government of South Africa making to ensure PMTCT treatment can be made available through all district clinics?

5. South Africa in the Regional Food Crisis South Africa occupies a crucial position in influencing the politics and economy of the southern Africa region. During the course of the current food crisis South Africa has been a centre for the co-ordination of the humanitarian response, and the grain surplus that the country generates is an important source of both private sector and humanitarian relief cross border flows. South Africa should be central to any regional analysis of food security, both in terms of tracking the commercial flows of staple food surpluses out of the country and in recognising the food needs that exist within the country. The eVorts that have gone into understanding and analysing vulnerability in other countries in the region need to be replicated in South Africa and included in the regional early warning system. 5.1 Food security is a growing concern in South Africa households, with approximately 30% of the country’s population experiencing food insecurity. Price stability is fundamental to food security. Food insecure households are risk-averse households; risk-averse households do not make the investments needed to move beyond subsistence. SADC has a role to play that involves the state and the private sector in the regulation of staple food markets. Though it is not clear what sorts of systems might be able to deliver both price stability at appropriate levels, and the coordination and protection needed to nurture fragile market development, appropriate institutions need to be put in place to ensure that suYcient maize is available at prices which the poor can aVord. 5.2 HIV/AIDS itself is exacerbating food security in South Africa and in the region as a whole, as households aVected by HIV face diYculties in producing or purchasing their food needs. Food insecurity and poor nutrition accelerates AIDS—thereby creating a vicious cycle.

The Committee could enquire: (a) What plans the Government of South Africa is putting in place to address food security amongst poor communities? (b) What is DfID doing to ensure that agriculture is not neglected by governments in southern Africa? (c) How will DfID ensure that South Africa is included in regional vulnerability analysis, both within SADC and the UN, so that both South African grain surpluses and relief requirements can be tracked.

Impact of NEPAD and G8Action Plan 6. The role of South Africa’s leadership is setting up NEPAD is exemplary, and South Africa remains the major driving force in this initiative. The move to agreeing a voluntary peer review systems across governments is to be welcomed and supported. To what extent NEPAD can progress the tenets of good governance, transparency and accountability within the inclusive structures of the African Union remains to be seen. 9573971021 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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6.1 NEPAD requests for additional aid, removal of agricultural tarriVs and debt relief are being met with demands from the G8 for accountable governance and macro-economic reform in accordance with the neo- liberal agenda. There is a danger that setbacks on the part of African countries in terms of governance and macro-economic reform is leading to excuses by rich countries not to ensure that vital policy changes for African development are met. The WSSD and Cancun trade talks highlight a continued disjuncture between African and “northern” priorities and may further marginalise prospects for large scale growth in African agriculture sector. 6.2 Whilst NEPAD, especially through its South Africa representation, is active on the international stage, there is a need for it to engage more with local civil society interests, and particularly those of children. Given some 40% of the populaton of Africa is under 18 years of age, and in parts of Africa hit by the HIV epidemic this proportion is growing, the need for NEPAD to understand the challenges facing young people in Africa is vital. 6.3 African leaders could build on the start made at the March 2003 NEPAD Civil Society Forum on Building Stronger Partnerships with Civil Society and support practical measures to implement the Forum’s recommendations, with a particular focus on consultation with young people. The African Youth Parliament convened in March 2003 called for youth to be involved in NEPAD.

The Committee could enquire: (a) What initiatives have been taken by Nepad since March this year to involve and consult young people, particularly young people from poor communities. (b) In terms of G8 and Nepad engagement the Committee could inquire as to what progress has been made on the NEPAD conﬂict prevention and management and reconciliation initiative.

Save the Children UK October 2003

Written evidence submitted by VisitBritain

1. VisitBritain 1.1 VisitBritian is pleased to submit a memorandum to the Committee as part of the inquiry into South Africa. 1.2 VisitBritain was launched in April 2003 and is formed out of the merger of the British Tourist Authority and the English Tourism Council. VisitBritain is a Non-Departmental Public Body, sponsored by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, and is accountable to the UK Parliament, the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. VisitBritain has two principal roles; to promote Britain as a tourist destination overseas, and to promote England as a tourist destination within Britain to the domestic market. VisitBritain has oYces and marketing teams based in 27 countries throughout the world; our oYce in South Africa is in Johannesburg.

2. The South African Travel Market to Britain 2.1 South Africa continues to be the dominant force politically and economically in sub-Saharan Africa and is still playing a leading role in the new African Union after providing the inaugural Presidency. 2.2 The country’s economy is the strongest in Africa although growth at 1.5% (year on year, quarter 1 2003) fell well short of the 3.4% target. Steady progress had been made as a result of the government’s careful economic management, which also sought to achieve an inﬂation target of between 3–6% by the end of 2002. Inﬂation was almost halved to 7.7% in the six months to May 2003, paving the way for interest rate cuts of 2,5% to 14.5% by July with a further 1% cut in September. The Rand has continued to strengthen in 2003, steadying below 12 to the pound by August. The Rand’s weakness had inevitably aVected South Africans’ purchasing power in Britain, but only in 2002 did it reverse the steady growth in South Africans’ travel to and expenditure in Britain, which had persisted despite FMD and 9/11 in 2001.

3. Travel and Tourism Trends 3.1 The trend for South Africans to travel outside of South Africa in ever increasing numbers was resumed (after a drop in 2001 due largely to political unrest in the region) in 2002 when 5.8 million South African residents travelled outside South Africa compared with 3.7 million in 2001. 9573971022 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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3.2 In recent years, Europe has lost market share to North America, Asia and Middle East as new destinations have established themselves in the emerging new South Africa. There are now 16 National Tourist OYces in South Africa compared to nine in 1992. Britain’s main competitors are the USA, Australia, Germany and France.

4. The Travel Market to Britain 4.1 According to Statistics South Africa, Britain accounts for 39% of all overseas departures (ie those outside Africa) by South Africans in 2002, and 78% of their departures to Europe. This makes Britain by far the most popular long-haul destination for South Africans, followed by the USA, Australia, Germany and France. Our market share has been challenged in recent years as new destinations have come on stream, but Britain has so far maintained its lead. 4.2 Domestic travel remains a powerful competitor, despite the strengthening of the Rand against Sterling, the Euro and the US dollar, as development of the domestic product continues and marketing eVort is maintained. 4.3 Just under one-half of South African visitors to Britain come from the province of Gauteng, the hub of the South African economy. A significant part of the population lives in Gauteng and this is also where the travel trade is most heavily concentrated. The Cape Town and Port Elizabeth areas account for just under one-third of traYc and the Durban area about 16%. 4.4 In 2002, 276,000 South Africans visited Britain, spending £198 million. Average spend per visit only dropped 2.5% to £713.60 in spite of the much weakened Rand. Source: International Passenger Survey, OYce for National Statistics (IPS) 2002. 4.5 For many young South Africans, a working holiday to Britain is now seen as an essential part of the growing-up process. This trend is creating a new Visiting Friends and Relatives (VFR) market as their friends and relatives—often themselves first-time visitors—go to Britain to visit them. The number of South Africans taking working holidays in Britain is likely to increase from September 2003 as regulations for applicants are relaxed, increasing the potential for resulting VFR traYc. 4.6 Business travel by South Africans to Britain is strong, as Britain remains a major trading partner. This segment accounted for 20% of South African visits to Britain in 2002 and 29% of their expenditure. 4.7 South Africans’ average length of stay has grown from 14.4 days in 2000 to 18.5 days in 2002, 10 days longer than world average, as has the incidence of Visiting Friends and Relatives (VFR) as a means of making a holiday aVordable. 4.8 South Africans’ average spend per stay of £713.60 in 2002 was substantially (45%) greater than world average of £489.50, but was £23 down on 2001 due to the weak Rand. (In Rand terms, average spend by South Africans was up by 23%). The Rand recovery and stability in 2003 (25% up year on year in August 03) should more than make good the sterling deficit of 02, but VisitBritain will need to maintain its emphasis on Britain’s aVordability. This is an opportunity for focusing on good value products, particularly out of London which will further enhance the regional spread of South Africans’ visits. 4.9 The South African is also adventurous and travels around Britain more than the average overseas visitor. Scotland and Wales have both become popular destinations for South Africans in recent years. 9% visited Scotland (8% nights) and 3% visited Wales (1% nights) in 2002. 4.10 The South African market to Britain has proved highly resilient, with a steady increase in spend per visit to Britain in Rand terms since 1998. The market is also resilient in times of crisis, one of only two VisitBritain markets to show visits growth in 2001despite the globally-publicised outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in the UK and the eVects on international travel of the events of 11 September. With the aftermath of war in Iraq and terrorist threats a persistent reality, this resilience oVers VisitBritain a relatively low risk scenario in South Africa. This, coupled with the stronger, stable Rand will provide VisitBritain with an opportunity to use Customer Relationship Management, focusing on a good value message, to rekindle the interest of “frustrated” visitors lost to the exchange rate in 2002.

5. Latest figures (International Passenger Survey: 2002)

South Africa 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Visits (000) 262 284 300 304 319 276 Nights (000) 4,542 4,587 4,971 4,381 5,482 5,100 Spend £ million 202 216 257 215 237 198 9573971022 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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6. Examples of Marketing Activity Undertaken in South Africa 6.1 January, June, October 2003 Destination Britain—Beginners TRAVEL AGENT TRAINING Inside Britain—Advanced TRAVEL AGENT TRAINING VisitBritain organises six training sessions annually for tour operator and retail travel agency staV from all areas of South Africa. The sessions are implemented to address a shortfall in destination awareness training within the industry. Our primary aim is to increase the agents’ knowledge of Britain’s tourist product, boost their confidence in selling Britain and ultimately, increase their sales of British products. Training modules feature subjects ranging from transportation to and within Britain, detailed product presentations on London, Scotland, Wales and regions of England, advice for working holidays visa applicants and the importance and value of business travel. All training sessions involve partner presentations by eg. airlines, car hire operators and other tourism related services and public diplomacy partners. In 2002 almost 250 agents attended the sessions. The benefits to Britain, identified by independent research conducted by A C Nielsen, are that on average, each consultant attending the courses generated an additional 28 clients to Britain, with a total spend of £5 million. 6.2 July 2003 Robbie Williams Promotion—Radio/Internet Campaign Partners: EMI, 5FM (national youth radio station), Virgin Atlantic Airways Visitbritain planned and executed a national radio competition with 5FM (1.5 million listeners 14–30 years old) for two winners to see Robbie Williams at one of his Knebworth Park concerts in the UK. VisitBritain acted as the catalyst to drive the competition to the benefit of both tourism and non-tourism partners within South Africa. The benefit to tourism partners is still yet to be fully realised, but our airline partner Virgin Atlantic Airways’ objectives was to increase its share of sales of economy tickets locally in South Africa. The target audience of listeners at 5FM fit ideally with their objectives. EMI, the local music distributors of Robbie Williams material throughout South Africa paid for flighting competition advertisements and provided tickets for the concert, as well as consolation prizes for runners up. They also used the competition to drive sales of the Robbie Williams “Escapology” album, which did in fact improve its chart (sales) position during this period of awareness. 5FM also promoted visitbritain.com as the competition entry mechanism. Over 5,000 entries were received during the three days of the competition and substantially increased VisitBritain’s youth database. 6.3 Ongoing Activity 2003 Public Diplomacy Promotions Partners: British High Commission VISA PACKS VisitBritain: With the co-operation of the British High Commission, a VisitBritain information pack is distributed to all successful applicants for Working Holiday Visas, currently being issued at a rate of 15,000 per annum. The pack encourages the young South Africans to visit Scotland, Wales and the regions of England while they are in Britain and to invite their friends and relatives in South Africa to visit them in Britain during their stay.

7. Collaboration with the British High Commission VisitBritian and our predecessor body, the British Tourist Authority, have enjoyed and continue to enjoy good working links with the British High Commission, the Consuls-General and the other UK public diplomacy partners in South Africa. We would like to place on record our particular appreciation of the current HM High Commissioner, Ann Grant. The High Commissioner is widely regarded in South Africa as a “breath of fresh air”, and her style, exceptional political contacts and pro-active networking have proved to be exceptionally useful for furthering VisitBritain’s (and BTA’s) marketing opportunities. VisitBritain September 2003

Written evidence submitted by Cofesa (Confederation of Employers of Southern Africa)

I only received notice of your inquiry this morning. Please accept my memorandum. Relations with the UK is of the utmost importance for us and your inquiry is necessary and highly appreciated. Cofesa was registered at the Department of Labour as Confederation of Employers of Southern Africa on 6 November 1990. Presently we assist our 4,000 employer members with all aspects of labour relations- employment contracts, disciplinary hearings, conciliations, arbitrations, court cases, union negotiations etc. (www.cofesa.co.za) 9573971023 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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In 1990 South Africa had 10.8 million job opportunities. Today only 4.6 million jobs are left while more than 300,000 people enter the job market every year. This is a result of rigid labour legislation. The result is 60% unemployment, rampant crime levels and socio economic problems including HIV Aids. We actively support the African Economic Renaissance vision of president Thabo Mbeki. To realise this vision we need to create more entrepreneurs. We did extensive research on the establishment of entrepreneurs and actively promote entrepreneurs. We presented papers at various conferences on this subject in (Stockholm, Malaysia, Dublin and Grenoble). Research indicated that their production is between 60% and 300% better than that of employees. At the recent session of the ILO, South African trade union representatives launched a campaign to extend the deﬁnition of “employee” to include dependent contractors. This will seriously aVect the establishment of entrepreneurs, micro enterprises and incubators. Our Minister of Labour, Mdladlana and trade union spokesmen launched this campaign. If this campaign succeeds it will stop development in many Third World countries and will harm the African Economic Renaissance. It will be appreciated if you will take this up at the international forums to make the development of entrepreneurs a priority. Malaysia appointed a minister for entrepreneurship. We need your support for the establishment of a minister of entrepreneurship in the RSA and in every state in Africa. Our countrywide network of advisors established more than 1.5 million micro enterprises for entrepreneurs in support of government policy of black empowerment and our policy to establish micro enterprises. For many years the contract between parties determined the nature of the relationship between them. In 2002 our Parliament (on initiative of the Department of Labour) added clause 200A to the Labour Relations Act. The amendment is in the form of a presumption to regard contractors as “employees”. “200A Presumption as to who is employee: (1) Until the contrary is proved, a person who works for, or renders services to, any other person is presumed, regardless of the form of the contract, to be an employee, if any one or more of the following factors are present: (a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another person; (b) the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person; (c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms part of that organisation; (d) the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 hours per month over the last three months; (e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she works or renders services; (f) the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other; (g) the person only works for or renders services to one person. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to any person who earns in excess of the amount determined by the Minister. (3) If a proposed or existing work arrangement involves persons who earn amounts equal to or below the amounts determined by the Minister in terms of section 6(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, any of the contracting parties may approach the Commission for an advisory award on whether the person involved in the arrangement is an employee. NEDLAC (a national forum of government, labour and employers) must prepare and issue a Code of Good Practice that sets out guidelines for determining whether persons, including those who earn in excess of the amount determined in subsection (2) are employees”. Cofesa is not represented on NEDLAC and was not invited to the ILO. Our legislations must be interpreted 1(b) to give eVect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the International Labour Organisation and in terms of our Constitution section 27 which is the Chapter on Fundamental Rights in the Constitution entrenches the following rights: (1) Every person shall have the right to fair labour practices. (2) (2) Workers shall have the right to form and join trade unions, and employers shall have the right to form and join employers’ organisations. (3) Workers and employers shall have the right to organise and bargain collectively. (4) Workers shall have the right to strike for the purpose of collective bargaining. (5) Employers’ recourse to the lock-out for the purpose of collective bargaining shall not be impaired . . . 9573971023 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Section 3 of the LRA provides for the interpretation of this Act Section c: in compliance with the public international law obligations of the Republic. (including the Convention on Freedom of Association). This presumption violates a number of our constitutional rights: 1. Equality—people are regarded as employees and not as contractors/entrepreneurs and therefore miss the opportunity to be developed as entrepreneurs who are equal in status. Employees are regarded as subordinate persons who are under supervision. 2. Freedom of association: Our freedom of association is curtailed since we cannot recruit these presumed employees as members. 3. The concept of a presumption is unfair and unconstitutional in itself. 4. Freedom of trade: Section 22 provides: “Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely. The practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by law”. In terms of the presumption, the contractors are now presumed as employees without their choice. 5. Persons contracting with these presumed employees are unfairly presumed “employers”. They are suddenly liable to pay minimum wages, (catch up with arrear payments), leave, sick leave, family responsibility leave, maternity leave, etc. Compliance orders and court orders may be issued against them. 6. This presumption discriminates against new entrants, unskilled, untrained, inexperienced people who are excluded from the labour market and excluded from doing contract work. 7. The presumption jeopardises our governments’ policy and eVorts to empower the disadvantaged, to promote micro enterprises, entrepreneurs and to create opportunities. Our Department of Trade and Industry and of Finance have projects in place to promote micro enterprises. It is important that your government support Mr Trevor Manual, Minister of Finance, and Mr Alec Ervin, Minister of Trade and Industry to stop this campaign against contractors and entrepreneurs. With your support Mr Manuel will be able to convince the Minister of Labour to discontinue the campaign.

Strategy We are doing our utmost to protect these entrepreneurs by helping them with the contracts and with the implementation of the concept of entrepreneurs. Some bargaining councils persecute these entrepreneurs. We need a strong independent lobby to curb these campaigns and to focus on the establishment of entrepreneurs. PS: The ILO debate is to be seen on www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc91/records.htm Our Australian friends summarised this issue on their website www.contractworld.com.au Hein van der Walt Cofesa (Confederation of Employers of Southern Africa) October 2003

Written evidence submitted by Professor Gerrit Olivier

Professor Extraordinary, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria, South Africa and Director, Centre for European Studies, RAU University, Johannesburg, South Africa. I will not try to assess UK foreign policy on speciﬁc SA issues in this brief memorandum. Rather I will restrict my input to some broad comments on the intellectual, political and strategic framework that seem to guide UK foreign policy towards SA. Particular aspects I will mention include UK foreign policy style and posture, quality of diplomacy and diplomatic strategy and tactics in the context of its bilateral relations with South Africa. I will also make some introductory comments on the unique SA foreign policy milieu and how it may inﬂuence UK diplomacy. 1. Among western countries, the present SA government seems most comfortable with the UK. Historical, cultural and economic relations mainly account for this attitude. Although this is a plus factor from the UK point of view, the impact of these factors are declining and the convergence of interests between the UK and SA have narrowed since the new beginning in 1994. Presently the relationship can be characterized as friendly and cordial rather than special or close, competitive rather than co-operative. Economic interdependence has become main determinant of continuing amicable bilateral relations, replacing erstwhile sentimental or emotional determinants. However, in this interdependent relationship SA is the more vulnerable one, a situation which UK diplomacy has been unable to exploit meaningfully. 9573971024 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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2. In general, UK influence on SA foreign policy decisions is limited and even declining. South Africa’s foreign policy priorities these days are guided more by ideological interests and predilections than by objective interests measured in the concrete terms of national welfare and security. It is a case of precedence of “permanent friends” over “permanent interests”; it is an uneasy mix between friends and interests and idealism and pragmatism. Solidarity politics play a major role as confirmed by SA’s stance on the catastrophe in Zimbabwe, its refusal to confront president Robert Mugabe. 3. President Thabo Mbeki’s role perception as champion of Third World causes and Prime Minister Tony Blair’s own philosophy and public stance on Africa and poverty, could be used as basis for developing a more productive partnership that could also spill over into other areas. Blair could use his leverage and perhaps lean more strongly on Mbeki to deliver on human rights and good government [Nepad Peer Review Mechanism] in Africa in return for his promotion of Nepad in the EU and G8 context. 4. It has become diYcult to influence SA foreign policy decisions by way of orthodox diplomacy. Some of the reasons are the decline in the quality of South African professional diplomacy, with the exception of Mbeki’s own role of course. Professional diplomats play a minimal role in the policy-making process and they are, generally speaking, not eVective brokers of policy or influence in their country of accreditation and at home they have but limited access to the higher echelons of government. This malaise is partially being compensated by the fact that Mbeki and senior oYcials in the presidency’s inner circles have all but monopolized foreign policy; Mbeki and the Foreign Minister S. Dlamini-Zuma are personally close, but due to her diplomatic incompetence and lack of gravitas , her role is mainly ceremonial and supportive rather than creative and innovative. Foreign policy on important issues can only be influenced by way of direct access to Mbeki, perhaps using ministers like Zuma as messengers, or by way of access through influential world business leaders. This calls for a revise of UK diplomatic tactics in regard to SA, as it seems that the High Commission mainly engage bureaucrats as interlocutors. 5. The question is, given the above parameters or constraints, how could UK diplomacy towards SA be more eVective [ie maximise beneficial relations]? Is there any scope for improvement? The UK High Commissioner in Pretoria generally keeps a low profile, and is mostly invisible to the public eye perspective. Prudent, inobtrusive, low profile, absence of presence and leadership, are terms one could use to characterise contemporary UK diplomacy in SA. This characterization seems to confirm a resignation on the part of the UK to loss of influence or inability to make any diVerence in political decision-making process in SA. It is, of course, not an uncommon for diplomatic missions these days to make prudence the lode star of diplomatic exercises. They are afraid to “rock the boat” and, therefore, away in the background so to speak. It could be Whitehall’s brief to the local HC to behave in this way. If so, the HC’s diplomatic task in SA is basically to maintain a “holding action” with minimalism the guideline. 6. Obviously, as Zimbabwe has demonstrated the UK’s experiment with “hard diplomacy” did not work. “Soft diplomacy” seems the better option, but this strategy could also become an alibi for practically doing nothing. Minimalism is not necessarily the only strategy one can follow under the heading of soft diplomacy. However, eVectiveness depends mainly on the quality of diplomacy and the eVective use and orchestration of the array of instruments of soft or subtle diplomacy. The UK have ample soft diplomacy instruments to its disposal, but fail to apply them or orchestrate them in an eVective manner. The big issues of SA politics [and elsewhere in Africa], domestic as well as foreign, seem to be immune to UK influence. Here I think of SA government policy on Zimbabwe, HIV/AIDS policy, criminality, unemployment, corruption, inability to create wealth to combat unemployment and poverty, and the obvious flaws in the NEPAD initiative. Of course, it is well understood that the HC cannot interfere in SA domestic aVairs. But for a major country like the UK to punch so far below its weight in the SA context is diYcult to justify. In the last days of apartheid the UK had an ambassador [Renwick] in Pretoria who understood the influence of his high oYce and achieved remarkable results. At the same time he was highly respected by the government of that time. 7. The UK has to its disposal an array of influential bilateral as well as multilateral instruments [Commonwealth, UN and EU] of foreign policy. Bilateral action could be supported or augmented by multilateral action and vice versa. The question is how these instruments could be combined and applied to the best eVect [ie to enhance as far as possible diplomatic influence, to promote economic/commercial interests and to maximise good relations in general]. 8. Some suggestions: (a) In dealing with South Africa UK policy makers and diplomats should, as far as possible, distinguish between sensitive political and moral issues on the one hand, and hard economic and strategic interests on the other hand, and pursue diVerent strategies and tactics in each case. On political/moral issues the UK should avoid acting as a lone crusader because of the risk of being isolated. Preferably the UK should assume a more high profile leadership role [in regard to South and Southern African matters such as human rights, good governance, rule of law, etc] in multilateral organizations, particularly the UN, the Commonwealth, and the EU. (b) On economic and strategic issues a multidisciplinary or eclectic approach could be followed in an eVort to intensify and diversify diplomatic eVorts, inter alia by: reaching out more purposefully to certain non-governmental sectors in South African Society by way of developing greater contact and rapport with leadership [elite elements] in the private sector [business, academia, science, culture]; heightening the UK profile in the media; participating in seminars and conferences on 9573971024 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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topical issues to put across the UK point of view [I cannot recall having seen any newspaper or magazine article or heard radio or TV commentary by the UK High Commission the last ﬁve years or so]; issue a regular newsletter and circulate press statements; develop rapport with bright postgraduate university students and research institutions; informing the public generally more systematically on the present and past UK ties with South Africa; informing South Africans on UK role in global matters such as the UN, the G8, the EU, and issues like globalisation, Third World poverty, the north/south divide, terrorism, trade patterns, etc. (c) The lack of a public debate on issues aVecting both the UK and SA is rather glaring. There should, therefore, be a greater qualitative dimension in the bilateral relationship. Also the UK’s economic diplomacy in South Africa should be beefed up and rendered more active and more engaged. (d) Alternatively, the present low-risk, minimalist, reactive, holding action could be maintained. Then, of course, UK image will become increasingly remote on the South African radar screen and its role and status will continue to decline and perhaps wither away. Gerrit Olivier, Pretoria October 2003

Written evidence submitted by the Campaign Against Arms Trade

1. The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) is working for the reduction and ultimate abolition of the international arms trade, together with progressive demilitarisation within arms-producing countries. Recognising that its aims will not happen overnight, CAAT’s campaigns often focus on particular countries or deals. One of the latter is the huge deal between European military companies and South Africa. 2. It is for many reasons in the interest of the United Kingdom that the Republic of South Africa should be stable, democratic and increasingly prosperous. It is therefore rather surprising that the Committee’s agenda appears to omit consideration of two major impediments to these objectives: the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the diversion of South Africa’s resources from health and other developmental programmes to military expenditure.

Resources Needed to Tackle HIV/AIDS 3. HIV/AIDS in South Africa is not only a human tragedy of huge proportions but a grave blow to the country’s economic prospects, in that it kills or incapacitates large numbers of people in their most productive years and burdens it with very many sick or orphaned children. Whereas Uganda, one of the originally worst aVected countries, has succeeded in halving the rate of infection, the government of South Africa has been notoriously slow to take eVective action, which would include the provision of drugs, especially those which inhibit the transmission of the virus to the unborn, the distribution of free condoms and a massive campaign of public information. 4. The South African government has undoubtedly been badly advised about the nature and causes of the disease; but one main reason why it accepted that advice and has only reluctantly changed course is the very high cost of the necessary measures. It is all the more regrettable that it should have embarked on a programme of expensive arms procurement from UK and other European suppliers. The UK government may not be able to do much about HIV/AIDS, but it can and should refrain from encouraging South Africa to spend large sums of desperately needed money on irrelevant and unnecessary purchases. South Africa is of course a sovereign democracy which must set its own priorities, but it should be allowed to do so without external, self-interested persuasions and inducements.

The Arms Deal 5. In 1994 the incoming South African government inherited a military budget of about R10 billion a year (then worth about £1 billion). For some years this was held steady, but in 2001 projections forecast expenditure of R17.667 billion in 2003–04. If realised, this would represent an annual increase of 15%, of which only one-third would be due to inﬂation. By contrast the health budget would go up by only 6% annum. 6. The actual budget for 2003–04 was R20.05 billion. Of this, R8.844 billion was allotted to a “Special Defence Account”, much the greater part of which was devoted to a package of arms purchases from the UK and other European countries. When the package was negotiated in 1999 it was priced at R30 billion, or £3 billion, but by 1993 the estimated cost had risen to R52 billion, spread over 14 years. In 2003–04 the programme would cost the South African taxpayer R3.9 billion—nearly 12 times as much as would be spent on combating HIV/AIDS. 9573971025 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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7. The 1999 deal comprised the following items: four frigates and three submarines to be supplied by German shipbuilding consortia for R11.2 billion; 28 Gripen fighter aircraft from the Anglo-Swedish company SAAB for R10.875 billion; 24 Hawk lead-in trainers from BAE Systems for R4.728 billion; four Super Lynx naval helicopters from the UK company GKN Westland for R0.787 billion; 40 utility helicopters from the Italian Agusta company (in which GKN Westland has an interest) for R2.168 billion. 8. No persuasive military case has been made for these purchases, apart from the utility helicopters. South Africa has no enemies and there is no power within thousands of miles that could do it harm. Its military needs, by common consent, are for border control and possibly regional peace-keeping operations. These activities call for light weapons, transport, radio, not state-of-the-art fighters or large warships. But the Army’s requirements were deferred from the original package, and the follow-up package now under consideration focuses on armoured fighting vehicles, including 95 main battle tanks (to be deployed against what opposition?) and ground-to-air defence systems (to shoot down what enemy aircraft?). 9. UK companies, mainly BAE Systems, stand to receive a little over £1 billion from the contracts already signed: £300 million from the Hawk sales, about £700 million from a half share of the Gripen sales, and £78 million from the Lynx helicopters. In addition, Alvis plc (now the owners of Vickers), having acquired a 75% stake in the South African armoured-vehicle maker OMC, is well placed to secure the prospective order for tanks; and it is likely that the air-defence system will be built round the Starstreak missile, manufactured by Thales in its Belfast plant.

UK Government Promotion 10. None of these present and future orders would have been possible without the support of the UK government. Ministers like to present their role in arms-trading as a merely permissive one; they issue export licences when there is no compelling reason not to. In reality, however, the Government plays a much more active part than that. In addition to the work of the Defence Export Services Organisation, there is the support given to arms contracts by the Export Credits Guarantee Department. The ECGD Annual Report for 2000–01, listing guarantees issued during the year, shows that the trainer/fighter aircraft for South Africa were covered for £1,679.9 million. This is 49% of the total for all the guarantees issued in that financial year. Although there is no oYcial confirmation, the amount of the cover seems to indicate it covers all 52 aircraft. 11. The arms deal was at first strongly resisted by the South African Treasury, but it was won over in part by exceptionally favourable financial terms. Not only are payments to be spread over 14 years, but they are being financed by loans from European banks, mainly Barclays and Commerzbank; and thanks to the ECGD cover Barclays has been able to charge only half the normal commercial rate of interest. 12. Even more important has been the political and diplomatic eVort. Like the Al-Yamamah deals with Saudi Arabia and the recent sale of Hawks to India, the UK’s military exports to South Africa are the result of aggressive selling by ministers, from the Prime Minister downwards. In the years of the new regime in South Africa there was strong resistance to arms exports and arms imports, both on moral and on financial grounds. The militarists gained the upper hand during 1996 and 1997, and it is believed that discussions held by Thabo Mbeki, then Deputy President, with Chancellor Kohl in 1996 and Tony Blair in 1997 were a major factor in this shift. The press was told that the UK deal was “clinched” by Tony Blair during his visit to Pretoria in January 1999. In eVect, like Al-Yamamah, the deal is government-to-government. 13. The procurement package is heavily skewed towards UK interests. The South Africans originally intended to buy a single kind of plane, either a dedicated fighter or a fighter-trainer. They ended up buying both the Hawk and the very expensive Gripen, although the Hawk has, or could be given, a combat capability that would make the Gripen redundant. Moreover the Italians and the Czechs have dual-purpose planes much cheaper than the Hawk.

Against the UK Government’s Criteria 14. In July 1997 the new Labour government announced criteria against which it would assess applications for military export licences and this was followed by the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports which was adopted in June 1998. (In October 2000 the two similar sets of criteria were brought together as the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.) These criteria include a commitment by the UK government to look at the adverse eVects on development when deciding whether or not to issue an arms export licence. 15. This should have prevented the UK government from licensing the arms deal with South Africa, let alone encouraging it. Although the development criteria have never yet been used to refuse an export licence, there was surely an open-and-shut case for applying it here. With a per capita GDP of $2,530 in 2001, South Africa is not among the poorest countries in the world, but it is far from being among the aZuent either, 9573971025 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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and it has massive problems of unemployment and disease which should take precedence over the build-up of military power. No good purpose will be served by diverting resources needed for tackling these problems and by casting on a fragile country burdens that it cannot bear.

Offset Programme 16. The arms deal has been defended on the ground of the “oVset” programme that accompanied it, and that programme was certainly a major factor in winning support for it within the South African government. In January 1999 Tony Blair promised that in return for its purchases from the UK South Africa would obtain “up to £4 billion in associated investment and trade”. The negotiated package included oVsets of R70 billion in return for R30 billion of sales, and held out the prospect of 65,000 jobs. The R70 billion comprised R38 billion in counter-purchases, including the work to be done by South African subcontractors on the imported ships and planes, and R31 billion in investment, or “industrial participation”, both in military and non-military projects. 17. OVsets are in general contrary to international law. A loophole has been provided for those related to military sales, but they are inherently ambiguous and suspect. The investments linked to sales are not necessarily the ones the purchaser would have chosen. In this case the biggest single item, a German project for a steel plant and deep-water harbour in the Eastern Cape was dropped after a storm of protest, as being environmentally damaging and economically redundant. It was replaced by plans for a condom factory, which would have been genuinely useful; but this does not seem to be materialising either. Moreover, if the purchases and investments were an optimal use of capital, they would presumably have been made anyway, and so are not genuine oVsets. If they were not optimal, why were they made? It can only be assumed either that the companies have been leaned on by their governments or that they have some ulterior motive. Most probably they hope to secure long-term beneﬁts from the control of South African industry that their investments will bring. 18. This is especially clear in the case of investments by arms companies. On the face of it, there is no sense in a bargain which commits the companies to outlays of more than double the prospective receipts. But by taking a stake in the indigenous arms industry they could look forward, among other things, to the economies to be achieved from transferring production to low-cost countries. South Africa is said to be near the top of the list in the MoD’s plans for outsourcing of military procurement, and BAE Systems and other companies will want to be in a position to control and proﬁt from that process. Contradictions have already appeared. South African sales of ammunition threaten the income of BAE Systems’ subsidiary Royal Ordnance, and thus constituency interests in Scotland and northern England.

Developing South Africa’s Arms Industry 19. Foreign investment was also seen as the salvation of the South African arms industry. The incoming government in 1994 made the decision to preserve the large, and in some fields highly proficient, industry built up during the apartheid era, in the hope of developing a profitable export trade. It soon found, however, that the industry did not have the capital needed to break into the international market in any major way, and so would have to go into partnership with foreign companies. The oVer of investment by BAE Systems and others was thus a major inducement. Again, however, the linkage with arms purchases was not really necessary. Companies such as Alvis, Thales and EADS have been taking large stakes in South African arms companies without any direct reference to sales. 20. Part of the deal was that BAE Systems would take a 30% share in the state-owned arms company Denel. Negotiations over this transaction were long drawn out, and in April this year they were abruptly terminated by the South Africans. It is not clear whether BAE Systems was oVering too low a price, or whether there has been a fundamental shift of policy. Perhaps it has been realised that “partnership” with such a giant as BAE Systems would be a very unequal aVair. 21. The programme of arms purchases negotiated in 1998–99 became contractual between November 1999 and May 2000. It might now be diYcult to cancel or alter it, although a legal challenge by Terry Crawford-Browne is currently going through the court system. The UK government could, however, refrain from supporting the second round now under discussion and involving tanks and air-defence systems. More importantly, the whole episode highlights the need to give greater prominence in future—in fact, decisive prominence—to social and economic criteria for the evaluation of arms sales.

Wider Trade Implications 22. The arms deal undoubtedly had wider political aspects, which may link it with themes set out in the Committee’s agenda. In the ﬁrst place, what South Africa wants more than anything else is easier access to the European market for its products; and it was said that, in his discussions with Mbeki, Tony Blair proVered his good oYces in that matter, with some tacit linkage to arms purchases. It would be interesting to know what progress has been made. 9573971025 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Recommendations 23. The UK government should never again allow the demands of the arms manufacturing companies to be given precedence ahead of adherence to its own criteria when considering arms export licences. Criterion Eight of the Consolidated Criteria clearly states that the Government will consider: “The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.” 24. The UK government should end Export Credit Guarantees for goods being purchased by overseas military or security forces, or armaments-manufacturing bodies. This would include cover for the construction of military bases. Campaign Against Arms Trade October 2003

Written evidence submitted by The Royal Institute of International AVairs This memorandum highlights key areas that we think the Committee should focus upon. We also provide the Committee with a list of the Royal Institute of International AVairs’ (Chatham House) Africa programme experts available for consultation and a select bibliography of articles, books, and monographs for background information.

Issues to Focus Upon — To assess how South Africa’s new parliamentary institutions are functioning. It would be illuminating to focus on the Portfolio Committees, particularly the Standing Committee on Public Accounts, which scrutinised the defence contracts and the corruption charges arising there from, which involved some foreign companies. — Britain’s role in facilitating a reduction/elimination of trade barriers for African goods, especially agricultural commodities, within the EU. To what extent might this benefit small-medium black farmers, in the light of the South African Government’s renewed commitment to land redistribution and agricultural development? — To what extent is Black Economic Empowerment being reoriented to tackle mass poverty, rather than (as some critics claimed) to nurture a small black elite? And what mechanisms are being contemplated for job creation? — Focus on the land issue in South Africa. How are events in Zimbabwe influencing debates and policies in South Africa, such as the ANC’s Youth Commission policy on land? — Look at the South African policy towards HIV-AIDS and the impact of this policy. — South Africa and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Does South Africa dominate NEPAD, and how does this influence its diplomatic eVorts? What is the impact of NEPAD outside Southern Africa? — South African diplomatic initiatives in Africa. How has South African foreign policy been decided and who makes the decisions? What influence has the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce, UK, over this and what are the successes and failures? — Expansion of South African business and investment in Africa. How does this compare with UK penetration of emerging markets. What are the lessons for the UK? — What is the role of South Africa in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and where is SADC going? — What type of support is the UK giving to civil society, particularly grass-root groups working on education, health-care and public order issues?

The 2003–04 South Africa Series at Chatham House From October 2003, the Africa programme at RIIA will hold a series of meetings and workshops to mark the 10th anniversary of South Africa’s transition to majority rule entitled “South Africa’s role in Africa: engine of development and/or emerging regional hegemon?” The series is convened by Merle Lipton and will be launched on 27 October with Essop Pahad, Minister in President Mbeki’s OYce, speaking on “South Africa’s global and African political strategy”. On 29 October, JeVrey Herbst, Professor of African Studies at Princeton University will provide and assessment of “International responses to South Africa’s strategy”. Members of the Committee are welcome to attend these and other meetings. Details or this series are available from the Africa programme at Chatham House: Liz.Hornwriia.org 9573971026 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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Expertise Available From the Royal Institute of International AVairs, Chatham House Chris Alden, Associate Fellow, RIIA Chris Alden is a specialist on South Africa’s foreign policy and co-author of the forthcoming Adelphi paper: “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: Africa’s Last Best Hope?” He is also a lecturer at the London School of Economics and Political Science and from 1990 to 1999 was a Senior Lecturer in the International Relations Department, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Heather Deegan, Associate Fellow, RIIA Heather Deegan is a specialist on democratic change in South Africa and author of the book “Politics of the New South Africa: Apartheid and After”. She is also a Senior Lecturer at Middlesex University. Merle Lipton, Associate Fellow, RIIA Merle Lipton is a South Africa expert and published widely on various issues including on land, labour & livelihoods in rural South Africa and the State & Market in post-Apartheid South Africa. She is also a research fellow at the School of African & Asian Studies, Sussex University. Alex Vines, Head of Africa Programme, RIIA Alex Vines is a specialist in regional security and light weapons proliferation. He has published widely on the proliferation of light weapons in southern Africa and has also researched South Africa’s foreign policy in Africa. He is a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch. The Royal Institute of International AVairs

Written evidence submitted by BBC World Service

BBC WORLD SERVICE AND GLOBAL NEWS IN SOUTH AFRICA Summary South Africa is home to many of the continent’s major media companies, and its broadcasters and publications reﬂect the diversity of the population as a whole. The BBC operates its Africa newsgathering co-ordination centre for radio and TV from Johannesburg. The Africa Bureau was established in the early 70s, and is one of the BBC’s seven major newsgathering “hubs” located around the world. The Bureau provides news coverage for World Service radio, BBC World television, the BBC’s International Facing Online News Site and the domestic channels. Although the impact of the World Service has, in recent years, been limited in South Africa for reasons detailed below, the BBC recognised the need to adapt to the changing market following deregulation. It has established a good relationship with SABC, the home broadcaster, which has enabled the World Service to be heard by a wider audience than previously reached. The reach of BBC World has been enhanced through a digital TV agreement, and a rebroadcasting arrangement with SABC. The BBC is also making inroads into the emerging internet market—it has headline syndication deals in place with the largest Internet Service Provider in the country, and with two leading websites. The strong regional programming produced for World Service radio and BBC World television has been a key factor in reaching new audiences through these recent negotiations.

Market Overview The South African constitution provides for freedom of the press, and this is generally respected in practice. Laws, regulation and political control of media content are considered to be moderate and there is little evidence of repressive measures against journalists. Newspapers and magazines publish reports and comment critical of the government and the state-owned SABC is far more independent now than during the apartheid era.

Radio Post-apartheid the South African government has been keen to decentralise control of the radio and TV market. Deregulation in 1996 led to a proliferation of private radio stations to compete with the overwhelmingly state-oriented broadcasting system. Listeners in Johannesburg alone can now choose from among some 40 radio services, from the national broadcasts of the reformed state-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) to community stations targeting local neighbourhoods or ethnic groups. Prior to deregulation, the apartheid government made great eVorts to deliver pro-government radio services through high quality FM networks, and as a result, short wave listening did not develop as in other parts of Africa, where domestic services were, and to some extent still are, delivered mainly via shortwave. 9573971027 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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South Africa represents a large radio market with 22.9 million adults listening in a typical week. Just over 16 million of these radio listeners can understand at least some English. In comparison with television, with print media, radio remains the most powerful medium. The World Service delivers its programmes via SABC (through a recently signed new agreement with the corporation—further details are given below), by shortwave, through partnerships with some local FM stations, and via audio channels on Multichoice.

Television Well-established state-run and commercial TV networks broadcast nationally, and hundreds of thousands of viewers subscribe to pay-TV services operated by the major cable and satellite company MultiChoice. SABC operates three national TV networks and two pay-TV channels. 13.4% of the population have access to television. BBC World is available on digital television and there are also morning and evening rebroadcasts of BBC World news sequences every day on SABC 3 TV.

Internet In June 2000, President Thabo Mbeki set up an international information technology council to help Africa bridge the “digital divide”. Africa has only 0.6% of the world’s internet users and two-thirds of them are in South Africa, which amounts to just over 7% of the population. 10% of the population have mobile phones. The BBC is making headway into this market with deals recently struck with M-Web, the largest Internet Service Provider in the country, amongst others. It is also exploring the possibility of a mobile phone deal. Full details of the BBC’s radio, TV and online oVer to South Africa, and its newsgathering strength there, are set out below.

BBC World Service Radio

Output The World Service broadcasts in English to South Africa 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Special regional programmes for Africa are broadcast on the English Service for over five hours a day every weekday and over two hours on Saturdays and Sundays. African news features daily in the well established and respected news and current aVairs programmes, Focus on Africa, (broadcast three times a day during the week, one edition at weekends) that oVers evening news and analysis from the region, and Network Africa (broadcast five times a day weekdays) that produces a morning mix of rolling news, analysis, sport, features and music. Africa Live, launched in June this year, is an interactive programme that gets to the heart of Africa and the continent’s issues, and encourages listeners to phone in, email and text the programme with comments. This programme was set up using extra Grant-in-Aid funds allocated to the World Service for broadcasting to Africa in the Spending Review 2002—it aims to tackle grassroot problems specific to Africa and oVers positive solutions and guidance on the way forward. The programme has discussed development issues which have resonance for South Africa such as the Brian Drain, the treatment of refugees and foreigners, Africa’s Airline industry, the drug industry and the politics of Water. The programme has ensured that South Africans are very much part of the discussion. One such example was when Africa Live discussed the merits of African inventions. The programme linked up with Don Pilkington, Managing Director, South African Institute of Inventors, who was able to oVer advice to inventors across the continent on how to get patents etc. Africa Live was also invited to go global as part of the World Service’s 70th anniversary celebrations. Table Mountain in Cape Town, the location of World Service’s first Outside Broadcast in 1933, was the venue for Global Live. From the top of the mountain World Service presenters linked live to callers around the world for a 14-hour broadcast. Other regional programmes include African Perspective, a weekly programme which takes an in-depth look at life in Africa. Fastrack is a popular sports programme that reports on Africa’s sports results, and provides analysis and interviews—it recently interviewed the South African winner of the women’s high jump competition at the World Athletics in Paris. TalkingPoint —the WS global phone-in programme that gives listeners and internet users the opportunity to put questions to guests—was joined from the Aids Conference in Durban in August by South African Minister of Health Mantombazana Tshabalala-Msimang and Stephen Lewis UNAIDS envoy for HIV/Aids in Africa. 9573971027 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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The African Service also strives to reﬂect South African culture on its airwaves. Each year the World Service holds a playwriting competition and this year the second prize winner came from South Africa. Soldier Boy, was a powerful drama set in South Africa during the Angola border war and recorded entirely on location in Kwazulu Natal. The plays companion programme heard from two ex-combatants, one from the SADF, the other from MK the armed wing of the ANC. Coming up in November this year, as part of the HIV/Aids programme season, the World Service has been granted rights to broadcast the Nelson Mandela Foundation concert from Cape Town which aims to raise awareness about HIV and to help South African victims of Aids. The programme will feature an address by Nelson Mandela, as well as world-class musical performances and contributions from key celebrities and political ﬁgures.

Transmission The World Service can be heard 24 hours a day across South Africa via short wave. In 2002 the BBC signed a new agreement with SABC, which allows SABC to use news items from the World Service in their own output—properly credited. In addition to news items, sports and features are also relayed on the English FM network of SABC. SABC also has an extensive network of FM stations broadcasting in local languages—World Service news items and despatches are used on these African language FM networks, with an appropriate translation in to the relevant local language. The World Service has several local partner stations: Radio Khwezi in Kranskop (Zulu Natal) and Good News Community Radio in Durban are community stations that run some BBC output. Bush Radio in Cape Town also takes World Service programming, including some English teaching. World Service can also be received 24 hours a day via Multichoice (satellite TV) as an audio channel throughout South Africa. In April 2001, MultiChoice Africa and the BBC World Service renewed their long-standing agreement to broadcast the BBC throughout the continent of Africa. This agreement extended the broadcast rights of BBC World Service for an additional ﬁve years, and included the 50 countries in which MultiChoice Africa was currently operating. The service enables subscribers to MultiChoice Africa’s premium DStv bouquet to listen to BBC World Service 1, 2 and 3 channels via their decoders. Additionally, World Service is available as a 24 hour service on the digital satellite channel Worldspace. Michel Lobelle, Broadcasting Manager for the Africa/Middle East Region, has been based in Cape Town for the last two years, and has made signiﬁcant progress in developing rebroadcasting opportunities in Southern Africa.

Audiences BBC has traditionally had very small radio audiences in South Africa compared to the rest of Africa. In late 1995, when the World Service last commissioned a survey, BBC World Service on short wave was reaching approximately 310,000 weekly listeners (2.4% of the population). In addition, the weekly audience on SAFM in English is about 700,000. All SABC African networks represent cumulative weekly audiences of about 30 million. The World Service does not include any of these figures in its estimated audience for the BBC because the news items are usually short and the BBC specifies a minimum duration before counting the listeners in to its figures. However, the arrangement clearly helps the BBC with its profile in South Africa. The BBC does not have recent audience figures for listening to BBC via individual community stations. Audience research carried out by Roper Starch in 1998 revealed that most people associate the name “BBC” with TV.

Johannesburg Office The Johannesburg Bureau, run by Bureau Chief Milton Nkosi, is the BBC’s radio, television and online bureau for Africa. Three correspondents, two main producers, a television crew, two African service stringers and occasional casual staV operate from the bureau. There is a small but very busy radio studio, and one of the busiest television edit suites amongst international bureau in Africa. A lot of the work produced is for World Service radio and domestic news. Local translators, ﬁxers and technicians are employed for teams coming out from London. The bureau, established in the early 70s, has seen many well-known correspondents come through it— Michael Burke, Fergal Keane, Jeremy Vine, George Alagiah, Rageh Omar, Allan Little, Jane Standley among them. 9573971027 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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A range of freelance crews work closely with the Africa bureau—its coverage stretches throughout sub- Saharan Africa. In recent weeks teams have covered the Liberia civil war and the subsequent departure of former president Charles Taylor, and the Africa tour by President Bush was covered in all the countries he visited. A year ago the bureau, with the help of colleagues from London, covered the biggest conference on earth, the World Summit on Sustainable Development. The bureau has also been the base for BBC reporters previously working in Zimbabwe. Since early 2001 when new media laws were introduced in that country, and the BBC’s own correspondent was expelled, the BBC and all foreign journalists have been prevented from having a permanent reporting presence there. However, as Zimbabwe continues to be a major story, the BBC has sought to ensure that it is covered in the depth and breadth that it warrants, making use of the facilities available at the Johannesburg oYce. Productions range from day to day news coverage to Newsnights, Panoramas, documentaries and Correspondent. The popular BBC World magazine programme, Africa Direct, is produced from the bureau—it shows a diVerent Africa from the usual news material. Short ﬁlms about what Africans are doing to improve their lives are also produced from the bureau. The countries reported from in the last year include: South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola, Mozambique, Dem Rep Congo (Kinshasa), Rwanda, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Madagascar, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Niger, Liberia, Gambia, Malawi and Djibouti.

BBC World Television BBC World is available as a full 24 # 7 service on the DSTV digital pay service to 880,000 subscribers. A late night and early morning BBC World News bulletin is rebroadcast on SABC3, who also carry a selection of BBC World programmes overnight—taken from the previous day’s output. The arrangement with BBC World to rebroadcast simultaneous News Bulletins and selected programmes, replaced the agreement that SABC previously had with competitors CNN. An agreement is also in place for SABC to simultaneously use BBC World’s Breaking News, on any of their terrestrial channels. BBC World and CNN are equally popular on the DSTV line up.

Online/BBC International Facing Site The BBC has a headline syndication deal in place with M-Web, the largest Internet Service Provider in the country, which provides access to the BBC’s online services. Headline syndication deals are also in place with iAfrica.com, which is the biggest portal, and Ananzi.com, which is the biggest search engine. These three websites display continually updated headline feeds from BBC News Online. Each headline links to the full story on the BBC website. Data gathered for August this year indicated that traYc from South Africa for the World Service and the BBC’s International Facing Site amounted to about 1.17 million page impressions. That ﬁgure does not include traYc from South Africa for other parts of the BBC site. The BBC is also exploring the possibility of a mobile phone deal, which would enable mobile phone users to receive BBC news bulletins via text messages directly to their phones. BBC World Service October 2003

LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE BBC WORLD SERVICE As you may be aware, the Foreign AVairs Committee recently visited South Africa as part of its current inquiry into UK–South African relations. During the visit we had the pleasure of meeting Mr Milton Nkosi and some of his staV at your bureau in Johannesburg. We were, as ever, very pleased to see the valuable work being done by the Service’s staV. Following our visit, the Committee had a number of questions concerning the BBC World Service’s broadcasts in Swahili: 1. What is the estimated number of speakers of Swahili as a ﬁrst language in Africa? 2. For how long does the BBC World Service broadcast in Swahili each day at present? 3. What is the estimated number of listeners to the BBCWS’s Swahili service? 4. Could you provide details of the Swahili service provided by other national radio services, particularly those of the USA, France, Germany and China? 9573971028 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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5. Does the World Service have any plans to make changes to its Swahili service in the near future. Were it possible to receive an answer to these points by Friday 12 March, I would be very grateful. If your staV would like any clariﬁcation on these matters, please do not hesitate to contact the Second Clerk of the Committee, GeoVrey Farrar (020 7219 3309 / farrargwparliament.uk). Rt Hon Donald Anderson MP Chairman of the Committee 24 February 2004

LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FROM BBC WORLD SERVICE Thank you for recent inquiry. I am delighted to hear that you enjoyed your meeting with Milton and the other staV in our Johannesburg bureau and that the Committee could see that part of the World Service’s work first hand. The answers to the Committee’s five questions: 1. What is the estimated number of speakers of Swahili as a first language in Africa? A. There are approximately 100 million Swahili speakers, of whom about 25 million speak it as their first language. 2. For how longdoes the BBC World Service broadcast in Swahili each day at present? A. Presently BBC Swahili transmits five programmes a day. — Two half hour current aVairs programmes in the morning; — Five minutes lunch time news bulletin; — 60 minutes of current aVairs in the afternoon; and — 15 minutes of African news in the evening. A total of two hours and 20 minutes everyday on a week-day (Monday—Friday) On Saturdays we broadcast for two hours and on Sundays for 2 hours and 30 minutes. Weekend programming includes 45 minutes each weekend devoted to programming about learning English. 3. What is the estimated number of listeners to the BBC WS’s Swahili service? A. The current weekly measured audience for Swahili is 18.4 million which includes listening in—DR Congo, Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda. 4. Could you provide details of the Swahili service by other national radio services, particularly those of the USA, France, Germany and China? A. International Broadcasters in Swahili include Voice of Germany (Deutsche Welle), Voice of America, Radio China, Radio Japan, Radio Iran, Radio Egypt, Radio Nigeria and Channel Africa (South Africa Broadcasting Corporation). Deutsche Welle and Voice of America are the two main traditional competitors. The Kenya Broadcast Corporation broadcasts on SW and also has a sizeable audience. Radio China, Voice of Nigeria and Radio Cairo also broadcast in Swahili but have niche audiences. The others mentioned would also have minimal audiences. By way of comparison the respective weekly measured listening figures in the three main countries are as follows (some of those surveyed would listen to more than one service): Tanzania World Service 59.8% listening weekly (11.5 millions) Deutsche Welle 57% Voice of America 28%

Kenya World Service 31% listening weekly (5.6 millions) Deutsche Welle 8% Voice of America 7% Uganda World Service 7.5% listening weekly (0.9 millions) Deutsche Welle 1% Voice of America 1% 9573971028 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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5. Does the World Service have any plans to make changes to its Swahili service in the near future? A. The World Service is planning to improve its audibility still further by increasing the number of FM transmissions in most of the target areas especially Southern Tanzania and other major towns in Kenya. I appreciate that the Committee’s agenda has been particularly busy of late and that the Easter Recess is fast approaching but I am keen that the Committee be kept fully abreast of the World Service’s activities and plans. With this in mind I was wondering if the Committee would like to visit Bush House after Easter so that I can brief them about the challenges facing the World Service and our exciting plans to meet them. Nigel Chapman Acting Director BBC World Service 11 March 2004

Written evidence submitted by The Corner House

Introduction 1. The Corner House is a UK NGO that works for environmental and social justice by carrying out analysis, research and advocacy. The Corner House has worked on corruption issues from a development and human rights perspective for a number of years. 2. The Corner House notes that the Foreign and Commonwealth OYce (FCO) is one of the departments involved in delivering the UK government’s commitment to support NEPAD. With suYcient civil society involvement and consultation and real local ownership, it is clear that, as some African NGOs have said, NEPAD has potential to improve political governance and decrease corruption in Africa. However, in the context of NEPAD, there is a tendency by G8 and donor governments to emphasise corruption and political governance as an African problem, and ignore the signiﬁcant role played by the business communities of G8 and other Western countries in exacerbating corruption in Africa through bribery and money- laundering. Unless G8 and other Western governments fully address the institutional failures in their own countries that allow such activities by their business communities to go undetected and unpunished, their support for NEPAD will be seen as at best equivocal and at worst hypocritical. 3. Under the G8 Africa Action Plan of 2002, the UK government has committed itself to “intensifying support for the adoption and implementation of eVective measures to combat corruption, bribery and embezzlement”. The G8 committed to do this, among other things, by assisting implementation of the OECD Convention on Bribery, which criminalizes bribery of foreign public oYcials, and intensifying international cooperation to recover illicitly acquired ﬁnancial assets. In the UK, the FCO plays a lead role in implementing the UK legislation that enforces the OECD Convention on Bribery: under a Memorandum of Understanding between UK government departments and law enforcement agencies, the FCO is responsible for reporting corruption allegations from overseas to law enforcement agencies and monitoring all investigations by these agencies of bribery oVences. The Corner House therefore suggests that the Foreign AVairs Committee inquiry on South Africa would be an excellent place to examine how the FCO is implementingthe UK government’scommitments under the G8 Africa Action Plan to take action on bribery and recovery of assets in its own back yard. 4. A recent test case of the UK government’s commitment to address the UK’s role in exacerbating corruption in Africa, and to implement the OECD Convention on Bribery is presented by the corruption allegations surrounding the South African government’s defence procurement package of September 1999. These allegations, some of which involve a UK contractor for the package, arose just two years after the UK government signed up to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery in 1997 and one year after it came into force. The Corner House notes that given the considerable involvement of the UK government in helping negotiate the South African defence package and in facilitating the industrial participation (or oVset) arrangements that accompany the package, and given the potential for controversies surrounding the defence package to impact upon the UK’s diplomatic and political relations with South Africa, the Committee should give some time and space to examining the defence package, and the corruption allegations that have dogged it.

Background to the Corruption Allegations in South Africa’s Defence Procurement Package 5. In September 1999, the South African government signed a $4.8 billion defence procurement package with European contractors from Germany, Italy, France, Sweden and the UK. BAE Systems (then British Aerospace) in a joint venture with SAAB from Sweden had been chosen as preferred bidder to provide 24 Hawk trainers and 28 Gripen ﬁghters in November 1998 as part of this package. 9573971029 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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6. Corruption allegations ﬁrst surfaced in June 1999, when ANC intelligence operatives approached a South African NGO, the Coalition for Defence Alternatives, stating that they had evidence of corruption by senior politicians and government oYcials in connection with the defence package.8 In September 1999, a memo addressed to the Pan Africanist Congress MP, Patricia De Lille, from “concerned ANC MPs” raised similar concerns of corruption in the package.9 The allegations centred on claims that senior members of the South African government had taken bribes from foreign defence contractors and that they had pressured these contractors to award subcontracts to South African ﬁrms in which either they or their relatives had substantial stakes. In November 1999, De Lille forwarded the allegations to South Africa’s foremost anti-corruption body, the Special Investigating Unit, headed by Judge Willem Heath. De Lille subsequently received death threats.

7. As a result of the allegations, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts of the South African Parliament (SCOPA) called for an oYcial enquiry. Heath’s Special Investigating Unit was on the verge of launching a full-scale investigation, when the Auditor-General of South Africa announced its own enquiry. The Auditor-General concluded in September 2000 that there had been “material deviations from generally accepted procurement practice” particularly for the trainer jet component of the package and that “the explanation provided by DoD (Department of Defence) for this material deviation does not appear to be satisfactory”. In addition the Auditor-General recommended a full forensic audit of subcontracting processes.10

In response, SCOPA issued a resolution in November 2000 calling for an investigation to be carried out by South Africa’s Special Investigating Unit, the Public Protector, the Auditor-General and the National Director of Public Prosecutions. In January 2001, President Thabo Mbeki refused permission for the Special Investigating Unit—widely seen as the most independent and vigorous of the country’s anti-corruption institutions—to take part in the investigations. An investigation involving the Public Protector, the Auditor- General and the National Director of Public Prosecutions went ahead as a Joint Investigation Team.

8. In November 2001, the Joint Investigation Team (JIT) report cleared the South African government of “any improper or unlawful conduct” in connection with the package and concluded that “there are no grounds to suggest that the Government’s contracting position is flawed”.11 However, there were several serious flaws with the JIT report that have led to accusations of whitewash and political interference, not least by the former head of the Special Investigating Unit, Judge Willem Heath. These flaws have meant that the controversy surrounding the package has not gone away. They are as follows:

Firstly, as the Auditor General himself noted before a hearing by SCOPA in August 2003, the exclusion of the Special Investigating Unit from the enquiry created mistrust and speculation from the start.12

Secondly, credible South African sources have claimed that the Auditor-General’s oYce was given a direct steer by the President as to who and what it could investigate. The recent allegations that the Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, requested a bribe from a French company to ensure it was not subject to investigation have only increased speculation as to political interference.

Thirdly, suggestions were raised in May 2003 that the JIT report had been heavily edited by the executive before being submitted to Parliament, following a court action by a subcontractor who lost out in the bidding on one part of the package led to the draft report being made available to the subcontractor.

And ﬁnally, the report appears to have only looked at a very limited number of the 50 or so allegations of corruption that were raised. Allegations involving BAE Systems included in an annex to this submission do not appear to have been investigated and it is not clear whether they are subject to a continuing criminal investigation by the National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP).

9. New allegations of corruption, meanwhile, continue to emerge in the South African press, and there is little sign that they will go away. This has led to calls by respected South African NGOs such as the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) for the Joint Investigation Team to re-open its investigation to answer all outstanding questions, and for the National Director of Public Prosecutions to clarify which allegations it has investigated and which are still under investigation, and to ensure that all allegations of criminal activity are swiftly dealt with.13

8 Terry Crawford-Browne, “A Betrayal of the Struggle Against Apartheid: a summary of South Africa’s R48 billion weapons acquisition programme, related oVsets and allegations of corruption”, 28 September 2000. 9 “Brieﬁng to Honourable Patricia De Lille, Member of Parliament”, by concerned ANC MPs, September 1999. 10 Auditor General of South Africa, 15/9/2000, “Special Review of the Selection Process of Strategic Defence packages for the Acquisition of Armaments at the Department of Defence”, para 4. 11 Joint Investigation by the Public Protector, Auditor-General and National Director of Public Prosecutions into Strategic Defence procurement Packages, Report to Parliament, 14 November 2001. 12 Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), 20 August 2003, “Special Report by the Auditor General on Arms Deal Report: Hearing” 13 IDASA, “Democracy and the Arms Deal, Part 3”, A Submission to Parliament, 5 August 2003. 9573971029 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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10. The ongoing controversy and persistent leaking out of allegations risks undermining the credibility of the defence package. As a recent submission on the defence package to the South African Parliament by IDASA observed, “the perception of corruption is often as harmful as actual corruption. While the allegations remain unanswered, the public will draw their own, often negative conclusions”.14 The lack of clarity on the allegations surrounding the package furthermore threatens to have a negative impact on the reputation of the South African government both domestically and internationally, the UK company concerned, and even the UK government itself. The Corner House believes that the FCO has a potential role to play in helpingestablish clarity on the allegationsinvolvingthe UK company in order to restore credibility to at least the UK component of the defence package. 11. The UK government is of course aware of the corruption allegations. On 5 September 1999, the Campaign Against the Arms Trade, on behalf of a South African coalition of Churches and Human Rights groups, the Coalition for Defence Alternatives (CDA), referred allegations involving BAE Systems to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Stephen Byers (see annex). In December 1999, one of the convenors of CDA directly informed the Export Credit Guarantee Department, which was then arranging the finance for the UK component of the defence package, of pending investigations by investigatory authorities in South Africa. In December 1999, the ECGD in a letter to CDA acknowledged the pending investigations but stated that it was working to the timetable of the South African government for concluding the financing arrangements.15 In April 2000, as Heath’s Special Investigation Unit was reported to be on the verge of requesting presidential authority to launch a full-scale investigation,16 the ECGD issued the guarantee for BAE Systems’ sale of Hawk jets to South Africa. In January 2000, according to a recent response to Parliament, the FCO had also received allegations of corruption against BAE Systems in January 2000.17 It is not clear whether these were the same allegations earlier submitted to the DTI by CAAT or whether they diVered both in source and in substance. The FCO stated: “These, and earlier allegations to other Government Departments, were passed to the MOD Police and Metropolitan Police.” Again in January 2000, the FCO told the CDA that “The Metropolitan Police have confirmed that they found insuYcient evidence to substantiate the allegations”.18 Both the ECGD and the FCO meanwhile in recent responses to questions in Parliament have focused on the fact that the oYcial investigation by the South African the Joint Investigation Team found BAE Systems’ contract to be sound, and found no evidence of wrongdoing.19

Recommendations to the Foreign Affairs Committee 12. The Corner House recommends that the Committee consider in its examination of the impact of NEPAD and the G8 Africa Action Plan on South Africa, the role and record of the FCO in helping to meet UK government commitments to implement the OECD Convention on Bribery and to help recover illegal ﬁnancial assets, made under the G8 Africa Action Plan. In so doing, the Committee may wish to consider asking the FCO to disclose to it: — What steps it has taken together to raise awareness amongst British businesses operating in South Africa and Africa in general that the payment of bribes is a criminal oVence, and to encourage the responsible use of agents and intermediaries by British businesses. — What steps it has taken to ensure that complaints of bribes received by the UK representative in South Africa are given due weight and forwarded to the appropriate authorities either in the UK or South Africa. — What steps it has taken to ensure that its staV in South Africa and Africa in general are aware of the criminal nature of bribe payments and the necessity to pass such information on to the relevant law enforcement authority in the UK. 13. The Corner House urges the Committee to give time and space to considering the South African government’s defence procurement package, its associated industrial participation (or oVset) arrangements and the corruption allegations surrounding it, given the strong role that the UK government has played in promoting and facilitating the involvement of UK contractors in the package and in the industrial participation arrangements, and given the potential impact that the controversies surrounding the package could have on political and diplomatic relations between the UK and South Africa. 14. Speciﬁcally with regard to the corruption allegations in the South African defence package, the Corner House believes that the FCO could and should play a pivotal role in helping put an end to the damaging speculation that has persisted about the role of one of the UK contractors in the package. It is in the interests of both the South African and UK governments and of the UK contractor concerned for this to happen. The Corner House believes that in order to play such a role:

14 Ibid. 15 Letter from Chris Leeds, ECGD to Terry Crawford-Browne, 23 December 1999. 16 The Star, 18/4/2000, “Heath Keen to Blow Open Arms Deal Probe” 17 Hansard, 10/7/03, Column 985W, Response from Mr Mullin to Matthew Taylor MP. 18 Letter from Peter Hain, FCO to Terry Crawford-Browne, 26 January 2000. 19 Hansard, 10/7/03, Column 985W, Response from Mr Mullin to Matthew Taylor MP; Hansard11/9/03, Column 385W, Response from Mike O’Brien to Matthew Taylor MP. 9573971029 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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— the FCO should disclose advice it has given to other UK government departments such as ECGD, DTI and DESO on the scope and gravity of the corruption allegations; — the FCO should clarify whether allegations it received in December 2000 were the same in content and source as those received by other UK government departments in September 1999, and if not, what they were and whether they were separately investigated by the Metropolitan Police; — the FCO should be encouraged to oVer the full support of the UK government to South African authorities for any criminal or other oYcial investigation into allegations against BAE Systems or other UK contractors; — the FCO should disclose what it has done so far to assist South African investigators examining allegations involving BAE Systems or other UK contractors; and — the FCO should disclose what steps it has taken to monitor the allegations of corruption in relation to BAE Systems and any other UK contractors in the defence package. 15. The Corner House also believes that the FCO, in conjunction with other UK government departments, particularly the Department of Trade and Industry, the Defence Export Services Organisation and the Export Credit Guarantees Department, could play an important role in urging, indeed, requiring— given that taxpayers’ money has underwritten the UK component of the package—BAE Systems to help put an end to the speculations and allegations. In particular, the FCO with other government departments could urge BAE Systems and its subsidiary BAE Systems Holdings (South Africa): — to disclose the exact amount of money it paid in commission fees to its South African agent Osprey, for what services the fees were paid, on what dates, whether the payments were made into South African or oVshore accounts, and to which company in the Osprey group the fees were paid; — to disclose the grounds on which BAE Systems decided to use an agent given that it had a subsidiary within South Africa who could have performed at least some of the duties that Osprey is said to have performed; — to dislose audit reports of the donation given by BAE Systems to the Airborne Trust, and a detailed account of how the donation was used; — to disclose whether the former defence minister of South Africa, Joe Modise, met with anyone from BAE Systems or anyone acting on behalf of BAE Systems when he visited the UK in 1998, and to disclose what steps BAE Systems took to ensure that money it donated to the Airborne Trust was not used to fund this trip; — to make public details of all gifts, payments and donations made or oVered to South African government oYcials, MPs, or organisations; — to give a full account of members of the ANC, or relatives of members of the ANC that were employed by BAE Systems, BAE Systems Holdings (South Africa) or any company in receipt of consultancy or agency fees from BAE Systems, and on what grounds they were employed; — to disclose details of any payments made to third parties in connection with the South African procurement package; and — to disclose whether John Bredenkamp or companies in which he is an investor, such as Aviation Consultancy Services, played any role in negotiations between BAE Systems and the South African authorities and if so what role he or these companies paid, how much commission fee he received, for what services and whether that commission fee was included in the contract submitted to the ECGD. The Corner House October 2003

Written evidence submitted by Adriana Stuijt

(a) In regard to the testimony submitted by Prof James Barber and Professor David Simon, 9 December 2004 in Public Questions 1–83: (New evidence submitted herewith) (b) Video evidence: on unusually cruel nature of the farm attacks against owners of farm land; I am submitting this video of a 2003 broadcast on the South African Broadcaster “Carte Blanche” programme; the contents of which were clearly unknown to Prof. Simon and Prof. Barber. This documentary by the award-winning documentary producer Susan Puren shows clearly that these farm attacks are not motivated by greed—frequently valuable articles such as jewellery are left behind on the scenes of these crimes. Their information that mostly “white” Afrikaner farmers were targeted also is highly inaccurate; many black owners of farm land also are murdered, often with their entire families, over land disputes mostly. 9573971030 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 135

Our website, http://www.censorbugbear.com, has collected a large body of evidence in this regard over the past three years, submitted by journalists inside South Africa. The South African police has also published a new report on their website, http://www.saps.org.za, from the “independent commission of inquiry into the farm attacks” appointed by Pres. Mbeki. This information also seemed unavailable to your expert witnesses, even though it is freely available on the internet. Moreover, a complete list of names of farm attack murder victims, provided by the SA Police, is updated regularly on the following website; also run by unpaid volunteers in South Africa: http://www.100megspop2.com/crimebusters/farmvictims.html and also http://groups.msn.com/crimebustrsofsouthafrica/farmvictims.msnw Thus far, 1,591 farm dwellers have been killed in such armed attacks, people of all racial backgrounds who are being targeted by organised groups of young African men who often steal nothing at all. This violence is being described by a leading world expert on genocide, Dr Gregory Stanton of “Genocide Watch” in the US, as being in an advanced stage of genocide. Read his report on: http://www.genocidewatch.org/ boersslain01.htm *I am submitting these website addresses because I believe in not using to much paper. I hope that the Members of your committee will access these websites and download these reports themselves—and thus view these reports as written evidence submitted to your hearing. The “Carte Blanche” programme may be further highlighted by the journalist Susan Puren who did all the interviews and research. Her email address is purenswlantic.net The SA police farm attack report may be read online at: http://www.spas.gov.z2/farmat/index.htm This investigation had also found that in certain cases, “the farm attacks are being carried out with considerably more violence than routine robberies elsewhere and that this is due to racial hatred”. Futhermore, the illegal land occupations by the Landless People’s Movement and other NGOs are on the increase and also lead to farm attacks and murders and “this was a matter of large concern”, this independent report stated. I apologise for this hand written submission but this is due to circumstances beyond my control. Adriana Johanna Stuijt January 2004

Written evidence submitted by TAU SA

1. Introduction TAU SA, formerly Transvaal Agricultural Union, is the oldest agricultural union in the Republic of South Africa having been established in 1897. Since its inception, it has been in the forefront to maintain commercial agriculture in the interest of economical stability and food security in South Africa.

2. TAU SA’s Current Stance TAU SA is ferverently in favour of: 2.1 The maintenance of RSA’s food- and ﬁbre production capability. 2.2 The economical sustainment of commercial agriculture. 2.3 The willing seller—willing buyer principle as the only way in which property can exchange. 2.4 Ensuring a safe and secure environment within which commercial farmers, their families and employees may live and work without fear of theft and violent criminality. 2.5 Respect for property rights and legal ownership of property. 2.6 Payment of taxes and levies based on provision and quality of services rendered by local-, provincial- and national government.

3. Current Reality 3.1 The Amendment Bill on the Restitution of Land Rights seriously threatens property rights and ownership of land. Owners aVected by expropriation have no recourse to a court of law except to challenge remuneration. 3.2 Commercial agriculture, and thus South Africa’s ability to produce food for the populace, is seriously jeopardised. Very few, if any, farms which have been transferred to land claimants, have been successful commercial enterprises. Many such farms have been utilised as squatting areas. 9573971031 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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3.3 Commercial farmers are faced with unprecendented crime in rural areas. Notwithstanding stock- and game theft, theft of produce, fuel and equipment, more than 1,600 farm dwellers have been murdered since 1991. This represents in excess of 8,000 attacks on rural dwellers. 3.4 The realities of South African history are deliberately extorted beyond recognition only to accommodate a specific political parties ideology. 3.5 Commercial landowners have already been unilaterally deprived of original mineral and water rights. This in eVect constitutes alienation of property through a process of nationalisation. 3.6 Commercial farm owners are subjected to a range of local taxation for services not rendered. The scale of such taxation by far exceeds viability of economic sustainable commercial enterprise of commercial farming. 3.7 Notwithstanding Constitutional guarantees, citizens of European extraction are in the process of being sidelined from general economic activity in the country of their birth. 3.8 The Landless Peoples Movement (LPM), aYliated to the National Land Commission (NLC) and sponsored by foreign donors, including British institutions, has openly threatened farmers through the media with violence and death, but instead of being charged appropriately, received an urgent audience with the Minister of Land AVairs, elevating the LPM in status to an unacceptable level. 3.9 In a documentary shown by the BBC, farmers are portrayed as barbaric racists, guilty of inhumane behaviour. Irrespective of written complaints directed at the BBC, no supportive facts have been produced, in fact no response from the BBC has been received, and the clear incitement of racial anger and hatred goes unchallenged. 3.10 Countless, if not all of Government land reform projects have resulted in failure, poverty traps for the people supposed to benefit from it and the total destruction of once successful business units, simply due to untrained people being settled on developed land, without any assistance by Government, left to fend for themselves. In many cases the former landowners has come to their rescue. 3.11 The land obtained from successful producers of food and fiber under the threat of expropriation and other forms of intimidation, lie fallow, whilst the previous owners are struggling to start a new career and the claimants are left to fend for themselves. 3.12 Many farms are available on the open market at acceptable open market prices, whilst State owned land are simply left unused, or under utilized. Government nevertheless insists on threatening and intimidating farmers with threats of expropriation if they do not co-operate within the Department of Land AVairs’ process of redistribution and resettlement. 3.13 The sweeping expropriation powers now obtained by the Minister of Land AVairs, reminds strongly of Zimbabwe in 1991. The same powers were given to individual ZANU PF Party leaders and the consequences are clear for all the world to see. 3.14 TAU SA intends avoiding a similar situation in South Africa, with or without Government assistance. That situation is not limited to the violent take over of agricultural land. It is neither the attack and murdering of farmers. South Africa has more experience of both since 1994 than Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe situation is: 3.14.1 An inflation rate of well over a 1,000%; 3.14.2 Total collapse of the national economy; 3.14.3 A starving populace and collapse of health services; 3.14.4 Collapse of law and order; 3.14.5 State security forces applied to subdue the populace and keep the ruling party in control; 3.14.6 Food used to victimise the opposition party members, or even as a form of ethnic cleansing; 3.14.7 Total destruction of fauna and flora and infrastructure; 3.14.8 A dictatorship/one party state.

4. Revolutions in Africa has very distinct phases and is only completed once the ﬁnal phase is in place. These phases are: (a) Destabilisation; (b) Democratisation; (c) Transformation; (d) Domination. 9573971031 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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5. South Africa Today

Is at present a considerable way into the third phase.

5.1 Irrespective of what we envisaged and prayed for before and immediately after 27 April 1994, South Africa is proving to be no diVerent from other African countries. There was considerable hope for Zimbabwe prior to 1999, but cycle had to be completed. We know the outcome. Compare Zimbabwe before 1999 with South Africa today and the parallels are distinctly clear. President Mbeki’s support of Mugabe is a contentious issue, here and in Britain and USA.

5.2 The recorded history of Southern Africa, albeit done by so-called colonialists and kept in European archives, are blatantly swept away. The land to which only the Khoi and San peoples can historically and rightfully lay claim, is now under siege of the so-called majority. They, the Koi and San descendants, are left only a reservation in the Kalahari Desert, simply because they are a minority. All other ethnic groups, if the same rules apply, shall be regarded as “settlers” and the question that needs to be answered, is to deﬁne the term “indigenous” or “endemic”.

5.3 Universally recognised treaties dating back to the nineteenth century are documented and kept in archives and form part of the historical records in Britain and elsewhere. Nevertheless, land claims even on that speciﬁc land has been instituted and such treaties are simply ignored.

5.4 The European descendants, the farming stock of South Africa are now to lose their property, their farms and only source of income. They are even labeled by President Mbeki as colonialists, invaders and landgrabbers. They are continuously branded as thieves, racists and oppressors. They are made to feel extremely unsafe and unwelcome in their country of birth. They are slowly but surely driven out of Africa. They are a minority.

5.5 Would the same rules apply to the Caucasians of the United States of America, or the Australian and New Zealand citizens of British descent?

5.6 If the same rules apply internationally, South Africans of European descent could lay claim to the land of their European ancestors. Would that be acceptable for the respective countries of origin?

6. Appeal

6.1 We need to avoid the stage where South Africa will become another (the ﬁnal!) basket case of Africa.

6.2 The truth of what is happening in Southern Africa needs to be told. Turning a blind eye, or supporting the processes, has only one outcome. Extreme poverty, famine and destruction of a wonderful country, (developed to ﬁrst world standards, with the assistance of western countries, especially Britain). detrimentally aVecting all who live in it.

6.3 TAU SA urgently requests the opportunity to raise these issues with yourselves and other inﬂuential institutions. We need to inﬂuence our Government to reconsider its actions and rather utilise existing market powers to bring wealth and prosperity to Africa.

6.4 TAU SA has no political goals or intentions. It is an established agricultural organisation and believe that the answer to Africa’s dilemma lies in suYcient food and ﬁbre, jobs and housing, a safe environment, law and order, eVective health care systems, equality and respect for all cultures and ethnic groups, the creation of wealth through a free market system, with as nucleus, the protection of, and respect for private property rights.

WE ARE STARTING WITH OUR OWN COUNTRY, SOUTH AFRICA, AND INTEND CONTRIBUTING TO THE SAME FOR THE REST OF OUR CONTINENT. WE NEED YOUR ASSISTANCE TO ACHIEVE THAT. TAU SA 9573971032 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Ev 138 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

Written evidence submitted by Basil T Hone, USA, 23 March 2004

SOUTH AFRICA’S MBEKI AND ZIMBABWE’S MUGABE

PROLOGUE

May 2000

Mbeki Speech at Zimbabwe Trade Fair, 5 May 2000 (Bulawayo) The first time I came to this city nearly forty years ago, it was as a detainee, our group travelling to Tanganyika having been arrested by the Southern Rhodesian police who held us in a prison in the city for a number of weeks. Whereas the white minority regime of Southern Rhodesia wanted to deport us back to apartheid South Africa, where we would have been imprisoned for many years, members of this country’s liberation movement worked hard and ensured that, instead we were sent back to the then British territory of Bechuanaland. I stand here today as an elected representative of the people of South Africa thanks in good measure to the fact that when the liberation movement of Zimbabwe acted practically to ensure that we too should gain our freedom. I am pleased to take this opportunity publicly to salute President Mugabe, the rest of the leadership and the people of Zimbabwe for what they did to ensure our liberation from apartheid tyranny. I mention President Mugabe specifically because I had the privilege to accompany our late President, Oliver Tambo, when he and President Mugabe discussed what Zimbabwe could do to help expedite the process towards our own emancipation. I can therefore say that whereas Zimbabwe’s liberation fighters saved our group from imprisonment on Robben Island, liberated Zimbabwe helped the entirety of our people to break down the prison walls behind which the apartheid white minority regime held the millions of our people in bondage. And so here we are together in Bulawayo, during the month when all of us will celebrate Africa Day, on May 25th, with both of our countries free of the yoke of white minority rule. As neighbours and peoples who have shared the same Wenches in the common struggle for freedom, it is natural that we must now work together to build on the victory of the anti-colonial and anti-racist struggle. Both of our countries, which experienced extensive land dispossession of the indigenous majority by those who colonised our countries, are confronted by the challenge to address this colonial legacy.

CHAPTER 1

QUIET DIPLOMACY LIMITATIONS

May 2002

The Mail and Guardian (SA), 17 May 2002

Mbeki talks to Nordic Leaders Mbeki’s message was that he and Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo have brought Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe to heel, and that NePAD’s pledge of African democracy for Western economic assistance remains on course.

News24 (SA), 21 May 2002 South Africa was not giving up on its strife-torn northern neighbour Zimbabwe, the presidency said on Tuesday. “The question of cutting diplomatic ties has not even arisen,” presidential spokesperson Bheki Khumalo said. “It is not an issue being considered by the president [Thabo Mbeki]. We cannot turn our backs on Zimbabwe.” The European Union has reportedly called on Southern African Development Community governments to refrain from “normal diplomatic relations with the Mugabe Regime.” Khumalo said South Africa’s envoy, African National Congress general secretary Kgalema Motlanthe, would continue to engage both parties. “There is no alternative to negotiations in Zimbabwe,” he said. “There is no alternative to Zanu PF and the MDC working together. We will not give up on Zimbabwe. We will keep on talking and talking until we succeed, even if this takes very long.”

SABC News, 28 May 2002 9573971032 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 139

Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma “We should work towards bringing the Zimbabweans back from the brink. We should not be the ones that push them to the precipice.” The Mail and Guardian (SA), 31 May 2002 Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel has said with regard to Zimbabwe: “They say quiet diplomacy has failed. Should we act like Ariel Sharon? Should we? Should we just go in there; kick butt; blow them up; drive over their cars; should we send in our tanks? If there are alternative solutions, let’s hear what they are.”

August 2002

SAPA Report, 22 August 2002 “There can never be a policy for South Africa to replace any government.., to discuss with anybody about how to replace another government,” said Pahad (Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad)

October 2002

Sunday Times (SA) Mbeki Interview, 8 October 2002 And when people say: Do something, we say to them: Do what? And nobody gives an answer, because they know that when they say: Do something, what they mean is march across the Limpopo and overthrow the government of President Mugabe, which we are not going to do. So, if that (settlement of Zimbabwe land issue under UN auspices) does not happen, beyond the interventions that we make, no one must walk in and overthrow the government. So, I’m saying, it is suggested that the worst crisis point in the world is Zimbabwe. It does not help us to solve the problem of Zimbabwe, because you can see that there is a particular agenda that drives that particular perception about Zimbabwe. The notion that South Africa can dictate policy to the Zimbabweans, I think people must stop cherishing that. The notion that South Africa can walk across the Limpopo and remove that government—do what President Bush calls regime change in Zimbabwe—this is not going to happen. The Sunday Times (SA), 13 October 2002 South Africa will not dictate policy to Zimbabwe, neither will it be “dragooned” into overthrowing President Robert Mugabe’s government, President Thabo Mbeki said this week. The Mail and Guardian (SA), 17 October 2002 President Thabo Mbeki has reaYrmed South Africa’s policy of constructive engagement towards Zimbabwe and again rejected calls to punish President Robert Mugabe and his ruling Zanu PF party. “We are not going to act on the Zimbabwe question with a view to punishment . . . What we have got to do is to ensure that the situation in Zimbabwe changes,” he told MPs during parliamentary question time on Thursday. However, it was perfectly clear that there were people within South Africa who had a diVerent objective, Mbeki said. “Other people think our task is to punish, to defeat, to crush Robert Mugabe and Zanu PF.” Mbeki said the way to ensure human rights and democracy was not to crush, “but to ensure that Zimbabwe gets onto a diVerent path”. He noted that many of those calling for the “crushing” were putting the obligation on South Africa to do so. “If they want to crush, I don’t know why they don’t do so themselves,” Mbeki said to the amusement of ANC MPs.

January 2003

ZWNEWS, 6 January 2003 Does anyone ask why South African Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma fails to salute the Swazi royal family, as she recently did Mugabe’s Zanu PF party as a “progressive force”? Zimbabwe does not need what Mbeki calls “megaphone diplomacy”.

February 2003

The Star (SA), 3 February 2003 Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe is to introduce legislation to increase press and political freedoms in his country. This is the message President Thabo Mbeki gave British Prime Minister Tony Blair during a six-hour meeting on Saturday at Chequers, Blair’s weekend residence outside London. 9573971032 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

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March 2003

The Sunday Times (UK), 2 March 2003 Last month he (Mbeki) used his presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement to steer its 115 members into giving Mugabe a unanimous vote of conﬁdence and voting through a motion that attempted to lay blame for the “grave humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe” on drought, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

The Zimbabwe Independent, 28 March 2003 In a major rebuV to South African President Thabo Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy”, the government says it will not under any circumstances amend the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) which it needs as its chief weapon to ﬁght the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. After two months of speculation, mainly spawned by comments from Mbeki that Zimbabwean security legislation would be relaxed, Justice minister Patrick Chinamasa on Wednesday said POSA would not be amended as it was serving a key purpose He (Mbeki) told Blair South African cabinet ministers who had visited Harare learnt of Mugabe’s plans to ease political restrictions.

The Sunday Times (SA), 30 March 2003 Mbeki said in Parliament this week that he would deal with Zimbabwe in a manner that sought to “produce results”. “We’re not going to deal with it in a manner that makes good headlines,” he said.

May 2003

BBC News, 3 May 2003 A spokesman for South African President Thabo Mbeki has, however, said he strongly rejected the notion that he would go to another country to bring about regime change.

The Times (UK), 5 May 2003 While he ruled out “regime change”, Mr Mbeki said last week that the key issue was to bring Mr Mugabe and Mr Tsvangirai to the negotiating table, but he gave no further details of the talks’ agenda.

Business Day (SA), 12 May 2003 In a signal that President Thabo Mbeki is intent on quashing speculation that pressure is about to be applied to Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, he stressed in his weekly letter on the African National Congress (ANC) website that Zimbabweans should determine their own future, and the country’s problems were not the result “of a reckless political leadership”.

The Daily News, 17 May 2003 Sources told The Daily News that after the visit to Harare, Tsvangirai received an oYcial invitation from the Malawian government, through its Foreign AVairs Ministry, to hold talks with Muluzi. They said the invitation was received last Friday morning but was cancelled on the afternoon of that day. They said on Friday afternoon, the MDC leadership received a message from the Malawian High Commission in Harare cancelling the invitation and saying that Muluzi and Mbeki were consulting on the matter. It could not be established yesterday why the Malawian and South African leaders still needed to consult over Tsvangirai’s visit.

June 2003

The Financial Mail (SA), 27 June 2003 Pretoria remains unhelpful. Defense minister Misiuoa Lekota blames the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) for the impasse over talks, but again this is not so. The sole precondition set for negotiations was by Mugabe himself, who will not talk to the MDC unless and until it drops its court challenge to his presidential poll victory last March.

News24, 30 June 2003 Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad said on Sunday South Africa hoped to reach a common understanding with the US on Zimbabwe during the visit. He reiterated South Africa’s stance that it could not impose a solution on Zimbabwe. Only the Zimbabweans themselves were able to solve their problems. Outsiders could merely assist. Pahad added: “I think all of us accept that we have to do something quickly to assist the Zimbabweans to move forward. If there are technical diVerences, we have to discuss them.” 9573971032 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 141

July 2003

Zimbabwe Independent, 9 July 2003 South African President Thabo Mbeki has assured his United States counterpart George Bush that President Robert Mugabe will soon quit to make way for fresh elections, diplomatic sources said yesterday. Reports from Pretoria yesterday said Mbeki indicated to Bush that Mugabe has promised to give up the Zanu PF leadership in December during Zanu PF’s annual national conference. A fresh presidential poll would then be held in March in tandem with a parliamentary election.

October 2003

Foreign Minister Dlamini Nkosazana Zuma Speech regarding Africa, 25 October 2003 The Zimbabwean problems are taking long to resolve. The Ethiopia and Eritrean situation is also fragile. A lot has been said about how South Africa should resolve the problems of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is an independent, sovereign state and not the 10th province of South Africa. We ﬁrmly believe that the Zimbabweans themselves, across party political and other divides have the responsibility to resolve their problems on the basis of the will of the people of Zimbabwe. Certainly all of us want Zimbabwe to succeed and have an obligation to help them move forward. On the primary problem of the land, we believe the redistribution of land is an attempt to correct an historic injustice and we support them in that.

January 2004 The Times (UK), 23 January 2004 Speaking at a press conference in Pretoria with Gerhard Schroeder, the German Chancellor, Mr Mbeki said that he had mediated a deal last month that had been delayed only because of the Christmas holidays. “I’m happy to say that they have agreed now that they will go into formal negotiations,” the South African leader said. “I’m saying that I am quite certain that they will negotiate and reach an agreement.” The announcement drew a sceptical response in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 2

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH

October 2002

Sunday Times (SA) Mbeki Interview, 8 October 2002 The Commonwealth observer’s team had a very interesting formulation—they said the outcome of the presidential election was not fully representative of the will of the people of Zimbabwe. They did not say it was unrepresentative; they said it was not fully representative because they think that some people did not get on to the voters’ role and, maybe, you should have extended the time on the voting day by a few hours, or something. (Note: The Commonwealth Mission wrote: “the conditions in Zimbabwe did not adequately allow for a free expression of will by the Electors”)

New York Times, 17 November 2002 Referring to the penalties, Dr. Zuma, speaking as she stood next to Foreign Minister Stan Mudenge of Zimbabwe during the news conference in Pretoria, said, “We don’t think that’s a situation (Commonwealth sanctions) which should continue for a long time.”

December 2002

ZWNEWS, 26 December 2002 President Mbeki makes much of the apparent contradictions between the Commonwealth Observer Group’s report and that of the oYcial South African observers, but makes no comment on the fact that the conclusion reached by the South African observers was solely that of the ANC and was wholly repudiated by the members from other South African parties. This piece of obfuscation is continued by Azziz Pahad. 9573971032 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Ev 142 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

January 2003

The Sunday Times (UK), 19 January 2003 To Mbeki’s dismay the Commonwealth observers’ report made action against Mugabe inevitable. The only concession he won was that Zimbabwe’s suspension from the organisation was limited to a year. Mbeki returned to South Africa making furious comments about the “white Commonwealth” and declaring that “if the decision-making process within the Commonwealth is to be informed by this kind of thinking, it is not worth maintaining the association”.

March 2003

The Sunday Times (SA), 30 March 2003 “Otherwise there is no consistency and the outcome is a consequence of a political and procedural travesty,” Mabuza (SA High Commissioner London) raged. Deputy Foreign AVairs Minister Aziz Pahad went further to say that South Africa wanted a review of the decision. South Africa seems conﬁdent that Africa and other developing nations are willing to back Zimbabwe to the hilt, as South Africa does.

April 2003

The Guardian (UK), 10 April 2003 The Guardian has obtained a copy of the conﬁdential report by Don McKinnon, the Commonwealth secretary general . . . The report, which was commissioned in March 2002 when Zimbabwe was ﬁrst suspended from the Commonwealth, categorically refutes assertions made last month by Thabo Mbeki, the president of South Africa, and Nigeria’s leader, Olusegun Obasanjo, that the situation in Zimbabwe had improved.

September 2003

ABC News Australia, 16 September 2003 A spokesman for South African President Thabo Mbeki, Bheki Khumalo, says Zimbabwe should be included in the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). “We are very disappointed because we don’t think that excluding Zimbabwe from CHOGM in Nigeria will achieve anything,” he said, “We would have hoped that Zimbabwe would have been invited to attend the meeting.” Zimbabwe was suspended from the councils of the Commonwealth last year when it failed to contain political violence and intimidation.

The Times (UK), 17 September 2003 However, Bheki Khumalo, President Mbeki’s spokesman, insisted that there was nothing to be gained from barring Mr Mugabe from the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Abuja. “We want to appeal to the Australians to understand that megaphone diplomacy will not produce results,” Mr Khumalo said. “Sanctions have been imposed against Zimbabwe now for a number of months with no result at all, and we don’t think that using megaphone diplomacy will work.”

Business Day (SA), 19 September 2003 There was no additional sanction barring Zimbabwe from attending the Commonwealth summit to be held in Nigeria in December, President Thabo Mbeki said yesterday. Mbeki reminded the National Assembly that Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth had been for a period of a year, which had passed in March. He said the decision to suspend Zimbabwe for a year was taken within a very speciﬁc mandate. “The troika decided to impose a maximum sentence of suspension for a year and that has been served. I am not aware of any additional sanctions.”

Mail and Guardian (SA), 20 September 2003 “Our view is that the Commonwealth imposed the maximum penalty on Zimbabwe by suspending it. for one year. We do not understand this business of Australia saying that Zimbabwe [should still be] excluded. You cannot impose a speciﬁc punishment on a country and then, because you don’t like it, simply decide to continue that punishment.” 9573971032 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 143

October 2003

ZWNEWS, 1 October 2003 Nigerian President Obasanjo, the Commonwealth summit host, said in an. interview Monday with allAfrica.com. That only a sea change in Zimbabwe would get Mugabe an invitation. Of the ban on the Daily News he added, “I will say that if it qualiﬁes as a sea change at all, it is a negative sea change.”

December 2003

Mbeki article in ANC Weekly Newsletter, 12 December 2003 During the Abuja CHOGM those accustomed to the practice of disinformation described as “spin” did everything to communicate false reports to the media. They campaigned and lobbied to ensure the continued suspension of Zimbabwe. We deliberately avoided engaging in any of these activities. We fed no stories to the media. We did not campaign. We lobbied nobody. Yet the story is put out that we lobbied, blocked agreements, and dismally failed to achieve our objectives.

CHAPTER 3

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE WEST May 2002

News24 (SA), 21 May 2002 The European Union has reportedly called on Southern African Development Community governments to refrain from “normal diplomatic relations with the Mugabe Regime.”

November 2002

New York Times, 17 November 2002 The South African foreign minister. Dr. Nkosazana Zuma, said it was time for Western nations to consider ending penalties they imposed on Zimbabwe for intimidating opposition party supporters, judges, journalists and white farmers, and manipulating the presidential election. “We don’t think that’s a situation which should continue for a long time.” Asked whether South Africa was condoning lawlessness, Dr. Zuma said it was important to look ahead. “Even if Zimbabwe made a mistake the point is that we need to move to the future,” she said. Business Day (SA), 25 November 2002

EU: ACP at odds over exclusion of Zimbabweans SA delegates to the conference want the Zimbabweans to attend. Last week Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma said SA would seek to have international sanctions against the beleaguered state lifted.

October 2002

Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 13 October 2002 In an interview with the Sunday Times, Mbeki said the West’s suggestion that “the worst crisis in the world is Zimbabwe” was not helping to solve that country’s problems.

CHAPTER 4

PLAYINGTHE RACE CARD May 2002

SABC News, May 2002 “We should work towards bringing the Zimbabweans back from the brink. We should not be the ones that push them to the precipice,” Dlamini-Zuma also expressed concern about the “fast-growing right-wing trend in the developed world” that was being manifested through xenophobia, Islamaphobia and racist policies. South Africa’s hosting of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance to stem the tide of this rabid racism was correct, she said. “It is our hope that the international community will implement without further delays the programme adopted at the conference to push back the frontiers of racism,” she said. 9573971032 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Ev 144 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

May 2003

Business Day (SA), 22 May 2003 In his weekly letter (ANC Today, May 9–15), Mbeki incredulously claims that “(c)ontrary to what some now claim, the economic crisis currently aVecting Zimbabwe did not originate from the actions of a reckless political leadership or corruption” and blames Zimbabwe’s ills on abstract historical forces and economic inevitability, not on Mugabe’s rotten leadership. No, according to Mbeki, Zimbabwe’s economic decline has to do with a racist negotiated settlement with London, that” quarantined the matter of land redistribution because of agreements reached” and that “sought to counterbalance the principle of black liberation with the protection of white property, inserting into the settlement the racist notions of black majority rule and white minority rights”.

June 2003

SAPA News, 5 June 2003 Last week Mbeki defended Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe in an article in The Guardian in Britain entitled “Don’t blame Mugabe for everything”. Mbeki’s analysis of the crisis in Zimbabwe was full of evasions and half-truths. Nowhere in his article did he ever mention abuses of human rights or the destruction of democracy. lie ignored Mugabe’s virulent racism and blamed London for any “racist notions” that might exist in Zimbabwe.

September 2003

The Daily Nation (Kenya), 18 September 2003 When it comes to Zimbabwe, South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki seems determined to split the Commonwealth along racist lines by insisting that President Robert Mugabe be invited to the Club’s December summit in Nigeria. This is only the latest intervention by the South African leader on behalf of the Mugabe regime. Last year Mr Mbeki attacked “white supremacists” within the Commonwealth who dared criticise the collapse of law and order in Zimbabwe.

December 2003

Mbeki article in ANC Weekly Newsletter, 12 December 2003 In time, and in the interest of “kith and kin” (British), the core of the challenge facing the people of Zimbabwe, as identiﬁed by the Coolum CHOGM, has disappeared from public view. Its place has been taken by the issue of human rights. Those who have achieved this miracle are not waiting passively for free institutions to evolve. The Sunday Independent (SA), 14 December 2003 President Thabo Mbeki has shocked foreign diplomats and some local observers by justifying Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s forcible seizure of white farmland as “perhaps inevitable”, They have also reacted with dismay to what they called Mbeki’s “deeply oVensive” remarks written in his weekly electronic letter in his party’s website journal, ANC Today. These include the charge that Britain opposed Zimbabwe’s readmission to the Commonwealth this week merely to protect its “white, settler, colonial kith and kin”. And that western powers are using the demand for Mugabe to respect human rights merely as a tool for “regime change” in Zimbabwe.

CHAPTER 5

THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE

November 2002

New York Times, 17 November 2002 Referring to the penalties, Dr. Zuma, speaking as she stood next to Foreign Minister Stan Mudenge of Zimbabwe during the news conference in Pretoria, said, “We don’t think that’s a situation which should continue for a long time.” 9573971032 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 145

Many African oYcials are also suspicious of all the Western talk about human rights in Zimbabwe when there is little talk about human rights in other African countries. “In other African countries where human rights are ignored, it’s business as usual,” said Claude Kabema, the acting director of the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa. “That’s why many people have failed to embrace the Western position. They see it as hypocrisy.”

April 2003

SABC News, 16 April 2003

Sudan and Zimbabwe escape censure at UN rights meeting The United Nations top human rights body rejected an European Union motion condemning abuses in Sudan today and blocked a bid to put Zimbabwe in the dock . . . However, African countries led by South Africa voted to prevent any further action being taken on the EU call, a similar outcome to last year.

January 2004

Mail and Guardian (SA), 5 January 2004 But what is most revealing in Mbeki’s ANC Today commentary is his resentment of any foreign policy that is driven by concern for human rights.

CHAPTER 6

THE LAND ISSUE

November 2001

Justin Pearce—News Online November 2001 Instead Mr Mbeki- with the support of Namibia’s Sam Nujoma and Mozambican President Joachim Chissano—aYrmed his support for the land reform process in Zimbabwe, without censuring Mr Mugabe for failing to stop the violence which accompanied the seizure of land.

May 2002

The Guardian (UK), 31 May 2002 He (Mbeki) declined to criticise Mr Mugabe and defended Zimbabwe’s land redistribution programme as a “correction of a colonial legacy”, dismissing opposition assertions that the land seizures were a cover to crush political opponents. “The land redistribution in Zimbabwe cannot be called an excuse,” Mr Mbeki said. “To turn around and say the land redistribution is an excuse is very unfeeling. There are people in Zimbabwe who are very poor, who don’t have land.” He said the country’s crisis was the result of a century’s old wrong which Mr Mugabe had been unable to address sooner because he was constrained by a constitution imposed on him by Britain two decades ago. The solution to Zimbabwe’s problems would take some time,” Mr Mbeki said, ‘just as the solution to the Palestine problem won’t take just a day.”

November 2002

The Financial Gazette, 14 November 2002

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma: Seized Farms “We think it would be nice to end this matter in a neater way, in a way that does not leave a sector of the Zimbabwean population bitter and that all those who lose land are compensated,” she said, referring to Mugabe’s land seizures. “We are looking to countries like Britain to try and assist (in compensation).” She then urged the international community to aid Zimbabwe regardless of the government’s mistakes. “Even if Zimbabwe made a mistake, the point is that we need to move to the future,” she said. “No one can change yesterday, no one can change today, but we can change the future.” 9573971032 Page Type [E] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Ev 146 Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence

January 2003

The Guardian (UK), 11 January 2003 The South Africa labour minister, Membathisi Mdladlana, said in Zimbabwe yesterday that his country had a lot to learn from President Robert Mugabe’s programme of land reform, The political opposition in South Africa denounced his remarks as “chilling”. Mr Mdladlana said during a tour of farms that it was “important that black people should also own land that they till, and know how to produce food and be self-suYcient and sustainable”. The South African Press Association also quoted him as saying that South Africa had a lot to learn about land reform from its neighbour. His comments were trumpeted by Zimbabwe’s state press as strongly supportive of Mr Mugabe’s land seizures, which are widely seen as the primary cause of the country’s current famine. December 2003

Mbeki article in ANC Weekly Newsletter, 12 December2003 With everything having failed to restore the land to its original owners in a peaceful manner a forcible process of land redistribution perhaps became inevitable.

CHAPTER 7

MISCELLANEOUS Elections

May 2002

Business Day (SA), 31 May 2002 The Zimbabwean authorities “inadequately adhered” to their country’s laws when conducting the March 9–11 election that saw Robert Mugabe re-elected as the president, according to the SA observer mission’s final report. The report which was recently submitted to President Thabo Mbeki but not yet made public also says that the will of Zimbabweans was demonstrated by the poll only “to a degree”. The 50-member multi-sectoral observer mission appointed by Mbeki and headed by businessman and African National Congress member Sam Motsuenyane declared the poll “substantially free and fair” when it announced its verdict immediately after the poll. The finding was repudiated at the time by some members of the mission and other observer missions, such as the one from the European Union. After some damage control, the mission then “clarified” the report, saying it was an interim one and that other members of the mission had yet to make their input. A more elaborate criticism of the election lies hidden in the mission’s 13 “recommendations” in which voices of dissent point out that there is an explicit acknowledgment of all the issues raised by other missions, and which led to other international observers raising questions about the credibility of the election. “Without these fundamentals, allegations of fraud can easily be made resulting in a situation that casts doubts and aspersions on the integrity of the elections,” the report notes, concluding nevertheless that the election outcome represented “the legitimate voice of the people of Zimbabwe”. March 2003

The Sunday Times (UK), 2 March 2003 Mbeki made strenuous eVorts to ensure that observers from both South Africa and the Organisation of African Unity declared the poll free and fair. Last month he used his presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement to steer its 115 members into giving Mugabe a unanimous vote of conﬁdence. January 2004

The Mail and Guardian (SA), 5 January 2004 When the team’s chair Sam Motsuenyane was asked why there had been insuYcient polling stations in Harare, an opposition stronghold, he replied that it was an “administrative oversight”.

Freedom of the Press in Zimbabwe

February 2003

The Star (SA), 18 February 2003 Last year Mbeki told the world Mugabe would scrap the new press restrictions. Instead Mugabe has seen to it that they are tightened and the Daily News is out of business—to the delight of our foreign minister. 9573971032 Page Type [O] 13-05-04 04:41:58 Pag Table: COENEW PPSysB Unit: PAG1

Foreign Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 147

March 2003

The Mail and Guardian (SA), 3 March 2003 First was Minister of Foreign AVairs Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. “But what’s wrong with registering journalists?” was the bottom line of her message. Then came Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development Penuell Maduna. The gist of his theme: “Why assume that registration of the media is necessarily bad?” Their mantra has been making many media people angry, because it whitewashes Zimbabwe’s repression of the press via registration. On the contrary, its ministers are now actively defending Zimbabwe’s violations of basic rights. “We accept the Aippa,” says Dlamini-Zuma. Zimbabwe Independent, 28 March 2003 Mbeki has made a number of statements suggesting Zimbabwe would amend POSA and the Access to information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the last as recently as this week. “We have agreed with the government of Zimbabwe that they should attend to the pieces of legislation that are said to oVend human rights (and) the press,” he told African clerics meeting in Midrand on Monday.

Treason Trial

February 2003

The Mail and Guardian (SA), 18 February 2003 South Africa’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Aziz Pahad, has said Zimbabwean law should be allowed to take its course, and that it would be premature to dismiss the charges against Tsvangirai as bogus.

EPILOGUE December 2003

New York Times, 19 December 2003 On Thursday, Mr. Mbeki stood solidly with Mr. Mugabe in public. Speaking to about 200 supporters of Mr. Mugabe’s governing Zanu Party, Mr Mbeki emphasized their countries’ history of white minority rule. “In the African Revolution, we shared the trenches together,” he said, according to Zimbabwean state radio The Sunday Independent (SA), 21 December 2003 Mbeki said: “Our countries have shared common problems. As they shared the common problems of oppression, they share common problems today. President Mugabe can assist us to confront the problems we have in South Africa so that we can assist you to solve the problems that face Zimbabwe.” 23 March 2004

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