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The Rise of the South African Security Establishment An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power

Kenneth W. Grundy

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THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The Rise of the South African Security Establishment An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power

Kenneth W, Grundy

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS August 1983 BRADLOW PAPER NO. 1

THE BRADLOW FELLOWSHIP

The Bradlow Fellowship is awarded from a grant made to the South African Institute of In- ternational Affairs from the funds of the Estate late H. Bradlow.

Kenneth W. Grundy is Professor of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio. Professor Grundy is considered an authority on the role of the military in African affairs. In 1982, Professor Grundy was elected the first Bradlow Fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs.

Founded in Cape Town in 1934, the South African Institute of International Affairs is a fully independent national organisation whose aims are to promote a wider and more informed understanding of international issues — particularly those affecting South Africa — through objective research, study, the dissemination of information and communication between people concerned with these issues, within and outside South Africa. The Institute is privately funded by its corporate and individual members. Although Jan Smuts House is on the Witwatersrand University campus, the Institute is administratively and financially independent. It does not receive government funds from any source. Membership is open to all, irrespective of race, creed or sex, who have a serious interest in international affairs. While providing a forum for differing political viewpoints, the Institute itself, as a strictly non-partisan body, never propagates a particular policy on any issue within its field of activ- ities and any opinions expressed in this monograph are the responsibility of the author and not the Institute. The Institute's publications are intended for a wider audience than its own membership and are available to the general public on subscription or singly.

® The South African Institute of International Affairs Contents

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT 3

III. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 9

IV. THE SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT 11

V. THE MILITARIZATION OF WHITE SOCIETY 17

VI. A CONSTELLATION OF STATES AND SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY TOWARD THE HOMELANDS 20

VII. FOREIGN POLICY 28

VIII. CONCLUSIONS 33

NOTES 36 THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Jan Smuts House, PO Box 31596, Braamfontein 2017

ISBN 090837114 4

Printed by The Natal Witness (Pty) Ltd The Rise of the South African Security Establishment An Essay on the Changing Locus of State Power

I. Introduction Diverse public and private institutions and agencies In June 1982 South African Foreign Minister R.F. concerned about security, strategy and defence "Pik" Botha turned up at a press conference in the have grown in size and importance in national life. operational area wearing the uniform of an honor- Although they may compete with one another for ary colonel in the South African Air Force. The favour and budgetary largesse, together they consti- Sunday Times' "Hogarth" playfully pondered that tute a concerted force proclaiming a parallel if not since "the doves of Mr Botha's Foreign Affairs always identical perspective on state policy. But Ministry have long waged a losing battle with the what is more, because of the pervasive combative military hawks over matters Namibian and other mentality that has come to see so many issues of diplomatic diversions," perhaps the Foreign Minis- public affairs as bound up in the defence and secu- ter was signalling that if you can't beat 'em, join rity of the South African regime, security institu- 'em.1 "Tantalus" of the Sunday Express was equally tions increasingly have demanded a greater voice cheeky, suggesting that since Pik Botha has been and role in policy issues not normally associated good at predicting the future, his uniform must with defence and security. By so doing, various seg- demonstrate that in his view the government sees ments of the defence establishment have positioned its future in military terms.2 themselves to be drawn into the highest policy In their own sarcastic ways, these columnists are councils. In short, the defence establishment has telling us what many have long suspected, indeed grown in power and has expanded the range of what some have openly expressed, that the armed policy concerns beyond the defensive and strategic. forces or more accurately the security establishment Of course, this primacy has not always been so. has positioned itself at the centre of power. The When geographer Edwin Munger wrote his Noses SADF is no longer simply an instrument for policy on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy implementation. It is an active participant in policy over seventeen years ago, he was led to conclude: making. Not merely in military matters, but in If one were to list the most important people wider security issues, both domestic and external, making foreign policy, the names might well run: and even in matters concerning the homelands, and 1. Dr Verwoerd. 2. Dr Verwoerd. 3. Dr Ver- economic and foreign policy, those associated with woerd. 4. Foreign Minister Muller. 5. The Cabi- a military perspective have gained the ascendance. net, and 6. Secretary G.P. Jooste, Brand Fourie, Various components of the security establishment Donald Sole, and one or two other profess- 3 are prepared to provide intelligence, analysis and ionals. policy advice in order to enable South Africa to counter what they perceive to be a "total In that instance, not a single name was listed from onslaught". Indeed, the very concepts of "total the security forces or the civilian defence establish- onslaught" and "total strategy" are creatures of the ment. Something significant has happened in these military mind. That the agenda of government can intervening years that has enabled a changing con- be dictated by such a perspective itself attests to the figuration of power to be entrenched in top policy- extent of insecurity in South Africa. making councils. It is the purpose of this mono- Over the past dozen years or so we have wit- graph to explore these power realignments and to nessed the rise of what might accurately be de- discuss and analyze changing diverse regional strat- scribed as a security establishment in South Africa. egic perspectives of government and other agencies

1 close to power in the light of the rise of the security obsolete, and badly maintained. The Minister of establishment. Defence during the 1930s, Oswald Pirow, had dis- First, however, it becomes necessary to define played little aptitude for modernizing his forces and what is meant by the security establishment in this less interest in the assignment. South Africa was, context. This establishment includes all those indi- after all, thousands of miles remote from poten- viduals and institutions, whether a formal part of tially hostile forces. Its immediate neighbours posed the governmental and administrative apparatus of little threat to the Union. Small wonder that the ar- the state or attached to private and parastatal or- med forces had been regarded as more important ganizations, that are concerned with the mainten- ceremonially than operationally and had been al- ance of the South African state primarily by devel- lowed to atrophy. oping and employing the coercive instruments of The growth of the Defence Force in World War the state or by weakening by various means the co- II was but a temporary aberration in policy. This ercive arms of hostile states. It is a definition that is was confirmed by the demobilization after the war consciously inclusive in order to discuss the full ex- and a further postwar de-emphasis on military pre- tent of security concerns. paredness. The electoral defeat of the Government First and most obviously the security establish- of General J.C. Smuts in 1948 brought to a close an ment includes the South African Defence Force era in South African politics. Although General {SADF), the Department of Defence, and the Smuts was in many ways the embodiment of the South African Police (SAP), particularly its parami- UDF, the Defence Force had played virtually no litary units. Incorporated, as well, are the various role in domestic politics. And because the UDF had branches of the intelligence community (the Na- been identified as an institution very much domi- tional Intelligence Service, the Division of Military nated by English-speakers and moulded along Intelligence, and the Security Branch of the Police). British lines, it fared no better during the first years Some governmental parastatal corporations, par- of the National Party Government. ticularly Armscor, are defence oriented, as are the That government first concentrated on the sys- dozens of private firms that do work on subcontract tematic construction of the apartheid state. Then, from Armscor. The official vehicle for co-ordinat- having set in motion their race policies, government ing and expressing the views of these components turned to the UDF and the SAP to eradicate the has been, of late, the State Security Council and es- vestiges of the imperial mentality and English- pecially its Secretariat. The latter is heavily in- speaking dominance. All governmental institutions debted to the SADF for key personnel. Part of the were converted into apartheid institutions to intellectual community, involving private and quasi- strengthen the party's hold on the state apparatus, official think tanks have also been recruited into and in the process loyal Afrikaners were favoured. this constellation of groups. All are deeply engaged Many British-trained, English-speaking officers in the debate over defence and strategic policy, were pushed into premature retirement. A defence and, moreover, most have contributed to a amendment act required fluency in both languages widening delimitation as to what might be properly for all UDF officers and NCOs and for all men regarded as strategic cum regime maintenance af- seeking enlistment in the Permanent Force. Innoc- fairs. uous enough on the surface, this measure effec- tively discouraged the recruitment of English- Background speakers, by and large less inclined then to be bi- During the inter-war period and virtually until the lingual. Replacements in the officer corps were eve of South Africa's entry into World War II, the largely Afrikaners with little or no combat experi- Union Defence Forces had been politically insignifi- ence. Regiments with long and proud traditions, co- cant and, as a result, militarily weak. At the time of lonial designations, uniforms and insignia, and inva- South Africa's 1939 decision to ally with Great Bri- riably identified with segments of the English- tain, the Union Defence Forces (UDF) consisted of speaking community, lost their historic identity. only 313 Permanent Force officers and 3 040 other New uniforms and insignia were introduced. Afri- ranks (it had been authorized to number 5 385), kaners became more deeply entrenched in positions plus around 14 631 Citizen Force men. There were of authority throughout the defence forces, the po- another 1 900 in the Air Force and 432 in the lice, and the ancillary organizations associated with Navy.* Equipment and supplies were inadequate, security. The decision taken in the October 1960 referendum to establish a Republic and its subse- concern. It is this pattern we seek to chronicle and quent implementation on 31 May 1961, were the analyze. symbolic capstones to this policy. The gathering influence of the defence establish- Yet a large number of Afrikaners positively sup- ment has not gone unnoticed. Although consider- ported the war effort at the risk of being ostracized able effort is taken to-shield the process from the as "traitors" to their "nation". The division of public, it has not been a conspiracy and probably white South Africa was as much a division within cannot be attributed to a conscious scheme on the Afrikanerdom as it was between Afrikaners and part of individuals or institutions to take over English-speakers. The war was the emotional trip- government or inflate their power in order to hammer that brought into the open the latent social strengthen the security establishment or parts cleavages among whites that had temporarily been thereof. Much information on these changes at all suppressed or glossed over. levels is a matter of public record. But it is necess- For the decade of the 1950s, the defence forces ary, if one wishes to understand the process, that were not involved deeply in policy consideration or interested observers ferret out the information and implementation, and not at all in policy making. that they engage in logical and additive procedures Even into the 1960s, as the prospect of domestic and that they analyze the data soberly, even if it civil unrest and external military threat on the "bor- leads to conclusions they may not wish to admit. der" (expansively defined) grew, the defence forces maintained a low profile. After all, there were II. The Ideological Context guerrilla wars smouldering in Rhodesia, Mozambi- Central to an understanding of the rise of the secu- que, Angola and Namibia, and the SADF was en- rity establishment is an appreciation that South tangled in one fashion or another in each. Nonethe- Africa's governmental officials live in a world that less, the situational variable characterized by black they perceive to be fundamentally and increasingly dissatisfaction and international rejection meant hostile to South Africa, a world whose attitude to- that state security would play an ever more promi- ward white South Africa can be encapsulated under 5 nent role in governmental thought. the rubric "total onslaught". Despite the growing perceived need for larger It would be helpful at this point to define what is and more efficient coercive arms, there was never meant by "total onslaught" since that term forms total agreement on how best to deal with the chal- the basis for so much of state policy in South lenge. This contributed, for example, to compe- Africa. Fundamentally, "total onslaught" can be tition between various intelligence branches. They viewed from at least two angles. On the one hand, engaged in running jurisdictional disputes as well as there is the perceptual or subjective conception of a institutional jockeying for position. Likewise, there total onslaught. This contributes to the ideological was no clear agreement on the division of labour and political context in which decisions are taken. and the mode of deployment of the various armed On the other hand, "total onslaught" might be ex- forces. Considering South Africa's commitment to amined in objective terms. Is there a total military defence, it is surprising how little systema- onslaught upon the Republic? Or better, to what tic strategic planning took or takes place. Other extent do the perceptions of governmental policy than low-level planning regarding budgeting, man- makers coincide with reality with respect to "total power, and weapons' procurement that began in onslaught"? An objective assessment of the phe- the late 1960s, it was not until 1977 that a Strategic nomenon rather than the perception of that phe- Planning Section of the SADF was created. None- nomenon would help in evaluating the extent to theless, given P.W. Botha's reputation as a plan- which policy predicated on this doctrine is likely to ner, long-range strategic thinking was late in com- succeed. Not that policy based on a false reading of ing to the SADF. Nowadays, strategic planning empirical reality always fails. In cases of asymme- functions take place principally in the State Security tric distributions of power and wealth, policy ill- Council. Increasingly, however, the spokesmen for founded may successfully blunder or muddle various security groups sought a greater voice in through, in spite of misperceptions. policy determination, first with regard to their own United States foreign policy, when it brought strategic bailiwick, and later in related policy areas inordinate force to bear on problems sometimes such as foreign affairs, domestic security, the econ- succeeded. So, too, did some features of British na- omy, and eventually practically every facet of state val policy in the nineteenth century, early Hitlerian military strategy, and some aspects of Soviet do- doubted that the Republic of South Africa enjoys mestic and foreign policy. Because they were costly a high priority in the onslaught by Moscow. All "victories" one might argue that they were not suc- the authorities on strategy agree on this point. cessful according to cost/benefit criteria or in terms However, South Africa is also experiencing of larger social standards of success. To caricature double standards on the part of certain Western bodies in their behaviour towards her. They are the issue — why mobilize 50 per cent of the avail- doing this in an attempt to pay a ransom to the able manpower into the defence force to the neglect bear whose hunger must be satisfied.** of other social needs? Defence spokesmen may ar- gue that this mobilization "succeeded" in deterring Since the Western world is calling for major invasion and the territorial integrity of the state was changes in racial policies in South Africa, the West maintained. But at what cost, if the same end could is itself viewed as part of the problem rather than have been accomplished with far less manpower? part of the solution. South Africa stands alone. In- Since South African policy makers have taken sofar as opposition parties attack the government such care to spell out their own views of the total "they do not care that their complaints sometimes onslaught, it seems hardly necessary to elaborate. play into the hands of those powers that are bring- The "total onslaught", General Malan says, "is an ing pressure to bear on South Africa".1" ideologically motivated struggle and the aim is the Virtually every facet of public life, and many implacable and unconditional imposition of the ag- facets of private life, therefore, can be seen as part gressor's will on the target state".6 The enemy uses of the total onslaught. Since the onslaught directed all means at its disposal. The onslaught is not just at South Africa is "communist inspired", then military; it is political, diplomatic, religious, psy- South Africa must be regarded as a keystone in the chological, cultural and social. General Malan defence of "the whole free Western world". The again: "South Africa is today , . . involved in total West, by refusing to appreciate the centrality of war. The war is not only an area for the soldier. South Africa's strategic location, mineral wealth, Everyone is involved and has a role to play."7 and highly developed economy and polity, is practi- In a nutshell, the Soviet Union is regarded as the cally collaborating in its own demise." root cause of discontent and instability in the re- There is little point discussing the objective con- gion. They are diabolically using newly independent ditions that led to the rise of this defensive, some black states for their expansionist designs. "The ul- would say siege, mentality amongst those charged timate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies," reads with state security. The growing isolation of South the government's While Paper on Defence and Ar- Africa and the mounting threat of violence in the maments Supply, 1982: region and the country have been widely recognized and analyzed. is to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA and to replace it with a Marxist-orientated While there is an undeniable threat to the South form of government to further the objectives of African regime, one might take issue with Pre- the USSR, therefore all possible methods and toria's diagnosis of regional and global affairs at this means are used to attain this objective. This in- time. To be sure, South Africa is the target of vir- cludes instigating social and labour unrest, civi- tually universal criticism and condemnation of its lian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infra- domestic racial order. But criticism and condemna- structure of the RSA and the intimidation of tion hardly constitute onslaught, least of all total Black leaders and members of the Security onslaught. It is stylish and politically advantageous Forces. This onslaught is supported by a world- to "attack" (an unfortunate word for verbal ac- wide propaganda campaign and the involvement of various front organizations, such as trade tions) South Africa. Moreover, there are genuine unions and even certain church organizations and moral and philosophical misgivings about South leaders.8 Africa's system. For many people and govern- ments, their judgements are well founded and they In a censure debate in 1978, P.W. Botha as Minis- sincerely want apartheid ended. But for most of ter of Defence told the House of Assembly: them, they are not prepared to participate in a cru- sade or even in economic activities to undermine . . . South Africa is experiencing unprecedented intervention on the part of the superpowers. . . . the Republic. To accuse such people and govern- The Republic of South Africa is experiencing the ments of joining in a Marxist-directed total full onslaught of Marxism and it must not be onslaught is simply wrong-headed. One might also question, in light of the above, particularly General Magnus Malan, had sought to the extent to which the onslaught is directed from fashion such a strategy during Botha's tenure as Moscow, or is a series of ad hoc and sometimes co- Minister of Defence in the Vorster Government. ordinated responses to the same phenomenon. However, other political forces and personalities Agreed, the Soviet Union would be overjoyed To pursued different, though not necessarily conflict- see political instability in South Africa or, better in ing, agendas. Since achieving leadership of the Na- their eyes, a socialist government in South Africa. tional Party and the Prime Ministership, however, But for the Soviet Union it is a matter of priorities. P.W. Botha has been well positioned to formulate The USSR has other more pressing concerns in and implement his programme. world affairs — Poland and its own East European In practically every respect the current fascina- satellites, the global nuclear balance, China, the tion with a co-ordinated "total national strategy" Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Soviet economy and consequently with the deepening involvement itself. Why should the Kremlin assume greater risks of the defence establishment in multi-faceted as- and costs for a nice enough bonus. South Africa, pects of civilian life, as well as defence concerns, that would not add all that much to Moscow's grows quite logically from the strategic thinking global power? now identified with top-level SADF personnel, and In South Africa, thousands of white people and is increasingly popular in the National Party and its 13 millions of black loathe the apartheid system. Are voting constituents. they agents or tools of the Kremlin? Not today. But It is not our responsibility to analyze empirically they will be if they are continually harassed by the the concept of "total onslaught" and the worldview authorities and accused of complicity in a foreign- that emanates therefrom.14 Suffice it to say that the based violent revolution. The effect of domestic acceptance of such a view tends to emphasize a de- security policy based on a perception of total pendence on those instruments most identified with onslaught is to alienate still further well-meaning physical resistance and coercion, notably the armed non-violent critics who wish to reform what even forces and their support institutions, and leads to a some members of the Government recognize as an pervasive atmosphere that is suspicious of dissent, antiquated system that needs to be changed. and even alternative proposals and hard-hitting crit- In sum, it would appear that the total onslaught is icism. In this apprehensive atmosphere a confusion not total. If it were, South Africa would be more develops (and is consciously fostered) between completely isolated, its trade with the rest of the white survival and the maintenance of the apartheid world more difficult, its citizens constrained more system. To lose control is to surrender, and if apar- significantly in their movements around the world, theid means anything, it means control. That the and the levels of violence against the country from South African state can actually be saved by re- domestic as well as external sources would multiply structuring the state in ways quite different from many times over. Is the threat real? Definitely. But those suggested or entertained by its present lead- it is not total, and labelling it as such, at this stage, ership is to think the unthinkable. This does not may appear at first glance to be sharp politics, but mean that change is beyond the National Party in the longer run detracts from the credibility of regime. In fact, one vital aspect of the counter- policy makers in Pretoria, and will make it virtually revolutionary strategy is to introduce proposals for impossible to increase the dosage of motivation and modulated change, to blur the lines between formal mobilization later. segregation and integration, to experiment, to dis- Crucial to the maintenance of the South African arm critics by revising the trappings of apartheid regime is the necessity to devise a co-ordinated, ho- without tampering with the essentials. This process listic, counter-revolutionary strategy. It is the mark still enables those in charge to control the pace and of the present government, although it by no means nature of change: or so it would seem. Whether it stems directly from the time when P.W. Botha re- will unleash unexpected forces moving in surprising placed B.J. Vorster as Prime Minister, that "a more directions (as the Conservative Party contends) is conscious, concerted, and systematic effort is being another matter and is hotly debated in various seg- made to integrate various mechanisms of white con- ments of South African society. trol to produce a counter-revolutionary package The encirclement of the Republic, brought on in more rationalized and efficient than at any time be- large part by the Republic's own domestic racial 12 fore". P.W. Botha and his most trusted associates, order, requires that when one thinks of a "total national strategy" one conceives of it in at least stated by high-level National Party leaders, until regional terms. What happens in neighbouring early into the 1960s, that blacks must never be states, in ostensibly independent homelands, and in armed or required to serve in combat assignments self-governing homelands in various stages of domi- in the SADF. As late as 1970 the Minister of nation, becomes a part of the total strategy. Their Defence had stated that black Africans would be stability or instability, their economic achievements employed by his department only as common and frustrations, their evaluations of Pretoria's re- labourers. Their deployment would be solely in gime, become important data to be analyzed and "traditional roles", menial positions as cooks, bat- influenced by the Republic. In short, in a state con- men, orderlies, labourers, drivers, and so forth. fronted by a "total onslaught", virtually everything Despite their expressed aversion to arming blacks, foreign and domestic becomes a fitting subject for in 1963 the SADF was authorized to re-establish state policy and guidance. the Coloured Corps. Ten years later a black Afri- can unit was created (currently the 21 Battalion), Rise of the Defence Forces and later still, in 1979, a number of ethnic cum re- and the South African Police gional formations were established to be attached The growth in the force levels, budgets, quality of to various regional commands. material and equipment, and the professional skills By early 1983 the SADF had an estimated 9 500 of the various coercive arms of the state is a matter black (Coloured, Indian, and black African) mem- of public record. From a budget of R44 million in bers. This figure does not include the various 1960 to R3 068 million in 1982, the SADF reflects armies and national guards now attached to the government's commitment to strength and military "national states" or homelands, the black elements excellence. Likewise, the South African Police of the South West African Territorial Force (SAP) has seen its budgetary vote expand from R29 (SWATF) (a not insignificant proportion of that million to R482 million in those same years. In pol- force), or the blacks in paramilitary formations of itics money talks. In regard to these governmental the SAP. But the black forces in the SADF itself subventions, money reflects the product of institu- constitute around a third of the Army and Navy tions well placed and appreciated by those in posi- Permanent Force. Seen in this context, the black tions to distribute funds. Even accounting for infla- contribution to the career Defence Force is note- tion, these are significant patterns of growth, and worthy, especially the changeover in the past few they have taken their toll on the economy and on years. But by including Air Force Permanent Force taxpayers' resolution. Yet expansion of the security numbers, the black proportion falls to 22 per cent budget must follow inevitably from the panorama of the Permanent Force. Dilution is far greater perceived from Pretoria. when one adds in white national servicemen and The size and composition of the forces also re- still further Citizen Force and Commando units. flect a commitment to build a formidable security Black units, however, have been actively involved force that can intimidate and deter potential aggres- in border patrols, cross-border operations, and sors and dissidents as well as be operationally effec- combat duties in the operational areas. If blacks in tive when ordered into the field. In 1960 the SADF the Namibian forces and blacks in military and para- numbered 11 500 Permanent Force and 56 500 part- military formations deployed in the operational time men (plus 10 000 national servicemen). This area are also considered, one can see that blacks resulted in a standing operational force of 21 500 bear a disproportionate burden of combat (com- men. By 1982, those figures had been raised to pared to their number in the SADF itself). The 32 28 300 Permanent Force, 157 000 part-timers, and Battalion (made up mostly of Portuguese-speaking 53 100 national servicemen. The standing operatio- blacks from Angola and chiefly involved in cross- nal force by this time had reached 81 400. The border strikes), the SAP Counter Insurgency SAP, because of recruitment and wastage prob- (COIN) Units (mostly Ovambo) noted for their tra- lems, number 37 126 members today, up only 31 cking tenacity within Namibia, and the various San per cent since 1962. units alone, if press releases are to be believed, must account for an extremely high proportion of Numbers alone do not tell the entire story. The contacts with SWAPO.15 In this sense, blacks can changing racial composition of the armed forces sig- be regarded as a form of "cannon fodder" as al- nifies a realisation that the security situation is leged by the African National Congress.16 In that serious, though not desperate. It had often been they are largely volunteer and specialist units that leave the Republic militarily exposed. If not argument may lose some of its effect. So far, most friendly, at least not actively hostile governments of the published reports on blacks in the SADF in- must be in place, and it is hoped firmly so in the dicate that these men have been most effective in "national states'Yhomelands and among the Repub- their assigned tasks. lic's immediate neighbours. For geopolitical rea- But the overall view of government is unmistak- sons, measured criticism and even hostility can be able, and it is probably based on an undeniable re- tolerated more in some states than in others. Such ality (though their time frame may be exaggerated). matters and strategic co-operation and co-ordina- Their view, predicated as it is on the twin concepts tion will be discussed later. of "total onslaught" and "total national strategy", But what strikes the Pretoria watcher so graphi- is that the next five years will be decisive, and that cally is the recent interest by the SADF, as well as "if we want to survive" the Defence Force must be by the government, in a more systematic attention enlarged and strengthened.17 Since the source of to domestic or internal security concerns. This can white manpower has already been "over-extended", be seen in the emphases of the Defence Depart- a further increase of the full-time force can only ment in its latest strategic "line" and in its legis- be brought about by involving larger numbers of lative proposals. Not that the SADF and govern- other population groups.18 This view, of course, is ment have abandoned the international aspects of not shared officially by the Herstigte Nasionale security and border defence. Rather, these ideas Party (HNP) and the Conservative Party (CP). are now supplemented by a re-emphasis on pre- Dr Ferdie Hartzenberg, former Cabinet Minister venting and combatting internal unrest. Domestic and now chairman of the C.P.'s executive commit- internal security has long been a theme of succes- tee, calls for a return to apartheid in all walks of sive South African Governments. But generally it life. This includes separate defence forces with sep- had been a concern of departments normally identi- arate uniforms for each "nation" in South Africa.19 fied with domestic issues — Justice, Police, Bantu Greater involvement of all race groups in the Affairs, Internal Affairs, and so forth. It is signifi- SADF has been, however, long and strongly en- cant that the Department of Defence and the dorsed by the Progressive Federal Party (PFP).20 SADF as its operational arm have now taken up the matter. Of course, internal security has always been The importance of domestic order an important matter for the SADF, from the time Other aspects of strategic thought have recently of the "Rebellion" of 1914 and the 1922 miners' emerged. General Constand Viljoen himself talks strike. According to the Defence Act of 1957 as of "total victory" in five years, and he is referring amended, the second function of the SADF is to be employed "on service in the prevention or suppres- not just to a military victory. This will come, in his 22 view, through efforts to reach political settlements sion of internal disorder in the Republic". But it in both South Africa and Namibia. Yet one might had generally been assumed that this was clearly a add that it is the SADF that seems to be a factor de- secondary function. This still may be so, but recent laying settlement in Namibia. But in five years Afri- utterances and points of emphasis at least indicate cans "will eventually see through the intentions of that the SADF is increasingly aware that when the Russia".21 Why official SADF sources have fas- security of the state is at stake, defensive and do- tened on a five-year span in what clearly is a pro- mestic security considerations overlap. tracted political-military war of attrition is not In at least three ways, changes in strategic think- clear. It almost invites second-guessing, since in the ing point up a new concentration on domestic sta- past SADF leaders have not been noted for an bility. First is a renewed attention to urban unrest. overly optimistic or naive perspective. Jonathan Kapstein, a close observer of South These views reflect, as well, a kind of juggling act Africa, indicates that South African military strate- being done by South Africa's strategic thinkers. To gists use as "their bible" the writings of French Le- be sure, the regional strategic picture is not neg- gionnaire officer, Roger Trinquier. From his Alge- lected, and much of this revolves around an out- rian experience, Trinquier argues that it is possible come in Namibia that politically would not under- to control urban opposition from a technical and mine the Botha Government and its dual white tactical viewpoint.23 Aware that it would be expen- constituency in the Republic and Namibia and sive if not impossible to fight both an external and would not, in the view of SADF headquarters. an internal war at the same time, SADF thinkers have urged domestic political, economic, and social publicity from the least activity".26 reforms to defuse a polarized and tense situation. Government's response has been to coin the con- On the basis of the British experience in Malaysia cept of "area defence" and to fashion call-up policy and the French example in Algeria, some military to satisfy such needs. Unlike SWAPO, the enemy spokesmen believe that managed social change can fighting South Africa itself does not plan a "border be an instrument to disarm or reduce the appeal of war" but rather an "area war". To contend with those forces calling for social revolution. The carrot this, "people living in an area must be organized to and the stick are to be used in tandem. The classic defend themselves". They are the first line of de- 20 per cent military — 80 per cent political solution fence. The full-time SADF then becomes a "reac- comes to mind. To these ends increasingly, SADF tion force". The armed citizenry, or large segments personnel can be found deployed within South of it, now are expected to bear the primary re- Africa, far from the Republic's borders: everything sponsibility for containing localized outbreaks of from Civic Action schoolteachers in Soweto and violence. medical teams in the homelands to SADF units in- Thus the Defence Department sought to have the volved in cordoning off townships during SAP Defence Act amended during the 1982 session of swoops, or SADF troops manning roadblocks. The Parliament, to be able to call upon a large reservoir formerly low domestic profile of the SADF do- of auxiliary manpower "so that no area in SA will mestically has been raised and activated. be vulnerable to attack".27 The Act does not fore- shadow "total mobilization", but rather is designed The concept of * 'area defence" as a contingency measure. The object of the De- Second are recent references to what is called a fence Amendment Act of 1982 is not to call up all "second front". General Malan in 1982 interpreted eligible men up to the age of 55 since that would be a series of bomb attacks in Cape Town, the eastern impossible and impractical anyway, but rather to be Transvaal, Natal and Soweto as a "second front".24 legislatively empowered to do so in selected areas By this he means a pre-conventional warfare strat- that are under attack or infiltration. Area defence, egy that includes an increase of sabotage strikes if it means anything, necessitates the SADF taking against selected, largely symbolic targets. The advantage of a specialized knowledge of the terrain impression is that such unrest is growing with 12 in- and the people of a locality. Local farmers, in par- cidents reported in 1979,19 in 1980, and 55 in 1981. ticular, seem well suited to provide such intelli- Although the number of incidents in 1982 fell to 32, gence and field skills. Thus it would appear that the many were designed for maximum propaganda im- Defence Amendment Act is not fashioned to swell pact.25 That pattern of political violence continued the ranks of the Defence Forces across the board, into 1983 with the Bloemfontein and Pretoria but to call upon eligible men in particular locales or bombings. Yet the number of incidents alone is not with particular skills when the need arises.28 There nearly as significant as the psychological impact is the further possibility that the SADF might use they have. Moreover, ANC operatives have dem- the compulsory service provisions of the Defence onstrated greater efficiency and competence. Thus Amendment Act to provide staff for civil (as op- South Africa had best be prepared for both sorts of posed to military) service departments with staff warfare — conventional assaults when conventional shortages.29 defences are lowered, revolutionary assaults for Other recent legislation seems to focus on do- propaganda, psychological, and political effect be- mestic security questions. One might cite a battery hind the "lines". The second front far from Nami- of laws passed to inhibit publication or dissemina- bia and inside the Republic's borders also serves to tion of information regarding the activities of the spread the Republic's forces thin. In order to police and other security forces. Between 1977 and undermine a reformist "political solution" revolu- 1981 more than twelve statutes were enacted to this tionaries will step up sabotage and subversion. end.30 According to General Viljoen, ANC politicization More directly, the National Key Points Act gives of the black community has not gone far enough to the Minister of Defence extensive powers to declare support revolutionary action. He thinks the ANC any premises a National Key Point. Thus, "any operates without popular support, and therefore place or area (that) is so important that its loss, their isolated strikes seek "to create an atmosphere damage, disruption or immobilization may preju- of instability while endeavouring to get maximum dice the Republic" may be so designated, thereby obliging the owners to undertake security precau- oriented. Thus General Viljoen can say-that he be- tions, such as storing weapons and communications lieves in "offensive defence". "You have to be ag- equipment, and organizing and training a defence gressive, as this demonstrates your determina- unit to secure the Key Point against "terroristic [sic] tion."" For the Defence Force it is an activities, sabotage, espionage or subversion".31 interventionist defence of non-intervention. A baf- In border areas of South Africa the abandonment fling bit of Orwellian newspeak appears in the 1982 of farms is growing, and isolated rural communities Defence White Paper where it is written that if cir- are vulnerable to sabotage and violence. Recent ef- cumstances demand it, the SADF will engage in forts to improve security there likewise point up a "offensive pro-active action".34 concern with the psychological as well as military Likewise, defence schemes include the encour- dimensions of the problem. Both the Departments agement of a constellation of southern African of Agriculture and of Defence are anxious to avoid states and collaboration among neighbouring white depopulation of the platteland. Yet of the "national states" in preventing Marxist incursions. 1 908 Transvaal farms along the border from Mo- Physical and material policies also demonstrate that zambique to Botswana, 761 no longer have white these foreign factors will not be neglected. But of resident farmers. Most of those remaining are late there has been a shift in the stresses of security heavily armed and are digging in behind security rhetoric, themselves an outgrowth of perceived fencing. Many are leaving, not for security reasons, menace. These are additional themes joined to an but because the economic future for them is unsure. already immense commitment to regional defence. Drought, high costs, labour shortages and poor in- Yet regional defence does not necessarily represent frastructure are the key reasons. Almost all feel a commitment to regional stability. Many of these that terrorism will increase. Agricultural subsidies ideas will be dealt with later in this essay. are costly and do not necessarily keep farmers on unproductive land. Ideas to purchase abandoned III. Institutional Changes farms have been bruited about among the Defence Apparent to all who study South Africa have been planners, and resettling demobilized national ser- certain shifts in the institutional centre of gravity 32 vicemen on such farms has been suggested. The and in the institutional setting for high-level policy proposal of a "ring of steel" around the borders to making. In each of these shifts, it would appear that provide protection for outlying areas is popular in the security establishment, and especially the de- Defence circles. The plan was suggested to establish fence services, have gained power and influence at a series of fortified strong points linked into a radio the expense of other bodies. Before trying to de- network. Cactus fences topped by barbed wire, and scribe the nature of these changes, it might be help- razor wire fences, are being erected, too. ful to place them in the narrower context of the Such schemes themselves are a reflection of the idiosyncratic variables. In other words, the person- times — of South Africa's shrinking hinterland, of alities and experiences of the key actors involved the southward movement of the defence perimeter have shaped the trends that are reflected in the in- of the Republic from the Equator, to the Zambezi, stitution and roles involved. To many, what will be to the Cunene, to the Limpopo and the Orange. It written here is conventional wisdom, but scholars is not yet a counsel of last resort. Foreign policy have an innate capacity for neglecting the obvious and expansive security plans still are central to the in their analyses. defence of the order. It reflects, however, an P.W. Botha has been responsible for so many of awareness of the need for a complete and holistic the changes that we point up. His leadership style is security system. There is in South Africa a conflu- considerably different from that of his predecessor. ence of interests between today's NP politicians in That, plus his principal governmental experience as government, the SADF and the various intelligence Minister of Defence, accounts for the phenomena services. They see and believe that the communist we shall describe. To begin with, P.W. Botha is a menace is not only real, but the most profound manager, an organizational virtuoso, a leader who challenge to their system and their rule. Since the places great stock in expert advice, planning, prep- immediate communist challenge is perceived to be aration, structure, and follow-through. He is, as military and to be largely based beyond South one academic put it, a "forceful managing direc- Africa's borders and those of Namibia, then the im- tor". This contrasts with Vorster's "chairman of the mediate response is military and offensively board" style.35 Where John Vorster's lead was slack, Botha's is firm. With consummate political the vanguard of that revolution has been P.W. and and administrative skill Botha took over the reins the SADF. of government. His moves have not gone unchal- To a large extent these tendencies reflect P.W.'s lenged. He has, from time to time, been forced to own personality. His career has been as an organi- slow the pace of executive consolidation, to modify zation man, a manager.37 He rose to prominence as his policies, and even to retreat in the face of vocal a party careerist, identified for years with the cadre and concerted opposition. But the trend is unmis- of the Cape branch of the National Party where takable — government is being enlarged, central- he gained a reputation as a brilliant organizer and ized and streamlined. Efficiency and performance administrator. In April 1966 he was appointed matter, and it is increasingly difficult for indepen- Minister of Defence, a post he held until 1980. Al- dent centres of power to become entrenched. though it is hard to say who influenced whom, it is Reflective of the overall process has been what is apparent that Botha presided over the moderniza- called the "rationalization" of the government and tion and expansion of the SADF. The professional the public service. This involves, inter alia, the cen- military technocrats he promoted and admired in tralization of power at three levels, much different the SADF, in turn, taught Botha some lessons from the ad hoc approach to government character- about managerial efficiency, planning, professional- ized by Vorster and H.F. Verwoerd. Disclosures ism, and hierarchical structures. The cross-fertiliza- stemming from the Information Scandal from 1974 tion process has been salutary for both the armed to 1978 reveal much about Vorster's style. The forces and for Botha's evolution as an executive. A scandal itself grew out of a slovenly administrative not insignificant part of the explanation for the rise and decision-making style marked by departmental of the defence establishment in governmental cir- autonomy and debilitating inter-departmental po- cles is the fact that during his tenure as Minister, litical competition. Revelations of illegal or suspect Botha was able to identify and promote officers of practices hit close to Vorster. His direction of gov- intellectual and administrative promise. Most sig- ernment was, at best, loose. Vorster's tenure as nificant, of course, was his association with General Prime Minister, in retrospect, was an organizational Malan. In rapid succession Botha appointed Malan, and administrative nightmare in more ways than one. the youngest ever Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief To correct this, Botha has simultaneously reorga- of the Army, and Chief of the SADF. There is a nized the Cabinet, developed an interlocking sys- special trust between the two men, and the Prime tem of cabinet committees to devise policy and co- Minister clearly relies upon the General for advice ordinate its implementation, engaged and broad- on strategic matters, as well as on a number of do- ened the scope of the Office of the Prime Minister, mestic political concerns. Malan has not, as yet, and launched a President's Council charged with proven to be particularly adept at parliamentary or the task of advising government on constitutional intraparty politics. Botha's long association with the development and racial relations. The organizatio- SADF has also enabled him to identify gifted ad- nal changes began in earnest in September 1979 minstrators and thinkers in "his" ministry. Thus, it when the Prime Minister combined a score of estab- was only natural that on becoming Prime Minister lished cabinet committees, some of which existed he should turn to individuals whose skills he had only on paper and many of which met sporadically already observed at first hand, or whose perspec- and whose charges were fuzzy, into five key com- tives he shares. mittees. He gave them clear assignments, saw to it Running throughout this account of civil-military that they met periodically, and co-ordinated and relations are references to the close personal and 36 regularized their procedures. Each of these layers professional bonds between the Prime Minister and has loosely parallel structures. But several conclu- particular SADF officers. It is equally understand- sions are self-evident. Decision-making at the top able that as Botha becomes preoccupied with the has been tightened and centralized. P.W. Botha is detailed affairs of other departments, he will begin indispensable to the process. The security establish- to recognize individual talents outside the SADF ment exercises an enlarged role, and decisions ar- (as he has already within the Party) and move these rived at are more likely to be enforced and imple- individuals into responsible positions in his govern- mented than in the past with interdepartmental co- ment, thereby effectively diluting SADF influence. ordination the norm rather than the exception. The So it is no accident and no apparent conspiracy that managerial revolution has arrived in Pretoria, and catapulted high-ranking SADF men into political

10 and advisory positions close to the Prime Minister. management, as opposed to a representative mode There, SADF personnel have an advantage in the marked by delay, compromise, and consensus. Per- definition of social issues and the establishment of sonalized though it may be in its South African the agenda of state. The challenge of "total garb, it is a phenomenon occurring in many West- onslaught" is, on the surface, a military problem. ern democracies. The rise of "the Executive State", Those who share that view quite comfortably turn in turn has meant the decline of two institutions to the military for guidance. In effect, the SADF representative of the exclusive white community — are experts in control and the exercise of coercion, the National Party and Parliament. Government but not normally experts on political matters. Botha from above, especially when it seeks to fashion pol- has ideas of his own. The SADF are specialists in icies likely to be unpopular with one's narrow and the planning process and the execution of policy. privileged constituency, has led to a paternalistic, As such they have been drawn into affairs of state centralist regime, a departure from the casual outside of their normal portfolio. By demonstrating "democracy for the Herrenvolk" as once described certain technical/managerial skills, the SADF is in- by Pierre van den Berghe.3ti In right-wing Afrikaner volved at high levels. Much like the computer pro- circles Botha is accused of erecting, especially with grammer or the systems analyst who, by virtue of the new President's Council proposal for an ex- his technical expertise, may take up work for an ecutive President, a verligte dictatorship. There are, economic planner while knowing little about econ- of course, other insitutions that have gained or lost omics, the military planner may find himself re- power and influence in the movement toward the cruited to help with the political process in edu- executive state, some within the executive branch. cation or homelands consolidation or industrial The Department of Foreign Affairs and Infor- decentralization, among other things. mation (as it is now called) seems to have fallen on Botha has been a leader anxious to have expert hard times. The Information Department has been input into decision and policy execution. This has downgraded (to the extent of inclusion in the above led to an enlarged role, not just for the military Department), as has what once had been called elite, but for top-level civil servants and public offi- Bantu Affairs (now the Department of Co-opera- cials and even to involvement for specialists in pri- tion and Development) and the intelligence organ vate industry, the universities, and the independent formerly known as BOSS and DONS and which think tanks. To the chagrin of politicians outside is now called the National Intelligence Service the inner circle and others with narrow regional (NIS). Institutions so sloppily managed that auton- bases, it has become in many ways government by omy and individuality led to embarrassment or professionals. worse, organizations with less than cost-effective procedures have been marked for reorganization, Finding experts to provide counsel understand- reduction, or dismantlement. ably has been resisted by the rank-and-file career administrative cadre who have not always promptly and dutifully carried out decisions taken by Botha IV. The Security Establishment and his associates, especially when they involve the It should be helpful to outline in more detail what is downgrading of a particular office or function or meant by the term, the security establishment. This changing already familiar routines. The traditional fortuitous aggregation of institutions and groups maxim, "the expert should be on tap, not on top", can be divided into six components, although there still applies, but in some fields, such as the econ- is some overlap. First and most obvious is the omy, domestic security and defence, the authorities SADF and the Department of Defence, and princi- have permitted specialists to determine the agenda pally those Permanent Force officers charged with and to formulate the alternatives. Because the co- shaping overall defence strategy and especially with opted experts have demonstrated their loyalty to applying it in Namibia. We have already referred to Botha or because they already share the perspec- the growing force levels of the SADF in most of its tives of important political leaders, they have been formations. Particularly important to the present able to make themselves indispensable. discussion are those elements of the SADF charged This centralization of executive power in the with tasks with more political overtones. Here we Cabinet and particularly in a few departments, an include the various service academies and special- inner circle, or inner Cabinet as it has been called, ized advanced training institutions, the planning grows out of a personal hierarchical approach to and especially strategic planning groups, Civic Ac-

11 tion arms, intelligence and, as will become apparent tion. From the Security Police came resentment shortly, those segments of the SADF that liaise over BOSS intrusion into the Police's function and regularly with governmental, political and business areas of operation and over BOSS recruitment of elites in agencies such as the State Security Council Security Police personnel. Military Intelligence and the Defence Advisory Board. (DMI) suspected that van den Bergh and Vorster Second is the intelligence community, presently were plotting to have BOSS assume control of mil- consisting of the Department of Military Intelli- itary intelligence (BOSS did have a division respon- gence, the NIS, successor to the Bureau for State sible for military evaluation). Effectively this ap- Security (BOSS), and the Security Police. Their re- peared to have happened when, in 1968, General lationships among one another and with other gov- van den Bergh was appointed Security Adviser to ernmental and political bodies have been marked the Prime Minister (in addition to his control of by continual flux.3y Under Vorster, internal state RI), and at the time this was regarded as a move to security and a considerable range of foreign policy end competition between the three branches of the decisions and advice were proferred by Vorster's intelligence community. It did not. DMI bypassed closest lieutenant, General Hendrik van den Bergh, van den Bergh and reported directly to Botha, as the then chief of BOSS. Minister of Defence, and P.W., in turn, reported to In the early 1960s, South African authorities the National Security Council. This led to intense were alarmed by the threat posed by banned organ- rivalry between DMI and BOSS and to fierce izations such as ANC, PAC, Poqo, Umkonto we clashes in the NSC between Botha and Van den Sizwe, the Communist Party and other resistance Bergh. movements. John Vorster, as Minister of Justice, Rumours circulated of intra-intelligence spying, and his Commissioner of Police felt the need for a or various intelligence agencies withholding infor- sophisticated intelligence organization that could mation from the others and from the Security Ad- gather and evaluate information and thereby relieve viser, of BOSS'S partisan political activities against the burden that was borne by the Security Police. legitimate as well as illegal political parties, and Republican Intelligence (known as RI) was founded even against National Party politicians critical of as a clandestine extension of the Security Police. Its Van den Bergh and Vorster. Claims as well of members were hand-picked and included the for- BOSS'S dirty tricks abroad were legion, but these mer Commissioner of Police and the present Com- were hard to substantiate. Recent disclosures by missioner formerly head of the Security Police. Arthur McGivern and Gordon Winter have re- Their leader was then the head of the Security Po- fuelled speculation.10 lice, Colonel Hendrik van den Bergh, a Vorster The fact remains that BOSS went from 500 to nominee approved by Prime Minister Verwoerd. over 1 000 full-time employees in the decade of its The Colonel saw RI as his personal vehicle to existence. Van den Bergh's domination of BOSS greater power. As RI grew, it modelled itself on and his symbiotic attachment to Vorster made the America's CIA. But the CIA is involved largely principal intelligence agency of state vulnerable to with foreign espionage and operations. RI was also governmental changes at the top. The Information engaged in domestic spying, and so it also borrowed Scandal provided just the sort of predicament to from the FBI and from MI6, the British counterpart lead to the demise of BOSS. Like a rogue elephant of the CIA. BOSS had to be brought down, and when the per- General van den Bergh's reputation flourished as sonalities that dominated it fell from grace, BOSS RI's grew, and his close personal ties to Vorster lost its flimsy supports. (they had been interned together during Word War Even before Vorster resigned as Prime Minister II) enhanced his influence. This friendship was later in October 1978, "the second most powerful man in to shape the nature of BOSS in the Vorster years. the country", General Van den Bergh, stepped In 1969 the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) was down in a barrage of criticism. During his tenure he created as a Department of State, thereby bringing had built BOSS into a formidable and feared insti- the wholly secret RI into the open by making it an tution. In retrospect, however, it was a house of agency with a formal, high-profile identity. But cards. He had also become the confidant of the there were also smouldering resentments in security Prime Minister and had provided the impetus for a and government circles. From within BOSS came vigorous South African policy of detente in the re- criticisms of favouritism and Broederbond domina- gion and throughout Africa. That, too, was still-

12 born. And Van den Bergh was central to many their ex-agents were involved.41 In either case, the schemes of the Department of Information, an edi- operation does not reflect well on DMI and NIS fice that fell on top of him and his patron. Finally, and as a result, the Security Branch by default he had done battle with the man who was to be- seems to have emerged relatively unscathed from come the next Prime Minister, on matters of the Seychelles debacle. intelligence, defence policy and foreign policy. The third component of the security establish- Meanwhile, however, DMI saw its star rise as ment is that segment of the intellectual community Botha took command and pulled along with him that serves parts of the security establishment on an various defence agencies. A major review of the in- ad hoc contractual basis. There are, for example, telligence service, undertaken by a former director various centres of strategic studies. Perhaps the of DMI, concluded that DMI should be central to most active is the Institute for Strategic Studies at the total enterprise. Botha consolidated his own the University of Pretoria. The centre at the Rand control of the intelligence services by naming Kobie Afrikaans University is headed by a former Direc- Coetsee as Deputy Minister of Defence and of Na- tor of Military Intelligence, and that at UNISA is tional Security and by asking Coetsee to examine led by a Citizen Force officer. Faculty and research- the roles of the security forces. Without Van den ers from these centres participate in discussion Bergh DONS (the re-named BOSS) lost its special groups, planning sessions and advisory bodies and place in the intelligence hierarchy. Van den Bergh's regularly address various classes in diverse military tenure as head of State Security had not erased fric- and police training programmes. They also do con- tion between intelligence branches. DMI had been tract work for the SADF and other security bodies. weakened but not destroyed. The Security Police Likewise, private independent firms are engaged resisted BOSS domination, too. increasingly in research and policy advice on secu- To this day, competition is intense. DONS, re- rity and strategy. Among these groups would be the named again the NIS, with a new leader, Dr Lukas Terrorism Research Centre in Cape Town, Ron Daniel "Niel" Barnard, has an unclear mission. It Reid-Daly's team of security technicians in Johan- has been re-established as an intelligence evaluation nesburg, and other private firms advising private in- centre, a think tank rather than a gatherer of intelli- dustry and parastatal corporations on improving gence. But operatives accustomed to a more active their security to comply with the National Key policy role seldom are contented as passive ana- Points Act of 1980 and to protect their executives lysts. DMI seems to have taken over external intel- from terrorist attacks and kidnappings. ligence gathering. The Security Branch handles do- Individual academics interested in strategy and mestic intelligence. Covert operations are anyone's security are also drawn into the policy process, guess. Top-level policy advice seems to come from usually remotely, occasionally directly. They testify a number of SADF offices and officers. "The day of before governmental commissions, undertake con- the generals is at hand", one Foreign Affairs offi- tracted research, help train security and govern- cial put it. The Security Police, however, have not ment personnel, and in general make their expert been overshadowed, indeed, their chief officer was advice available to the authorities. recently promoted to Commissioner of Police, The armaments and related industries are in- thereby affording him a direct presence on the State volved in the security establishment, too. Most Security Council. It is clear that NIS has been prominent are the parastatal corporations directly a downgraded in importance in relation to the other part of the security enterprise. The Armaments intelligence agencies. No apparent logical division Corporation of South Africa (Armscor) exists solely of intelligence labour exists, and that leaves the to improve the material defence capabilities of the field open for competition and claims to authority state. Like the SADF itself, Armscor comes di- and responsibility. Each agency tries to enlarge its rectly under the authority of the Minister of De- own turf at the expense of its rivals. Now it would fence. It is one of the biggest industrial undertak- appear (and it must be emphasized that this is con- ings in South Africa, with assets greater than jectural) that DMI is on top, with NIS at the bot- Rl 200 million, 500 per cent greater than its hold- tom. Both, however, have been tarnished by their ings of R200 million in 1974. This places Armscor alleged implication in the abortive Seychelles coup, among South Africa's top twenty companies. or conversely, by their inability to see it being Armscor directly employs around 29 000 and pro- planned, when South Africans and even some of vides work for nearly 100 000 people through its

13 subsidiaries and its 3 000 private subcontractors.42 other things serve to punctuate a linkage that P.W. The result of this growth and size is that Armscor Botha seeks to develop. As in all political regimes is now the world's tenth-largest arms manufacturer. that purport to be representative, various social Where ten years ago about 70 per cent of the de- groupings seek to expand their access to and role in fence budget went to material imports, today mil- government. In South Africa, the corporate world itary imports represent only about 15 per cent of likewise seeks to improve its access to public deci- the defence budget. Armscor, which was created sion-making bodies while also wishing to maintain partially in response to a UN arms embargo, is to- its political distance. But the idea of total national day in a position to export weapons. For political strategy propounded by Botha and the Defence reasons it is not easy to find customers. Force has been identified as a form of managerial Through its subsidiaries, Armscor has deep links modernization. This may well enhance the private with private-sector firms and research companies. sector's confidence in government. Business lead- Up to 60 per cent of Armscor's production is con- ers, after all, admire managerial efficiency and ef- 43 tracted out to the private sector. This partnership fectiveness. The 13-man Defence Advisory Board, with private enterprise goes back to the time when whose membership is an elite of big business, is one P.W. Botha was Minister of Defence. He gathered medium for this involvement of the private sector in around him advisers from private firms, and that the total strategy for state defence and security, but closeness persists today. Armscor tenders touch it has not proven altogether satisfactory from the practically every sector of modern industry. Some government's standpoint, and it has been relatively of the country's top industrialists and managers inactive since its formation. serve on various group boards. Barlow Rand sec- A fifth component of the security establishment onded John Maree to Armscor for three years, and is the South African Police (SAP). There is no need he reorganized the corporation to make better use to detail the role of the SAP in maintaining state se- of the private sector. The main Armscor board in- curity.44 Perhaps less public are the paramilitary cludes the Chief of the SADF, General Constand formations that patrol the borders, that are used to Viljoen, as an ex officio member and the Director put down internal unrest, and that have been de- General of Finance. Armscor does not make public ployed in the operational areas of Namibia and the names of its other Directors. But the concept of Rhodesia. In all of these activities and others, there private-state co-operation for state security is well is a high level of interaction and co-operation be- advanced by Armscor and is regarded by some tween the SAP and the SADF. Although the SADF planners as a model to be applied elsewhere. has sought to avoid the stigma of repressing the civil Other parastatal corporations, Sasol and Iscor for population, the fact is that the SADF has widened example, also have defence and security links its range of domestic deployment and in the process through planning bodies and through sales to secu- finds its popular image more closely identified with rity forces and other state organs. Moreover, the the apartheid policies of the government and hence terms of legislation such as the Atomic Energy Act of the National Party. as amended in 1979, the National Supplies Procure- Many of these organizations and their functions ment Act of 1970 as amended in 1979, and the Pe- are brought together in the workings of the sixth troleum Products Amendment Act of 1979, require element of the security establishment — the State that firms do not disclose certain data about their Security Council (SSC). The SSC has become the operations. These laws, for their part, commit the central organization through which security policy is private sector to what could justifiably be regarded determined and its implementation co-ordinated. It as a military-industrial complex. also serves as the most important cabinet commit- It is not only Armscor and the other parastatals tee in a variety of other issue areas, including for- that are the conduit through which the private busi- eign policy, many economic decisions, some issues ness sector has been engaged in the security of the of justice, and even key apartheid and consti- state. The Carlton and Good Hope meetings at tutional questions. Technically the SSC is but one which the Prime Minister sought to explain and dis- among the five pivotal cabinet committees. In fact, cuss with private business leaders the thrust of his it is primus inter pares. In the first place, it is plans, to elicit from them ideas and reactions to his chaired by the Prime Minister himself. Secondly, it government's proposals, and to involve them more is the only cabinet committee established by law closely in his future visions. These meetings among with a fixed membership, and although this, in

14 itself, was not enough to make the SSC so vital in evant officials, and that co-operation and co-ordina- the Vorster regime, it adds to the impact of the tion are assured. There are also around fifteen in- body when coupled with other factors. Thirdly, it is terdepartmental working committees organized apparent that the SSC's range of interests has been along functional lines. They consist mostly of heads wider than other cabinet committees largely be- of departments or their senior deputies, plus a cause its members subscribe to and propagate the heavy SADF component. In the past these have necessity of a "total national strategy" to combat a been associated with the Office of the Prime Minis- "total onslaught" aimed at South Africa. Seen from ter. More recently, however, individual Cabinet this vantage point, practically no facet of state pol- members have tried to stake out "claims" to par- icy can be excluded from some aspect of security af- ticular working committees. J.C. Heunis, Minister fairs. of Constitutional Development and Planning, has Although the full membership of the SSC has been particularly adept in laying claim to the cabi- never been publicly disclosed, it includes at least net committee for Internal Affairs, the branch of the following: the Prime Minister and the Ministers the Office of the Prime Minister responsible for of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Police, Justice, and Constitutional Planning, and the Constitutional the most senior Cabinet Minister.45 The SSC also Committee of the President's Council. His influ- includes the top-ranking civil servants/career pro- ence ramifies from these bases to various interde- fessionals in each of those key departments. Thus partmental working committees in related fields. the Directors General of Foreign Affairs and Jus- The Secretariat for the SSC is headed by Lieuten- tice, the Director General of the Department of the ant General A.J. van Deventer. He attends SSC Prime Minister, the Chief of the SADF, the Com- meetings and, as a personal confidant of the Prime missioner of Police, and the Head of NIS partici- Minister, is in a position to influence policy exten- pate. A number of important people not directly re- sively. As many as 70 per cent of the initial comple- sponsible to Parliament participate in the decision- ment of Secretariat personnel came from the making process at the highest levels. The ministers SADF; only 20 per cent from the NIS and around who chair each of the other four cabinet commit- 10 per cent from the DFAI. In short, the Secreta- tees are also co-opted attendees. Others in govern- riat represents the triumph of the SADF in its on- ment and in private life may be invited to attend in- going battle with BOSS/DONS/NIS, the SAP, and dividual meetings, depending on the subject at of course the DFAI. How long it can retain that hand and the nature of the expertise they might be ascendancy is probably a function of the political expected to apply. If, for example, weapons devel- staying power of the Prime Minister himself. opment is on the agenda, the Director of Armscor The State Security Council was established by the may be asked to attend. If the topic is regional Security Intelligence and State Security Act of economic growth or transport planning as it impacts 1972. Its function was initially to advise the govern- on foreign policy, the General Manager of the ment with regard to the formulation of national pol- South-African Transport Services (SATS) may be icy and strategy and to determine intelligence prio- co-opted. The SSC is a body composed of political rities. It was, at that time, just one of twenty heavyweights supplemented by the highest-ranking different cabinet committees. It met sporadically, as political and governmental experts in security and did the other cabinet committees. There was little strategy. When they recommend policy, Cabinet is co-ordination of committee actions.46 The SSC was not likely to deny them. It is the prestige and influ- clearly subordinate to the Cabinet, politically as ence associated with the individuals and their off- well as legally. ices that assure that the SSC continues at the hub of When P.W. Botha became Prime Minister he en- governmental decision-making in so many areas of gineered a transformation in the SSC. The changes state policy. were largely structural rather than in the personnel. Backing the SSC is a Working Committee and To begin with, he reduced the number of cabinet behind it a Secretariat, poised to shape agendas, committees from twenty to five permanent commit- develop position papers, formulate alternatives, tees. He introduced regular (fortnightly) meetings take and circulate minutes, and, once the SSC and and rearranged their timing, so that SSC meetings then the Cabinet has acted, to see to it that each precede Cabinet meetings. The appearance of the operational department and bureau knows what is SSC presenting Cabinet with fait accompli decisions expected of it, that decisions are circulated to rel- has been noted.47 In addition, the SSC holds meet-

15 ings when Parliament is in recess and when the organ for the total national strategy, " the focal Cabinet is inactive. The SSC again would seem to point of all national decision-making and govern- provide executive continuity, particularly on mat- mental power", as one analyst, perhaps with a bit ters of security, even though in formal terms the of overstatement, put it.48 The SSC's agenda has Cabinet is paramount. widened as awareness of "total onslaught" has Although the institutional roles of the SSC have grown and as commitment to "total national strat- remained largely unchanged in the past ten years, egy" broadly constructed has taken root. It is an at- the perceptions of the individuals occupying these mosphere where, if one does not believe in "total positions seem to have been changed. Under onslaught" one, ipso facto, contributes unwittingly Vorster, the SSC was composed of a collection of to that onslaught. It is an inherently polarizing out- strong-willed individuals with bases in the Party and look. keen on maintaining their departmental strengths. Other changes in executive organization have, by In this interlocking directorate they perceived the default, given the SSC and its ancillary Secretariat Cabinet and the Party as their primary power base further advantages. The number of government de- of operations and not the peripatetic SSC. In con- partments has been reduced. The Office of the trast, under P.W., as the SSC was elevated in Prime Minister has been expanded and organized in prominence, so its members began to identify with a fashion that parallels the structure of cabinet com- it as an institution. More key leaders began to see it mittees. In 1982, the Security Planning section of as an inner Cabinet and to regard the full Cabinet the Prime Minister's Office was moved organizatio- as less central to the decision-making process. A nally out of the Prime Minister's Office into the parallel ironically exists in politics in the Soviet NIS. But rather than this representing an enhance- Union where there is an interlocking directorate at ment of NIS power41* it is more likely a convenience the top. Key individuals hold positions in both gov- move to enable Lieutenant General Van Deventer, ernment and in the Politburo of the Communist the Secretariat's head, to report directly to the SSC Party. But without question they regard their stand- and the Prime Minister without having to work ing in the Politburo as more important than their through the Director General of the Office of the position in the Council of Ministers — one is Prime Minister, Dr J.E. du Plessis. In other words, clearly the decision-making locus, the other is a the Secretariat is now even more independent. The rubber-stamp and policy-coordinating body. Party decision-making process has been centralized, and prevails over government. Those who misjudge the placed firmly at the hub of the process is the Prime situation, as did Georgi Malenkov, find their politi- Minister, the SSC, and its Secretariat. cal careers side-tracked or shortened. Although it is To add to the importance of the military estab- clearly premature to regard this as a pattern that lishment, SADF officers are prominent in many applies in South Africa — after all, it involves just high-level interdepartmental committees, and they one government, that of P.W. Botha — the parallel have had a direct input into diverse governmental cannot be ignored since it does represent a possible commissions and investigatory bodies through peti- formula for imposing marginal (though symbolically tion, testimony, submission of evidence, and dep- significant) reforms on a constituency that resists. utation. Often representatives of the SSC (and To be sure, not all top Cabinet officers share an therefore not always military persons) sit on these identity with the SSC in preference to a political panels. Just a few examples should suffice to dem- base in the department or in the provincial party onstrate that they cast their net wide. The SSC has apparatus. Most would prefer to keep all political a spokesman on KEOSSA (the Afrikaans acronym options open in an as yet fluid situation. South Afri- for the Committee for Economic and Development can politicians are too individualistic, too pragmatic Co-operation in Southern Africa) even though the to conform to some analytical model developed to enterprise is largely associated with agricultural explain political patterns. Nonetheless, in the ag- development, finance, and foreign affairs in the gregate, this tendency to identify with the SSC as an "national states". Similarly, the SADF has limited institution (particularly as one on the rise) ought representation (General Malan himself) on the not to be ignored. Central Consolidation Committee of the Commis- By the nature of governmental and adminis- sion for Co-operation and Development (the Van trative reorganization, the SSC has the advantage der Walt Commission) and is actively involved in its of being the principal originating and co-ordinating Defence and Strategy sub-committee. The SADF

16 has supplied researchers to the Human Sciences conditions of sacrifice under situations perceived to Research Council (HSRC) to study press reporting be isolation, siege, or even war. for its report to the Steyn Commission. Although Particularly noteworthy has been the deepening there is nothing inherently pernicious about these militarization of the white educational process. Ca- linkages, they do illustrate the ubiquity of such se- det detachments have been set up in white boys' curity ties and their potential for influence. They secondary schools. There, some 150 000 to 200 000 also exemplify a salient departure from past prac- boys are provided paramilitary drill and training, tices. and are psychologically prepared for national ser- As the Prime Minister institutes these organiza- vice. They are encouraged to enlist in the Perma- tional changes one cannot help but think that there nent Force upon graduation. While in some schools is, indeed, purpose and design to his steps. To be cadet detachments have been disbanded, in others sure, there is a good deal of rationalization in these the cadet units have been affiliated with Permanent measures and efficiency has its own rewards. But Force and Citizen Force regiments. Officers and underlying these changes is a widely held belief that NCOs regularly visit schools in connection with the Prime Minister is clearing the decks for action youth preparedness, career guidance, information — not merely for fighting a war with violent oppo- with respect to national service, the selection of nents of the regime, but for fashioning significant boys in Special Schools for national service, and ac- political changes in order to outflank those oppo- tivities regarding the training of school cadets. nents. Ironically, the nature and extent of these Some students attend two-week camps during hol- changes depend as much on those not at all rep- idays. There, school teachers who also serve as off- resented on these bodies or in the latest consti- icers subject them to a regimen of activities resem- tutional schemes — black South Africans — and to bling what they can expect in the SADF.50 Even a lesser extent upon the Coloured and Indian com- before senior high school, youngsters in the Trans- munities and their leaders who are inclined to resist vaal are urged to attend "voluntary" week-long being drafted into an order that still does not give veld schools ostensibly for the purpose of environ- them fully equal status and that excludes and is not mental education and outdoor survival techniques. even envisioned to include their black brothers. What is also included is a heady dose of political, and some would say partisan, indoctrination and In the remainder of this essay some issues in 51 which the hand of the defence establishment is paramilitary discipline. marking the outcome will be examined. These con- cerns do not represent a complete picture of de- Press relations fence involvement in matters not entirely defensive In addition, the news and entertainment media, or strategic in nature. Rather, they are used to illus- particularly the state-owned and operated radio and trate some of the broad observations and generali- television networks and the Publications Control zations noted in the preceding sections and to sug- Board, contribute to a largely one-sided atmos- gest an evolving pattern for future political phere that tends to glorify, but not romanticize, alignments and contests. military service. Yet there appear to be limits as to how willing the media are to be used. At one point, V. The Militarization of White Society SABC production personnel refused to be associ- To an outsider who returns to South Africa periodi- ated with a sabre-rattling and propagandists "docu- cally it is possible to discern a rising visibility of mentary" on the SADF. A private company had to 52 things martial creeping into what had heretofore be hired to film the show. The press can be press- been regarded as exclusively civilian life. Few in ured by, for example, the establishment of the South Africa would like to admit it, especially in Steyn Commission of Inquiry into the Mass Media. that it develops imperceptibly. Obviously these ten- The SADF made submissions to that Commission dencies predate P.W. Botha's ascension to power. and seconded researchers to the HSRC to study As this process has evolved, there has been a con- press coverage of the security forces for the Com- scious creation of a social atmosphere that makes mission. Self-censorship in response to tightened se- military service appear attractive, military re- crecy and imposed journalistic restraints account sponses to policy issues sensible, and greater mil- for a situation where the security establishment is itary strength and expenditure acceptable — a seldom mentioned except in a favourable light. The mood which generally prepares the population for recent situation involving reporters who sought to

17 dig deeply into DMI and other SADF involvement urban townships, in which case the propaganda in the Seychelles coup attempt and cover-up is a message may become heavy and may damage inter- case in point." group relations. Most national servicemen in these Part of the positive image of the SADF is attri- situations serve in full uniform, including holstered butable to outright intimidation, part to self- revolvers. Complaints regarding these activities restraint, part to conscious public relations, and, of have taken various forms, although in other in- course, part grows out of a genuine admiration for stances coloured and.black principals have ap- the effectiveness and professionalism of the SADF. plauded the teaching efforts and skills of national The press liaison and public relations sections of the servicemen. On at least one occasion, however, the SADF have been steadily enlarged and profession- SADF teachers distributed copies of a SADF mag- alized over the years. Efforts have been made to azine, The Warrior, in which it is claimed that there engage large segments of the civilian population in is freedom in South Africa and that the true leaders support programmes to assist national servicemen of the black people are not "convicts" like Nelson before, during and after their service, and to help Mandela but Community Council officers such as SADF members adjust to their lives and sacrifices. David Thebehali. In protest against this "gun toting 54 The Civic Action arms of the SADF contribute to battalion" some students boycotted classes. When an overall affirmation of military virtue. The gov- the idea of national service teachers was first sug- ernment and the SADF often refer to a "winning gested for Soweto, prominent black spokespersons 55 hearts and minds" (WHAM) philosophy with re- objected. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi stated that al- gard to the black population. Here the emphasis is though he favoured Civic Action presence in his on painting the SADF in a favourable light in order territory, he opposed the SADF insistence on mil- to deny the insurgents the psychological advantage itary uniforms. In this context, it appeared to be a of being more popular than the defence forces. The propaganda ploy rather than "a genuine wish to 56 rationale is that by providing the people with help, for humanitarian considerations.'' needed services and assistance, perhaps the people When Civic Action was first conceived, it was re- will be less supportive of the insurgents and pos- garded as very much the professional, modern way itively helpful to the SADF and the governmental to combat civil unrest. The psychological weapon officials. As part of the practical and propaganda was to be one of the most powerful arrows in the strategies undergirding WHAM, the SADF in Jan- SADF quiver. General Malan had stressed time uary 1978 established a subsection of Burgersake or and again the need to gain the "trust and faith" of Civic Action. Prior to 1978 similar assignments local populations in order to foil insurgency.57 were performed by an organization operating in On paper Civic Action made a great deal of Namibia which, since 1974, had been a part of the sense. Some departments of government have diffi- SA Army. In time the activities of the Civic Action culty persuading young, urbanized civil servants to programme were expanded and the functions were take up assignments in rural areas. Under the guise divided, the subsection Civic Action concentrating of military discipline such services can be supplied. on policy and co-ordination and the executive func- The idea of the social welfare services being pro- tions remaining with the branches of the service, vided by compulsory service formations also has mainly the army. Burgersake was headed by a for- been advanced by PFP MPs. Ray Swart, for exam- mer commander of the Transkeian Defence Force ple, has suggested that a multiracial, volunteer and Secretary of Defence to the Transkeian Gov- "peace corps" type organization be established and ernment, Major General Phil Pretorius, a specialist linked to the SADF (perhaps as a form of alterna- in psychological warfare. tive service).58 Civic Action provides national servicemen who But psychological operations and Civic Action perform mostly as teachers, agricultural specialists, fool few blacks. The problems are not so much the medical doctors, engineers, and administrators. personality or methods of those leading Civic Ac- They work throughout South Africa and Namibia, tion but the fact that the programme is, in essence, in the homelands and in various other black venues, a part of the government's "total national strategy" largely to improve relations with the black res- designed at heart to maintain control of the major- idents, and in the process to gather intelligence that ity peoples and to perpetuate racial subordination. may be politically and militarily useful to the Civic Action involves the deployment of national regime. Some have been employed in schools in servicemen doing their obligatory military service.

18 Although they may be happily furnishing a "non- parties for their efforts to secure full divulgence and military" service, their activities have a basic secu- explication of the matter. P.W. Botha tried to pass rity purpose. Defence Headquarters and strategic the matter off as a minor error of judgement. PFP planners clearly see Civic Action in its overall strat- leader Dr Frederick van Zyl Slabbert argued that egic and security contexts. In short, although Civic "if an image is created that the Defence Force is Action may have positive ramifications on the lives simply the National Party in uniform, this country of some of the inhabitants in terms of the social ser- will split from top to bottom".59 Revelation Ntoula vices it provides, it is at heart an instrument of con- of Voice tartly jibed Dr Slabbert: "You see", he trol. It involves virtually no black input in deciding wrote, "we Blackies fully perceive the role of the which programmes to undertake or how to manage army, but without sounding too nasty to most Black them in the interests of the subject peoples. Civic members of the army, it is indeed synonymous with Action constitutes another field in which the SADF the Nationalist Party".60 has insinuated itself where the political and social Almost all who criticized the Action Plan at- overtones amount to the militarization of South Af- tacked the efforts to shape opinion in the House of rican society. Assembly. Other features of the Plan went unscathed. By their silence most white politicians Involvement of the SADF in partisan politics implied that SADF dabbling in domestic affairs was It was Major General Phil Pretorius, the very Di- acceptable. To seek to channel public opinion and rector General of Civic Action, who caused the to create a positive image for the SADF is under- Prime Minister and the SADF some embarassment standable to most politicians. But to turn that in 1980. On 23 March 1980 the Sunday Times pub- propaganda covertly on members of Parliament lished a story about an SADF document headed aroused a howl (among Opposition MPs) that the "Psychological Action Plan: Defence Budget De- very basis of "democracy" was tottering.61 bate" and dated 12 February 1980. That document The Prime Minister rejected the Opposition's call detailed secret steps to manipulate the news media for a Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate in order to nullify the opposition's criticisms of the the SADF's secret Action Plan to "nullify" the Op- Prime Minister. It was signed on behalf of the Chief position during the budget debate on the Defence of the SADF, General Malan, by Major General Vote. Instead, the Prime Minister appointed an Pretorius. Such direct dabbling in Parliamentary af- SADF board of inquiry headed by the former Chief fairs and with it in partisan politics shocked some of the Defence Force, Admiral Hugo Biermann. observers. The SADF, after all, had carefully culti- This in-house investigation, as expected, exoner- vated its professional, non-partisan image. The ated the SADF and found no willfulness or neg- Deputy Minister of Defence has said that the policy ligence by anyone concerned in drawing up, author- of his department, since 1966, had been to involve izing, handling, or distributing the document. The all parties in Parliament in the defence process farthest the report would go was to admit that through Parliamentary briefings, visits and consul- "serious errors of judgement" had been made. No tations. The Defence Force is, we have been told disciplinary steps were recommended, although repeatedly, a "peoples' army", and an army of all shortly before the story broke, the subsection Civic the people of South Africa. Apparently, some Action was officially disbanded, and Major General people matter more than others. Since a general ap- Pretorius was relieved of this command. He has proval of the SADF as an institution had character- since been named Chief Director of Manpower De- ized all legitimate political parties' positions in the velopment. preceding years, many opposition politicians felt Despite this flap, within months another SADF betrayed by this report. Regularly, the UP, NRP, pamphlet, entitled The Reason Why, was printed, and PFP had supported larger budgets and a gen- propagating the policies of the National Party and eral encouragement for the verligtheid of the SADF attacking the Opposition. General Malan repu- leaders. Now the SADF had apparently been diated this document, as well, and promised action caught trying to undermine those who criticized the against those responsible, who had been in viol- National Party on other issues. ation of an SADF directive requiring all materials The Prime Minister, clearly compromised by the affecting party politics to be cleared by the Chief of disclosure, nonetheless characteristically took the the SADF. Again the internal mechanisms of the offensive, attacking the press and the opposition Defence Force, at the highest levels, were able to

19 whitewash the embarrassing yet ever more apparent On his recommendation, the regulations were re- partisan meddling of the SADF in the country's po- vised in 1971 to permit Permanent Force members litical life. nothing more than attendance at public political Within the military itself, the training of black meetings while dressed in civilian clothes, and the and white troops involves some political indoctrina- exercise of their voting franchise. Such members tion, as is perfectly understandable.62 But the mes- may not take part in any activities "for the further- sage contains a strong, perhaps inadvertent, ance of the interests of a political party or of a can- measure of pro-National Party publicity, too, and didate for partisan election". His policy, simply an unflinching defence of racial separation. The put, is "to keep party politics out of the Defence orientation manual for national servicemen was re- Force". Moreover, "political indoctrination is not vised upon the protest of Opposition MPs, and in practised in the South African Defence Force. Our another instance the Opposition criticized an SADF soldiers are, however, motivated against subversion handbook used for civic guidance programmes. The and communism. This is done in an unbiased man- handbook in question was used to help officers and ner . . ."w NCOs prepare lectures to servicemen on "civic gui- Such assertions may be of little consolation to 1 dance '. "Civic guidance" is an integral part of per- PFP, HNP or CP leaders who feel that the full pan- sonnel training in which recruits are subjected to oply of the state, including the SADF, is engaged lectures and discussions about, inter alia, political not only in maintaining the regime, but in further- ideologies, world affairs, and domestic political and ing National Party policy and partisan ends. In the social affairs. The Minister of Defence, a few days recent words of Koos van der Merwe, CP defence after the protests, released a brief part of the docu- spokesman, "The Minister of Defence, typical of so ment in question, but defended his Department and many other National Party politicians, is now using 63 the handbook. the total onslaught against South Africa as a The Action Plan was a covert scheme to under- weapon against the NP's political opponents in an 66 mine opposition critics in Parliament. The hand- attempt to win cheap political points." Seen from book more openly shaped the political thinking of such a vantage point, little can be done to set his young servicemen. But in other ways the military is mind at ease. Ironically, government gets criticized accused of participating in internal political manipu- by the PFP for using the SADF to resist significant lation. Within DMI is purported to be a group that social change and by the HNP and the CP for jeop- specializes in disinformation. The DMI has also ardizing the security of the state by changing the been accused of distributing literature to men eli- system too rapidly. Such flack from both positions gible for national service to make it appear that the need not, however, serve to exonerate the govern- literature was from a group supposedly seeking to ment from either criticism or from both. discourage national service. The pamphlet in ques- The nub of this issue would show most overtly tion sought to associate this group with enemies of with regard to the matter of constitutional change the state. In another instance, in a Cape Town and reform. Although it stands to reason that labour dispute, the armed forces were charged with SADF thinkers, as individuals and even as a group, forging a Cape Housing Action Committee flyer in would have a preferred constitutional order which order to undercut that group. When the Minister they would feel more comfortable furthering and was asked if the SADF was involved, he denied defending, there is no evidence of direct SADF in- 64 knowledge and declined to make a statement. put in the deliberations of the Constitutional Com- Such suspicions and rumours are commonplace as mittee of the President's Council. It has been sug- the "tentacles" of the SADF are seen and imagined gested to this researcher by someone close to the "everywhere". National Party centre that, indeed, the SADF con- Throughout it all, the Defence Force stoutly den- tributed to, if not imposed, the decision not to turn ies partisan preferences or pressures. The Minister District Six in Cape Town back into a coloured said that in 1971 he ruled against a suggestion that group area. One can see how such a decision might the General Regulations for the SADF and the affect the provision of civil order and internal secu- Reserve be amended to permit members of the rity. This influence was allegedly "entirely behind Permanent Force to become members of political the scenes", but it has not been possible to confirm parties. the story.

20 Economic issues that are less fuel efficient, and total South African Self-sufficiency in weaponry and military material financing have led to a situation where the country quite obviously is the proper concern of the security is really not self-sufficient since licensing is still re- apparatus of the state. It is, as well, related to the quired. It was apparent, however, that through the strength and co-ordination of the national economy preparations for this decision, the SADF and the and infrastructure, and its relationship to the ma- strategic planners would not be satisfied with any- chinery of the state. Because of these imperatives it thing less than 100 per cent South African diesels is likely that the regime will also feel compelled to — even if it could have been demonstrated that achieve greater economic self-sufficiency, even at there was, say, a 90 per cent chance of South Africa the cost of paying a high economic price in the short being able to continue to import diesel engines. The run. After all, if outright warfare is contemplated, government later admitted that the decision had why should not sub-violent hostile acts such as sanc- been 80 per cent strategic and 20 per cent econ- tions and embargoes not also be within the realm of omic. Lou Wilking, Managing Director of General possibility? Some industries are undeniably related Motors (SA), wryly quipped: "It looks more to me to the military defence of the system. Steel, energy, like it is 111 per cent strategic and minus 20 per transport, automotive, chemical, food and related cent economic." Others criticized it as well.68 industries come to mind. Likewise, manpower and In those fields where total self-sufficiency is not even educational matters have direct economic and attainable, the government has co-opted many for- security consequences. Small wonder that the SSC, eign firms into security collaboration. The National the SADF, and other parts of the security establish- Key Points Act of 1980, the Atomic Energy Act as ment should seek to become involved in decisions amended, the National Supplies Procurement Act in these fields, and even beyond. We have already as amended, and the Petroleum Products Amend- discussed Armscor and other links between the ment Act, among other pieces of legislation, impli- economy and the state. cate private firms in a secrecy about their produc- A good deal of the effort to acquire or develop tion levels, sources of supply, trading partners and nuclear technologies and capacities has an obvious so forth that contribute to the siege mentality. They military and foreign policy application. The same also compromise branch subsidiaries of transnation- might be said of the expansion of Sasol facilities in al firms with their corporate headquarters outside order to enhance the country's self-sufficiency in of South Africa. One suspects, however, that few petrol energies. Most of the other economic efforts foreign firms resist such strictures provided the are more remote, temporally, from a direct military costs are kept tolerable and total corporate opera- or defensive utility. tions are not too adversely affected.69 One could Nonetheless, this does not deter security policy also surmise that in this atmosphere there is a good makers from being alert to the long-range necessity deal of planning and implementation of secret of developing a self-reliant economy. During de- stockpiles, strategic reserves and contingency plans bate and discussion of the local-content programme entangling the private sector and the strategic plan- in the automotive industry, for example, the fear of ners. sanctions and an awareness of military linkages In one other policy area there appears to be an were frequently expressed.67 uncanny confluence of strategic and economic In addition, the military helped to persuade gov- thinking. That is in the matter of regional economic ernment that South Africa needed its own diesel ca- planning and strategic/territorial planning. The pacity. In 1978, government decided to let out bids various industrial development plans, physical de- for a diesel industry for South Africa. The Atlantis velopment plans, decentralization schemes, long- site north of Cape Town was chosen. But since die- range homeland and national state consolidation sel manufacturing is a high-technology precision- plans and regional military command boundaries machinery industry requiring high tolerances, the virtually overlap at every turn, as though they could result has been that South Africa now produces in- not have been delimited without close and high- ferior diesel engines at around one-third greater level co-ordination. Again, there is nothing notably cost than imported models. Many industrialists and wrong or perverse about this. Indeed, it is rather economists predicted this outcome. Simon Brand, far-sighted to be able to show such purpose and or- Chief Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister, re- ganization. But it is further evidence of an order sisted the decision. Higher costs, obsolete designs that values politico-strategic conformity and collab-

21 oration, and one that is structured to bring it about, plying arms and training to homelands ar- a not insignificant achievement. mies; (3) terror gangs might operate from the home- VI. A Constellation of States and South African lands, thereby making the homelands "a fes- Policy Toward the Homelands tering sore on our borders in ten or twenty or There is no question that the territorial and admin- thirty years time",73 much as Cuba became a istrative subdivision of what had been the RSA threat to the United States; prior to the "independence" of the Transkei has (4) revolutionary forces might seek to remove important military ramifications. If one perceives compliant pro-Pretoria regimes in the home- the hiving off of the homelands into "national lands and thus use their territories as "liber- states1' with their dozens of parcels of territory as a ated areas"; problem of territorial and border defence, one can (5) to grant independence to homelands would appreciate the apprehension, if not alarm, that be to surrender South Africa's "entire de- must face military planners. The independence of fence perimeter" along all but the southern the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei frontier to blacks who were years away from alone have added 4 930 kilometers to South establishing "any adequate defence".74 Trans- Africa's land borders.™ Not that the national states kei thus is seen as South Africa's "soft under- or potential national states pose any immediate mil- belly". itary threat to the Republic. Rather the multiplica- tion of "international boundaries" and the pro- One could not be sure whether the defence of spects for governmental and social instabilities in South Africa would be threatened by homeland in- these lands add to the potential problems that must dependence because the homelands would be too be considered in strategic arrangements. To be sure weak or because they might be too strong or too in- the SADF has been responsible for training and dependent. equipping homeland defence forces. It is also true Government countered in those days with ex- that these regimes are economically dependent on pressions of confidence and assurance that the new the Republic, and that their present governments black states would be so grateful for having been will, for a long time to come, look to Pretoria for granted independence that a commonwealth would economic and military assistance, and even political "arise". If South Africa were ever attacked, Ver- maintenance. But a future not entirely or directly in woerd had said, the "common sense of the Bantu", Pretoria's control adds to defence and foreign pol- and South Africa's "friendship" and "assistance" icy problems. An NRP MP put it most caustically would lead the homelands to stand with South when he condemned the homelands scheme as a Africa.75 Current government thinkers and strategic "nightmare" for South Africa's military command- planners seem less inclined to leave the matter to ers. "Surely even a moron can see that this map is chance and more determined to develop policies to the most illogical and stupid plan ever devised by offset any potential threat. man."71 But the SADF alone is not patrolling bor- The extent to which SADF thinkers agree with ders. The SAP is responsible for "internal" borders government on the question of homeland policy is and the SADF for "external" borders, and the SAP difficult to determine and in many respects is not has its own highly regarded COIN units. that important. Certainly, they would probably sub- The debate, of course, goes back much earlier as scribe to the necessity of keeping rural blacks separ- UP Parliamentarians resisted the unfolding policy ate from urban blacks in order to avoid the future of homelands in the 1960s. Their catalogue of de- need for simultaneous COIN operations in both fence-related horrors bears repeating, as their sectors. Whether they concur that the present leader, Sir de Villiers Graaff, asserted that the model of homeland self-government and eventual homelands policy showed "a total disregard for independence facilitates that end is not clear. One considerations of defence".72 It was noted that: must surmise that it would be difficult for them to be pleased with the current conceptualization of (1) eight separate armies in eight separate home- homelands in all its particulars. lands would open a Pandora's box of prob- Defence of the homelands, in other words, is lems; contingent on the pursuit of a homelands policy the (2) communist states might be involved in sup- precise parameters of which are still unclear. Ef-

22 forts to provide some greater assurance in strategic flesh out a complex picture of organizational diver- terms have taken a number of routes, each of which sity toward a single end. Initially four such "bat- might be pursued independently, but together talions'Vcompanies were started in 1979. It was might form a consistent package that would expe- over a year later before official announcement of dite state security for the RSA and for the particu- their existence was made (May 1980). In fact, the lar homeland governments in question. first four regional units have not fared as well as There are, of course, multiple components of was hoped. It would appear that the ambitious strategic policy in this realm. To begin with, the plans to establish up to eighteen such formations SADF is committed to creating, training, and main- have been set aside. Originally, these regional for- taining in materiel the national defence forces for mations were seen as embryonic homeland armies, each homeland as it acquires "independence".76 As to be attached to each new "national state" upon its each homeland follows "the road of independence independence. But, in fact, the SADF established to its end" it will develop its own "military unit in both a Venda National Force as well as a distinct one form or another". If one accepts the basic 112 Battalion for Venda volunteers. And many premise that these non-contiguous territorial Venda members of the 21 (non- or multi-ethnic) patches are to become sovereign and fully indepen- black battalion and of the 112 Battalion were not dent states, then it would have to follow that their pleased by the prospect of leaving the SADF for a governments would be free to pursue defence poli- career in the VNF. It was not until September 1982 cies and foreign policies in their own interests as that the Venda Government took charge of the 112 they perceive them. Battalion. The homeland defence forces, in turn, are re- Similarly, the KwaZulu Government will have garded as an integral part of a larger regional nothing officially to do with the 121 (Zulu) bat- defence scheme, though it is difficult for an out- talion, and it would appear that the force levels of sider to grasp the configuration of that scheme as the battalion have dropped dramatically recently. contemplated. Government spokesmen have re- The status of the 113 (Shangaan) and 11 (Swazi) peatedly referred to regional defence. Although battalions is unclear, especially in light of the homelands have gained what Pretoria calls indepen- kaNgwane-Ingawavuma land swap issues. dence, the homelands still occupy a position within A NATO-type alliance is unattainable. More "the military milieu of the Republic of South Africa likely some version of a Brezhnev or Monroe doc- and not outside the military milieu of the Republic trine may be on the cards, one that correctly ac- of South Africa".77 Just how an independent state is counts for the military asymmetries that prevail and to be made to have its defence policy conform to which may be brought into force unilaterally. The that of the Republic is not publicly specified, but SADF would like to exercise a "right of access" and politically and economically it is more than possible joint command arrangement in times of crisis or — it is likely. These sorts of issues were raised emergency — not that any such formalities would anew when the government of the Transkei severed be necessary as demonstated by current pre-emp- diplomatic and military relations with South Africa tive cross-border policies on the Republic's north- in 1978 — at the time a theatrical, but practically ern frontiers. inconsequential act. Despite the problems this en- Certainly, joint security planning is the lowest tailed, Pretoria continues to regard homeland ar- common denominator to be expected. By and large mies as part of the southern African defence system most planning efforts involving the Republic and arrayed against the "onslaught of marxism and the homelands deal with issues other than strategy. communist imperialism". With the government's There are bilateral joint defence management coun- resurrection of the idea of a regional constellation cils or committees and quite probably a multilateral or confederation of states, the SADF again is called working committee for security, although the upon to design and promote a means for joint de- Ciskei-Transkei animosity would complicate that. fence of the region. SADF personnel on second- One suspects that discussions tend to deal with lim- ment or ex-SADF men continue to play high-level ited functional or housekeeping chores, such as roles in the forces of all the homelands except training, weapons standardization and supply, secu- Transkei. rity intelligence exchange, and so forth. Insofar as The establishment of regional-cum-ethnic units there is strategic planning with regard to joint attached to various SADF regional commands helps homeland/Republic questions, it is to all intents and

23 purposes the exclusive purview of the SADF, sover- Africa in 1978 and its abrogation of the non-aggres- eignty and independence notwithstanding. Under sion pact and military training and co-operation ar- P.W. Botha's leadership at Defence, the SADF was rangements. Obviously there were other reasons for trusted and assigned principal responsibility for ne- their actions, but when international recognition gotiating with the homeland governments on de- and support were not forthcoming and the Trans- fence collaboration. Details were not the concern of kei's abject dependence on South Africa became Foreign Affairs and Information, for example. This apparent and awkward to deny, the Transkei ended has been a basic attitude that Botha has displayed its foray into confrontational politics and diplomatic throughout his tenure. In his view, the upper eche- relations were resumed with Pretoria. Interestingly, lon of the SADF is trustworthy as well as sensitive the Transkei justified its retreat by fastening on to political and diplomatic concerns. South Africa's expressed willingness to negotiate The heart of the problem is perceived by many to the Transkei's demands that South Africa transfer 811 be territorial or spatial. Thus a good many strategic East Griqualand to the Transkei. problems could be prevented if only the non-self- One way of looking at these relationships is to governing homelands were more compact and con- see them as a series of concentric circles."1 The in- tiguous, thereby rendering fewer and shorter ner circle or core consists of the so-called white boundaries for the security forces to "defend". As parts of South Africa. Here the central government early as 1974, Brigadier C.L. Viljoen, then Director is singularly responsible for security and defence. of Operations for the Army (and today Chief of the The innermost ring would then consist of those SADF), suggested that the consolidation of the homelands that have not gained or even sought in- homelands would be beneficial from a security dependence. Here would be included, for example, standpoint. In his view, the existing fragmentation KwaZulu, QwaQwa, Lebowa, and Gazankulu. The was militarily unacceptable.78 The Van der Walt "boundaries" in these instances are porous and, in Commission dealing with homeland consolidation is fact, when it comes to security, the Pretoria Gov- likewise made to appreciate that decisions regard- ernment is legally as well as politically responsible ing parcels of land can affect military matters, as lo- for defence and the maintenance of law and order gistical problems are compounded by the reassign- in these units. The second ring, more remote from ment of roads, bridges, and other transport the inner core, are those homelands that have infrastructure. Consolidation of land might weaken opted for and been granted "independence". Here the air radar network, and the proximity of home- the security links are diverse, especially before but lands to cities might be viewed critically by the also since the act of independence. For a variety of police and other security arms. For these reasons, economic and political reasons the Republic sees among others, the SADF has sought to make the these territories as a part of the larger regional se- Commission aware of the possible dangers and op- curity system. It is not an association of equals by portunities of particular consolidation measures. any means. In other ways, border adjustments and territorial It would appear that the South African Govern- swaps with neighbouring states might also be seen ment would ideally like to transform the home- as having a strategic dimension. As one surveys a lands, as each gains its independence, into an "in- map of South Africa, it becomes apparent that the ner ring of buffer states" to replace what had been homelands occupy strategic territory on or near the a defence in depth prior to the fall of the Portu- borders.79 They form a semi-circle around the in- guese holdings in Africa and the Zimbabwe resolu- dustrial and mining heartland of the Republic. tion. As a first and rather ineffectual line of defence Moreover, these territories are generally peopled against insurgents, the bantustan armies do little by ethnic elements that also live in independent more than pose token resistance. Still they are im- neighbouring states. Such a situation is a two-edged portant. They are the triphammer that sets into mo- sword, as the histories of the non-Russian minori- tion emergency plans in which the homeland gov- ties of the Soviet Union indicate. It poses problems, ernments invite in the SADF. The security of the but it also widens foreign policy and strategic op- two regimes, Pretoria's and the homelands', are in- tions. extricably interwoven, as successive Republic gov- Historical claims based on ethnic occupation ernments have structured the situation. were at the base of the Transkei's justification for Unfortunately, this policy is not altogether clear its severance of diplomatic relations with South in every case. Pretoria's policies have been inconsis-

24 tent and most baffling in some cases. Not that con- to offset the likely political costs. sistency is either necessarily wise or important. In The geostrategic issues, though not widely re- some instances, homelands gained their indepen- garded as particularly crucial to the decision, might dence with territory flush against a border with a have been considered, but the prima facie evidence neighbouring state. In another instance a narrow seems loaded against it. Swaziland stability and strip of territory was excised and retained by the economic progress might be set back by the addi- Republic. In still other instances attempts were tion of some 800 000 more inhabitants, not all of made to transfer the territory of an entire homeland whom are Swazi and large numbers of whom do not or a part of one to an independent neighbouring want to lose their South African citizenship or be- state. In short, if there is a method to this madness, come citizens of Swaziland. Given the King's age at it is cryptic at the least. If homelands are to consti- the time, a succession struggle combined with the tute a kind of cordon sanitaire, why did Pretoria unwieldy integration of peoples who would then with the consent of the Venda authorities push for a constitute over 60 per cent of the country's total five-kilometre-wide strip of land between Venda population might simply be indigestible. Until re- and the Limpopo River? By removing Venda from cently the bulk of ANC infiltrators into the Repub- direct contact with the Zimbabwe border, the buf- lic passed through Swaziland. So ceding more terri- fer principle falls away. Factually, this has always tory to Swaziland (some one million hectares) been the case. But the homelands on the inter- hardly augurs well for border region security. White national borders have been dealt with differently. farmers in northern Natal and the Lowveld have Another set of aspirations based on traditional or made such fears known to Pretoria. The thinly historical experience, or so it has been argued, had populated Ingwavuma region would not be easily been the dream of Swaziland's late King Sobuza II policed either. to unite all Swazis under a single government, Another strategic dimension would involve pro- namely his Swaziland. To accommodate the King, viding Swaziland with its own outlet to the sea and we have been told, and most probably for a variety with the opportunity to develop a port at Kosi Bay. of other reasons, Pretoria was prepared to cede Rumours circulating held that the United States, Swaziland all of the kaNgwane (Swazi) homeland anxious to counter Soviet naval power in the Indian and the Ingwavuma region of KwaZulu. Although Ocean, and for political reasons unwilling to utilize the outcome, details, and larger questions need not South African ports or to develop naval facilities in concern us here, Pretoria knows full well that a homeland, thereby tacitly associating with the boundary disputes and unfulfilled irredenta are lin- policy of separate development, might be willing to gering sources of friction, even between unequal invest heavily at Kosi Bay if it were a part of Swazi- parties. Transkeian and Ciskeian land claims, vast land. Pained denials of this line of reasoning have Lesotho claims, including the QwaQwa homeland, been firm. and other malcontents might be seen as amenable There is no need to speculate further as to why to territorial exchanges and transfers. Decisions, es- the scheme was hatched. Politically it has been pecially controversial ones, like the border adjust- costly for those identified with it. Pik Botha in For- ment schemes involving Swaziland, are not taken eign Affairs and Dr Piet Koornhof, Minister of Co- lightly or without considerable domestic political operation and Development, were burnt, in parti- bloodletting. The idea of giving large pieces of san terms. In contrast to the speed with which it South African territory to a neighbouring country was announced in June 1982, one gets the does not go down easily with a committed national- impression that it was not such a spur of the mo- ist (small n or capital). The manner in which the ment idea. It is revealing that the Physical Devel- land cession was decided (unilaterally and in cam- opment Plan map for the Republic and surrounding era) and announced (ambiguously and disingenu- lands clearly places Ingwavuma and kaNgwane out- ously) added to a distrustful sense that there must side of the Republic's borders and makes them a be another, secret agenda that Pretoria and Mba- part of Swaziland. The proposed Industrial Devel- bane are not publicizing. Strong opposition from opment Plan, in contrast, depicts them as part of other quarters, foreign and domestic, white and South Africa. black, government supporters and those hostile to According to one account, the scheme originated the government, mounted. Hence, it was assumed, with the Secretariat of the SSC. In order to try to a substantial quid pro quo must have been expected attract Swaziland's co-operation with constellation/

25 confederation and to encourage Swaziland to serve regarded as a stigma too damaging to contemplate, as a link between the SADCC and any embryonic and what is more, a military treaty implies the ac- constellation involving the Republic, it was pro- ceptance of the political status quo. posed that kaNgwane be offered to Swaziland. Ing- The non-aggression pacts between Transkei. wavuma was allegedly not a part of the original de- Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda and South sign. This proposal was then supposedly turned Africa are fairly simple documents in which each over to the appropriate cabinet committee where party pledges not to resort to the use of armed force both the Foreign Minister and the Minister for Co- against the territorial sovereignty or political in- operation and Development could better co-ordi- dependence of the other. Article 2 is a bit more nate their efforts. At this level Ingwavuma was portentous in that it states that neither party shall added to the package. The strategic planners pro- allow its territory or airspace to be used as a base or posed — the politicians disposed in a fashion not at thoroughfare by any state, government, organiza- all to the liking of the military thinkers at the SSC tion or person for military, subversive or hostile ac- Secretariat. If this account is accurate, and confir- tions or activities against the other party. This com- mation is virtually impossible, then indeed the secu- mits each signatory to a more positive act of rity establishment has a central role in foreign af- preventing such activity. Should a homeland find it- fairs and in other issues outside of strictly strategic self unable to enforce its undertaking as per Article matters. But it does not always carry the day. The 2, that might provide an excuse and legal basis for DFAI, which would normally handle relations with South African intervention, or it might prompt an Swaziland, and the Department of Co-operation invitation to South African forces by a government and Development, the instrument for homeland af- in fear of its control. These pacts do not oblige the fairs, have been embarrasssed and upstaged in a parties to come to one another's defence when the policy area that has eluded their principal direction. security of one is threatened. A non-aggression pact, as innocuous as it may at first appear, can be a Partly as an international as well as a regional 2 public relations effort, partly in order to establish useful tool in the hands of an activist government." the legal and ideological bases for greater military If the homelands, as they gain their formal in- co-operation, and partly to facilitate cordial re- dependence, are to be successful as buffers protect- lations with neighbouring states and territories, the ing the Republic militarily, some device or plan Republic has offered to negotiate non-aggression must be developed by which the Republic can ratio- pacts with regional states. Only the former home- nalize its own dominant regional role and its own lands, however, have entered into such agreements, right to intervene in neighbouring territories when most likely as nearly compulsory terms for their it perceives it is useful to do so. Although it may own achievement of independence. South Africa superficially appear to be anathema for NP leaders has concluded a series of bilateral pacts with each of to think along such lines, some version of a Brezh- the four independent homelands. Originally, when nev or a Monroe doctrine may be evolved involving the idea was first advanced by J.B. Vorster in 1970, the Republic and its homelands. Apparently, Gen- he had hoped to involve independent black states eral J.C. Smuts advocated a Monroe doctrine in that were members of the OAU. This was, of 1918 as a protection for Africa against European, course, a pipe dream. Equally prominent in the and chiefly German, militarism.83 More recently, rhetoric have been South African threats to retal- such ideas have been broached to apply to per- iate should neighbouring states harbour insurgents ceived threats from the Soviet Union and the Chi- against South Africa. It is the latter message the nese People's Republic and are more limited re- world chooses to hear, and it is a message repeat- gionally or even only to security links with the edly reinforced by South Africa's military incur- homelands. sions. Black Africa's sense of reality, it would ap- Hence the Brezhnev doctrine comes more to pear, is more attuned to regional experience than mind with its concepts of limited sovereignty and professions of non-aggressive desires emanating intervention to maintain in power compatible socio- from the DFAI. political systems. When the Brezhnev doctrine was No truly independent states would entertain the propounded, it was an ex post facto rationalization prospect, at least publicly, of a co-operative mil- for the Soviet-cum-Warsaw Pact intervention in itary association or non-aggression pact with South Czechoslovakia in 1968. In that crisis involving a re- Africa. Any open political link with the Republic is gional grouping of independent states, the USSR

26 asserted that a member of the group possessed only confederation, at minimum involving independent limited sovereignty, thereby enabling fraternal al- and non-independent homelands, and maximally lies to intervene when that partner's class solidarity including regional neighbours that belong to the was endangered. The group, acting co-operatively OAU. If carried to its logical conclusion, co-opera- and "by way of self-defence", had the right to use tion and interaction today might lead in a stage-like force to assure fraternal socialist unity and to pre- progression to a re-integration into a confederation vent the possible collapse or overthrow of a mem- and eventually to a federation of diverse national ber state's government. Insofar as there already is a states. In this way, the ultimate dream might be to serious question about the sovereignty of the home- join together what the Verwoerdian paradigm land governments, and in that group solidarity has sought to tear asunder. White South Africa is still not, as yet, been institutionalized or formalized a la dominant. Confederation becomes a "second the Warsaw Pact, such a doctrine might more easily prize" of sorts for South Africa's blacks under- be applied toward a homeland government than, standably disheartened by their exclusion from the say, in a situation where there is no challenge to the body politic and from the proposals of the Presi- juridical independence of the state. Clearly, Pre- dent's Council and the Prime Minister for a new toria feels that it must have the right to intervene dispensation. Bear in mind that the political, ideo- preventatively, "pre-emptive intervention" they logical and economic conflicts of interest and the call it, if necessary, in any part of its former territo- asymmetries cannot be wished away by the assump- ries if its interests should be threatened. The task is tion that shared economic realities can heal all to devise an instrument and saleable rationale for breaches. Black southern Africa is more realistic the expression of that right.84 than Republican spokesmen care to admit. The idea of a confederation of southern African The wider constellation is "dead", or so it would states such as proposed by the Botha Government seem. Constellation has been a concept long con- could expedite such a desire, yet so far the constel- nected with Pik Botha. When the design for the lation/confederation idea has been most openly ap- Constellation of Southern African States was an- plied to economic and functional interaction, not to nounced, even before the Zimbabwean elections, it military/security links. Although it may be Pre- seemed a scheme to strengthen the Muzorewa toria's policy to regard the homeland security forces forces in the voting ahead. But Pik was also pushing as part of the regional defence system to fight to- to steal the march on the military and their hawkish gether against the marxist onslaught, their an- views on foreign policy. He seemed to be thinking ticipated role may be little more than the canary in that if successful it might strengthen his hand in the coal mine — to signal to the SADF that larger- Cabinet and in the SSC. He was, as one analyst put scale action must be taken to stem the tide of oppo- it,"prepared to barter the future in order to secure sition to a homeland government and to the larger the Zimbabwe he wanted". He failed. His an- apartheid system. Since so far no homeland has nouncement of a constellation was premature, and gained any form of international recognition out- Mugabe's victory led to Pik being outmaneuvered side of South Africa, intervention, on invitation or in domestic party politics. without it, would be relatively easy. It would also Confederation concentrating on the new "in- confirm the rest of the world's scepticism of the dependent national states" carved out of the pre- homeland experiment. 1976 Republic seems about all that can be ex- In one respect the idea of constellation/confed- pected, and even much of that progresses sub rosa eration is the brainchild of Foreign Affairs and In- and with difficulty. At each stage through the years, formation and the South African economic estab- South Africa has been forced to scale down its lishment. If the neighbouring states can become en- image of regional co-operation. This narrow con- meshed in an economic network, expanded to struction represents a blow to Pik Botha, the DFAI include functional and even diplomatic ties, then and the economic regionalists keen on spinning an military operations become less likely and less economic spiderweb of constraints based on what necessary. Structural control is superior to coercive they erroneously see as mutual self-interest. A de- control — and cheaper. The specifics of various feat for Foreign Affairs can be translated into a vic- constellation/confederation plans are not that im- tory for Defence in the hierarchy of Pretoria's pol- portant to this discussion.85 What is clear is that itics. To be sure, the main thrust of confederal total strategy includes the creation of some form of dreams is still economic. But there are hopes, one

27 suspects, to parlay the bilateral non-aggression the global diplomatic picture, and particularly the pacts into a more positive and assertive multi- indecisive American position (especially among di- lateral arrangement, perhaps even an outright alli- verse US branches and organs of government), the ance. That would be the signal for Defence assum- appeals of black states in Africa, the ebb and flow ing an even greater role in the realm of foreign af- of independence movement support, OAU activ- fairs. ities, and other foreign military and diplomatic dab- blings. VII. Foreign Policy South Africa did not appear to know what it What has emerged, in part, from the preceding dis- wanted to do largely because the same South Afri- cussion has been a picture of the Department of cans were not involved, to the same degree, in Foreign Affairs and Information being eclipsed by every stage of the decision-making, and when they other governmental institutions and agencies, even did contend for power, their domestic bases for on decisions directly touching upon foreign policy. support rested on shifting foundations. It is not ap- This process began back in the Vorster years with propriate to argue here the whys and wherefores of the rise of BOSS and the Information Department the issue. Suffice it to note the effects of the deci- and the personalities associated with them. The sion-making nexus during this period. DFAI was outmaneuvered and later the defence es- To begin with, although Defence and the SADF, tablishment outflanked the DFAI still further. were steadily identified with a hawkish orientation, It is hard to imagine that any decision as import- they were somewhat restrained in their policy advo- ant and as controversial as South Africa's decision cacy. Perhaps they were too inclined to believe to intervene in Angola before and immediately af- their intelligence about MPLA weaknesses and ter that country's independence in November 1975 UNITA-FNLA strengths. Perhaps they overesti- would not be hotly debated and cause controversy mated American commitment and underestimated in high places. The Angolan decision was no excep- Soviet aims. For whatever reasons, they did advo- tion.86 cate deeper involvement and more direct and un- Prior to the decision to intervene, General Van ambiguous orders. But in the context of a military den Bergh had provided much of the impetus for invasion, they were temperate. Their initial large- Vorster's efforts at detente and for his reluctant scale strike, Operation Zulu, demonstrated re- willingness to meet with leaders of OAU member- straint in the number of South African troops de- states.87 Hilgard Muller had proved to be a lack- ployed and the composition of the forces, consisting lustre Foreign Minister and certainly not influential of a Bushman (San) battalion, a black FNLA bat- in the Party or the Government. He was not a talion, and just a dozen or two SADF officers and strong and effective advocate of departmental pol- NCOs. Perhaps this reflected the compromise icy and growth in NP councils, certainly not in com- character of the decision and the conduct of the in- parison to Van den Bergh, P.W. Botha or Connie tervention, by which hawks could gain the decision Mulder, each in his way headstrong and manipula- provided the doves were mollified by a less inten- tive. sive and extensive SADF deployment. The later op- It came as no surprise, then, that when Govern- erations, "Foxbat", "X-ray", and "Orange", for ment was faced with some very difficult decisions example, were more overtly South African exer- regarding policy in the unfolding Angolan civil war cises in terms of personnel. Through that period, leading to independence, Muller would take a back however, there were few if any doves among the seat and more forceful personalities would contest South African military strategists. But at least they the wheel. Insofar as the policy dispute can be appreciated that little could be gained by sending in characterized as one between hawks and doves, it more South African troops without more tangible was Defence arrayed against BOSS and Foreign Af- Western support. And when they came to appre- fairs (particularly Secretary Brand Fourie and Am- ciate that Western support would not be forthcom- bassador Pik Botha), and Information playing a ing, and that what had been a free-wheeling bush supportive role. It is apparent that as conditions war had become more like a conventional war with shifted in the field the coalition of voices for or long logistical lines, larger troop concentrations, against deeper involvement or withdrawal shifted. rapidly deployed vehicle columns with heavier artil- In this instance, field conditions refer not only to lery and projectiles, and when the SADF thinkers the military situation in Angola itself, but also to realized that their Angolan allies and clients. UNITA and FNLA, were ill-prepared for that kind Dr Rhoodie, P.W. Botha, as Minister of Defence, of protracted struggle, they were willing, perhaps sought to support counter-revolutionary guerrillas reluctantly, to pull back to more defensible (militar- trying to unseat President Machel. At the same ily and diplomatically) positions. time that Vorster had arranged to assist with the re- The decision to retreat was taken over the Christ- pair of Mozambique's railways and harbours, Botha mas holiday during which the Cabinet was unable secretly ordered the DMI to supply extensive quan- to meet. The military hierarchy wanted to continue tities of arms and ammunition to guerrillas operat- their support for FNLA and UNITA. The doves in ing from a base near Komatipoort. When General BOSS and the DFA argued that this military inter- Van den Bergh learned of this he sent men to vention was being used against South Africa and Nelspuit and Komatipoort to immobilise the equip- alienating many African and Western states that ment being transported to Mozambique. had not been particularly sympathetic to the MPLA On another occasion immediately after the with- or a Cuban presence in Africa. Curiously, it was drawal of SAP units from Rhodesia, Rhoodie has P.W. Botha who signalled a shift in government maintained that Botha arranged for 500 troops to thinking when he stated, in effect, that South be airlifted from Waterkloof Air Force Base to Africa would almost certainly reconsider its in- Rhodesia to help Ian Smith combat the Patriotic volvement in Angola if its interests in southern Front forces. This coincided precisely with Angola were guaranteed and attacks into Namibia Vorster's assurances that South Africa was no wereterminated.** longer directly involved in the Rhodesian war. Throughout the intervention, top military men Again, at the eleventh hour, General Van den felt tethered to a foreign policy that made their jobs Bergh told Vorster about Botha's designs and foiled awkward and difficult. During the crisis it was Botha's plans. BOSS, not the DFA, that kept communications The Namibian war adds to the authoritative role open with black governments in Africa and it was of the SADF in foreign policy. In effect, vast re- BOSS that was able to elicit discreet appeals from gions of Namibia are "governed" by the SADF, these governments to intervene and to stay in Ang- and the SADF possesses a virtual veto over any ola.89 It was BOSS, as well, that argued for withdra- settlement proposal. In fact, top SADF voices par- wal and eventually they got their way. Dr Eschel ticipate directly in the negotiation process. Major- Rhoodie of Information was sent off to Washington General Charles Lloyd (Chief of the SWATF) and in January 1976 to meet with Americans (neither Lieutenant-General Jannie Geldenhuys (Chief of President Ford nor Dr Kissinger would see him). In the Army) have been members of various negotia- all these dealings it was the DFA, and especially the tion delegations. The DMI also participates. Al- Minister of Foreign Affairs, that was conspicuously though they would appear to support different posi- silent or absent. By this time the DFA had lost its tions (Lloyd and the DMI the hawks, and grip on foreign policy, and out of the crisis emerged Geldenhuys the doves), they do bring a common BOSS and Information as Prime Minister Vorster's professional military perspective into the proceed- "second Department of Foreign Affairs". ings. Various members of government and those Interestingly, it was the Angolan issue with De- close to government maintain that government fence arrayed against BOSS and the DFA that wants a settlement on Namibia, but a quick probably led P.W. Botha to want to reorganize the agreement involving major South African conces- entire foreign policy decision-making apparatus. sions is not likely. Those in a position to shape the When the information scandal broke and BOSS and practical outcome in Namibia, the military men, Vorster plummeted from power, P.W. Botha was would appear to favour the view that the Republic able to establish his new, more rationalized policy can best be defended from forward positions. When machinery. General Constand Viljoen talks of pushing SWAPO There are stories of other major confrontations forces as far back as possible, his allusions are to spa- between P.W. Botha and Van den Bergh in foreign tial and territorial considerations far beyond the affairs that contribute to this atmosphere of compe- boundaries of Namibia." Although he has stressed tition at the centre.*0 When the Frelimo Govern- that it is for government, not the SADF, to decide, ment assumed power in Mozambique, Prime Minis- General Viljoen insists that South Africa should not ter Vorster took a conciliatory line (in contrast to "rush into a settlement within the next year" (1983). his posture in the Angolan civil war). According to "We are capable of maintaining the military situation

29 for a long time", Viljoen stated. The government It is pointless detailing the various operations, should, he went on, take the time to reach a long-last- charges, and denials in order to arrive at an empiri- ing solution. Hidden in these vague terms is a hard- cal statement about conscious policy. Suffice it to line view that the military still has the key role to play say that the list is long and damning. SADF forces in Namibia, strategically and politically, and that on numerous occasions have struck into Angola, SADF thinkers are extremely sceptical of any conces- not just in hot pursuit, but in large-scale, planned, sions to other negotiating actors. It is apparent that coded operations that could only have been the military is confident that it has the combat situ- launched with the approval of government at the ation in the field well in hand. This being the case, highest levels. Moreover, SADF forces have occu- SADF leaders are portentously signalling the pol- pied vast stretches of Angolan territory for consid- iticians that they had better not do anything impetu- erable periods of time, ostensibly to destroy and ous or irresolute. Viljoen has implied that even disperse large SWAPO concentrations of fighters should a negotiated settlement be reached, if it failed and material, but also to terrorize Namibian refu- to meet the SADF's demands, the SADF might have gees and local Angolan peoples and to demolish the "to go back in" when Namibia was "again burning". economic infrastructure of the region nearest the From this vantage point, the SADF would seem to border with Namibia.92 No manner of denial can ef- want to delay, as much as practical, a settlement that face the facts of these destructive results. This has might lead to a SWAPO government in Windhoek. been going on since the 1975-1976 invasion and has From an SADF viewpoint, independence for its own been most actively pursued since 1980. sake is worthless and does not necessarily bring Controversy has surrounded the extent of official peace. Look at Angola, Mozambique, and Zim- SADF and DMI involvement in the abortive at- babwe, Viljoen pointed out. Just as importantly, the tempted coup in the Seychelles. Ex-SADF and ex- SADF is in the position to engage in cross-border NIS personnel participated, and in their defence strikes, to undermine a cease-fire should an they have tried to implicate high officers of the agreement be reached, or to undermine the transitio- SADF, DMI, and the South African Government. nal process to independence. Initiative, it would The full story did not emerge from the Pieter- seem, lies with Defence Headquarters, not with the maritzburg trial of the airplane hijackers or from DFAI. the captured mercenaries in the Seychelles. In fact, Most disturbing of all in shaping the Republic's the South African authorities have sought to draw a overall regional foreign policy posture are the appa- curtain of silence, insofar as the law allows, over rent efforts to destabilize the domestic order in these issues. The Minister of Defence sought a neighbouring states. To be sure, one cannot docu- clamp on certain evidence at the trial by invoking ment or declare with assurance a conscious decision the General Law Amendment Act of 1969, section by government or agencies thereof to destabilize 29 of which provides that no person can be forced the region. Rather, one can arrive at such an asser- to give information if a Minister of State signs an af- tion by assessing the sum total of a number of pol- fidavit saying the release of the information would 93 icy decisions and their cumulative impact on re- affect the security of state. Later in the year police gional affairs. Although governmental rhetoric confiscated reporters' notebooks and documents fastens on a desire for peaceful co-existence, con- about NIS links to Martin Dolinchek, who was stellation, and non-intervention as hallmarks of awaiting trial in the Seychelles on treason charges South African regional policy, actual policy also for his role in the coup attempt. A complaint from consists of a growing dossier of reports of large and the Director General of the NIS invoked the Offi- small-scale open and clandestine raids into nearby cial Secrets Act. Even though the South African states, the effects of which have been to heighten court determined that this was not an SADF opera- insecurities in areas near the international borders tion, evidence clearly showed that somebody in the with the Republic. From close up it may appear to Defence Force took a sympathetic view of the at- be a series of unrelated, ad hoc responses to diverse tempt, and it appeared to some of the accused that stimuli. But from afar what emerges is an unmistak- the imprimatur of SADF approval was put on the able pattern of coercive hostility toward govern- arrangements. SADF weapons were somehow ments already inclined to be hostile to Pretoria, in- made available to the mercenaries involved. Per- secure and even skittish about incursions from the haps what is most disturbing is that SADF officers remaining white regime in Africa. could act without the knowledge or approval of

30 government or of their military superiors. Either work through proxies to destabilize the region. Af- the SADF staged the operation or else it was not an ter all, an opponent's weakness is one's own official SADF enterprise, in which case the SADF strength. was negligent in not controlling its own people. Resort to such activities demonstrates the extent The inept January 1981 raid into Mozambique, of Pretoria's diplomatic and political isolation. Pol- ostensibly a surgical strike against ANC operatives icy by coercion and proxy is the measure of a pariah in Matola, outside of Maputo, left thirty-one dead state caught in a deteriorating regional political bal- and others wounded. More recently, in August ance.9'1 The military trump card is a deceptive indi- 1982, three South African soldiers were killed in cator of policy — superficially refelecting strength Zimbabwe. According to General Viljoen, they, and purpose, but in reality a counsel of desperation along with fourteen black soldiers, had been on an rather than one of confidence and patience. "unauthorized" mission. But this leads one to spec- South Africa, it would seem, has come to accede ulate on this mission's purpose, on how many unde- to a superficially quite revolutionary doctrine of re- tected "unauthorized" missions have been into gional intervention. Increasingly, they have found it Zimbabwe, and on why the SADF command was useful to employ or to encourage dissident factions unable to control and prevent such a mission. from neighbouring states to intervene against their In December 1982, according to an SADF home countries. Since the rules of international law spokesman, thirty-seven ANC "terrorists" and civi- apply only through the intermediary of the state, lians died in an SADF raid into Maseru, Lesotho. there would appear to be little inhibiting the use of This is an attack openly admitted by the SADF. such forces against former homelands whose sover- Despite the fact that these two admitted raids have eignty and independence is universally challenged. ostensibly been aimed at opponents of the South In fact, however, since no one but South Africa rec- African regime, they effectively sow the seeds of ognizes such governments, South Africa might di- fear and insecurity in the region. rectly intervene even without an "invitation" to do Persistent accusations and reports of border in- so and argue that no sovereignty is violated since no cursions, military over-flight violations, and even one recognizes bantustan sovereignty. Without sov- short-term territorial occupation against the territo- ereignty the doctrine of non-intervention falls away. rial integrity of Angola, Mozambique, Lesotho, This is the virtue, if there is one, of a Brezhnev-like Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe by South Afri- doctrine predicated on the concept of limited sover- can military units, raids not always aimed at oppo- eignty. nents of South Africa harboured in that state, con- When it comes to intervention further afield one stitute a pattern of hostility and aggression difficult might seek to justify intervention as the exercise of to deny. If this were not enough, one might add the traditional right of self-defence.'*5 Alternatively, unproven accusations of assassination attempts, it might be rationalized as a form of counter-inter- sabotage, and intelligence "dirty tricks", and the vention, i.e., intervention to redress a balance of destabilizing activities of counter-revolutionary force that has been disrupted by another's outside movements targetting leftist and even some moder- intervention. In this case, the Angola interventions ate black governments in the region. These include might so qualify, but only in a contorted fashion, support and assistance for diverse dissident move- since the Cubans have the blessing, indeed have ments, including UNITA and FNLA in Angola, the been invited by the Luanda Government. The doc- Mozambique National Resistance Movement, the trine of hot pursuit is well established in inter- Mushalala gang in Zambia, dissident Matabele national law and on occasion might be helpful, too. elements in Zimbabwe, and the Lesotho Liberation But South Africa would be hard-pressed to adopt Army guerrillas, possibly harboured in the Free that line in most of these cases, since the cross- State. The evidence of South Africa's encourage- border code-named operations are not in straight- ment, sanctuary, training, equipping, financing, away hot pursuit, but are operations necessitating logistical and diplomatic support contributes to a considerable planning and logistical support. Some widespread atmosphere of animosity in the region. take the form of punitive raids in retaliation for One might add that in some respects it is a mirror guerrilla raids staged earlier by revolutionary forces image of Soviet policy, in southern Africa. That is believed to be based in a neighbouring target state. because both South Africa and the Soviet Union In those few cases where hot pursuit is indeed tak- share a similar policy style for opposite ends: they ing place, there is an immediacy and spontenaity

31 that is undeniable. What is more, even in ligitimate One might see this as the international functional cases of hot pursuit, how deep and for how long equivalent of what in American constitutional law is may the pursuer penetrate after contact has been known as the "bad tendency test", whereby govern- broken off before "hot pursuit" no longer applies? ment may limit in part one's constitutional first- More likely there is emerging in the world a doc- amendment rights of free speech if, at some future trine of pre-emptive intervention based rather on a time, there is a likelihood that such speech might rationale rooted in an arrogance of relative power. lead to substantive evils that disrupt the good order Usually the objectives have been precise and lim- of the state, thereby demonstrating a "bad tend- ited. Pre-emptive intervention is exemplified by Is- ency". Some elements in South African governing rael's strikes into Lebanon and its destruction of the circles, it would appear, subscribe to such a view, nuclear reactor in Iraq as it is in Rhodesia's raids on international law and practice notwithstanding. The Lusaka and United States bombing raids on Viet very revolutionary, socialist nature of some re- Cong concentrations in Cambodia. This is a form of gimes, or their willingness to harbour opponents of anticipatory defence that, depending on the context apartheid, or their instability per se, may be seen as and situation, may be more or less defensible. ominous in the long run, crying out for preventative Sometimes intervention involves direct (although action. usually covert) state acts; more often it employs It is ironic that P.W. Botha would, at the same proxies indigenous to the target state. According to time that he subscribes to a hard line in foreign pol- this emerging new political doctrine of pre-emptive icy, try to push a more liberal {only in relative intervention, the inherent right of self-help or self- terms) line domestically. By being so enamoured of defence warrants the use of pre-emptive interven- the views and advice from those of a military orien- tion if: (1) a neighbouring government is hostile to tation, P.W. may well be a prisoner of a narrow and the intervening regime; or (2) if it is not especially inaccurate reading of regional political realities hostile or directly abetting those exiles in arms which takes on the quality of a self-fulfilling proph- against the intervening government but still is un- ecy. There is something badly wrong, practically willing or unable to curb their activities; or even self-deluding, in the Defence view which regards more minimally (3) if that host government may at Zambia, for example, as a "Marxist satellite" in the some future time either aid or be unable to control same sense as Angola, Mozambique and Zim- announced enemies of the intervening regime. This babwe.*1 Undeniably committed to Marxism, one is not a widely accepted doctrine of law — indeed, might also argue whether even the last three gov- few if any governments would publicly acknowledge ernments can fairly be called "satellites". More- their adherence to this norm. Rather it arises be- over, this very statement was published just weeks cause it seems to be practiced by a variety of states before the Prime Minister was scheduled to meet today. A government may presumably do what its with President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. Senior leaders perceive it must do to survive, sweepingly military decision-makers have proven uncanny in defined. their capacity to misinterpret the intentions of their It is argued that the security of the intervening counterparts abroad. What South Africa lacks, as state is jeopardized if it fails to act. The legal mean- US Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker ing of such acts is rather ambiguous. But insofar as has written, is "the capacity for sophisticated threat unilateral acts of pre-emptive intervention have no assessment and political analysis"," particularly collective basis or approval, the determination of when it comes to politics in black African states. their legitimacy often rests with some international This includes everything from their inability to ap- body such as the Security Council or the General preciate the popularity of Robert Mugabe prior to Assembly of the United Nations. In these instances, the Zimbabwean elections, to their misunderstand- situational and political criteria are applied. To the ing of United States politics in their initial invasion intervening government, legitimacy is usually not of Angola in 1975. American executive branch offi- the crucial issue. A unilateral act of pre-emptive in- cials, no matter how highly placed, simply were not tervention derives what justification and legitimacy in a position to commit the Government (and cer- it claims because the state's leaders perceive a con- tainly not Congress) to assist in military operations dition of encirclement or embattlement. In their abroad. Had South African officials really under- eyes, intervention is unquestionably an act of self- stood American politics, they would have known defence. this from the start.

32 As a result, the DFAI has been forced to conduct necessary to inform their civilian superior of their a responsive foreign policy, to extinguish brush fires views. No doubt they merely confirmed P.W. of rage, incredulity, and criticism brought on by fre- Botha's predilections.w It is to be a changed order quent SADF and badly disguised proxy thrusts at in which the essence of the system will be un- South Africa's neighbours. SADF top brass repeat- changed. Those who rule will continue to rule edly plead that in the long run no military solution largely because they have discarded the excess ideo- is possible, yet their actions make political solutions logical baggage of the past and because they have more and more remote. streamlined the governmental machinery and in- struments of control as never before. Mr. Botha VIII. Conclusions would seem to be building his machine for the long It has been increasingly apparent to anyone who haul, and with the approval of the military men. cares to observe the political realities of South The youth of the top military brass is striking. Africa that the security establishment has gained General Malan was 46 when he took over as Com- prominence in policy-making activity. This rise in manding Officer of the SADF and 50 when he be- importance itself grows out of a commitment to re- came Minister of Defence. General Viljoen was sist the "total onslaught" by mounting a "total only 42 when he took over command of the Army, national strategy". It is justified by many as a survi- and Lieutenant-General Jack Dutton became Chief val response in a militantly hostile world. Early in of Staff of the SADF at the age of 47. There is, as the regime of P.W. Botha it became apparent that well, a certain homogeneity among the men who the defence elite had achieved greater status and achieve high rank in the armed services. At the top, power, especially in comparison to its place in the political reliability matters. Most of the senior offic- Vorster scheme. One journalist exaggeratedly ers rose to authority before P.W. became Prime wrote that the governmental setup was "popularly Minister. It is now decreed that all who aspire to known as 'General Botha's Junta' ", a term, it leadership earn a B. Mil. at the Military Academy might be added never otherwise encountered when at Saldanha Bay. While there, a certain conformity trying to research the phenomenon.98 of thought can be instilled into degree candidates. A situational analysis demands that the power In that fashion, candidates for entry into the senior shifts described in these pages not be divorced from circle can be "tested" and the uncommitted and po- their political context. P.W. Botha is determined to tential critics can be sifted out. In a way, one might see South Africa through its present malaise. His sense an "informal master plan" emerging and, governmental experience lies with the defence characteristic of the military mind, verlig but still forces, which he has come to respect and admire. very committed to the continuation of the white His would appear to be a sort of De Gaulle strate- dominant society. There are, of course, personality gem by which essential, yet manageable or con- differences and personal divisions among ambitious trolled, change would be devised and implemented men. These might easily be translated into different with the concurrent force of the state and its instru- policy preferences from time to time. But compared ments of coercion. Government will be flexible and to intra-armed forces competition elsewhere, these pragmatic in creating a domestic and foreign policy differences are tractable. order, but absolutely firm in dealing with real chal- Throughout this essay the emphasis has been on lenges to its stability and authority. What are the discussing and, to a lesser extent, documenting this genuine threats to the system and who is to make undeniable trend of a greater reliance and involve- that determination? How much change is necessary ment of the security establishment in decision- to defuse an embryonic revolutionary situation? It making and its output. The problem for a social sci- has been claimed, for example by Dr John Seller, entist is all too evident. By setting out to study a that members of the SADF general staff sent a particular phenomenon, one may inadvertantly fas- memorandum to P.W. Botha, then Minister of ten on confirmatory data to the neglect of evidence Defence, after the Soweto uprising, "implying that or events that do not corroborate the basic hypo- some form of military takeover might be necessary thesis being examined. to bring about socio-political changes". As a reac- In this respect it is vital to point out that the find- tion to the inability or unwillingness of the Vorster ings are not all one-sided. The "defence family", if Government to respond creatively to the Soweto it can be called that, does not always get its own challenges, the SADF leadership felt that it was way, and its influence is not uniformly high on all

33 issues. There is a deep-rooted Boer resistance to a sumed a place of great importance in Party councils standing professional army, and a reticence to give and in Parliament as some had predicted when he that force too much authority independent of the was first named to Cabinet."" Although his role has elected government. Such an outlook stems from not been weakened since October 1980, it does ap- the same colonial experience and mentality that led pear that he has been subject to intensive on-the- American colonists to press for constitutional pro- job political and partisan training, General Malan is visions that assured civilian supremacy over the mil- an outsider in partisan politics. Although he is pop- itary, the right of all citizens to bear arms (in order ular nationally, he has no provincial base in the to form their own militia), Congressional control Party. Party loyalists have long been reluctant to re- over the budget, and protection against the quar- ward co-opted leaders too rapidly. Hence, individ- tering of soldiers in private houses without permis- uals such as Pik Botha (Foreign Affairs), Dr Gerrit sion of the owners. The British colonial authorities, Viljocn (Education), Dr Owen Horwood (Fi- after all, made excessive demands on the American nance), and General Malan, as examples, are ex- colonists. When the colonists opposed or threat- pected to pay their partisan dues, so to speak, be- ened to revolt against what they regarded as exploi- fore gaining the topmost ranks in the Party. A case tative British policy, the authorities sought to im- might be made that the defence establishment had pose their wills upon the recalcitrant colonists. That been better represented when P.W. Botha was usually entailed the imposition of force, involving Minister of Defence and General Malan was Chief both British and occasionally mercenary forces oftheSADF. from the continent. This led eventually to the war Likewise, elements in Cabinet concerned with for independence. Once having achieved indepen- the economic well-being of the country are wary of dence the Founding Fathers vowed to establish committing too many resources to military expendi- their opposition to a parasitic armed force in the ture and are keenly aware of the disorder that arises 11 1 Constitution. " In its South African construct, the from expanded national service and Citizen Force concept of volksleer is deeply engrained, and this obligations for economically active men. Of course, value has yet to be reconciled fully with a profes- other elements of the economic community, in gov- sionalized career armed force. ernment and in the private sector, argue that their There are, as well, other individuals and institu- efforts, especially at regional investment, trade and tions who also question P.W. Botha's reliance on general economic co-operation, are made more the security forces. In the Party and in the Cabinet burdensome by an aggressive military posture to- are powerful forces with a slightly different agenda ward neighbouring states. Economic instruments of for government, or at least slightly different priori- foreign policy gain in effectiveness by a patient ties. Although individual political fortunes shift buildup of links and trusted relationships — they regularly, it would appear that particular leaders can be swiftly undermined by threats and open or have been able to accumulate power, among them clandestine military strikes into states with which, J.C. Heunis, Minister of Constitutional Devel- ostensibly, correct relations are sought. opment and Chairman of the Cabinet Committee In another sense, although the SSC has been re- for Internal Affairs and other key committees in the garded as a sounding board for SADF views, in a Office of the Prime Minister, and F.W. de Klerk, way it is also a check on the SADF. It reinforces a leader of the National Party in the Transvaal and reliance on the principle of civilian supremacy over Minister of Internal Affairs. Heunis is now charged the military and to political paramountcy in the with the task of supervising constitutional revision, decision-making process. The military voice is clear and de Klerk is widely regarded as the political and, as we have explained, well placed, but in the strategist entrusted with dealing with the right wing end it, too, must come to accept that this is an inside and out of the NP and a possible successor to elected government answerable to an exclusive P.W. Botha as leader of the Party. Both men electorate, but nonetheless answerable. gained considerable leverage in the 1982 Party Since P.W. Botha became Prime Minister he has struggle culminating in a July Cabinet shuffle. reorganized the executive branch. This has entailed These men are not especially close to the security a heavy emphasis on planning, administrative re- establishment although, unlike the DFAI, they are organization and co-ordination, and a far greater not in direct competition with it either. It is worth reliance on professional advice, even if that entails noting that General Malan has not immediately as- going beyond the normal state machinery. The

34 SADF has gladly made its superior organizational social struggle", Brigadier Ben Roos, then Director skills available to P.W. Botha, and in the process of Army Operations, has stated."13 General Malan has seen its role grow in power and stature. All as- has often expressed similar views. The axiomatic pects of government planning are now undertaken 80:20 ratio is shared by the former PFP spokesman with strategy and security in mind. "Regional plan- on defence, Harry Schwarz; the NRP leader, W. ning, economic planning, manpower planning, Vause Raw; journalists, commentators, and ordi- constitutional planning — the whole gamut is nary citizens."14 General Malan confidently asserts: influenced by security and internal stability con- "Militarily we can win the war. We can win it to- siderations."102 Executive government demands de- morrow. But this is the type of battle you never win cisive, efficient, and far-sighted leadership. The on the military field. You win it in the political managerial revolution in South Africa has been field."105 It might be asked in all seriousness, what itself prompted by the military with its distinctive are the politicians doing to assure that military leadership style, and the military, in turn, benefits pressures will eventually be relieved? Will the new from a government that effectively accepts its constitutional design which neglects in its essentials framework of analysis and its strategic-ideological the black seventy per cent of the population, satisfy mindset. the black leaders and citizenry? The answer is an Make no mistake, the military alone does not emphatic "no". The military arm is therefore indis- possess these skills and viewpoints. And it alone pensable. This perspective the military shares with does not have access to power brokers in govern- the key partisan leaders and hence military influ- ment. P.W. Botha has been open to ideas from all ence, based on shared values and analytical modes, "acceptable" and knowledgeable quarters. This grows. heightens governmental dependence on civil ser- The Republic of South Africa finds itself in a vants rather than upon elected partisan officials of state of "pre-semi-war", a situation that it has limited experience. In the SSC, for example, there largely brought on itself. The principal opposition are some working groups empowered to take deci- to the regime, the ANC, is in the process of trying sions on their own, thereby giving civil servants to build political support and to organize within the power unencumbered by the need to secure imme- country. There is no question that the ANC and its diate political approval in Parliament. imprisoned leaders are popular among the urban Part of the explanation for the rise of the security blacks. And it is also clear that ANC operatives in- establishment in central decision-making organs is filtrating into the Republic are more effective and that both P.W. Botha and his closest NP associates better trained than their colleagues of the past. But on the one hand, and the military-industrial axis on the ANC is not in the position to achieve more than the other, appreciate the need for change in South a propaganda victory here and there. They hope, Africa. The issue of political-governmental reorga- no doubt, that well publicized acts of violence will nization is not an apolitical desire for efficiency or demonstrate the regime's inability to maintain rationalization. It is very much linked to the lead- order, and will force the government to lash back ers' tolerance of and awareness of the need for viciously, thereby weakening the regime further change, a controlled change to be sure, that seeks among black South Africans and in the eyes of the better to defend the essence of the South African outside world. In this sense, the May 1983 bomb- status quo. In this regard the best form of conser- ings near Maputo were the reaction the ANC ex- vatism is a modulated liberalism. Magnus Malan pected and wanted as retaliation for the Pretoria and most ranking officers in the SADF believe that car bombing outside Air Force Headquarters. But South Africa's future solutions must be principally the ANC is by no means able to launch more than a political, but within the context of a secure and series of isolated sabotage attacks and hope that stable order. their impact ramifies domestically and internation- According to this view, the struggle for South ally. Africa is mainly a political and social contest. The Yet in this smouldering conflict, the rise of the military dimension is chiefly concerned with provid- security establishment has been almost inevitable. ing the politicians with the time and secure environ- The problem for the South African Government is ment to bring about the needed changes. "It is at that it is faced with a virtually insoluble dilemma. It the most a twenty per cent military struggle as op- feels that it must alert the people to the danger and posed to an eighty per cent political, economic and threat posed by a total onslaught and must prepare

35 itself for the expanding conflict, at the same time asking too much of any government, least of all one that it must try to reassure the electorate that panic whose popular base is, by choice and design, nar- and desperate or extreme measures are not called rowly defined and exclusive. for. To reconcile these opposing aims may be

Notes

1. Sunday Times, 20 June 1982, p. 34. 272-292. Some of this author's views are very briefly 2. Sunday Express, 20 June 1982, p. 22. outlined in: "The Truth About Total Onslaught", 3. Edwin S. Munger, Notes on the Formation of South Sunday Times, 15 August 1982. African Foreign Policy (Pasadena, California: Grant 15. Sunday Express, 24 May 1981; and 30 May 1982; DahlstronVThe Castle Press, 1965), p. 85. Sunday Tribune, 24 May 1981; Rand Daily Mail and 4. See J.S.M, Simpson, South Africa Fights (London: The Star, 29 May 1982. Hodder & Houghton, 1941), pp. 94-101; and Deon 16. "Army and Politics", part 3, Sechaba (June 1980), Fourie, "South African Forces in World War II", p. 11. New Nation, vol2.no. 12 (July 1969), p. 19. 17. Brtg. C.C. van der Westhuizen quoted in The Star, 5. See Deon Geldenhuys, South Africa's Search for Se- Weekly Air Edition (WAE), 30 October 1982, p. 3. curity Since the Second World War (Braamfontein: See also the excellent series on the current situation South African Institute of International Affairs on defence by Andrew Walker in The Star, 1-5 June [SAIIA] September 1978); Robert S. Jaster, South 1982. Africa's Narrowing Security Options, Adelphi Paper 18. Brig. C.C. van der Westhuizen in The Star, WAE, 30 No. 159 (London: International Institute for Strate- October 1982, p. 3. gic Studies, 1980); and Deon Geldenhuys, What Do 19. The Star, WAE, 2 October 1982, p. 3. We Think? A Survey of White Opinion on Foreign 20. See Kenneth W. Grundy, Soldiers Without Politics: Pofcy/ttues (Braamfontein: SAIIA, 1982). Blacks in the South African Armed Forces (Berkeley: 6. As quoted in Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Im- University of California Press, 1983), pp. 118-133 plications of South Africa's "Total National Strat- et pass. egy", with particular reference to the "12-point plan" 21. The Star, 1 June 1982, p. 12. (Braamfontein: SAIIA. March 1981), p. 3. 22. Statutes of the Republic of South Africa, Defence 7. As quoted in The Star, 10 September 1977. Act of 1957, Sec. 3 (2)a. 8. Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, 23. Jonathan Kapstein, "Armed Confrontation Builds in White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, South Africa", Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Insti- 1982 (Cape Town: South African Navy Printing and tute, vol. 107, no. 12 (December 1981), pp. 37-38. Photographic Unit, 1982), p. 2. 24. Rand Daily Mail, 5 June 1982, p. 5. 9. Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly, De- 25. Los Angeles Times, 18 March 1982, Pt. I-C, p. 6; bates (Hansard), 31 January 1978, cols. 103-104. and The Star, 5 January 1983. See also: Tom Lodge, Hereinafter cited as Assembly Debates. "The African National Congress in South Africa, 10. Ibid., col. 105. 1976-1982; Guerilla War and Armed Propaganda", a 11. See: P.W. Botha in Assembly Debates, 8 March paper presented at the African Studies Association 1979, col. 2067; and 21 March 1980, cols. 3317-3319. Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., October 1982. 12. Philip Frankel, "Race and Counter-Revolution: 26. "Changing defence strategy". Financial Mail, vol. South Africa's 'Total Strategy'" Journal of Common- 82, no. 3 (15 January 1982), pp. 190-191. wealth and Comparative Politics, vol. 18, no. 3 (Oc- 27. Ibid.,p. 191. tober, 1980), p. 273. 28. The Star, 13 July 1982, p. 19; and Rand Daily Mail, 13. First mention of a similar idea, although applied only 13 July 1982, p. 1. See also Assembly Debates, 1 to the military goals of the white community and ad- June 1982, cols. 8411-8571; and 11 June 1982, cols. vocating a commando structure as part of COIN ac- 9416-9450; and especially Gen. Malan's explanation tivities, appeared in: Neil Orpen, Total Defence in '"Total Mobilization' Biggest Misconception", (Cape Town: Nasionale Boekhandel, 1967). Paratus, vol. 33, no. 7 (July 1982), pp. 34-35, 81. 14. See: Geldenhuys, Some Foreign Policy Implications; 29. Financial Mail, vol. 85, no. 4 (23 July 1982), p. 403. and Frankel, "Race and Counter-Revolution", pp. 30. The Star, WAE, 19 October 1982, p. 4.

36 31. Statutes of the Republic of South Africa, Defence, also the Security Intelligence and State Security Act National Key Points Act, No. 102, of 1980, pp. No. 64 of 1972, which provides that the Prime Minis- 971-977. Even before passage of this Act, there had ter must be chairman and membership must include been a high degree of co-operation. See, for exam- the senior Minister of the Republic, the Ministers of ple: "GM's Contingency Plans for South Africa 'Un- Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Police, and rest'", Southern Africa, vol. 11, no. 5 (June/July any other Ministers whom the Prime Minister asks to 1978), pp. 2-7; and New York Times, 19 May 1978, attend. In "Reaching into government". Financial pp.DlandDll. Mail, vol. 86, no. 2 (8 October 1982), p. 145; it was 32. See: "Border Warders", Financial Mail, vol. 71, no. reported also to include the Ministers of Finance, 10 (9 March 1979); Sunday Tribune, 21 May 1978; Co-operation and Development, Internal Affairs, Rand Daily Mail, 3 March 1979, p. 5; 5 February and Constitutional Affairs. 1982; and 24 May 1982, p. 2. 46. See: P.W. Botha in Assembly Debates, 6 February 33. Financial Mail, vol. 82, no. 3 (15 January 1982), 1980, col. 324. p. 191. 47. Cape Times, 23 January 1982. 34. Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence, 48. Frankel, "Race and Counter-Revolution", p. 277. 1982, p.28. 49. See the portrait of Barnard in: Financial Mail, vol. 35. Herman Giliomee, The Parting of the Ways: South 84, no. 10 (4 June 1982), p. 1131. African Politics, 1976-82 (Cape Town: David Philip, 50. See, for example. The Citizen, 20 July 1982, p. 14. 1982), p. 11. 51. See: Rand Daily Mail, 3 June 1982, pp. 1 and 6; The 36. Ken Owen and Neil Hooper in Sunday Times, 14 Oc- Star, 3 June 1982, p. 11; and Sunday Express, 13 tober 1979; and Ivor Wilkins in Sunday Times, 28 June 1982,p. 13. September 1980, p. 31. 52. Sunday Express, 30 March 1980, pp. 1-2. 37. See: Giliomee, "Governing in the Managerial 53. See also the agreement between the Newspaper Style", Parting of the Ways, pp. 34-42. Press Union and the Deputy Minister of Defence, of 38. South Africa: A Study in Conflict (Berkeley; Univer- March 1979, described in the Daily News, 27 March sity of California Press, 1967), p. 86. 1979. 39. This account is dependent on a series of articles 54. The Post, 31 January 1980; Sunday Post, 2 Septem- by Mervyn Rees that appeared in: Rand Daily Mail, ber 1979. 1 and 2 February 1980; and also The Star, 14 January 55. Sunday Post,10 February 1980. 1980, p. 2; and 23 April 1982, p. 10; Sunday Express, 56. Rand Daily Mail, 21 February 1980. The programme 13 December 1981; Sunday Times, 22 October 1978, in KwaZulu began in February 1980. See also Finan- p. 15; and Chris Vermaak, "The BOSS Man cial Mail, vol. 73, no. 7(17 August 1979), p. 634. Speaks", Scope, 29 June 1979, pp. 16-23. Also 57. For example. Rand Daily Mail, 13 June 1979. BOSS: The First 5 Years (London: International De- 58. Assembly Debates, 17 April 1978, cols. 4919-4923, fence and Aid, 1974); and Republic of South Africa, among others. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Matters Re- 59. Assembly Debates, 25 March 1980, cols. 3502-3515 lating to the Security of the State (Abridged) [Potgieter (Prime Minister) and3477-3482 (Dr Slabbert). Report] (Pretoria: Government Printer, 1971). 60. Voice, vol. 4, no. 13 (April 1980), p. 2. See also stu- 40. See, for example, Gordon Winter, Inside Boss; dent criticism of Dr Slabbert's naivete in the pamph- South Africa's Secret Police (Harmondsworth: Pen- let Army News (Johannesburg: Milcom, Student guin, 1981). Representative Council, Witwatersrand University, 41. Sunday Express, 13 December 1981. 1980), p. 2. 42. "The business of defence", Financial Mail, vol. 62, 61. On this episode see: Sunday Times, 23 March 1980, no. 9 (26 November 1976), pp. 797-98; "Armscor: p. 1; and 30 March 1980, p. 20; Rand Daily Mail, 24 behind the secrecy shroud". Financial Mail, vol. 81, March 1980, pp. 1-2; 25 March 1980, p. 12; 26 no. 11 (11 September 1981), pp. 1240-1241; Sunday March 1980, pp. 1-2, 4; and 31 March 1980, p. 7; Times, 11 July 1982, p. 25; Department of Defence, Sunday Express, 30 March 1980, pp. 1-2, 8-9; and White Paper on Defence, 1982, pp. 25-28; and Assembly Debates, 24 March 1980, col. 3325; and 25 "Krygkor/Armscor", supplement to Paratus, vol. 33, March 1980, cols. 3477-3515. no. 11 (November, 1982). 62. For comparative materials, see: Morris Janowitz and 43. Frankel, "Race and Counter-Revolution", pp. Stephen D. Wesbrook (eds.). The Political Edu- 277-279. cation of Soldiers, Sage Research Series on War, 44. Frankel, "South Africa: The Politics of Police Con- Revolution, and Peacekeeping, vol. 11 (Beverly trol", Comparative Politics, vol. 12 (July, 1980), pp. Hills, California: Sage, 1983). 481-199. 63. Assembly Debates, 22 April 1975, cols. 4569-4574; 45. See: Ivor Wilkins, "The Way P.W. got it all sewn Rand Daily Mail, 25 April 1975, p. 2. up", Sunday Times, 28 September 1980, p. 31. See 64. Assembly Debates, 19 May 1982, Q.col. 861.

37 65. Assembly Debates, 6 May 1975, Q. cols. 886-887. Law, 1975, vol. 1 (Pretoria: University of South 66. Cape Times, 6 August 1982. p. 3. Africa, 1976), pp. 103-114. 67. See, for example, J.S. Pansegrow (N.P.) in Assem- 85. See: Deon Geldenhuys, South Africa's Black Home- bly Debates. 13 June 1975, cols. 9307-9308. lands, pp. 51-78, for a discussion of alternatives. 68. "South Africa: Countering the Threat of Sanctions", 86. Robin Hallctt, "The South African Intervention in Business Week, 20 November 1978; and "South Angola, 1975-76", African Affairs, vol. 77, no. 308 Africa Driving a Perilous Road to Diesel Self-Reli- (July 1978), pp.347-386. ance", Business Week, 16 June 1980. 87. See: Chris Vermaak, "The BOSS Man Speaks: Gen- 69. See Kenneth W. Grundy, "On Domesticating Trans- eral Hendrick van den Bergh". Scope, 29 June 1979, national Corporations : South Africa and the Auto- pp. 16-23, especially pp. 21-22. motive Industry", Journal of Commonwealth and 88. The Times (London), 30 December 1975. Comparative Politics, vol. 19, no. 2 (July 1981), pp. 98. Hallett, "Intervention in Angola", p. 370; quoting 157-173. Robert Moss of the Sunday Telegraph (London). 70. See: Deon Geldenhuys, South Africa's Black Home- 90. See: Guardian (London), 8 August 1979, p. 6. lands: Past Objectives, Present Realities and Future 91. International Herald Tribune, 28 December 1982; Developments (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 1981). pp. Citizen, 27 December 1982; and Rand Daily Mail, 27 40-41. December 1982. 71. Assembly Debates, 5 April 1978. col. 3955. 92. On SADF destruction of civilian targets in Angola 72. Assembly Debates, 6 March 1963, col. 2265. see: Guardian, 29 January and 2 February 1981. 73. Assembly Debates, 1 March 1963, col.2356. 93. See: The Star, 16 June 1982, pp. 1 and 3. 74. Assembly Debates, 26 January 1963, col. 271. 94. See: Peter Vale, "South Africa as a Pariah Inter- 75. Assembly Debates, 20 May 1959, col. 6227; 29 March national State", International Affairs Bulletin, vol. 1, 1962, col. 3458. no. 3. 76. See: Grundy, Soldiers Without Politics, pp. 231-241. 95. See: Derek W. Bowett, "The Interrelation of The- 77. P.W. Botha in Assembly Debates, 22 April 1975, coi. ories of Intervention and Self-Defense", in John 4584. Norton Moore (ed.), Law and Civil War in the Mod- 78. Rand Daily Mail, 3 August 1974. ern World (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins 79. Sec: Patrick Laurence, The Transkei: South Africa's University Press, 1974), pp. 38-50. Politics of Partition (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 96. S.A. Department of Defence,White Paper on De- 1976), p. 131. fence, 1982, p. 28. 80. See: South African Institute of Race Relations, Sur- 97. Chester A. Crocker, "South Africa's Defense Pos- vey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1980 (Johan- ture: Coping and Vulnerability", The Washington nesburg: [SAIRR], 1981), p. 422. Papers, vol. 9, no. 84 (Beverly Hills, California, and 81. This idea is borrowed, with licence, from Francis London: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 85. Wilson's paper, "Towards Economic Justice in South 98. Caryle Murphy in International Herald Tribune, 31 Africa", prepared for the 50th anniversary confer- May-Uunel980,p. 3. ence of the South African Institute of Race Re- 99. This was disclosed by Dr Seiler in testimony before lations, Johannesburg, 4 July 1979, particularly pp. the United States House of Representatives Subcom- 23-30. Prof. Wilson is applying a similar model to mittees on International Economic Policy and Trade the issue of labour linkages between the RSA and its in Africa and on International Organizations; U.S. neighbours. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on 82. The agreement with Transkei is in: RSA, Govern- Foreign Affairs, U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, ment Gazette, vol. 136, no. 5320, 22 October 1976, p. 96th Congress, 2nd session, 1980, p. 46. Dr Seller 26; with Bophuthatswana, in Government Gazette, later said that this information had been confirmed vol. 150, no. 5923, 6 December 1977, pp. 34-35; and by at least three different people; The Star, 7 May with Venda, it is reprinted in "Homeland" Tragedy: 1980, p.1. function and farce (Johannesburg: SARS/DAG In- 100. Constitution of the United States of America: Arti- formation Publication 6 August 1982), p. 21. The cle I, Section VIII, Clauses 11, 12, 14, 15, and 17; agreement with Ciskei is in : Government Gazette, Section X, Clause 3; Article II, Section II, Clause 1; vol. 203, no. 8204.14 May 1982, pp. 1-7. and Amendments II and III. 83. See: Gail-Maryse Cockram, South West African 101. See, for example, Financial Mail, vol. 77, no. 10 (5 Mandate (Cape Town: Juta, 1976), p. 40. September 1980), pp. 1084-1085. 84. See the arguments advanced in C.E.J. Stephan and 102. Harry Schwarz as quoted in Financial Mail, vol. 86, H. Booysen, "The Angolan Conflict: Its Relevance no. 2 (8 October 1982), p. 144. for South Africa in her Relations with Future In- 103. Sunday Times, 13 July 1976. dependent Bantustans and the Need for a Monroe 104. See: The Citizen, 23 April 1982 (Schwarz): Assembly Doctrine", South African Yearbook of International Debates, 17 April 1978, col. 4835 (Raw); Rand Daily

38 Mail, 11 November 1978 (editorial); Sunday Times, 8 Krygstuigvoorsiening 1979", ISSUP Strategiese Oor- July 1979, p. 16 (editorial); and M. Hough, "Strate- sig (September, 1979), p. 6. giese Aspekte van die Witskrif oor Verdediging en 105. Quoted in the New York Times, 7 September 1971.

39