South Africa

South Africa r OR THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1990 was one of the most dra- matic, exciting, and, at the same time, bewildering periods in recent history. It was a year in which radical government action hastened the dismantling of apartheid and further threatened the traditionally dominant and privileged position of whites. Jews shared the anxieties of other whites about the future and were also mindful of their own potential role as scapegoats during the painful adjustments to come. They were worried, too, about the apparent growth of black anti-Semitism and how this might afiFect them in the new South Africa.' National Affairs On February 2, 1990, Pres. F.W. de Klerk stated in his opening speech to Parliament that the government had decided to lift the ban on all prohibited organizations, including the African National Congress (ANC), as well as to release, unconditionally, ANC leader Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners. Fur- thermore, the three-year-old "state of emergency" would be relaxed in regard to media curbs, conditions imposed on released emergency detainees, and restrictions on some 33 organizations. He also announced the repeal of the Separate Amenities Act of 1953, which comprised the discriminatory laws generally referred to as "petty apartheid." De Klerk's speech marked the beginning of a new phase in the process of political reform that had been initiated more than a decade earlier by his predecessor, P. W. Botha, in response to growing doubts within the National party about the continued viability of apartheid and to various political and economic developments during the late 1960s and 1970s. By 1986, when his attempts to introduce limited reform had failed to curb growing violence, Botha declared a general state of emergency. While it appeared that progress toward ending apartheid had halted at the political level, this was not the case in other areas of life in South Africa. "Apartheid is crumbling all about us, and the new society is taking shape," wrote anti-apartheid activist John Kane-Berman. "Post-apartheid SA is not going to be legislated into existence by some future government under a new constitution. It is being forged 'See Gideon Shimoni, "South African Jews and the Apartheid Crisis," AJYB 1988, vol. 88, pp. 3-58, for an account of developments up to 1987. 413 414 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1992 in theatres and hotels and restaurants, on trains, on beaches and sports fields, in universities and private schools, in shops and offices, in mines and factories. ... In our silent revolution the Government has often been more of a spectator than an actor. Change has taken place despite, not because of, its wishes."2 What happened in 1990, then, was that the government not only recognized and sanctioned the so-called silent revolution, but also resumed and accelerated legisla- tive and structural reform. De Klerk clearly demonstrated that he and his government were irrevocably committed to the abolition of apartheid and to the establish- ment of a democratic South Africa with equal rights for all. Responses to Change The responses of whites to these events ranged from uncritical optimism about a nonracial, democratic, more egalitarian South Africa, to deep pessimism about the country's viability and the future of whites and, on the extreme Right, to uncompro- mising rejectionism. For those who accepted that black majority rule was inevitable, hopes for the future depended to an important degree on their assessment of what would happen to the economy. Thus, the immediate concern of lower- and middle- class wage- and salary-earners was the growing competition from blacks, Indians, and coloreds, both in getting jobs and in job advancement, as well as the increasing possibility of having to work under black supervisors and managers. Small white businesses that traded mainly with blacks also faced increased competition. At another level, large employers of labor, both public and private, were constantly under pressure from the powerful black trade unions, legalized only relatively recently. Some factories and commercial firms already had to close down because they could not meet union demands, while many others were involved in a danger- ous game of brinkmanship. Looking beyond the present and immediate future, there was great trepidation in the white business community over the implications of ANC rhetoric about nationalization and the redistribution of resources. At the same time, there was hope that black leaders would acknowledge the importance of white capital and know-how in maintaining the economy. Other, noneconomic, concerns of whites related to the effects of removing discriminatory legislation. Although this had already been happening gradually over the previous 10-15 years, during 1990 the Separate Amenities Act was repealed in its entirety. The Group Areas Act—which designated where members of each racial group could legally own and occupy property—was modified with regard to business premises and was not being enforced against blacks wanting to live in "white areas." Many whites found it difficult to share places of recreation, restaurants, hotels, and amenities such as public lavatories with people whom they still regarded 2John Kane-Berman, South Africa's Silent Revolution (Southern Book Publishers, Johannes- burg, n.d., probably 1990), quoted from Business Day, Johannesburg, Aug. 1, 1990, in Focus on South Africa, Aug. 1990. SOUTH AFRICA / 415 as uncouth, uncivilized, and even "unclean." Many also feared that blacks moving into white neighborhoods would bring noise, litter, overcrowding and, in general, lower their tone—and property values. There was also serious concern about the quality of education as schools, colleges, and universities were opened up to all. There was fear as well that the loosening of control over black political activity would lead to an increase in violence against whites. This fear was reinforced by the ANC's insistence that it was not ready to renounce what it termed "the armed struggle" until it was convinced that there was "real progress" toward majority rule. In the longer term, there was the equally frightening prospect of complete anarchy when expectations by ordinary blacks for a better life could not be fulfilled by a black government. Black responses to the dismantling of apartheid were also not uniform. At the ideological level, there were groups, like the Pan Africanist Congress, that were reluctant to acknowledge de Klerk's sincerity or to negotiate any compromise with the whites; others would talk to the government, but only on the understanding that such issues as nationalization and majority rule based on one-man one-vote were nonnegotiable preconditions; and still others, like Mandela, who were prepared to lay everything on the negotiating table. There was also an internal struggle for power between the older (and, generally, more moderate) ANC leaders and the younger ones; the unabated violence and bloodshed in the conflict between the ANC and Zulu chief minister Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement; the ideological gulf between the ANC and the youthful militants of the 1976-1986 uprisings; the proba- bility, at some future date, of a test of strength between leaders of the ANC and those of the powerful black trade unions; and the potential tensions, within the ANC, between the noncommunists and those advocating a socialist state. This lack of unity encouraged some whites, perhaps naively, to believe that there was no great danger of a black government taking over in the near future. For others, probably the majority, the confused situation among blacks simply added to the uncertainty. Jewish Responses* On February 28, 1990, two-and-a-half weeks after his release from prison, a photograph of Nelson Mandela warmly embracing Yasir Arafat in Lusaka, Zambia, was published on the front pages of several South African dailies. The following day Mandela was quoted as saying, in response to a question, that if his meeting with Arafat and his statements equating the struggle of the Palestinians with that of the blacks were to alienate "South Africa's influential Jewish community," that was "too bad" (FIJI, Mar. 2, 1990). These reports, coming on the heels of recent 3The major sources of information for this section are the news digest Press Items of Jewish Interest (PIJI), published periodically by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, Johan- nesburg, and an early draft of Milton Shain's "What Future for South African Jews?" Mid- stream, Jan. 1992, pp. 17-19. 416 / AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1992 right-wing anti-Semitic incidents, raised the ire of local Jews—and their anxiety. To give expression to the community's outrage and, at the same time, to restore calm, mass meetings were organized during March in Johannesburg and Cape Town. These were addressed by leading representatives of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies and the South African Zionist Federation, by Chief Rabbi Cyril Harris, and by Democratic party parliamentarian (now ambassador to Washington) Harry Schwarz. While reaffirming the community's support of Israel, the major thrust of all the speakers was to allay anxiety, cool tempers, and place events in a more realistic perspective. Schwarz assessed the overall situation as follows: The Jewish fate is ultimately tied up with that of the white population as a whole and there can "be no separate deal between blacks and Jews." Clearly it would be in the interest of Jews for South Africa to have a liberal constitution underpinned by a bill of rights. As Schwarz correctly explained: "Only a society which gives everyone rights will give Jews rights." He also suggested, as did other speakers, that insofar as Jews felt that they did have special interests, they should be vigilant while maintaining a low profile. Since almost all Jews were part of the English-speaking sector, and since a large proportion belonged to the middle and upper classes, it was primarily with these groups that they shared their hopes and fears.

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