To Strategic Autonomy: a Shift in the Implementation of the Global Strategy?

Home , Federica Mogherini, Josep Borrell

From ‘Resilience’ to Strategic Autonomy: A Shift in the Implementation of the Global Strategy?

Pol Bargués

No. 09. February 2021

This publication has been funded by the European Union under the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 769886. EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series. 09. February 2021 (Routledge 2018) and co-author of He isauthor of in post-conflictcountriessuchasBosniaandKosovo. specifically, he has examined the evolution of EU external action and has specialised in interventions explores and contributes to peacebuilding and resilience. debates in international More intervention, coordinates the Horizon 2020 project on EU’s external action (EU-LISTCO). In his research, Bargués Pol Barguésis research fellow at CIDOB, Centre Barcelona for International Affairs, where he with otherpartners. imply amove away from aspirations to foster resilience inaconstructive andcooperative way widen thegapbetween capabilities andexpectations; (2) intervening geopolitically canalso the EUexternal action: 1) strategic autonomy mightbeunrealistic intheshortterm andthus resilience asenvisioned intheGlobal Strategy, andhighlightssomeunforeseen risksfor This paperdiscusseshow theideaofstrategic autonomy isused,contrasts itwiththatof deployed to entertain ageopolitical EUandimplement theGlobal Strategy more efficiently. policy. Inresponse to these shortcomings, theideaof‘strategic autonomy’ is currently being policy sectors andmemberstates’ preferences, askey elements constraining EUforeign Scholars highlightthevaguenessofresilience, aswell astheexisting contradictions between neighbourhood increasingly threatened by governance breakdown andviolent conflict. Strategy (2016), which buildsontheideaoffostering resilience to theeastandsouth,ina There isagrowing scepticism regarding the implementation oftheEuropean Union Global ABSTRACT -2- (Sage). and Statebuilding (TaylorIntervention and Francis). He is also Associate Editor Perspectives for New Affairs. He is co-editor and Statebuilding and Routledge Studies in of JournalIntervention International of Review Cambridge Quarterly, World Third Statebuilding, and Intervention of Journal Society, Global Studies, International Reviewof numerousincluding in journals, academicpublished Deferring Peace in International Statebuilding: Difference, Resilience and Critique Critique and Resilience Difference, Statebuilding: International in Peace Deferring Mapping and Politics in a Digital Age Digital a in Politics and Mapping (Routledge, 2019). He has Pol Bargués . From ‘Resilience’ to Strategic Autonomy: A Shift in the Implementation of the Global Strategy? ------3- , 2019, with a clear ambition to implement the Global Strategy. In the initial months of his mandate, st Borrell Borrell endeavoured to further diplomacy and find collective responsesto global challenges.However, as the pandemic has accelerated socio-economic uncertainties and great power contestation, Borrell has placed greater emphasis on the concept of ‘strategic autonomy’, which he defines as ‘the abilityto think the conceptAlthough 2020b). and interests’ (Borrell own values one’s act according to and to for oneself has received particular building anpossibility of the concerning since the early 2010s, in debates attention EU defence industry independent from Borrell NATO, makes it central to correct the shortcomings of EU the with security and defence of sectors traditional the beyond meaning its expands also He policy. foreign aim of being influential, geopolitical, and interests: defending ‘we Europe’s need to close many capability gaps and loopholes be and present to and active in areas where our interests are at stake (Borrell 2020d). Yet a question emerges after an emphasis on geopolitics and the widening of strategic autonomy: is it compatible with or a departure Strategy? resilience underpinned in the Global fostering the idea of from In 2020, less than four years after the publication of the Global Strategy, the vision of the former High (HR/ Commission European the of Policy/Vice-President Security and Affairs Foreign for Representative pandemic Covid-19 The down. upside turned world the as stress under put was Mogherini, Federica VP), revealed the European vulnerabilities Union in (EU)’s the health sector and generated economic - conse tensions flared up quences between that themay set back investment in security and defence. Abroad, multilateral) than (rather state-centric favour that perspectives nationalist while China, and States United their nuclear arsenal, upgrading continue The great powers elsewhere. and Europe in actions burgeoned fears raising that the ‘world is in the of throes (Maulny an 2020). arms Also, race’ Eastern and Southern Partnership tensions and hold by geopolitical (CO) derived contestation are affected by order countries areas of limited statehood (ALS) affected by multifarious risks that have a destabilizing impact on go INTRODUCTION vernance and conflict both for the neighbourhood and the EU, as demonstrated by EU-LISTCO research EU-LISTCO by demonstrated as EU, the and neighbourhood the for both conflict and vernance and Sasnal 2020; Kakachia and Lebanidze 2020). findings (Fahmi While the Global Strategy was initially valued for operationalizing a ‘principled pragmatism’ - frame work, combining norms and interests, through the idea of fostering resilience abroad 2020), (Tocci we have noticed a growing dissatisfaction within EU policy circles and academic analysts. Some of the limitations identified respond, in part,to the vagueness of resilience, as well as the existing con - Tuni in concerns security EU shown, have (2020) et al. (as Cadier sectors between policy tradictions for prospects undermined have Libya in interests economic or Bosnia, in management migration sia, countries). enhancing societal resilience in these In consequence, an emerging perception is that the path initiated by Mogherini with a preference for strengthening resilience (through the means of long-term, non-linear approaches and the mobil isation of bottom-up diplomatic resources and partnerships) is too soft and ambiguous for a world which is increasingly dominated by great power rivalry and contestation. While the Global Strategy already responded to a complex and contested world where the European project and the international order were liberal questioned, growingly the shock of 2020 geopolitical has tensi aggravated ons and brought major uncertainties in ALS and CO (Flockhart 2020; Newman 2018). Thus, a wide coheren and autonomy develop to strategy bolder a needs EU the that is literature the in consensus ce in security and defence instruments to then take actions to foster resilience in ALS and CO and et al. 2020). world order (Biscop 2020; Sabatino greater impact in a post-liberal ultimately have The EU has recently embraced the ‘language of power’ in foreign policy, as an attempt to meet December on HR/VP as Mogherini replaced assertiveness greater Borrell for Josep mand 2020a). (Borrell the de- 1 EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series. 09. February 2021 threats thatemergeinatroubled neighbourhood. operation and multi-lateral solutions, the focus may turn out to be on unilateral actions to contain the toco leading than Rather concerns. and geostrategicinterests on premium a putting when actions bottom-up and sustained of policy foreign resilience-oriented a suspending) (or refusing be might EU the that is drawn is that risk second The expectations. and capabilities between gap the widen thus and unrealistic be might it term, medium the in strength and unity of horizon certain a gives it While action. external EU the for bring may autonomy strategic obtaining that risks unforeseen the In the conclusion of the policy paper, we build our second contribution. We seek to open a debate on forceful andstrategic intakingaction andbuildingresilienceinglobalaffairs. of instruments and perspectives among member states, as well as the possibility of being more integrationgreater imply would sectors policy all strategicin autonomyacquiring So, influence. and capacity of Europe’sloss revert to wishes and powers great between antagonism greater to an international conjecture of complexity and uncertainty. It is a concept which acknowledges blication of the Global Strategy, where the EU recognized the need to be more pragmatic to adapt opposite direction, it is meant to complete the realist foreign policy shift that began with the pu- the in change a than rather that, argue We autonomy. strategic of concept the clarify we First, we pursuetwocontributions: conclusions, Borrell’sreach toin mandate early too is it While Strategy. Global the implement to cond examining the logic that have led Borrell to make strategic autonomy the foremost concern se- a and documents, subsequent and StrategyMogherini’s Global under resilience of elements Borrell in the last year. We divide the policy paper in two sections: a firstby where we dissectwritten the key essays and reports latest EU of sample a analyse as well as publications, academic recent key with engage EU-LISTCO, at done research previous on build We South. and East the Mogherini and anticipate whether it may have implications on the aim to strengthen resilience to by up set vision the from away move a represents Strategy Global the implementing of process the in autonomy strategic on emphasis increasing the whether assess we paper policy this In -4- global implications(EEAS2016:29): 2020). The neighbourhood seemed unstable and conflicts like Syria and Libya had local, regional and (Tocciunion the outside and inside both norms EU’sand with valuesdemocratic unease and liberal growing the as much as countries, neighbouring of fragility and violence instability, the of result the was explains, Tocci Nathalie complexity, of perception This 13). 2016: (EEAS world’ complex and contested connected, more difficult, this ‘navigate to designed carefully was Strategy Global The GLOBAL STRATEGY IDEA OF RESILIENCE SETUPINTHE 1. ‘PRINCIPLED PRAGMATISM’ ANDTHE mounting, while climate change causes further disruption”(EEAS2016: 7). mounting, whileclimatechange causesfurther are Asia in tensions security Africa, of parts in demography outpace to yet Economic is growthitself. Europe as well as East, Middle the and Africa North vi- plague and olence terrorism while violated, been has order security European the east, the “To - Pol Bargués . From ‘Resilience’ to Strategic Autonomy: A Shift in the Implementation of the Global Strategy? - - -5- - - – The approach to foster resilience to the east and south provided the east and south provided to resilience foster to The approach – diate crisis of displaced people, while development cooperation addresses the ger-term lon root causes of poverty, further complemented by actions for job mitigation” (EEAS 2017: 15). education, health and climate access to creation, “different instruments, including CSDP missions, complement each other in bolstering the resilience of local states and societies. Humanitarian aid helps tackle the imme Long-term, sustained action a common compass and shared language to different policy communities that had un- traditionally derstood their work as separated and ruled by specific institutional logics 2020). (Tocci Resilience would bridge all discrepancies: under the same umbrella of fostering resilience to fragile societies, those to tasks their link would fixes long-term with concerned agents peacebuilding or development working for more immediate security logics. Resilience was bring a all to together policy framework external up’ ‘joined a towards step a represented and institutions and actors communities, policy EU action (EEAS 2017:49). The idea of achieving internal cohesion in different policy sectors has been key to involve multiple actors and use all instruments at disposal to tackle all phases and dimensions of conflicts and cri ses (Bargués et al. The 2020). interdependence and complexity of conflicts and crises were seen to require sustained engagements to tackle root causes and address unpredictable, non-linear effects in the future. Resilience As puts to the it, there Joint Approach Communication is on ‘the a Strategic need to move away from crisis containment to a more structural, long-term, non-linear approach to vulnerabilities, with an emphasis on anticipation, prevention and preparedness’ (EC & HR/VP 2017: in consists which resilience’, to approach ‘multifaceted a to referred similarly Strategy Global The 2). EU’s The action. resourceful and sustained a through areas policy many in societies fragile assisting complex intervention in the Sahel region, where diverse tools have been complementarily deployed, practice: into shows how these ideas translate Moreover, the Global Strategy was conceived in a very convoluted moment, as it was published only published was it as moment, convoluted very a in conceived was Strategy Global the Moreover, a week after the Brexit referendum and a few months before Trump won the elections in (Larik 2018). and antiglobalism of Euroscepticism the trends which reinforced the US, In response to a world in disarray, the EU external ‘idealistic an as action well as environment’ pivoted strategic the of assessment around ‘realistic a combining the pragmatism’, vision of ‘principled a become to aspirations the from cry far A 16). 13, 2016: (EEAS world’ better a advance to aspiration Global the 2000s, early the in expressed as values, export could liberal that power normative leading Morillas and (Barbé methods its in cooperative more and aims its in modest more appeared Strategy 2019; Morillas 2019). A key to advance in this ‘principled and pragmatic’ direction was the idea of resilience, which was defined as ‘the ability of statesto and reform, societies thus withstanding and crises’ (EEAS 2016: 23). internal and external from recovering Although resilience already appeared in the 2012 Commission Communication on and the Resilience food Action Plan 2013-2020, it developed more consistently security in the EU Global Strategy Notwithstanding (2017). Resilience’ to Approach Strategic a on Communication ‘Joint the and (2016) EU within even and states member EU different among interpretations of variety a has resilience that interven- ‘top-down’ and ‘quick-fix’ from away move a represents it 2018), (Joseph documents policy tions of statebuilding and democracy promotion (Börzel and Risse Therefore, 2018). a resilience-in formed foreign policy has built upon two axis that reinforce each other: axis that reinforce formed foreign policy has built upon two (1) EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series. 09. February 2021 on the topic, resilience becomes, in practice, a new “constructive ambiguity” in EU foreign policy; that report found out: ‘there is a risk that, in spite of the framework documents adopted by EU institutions to agree that resilience is too vague to mobilize coherent and efficient action. As another EU-LISTCO strategic to foster resilience in the neighbourhood (Biscop 2020). Academics and policymakers tend more and faster be EU’sto the need that responses perception growing a is there years, past the In much moremodestandreactivepath(JosephJuncos 2019). a instead taking affairs, global influence and lead to capacity the lost gradually has action external EU the Mogherini under that suggested have critics 2016, in agreement Paris the of ratification the in or 2015 in agreement the reach to P5+1 the and Iran between negotiations the in role prominent Mogherini’s2013, in relations tothe normalize a had exuberant.she less Although as seen is record nuclear programme in 2013, and mediating between Serbia and Kosovo who reached an agreement Ashton, who could boast about creating the EEAS in 2010, leading the negotiations to freeze Iran’s Catherine or 2008; in war Russo-Georgian mediatorthe peace during a as acting or Macedonia, and glory for ending the Balkan wars and conducing complex statebuilding processes in Kosovo, Bosnia 2019 with no grandiloquent successes. Unlike her predecessors, Javier Solana, who could Novemberclaim the in ended term her However, 16–18). 2016: (EEAS resilience foster to way (bottom-up) pled and pragmatic at the same time, experimenting with a with experimenting time, same the at pragmatic and pled princi was that policy foreign a constructed Mogherini world, complex and connected a in sum, In Diplomacy forPeacein April2019. and Multilateralism of Day International first the in (2019) Mogherini asserted multilateralism’, ue to be a principled, reliable, consistent and cooperative global player, a point of reference for she pursued and partnerships collective answers, making multilateralism central: ‘We will contin- visibility and voice of the EU. Rather than seeking to enforce European norms and values abroad, international developments, she also made constant statements and declarations to increase the with other countries and regions. Reacting topolicies and actions and strengthen partnerships she travelled on numerous occasions to Africa, Asia, and Latin America to communicate the EU’s tration, Mogheriniunderstood thattheEUhadto bepresentabroad. Morethanherpredecessors, Trumpadminis- the under US the of isolationism the tocontrast sharp In solutions. multi-lateral towards work to world the of regions the all and EU the between connectivity emphasized and EU’sabroad the visibility increased Mogherini diplomacy, multi-level of brand new this to Linked resentatives from Iraq and its immediate neighbours: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait. rep- society civil together bring that workshops multilateral and bilateral of series a through logues IntegrationRegional promotesand Asia’ Dialogue West Enhancing multi-levelin Neighbours: dia its and ‘Iraq project the Similarly, Syria. on talks Geneva UN the support to 2017 since organized been include the annual Brussels conferences on ‘Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region’ that have initiatives remarkable 2018), Juncos and process(Ejdus the torsresilience building lead and of own scholars have pointed out that the EU has failed to enact a truly bottom-up approach, where local ac- answers to local, regional, and global affairs (Göldner-Ebenthal and Dudouet 2017). Although critical il society groups and the private sector, to share their experiences and views in pursuit of collective 2016: 29). The idea is to bring together international and national policymakers, as well as diverse civ to (EEAS cooperateactors different where approach ‘multi-level’approach a pursues EU the reform, governanceelite-driven an pursuing merely or resilience of idea external an imposing of instead spond to the recognition that local actors need to own and lead crises recovery plans. Therefore, re- strategies Bottom-up crises. addressing of ways cooperative include and ‘bottom-up’ are that (2) -6- Bottom-up and cooperative action cooperative and Bottom-up – The approach to foster resilience consists of interventions sustained sustained (long-term) and (long-term) cooperative - - -

Pol Bargués . From ‘Resilience’ to Strategic Autonomy: A Shift in the Implementation of the Global Strategy? -7- The EU in a Changing anniversary of EEAS – that had as a title of anniversary th “We now live in an even more contested world than we did only a few years ago. Con- testation is playing out in the strategic, economic and political spheres. Strategically, non-proliferation and arms control are at risk. Economically, trade tensions and tech- nological polarisation threaten both to damage the global recovery after the 2008-9 financial crisis, andto make it harderto manage security issues.Politically, we have seen the some of emergence which of different openly political contest narratives, the values underpinning liberal democracies worldwide, and those of the (EEAS 2019: 8). EU itself” and brought into conversation Solana, Mogherini and Borrell – Solana also criticized Mogheri- criticized also – Solana Borrell and Mogherini Solana, conversation into brought and ni for having lost influence in the world stage. ‘We started with much less infrastructure than the one the than infrastructure less much startedwith ‘We stage. world the in influence lost having for ni that Federica [Mogherini] had or Pepe [Josep] Borrell has today. I think we had less power but had more influence; probably today the HR has more power, more people at its disposal … but I dare to claimed. he say we had more influence’, In addition to the demands of greater concretion and strategy, there is the observation that the security situation has deteriorated. In 2019, the report assessing the implementation a gloomy forecast: issued Strategy of the Global conflict and as instability react, action external the EU did How worse still. got the situation 2020, In complexified? pandemic Covid-19 intensified, and a world affected by the Josep Borrell started his mandate in December 2019 and in the early months sought to implement the Global Strategy, following the steps of Mogherini through the pursue of sustained and actions. cooperative In one of his first appearances as and HR/VP, focusing on strengthening resilience at the COP25 in Madrid, Borrell linked climate change to ‘multifaceted’ problems such as social jus- ‘do[ing] to committed and action’ ‘collective for need the underlined he pressures; migratory and tice everything at my disposal to reinforce our impact and generate truly global cooperation on climate (Borrell 2019). action’ In January and February 2020, before Europe became a Covid-19 hotspot, Borrell visited Belgrade and Pristina to reinvigorate the dialogue to normalize the relations between the two; and then also ease the preserveand help to the deal to consecutively, and Washington, Teheran both to travelled Qassem General Guard Revolutionary Iranian the killed strike military US a when generated tensions Soleimani in Iraq. Like Mogherini, he also developed and strengthened the partnerships with Africa, 2. BUILDING STRATEGIC AUTONOMY TO TO AUTONOMY STRATEGIC 2. BUILDING STRATEGY? THE GLOBAL REVITALIZE is, a malleable and concept vague that each member state re-articulates based its own preferences coordination greater for push academics that reason, this for is It 2020). al. et (Cadier objectives’ and to enable action: ‘Fostering resilience consequently requires a preliminary “resilience audit” in order to better understand existing strengths and weaknesses in each state, region and policy area. The equipped is it if strategies targeted develop and instruments and objectives its fine-tune only can EU the in that telling was It 93). 2017: Popescu and (Gaub importantsuch with knowledge’ focused and webinar commemorating the 10 World EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series. 09. February 2021 security actor (Sweeney andWinn2020). internationalan tobecome EU the strategicautonomyof the boost instruments these coupling), NATO’sas EU’s(such constraintsof de- political critique apparent by or haunted scepticism and embryonic still is instruments these of implementation the Although universities. and nisations orga- international administrations, national centres, research enterprises, by technologies and fence Fund (EDF) that uses EU budget to finance research and development of defence products in December2017.Also, theEuropean Commission haspromoted thecreation theEuropean De- Review on Defence (CARD) in November 2016 or the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) operationalized new instruments to deepen defence cooperation such as the Coordinated Annual has Council EU The Strategy. Global the of implementation and developments subsequent the in importance graduallygained has strategicautonomy then, Since 19). 2016: (EEAS borders’ its beyond and within security safeguard Europe’sand for peace foster toimportant ability is nomy self-sufficient and obtain peace and security: ‘An appropriate level of ambition and strategic auto- from NATO. It was mentioned only in passing in the Global Strategy, as for important the EU to be lance in the past decade, generally in relation to the need to build a defence industry independent par- European in significance greater acquired gradually has autonomystrategic of concept The times ofincreasingcomplexityandmultipolarcontestation. vigorating the idea of ‘strategic autonomy’ to unite and develop capacity to act alone, if necessary, in rein Borrell’sis how doctrine suggest to seek we Rather, around. Strategy Global the turned swiftly as we hoped it would be’ (Borrell 2020a). The point highlighted in this section is not that Borrell has by raw power politics. We Europeans must adjust our mental maps to deal with the world as it is, not ne the urgency with which the European Union must find its way in a world increasingly characterized need for a further pragmatic, realist turn. ‘The geopolitical upheavals we are witnessing today underli This perception of complexity and the return of geopolitical tensions has led Borrell to emphasize the deep-seated. Asheargues: is crisis the Borrell for 2020), (Stiglitz many for hope of beacon a was December in vaccine the of scop 2020). Even if the victory of Joe Biden in the US elections and the beginning of the distribution of conflict-affected societies like societies conflict-affected of rivalry between the US and China, the widening of social and economic inequalities or the disruption that jeopardized thestrategy thatMogherini had envisioned, such asthespiralling of great power However, in 2020, the pandemic of Covid-19 triggered dangerous dissociate from Trump’s anti-globalism:‘weneedto makemultilateralism greatagain’. EU’sup sum half-ironic,that the half-adventurous words are His EU. the towillingness and ambition blog titled ‘A window on the world’ to be visible elsewhere and communicate a common narrative of a in weekly almost wrote and imposed were pandemic the to due travelwith restrictions when world the connected kept He migration. and security to change climate and trade from – areas policy key of variety a in cooperation promoting always Asia, Central and Caribbean, the & America Latin -8- 2020c). (Borrell difficult” more ever resolution their makes implicitly problems,which of plexity com increasing or Turkey;the Russia and China, as such actors with all above eignty, sover - national of return the actors; of multiplication the crisis: this for reasons three Donald Trump. of Which means that election it will the probably not end with up with recently that of Joe just Biden. I see start mainly not did multilateralism of crisis “[The] Libya, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen (Bargués 2020; Bi 2020; (Bargués Yemen and Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, South Libya, dynamics in international relations - - - - Pol Bargués . From ‘Resilience’ to Strategic Autonomy: A Shift in the Implementation of the Global Strategy? - - - -9- “It is crucial for discussion the expand to strategic-autonomy far beyond the issues such issues shown, has crisis disease coronavirus the As security. and defense of as public health and economic interdependence are no less important…interdependen- of nature asymmetrical fundamentally the revealed The has crisis vid-19 Co- are investments data, trade, technology, Science, Europe. of vulnerability the and ce, 2020b). (Borrell politics” international in force of instruments and sources becoming “Strategic autonomy is the conceptual framework that Europe needs to understand these issues and how they relate to one Viewed another. in isolation, face masks and - pro the when changes calculus strategic the But products. strategic not are medicines duction of such items in is just concentrated a The few same countries. applies the to sourcing of rare metals, social media and other digital platforms, and such as 5G” (Borrell 2020b). technologies For Borrell, ‘the weight of Europe in the world is shrinking’ and the interconnectedness of the world’s the world’s of the interconnectedness and shrinking’ is the world in Europe ‘the weight of Borrell, For (Borrell 2020d). A vulnerabilities degree opens opportunitiesproblems as well as discloses Europe’s in all areas is thus desirable: of autonomy The key question for this policy paper is whether the centrality of strategic autonomy in the imple - sho Strategy Global the While level. next the to autonomy strategic take to determined is Borrell Yet, thinks Borrell autonomy’, strategic and ambition of level ‘appropriate an demanding calculation, wed the more generally autonomy While the the better. concept usually refers to increasing capability in defence matters, he has widened its meaning to encompass all policy fields (Borrell 2020b). Again, be the pandemic: the trigger seems to mentation of the Global Strategy may contradict the direction of resilience taken by Mogherini in the in Mogherini by taken resilience of direction the contradict may Strategy Global the of mentation genesis of the Strategy. The idea expressed by Borrell, that ‘the Union must learn quickly to speak the language of power’, is often criticized by commentators, as a deviation from an external action dominated by norms and principles (Weiler 2020). An insistence on achieving autonomy could pos- sibly imply an inward-looking move to cut off global interconnections and dependencies, while also see not does Borrell Yet, initiatives. multi-lateral multi-level, and sustained embrace to reluctant being strategic autonomy as contradictory with building resilience. We interpret it as a double movement decisi abroad intervene to outward then and coherence, and capacity build to inward, looking first of sustain interventions and partnerships.vely, being able to avoid and sectors policy all in autonomy strategic acquire to step first the seems, it so or Borrell, For between cooperation and cohesion greater for inward, looking is affairs world in others on depending member states. While all High Representatives have perceived the division of Member States as a burden to undertake efficient andrapid action,the growing internal contestation and politicisation has turmoil, and instability of conjecture international current the to adds which policy, foreign EU of made the building of a joined external action a foremost priority (Barbé and Morillas 2019; see also, argues that EU most This is one of the reasons why Borrell reiteratively Cadier and Lequesne 2020). foreign policy actions ought to be decided by qualified majority,rather than unanimously by all its members. He also stresses the need to work on a gradual alignment of the variety of perspectives that Euro its and world the see they how on agree Europeans more ‘The relations: international on have peans EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series. 09. February 2021 occupied: autonomy is becoming the distant horizon to be longed for, which will keep EU foreign policymakers act together now, we will become irrelevant as many have argued cogently’ (Borrell 2020d). Strategic internal coherence, build capacity, and take action in ALS and CO. further my to nurture ‘If wedo not autono strategic on insists Borrell 2020), Flockhart (Korostelevaand irrelevance and vagueness of critiques the to response In weaknesses. apparent its correcting by partners) with way cooperative (the quest for a framework to coordinate all actors and policy fields and intervene in a sustained and ‘resilience’with attempted Mogherini what reenergize to seeks Borrell time, same the at both doing Euroscepticism.abroaddefy drawacting will and as togetherEU In much the as action, external ble capa- more tolead a will policy foreign on reciprocally.views other states’ member of cohesion The – policy foreign in strategically act The two moves taken by Borrell to develop strategic autonomy – a quest for internal cohesion to then possible’ andacting‘alonewhennecessary’(Borrell2020e). the EU must be autonomous to be able to find a balance between cooperating ‘with others whenever antagonism, and contestation increasing with world complex a in that acknowledges Borrell short, gy’sIn 2020). (EEAS development,resilience, capability management, crisispartnerships vision: and Strate- Global the further that clusters four in action enable and priorities concrete define to meant and openness’ (Borrell 2020b). Indeed, the threat scanning that will lead to the Strategic Compass is multilateralism to commitments our preserving and alliances our strengthening time same the at interventions will be unilateral. On EU’sthe contrary: acquired, ‘The EU needs is to autonomy achieve this once kind of autonomy,that while imply not does he importantly, Also, 2020b). 2020e; (Borrell duty of neglect ‘complacency’, is autonomy strategic of opposite the it, puts he As affairs. global in engaging constantly outdoors: great the into step must EU the rest, the from isolating from Far na. strategicning autonomy sectorspolicy all withdrawalin a imply not does from international are- the deepe- Borrell, For action. taking to commitment a is autonomy strategic build to step second The in 2022(EEAS2020). states member by adopted when defence Europeaninto coherence provide will Compass Strategic Drawing on an intelligence analysis of the full range of threats and challenges the EU faces, the standing isvitalto manageforeigncrisessuccessfully. under- cohered This 2020e). (Borrell them’ about do to what on agree will they more the problems, -10- to guarantee ourfuture”(Borrell2020d). and values in an increasingly world, harsh a world that obliges us to rely on ourselves ensure that Europeans increasingly take charge of themselves. To defend our interests to intended one, long-term a process, a but wand magic a not is autonomy “Strategic (Borrell 2020b). nalization and response. That is why we are now developing a Strategic Compass” analyzing threats, so that it can move quickly from threat assessment to operatio andmonitoringstability. framework forTo own its develop Europemust succeed, regional maintaining of interest the in act can it which from position common a define to is EU the for task The response. European strong a demand that crises of shortage no is there Mediterranean, eastern the to Libya and Sahel the “From should not be understood sequentially; the two feed into each into feed two the sequentially; understood be not should - - Pol Bargués . From ‘Resilience’ to Strategic Autonomy: A Shift in the Implementation of the Global Strategy? - - -11- growing strong internally to act constructively in constructively act to internally strong growing “We will engage in a practical and principled way, sharing global responsibilities with responsibilities global way, sharing principled and a practical engage in “We will our partners and contributing to their strengths. We have learnt the lesson: my neigh- bour’s and my partner’s weaknesses are my own weaknesses. So we win-win will solutions, invest and in move beyond the illusion that international politics can game” (EEAS 2016: 4). zero-sum be a Strategic autonomy Strategic seems to be emerging as the key concept to the operationalize Global Strategy in a (post-)Covid world. It permeates through all policy sectors, not only defence and security, and seems apt to build greater coherence and capacity for action. In this sense, it seeks to overcome the shortcomings identified in the ‘principled and pragmatic’ vision of the Globalresilience Strategy,appeared as too vague and elusive for where policymakers (Cadier et al. 2020). As it is currently – move double a forth bringing in therefore, framed, - pragmat and ‘principled the sublimate to useful be may autonomy strategic greater – policy foreign here with grapple to seek we that direction unforeseen the However, Strategy. Global the of vision ic’ the on conclusions reach to early too is it While considered. be to ought that risks some in brings also direction taken by the current external action service, we raise two points to open a discussion that EU policymakers as well as academic debates beyond EU-LISTCO. may be useful to The first hasto do with the shrinking capacity that the EU hasto deliver on what it promises. The Covid-19 crisis has revealed a high degree of interdependency most European policy sectors have states member force may and perspectives nationalist fuelled has crisis the countries; external with to relegate European integration on security and defence to the So, back becoming burner. autono CONCLUSION - irrelevan of accusations the correct and strong grow to objective daring a seems strategically mous reality and expectations the gap between close how to on the debate reopens it yet past, the of cy (Rieker and Blockmans 2019). While external crisis-response capacities have increased since the - (2009) and the expectations diminished with the realistic outlook of the Global Strate Treaty Lisbon capacity-building greater to stimulus a be this Will again. widens gap the expectations, higher with gy, another phase of utter disappointment and Euroscepticism? to or instead lead and integration Secondly, strategic autonomy implies finding a balance between ‘cooperating others with All policy. foreign EU in balance whenever fragile a generally is this but necessary’, when alone acting and possible society of whole a than (rather elites with negotiate or alone act to tempted then be may EU the often too This others. with cooperating of ways finding over Europe of protection the to priority give and approach) bias may definitely become a departure from the ideal of resilience as transformation that EU-LISTCO aspires to (see, further, Börzel, Risse and Stollenwerk 2021). It even seems to represent contradicting a while move Mogherini, away by promoted as way, constructive a in resilience fostering of idea the from Strategy: in the Global learnt and pronounced lessons the central of one imply may strategic being For autonomy. strategic building in involved risks the of think to timely is It to withdraw connectivity, break relations and partnerships, rather than creating new and sustaining or even intensifying existing partnerships.This may also furthergenerate reaction and contestation developing be may EU the that is line bottom The powers. great other among or neighbourhood the in a pragmatism without principles and finally lose its distinctiveness as a normative actor in interna as Europeans on depend will the EU suits a path that is Whether this 2020). (Biscop relations tional much as on an increasingly interdependent world. EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series. 09. February 2021 Covid World. 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Tocci, European Journal of International Law ABOUT EU-LISTCO RESEARCH

EU-LISTCO investigates the challenges posed to European foreign policy by identifying risks connected to areas of limited statehood and contested orders. Through the analysis of the EU Global Strategy and Europe’s foreign policy instruments, the project assesses how the preparedness of the EU and its member states can be strengthened to better anticipate, prevent and respond to threats of governance breakdown and to foster resilience in Europe’s neighbourhoods. Continuous knowledge exchange between researchers and foreign policy practitioners is at the cornerstone of EU-LISTCO. Since the project’s inception, a consortium of fourteen leading universities and think tanks have been working together to develop policy recommendations for the EU’s external action toolbox, in close coordination with European decision-makers. The EU-LISTCO Policy Papers are peer-reviewed research papers based on findings from the project.

This publication is part of a project that has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under grant agreement no. 769866. It reflects only the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. This paper is reusable under a creative commons license ShareAlike under attribution (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0) details of which can be found at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/.

ISSN: 2604-6237 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4548133

Edited by the Project: Europe’s External Action and the Dual Challenges of Limited Statehood and Contested Orders (EU-LISTCO) EU-LISTCO Policy Papers are available on the EU-LISTCO website: https://www.eu-listco.net/ EU-LISTCO Policy Papers are also available at https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/24657

Editorial coordination: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)

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This publication has been funded by the European Union under the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 769886.