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Six Months on Brexit: Six Months On

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Six Months on Brexit: Six Months On Brexit: Six months on Brexit: Six months on 1. Six months on: where are we now? Anand Menon 2. Public opinion John Curtice 3. The politics of Brexit Anand Menon 4. Electoral dynamics Matthew Goodwin 5. UK government Simon Usherwood 6. The rest of the EU Sara Hagemann 7. The law Catherine Barnard 8. The nations and regions Jo Hunt and Michael Keating 9. Foreign, security and defence policy Richard G Whitman 10. Immigration and free movement Jonathan Portes 11. The EU budget and public finances Iain Begg 12. The economy Iain Begg and Jonathan Portes 13. The UK-EU trade relationship Angus Armstrong Hyperlinks to cited material can be found online via www.UKandEU.ac.uk Brexit: Six months on Six months on: where are we now? By Anand Menon Yet for all the chatter, six months on it is striking that we seem little closer to knowing what Brexit actually means. ‘Brexit means Brexit’, declared the Prime Minister immediately after Indeed, chatter is pretty much all that has occurred since that fateful day in June. While the media are full of taking over the leadership of her party and the country. The British Brexit stories, these are, of necessity, speculative. Everyone knows that something big is going to happen. The people had just voted by a small but significant majority to leave the problem is, we can’t be sure of what it will look like until it does. European Union. Six months on, it’s time to take stock. Nevertheless, it seemed apposite, after these first six months, to cast an eye more systematically over what has It has become steadily clearer that ‘Brexit’ could in fact mean a whole transpired. To that end, we have looked at a number of areas of relevance to the Brexit process, to see just where number of things, at least in terms of the UK’s future relationship with we have got to. the EU’s single market, customs union and policies in many areas. Take your pick between soft Brexit, hard Brexit, white Brexit, black We open our report with John Curtice’s analysis of post-referendum public opinion, which suggests that the Brexit, grey Brexit, red, white and blue Brexit, clean Brexit, dirty Brexit, country is as divided as it was six months ago. I argue that the logic of post-referendum politics is nevertheless stupid Brexit, smart Brexit or dog’s Brexit. for a ‘hard Brexit’ and that Brexit forms part of a potentially broader shift in the UK political landscape. Matthew Goodwin pursues this further, showing how Brexit is exposing and exacerbating potentially fatal strains in, The roots of this confusion can be traced back to the referendum especially, Labour’s traditional electoral coalition. Meanwhile, Simon Usherwood identifies the ‘massive shock campaign, when both process and substance conspired against clarity. and apparent inertia’ characterising the UK Government in its preparations for the Brexit negotiations, as it As Simon Usherwood argues in this report, the decision by the then struggles with internal reorganisation and difficult politics at home and in the EU. Sara Hagemann confirms that government to forbid the civil service from carrying out any planning opinion towards the UK has hardened in other member states since the referendum, to the extent that the EU27 for a possible ‘Leave’ outcome has limited our understanding of what appear to have achieved a rare degree of unity. Brexit might entail. There was, in any case, no way of finding out the possible outcome of UK-EU exit negotiations until after a vote to leave. Catherine Barnard argues that the legal framework for the Article 50 negotiations also poses severe challenges for the UK, because of the two-year timeframe it allows, and because it excludes negotiation of any long-term Moreover, people voted in June for the idea of Brexit, with no choice agreement. Meanwhile, the Great Repeal Bill promised for 2017 is set to be another apparent legal formality that over those who might put it into practice. Those who campaigned for will raise challenging questions across a whole raft of policy areas. As Michael Keating and Jo Hunt show in their ‘Leave’ were in no position to deliver, being either outside government, contribution, the signs so far are that both the Great Repeal Bill and the Brexit negotiations could severely strain or unable to guarantee their future position within it. The ‘Leave’ the UK’s current devolution settlement. campaign, therefore, was in no position to implement whatever programme it had laid out. Richard Whitman suggests that UK-EU negotiations over a future foreign, security and defence policy relationship could be relatively straightforward, although the challenge remains for the Government of defining the place of Which brings us to the second problem. There was no clear programme. future relations with the EU in the UK’s wider international relations. By contrast, Jonathan Portes and Iain Begg Indeed, the ‘Leave’ side was profoundly divided along a spectrum suggest that, with regard to free movement/immigration policy and the EU budget, respectively, negotiations ranging from those interested in significantly reducing migration are likely to be extremely difficult. and those who see Britain’s future as being more - rather than less - internationalist and are far less concerned with pulling up the national Iain Begg’s piece also highlights that the impact on the UK public finances of the UK-EU budget settlement will drawbridge. be dwarfed by that of the macroeconomic effects of Brexit. In a further contribution, he and Jonathan Portes In other words, as Jonathan Portes pointed out even before the set out how the UK economy has not suffered anything like the shock from the vote that most observers had referendum, three outcomes were squeezed into the binary container expected. However, they argue that the economy’s current performance may not be sustainable, and that the that was the ballot paper. ‘Remain’ was arguably clear enough; but macroeconomic effects of Brexit will anyway mostly be felt over the medium to long term. These effects will ‘Leave’ encapsulated at least two options – what we now know as ‘soft’ depend in part on the UK’s future relationship with the EU, specifically with the single market and customs and ‘hard’ Brexit. Briefly put, the softest conceivable Brexit involves union. Concurring with my analysis, Angus Armstrong suggests the indications so far are that the UK is unlikely continued membership of the single market (the ‘Norway model’), to be in either – that is, that Brexit is likely to be ‘hard’, although how hard remains to be determined. while hard Brexit implies no agreement with the EU on future trading All in all, six months on, we do know more about where the UK Government may try to take us. Many key issues, relations (the ‘WTO model’). however, remain stubbornly unaddressed or unresolved. And as for where our partners will allow us to go, this It is no surprise, then, that recent weeks have seen a lively debate as to is something we will only know once we have pushed the Article 50 button. the outcome the Government should seek. Talk has resurfaced of the As ever, I’d like to thank all those colleagues who contributed to this report, and more broadly to our work over Norwegian, Canadian and Swiss (though not, as yet, Albanian) models this year. Ben Miller was, as always, key to this publication’s timely appearance. Particular thanks to Brigid which figured so prominently during the campaign. Meanwhile, as Sara Fowler who went far beyond the call of duty to bash this report into shape. Hagemann argues here, statements from the UK’s European partners have set out the limits of what they are willing to contemplate. Finally, let me take this opportunity to wish you all a merry and Brexity festive season. Page 4 Page 5 Brexit: Six months on Public 0pinion By John Curtice What has happened? Britain’s voters did not just surprise many commentators on 23 June – No two polls on this issue, even when conducted by the same firm, have used the same wording. For example, they also surprised themselves. In polls conducted on referendum day the poll that found the lowest proportion of respondents prioritising access to the single market, by Lord Ashcroft itself, Lord Ashcroft found 70% reckoning that ‘Remain’ would win, in July, asked people to assess ‘securing access to the EU single market at all costs’ against ‘being able to control and YouGov 52% (with only 19% expecting a ‘Leave’ victory). immigration’. The poll that found the highest, by ComRes also in July, set ‘maintaining access to the single market So far, however, neither shock at the ‘Leave’ result nor the ensuing, so Britain can have free trade with the EU’ against ‘restricting the freedom of movement’. It does not require fierce, debate seem to have done much to cause voters to change much imagination to anticipate that ‘being able to control immigration’ sounds more attractive than ‘restricting their minds. In regular YouGov polling since the referendum on the freedom of movement’, and ‘maintaining access…to have free trade’ more attractive than ‘securing access… whether Britain was right or wrong to leave, almost 90% of ‘Remain’ at all costs’. voters typically say that the decision was wrong, and almost 90% of Such apparent confusion and sensitivity to wording makes it hard to assess exactly where public opinion stands their ‘Leave’ counterparts that it was right. By definition, therefore, on the issue. It certainly suggests that much will depend on how it comes to be framed, should the UK indeed on most occasions slightly more people overall have said that the find itself faced with a stark choice.
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