IAI COMMENTARIES 19 | 09 - FEBRUARY 2019 ISSN 2532-6570 © 2019 IAI 1 Nicola Bilotta isJunior Researcher at theIstituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). ultimatum: call democratic elections officially threatened Maduro with an Spain, theUK, andGermany – a number of EUcountries –including of action topursue. First, on 26January, states were again divided on the course Against this backdrop, EUmember transition of power. a returntodemocratic elections anda moderate approach, calling insteadfor Maduro government or adopt a more increase international pressureon the a dilemma: backtheUSstrategy and confronted the with The succession of events has countries. Canada andmany South American recognition of Guaidó bytheUS, stand, particularly inlight of the quick forced international actors to take a Venezuela’s institutional chaoshas Maduro’s authoritarian power. country’s crisis,threatening Nicolas on 23 January has exacerbated the as interim president of Venezuela Juan Guaidó’s self-proclamation by Nicola Bilotta the EUCommon Approach Venezuela’s Crisis: Clasheswith 31 January, with justfour days left in Guaidó’s interim presidency. within eight days or wewill recognize February 2019, February Venezuela’s Guaido”, in Recognizing 2 america-47014322 2019, in Leaders”, European by 1 country. return todemocratic elections inthe the issuing of a statement calling for a supporting Guaidó, leading insteadto reportedly blocked a joint EU statement It wasinthismeeting that Italy Venezuela. Assembly, as interim president of of theopposition controlled National officially recognizingGuaidó, thehead and credible elections, but fell short of an official statement demandingfree response. Themeetingresulted in informally discussaunited European foreign ministers met in Bucharest to the ultimatum, the EU’s twenty-eight

“Venezuela Crisis: Maduro Given Ultimatum Ultimatum Given Maduro Crisis: “Venezuela “Divided Italy Blocks EU Statements on Statements EU Italy Blocks “Divided https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin- 2 https://reut.rs/2GnY0hN . BBC News BBC 1 , 26 January January , 26 Then, on . , 4 Venezuela’s Crisis: Italy Clashes with the EU Common Approach

At the EU level, and as recently Meanwhile, to complicate matters reminded by High Representative further, another group of countries – Federica Mogherini, EU institutions Belgium, Finland and , among do not have the authority to formally others – have acknowledged support recognize either states or institutions for Guaidó avoiding however to directly within states, as this competence recognize his interim presidency.5 lies with member states.3 As a result, Lastly, a smaller number of EU nations and in light of the differences among – including Italy, Ireland, Bulgaria,

© 2019 IAI member states, the EU instead decided Greece and Cyprus – have refused to to establish an International Contact endorse Guaidó, instead demanding a Group (ICG) on 31 January. political transition to elections.

The International Contact Group is Italy’s coalition government – composed reflective of the broad international of the right-wing League party and differences on the crisis in Venezuela. the populist anti-establishment 5 Star Membership includes the EU and Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S) eight member states such as Italy, – has announced Italy’s “neutrality” ISSN 2532-6570 , France and the UK, flanked on the crisis in Venezuela, refusing to by further Latin American countries, recognize either side or to be seen as including Bolivia, Ecuador, Costa Rica intervening in the internal affairs of a and Uruguay, which hosted its first ICG state.6 While the governing coalition is meeting on 7 February. In this respect itself divided on the stance to take vis- the ICG contains the full spectrum à-vis Venezuela, on this occasion it was of views on the crisis and is aimed at the M5S party which came out on top, facilitating dialogue to favour a political directing the Italian foreign ministry transition to democratic elections with to refuse any unilateral recognition a 90-day mandate.4 of Guaidó and to block a united EU statement to that effect in the 31 January Yet, on 4 February, when the eight-day meeting of EU foreign ministers. ultimatum officially expired, the bloc of biggest European states – Germany, Matteo Salvini, head of the League France, Spain and the UK, among party and Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister others – formally recognized Guaidó, and Minister of the Interior, had implicitly undermining the mediation instead strongly come out in favour of efforts of the international Contact the 31 January ultimatum, demanding Group of which they themselves were that Italy recognize Guaidó’s interim members.

5 David M. Herszenhorn, “Venezuela’s Chaos 3 European External Action Service (EEAS), Exposes EU Disarray on Foreign Policy”, in Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Politico, 4 February 2019, https://www.politico. Federica Mogherini at the Press Conference eu/article/venezuela-president-inf-treaty- Following the First Day of Informal Meeting of chaos-exposes-eu-disarray-on-foreign-policy- the EU Foreign Affairs Ministers, Bucharest, 31 federica-mogherini. January 2019, https://europa.eu/!Hw49Kp. 6 “Divided Italy Blocks EU Statements on 4 Ibid. Recognizing Venezuela’s Guaido”, cit. IAI COMMENTARIES 19 | 09 - FEBRUARY 2019 19 | 09 - FEBRUARY IAI COMMENTARIES

2 Venezuela’s Crisis: Italy Clashes with the EU Common Approach

presidency.7 The League’s approach instead encouraging plans for towards the crisis in Venezuela was democratic elections and a political predictable. While it does not align with transition.10 ’s stance and is rather supportive of the EU position, Salvini holds an Meanwhile, Italian Prime Minister ideological hostility towards Maduro’s Giuseppe Conte has tried to find a “socialist” government which plays a middle way between the two stances key role in explaining his orientation, of Italy’s governing coalition parties. In

© 2019 IAI as does Salvini’s vicinity to the US this he has renewed calls for a credible Trump administration. transition of power while warning against the negative fallout from In contrast, the M5S has openly foreign interferences in Venezuela. refused to support Maduro’s Nevertheless, this stance has not opponent. Alessandro Di Battista, a satisfied many, particularly within charismatic member of the Italian Europe, where Italy is already suffering anti-establishment party who has from an increased isolation. recently returned from a prolonged ISSN 2532-6570 stay in South America, announced that It was in this context that, on 4 “this government will never recognize February – the same day in which key people who appoint themselves European states formally recognized president”.8 The M5S has couched its Guaidó’s interim presidency –, Italy’s stance in accordance with the principle President, , issued a of non-interference in foreign affairs, rare and strongly worded statement, as argued by Manlio Di Stefano, Italy’s reprimanding Italy’s government and Undersecretary of State for Foreign demanding increased efforts by Affairs, during a recent interview on to find a common stance with the EU.11 Venezuela.9 Mattarella’s statement reflects the Italy’s M5S party maintains that perceived gravity of Italy’s growing its policy of neutrality is aimed at isolation in Europe, but is also a preventing Venezuela from descending warning about the need for clarity to into a bloody civil war or inviting overcome the current incongruences foreign interventionism, with Rome dominating Italian foreign policy.

10 Raffaele Binelli, “‘Venezuela, l’Italia non 7 “Salvini: ‘Sul Venezuela abbiamo fatto una riconosce Guaidó’. Di Stefano spiega perché”, figuraccia’”, inCorriere della Sera, 4 February 2019, in Il Giornale, 31 January 2019, http://www. https://www.corriere.it/politica/19_febbraio_04/ ilgiornale.it/node/1637279. salvini-sul-venezuela-abbiamo-fatto-figuraccia- 11 “Mattarella Calls for Venezuela Clarity”, in 23364590-28a9-11e9-a9a8-f8d43e37edc8.shtml. ANSA Politics, 4 February 2019, http://www.ansa. 8 “Divided Italy Blocks EU Statements on it/english/news/politics/2019/02/04/mattarella- Recognizing Venezuela’s Guaido”, cit. calls-for-venezuela-clarity_4276a315-d688-486f- 9 “Venezuela, Di Stefano (M5S): ‘L’Italia non 9d39-3ba8d3877459.html; Italian Presidency, riconosce Juan Guaidó’”, in TGcom24, 31 Intervento del Presidente della Repubblica Sergio January 2019, https://www.tgcom24.mediaset. Mattarella alla cerimonia di inaugurazione del it/mondo/venezuela-manlio-di-stefano-l-italia- Centro di accoglienza “Matteo Ricci”, Rome, non-riconosce-juan-guaido-_3189035-201902a. 4 February 2019, https://www.quirinale.it/ shtml. elementi/22169. IAI COMMENTARIES 19 | 09 - FEBRUARY 2019 19 | 09 - FEBRUARY IAI COMMENTARIES

3 Venezuela’s Crisis: Italy Clashes with the EU Common Approach

International and domestic pressure Foreign policy is a game of compromises on Italy has also increased following a and quid pro quo. A more careful recent interview by Venezuela’s Guaidó balancing of Italy’s multiple interests who directly called for Italy’s support. and concerns would be preferable, as Venezuelans of Italian origin are a Italy is in dire need of support from large and influential community in the external partners when it comes to country. According to official data, there key dossiers such as Italy’s economic are 160,000 registered living in recovery and growing budget deficits,

© 2019 IAI Venezuela, of which 65 per cent hold its concerns vis-à-vis Europe on the dual nationality. However, taking into migration issue and broader issues tied account descendants without Italian to Mediterranean security, including in citizenship, the number increases to the energy domain. more than one million people. One must hope that Italy’s governing Italy’s approach to Venezuela is coalition find a common approach the product of infighting within its to foreign policy. Otherwise, the two governing coalition, both of which ruling parties will risk deadlock each ISSN 2532-6570 remain stuck in a perennial electoral time a new crisis emerges on the world campaign mode, particularly in light of stage. the upcoming European elections this May. It does not reflect a reasoned and 8 February 2019 carefully thought-out foreign policy strategy.

Italian foreign policy priorities have long revolved around the three pillars of NATO and the transatlantic alliance with the US, European integration and the Mediterranean region. Seen in this light, Italy’s policy towards Venezuela’s crisis, and its public opposition to European majoritarian views and stances, could damage Italy’s credibility and further increase its international isolation.

This would not only reduce Italian leverage within the EU, but may also carry over to have implications on the other traditional pillars of Italian foreign policy, where Italy can expect increased challenges in finding support from allies and partners to defend its national interests. IAI COMMENTARIES 19 | 09 - FEBRUARY 2019 19 | 09 - FEBRUARY IAI COMMENTARIES

4 Venezuela’s Crisis: Italy Clashes with the EU Common Approach

Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) The Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) is a private, independent non-profit think tank, founded in 1965 on the initiative of . IAI seeks to promote awareness of international politics and to contribute to the advancement of European integration and multilateral cooperation. Its focus embraces topics of strategic relevance such as European integration, security and defence, international economics and global governance, energy, climate and Italian foreign policy; as well as the dynamics of cooperation and conflict in key geographical regions such as the Mediterranean and Middle East, Asia, Eurasia, Africa and © 2019 IAI the Americas. IAI publishes an English-language quarterly (The International Spectator), an online webzine (Affarinternazionali), two book series (Quaderni IAI and IAI Research Studies) and some papers’ series related to IAI research projects (Documenti IAI, IAI Papers, etc.).

Via Angelo Brunetti, 9 - I-00186 Rome, Italy T +39 06 3224360 F + 39 06 3224363 [email protected]

ISSN 2532-6570 www.iai.it

Latest IAI COMMENTARIES

Director: Andrea Dessì ([email protected])

19 | 09 Nicola Bilotta, Venezuela’s Crisis: Italy Clashes with the EU Common Approach 19 | 08 Riccardo Alcaro, Ideology, Not Russia or China, Explains US Pullout from the INF 19 | 07 Riccardo Alcaro, Crunch Time for Europe to Save the Iran Nuclear Deal 19 | 06 Nathalie Tocci, Navigating Complexity: The EU’s Rationale in the 21st Century 19 | 05 Lorenzo Colantoni, China’s Vision of an Ecological Civilisation: A Struggle for Environmental Leadership in the Era of Climate Change 19 | 04 Nicoletta Pirozzi and Matteo Bonomi, A New Idea of Europe: The Challenge of Flexibility 19 | 03 Jørgen Jensehaugen, Saudi Arabia as a Peace Peddler? The Limits of Riyadh’s Influence over Israeli–Palestinian Diplomacy 19 | 02 Ferruccio Pastore, Not So Global, Not So Compact. Reflections on the Shitstorm Surrounding the Global Compact for Migration 19 | 01 Petr Kratochvíl, A Cordon Populiste from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea: Is a New Populist Alliance Emerging in the EU? 18 | 71 Francesca Capano, Prisons and Radicalization: Breaking the Cycle through Rehabilitation IAI COMMENTARIES 19 | 09 - FEBRUARY 2019 19 | 09 - FEBRUARY IAI COMMENTARIES

5