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Death, Despair and Sex: the Problem of Evil According to Augustine As a Threefold Foundation of the Good Life

Death, Despair and Sex: the Problem of Evil According to Augustine As a Threefold Foundation of the Good Life

DEATH, DESPAIR AND SEX: THE PROBLEM OF ACCORDING TO AUGUSTINE AS A THREEFOLD FOUNDATION OF THE LIFE

MUERTE, DESESPERO Y SEXO: EL PROBLEMA DEL MAL EN AGUSTÍN COMO TRIPLE FUNDAMENTO DE LA VIDA BUENA

Schutijser De Groot, Dennis1

Recibido: 7 de noviembre de 2016 Aprobado: 20 de febrero de 2017

1 Pontifica Universidad Católica del Ecuador, Facultad de Ciencias Filosófico-Teológicas, Quito, Ecuador, ([email protected]).

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DEATH, DESPAIR AND SEX: THE PROBLEM OF EVIL ACCORDING TO AUGUSTINE AS A THREEFOLD FOUNDATION OF THE GOOD LIFE

MUERTE, DESESPERO Y SEXO: EL PROBLEMA DEL MAL EN AGUSTÍN COMO TRIPLE FUNDAMENTO DE LA VIDA BUENA

Schutijser De Groot, Dennis.

Palabras Clave: San Agustín, Mal, Buen Vivir, Felicidad, Ética

Key Words: Saint Augustine, Evil, Good Life, ,

RESUMEN

En lo general, la obra de San El presente artículo presenta las Agustín no está asociada con la filosofía interpretaciones del Agustín temprano del buen vivir tal como se la encuentra acerca del problema del mal desde tres tan caracterizada en la antigüedad. Al enfoques: una aproximación metafísica, contrario, el padre de la Iglesia se asocia una epistemológica y una ética. Des- más bien con un distanciamiento de la de cada enfoque se puede indicar la existencia terrestre y una disociación de forma y el impacto del mal, llevando a la filosofía con la pregunta ética de la una triple propuesta de la vida feliz en vida feliz. Así se pierde de vista el interés respuesta al problema del mal. Así en- fundamental de Agustín por los orígenes contramos en Agustín un filósofo aún de la pregunta por el buen vivir y la bús- integrado en la filosofía antigua del queda de la felicidad. buen vivir, con una propuesta basada,

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no en la renunciación de la vida, sino en definitivamente responder al problema una toma de posición ética que busca del mal.

ABSTRACT

Saint Augustine is not usually as- lem of evil from three different angles: sociated with the of the art a metaphysical, an epistemological, and of living that is so characteristic of antiq- finally an ethical approach. From each uity. On the contrary, as a father of the viewpoint, the form and impact of evil Church, he is rather associated with a may be indicated, subsequently leading turn away from earthly existence and a to a threefold proposal of the good life dissociation of philosophy with the eth- in reply to the problem of evil. We thus ical question of the good life. This over- find in Augustine a philosopher still inte- looks Augustine’s fundamental interest grated in the classical philosophy of the in the origins of the question for the art of living, with a proposal based, not in good life and in the search for happiness. the renunciation of life, but in an ethical This article presents the early stance that seeks to permanently count- Augustine’s interpretations of the prob- er the problem of evil.

INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS THE GOOD LIFE AND HOW DO WE ATTAIN IT?

The philosophical works of Saint thought beyond both theology and phi- Augustine allow for many interrogations losophy, i.e. neither limited to academic and enriching answers, not only towards issues such as the nature of time or mem- philosophy as such, nor exclusively to- ory, nor to the essence of God or man as wards theology. Although Augustine’s his creation, but answering to such prac- works have been explored from both tical questions as “what is the good life?”. angles beyond measure throughout his- has tory, both readings also risk limiting the experienced a true revival of this ele- richness of Augustine’s work in general, mentary and universal question of the and his contribution to contemporary good life, or Beata Vita, often tracing

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its origin back to .1 analysis of evil, offering a threefold reply And indeed, the question of the good to a threefold problem. life may be considered to have been It is worth briefly mentioning the first formulated by (Augustine, historical context in which the work is 1887-2, VIII-iii), and has remained crucial written. The conversation that lies at its throughout antiquity and the Hellenis- basis can in fact be found in the Confes- tic era.2 It would be a mistake, however, sions, when Augustine and some of his to think that with the end of Hellenistic closest friends and family members re- philosophy, the question of the good treat to a landside villa, shortly after the also ceased to be relevant, as is some- conversion described throughout the times assumed.3 Augustine himself, ha- Confessions. Augustine is witnessing the ving been confronted with Hellenistic decline of the Roman Empire and the rise thought, among which most notably of Christianity first hand. It is against that with , author of the Hortensius, Augustine experiences bachgraund his the work that had such a profound im- conversion and writes the dialogues and pact on Augustine that it can properly many other earlier works, in which he be considered a first conversion, that to will lay the basis for his entire Corpus. Al- the pursuit of knowledge4, (but also of though for the long remainder of his life, the Tusculanae Queastiones, De Officiis, his thinking will display certain shifts in and other works on happiness and mo- attention, work out consequences, even rality), carried out similar philosophical retract earlier conclusions, the ancient works as his predecessors. Most notably, heritage and the focus on the question the short dialogue De Beata Vita, dedi- of evil, his own experience, and the con- cated to that same popular topic of the sequences for his formulation of a good good life. In it, Augustine’s proposal for life are most tangible in these early years a good life is strongly determined by his after his own conversion. 1 The (re-)emergence of the topic of the good life has, incidentally, reached beyond philosophy, having even found articulation in political programs and social debates. 2 See, for example, P. Hadot, 1995 3 See for example, A. De Botton, 2000. The author’s already limited historical selection jumps from Antiquity straight to Humanist Renaissance. Hadot (1995) defends the thesis that , especially in its earliest forms, was very much concerned with formulating ideas on the good life. 4 “This book, in truth, changed my affections, and turned my prayers to Yourself, O Lord, and made me have other hopes and desires. Worthless suddenly became every vain hope to me; and, with an incredible warmth of heart, I yearned for an immortality of wisdom, and began now to arise that I might return to You.” (Augustine, 1887-1, III-iv-7)

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What then is to be Augustine’s it is to the problem of evil that we need proposal for a good life, for happiness? to seek an answer, in order to reply to the As we shall see, the existence and pro- question of the good life. For this reason, blematic urgency of the experience of it is important to first understand what evil lay the basis for his proposal. For it evil is, in order to subsequently unders- is evil, in its diverse forms, that can keep tand what “the good” of the good life us from attaining the good life, and thus could be.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

The urgency of the problem of In this mainly metaphysical dis- evil plays a central role in Augustine’s pute over the ontological nature of God early thought, reappearing throu- and evil, the logical problem appears in ghout the Confessions5, as well as more all its complexity. For, as Augustine sta- extensively in his polemical writing tes: “The highest good, than which there Concerning the Nature of Good, Against is no higher, is God, and consequently He the Manichaeans. It is hardly an exag- is unchangeable good, hence truly eter- geration to name the problem of evil nal and truly immortal. All other good as a driving motor behind the entire things are only from Him, not of Him. For intellectual endeavor of the Hippo- what is of Him, is Himself.” (Augustine, nian thinker. The urgency most clear- 1887-3, I) Augustine here opposes Ma- ly manifests itself in this polemic with nichean dualism, that is, the Manichean the Manicheans, a sect to which Au- doctrine that God is not all powerful, but gustine adhered for nearly ten years, opposed by a metaphysical counterfor- for which reason it may be considered ce, a demiurge or maker of the material that, although he always kept a cer- world, who in turn is not good. (Augus- tain reserve and never climbed in the tine, 1887-3, XLI) Augustine rejects this ranks of the Manichean faith, he did limitation of God and is thus first to en- find strong appeal in its doctrines and counter the logical problem of evil in all for a long time pondered the issues it its force. That logical problem accounts presented and the solutions it offered. for the impossibility of reconciling three

5 See, for example, the famous theft of the pears (Augustine, 1887-1, II-iv), and the break from Manicheism and the consequent uncertainties Augustine faces (“Where, then, is evil, and whence, and how crept it in hither? What is its root, and what its seed? Or has it no being at all?” (Augustine, 1887-1, VII-v-7)

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postulates, all three accepted in full by ghout his intellectual quest, reflected in Augustine and many theologians – and the first books of theConfessions .7 Thus he philosophers – after him: 1) God is om- describes his profound when a nipotent; 2) God is the supreme Good; 3) close friend dies: There is evil in the world.6 Manichaeism rejected the first premise, thus avoiding “Behold my heart, O my God, behold the problem. Philosophers such as So- and see into me; for well I remem- crates and the stoics rejected the third, ber it, O my Hope, who cleansest explaining away evil as ignorance. But me from the impurity of such affec- Augustine’s God was both omnipotent tions, directing mine eyes towards and supremely good. And, nonetheless, Thee, and plucking my feet out of evil exists. It appears fundamentally in the snare. For I wondered that others, two forms: “We usually speak of ‘evil’ in subject to death, did live, since he two ways, namely when someone has (a) whom I loved, as if he should never done evil; (b) suffered something evil.”(- die, was dead; and I wondered yet Augustine, 2010, I-1-1-1) In other words, more that myself, who was to him a we can distinguish between natural evil second self, could live, he being dead. (das Schlechte) that befalls us, and moral Well said one of his friend, ‘Thou half evil (das Böse) that we as human beings of my soul’; for I felt that my soul and actively commit. his soul were ‘one soul in two bodies’: and therefore was my life a horror to Natural Evil: Death me, because I would not live halved. The first type of evil, natural evil, is And therefore perchance I feared to at the heart of the aforementioned para- die, lest he whom I had much loved dox of the problem of evil. How is it possi- should die wholly.” (Augustine, 1887- ble that God, being both all-powerful and 1, IV-vii-12) supremely good, allows for suffering and death to define our lives? For it is indeed Death does not only come to tho- the distinctly human being-toward-death se closest to us; it is that which relates all that profoundly disturbs Augustine throu- our fates together. The death of a friend

6 For a short and sharp analysis of the logical problem of evil, see J.L. Mackie, 1955. Notable additions of this formulation of the logical problem are that “omnipotent” is to be taken as meaning that God can indeed do anything at all, i.e. unlimited potency to act; and that are to be considered true opposites, as in that a truly good being will always seek to rid of any evil (Mackie, 1955, p. 201). 7 “For what would I say, O Lord my God, but that I know not whence I came into this dying life (shall I call it?) or living death.” Confessions I-vi-7

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reflects my own mortality, reminds me of evil as an absence or privation of good. my own ever imminent death. First of all, God’s omnipotence As mentioned, the Manichaean and the refutation of Manichean dua- solution to the paradox of evil is to not lism leads to the conclusion that all that enter into it, by denying its premise exists, including everything in the mate- concerning the omnipotence of God. rial world, being God’s creation, is good.8 Although Manichaeism was one of the What then could explain natural evil? dominant religious sects in fourth cen- Augustine mentions that “every measu- tury Roman Empire, little of its thought re, every form, every order” are from God. and works have been saved. Ironically, it To explain evil, Augustine elaborates on is Augustine’s attacks on his former com- such an aesthetic frame of reference, sta- panions that give us one of the most ting that “even these privations of things comprehensive insights in Manichean are so ordered in the universe of nature, thought. In “Concerning the Nature of that to those wisely considering they not Good, Against the Manicheans”, Augusti- unfittingly have their vicissitudes. For ne appeals to the followers stating that by not illuminating certain places and “[…] if the Manicheans were willing, wi- times, God has also made the darkness thout pernicious zeal for defending their as fittingly as the day. For if we by restra- error, and with the fear of God, to think, ining the voice fittingly interpose silence they would not most criminally blasphe- in speaking, how much more does He, as me by supposing two natures, the one the perfect framer of all things, fittingly good, which they call God, the other evil, make privations of things?” (Augustine, which God did not make […]”. (Augusti- 1887-3, XV) In other words, “good” is re- ne, 1887-3, 41) Thus, Manichaeism adhe- lative to being and what we call evil is res to a strong dualistic . Be- in fact better called a ‘lesser good’. In the sides a good God, there is an equivalent same way as the good of light needs the deity or demiurge responsible for all the darkness in order to be light, and in the evil that exists. Leading up to this refuta- same way as darkness is in fact privation tion of Manichaeism is Augustine’s intent of light, in much the same way what we to metaphysically found the existence of call evil is in fact relative privation of the 8 “All life both great and small, all power great and small, all safety great and small, all memory great and small, all great and small, all intellect great and small, all tranquility great and small, all plenty great and small, all sensation great and small, all light great and small, all suavity great and small, all measure great and small, all beauty great and small, all peace great and small, and whatever other like things may occur, especially such as are found throughout all things, whether spiritual or corporeal, every measure, every form, every order both great and small, are from the Lord God.” Augustine, 1887-3, XIII

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good to which it is related. Thus, our Epistemological Evil: from Pride to sickness and mortality are the privation Despair of being required to give that being its The Manicheans exerted a strong relative worth – whereas a total absence attraction on Augustine because in their of being is inconceivable. Our mortality doctrine he encountered the same im- is an evil only to ourselves: from God’s portance he himself attributed to the viewpoint, it is merely a privation of be- problem of evil. The given explanation, ing that forms part of the total measure, however, proved unsatisfactory. He form, and order. would ultimately seek to claim human Augustine rejects Manichean responsibility for evil, postulating the metaphysics, but it is this discussion on possibility to knowingly and willingly the metaphysical level that has made a act wrongfully, i. e. the human tenden- mark on the history of both philosophy cy toward evil. Before coming to that and theology, announcing the issue of ethical turn, it is worth mentioning what theodicy (how to overcome the logical drove him away from Manicheism. It was incommensurability of God’s goodness not so much the matter of personal res- and omnipotence with the existence of ponsibility, as it was the conception of evil) as the dominant treatment of the God. Manichaeism avoided the logical problem of evil for centuries to come. problem of evil by denying God’s om- Whereas this metaphysical approach nipotence, reducing God to a powerful does not arrive at what really matters. A being of good, opposed by an equally crucial objection to this metaphysical di- powerful being of evil. What’s more, vision of good and evil into a dualist me- both of these beings are effectively re- taphysics, is its moral consequence. For, duced to beings, i.e. substances. God is if a demiurge, equally powerful as God not only reduced to one half of a two- himself, is responsible for the existence some, he is furthermore limited to the of evil in the world, then what should/ horizon of beings, with all the limitations could man possibly do against this? Ma- this entails.10 In , Augustine nichean metaphysics results in a moral finds the possibility to think of God as so- evasion of responsibility.9 mething properly transcendental, inclu-

9 It is in opposition to this moral non-responsibility that Augustine will formulate and increasingly accen- tuate his concept of original sin and of natural evil as a punishment for that original sin. A topic that would lead us too far astray to be dealt with in more detail here. 10 “I thought not of You, O God, under the form of a human body. Since the time I began to hear something of wisdom, I always avoided this; and I rejoiced to have found the same in the faith of our spiritual mother, Your Catholic Church. But what else to imagine You I knew not.” Augustine, 1887-1, VII-i-1

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ding beyond concepts and beyond our solve the epistemological issue. Augus- understanding.11 Augustine not only tur- tine confesses: “You procured for me, by ns his back on Manichean metaphysics, the instrumentality of one inflated with but, it could be argued, on metaphysics most monstrous pride, certain books of in general. the Platonists”12, books from which Au- An interesting alternative to a gustine proceeds to quote Biblical pas- metaphysical reading is presented by sages much rather than philosophical G.R. Evans in Augustine on Evil. As Evans ones. For, whereas Neoplatonism seems suggests, “Everything Augustine has to to offer the philosophical foundation for say about evil must be read in the light the religious truths of Augustine’s Catho- of one central principle: that the effect of licism, the next and final step needs to evil upon the mind is to make it impos- take us from the (proud) philosophers sible for the sinner to think clearly, and to the humble believers, and from the especially to understand higher, spiritual logical word to the much more valua- truths and abstract ideas”. (Evans, 1982, ble imagery of revelation. Philosophical p.29) This epistemological approach to concepts, in the end, are not enough. evil explains why it is so hard (and never- What is needed, is to pass to the words theless important) to discuss with dis- of Scripture, “Because You have hid these senting Christian sects: their vision is blu- things from the wise and prudent, and rred and they are therefore incapable of hast revealed them unto babes.13 grasping any metaphysical or moral tru- What precisely is the difference th, and freeing themselves of evil on an between a philosopher’s text and the epistemological level. In his Confessions, Bible? One possible interpretation is lin- Augustine informs us of this shift, when king both readings to different human he abandons Manicheism and turns to experiences. For example, admiring a Neoplatonist philosophy, where he finds work of art is quite a different experience a truly transcendental (non-)form of God. from looking at a red traffic light. Althou- But philosophy in itself is not enough to gh the traffic light will tell me when I can

11 “But You, O Lord, I imagined on every part environing and penetrating it, though every way infinite; as if there were a sea everywhere, and on every side through immensity nothing but an infinite sea; and it contained within itself some sponge, huge, though finite, so that the sponge would in all its parts be filled from the immeasurable sea. So conceived I Your Creation to be itself finite, and filled by You, the Infinite.” Augustine, 1887-1, VII-v-7 12 Augustine, 1887-1, VII-ix-13 13 Augustine, 1887-1, VII-ix-14, paraphrasing Matthew 11:25

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or cannot cross a street, and therefore will of the words, much like submitting contains very useful information for me, I to the gaze required by a work of art.14 do not look at ”Busy New York Street” by What exactly is the problem in Stanislav Sidorov the same way. The di- pride, why is it an evil? Not only does fference is, essentially, not between the it cloud the vision and impede one to usefulness of the information it may give perceive the truth beyond the concep- me, but in my way of looking as an obser- tual constructions of philosophy; the ver. Looking at a traffic light, I am using proud tend to presume that they do not the traffic light to my own purposes. The need God to arrive at comprehension. painting however, seems to be using me A clear contradiction, considering the much rather than I it. I have to submit to transcendental nature of God found in the painting, let it dictate to me how it is opposition to the Manicheans: for how to be approached, to be seen. In much could the limited human mind compri- the same way, the “proud” philosopher se that which transgresses the limits of attempts to use the concepts he uses for his very comprehension? Neoplatonist his own purposes, submitting the con- philosophy provides Augustine with cepts to his own ends. Scripture requires the conceptual tools to free himself of humility from its reader, not only becau- the of God to a substance se Scripture is not reserved for the elite and postulate a transcendental God, but but may also be read by the uneducated, this transcendental sphere is also placed but more importantly because Scripture beyond our understanding. Augustine requires the reader to take on a different describes how he is taken by despair at stance in reading. The reader of Scripture the skeptic impossibility of attaining the cannot simply use and abuse the con- Truth that he seeks.15 Pride either leads to cepts, instead he has to submit to the the false assumption of self-sufficiency in

14 This, incidentally, also explains Augustine’s shift in his hermeneutic approach to the Bible. Whereas at first (Augustine, 1887-1, III-v-9), he is quick to discard the bible when he finds reading it difficult, after his intellectual conversion he will put the Bible aside for a while, hoping to better understand it another time (Augustine, 1887-1, IX-v-13). No one would put aside reading a restaurant menu in order to have another go at it some other time. Pessoa’s poetry, however, can be read and reread, laid aside and revisited for a better understanding. This is the beginning of . 15 “But now, hopeless of making proficiency in that false doctrine, even those things with which I had de- cided upon contenting myself, providing that I could find nothing better, I now held more loosely and ne- gligently. For I was half inclined to believe that those philosophers whom they call Academics were more sagacious than the rest, in that they held that we ought to doubt everything, and ruled that man had not the power of comprehending any truth; for so, not yet realizing their meaning, I also was fully persuaded that they thought just as they are commonly held to do.” (Augustine, 1887-1, V-x-19)

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knowledge, or to despair, in view of the This confession of sins is simultaneously fundamental unattainability of Truth. accompanied by the confession as eulo- The solution that finally offers/for- gy of God, an expression of the funda- ces itself on Augustine, is that of an inner mental precedence of God over man. It is experience that properly speaking trans- for this reason that Augustine repeatedly gresses his appeals to comprehension. quotes and paraphrases the Bible, as the The famous scene in the orchard, where word of God precedes the word of man Augustine breaks down and hears voices – including the concepts of the philoso- that seem to come from nowhere and phers. A second relation is that between order him to pick up a book and read Augustine and his readers. A confession the first passage he finds, thus opening can only be a confession, as praise can up the space required for Revelation and only be praise, if there are witnesses. his subsequent conversion, perfectly The reader is a witness to Augustine’s illustrates this transgression of compre- confession, sometimes even personally hension. What is lacking in a purely phi- addressed or implored – thus showing losophical discourse, is the willingness the two-directional functioning at work and/or capability to assume that passive also in this second relation: both a tes- receptive attitude that Scripture would timony and an appeal. The third relation require, much like in the admiration of Marion distinguishes is that between the a work of art. The epistemological evil reader and God. In other words, Augus- of pride and its slide into despair stand tine does not attempt to argue in favor in the way of this acknowledgment and of a certain truth, such as a philosopher transgression of comprehension. would do. Instead, Augustine attempts This same epistemological trans- to bring us into a personal relationship gression appears to permeate the entire with God, much the same as he himself Confessions when we consider the inten- has encountered. Thus, as Marion shows tion and strategy of the book. Contem- us, the Confessions show a shift from a porary French phenomenologist Jean- mere locutionary (to pronounce) work, Luc Marion offers us such a reading in to an illocutionary (to move us) writing, his Au lieu de soi. According to Marion, and finally a perlocutionary (to make us the confessions constitute an interaction act) appeal. It is with this third step that or dialogue on different levels. (Marion, the Confessions – and indeed many of 2008, pp. 66-74) At first, there is the con- Augustine’s works, both from his earlier fession of Augustine to God, whom he period and during his many years as a addresses directly, in the second person. bishop – show their true intention. That

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intention is neither to inform us, nor to wrong. Once I comprehend this truth, I convince or even to move us, but to will no longer steal. expands on make us act. Marion’s phenomenological this proposal, including the possibility study thus leads to the starting point of to deceive oneself. One can act wrongly the ethical question of how to live. when, even if one knows what would be the right thing to do in general, one fails Moral Evil: Sex (Cupiditas) to apply the general rule to a particular Before moving to the question case.17 For example, I know that stealing of how to live, one more form of evil re- is wrong, and I know these pears are not quires attention. As mentioned above, mine and so I should not steal them, Augustine distinguishes between but my hunger temporarily distracts my we suffer das( Schlechte), and evils we mind from this universal truth to ano- commit (das Böse). We have mentioned ther truth, that pears can still my hunger. death as the embodiment of evil we Augustine, however, when stea- suffer, whereas pride is one form of evil ling the pears, as recounted in the fa- we commit, albeit on an epistemological mous passage in his Confessions, knows level and in a partly unconscious way, that stealing is wrong, and he knows that as it affects our perception of world and this rule applies to what he is doing. To of self. Pride is an evil both of and out of make matters worse, he is not even hun- ignorance. But there is also that evil that gry. On the contrary, Augustine recogni- we commit knowingly and willingly, that zes that hitherto unheard-of possibility human tendency to doing evil deeds. to do wrong, knowingly and willingly, It may be noted that, prior to for the sake of doing wrong. “Yet had I Augustine, ancient Greek and Roman a desire to commit robbery, and did so, thought offered little to solve the enig- compelled neither by hunger, nor pover- matic possibility of acting contrary to ty through a distaste for well-doing, and the good. Socrates proposed a profound a lustiness of iniquity. For I pilfered that of anthropological optimism, in which it is which I had already sufficient, and much impossible for any person to perform better. Nor did I desire to enjoy what I an evil act willingly and knowingly. Evil pilfered, but the theft and sin itself. […] can only be understood as an act of ig- Those pears truly were pleasant to the norance.16 For example, I may be unawa- sight; but it was not for them that my mi- re of the universal truth that stealing is serable soul lusted, for I had abundance 16 This idea is implicit in , Gorgias 469e-479e 17 This is elaborated in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1146b25-1149a20

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of better, but those I plucked simply that the flesh and earthly pleasures.18 Despite I might steal. For, having plucked them, all his attempts to free himself from the I threw them away, my sole gratification evils of Manichaean metaphysics, from in them being my own sin, which I was philosophical pride; his earthly desires pleased to enjoy.” (Augustine, 1887-1, do not seem to let him go, not before III-iv-9 – III-vi-12) It is this particularly hu- that moment of divine intervention that man capacity to willingly and knowingly make up the final and decisive conver- commit evil acts that haunts Augustine. sion of Augustine toward God. Particularly human in that it is that trait Basically, the problem of desiring which he recognizes even in the smallest earthly , is that we are desiring children, as he rhetorically asks “I pray goods which, as mentioned before, are you, O my God, where, Lord, or when marked by privation, which is to say are was I, Your servant, innocent?” We receive they only relative goods. This means that no answer, for, as he continues, “I pass by we may and will lose whatever goods we that time, for what have I to do with that, might obtain. As mentioned before, dea- the memories of which I cannot recall?” th not only menaces our own existence, (Augustine, 1887-1, I-vii-13) it also snatches away those that we love. Underlying this desire to do evil Death is the paradigmatic translation of simply for doing evil, is the desire. As we the transitory nature of the lesser goods shall see shortly, desire is the unifying that make up the world. These lesser principle for all human beings. All human goods are just that: lesser goods. They beings desire. The error occurs in that we are not in themselves evil, for as crea- get confused over what it is that we desi- tions of God, delicious foods, beautiful re. Nowhere is this desire more clearly music, the female body, they are all good expressed than in Augustine’s pursuit of insofar as they exist. However, none of the sin of concupiscence. Even when, at these goods is the Supreme Good. They an intellectual (epistemological) level, he will wither and perish and, we will be has already acknowledged the Christian constantly experiencing the menace of Truth and knows in which direction to their disappearance. take his life, he declares himself incapa- Much in the same manner as na- ble of freeing himself of the desires for tural evil, on a metaphysical level, was

18 “But I, miserable young man, supremely miserable even in the very outset of my youth, had entreated chastity of You, and said, Grant me chastity and continency, but not yet. For I was afraid lest You should hear me soon, and soon deliver me from the disease of concupiscence, which I desired to have satisfied rather than extinguished.” (Augustine, 1887-1, VII-vii-17)

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explained as the privation of good, evil that it will go into another direction, for acts, Augustine proposes, are in fact acts example, toward concupiscence and identified by privation, failed acts. When sin. Thus, when our desires are directed we give in to our lusts, we are in fact fai- toward the lesser goods, we are in fact ling to act. To understand this, we can not fully acting, or failing to act in the full refer to Augustine’s use of the classical sense of the term. Acting wrongfully is theory of natural movement and rest.19 perversion in that it is a deviation from This theory state that all objects have a the natural way for a soul to act, in the natural point of rest, a natural belonging. same way as for an object to act contrary For example, rocks have a natural ten- to its natural way of acting is being impe- dency to fall to the ground, flames have ded to act, and as for a good that is not a natural tendency to reach upward. supremely Good to be determined by its When unhindered, the rock will go to the privation of something. ground, the flames will rise up. It is pos- Now, we have seen above that sible to keep the rock or the flame from the metaphysical answer to the meta- moving toward their natural place of rest physical problem of evil is not, for Au- by impeding them from acting as they gustine, the central issue at stake: it is its naturally would. We could, for example, moral consequence. While among the suspend the rock by a rope, or smother Manicheans, Augustine declares that “it the flame under a blanket. In these cases, still seemed to me that it was not we the objects are not infact; they are impe- that sin, but that I know not what other ded to act. nature sinned in us. And it gratified my Now, Augustine starts his dialo- pride to be free from blame and, after gue on happiness observing that “we I had committed any fault, not to ack- are body and soul” (Augustine, 1948, II-7). nowledge that I had done any—that The same basic principle that distingui- You might heal my soul because it had shes motion and (unnatural) motionless- sinned against You; but I loved to excuse ness in objects also applies to the mo- it, and to accuse something else (I know tions of the soul. The natural motion of not what) which was with me, but was the soul is upward, that is to say, towards not I.” (Augustine, 1887-1, V-x-18). the Supreme Good. 20 It is only when the This ethical turn is not to entirely soul is impeded from its natural motion dismiss any metaphysical reading of Au- 19 See for example Aristotle, Physics IV, 184a10-192b4 20 “I will soar, then, beyond this power of my nature also, ascending by degrees unto Him who made me.” (Augustine, 1887-1, X-viii-12)

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gustine. On the contrary, we can sum- Metaphysical, Epistemological And marize by retaining three of its most im- Moral Evil portant contributions. In the first place, Linking these three faces of evil the postulation of a supremely good together, we can summarize by pointing and omnipotent – as well as transcen- out that, in all three cases, the same root dent – God. This presupposition remains problem is that we attach too much va- at the basis of Augustine’s thought. And, lue to matters that do not deserve the regarding man as an ethical actor, it will we attach to them. Whether it is recur in the form of the (theological) our own life, our pride (reflected in the difficulty, if not impossibility, of solving esteem of others), or the temptations of the problem of evil without divine help, the flesh, in all three cases, we consider i.e. without the grace of God. A second as good things which are in fact inferior. point to keep in mind is that the world The result, in all three cases, is to fail to and all beings in it are good. In the eyes act according to the natural motion of of God, there is strictly speaking no evil the soul. in nature, only lesser goods.21 Thirdly, if This is not to say that these three God is considered all-powerful and su- faces of evil are in themselves evil, on premely good, and if the worldly order the contrary. Death is only an evil to us is not in itself evil, but only less good, who suffer them. From God’s point of then evil falls upon the shoulders of view, these and other natural evils are man. This man is a free agent, choosing not in fact evils but part of a whole. This willingly and knowingly to do evil. That is the aesthetic argument that Augustine was the gift of God to Adam. To further ventures to formulate in an ontological delve into these and other matters from frame against the Manicheans. “And to a metaphysical point of view is a valua- You is there nothing at all evil, and not ble exercise, but not one that we wish only to You, but to Your whole creation; to endeavor. It does, however, lead to because there is nothing without which the ethical issue of a free agent required can break in, and mar that order which to act and live. You have appointed it.”22

21 “And to You is there nothing at all evil, and not only to You, but to Your whole creation; because there is nothing without which can break in, and mar that order which You have appointed it. But in the parts thereof, some things, because they harmonize not with others, are considered evil; whereas those very things harmonize with others, and are good, and in themselves are good.” (Augustine, 1887-1, VII-xiii-19) 22 Augustine, 1887-1, VII-xiii-19

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The second case, pride, in itself is revelation to philosophy than the other indeed an evil, and Augustine points to way around. One who moves from re- its dangers in his Confessions.23 But pride, vealed truths to philosophical concepts along with the despair it could lead to, may risk mistakenly seeing the truth when brought back to its roots in the of revelation in the limited philosophi- philosophical investigations Augustine cal concepts. By first passing through himself has gone through, may have that philosophical search for truth, we its place in a necessary development can subsequently appreciate revelation toward the understanding of the Good. more fully. Reading the Neoplatonic philosophical Third was the issue of concupis- texts provided Augustine with the con- cence or the temptations of the flesh. ceptual framework he needed to sur- Desire in man is, in itself, not an evil. On pass the Manichean errors. The limited the contrary: every man desires. Now, conceptual truths of philosophy and the what is it that he desires? Augustine’s self-conscious confrontation with the li- answer: to be happy. Thus we come to mits of our understanding can motivate the properly ethical dimension of Augus- us to hide in the short-sighted answers tine’s work: his appeal to live a good life. of science (curiositas), or plunge us into This appeal makes up the perlocutionary a skeptic despair. But as an intermediate dimension of the Confessions, and it is at stage, this was a necessary step. Indeed, the heart of the dialogue De Beata Vita. the risk is much greater in passing from

BEATA VITA

We come then to the question of totle places the desire for knowledge in the good life. What should we do, how the heart of men24, Augustine also sees should we live our lives? Much as Aris- man as determined by desire. The fun-

23 In addition to this there is another form of temptation, more complex in its peril. For besides that concu- piscence of the flesh which lies in the gratification of all senses and pleasures, wherein its slaves who are far from You perish, there pertains to the soul, through the same senses of the body, a certain vain and curious longing, cloaked under the name of knowledge and learning, not of having pleasure in the flesh, but of making experiments through the flesh. This longing, since it originates in an appetite for knowledge, and the sight being the chief among the senses in the acquisition of knowledge, is called in divine language, the lust of the eyes.” (Augustine, 1887-1, X-xxxv-54) 24 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 980a21

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damental principle for Augustine is the his readers to a relationship with God – desire – for what? For happiness. “All men which is to say, with the Good. However, desire to be happy”, Augustine observes a problem immediately presents itself. As (Augustine, 1948, II-10). An observation we have seen, God is fundamentally trans- no doubt prima facie more credible than cendental in that He is fundamentally be- Aristotle’s “all men by nature desire to yond our grasp. Beyond our grasp: not know”. But the apparent universal princi- only in the sense of being beyond our un- ple of man disperses as soon as the ques- derstanding (irreducible to any concept tion is raised: what is happiness? –hence, incidentally, the impossibility of a In short, the perfect life according purely theological reading of Augustine), to Augustine rests on three pillars: “solida but also beyond our reach. This unreacha- fide, alacri spe, flagrante charitate” (Augus- bility of happiness resonates throughout tine, 1948, IV-35); or faith, hope and love, the Confessions, starting with the famous echoing Corinthians 13:13. These three phrase in the very first chapter: “You move pillars resound throughout the life and us to delight in praising You; for You have works of Augustine, each receiving much formed us for Yourself, and our hearts are more elaborate – and more profoundly restless till they find rest in You.” (Augus- religious exploration in later works, for tine, 1887-1, I-i-1) A state of rest that we example in his Enchiridion or Handbook can reach in this life, or only at the end of on Faith, Hope and Love. But the stem of (beyond) this earthly life? To answer this, his advice for living a good life was already we can consider the first part of Augusti- present when his own conversion was ne’s dialogue The Happy Life, presenting a still fresh and continuity with his classical comparison of the human search for ha- predecessors was still very evident. Each ppiness with the search for a harbor. (Au- of these pillars of the good life show fai- gustine, 1948, I-1 – 3) There are, he obser- th, hope, and love, and reply to different ves, three types of people, or three ways aspects of the problem of evil that so pre- of conducting the search for the good life. occupied the pre-conversion Augustine. The harbor, Augustine states, is happiness, which to Augustine coincides Faith with philosophy. Now, considered that If we persistently follow through philosophy is the search for truth, which, on the phenomenological reading of the to Augustine, is the search for God, we relation and intention that guides the can conclude that the harbor is in fact Confessions, we can conclude that, what unattainable in this life. We are, as it were, really matters for Augustine, is to bring always at sea. And while at sea, we can ei-

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ther attempt to sail towards the harbor, or and remain, out at sea. In other words, we can sail out “deceived by the sea” trave- whatever course we may set, we are, as ling in pursuit of other ends, or in a third humans, out at sea, and can only deter- case, we can steady our course after ha- mine what course we set, not whether ving been adrift for a long time. Augusti- or not we will sail. We are, so to speak, ne considers himself of the third category, thrown into this world, and have to make having passed the first thirty years of his do with our worldly condition. Discar- life wandering in all the wrong directions ding our worldly state is not an option. only to change course after that fateful This includes accepting the waves and conversion under the fig-tree. storms that we meet on our way. It seems that Augustine consi- It further seems that, in both ca- ders these three different options not so ses of the captain set for the harbor and much as options, but rather “types of per- the drifter, we “belong” in that harbor: sons”. We thus see to what extent, as was that is the “natural” destination for both the case in the epistemological depen- the determined captain and the drifter, dency on grace, we once again depend reminding us of the theory of natural on God’s gift to us. We “are” one of three movement and rest. Much like Odys- types, and it seems to depend on some- seus, we are trying to reach our home. thing beyond ourselves to which cate- But unlike Odysseus, and perhaps more gory we belong. But this profound and closely resembling Moses crossing the highly complex issue of predestination is Red Sea, we do not know where it is not what we wish to investigate here. exactly that we are going, we do not Although there are three “types know what awaits us at our destination. of man”, there are in fact two possible We are not returning to a known state, courses, the third type being a variation but heading out to an unknown desti- or combination of both. And these are, nation. We only know that that destina- continuing in the metaphor of the sea, tion is the Good, although, as the Good towards the harbor (philosophy=Truth=- is wholly transcendental, we are incapa- God), or out to sea. In one case, we set ble of comprehending this. ourselves a certain goal to reach, whe- Contrary to the skeptic philoso- reas others “have chosen to proceed out phers, who continue searching for a tru- into the middle of the sea and venture th that they themselves declare they can to journey far away from their homeland, never attain, Augustine proposes the pos- which they then often forget.” (Augusti- sibility to “possess God”. (Augustine, 1948, ne, 1948, I-2) But in both cases we are, III-21) This possible possession of God

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finds itself in an enduring tension with Hope the established transcendental nature of God withdraws from our knowle- God. Reminiscent of another metaphor dge, right before our gaze. In the end, involving the sea, Augustine compares we inevitably fail to comprehend Him. the finite world with a sea, and God with Does that also mean we fail to grasp the a sponge, containing and permeating all Good, or to attain happiness? The skeptic finite things in its own infinity.25 Thus, God concern was that it is impossible to at- at the same time permeates all being, tain the truth, which would lead to ines- and finds itself as the destination towards capable unhappiness since, according to which one is to direct oneself. Augustine, unhappiness is lacking some- A somewhat counterintuitive con- thing, whereas happiness is not lacking in sequence is that it is quite possible to be anything. (Augustine, 1948, IV-33) In a way, happy, even though one does not have the skeptic concern is well-founded: if you everything one might desire. And, on the persistently seek to attain truth and identi- other hand, having everything you desi- fy having obtained truth with happiness, re may not assure happiness. In the first then the way there will be an unhappy case, the desire we have is directed at the one. That is the mistake of the philoso- (eternal) Good that we may not attain, but phers who seek to comprehend truth. keeping it as our destination is what truly Augustine changes direction, contributes to happiness. Whereas, in the though. Wondering how we can know second case, we may have every thing we God, in the Confessions he turns inward. desire, but all those things do not amount Knowledge of God is not to be found in to any happiness, being constantly mena- the world, as both Manicheans and phi- ced by their loss, and, even worse, distrac- losophers thought, but in our own inte- ting us from that thing that we should be rior. In our memory, to be precise. See- preferring. Happiness encountered in the king to know God requires introspection. pursuit of ends other than the natural end (Augustine, 1887-1, X-xxxiv-52) of what is natural to the human soul, is in Memory has a double para- fact not happiness, but a deception. dox. On the one hand, the infinite ca-

25 “I made one huge mass of all Your creatures, distinguished according to the kinds of bodies—some of them being real bodies, some what I myself had feigned for spirits. And this mass I made huge—not as it was, which I could not know, but as large as I thought well, yet every way finite. But You, O Lord, I imagined on every part environing and penetrating it, though every way infinite; as if there were a sea everywhere, and on every side through immensity nothing but an infinite sea; and it contained within itself some sponge, huge, though finite, so that the sponge would in all its parts be filled from the immeasurable sea. So conceived I Your Creation to be itself finite, and filled by You, the Infinite.” (Augustine, 1887-1, VII-v-7)

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pacities of our memory carry with it ii-15) For all its limitations and weaknes- its own finitude. This refers to the odd ses, memory is also a step beyond our phenomenon of forgetting. We have exterior context and even beyond our already mentioned Augustine’s rheto- experience, beyond our own identity. rical question to our own infancy. Who Augustine’s analysis of memory is knows what sins we committed when worthy of (and indeed has led to) much we were young? Although it should be more investigation than is appropriate somewhere in our memory, we have here.27 Returning to the issue of the good forgotten it. This is the beginning of the life, Augustine starts his De Beata Vita with need for constant search of the interior, a comparison that perfectly fits in the line for example in the practice of the con- of his ancient predecessors concerning fession of our sins. Our memory has the such issues. After having proven that strange capacity to forget. And to con- man consists of body and soul, he asks: tain the forgotten.26 “since we all now agree that man cannot On the other hand, this finite in- exist without body and without soul, I ask terior gaze contains the infinite. “Great is all of you: For which of the two do we this power of memory, exceeding great, try to obtain food?” (Augustine, 1948, II- O my God—an inner chamber large and 7) Food is for the body, it is determined, boundless! Who has plumbed the dep- and, making his point, Augustine states ths thereof? Yet it is a power of mine, that “All bodies have by nature received and appertains unto my nature; nor do a measure that they cannot exceed […].” I myself grasp all that I am. Therefore is (Augustine, 1948, II-7) In other words, a the mind too narrow to contain itself. body needs a certain amount of nutri- And where should that be which it does tion to function at its best, neither more, not contain of itself? Is it outside and not nor less.28 The same, Augustine argues, in itself? How is it, then, that it does not goes for the soul. Just as the body has a grasp itself?” (Augustine, 1887-1, X-vi- right measure, the soul too needs its nu-

26 “When I name forgetfulness, and know, too, what I name, whence should I know it if I did not remember it? […] But when I remember forgetfulness, there are present both memory and forgetfulness—memory, whereby I remember, forgetfulness, which I remember. But what is forgetfulness but the privation of me- mory?” (Augustine, 1887-1, X-xvi-24) 27 See, for example M. Heidegger, 1995 28 This incidentally carries a strong criticism to any ascetic idea of radical abstinence. The philosophy – or rather, lifestyle – of the school of the cynics has been considered to have had considerable influence on the earliest Christian sects, particularly adhering the hermit ways of living, a practice Augustine was un- doubtedly familiar with.

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trition- in the right amounts. In the case of maintaining that state of knowledge of the soul, nutrition consists of science, sought after. (Augustine, 1887-1, IX-x) or knowledge, not of the world of things, Pure beatitude alone is indigestible. And but of that interior that could lead from we ought to avoid the nothingness of the finite level of being to the infinite -ex inactivity. perience of the Good. We encounter this need for the right measure throughout Love the dialogue itself, where the chapters We thus arrive at the third pillar of of the writing, equivalent to evenings of Augustine’s good life, love – possibly the discussion, opens with a reference to the most important one, as the aforemen- beautiful weather or the pleasant meal29, tioned verse of Corinthians confirms. and closed with a “jovial moment” and Now, both “cupiditas” and “caritas” can be proper retirement for the day.30 translated as love, and in a way, love for This is not to say, though, that the flesh and love for the Good are the Augustine would welcome inactivity as same: the intentional driving force be- such. On the contrary: “nequitia”, idle- hind it, the love in man is the same. What ness, is the mother of all vices, whereas changes is not the affection itself, it is the its opposite is the virtue “frugalitas”, tem- object it aims for. perance.31 Augustine explains the term The problem that we face, is that frugalitas referring to its root in fruit, ob- many of us do not focus our efforts on serving that the task of this virtue is to the right destination, on the Good. Whi- bear spiritual fruit, whereas nequitia has le “all desire happiness”, and while our the same root as negation, i.e. nothing. In “natural destination” is the Good, we other words, Augustine calls for modest may find ourselves mistaking the lesser and well-dosed activity, involvement in goods for the Good. As we have seen, the right way and to the right measure these lesser goods are not evils, rather – but involvement nonetheless. Inactivi- they are goods that lack in comparison ty is required only because, much as the to the Good, goods marked by privation. experience of true beatitude shared with We might find some short-lived illusions his mother Monica, we are not capable of happiness, constantly menaced by

29 For example, Augustine, 1948, II-16 30 For example, Augustine, 1948, IV-23 31 Augustine, 1948, II-9. The original text reads “Etenim ipsam nequitiam matrem omnium vitiorum, ex eo quod enquidquam sit, id est ex eo quod nihil sit, veteres dictam esse voluerunt. Cui vitio quae contraria virtus est, frugalitas nominator.”

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the negation it carries with it, or, in other to steer towards the harbor, we simply words, by its natural limitations, by its are in the world: that is a givenness we deprivation in comparison to Happiness. cannot change. And we will have to Augustine gives two examples of keep muddling through everything life his own experience of pursuing goods throws at us, all the time keeping a ste- that ultimately kept him, for a long time, ady course. And, returning to the meta- from pursuing the Good. These are the phor of food for the soul, we do not try interest for honor and pride, and the at- to smother our desires as perhaps the traction of the flesh or women, which he stoics would propose. Instead, much as calls concupiscence.32 Both are forms of in order to stay healthy physically, we do a misdirected desire for happiness and a not stop eating, but choose to follow a resulting misguided conception of the healthier and more balanced diet, we good life. Thus desire as impulse for all rearrange our diet for the soul to make human endeavor is present, and the ima- it as healthy as possible. We do not stop ge of Augustine burning heart in hand to think and contemplate, but instead of is quite accurate: desire drives us all. But contemplating vanities in and for them- in the cases of the flesh and honor, that selves (curiositas), we contemplate truths desire is misdirected, aiming at matters that contribute to our spiritual wellbeing. that ultimately keep us from, rather than Thus we continue to exist in and approach us toward, happiness. How is for the world, attempting to improve it that the case? In that the flesh and honor and ourselves, despite, or rather in the will one day lose their value, diminish, face of, any adversities, challenges and perish. These goods are only relative and setbacks. With that, the care for the self will one day cease to show the value we traversing Augustine’s threefold reply to once attributed to them, or even cease the threefold problem of evil, arrives at to be altogether. The result, of course, the care for the other. As we have seen, is that we can grow attached to lesser the entire Confessions can be seen as an goods and be constantly threatened by attempt to bring the reader into a rela- their imminent loss. tionship with God. Augustine does not Augustine’s solution is not, as abandon his commitment to the world, did the anchorites of his time, to turn or to philosophy as a pursuit of happi- his back on the world. Returning to the ness. Nor does he abandon desire as metaphor of the ship out at sea seeking the driving force of all human endeavor.

32 “I acknowledge that I did not fly quickly to the bosom of philosophy, because I was detained by woman’s charm and the lure of honors […].” Augustine, 1948, I-4

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After his conversion, Augustine aban- ther, but much rather a universal love, dons his post as a rhetoric speaker and aimed not at lesser goods of this earth, accepts a religious post in his native Hi- that will come and go, but through them ppo. He will devote the next forty years to the universal and eternal Good. It is, of his life to all the tasks included in that then, not desires in themselves that we post, from giving sermons to refuting seek to eliminate, on the contrary. Desi- rival sects and resolving local disputes. re is universal; the desire for happiness For a man once close to a very success- is what determines all human beings as ful career in the highlife of the Roman such. The difference lies not in the desi- Empire, this is no less than a bucketful res themselves, but in their direction, of petty tasks. But Augustine accepts in their object. Desires aimed at lesser them wholeheartedly, because in these goods are what Augustine calls cupiditas, tasks he finds his love redirected, not to desires aimed at the higher good caritas. one person or another, but to all peo- Whereas cupiditas should be combatted ple, and through all people to the Good whenever possible for ultimately being a that he has encountered in God. distraction from the good toward which This explains how his longtime we should aim, caritas turns out to be a partner can disappear unnamed, and central aspect in Augustine’s proposal why only a few lines are dedicated to of the good life. The good shifts from an the death of his own son33. Because the interpersonal good (the other) to an ab- love he channels is no longer an indivi- solute Good (the Other, or God). Charity dual one, aimed at one person or ano- is desire redirected.

CONCLUSION

Augustine’s idea of the good life fficult elements to transmit unquestiona- is in some ways problematic for today’s bly today. It is, therefore, little surprising secular society. His reliance on Scripture, that the current revival of the philosophy his doctrine of original sin permeating all of the good life reverts to the classical mankind, his insistence of the need of di- schools, leaving Augustine aside. Never- vine grace, are but some of the most di- theless, Augustine places himself in this

33 “We took into our company the boy Adeodatus, born of me carnally, of my sin. Well had Thou made him. […]Quickly did You remove his life from the earth; and now I recall him to mind with a sense of security, in that I fear nothing for his childhood or youth, or for his whole self.” (Augustine, 1887-1, IX-vi-14)

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traditional inquiry of happiness, and by the waves of everyday life. contrasting his proposals with his ideas Regarding our intellectual pride: about evil, we can distill some central we should choose well we wish to nour- elements still of value today. ish our souls. To attempt to capture all Death, pride, concupiscence. the scientific truths, hoping that we will Three fundamental aspects of evil, seen somehow find the answers to the ques- metaphysically, epistemologically, and tion of the eternal, is a vain endeavor. ethically. Translating into the three pillars Instead, we should turn our gaze inward of Augustine’s proposal for a good life: and investigate ourselves, our memories, faith, hope, and love. our hopes, our desires. Such intellectual The red line connecting the three enterprise should, however, not detach evils to be combatted, consists in mista- us from the we find ourselves king lesser goods for higher ones, whe- in. Spiritual searchings can and should ther it be the lesser good of cupiditas for be dosed appropriately. And instead of caritas, that of conceptual knowledge for taking pride in our achievements, we insight in God through our interior, or should remain humble and aware that the appreciation of perishable life over these capacities are not to our own mer- that of the eternal. The investigation in it, but are much more a gift than an indi- these three evils leads Augustine from a vidual achievement. metaphysical through an epistemologi- Finally, instead of detaching our- cal toward an ethical investigation. That selves entirely from the world, we should is, the question “what is evil” requires reorient ourselves toward the Good, dealing with the question “how does evil through that world. Desire redirected affect our perception” in order to arrive can give upward direction to our lives, to the question “what should we do in moving us to where our soul would be the face of evil?” So how should we live? at rest. We thus do not detach from our Three concluding practical notes. human condition, but accept it as a giv- Regarding faith: as is the case en, with all its flaws and imperfections, with the harbor toward which we should challenging us to contribute to the Good attempt to sail, we may never reach within a praxis, whether it is in a fervent that harbor. The harbor might even be religious task, or in dialogues and every- reached only after this life. That does not day tasks and relationships. mean we cannot set our goal beyond

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651 DEATH, DESPAIR AND SEX: THE PROBLEM OF EVIL ACCORDING TO AUGUSTINE AS A THREEFOLD FOUNDATION OF THE GOOD LIFE

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