THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY of AMERICA Aquinas and the Kantian
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THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA Aquinas and the Kantian Principle of Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves A DISSERTATION Submitted to the Faculty of the School of Philosophy Of The Catholic University of America In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree Doctor of Philosophy © Copyright All Rights Reserved By Daniel P. Shields Washington, D.C. 2012 Aquinas and the Kantian Principle of Treating Persons as Ends in Themselves Daniel P. Shields, Ph.D. Director: Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D. This dissertation addresses the question of whether and on what terms Aquinas would accept Kant’s principle that one must always treat all persons as ends in themselves, and never merely as means. This question is of considerable interest given the wide contemporary acceptance of Kant’s principle and yet it has, to my knowledge, never received as sustained a consideration as I will give it. To answer this question I make a distinction between a finis cuius and finis cui . A finis cuius is an end in the sense of a value that is to be attained, and a finis cui is an end in the sense of someone for whom a value is to be attained. Aquinas holds that one must treat persons as ends in both of these senses. Nevertheless, no created person is a supreme finis cui or an ultimate finis cuius . For Aquinas, God is the end of the natural law and all of the moral life is ordered towards Him. “Love God with all your heart” is the primary precept of the natural law. Aquinas does not mean that the whole moral life is ordered towards one’s own personal happiness with God. Such a view would involve always using other persons as mere means. Rather, God is to be loved as both the supreme finis cui and the ultimate finis cuius . God offers Himself to man as a common good and must be loved as such. This means that one must love other persons as fellow participants in the common good and as those for whom the common good is intended. This is to say that one must treat his neighbor as a finis cui . Aquinas further holds that one must love one’s neighbor as oneself, that is to say, with the love of friendship. This requires valuing the other person as a finis cuius —thus wanting to be in community with him—in addition to willing his good as a finis cui . Such love perfects a natural tendency purposefully implanted in man by God and is necessary if the community is to flourish. This dissertation by Daniel P. Shields fulfills the dissertation requirement for the doctoral degree in philosophy approved by Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D., as Director, and by Angela Knobel, Ph.D., and Michael Rohlf, Ph.D. as Readers. _________________________________ Tobias Hoffmann, Ph.D., Director _________________________________ Angela Knobel, Ph.D., Reader _________________________________ Michael Rohlf, Ph.D., Reader ii To my wife Rebecca, and to our child iii “Haec est differentia inter amicitiam honesti et delectabilis: quia in amicitia delectabilis, amicus diligitur propter delectationem; in amicitia autem honesti amicus diligitur propter seipsum, sed delectatio provenit ex consequenti. Ad perfectionem igitur amicitiae honesti pertinet ut aliquis propter amicum interdum abstineat etiam a delectatione quam in eius praesentia habet, in eius servitiis occupatus. Secundum igitur hanc amicitiam plus amat aliquem qui ab eo se absentat propter amicum, quam qui a praesentia amici discedere non vult etiam propter amicum. Sed si quis libenter vel faciliter a praesentia amici divellitur et in aliis magis delectatur, vel nihil vel parum comprobatur amicum diligere. Hos igitur tres gradus considerare possumus in caritate. Deus autem maxime propter seipsum est diligendus. Sunt enim quidam qui libenter, vel sine magna molestia, separantur a vacatione divinae contemplationis, ut terrenis negotiis implicentur, et in his vel nihil vel modicum caritatis apparet. Quidam verum in tantum delectantur in vacatione divinae contemplationis, quod eam deserere nolunt, etiam ut divinis obsequiis mancipentur ad salutem proximorum. Quidam vero ad tantum culmen caritatis ascendunt, quod etiam divinam contemplationem, licet in ea maxime delectentur, praetermittunt, ut Deo serviant in salutem proximorum; et haec perfectio in Paulo apparet, qui dicebat Rom., IX, 3: Optabam ego ipse anathema , id est separatus, esse a Christo pro fratribus meis ; — et ad Philipp., I, 23–24: Desiderium habens dissolvi, et esse cum Christo; permanere autem in carne necessarium propter vos . Et haec perfectio est proprie praelatorum, et praedicatorum, et quorumcumque aliorum, qui procurandae saluti aliorum insistunt.” – Quaestio Disputata de Caritate , a. 11, ad 6. iv Table of Contents Introduction 1 Background and Intention 1 Contribution and Originality 5 Content and Structure 9 Method 13 Chapter 1 – Kant’s Ethical Philosophy and the Formula of Humanity 15 Section 1 – Preliminaries 16 Section 2 – A First Look at the Formula of Humanity 19 Section 3 – Approach to the Formula of Humanity 25 Section 4 – Autonomous Action 34 Section 5 – The Requirements of the Formula of Humanity 40 Section 6 – Love of Neighbor and the Duty of Friendship 49 Section 7 – God and the Moral Law 52 Chapter 2 – Aquinas, the Natural Law, and Persons as Ends 55 Section 1 – Natural Law and the Love of God and Neighbor 56 Section 2 – The Egoistic Interpretation 68 Section 3 – Response to the Egoistic Interpretation 74 The Opening of the Prima Secundae 74 Amor Amicitiae 78 The Natural Objects and Order of the Love of Friendship 86 v Chapter 3 – Justice in Aquinas 101 Section 1 – Justice and the Good of Others 103 The Virtues of Justice 103 Right and Equality 112 Section 2 – Freedom and Servitude 116 Natural Slavery 118 Slaves as Slaves and Slaves as Men 127 Section 3 – Justice and Friendship 134 The Point of Justice 134 The Distinction between Justice and the Love of Friendship 137 The Need for the Love of Friendship 140 Moral Progression 142 The Range of Friendship 144 Friendship and Shared Life 148 Conclusion 150 Boyle’s Interpretation of the Second Great Commandment 150 Summary 152 Chapter 4 – Persons as Ends and the Common Good 154 Section 1 – Individual and Common Goods and the Possibility of Love 158 Section 2 – The Kantian Solution 168 Section 3 – Aquinas and Common Goods 178 Section 4 – Concluding Remarks 196 vi Chapter 5 – Moral Obligation in Aquinas, Kant, and Finnis 201 Section 1 – Kant’s View of Moral Obligation 203 Section 2 – Obligation in Aquinas 212 Hypothetical Apodictic Imperatives 212 The Necessity of the Common Good 218 Lisska and McInerny on Obligation in Aquinas 221 Obligation and Cognitive Failure 223 Real but Limited Autonomy 227 A Thomistic Response to Kant 228 Section 3 – Aquinas and the New Natural Law Theorists 233 The New Natural Law Theory of Obligation 233 The “Is-Ought” Question 237 The Dominant End 240 Conclusion 251 Bibliography 257 vii My thanks go to Tobias Hoffmann, my director, and Michael Rohlf and Anglea Knobel, my readers for their help, as well as to David Forte, who commented on drafts of portions of this dissertation. I would like to thank Chad Engelland as well for his friendship and for his conversation. I am also grateful for all that the Capuchin Franciscans have done for me throughout my graduate career. Finally, my deepest thanks go to my wife Rebecca for her support and patience. viii Introduction Background and Intention In today’s world, few charges are so widely acknowledged as possessing significant moral force as the charge that a proposed action amounts to using someone or that someone’s attitude towards others is one of use . The principle that one should never merely use others, but always treat them as ends in themselves—what I will refer to in this dissertation as the principle of humanity—is nearly universally recognized as valid in contemporary moral philosophy and culture, although it is variously understood. Some see it as doing nothing more than ruling out any action involving others who have not given their informed consent. 1 This is a weak reading of the principle of humanity. Weaker still, a utilitarian might perhaps understand it as doing nothing more than giving every person’s happiness an equal weight in the utilitarian calculus. Even if their happiness must be sacrificed because it is outweighed by the happiness of a larger group, they have nevertheless still not been merely used, on this understanding, because their vote counted, so to speak. On the other hand a stronger interpretation is given by Thomas E. Hill, Jr. in interpreting Kant, rightly as I believe. The principle, according to him, demands that one treat every person as having an unconditional value that cannot be exchanged for any other, so that the utilitarian calculus, which weighs the interests of people as if they had a kind of quantitative value, is in principle unacceptable. 2 It was Kant, in fact, who explicitly 1 For example, Thomas Mappes, “Sexual Morality and the Concept of Using Another Person,” In The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings , 5th ed., ed. Alan Soble and Nicholas Power (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 229–48. 2 Thomas E. Hill, Jr., “Humanity as an End in Itself,” in Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory, 1 2 formulated this principle and, so far as I can tell, is responsible for its prevalence in contemporary moral philosophy. Moreover, there has been a renewed interest in Kant’s moral philosophy in recent decades, due perhaps principally to John Rawls and his students. 3 In this dissertation I will investigate whether Aquinas too would accept the principle of humanity, and if so, how he would understand it. Aquinas is obviously not a contemporary moral philosopher.