A Nietzschean Critique of Kant's Highest Good
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University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1988 A Nietzschean critique of Kant's highest good. Donald M. Schneier University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Schneier, Donald M., "A Nietzschean critique of Kant's highest good." (1988). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2029. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2029 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE OF KANT’S HIGHEST GOOD A Dissertation Presented by DONALD M. SCHNEIER Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY September I988 Philosophy Copywright by Donald M. Schneier I988 All Rights Reserved A NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE OF KANT’S HIGHEST GOOD A Disser'ta'fcion Presented by DONALD M. SCHNEIER Approved as to style and content by: Sara Lennox, Member Michael Jubien, Department Head Philosophy ACKNOV/LEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the members of my committee, es- pecially Bob Wolff, for their guidance, the AT for offering a constructive environment, my other friends for their change of pace, and Karen and my father for their steady support over this long haul. IV ABSTRACT A NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE OF KANT'S HIGHEST GOOD SEPTEMBER I988 DONALD M. SCHNEIER, B.A. , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS M.A. , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Directed by: Professor Robert Paul Wolff The concept of the highest good is important to Kant be- cause it serves to connect his rationalist ethics to reli- gion. However, this concept entails a paradoxical treatment of the concept of happiness which some commentators believe strains Kant’s rationalism. After discussing and assessing previous approaches to this problem in Kant's ethics, I de- velop a different line of argument against it. I draw upon Nietzsche's theory of valuation to demonstrate how Kant's treatment of reward and punishment, and, hence, of happiness, diverges from his rational principles. Such a line seems to prove more decisive than previous efforts, as I furthermore argue. This Nietzschean approach also suggests a novel per- spective on the relation between Kant and Nietzsche. V TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ABSTRACT ^ INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1. HAPPINESS AND UTILITARIANISM IN KANT'S . ETHICS . 5 Introduction ^ The concept of happiness in Kant's ethics .... 6 Against happiness as a universal moral principle . 8 The moral status of .’ happiness . 10 Controversy over this status 12 Beck's and Wood's positions I5 Happiness as the matter of maxims 21 Universality and happiness in Kant's ethics ... 23 Kant the utilitarian ' 29 Universal happiness as Kant's highest good .... 33 Conclusions 38 References 40 2. SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM OF KANT'S ETHICS .... 42 Introduction 42 Difficulties in applying utilitarianism to Kant's ethics 43 The utilitarian analysis of Kant's highest good . 46 vi Schopenhauer as a critic of Kant’s eudaimonism . 51 The earlier and the later Kant 54 Schopenhauer on Kant and the intelligible world 56 Schopenhauer on reason in general in Kant's ethics 59 Schopenhauer on reason in the Groimdwork 63 Schopenhauer on reason in the second Critique . 70 Intelligible world and intelligible selves . 71 Schopenhauer and Beck, Wood, and the utilitarian 73 Conclusion 76 References 78 3. REASON AND RES SENTIMENT IN KANT'S ETHICS .... 80 Introduction 80 Virtue, happiness, and the best world 82 Nietzsche on reason and Kant's best world . 84 Nietzsche's Genealogy and Kant's Groundwork . 87 Reason and criticism in Kant's philosophy . 89 Master morality, slave morality, and ressentiment 94 Bad conscience and guilt 99 Both moralities in Kant's ethics 106 Conclusions 115 References 116 4 . THE VALUE OF HAPPINESS IN RATIONAL ETHICS 119 Introduction 119 Criticism of the concept of deserved happiness 121 The value of happiness 123 vii Reason and the existence of God Comparison with the other commentaries I33 The Nietzschean side of Kant I38 Conclusion References 5. CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY viii INTRODUCTION This project grew out of what was initially an histor- ical inquiry. I was then interested in the relation between some trends in contemporary philosophy and seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophy. This led me into doing some work on the way in which the contemporary philosophers Husserl, Ortega, and Heidegger have appropriated the doc- trines of Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant, respectively. Soon I developed a more concentrated interest in Kant, but my curiosity about his relation to more recent philo- sophy remained. As I became more familiar with Jaspers, it was Kant's relation to existential thinking in partic- ular which drew my attention. It seemed to me that the existentialist notion of freedom bears a close resemblance to the Kantian concept of autonomy. However, such a com- parison would seem to fly in the face of certain received opinions about the relation between Kant and the existen- tialists, For, existentialist individualism seems direct- ly antagonistic to Kantian universalism and impersonalism. Furthermore, Kant is often regarded as being the direct forerunner of Hegelianism, a doctrine which most existen- tialists seem to plainly, and even vehemently, oppose. These conflicting historical theses came into sharper relief as I began to study Nietzsche, who is regarded, on the one hand as one of the seminal figures in existential- ism, and on the other, as an opponent of anti -individual- istic thinking which seems to be essential to Kantianism 2 and Hegelianism. But, again, the views in question seemed to fall only uneasily into those historical categories. Nietzsche's advocacy of not only autonomy hut of also crit- ical methodology places him much more squarely in a Kant- ian tradition than such categorization would seem to have it. It was beginning to occiir to me that one of the key tenets of the received historical thesis is the assumption that Hegel is the sole legitimate nineteenth-century heir of Kant. At about the same time, as I was becoming acquaint- ed with Schopenhauer, the questionability of that tenet be- came obvious. For, Schopenhauer's philosophy is as much a development out of Kant's as is Hegel's, only one which is less popular and prominent. And furthermore, Nietzsche's thinking is quite clearly a direct development out of Scho- penhauer's. Hence, it was now possible to examine Kant's relation to existentialism in the context of a tradition which is able to bypass Hegel. After this, I began to concentrate on Nietzsche from among the existentialists, with an eye towards determining how Nietzsche maintains his advocacy of autonomy and cri- tique while apparently jettisoning Kant's committment to rationalism. Then my investigations took a surprising twist. Partly inspired by Deleuze, I began to see that Nietzsche had not in fact jettisoned rationalism, but, quite to the contrary, that it is one of his main contentions that it is Kant who tiirns misologist. 3 This surprising conception of the relation between Kant and Nietzsche seemed fruitful enough to be the makings of a project of the present scope. In fact, it became apparent that it would exceed present constraints. It became clear that such a project would require defending not only this novel conception of their relation, but also revised inter- pretations of each thinker individually. How to narrow down my ambitions became clear as I began to concentrate on the ethical facet of Kant’s philosophy. The concept, in the latter, of the highest good was emer- ging as one which, on the one hand, is clearly objection- able to Nietzsche, and, on the other, seemed to strain some fundamental Kantian rational principles, ^//hen I understood how Nietzsche’s objections are in the name of reason, even if present constraints precluded the possibility of defending it as a definitive imderstanding, I v/as nevertheless suf- ficiently prepared to proceed to. a. discussion of Kant’s ethics which appears in these pages. Thus, the focus of my discussion is on Kant's concept of the highest good. The first chapter below explains the con- cept and assesses its significance. The concept is impor- tant to Kant because it serves to connect his rational ethics to religion. However, the concept hinges upon a paradox- ical treatment of the concept of happiness, and, so, pre- sents a ripe target for criticism. This chapter will show that this weakness seems to force Kant to the undesirable resort of assistance from utilitarianism. 4 The second chapter responds to the utilitarian defense of Kant’s highest good, by examining a further criticism of the latter. Here I have recourse to some of the results of the historical phase of the genesis of this project, as this second approach is Schopenhauer's critique of Kant's high- est good. As will be seen, though, neither the Schopen- hauerian attack nor the utilitarian defense are decisive either individually or with respect to one another, so the status of that highest good remains at this point in ques- tion. The last two chapters attempt to resolve the issue by developing the Nietzschean approach to the question. This approach v/ill take advantage of the uncertainty of Kant's treatment of happiness by demonstrating discrepancies be- tween rational principles and Kant's treatment of reward and punishment. With this critique of Kant's highest good established, the need at the end of the foiirth chapter to explain my appropriation of Nietzsche for the critique a little further, affords me an opportunity to close with v;hat could serve as a preliminary discussion of the historical thesis v;hich I could not get to in these pages.