Reason and Belief in God in the Nietzschean Postmodern Philosophy: a Critical Study in the Light of Thomistic Philosophy

Reason and Belief in God in the Nietzschean Postmodern Philosophy: A Critical Study in the Light of Thomistic Philosophy

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of the Degree of

Master of Philosophy in Philosophy

by PRINCE D. (Reg. No. 1234802)

Under the Guidance of Jose Nandhikkara Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy

Department of Philosophy ProperCHRISTty of Ch rUNIVERSITYist University. BANGALORE, INDIA Use it for fair purpose. Give credit to theMarch autho r2013 by c iting properly, if your are using it. Approval of Dissertation

Dissertation entitled ‘Reason and Belief in God in the Nietzschean Postmodern

Philosophy: A Critical Study in the Light of Thomistic Philosophy’ by Prince D.

Reg. No. 1234802 is approved for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy in

Philosophy.

Examiners:

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Declaration

I, Prince D., hereby declare that the dissertation, titled ‘Reason and Belief in God in the Nietzschean Postmodern Philosophy: A Critical Study in the Light of Thomistic Philosophy’ is a record of original research work undertaken by me for the award of the degree of Master of Philosophy in Philosophy. I have completed this study under the supervision of Dr. Jose Nandhikkara, Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy.

I also declare that this dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any degree, diploma, associateship fellowship or other title. It has not been sent for any publication or presentation purpose. I hereby confirm the originality of the work and that there is no plagiarism in any part of the dissertation.

Place: Bangalore

Date: ………………… Signature of the candidate ……………….

Name of the candidate : PRINCE D.

Reg. No. 1234802

Department of Philosophy,

Christ University, Bangalore

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Certificate

This is to certify that the dissertation submitted by PRINCE D (Reg. No. 1234802) titled ‘Reason and Belief in God in the Nietzschean Postmodern Philosophy: A Critical Study in the Light of Thomistic Philosophy’ is a record of research work done by him/her during the academic year 2012-2013 under my supervision in partial fulfilment for the award of Master of Philosophy in Philosophy.

This dissertation has not been submitted for the award of any degree, diploma, associate-ship, fellowship or other title. It has not been sent for any publication or presentation purpose. I hereby confirm the originality of the work and that there is no plagiarism in any part of the dissertation.

Place: Bangalore Date: ………………… Signature of the Guide ………………….. Name of the Guide: Dr. Jose Nandhikkara Designation: Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy, Christ University, Bangalore

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Acknowledgement

I sincerely thank Dr. Jose Nandhikkara, my supervisor, for his guidance throughout the research and writing of this dissertation. He passionately shared his critical and creative insights that supported and expanded my work.

I want to thank my wife Susan, who went to be with the LORD and to whom this dissertation is dedicated, for her encouragement, support and prayers during my studies here at the University.

I am grateful to many persons especially Rev. Dr. Saju Chackalackal and Rev. Davies Panadan, for their concerns and all the support that they have extended to me. I also want to thank my mother who allowed me to take leave of my works at home and showed me much sacrificial love and care during my research work. I acknowledge with gratitude many of my friends, colleagues, and librarians who assisted my research and my friends who helped me financially, especially, Mr. Eldo Joy, Pastor Sabu George, and Mr. Vijay Pradeep. I do also acknowledge the help of Mrs. Anne Oommen Thomas and Mrs. Julie Sam George in editing the entire text.

Above all I thank God Almighty who carried me through all the painful situations that I had gone through, and using many individuals to encourage and complete this research work.

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Susan who went to be with the Lord

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Table of Contents

Approval of Dissertation i

Declaration ii

Certificate iii

Acknowledgement iv

Dedication v

Table of Contents vi

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1 CONCEPT OF GOD AND REASON IN NIETZSCHEAN PHILOSOPHY 8 1.1. FREDERICK NIETZSCHE: A BACKGROUND STUDY 8 1.1.1. Greek Influence of Nietzsche’s Philosophy 9 1.2.2. Christian Influence of Nietzsche’s Philosophy 9 1.2. NIETZSCHEAN CONCEPT OF ‘DEATH OF GOD’ AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 10 1.2.1. Death of God and Its Implication on Logical Reasoning 11 1.2.2. Death of God and Its Implication on Epistemology 13 1.2.3. Death of God and Its Implication on Metaphysics 15 1.2.4. Death of God and Its Implication on Morality 16 1.3. NIETZSCHEAN CONTRIBUTION TO POSTMODERN THINKERS 18 1.3.2. Lyotard’sPro Endper tofy oMetanarrativesf Christ Univ er sity. 20 Use it for fair pur1.3.3.pose .Delegitimation Give credit t ofo tKnowledgehe author by cit ing pr operly , if you r are 23us ing it.

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1.3.4. Foucault’s Death of Man 25 1.4. NIETZSCHEAN CONTRIBUTION TO POSTMODERN LANGUAGE AND REASON 27 1.4.1. Postmodern Idea about Reason 27 1.4.2. Postmodernism and Language 29

CHAPTER 2 ROLE OF FAITH AND REASON IN THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY 31 2.1. THOMISTIC CONCEPT OF FAITH AND REASON 31 2.1.1. Use of Reason in Thomistic Philosophy 32 2.1.2. Relations of Faith to Reason 33 2.1.3. Reason as Support to Faith 35 2.1.4. Faith Above Reason 36 2.2. THOMISTIC METHODOLOGY 38 2.2.1. Thomistic Concept of Reality 38 2.2.2. Thomistic Concept of Knowledge 39 2.2.3. Thomistic Concept of Truth 41 2.2.4. Thomistic Concept of Revelation 42 2.3. THOMISTIC ARGUMENTS FOR THE RATIONALITY OF FAITH IN GOD 44 2.3.1. Argument from Change 45 2.3.2. Argument from Causality 46 2.3.3. Argument from Necessary Being 48 2.3.4. Argument from Degree of Perfection to the Perfect Being 49 2.3.5. Argument from Design or Purpose 51 2.4. THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE IN GOD-TALK 53 2.4.1. Equivocal and Univocal Language in God-talk 53 2.4.2. God and Analogous Language 56

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CHAPTER 3 THOMISTIC METHOD AS A CORRECTIVE TO POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY THOUGHT 58 3.1. THOMISTIC CRITIQUE ON POSTMODERN REASON, LOGIC, AND EPISTEMOLOGY 58 3.1.1. Universal Law of Logic/Reasoning 59 3.1.2. Basis for Universal Logic 62 3.1.3. Commonsense Philosophy 64 3.1.4. Corrective to Postmodern Epistemology 65 3.2. THOMISTIC CRITIQUE ON POSTMODERN CONCEPT OF GOD 67 3.2.1. Metaphysical Concept of God: Nietzsche Versus Aquinas 68 3.2.2. End of Metaphysics: Lyotard Versus Aquinas 71 3.2.3. Deconstruction: Derrida Versus Aquinas 73 3.2.4. A Corrective to Postmodern Philosophy of God 74 3.3. THOMISTIC CRITIQUE ON POSTMODERN MORALITY 76 3.3.1. Legitimation of Morality: A Thomistic View 76 3.3.2. Deconstructing Morality: A Thomistic View 78 3.3.3. A Corrective to Postmodern Moral Philosophy 79

CONCLUSION 83

BIBLIOGRAPHY 90

Property of Christ University. Use it for fair purpose. Give credit to the author by citing properly, if your are using it. INTRODUCTION

Postmodernism is one of the most vigorous ideologies in almost all fields of knowledge like Philosophy, Religion, Sociology, Anthropology, Politics, Literature, Architecture, Arts and Media, etc. today. Since the term ‘post’ precedes ‘modernism,’ literally speaking, postmodernism is an ‘ism’ comes after modernism; one need to have a basic knowledge of pre-modernism (believe in theodicy) and modern (believe in reason) to understand postmodernism. Though Scholars have disagreement regarding the core doctrines of postmodernism, they all agree that postmodernism, as mentioned above, has spread her roots so wide and deep into the different discipline of knowledge.1 Therefore, when one tries to define postmodernism he/she must have, at least a basic knowledge of those disciplines. Without that one’s definition of postmodernism would be very relative and cannot represent the idea in its complete sense. Since each discipline has its own nature, goals and method which differ from other disciplines, scholars find it very hard to define postmodernism though it is not impossible to define postmodernism.

Philosophically speaking, according to Jean Francois Lyotard, postmodernism is “incredulity toward metanarratives.”2 Evidently, Lyotard is skeptical toward all meta-narratives because it claims to explain various events in history, gives meaning by connecting diverse events and phenomena by appealing to some kind of universal knowledge and rules. It is generally against all “modern values and convictions” and also against “the confidence that human reason is capable of revealing the secrets of nature and of establishing universally binding moral principles.”3 The reason behind this postmodern attitude is that postmodern methodology known as deconstruction, is understood as a revolt against any discipline that holds on to modern ideology of absolute truth, reason, and any system that gives a fixed boundary of meaning or truth as its root can be found in the Nietzsche’s philosophy. Its assumption is that no fixed, absolute or rational meaning/truth can be pragmatic. Therefore, I define

P r o p e r t y of Christ University. 1 Drolet, The Postmodernism Reader, 2. Use it for fair pur2p Lyotard,ose. G Theive Postmodern credit t oCondition the au, xxiv.thor by citing properly, if your are using it. 3 Glock, What Is Analytic Philosophy? 234. 1

postmodernism as a theory founded in the Nietzschean anti-foundanitonal principle of logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and morality later developed as ‘Deconstructivism’ of Derrida, ‘End of Metanarrative’ of Lyotard, and ‘Death of Man’ by Foucault by challenging universal and objective reasoning and meaning. The general response given by postmodern philosophers is that postmodernism is a response to the failed aspect of modern philosophy namely, as mentioned, fixed boundary of truth and reason. This is what I am trying to challenge in this research paper. In this paper I will show that it is neither modern nor postmodern philosophy that will satisfy the need of a rational believer but both faith and reason. Can postmodern philosophy meet this need? This is what I am going to study in this research paper. The influence of postmodernism or postmodern ideas cannot be ignored as it forcefully focuses on deep questions regarding logical reasoning, nature of language, epistemology and reality.4 Jacques Derrida, Michael Foucault, and Jean Francois Lyotard, are generally preoccupied with the negative aspect of modernist philosophy that is the reason why their mode of thought came to be known as deconstructivism. This postmodern negative approach has been shown even in the study of faith and reason.

The basis for this negative approach can be traced as postmodern authors write against, logical reasoning, fixed conceptual and linguistic meaning, notion of objective knowledge, and the possibility of constructing a systematic and “complete understanding of the world.”5 Postmodernist pay more consideration to the difficulty that modernism faced with, and try to rectify the difficulties involved in the modern way of thinking by means of deconstruction and by abolishing universal laws of reasoning. In this process it seems that postmodernism rejects all the traditional concepts of logical reasoning, epistemology, and metaphysics.

Faith and reason is a perennial subject in the field of philosophy. Many philosophers from early centuries of Christianity to the present have discussed and analysed the nature of faith and reason. While in the modern period integrating faith and reason or philosophy and theology was a struggle, in the postmodern period it becomes a meaninglessPro p taskerty aso f postmodernChrist Un i philosophyversity. challenges all universal

Use it for fair pur4p Gill,ose Deep. Gi Postmodernismve credit to, 9.th e author by citing properly, if your are using it. 5 Gill, Deep Postmodernism, 10.

foundations; for example, objectivity of logical reasoning, universality of laws of logic.

Postmodern philosophy was a reaction to the modern concept of reason. While trying to repair the errors of modern philosophy, postmodernism developed a philosophy which is anti-foundational in nature. Establishing a truth or a concept becomes impossible when we apply the principles of postmodernism. Here I do not deny any good results that may arise by applying postmodern philosophy. But, I find the basic problem of philosophy is in the methodology of postmodern thought. Therefore, it is essential for one to know and analyse the postmodern methodology of philosophizing.

In this paper I would analyze both the postmodern and Thomistic methodology of philosophizing.6 One of the major problems that a rational believer (theist) finds in the postmodern philosophy is that it has failed to give a rational basis for his/her belief.

One might ask why we need to evaluate postmodern philosophy from the Aquinas’ point of view and what Aquinas’ philosophy has to do with postmodernism. Philosophy is always a search for truth; it is a search for meaning and clarity, and basis for search for meaning in the world. Most of the prominent early philosophers argued for the rationality of belief in God. Aquinas believed in God and made use of those philosophical methods developed by early Greek philosophers for explaining the rationality of faith.

No other philosopher in the history of philosophy has emphasised and argued so well for the possibility of integrating reason and belief in God as Aquinas did. Every man is a rational being. Since postmodern philosophy, however, seems to be hopelessly anti-foundational which I will explain in the following chapters; it cannot satisfy the rational quest of a believer as its objectives is to correct where modernism failed and to see the possibility of finding meaning and truth what modernism could not do. However, philosophyProper tdevelopedy of Chr ibyst UAquinasnivers seemsity. to be more reliable and a

Use it for fair pur6p Thomisticose. G iPhilosophyve credi meanst to t hthee philosophyauthor bdevelopedy citin gby pSt.ro Thomasperly Aquinas., if you Henceforthr are us iIn g it. would use the name Aquinas for St. Thomas Aquinas.

possible alternative by which a believer can satisfy both his/her rational and spiritual thirst and hunger.

The postmodern methods are inadequate for establishing a rational basis for belief in God, and a believer who considers his/her faith to be reasonable will find fulfilment in this quest by applying Thomistic method of integrating faith and reason than the postmodern philosophy.

Based on the power of reason, modernism rejected the medieval faith in God and substituted the medieval dictum ‘In God we trust’ with that of ‘In reason we trust.’ Postmodernism, however, adopted a sceptical attitude towards both God and reason, by stating that the concepts of faith and reason are contingent and relative, not universal and objective. Postmodernism, in the process of reacting towards the modernism’s arrogance of reason, rejected the foundationalism carried by both Aquinas and modern philosophy. Now, the question to be considered is: How does a rational being justify his/her faith in God to be a reasonable faith if there are no foundations or fixed meaning, as proposed by the postmodernism?

I begin my investigation with Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-1900) ‘Death of God’ argument as it paved way for the immediate rise of postmodern thought on Faith and Reason, and then proceed to examine the teachings of three major philosophers of postmodernism, namely, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Jacques Derrida’s and Michael Foucault who followed Nietzschean ‘Death of God.’ Since postmodern thought considers that all meanings are complex, contingent (no objective meaning), mixed, and rhetoric, it is extremely difficult to establish a case for or against the rationality of faith in God. This may lead a believer to hard agnosticism rather than finding the rationality of faith in God. Aquinas, on the other hand, as mentioned before, holds on to a method of integrating faith and reason. Aquinas argues that reason and evidences could argue for faith in God. Reason alone as the modernists hold or anti- foundationalism as postmodernists hold cannot satisfy a rational believer but one requires both faith and reason to attain the knowledge of God. Aquinas does accept the limitations of reasonPro pander tassertsy of C thathris onet U nmustive rfirstsity .believe what she/he, in later Use it for fair purpose. Give credit to the author by citing properly, if your are using it.

point, may be able to provide a good evidence for. Thus he brings a balance between rationalists and fideists, evidentialists and presuppositionalists.7

In this paper I would start with Nietzschean foundations for the development of a philosophy on God and reason and its role in Postmodernist concept of God and reason. Then I shall look into Aquinas’ thought in relation to the concept of God and reason. Finally, I would critically examine the Aquinas’ method of integrating faith and reason as a substitute to the postmodern concept of God and reason. I would also see whether Thomistic method as a corrective to postmodernism in relation to Faith and Reason as it is a method that would satisfy a rational being in his/her quest.

In the first chapter I will deal with Nietzsche’s early life experience which has exerted influences in developing his philosophy of religion. The whole philosophy of Nietzsche, in relation to God and Reason, is developed from his ‘Death of God’ argument. I argue in this chapter that most of the postmodern philosophy of reality (Metaphysics), knowledge (Epistemology), reason (Logic) and ethics (Morality) is based on Nietzsche’s ‘Death of God’ proposal. This chapter explores also how the major postmodern thinkers, namely, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Michael Foucault were influenced by Nietzschean thinking, particularly by his arguments regarding the non-existence of God, and developed their postmodern philosophy, especially about God and Reason. Therefore, I believe analysing Nietzschean arguments against the existence of God, in the light of Thomistic philosophy would be as effective as evaluating the basic postmodern philosophies developed by the above thinkers who were influenced by Nietzsche.

In the second chapter I will explore the concept of faith and reason developed by Aquinas, where I will explain how reason can be used to attain knowledge. Here I shall also look at how faith is related to reason where I will argue that according to Aquinas reason cannot succeed in exploring truth without faith. Aquinas argues that true faith and true reason are always in harmony; when he makes such claims it is not a subjective truth as postmodernism believes but the objective truths known by them. This chapter shall alsoP rdealope withrty o thef C Methodologyhrist Unive ofrs iAquinasty. focussing on his views Use it for fa i r p u r p o s e . G i v e c r e d i t t o the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 7 Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, s.v. “Faith and Reason.”

on Reality, Knowledge, Truth and Revelation where I will argue that the methodology of Aquinas is both reasonable and practical in establishing truth in relation to the understanding of Divine truth through commonsense philosophy. Moreover, knowledge of God is attained only through the revelation of God. I shall also look into Aquinas’ arguments about the rationality of Faith in God.

There are four major arguments I will develop in the third chapter. First, I would argue that Aquinas’ understanding of universal law of logic or reasoning would be the best possible option to clear the ambiguity of knowledge in the postmodern philosophy. As Aquinas himself argues, the highest possible knowledge a human can attain is the knowledge about God. Second, I would argue that Aquinas’ concept of knowledge and reality would help one to make sense of his/her faith and reason in the postmodern age. Nietzschean understanding of God (Death of God) is not based on commonsense philosophy. Since postmodern philosophy is influenced by Nietzsche’s ‘Death of God’ theory, the Thomistic critique on this concept would compel the postmodern understanding of God to be reconsidered. Thirdly, I would argue from the Thomistic point of view that objective moral values exist and this is undeniable but this would make sense only if God exists. Finally, I will argue and propose that Thomistic philosophy is a possible corrective method to postmodern ideology of God and Reason. In the conclusion I would explain the why Thomistic philosophy is more plausible than the postmodern option.

Methodology

In this paper I follow the analytical and critical study, from the philosophical perspective, on the texts of Nietzsche and other thinkers mentioned above, and also on the concept of integrating faith and reason according to Aquinas. I shall critically evaluate, first, Postmodern Philosophy as based on Nietzschean thoughts, second, Aquinas’s philosophy and then, the postmodern thought on God and reason. I would use only the translated works of Nietzsche, Derrida, Lyotard and Aquinas. I would use the accepted translationPro ofpe r Aquinas’ty of C hSummarist U n Theologicaiversity. by Fathers of the English Use it for faDominicanir purpos Provincee. Give candre dSummait to t hContrae auth Gentilesor by c byiti nJosephg pro pRickaby,erly, if S.J.you Thisr ar estudy usin g it.

will be purely based on library research. And at the end, I would see whether Thomistic method and philosophy would be a possible and relevant philosophical method for philosophers all the time.

Scope and Limitations of the Paper

The scope of my research paper is to explore the Aquinas’ method and its richness in establishing the reasonableness of one’s faith in God. Applying Thomistic philosophy of faith and reason in the postmodern philosophy on God and reason would lead one to both revive and to come back to scholasticism. For postmodern philosophy does not offer any justification to a rational being for the faith he/she holds. Evaluating the fundamental assumptions of both Thomistic and postmodern philosophy on God and reason would help a believer to find fulfilment in his/her quest of truth about God. Though there are significant, similar topics in the subject area of postmodernism, yet I have limited my research paper to the concept of God and reason in the postmodern thought, by critically analyzing it in the light of Thomistic philosophy only.

Property of Christ University. Use it for fair purpose. Give credit to the author by citing properly, if your are using it. CHAPTER 1

CONCEPT OF GOD AND REASON IN NIETZSCHEAN PHILOSOPHY

In this chapter I shall argue that Nietzschean ‘Death of God’ theory became the cornerstone of postmodern philosophy of God. I will explore how Nietzschean philosophy has influenced postmodern idea of logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and morality. Philosophical investigations without the knowledge of aforementioned foundations cannot be established. In the first section of this chapter, I will begin my investigation with Nietzsche’s biographical background which has contributed to his philosophy.

1.1. FREDERICK NIETZSCHE: A BACKGROUND STUDY

It is important to explore the background in which Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844 -1900), one of the most influential philosophers of continental philosophy who significantly contributed to the growth of postmodern philosophy, grew up and the kinds of situation that made him to develop his philosophy.

Nietzsche was born on October 15, 1844, as the son of Karl Ludwig and Franziska Nietzsche. His father was a Lutheran Pastor in the small Prussian town of Röcken, near Leipzig. When Nietzsche was five years old his father died of brain haemorrhage. He had two siblings, a sister and a brother who died shortly after his father’s death. The loss of his Father and all the physical sufferings that he underwent in life has influenced his philosophy. Besides this painful situation, Greek influence that he received from his education and his religious view had also shaped his philosophy.

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1.1.1. Greek Influence of Nietzsche’s Philosophy

In the year 1864, Nietzsche began his studies at the University of Bonn as a theology and philology student, at the age of nineteen. Gradually his interest in the study of theology began to deteriorate and he started paying more attention to Greek and Latin classics.8 It is no doubt that it was this Greek and Roman classics, idea of genealogy, which later would become a central and unique style of this philosophy. In the year 1870 and 1871 Nietzsche lectured on Socrates and tragedy and the Dionysian worldview, which became a foundation for his first book, The Birth of Tragedy.9 Nietzsche found that the heroic ideal man, great and noble people in the Greek and Roman mythology are more influential in comparison to ordinary people. I think this is what exactly what postmodernism also tries to do; since it looks for ideologies that are more influential than that of coherent philosophies. In addition to the Greek influence, his Christian religious background also has influenced him to develop his philosophy which I would explain below.

1.1.2. Christian Influence of Nietzsche’s Philosophy

Nietzsche was one of the most influential critics of Christian faith. Nietzsche’s personal life was filled with unforgettably tragic events which prompted him to question Christian concept of life, God, and morality. He even went to the extent of denying the fundamental knowledge about reality or the world.10 Nietzsche’s criticism has some value among most anti-religious philosophers. The reason for this is that as a Lutheran minister’s son Nietzsche had familiarity with the basic Christian faith and practices.11 Though he was in fact, for some time, a practising Christian himself,12 the

8 Nietzsche studied with Otto Jahn (1813-1869) who was academically trained under Karl Lachmann (1793-1851) who was a well known philologist during that time. Luchamann’s specialized area was on the Roman philosopher Lucretius (98-55 BC) and also in the area of “textual recension” – which studies writings or documents from a genealogical aspect by which one can determine the original authorship of the specified text by comparing and distinguishing both the secondary and derived texts. Nietzsche also studied under Friedrich Ritschl (1806-1876) who was a specialist in the classics of Roman; his expertise was on the Roman comic poet Plautus (254-184 BC). 9 Pearson, ed., AP Companionroperty to o Nietzschef Chris, t3. U niversity. 10 Wicks, Nietzsche, 3. Use it for fair pur11p oHisse own. G iandve hiscr esisters’dit t otestimony the au tellstho thatr b yboth ci thein andg p hisro familyperly desired, if yo thatur hear eshould usin g it. become a clergy and he took theology during his undergraduate studies.

questions that bothered Nietzsche was about the purpose of life, life after death, and also the questions about the world itself. He could not conceive of a concept of a morally good God or ‘Heavenly Father’ whom his fatherly elders worshipped with unconditional love.13 He also struggled with the question of the problem of evil.14 The question that was persistent in his mind was “why a Heavenly Father would allow not only his own father to be taken from him, but also his innocent two year old brother.”15 He concluded that Christianity do not have an answer to this question. He felt that Christian beliefs are not unique as he had thought it to be. Since he realized the incompatibility of religious faith and reason, particularly that of Christian faith he concluded that ‘God is Dead.’ In the following section I would examine how ‘Death of God’ theory has influenced the fundamental aspects in his philosophy.

1.2. NIETZSCHE’S CONCEPT OF ‘DEATH OF GOD’ AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

The idea ‘Death of God’ first appeared in Nietzsche’s work titled The Gay Science; where he states, New struggles. – After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave – a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. – And we – we still have to vanquish his shadow, too.16

Now for him, by the ‘Death of God’ everything changes and nothing remains the same anymore,17 which leads to nihilism.18 Nietzsche was nihilistic about Western tradition, science, religion in general and Christianity in particular.19 According to Nietzsche, nihilism means the ‘Death of God’ or the devaluation of the highest value.20 Nietzsche’s personal hostile attitude towards Christianity led him to philosophical nihilism. He thought, basic teaching and practices of Christianity namely, faith in omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient and omnibenevolent

12 Magnus and Higgins, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, 90. 13 Wicks, Nietzsche, 3. 14 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, s.v. “Preface,” § 3. 15 Wicks, Nietzsche, 3. 16 Nietzsche, Gay Science, § 125. 17 Haase, Starting with Nietzsche, 95. 18 The word ‘nihilism’Prop e comesrty o fromf Ch theri s Latint U n wordive rnihilsity, .meaning ‘nothing’ or ‘that which does not exist.’ Use it for fair pur19p Welshon,ose. Gi Theve cPhilosophyredit to of t hNietzschee auth, 57.or by citing properly, if your are using it. 20 Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 20.

Supernatural Being is not at all a sound argument, for it deprives people from fully getting involved in the worldly affairs.21 Vattimo puts Nietzsche’s philosophical nihilism as: “In Nietzsche’s philosophy, God dies precisely because knowledge no longer needs to arrive at ultimate causes, humanity no longer needs to arrive at ultimate causes, humanity no longer needs to believe in an immortal soul etc.”22 In Nietzsche’s The Gay Science the mad man makes the following statements: What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing?23

There are two observations I want to make from the quote above. Firstly, it shows that people are in confusion; for he says, “Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? … Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as though an infinite nothing?” Finally, the phrase, “unchained this earth from its sun” shows that the traditional knowledge (whether scientific or philosophical) about the world ceases to exist and there is going to be a new dawn of knowledge; meaning knowledge is not attained through any traditional way of learning. The reason for this confusion is that the traditional philosophy (reason, epistemology, metaphysics and morality) which is based on God or Christian faith is extinct from the arena as it failed to answer the basic questions that Nietzsche had in his mind. Consequently, we have lost all the points of reference; standards by which we distinguish good from bad, A from B and that has left us with no standard of validation.24 In the following section I will explore the implication of ‘Death of God’ to logical reasoning, epistemology, metaphysics and morality.

1.2.1. ‘Death of God’ and Its Implication on Logical Reasoning.

If ‘God is Dead,’ then all knowledge that are traditionally passed on to us are in question. Nietzsche asserts, “Logic … applies only to fictitious entities that we have created. Logic is the attempt to comprehend the actual world by means of a scheme of

21 Wicks, NietzschePr,o 52.pe rty of Christ University. 22 Vattimo, The End of Modernity, 24. Use it for fair pur23p Nietzsche,ose. Giv Thee c Gayred Scienceit to t, h§181.e a u thor by citing properly, if your are using it. 24 Haase, Starting with Nietzsche, 100.

being posited by ourselves; more correctly, to make it formulatable and calculable for us”25 Here we see a transition from God centred philosophy to human centred philosophy. He further says in Human All Too Human: “Logic, too, rests on assumptions that do not correspond to anything in the real world...”26 This means that Nietzsche considers logic is nothing but illusion and has nothing to do with the real world. Then he shows his sceptical attitude towards logical reasoning. He considered the law of contradiction as dangerous to the world, for he states: If according to Aristotle, the law of contradiction is the most certain of all principles, if it is the ultimate and most basic, upon which every demonstrative proof rests, if the principle of every axiom lies in it; then one should consider all the more rigorously what presuppositions already lie at the bottom of it. Either it asserts something about actuality, about being, as if one already knew this from another source; that is, as if opposite attributes could not be ascribed to it. Or the proposition means: opposite attributes should not be ascribed to it. In that case, logic would be an imperative, not to know the true, but to posit and arrange a world that shall be called true by us. In short, the question remains open: are the axioms of logic adequate to reality or are they a means and measure for us to create reality, the concept “reality,” for ourselves? – To affirm the former one would, as already said, have to have a previous knowledge of being – which is certainly not the case. The proposition therefore contains no criterion of truth, but an imperative concerning that which should count as true.27

From the quote above it seems to me that firstly, Nietzsche assumes that with the notion of law of contradiction, it is possible, at least, to assume the actuality of being- because law of contradiction assumes a kind of consistency even if it may be from other sources; one must use laws of logic to arrive at this conclusion. Secondly, Nietzsche assumes that if “opposite attributes should not ascribe to it’ makes logic imperative; therefore, it cannot be used to find the truth. Therefore, it follows, we create our own reality and traditional understanding of logical reasoning is one of the worst error and illusion in the history of philosophy; thus, reason is not objective. Apart from that, Nietzsche argues that the problem of philosophy is that it has often been forced to construe reality to be the foundation for rational prerequisite which means it demands logic.28 This argument can only be valid if Nietzschean ‘Death of God’ is true.

25 Nietzsche, WillP toro Powerpert,y § o516.f C hrist University. 26 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, § 11. Use it for fair pur27p Nietzsche,ose. Giv Wille c tore Powerdit to, § t516.he author by citing properly, if your are using it. 28 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, Essay I, §13.

1.2.2. ‘Death of God’ and Its Implication on Epistemology

Logical reasoning and knowledge is interconnected. In Genealogy of Science Nietzsche says, “we simply lack any organ for knowledge, for ‘truth’: we know (or believe or imagine) just as much as may be useful in the interests of the human herd, the species.”29 What did Nietzsche mean when he said “we simply lack any organ for knowledge”? Here he is speaking about human logical reasoning! Because, by murdering God we are left with no absolute standard by which we may distinguish one thing from another. Nietzsche never said that knowledge is impossible. Elsewhere he says, “No honey is sweeter than that knowledge”30 and “whoever seriously wants to become free … his will desires nothing more urgently than knowledge and the means to it – that is, the enduring condition in which he is best able to engage in knowledge.”31 Here one finds a Nietzschean dilemma; for in one place he says we lack any organ for knowledge and elsewhere he says if anyone wants to be free must desire knowledge. Now the question left is what did he mean by knowledge/truth? Nietzsche says: I heard one of the common people say, ‘he knew me right away.’ Then I asked myself: What is it that the common people take for knowledge? What do they want when they want ‘knowledge’? Nothing more than this: Something strange is to be reduced to something familiar. And we philosophers – have we really meant more than this when we have spoken of knowledge? What is familiar means what we are used to so that we no longer marvel at it, our everyday, some rule in which we are stuck, anything at all in which we feel at home.32

It means knowledge for Nietzsche is to reduce all unfamiliar and complex ideas or anything unsettled to familiar. This also means to interpret all ambiguous and unsettled human experiences in a way that will be compatible with every day human understanding. Now the confusion is how does one do this without any organ for knowledge? Here comes the incompatibility of Nietzschean philosophy. Now this leads to another question why does somebody posses knowledge at all? Nietzsche has an answer: First and foremost, because by it we gain awareness of our power … Second, because, as we gain knowledge, we surpass older ideas and their representatives, became victors, or at least

29 Nietzsche, GayP Scienceroper, t§y 354. of Christ University. 30 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, § 292. Use it for fair pur31p Nietzsche,ose. Giv Human,e cred Allit tooto Humanthe a,u §t 288.hor by citing properly, if your are using it. 32 Nietzsche, Gay Science, § 355

believe ourselves to be. Third, because any new knowledge, however small makes us feel superior to everyone and unique in understanding this matter correctly.33

In other words, the purpose of attaining knowledge is, firstly, to have an awareness of our power, secondly, to surpass older ideas, thirdly, to make us feel superior to everyone. This purpose is actually derived from the notion of ‘Death of God.’ Since God is dead, one needs to trust in himself, all the old ideas that were based on the notion of God should be rejected and hence one needs to find new ideas that are superior to the old ones, and this new knowledge which are not based on a Divine Being can make man feel superior to everyone.

Ironically, Nietzsche thinks, with the ‘Death of God’ the possibility of knowledge has expanded; for Nietzsche states in Gay Science, “all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never been such an ‘open sea.’”34 This open sea gives a wide opportunity for knowledge because he further says, “for me it is a world of dangers and victories in which heroic feelings, too, find place to dance and play. With the principle “Life as a means to knowledge” –in one’s heart one can live not only boldly but even gaily, and laugh gaily too.”35 These Nietzschean statement shows that he is not consistent with this idea of knowledge. Moreover these differences are permitted as long as he holds on to his ‘Death of God’ theory. Thus Nietzsche considers the rationalistic ventures of human knowledge and truth as totally illusory, arbitrary and relative.36 ‘Death of God’ demolished all kinds of standard for judging knowledge from ignorance. This is where one can recognize the emergence of nihilism and precursory of postmodern deconstructivism and epistemology. Nietzsche developed an anti-foundationalism for the postmodern philosophy especially regarding belief in God.

33 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, § 252. 34 Nietzsche, Gay Science, § 343. 35 Nietzsche, Gay Science, § 324. 36 Nietzsche states elsewhere that “what, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms-in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people:P rtruthsope arerty illusions of Ch aboutrist Uwhichniv oneers hasity for. gotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and Use it for fanowir p matterurpo onlyse. asG imetal,ve c rnoe dlongerit to asth coins.”e aut See,hor Nietzsche, by citin “Ong p Truthrop eandrly Lie, if iny oanu Extrar are-Moral usin g it. Sense,” 46-47.

1.2.3. ‘Death of God’ and Its Implication on Metaphysics

Nietzsche himself is not in favour of any traditional metaphysical theory as he calls himself “a godless anti-metaphysian.”37 This empirical world, according to Nietzsche, is neither created nor emerged from the metaphysical world. Further he says: “Even if the existence of such a world were ever so well demonstrated, it is certain that knowledge of it would be the most useless of all knowledge: more useless than knowledge of the chemical composition of water must be to the sailor in danger of shipwreck.”38 Nietzsche also thinks that distinction between real and apparent world is “the greatest error that has ever been committed, the essential fatality of error on earth.”39 These assertions logically follow from the theory of ‘Death of God;’ because, first, if there is no God then he has not created the world, second, if there is no God then distinction between apparent world and metaphysical world is the greatest error that philosophers made in the history,40 third, even if there is such a metaphysical world, it does not help human beings at all because the idea of God is killed or wiped out from the mind of man.

It is pervasive in philosophy, however, that the perceptible world is not the only world but there is something beyond all the sensory experience. The real world became the foundation for fixed meaning, truth and morality; but the problem with this so called real world, according to Nietzsche, is fictitious – projection form the belief in the soul – where the concept of soul itself is bogus one. Nietzsche thinks, since we do not have any epistemological justification for making any inferences, and since no metaphysical argument can be demonstrated from fictions, metaphysics and

37 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morality, § 344. 38 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, § 9. 39 Nietzsche, Will to Power, § 584. 40 In his work Twilight of the Idols, he titled a portion as “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable;” he summarizes his arguments: “the real world – we have done away with it: what world was left? The apparent one, perhaps? […] But no! With the real world we have also done away with the apparent one!’ Here Nietzsche startds with the development or evolution of his ‘true world.”, Nietzsche says that in the past the real wold was attainable through its existence as a promise to pious Christians. As the time pasesPro bype itr ttakesy o fanother Chri sformt U thatniv becauseersity .the real world is both unattainable and unknown and the realization of the true world is seen as problematic. Finally, according to Use it for faNietzsche’sir purpo explanationse. Give thecr erealdi tworld to t andhe theau appthoarentr b worldsy citi nareg obliterated.properl ySee, i fNietzsche, your a Twilightre usin g it. of Idols: How the “True World” Finally Became a Fable, 1-6.

argument; from real world to metaphysical concept of God is impossible.41 This is where one sees the connection between the epistemology followed from ‘God is Dead’ theory and his metaphysics. No traditional philosophy goes with Nietzschean metaphysics.42

Finally, he says in Zarathustra, “God is dead; God has died of his pity for man.”43 He further says, “The greatest recent event – that ‘God is dead,’ that the belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable – is already beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe.”44 What did Nietzsche mean about the shadow? It is the shadow of ‘Death of God’ with all its implications i.e. man has lost his faith in the traditional concept of truth, meaning and morality which is based on the ultimate Being whom believers call God. Since Nietzsche denies the value of knowledge of the metaphysical world, it also affects the moral aspect of human life.

1.2.4. ‘Death of God’ and Its Implication on Morality

As I have already argued, Nietzsche speaks against all forms of older ideas especially ideas that are developed under the dictum ‘In God we trust.’ Even in the case of Nietzschean morality this is evident. When God died, man became the measure of all things. That is why Nietzsche’s moral philosophy seems to be more of egocentric. He is known as one of the “most influential and articulate modern defenders of egoism.”45 He thinks that whatever moral principles we have inherited from our ancestors were “catastrophically wrong-headed guide.”46 In his introduction to On the Genealogy of Morality, Keith Ansell Pearson writes: “for Nietzsche, morality represents a system of errors that we have incorporated into our basic ways of

41 Welshon, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, 76-77. 42 Nietzsche speaks against traditional understanding of substance and identity that is developed since Aristotle. Traditional philosophers argued that there are stable entities or in simple words, substance behind every curtains of the apparent world. Though philosophers have their own versions of the theory they all have shared some common features in which substance is called ‘really real’ meaning “the bearer of properties and relations, that it is self-identical at a time (synchronic identity) and over time (diachronic identity), and that it is what remains identical across change.” See, Welshon, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, 79-80. 43 Nietzsche, ThusP rSpokeope rZarathustraty of Ch, r114.ist University. 44 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, § 279. Use it for fair pur45p Richardsonose. Giv ande c rBakeredit eds. to, tAppliedhe au Ethicsthor, 112.by c iting properly, if your are using it. 46 Welshon, The Philosophy of Nietzsche, 16.

thinking, feeling and living; it is the great symbol of our profound ignorance of ourselves and the world.”47 Pearson points out that according to Nietzsche, mankind has been traditionally trained by four errors; namely, first, we see ourselves only incompletely, second we endow ourselves with fictitious attributes, third, we place ourselves in a false rand in relation to animals and nature, i.e. we see human beings as being inherently superior to them and finally we always invent new tables about what is good and then accept them as eternal and unconditional.48 In On the Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche asked these questions: Under what conditions did man invent the value judgments – good and evil? And what value do they themselves have? Have they up to now obstructed or promoted human flourishing? Are they a sign of distress, poverty and the degeneration of life? Or, on the contrary, do they reveal the fullness, strength and will of life, its courage, its confidence, its future?49

It seems to me that Nietzsche, in other words, argues that there should be some condition by with we must develop value judgement or good and evil. For example, a prescription demands a prescriber; likewise a moral law demands a moral law giver! But since God is dead the possibility for making value judgement is ruled out. Nietzsche further argues, we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values should itself, for once, be examined – and so we need to know about the conditions and circumstances under which the values grew up, developed and changed (morality as result, as symptom, as mask, as tartuffery, as sickness, as misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, remedy, stimulant, inhibition, poison), since we have neither had this knowledge up till now nor even desired it.50

Here one might note that for Nietzsche, firstly, epistemological foundation becomes necessary for moral values. But I have shown in the previous sections that Nietzschean epistemology is based on his ‘Death of God’ theory, therefore, it is entirely anti-foundational; secondly, morality is evolved over the period of time, hence, it is not objective and it changes as situation demands; or in other words, morality is neither good nor bad. According to him, “Morality no longer the expression of the living and growing conditions of a people, no longer its deepest instinct of life, but become abstract, become something opposed to life – morality as

47 Nietzsche, “Introduction: on Nietzsche’s critique of morality” to On the Genealogy of Morality, by Pearson, xvi. 48 Nietzsche, “Introduction:Property onof Nietzsche’sChrist U critiqueniver s ofit y morality”. to On the Genealogy of Morality, by Pearson, xvi. Use it for fair pur49p Nietzsche,ose. Giv One cthere Genealogydit to th ofe Moralityautho,r s.v. by “Preface citing,” §p 3.ro perly, if your are using it. 50 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, s.v. “Preface,” § 6.

the fundamental degradation of the imagination, as the ‘evil eye’ for all things.”51 That is why he severely criticizes and challenges the priority given to the habit of compassion, and self denial or sacrifice in the affairs of human conduct.52 He also warns people to get away from moral principles;53 because, with the ‘Death of God’ every traditional yardstick of reason and objective morality ceased to exist.

1.3. NIETZSCHE’S CONTRIBUTION TO POSTMODERN THINKERS

Nietzsche is generally known as ‘the grandfather of postmodernism.’54 Though there were opposing thoughts against the enlightenment thoughts prior to Nietzsche, it was Nietzsche who opened a major attack on the modern premise of truth. Nietzsche thinks that every idea we make is an arbitrary abstraction: No leaf ever wholly equals another, and the concept “leaf” is formed through an arbitrary abstraction from these individual differences, through forgetting the distinctions; and now it gives rise to the idea that in nature there might be something besides the leaves which would be “leaf” – some kind of original form after which all leaves have been woven, marked, copied, colored, curled, and painted, but by unskilled hands, so that no copy turned out to be a correct, reliable, and faithful image of the original form.55

The point Nietzsche wants to make is that the rules/concepts or foundations are arbitrary abstraction; therefore, those are not reliable or correct, in other sense, it is not universally acceptable and objectively verifiable. This Nietzschean philosophical insight has deeply influenced philosophers like Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard whom I have chosen as the eminent advocates of postmodern philosophy and followers of

51 Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ. § 25. 52 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, s.v. “Preface,” §6. Here Nietzsche states: “This problem of the value of compassion and of the morality of compassion (I am opposed to the disgraceful modern softness of feeling) seems at first to be only an isolated phenomenon, a lone question mark; but whoever pauses over the question and learns to ask, will find what I found: – that a vast new panorama opens up for him, a possibility makes him giddy, mistrust, suspicion and fear of every kind spring up, belief in morality, all morality, wavers, – finally, a new demand becomes articulate.” Elsewhere he also says: “There is nothing else to be done: the feelings of utter devotion, of sacrifice for your neighbor, and the entire morality of self-abnegation have to be mercilessly taken to court and made to account for themselves.” The same expression is also found in his other work. See Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §33. 53 Nietzsche, BeyondProp Gooderty andof C Evil,hr i§34st U: “nAsideive r fromsity . morality, the belief in immediate certainties is a stupidity that does us little credit!” Use it for fair pur54p Peirce,ose. G “Fromive c‘Howred itot Maketo th Oure a Ideauth Clear,’”or by 102cit-i108.ng p roperly, if your are using it. 55 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” 46.

Nietzschean philosophy. Their major concepts are discussed in detail in the following section.

1.3.1. Derrida’s Deconstruction

Deconstruction56 is a postmodern idea developed by Derrida.57 Deconstruction is an approach of critical analysis directed towards exposing unquestioned metaphysical assumptions and internal contradictions in philosophical and literary language.58 It is an effort to “rectify or eliminate the difficulty involved in the modernist way of thinking and speaking.”59 After analyzing Derrida’s argument Rosenau tells that postmodernism is “a post modern method of analysis and its goal is to undo all constructions. Deconstruction tears a text apart, and reveals its contradictions and assumptions…”60 Which means, like Nietzschean method that derived from his ‘Death of God’ theory, Derrida, through his deconstruction, wants to cancel all meaning or foundation that are attributed traditionally. It is at this point one can find the Nietzschean root to Derridean deconstruction.

Nietzsche’s critique on the Western Philosophy’s presuppositions that left nothing of its power to defend became a guiding factor for the theory and practice of postmodern deconstruction.61 Nietzsche develops a kind of “style of philosophic writing which remains intensely sceptical of all claims to truth – its own included – and which thus opens up the possibility of liberating thought from its age-old conceptual limits.”62 Nietzsche pressed against traditional concept of limits of language more than any other philosophers of Western philosophy and Derrida

56 This word first used by Heidegger in relation to interpretation, but the term deconstruction in relation to postmodernism has different meaning, because in Derrida’s use of deconstruction, he dismisses all kinds of metanaratives and engages in critically analyzing the text. 57 Jacques Derrida (July 15, 1930 – October 9, 2004) was born to an Algerian Jewish family in El-Biar, Algeria. Derrida criticizes western philosophy beginning from pre-Socratics to Heidegger through his published works, through which he challenges the fundamental privileging of “logos” in Western Philosophy. He also developed a method known as “deconstruction” to identify patterns within the act of writing. 58 Nicholas, Jacques Derrida, 24. 59 Gill, Deep PostmodernismProperty, 10.of Christ University. 60 Rosenau, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences, xi. Use it for fair pur61p Norris,ose. G Deconstructionive credit , t55.o t he author by citing properly, if your are using it. 62 Norris, Deconstruction, 56.

attempts to explore it further. Nietzsche, in a way, expected exactly the style and approach proposed by Derrida, where the two seem often engaged in a kind of strange common exchange.63 Norris further comments: Nietzsche often seems to spell out in advance the programme and systematic uses of deconstruction, adopting the same attitude of sceptical rigour and denying himself any secure resting-place in method or concept. Philosophers, he argued, were the self-condemned dupes of a ‘truth’ which preserved itself simply by effacing the metaphors, or figurative discourse, which brought it into being. If language is radically metaphorical, its meanings (as Saussure was later to show) caught up in an endless chain of relationship and difference, then thought is deluded in its search for a truth beyond the mazy detours of language.64

For Nietzsche, the notion that language concurrently hides and brings about its own deceitful works through twisting and displacement, forced him to conclude “that all philosophies, whatever their claim to logic or reason, rested on a shifting texture of figural language, the signs of which were systematically repressed under the sovereign order of Truth.”65 This leads to infinite relativity of meaning, and “the ways in which philosophers have disguised or occluded their ruling metaphors, are the point of departure for Derrida’s writing like Nietzsche’s before him.”66 Derrida explains that: The Nietzschean affirmation, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation. This affirmation then determines the noncenter otherwise than as loss of the center. And it plays without security. For there is a sure play: that which is limited to the substitution of given and existing, present, pieces.67

Norris adds to this Derridean assertion, “It is this dimension of Nietzsche’s thought which has not merely ‘influenced’ but in many ways uncannily pre-empted the work of deconstruction.”68 Thus Derrida vows his gratitude to Nietzsche for his foundation.

1.3.2. Lyotard’s End of Metanarratives

Jean Francois Lyotard69 is one of the major figures in postmodern philosophy. He is well known in developing the postmodern concept in the Europe. His thoughts on

63 Norris, Deconstruction, 56. 64 Norris, Deconstruction, 56. 65 Norris, DeconstructionProper, t57.y of Christ University. 66 Norris, Deconstruction, 57. Use it for fair pur67p Derrida,ose. G Writingive cr andedi Differencet to the, a369ut. hor by citing properly, if your are using it. 68 Norris, Deconstruction: Theory and Practice, 59.

‘end of metanarrative’ is considered as one of the roots of deconstructivism. He defines postmodernism as “incredulity toward metanarratives.”70 Metanarrative is a postmodern critical theory, sometime known as ‘grand’ or ‘master narrative,’ is a totalizing way of thinking - that a concept or narrative presupposes another concept or narrative beyond it. Lyotard thinks that “our working hypothesis is that the status of knowledge is altered as societies enter what is known as the post-industrial age and cultures enter what is known as the postmodern age.”71 This period, according to Lyotard, began since 1950s in Europe.72 Lyotard distinguishes modern age and postmodernism. According to him, the term modern “designate any science that legitimates itself with reference to metadiscourse ... making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative...”73 whereas the “condition of knowledge in the most highly developed societies” is called postmodernism. Lyotard calls systematized/structured, reasoned, and objective, ideas of modern age modernism and the well developed society who has started to think out of the box is called postmodernism. In his work, Engaging Deconstructive Theology, Ronal T. Michener observes Lyotard’s rejection of metanarrative as “the postmodern mood or condition has lost its faith in these metanarratives. History is no longer seen as a directed, goal-oriented process. Nietzsche’s announcement of “death of God” is followed by the death of history and progress as well.”74 It seems that Nietzsche’s views give firm foundation for Lyotard’s rejection of metaphysics; as Nietzsche affirms, Lyotard also affirms that “history does not necessarily have a universal finality.”75 The meta-discourses of modernity curbs the diversity of truth and language, all small or little narratives make a universal or totalizing way of thinking. Lyotard in his Postmodern Condition explains that there is a reason why postmodernism lost her faith in the modernism’s metanarratives; because, the increase of knowledge, progress in science and technological development. That could be the reason why he starts the work with these words: “The object of this study is the condition of knowledge in the most

69 Jean-Francois Lyotard (10 August 1924 – 21 April 1998) was professor emeritus at the University of Paris-Vincennes. 70 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, xxiv. 71 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 3. 72 Lyotard, The PostmodernProperty Condition of Chr, 3.is t University. 73 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, xxiii. Use it for fair pur74p Michener,ose. Gi vEngaginge cred iDeconstructivet to the au tTheologyhor by, 52. ci ting properly, if your are using it. 75 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 51.

highly developed society.”76 Then after defining postmodernism as an ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’ he says, “This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the sciences...”77 However, Lyotard never takes science as the measuring rod. Knowledge [savoir] in general cannot be reduced to science, nor even to learning [connaissance]. Learning is the set of statements which, to the exclusion of all other statements, denote or describe objects and may be declared true or false. Science is a subset of learning. It is also composed of denotative statements, but imposes two supplementary conditions on their acceptability: the objects to which they refer must be available for repeated access, in other words, they must be accessible in explicit conditions of observation; and it must be possible to decide whether or not a given statement pertains to the language judged relevant by the experts.78

For Lyotard knowledge in the broad sense is different from science because it involves: Notions of “knowhow,” “knowing how to live,” “how to listen” [savoir-faire, savoirvivre, savoir-ecouter], etc. Knowledge, then, is a question of competence that goes beyond the simple determination and application of the criterion of truth, extending to the determination and application of criteria of efficiency (technical qualification), of justice and or happiness (ethical wisdom), of the beauty of a sound or color (auditory and visual sensibility), etc.79

The scientific knowledge has distanced itself from social bond, since it claims the existence of an objective reality or nature that exists independently of the society.80 In his work, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, he comments on metaphysics in the following words: According to its own concept, metaphysics cannot be a deductive context of judgments about things in being, and neither can it be conceived after the model of an absolute otherness terribly defying thought. (Metaphysics) would be possible only as a legible constellation of things in being ... (Metaphysical would bring (things in being) into a configuration in which the elements unite to form a script. The smallest intermundane traits would be of relevance to the absolute ... Metaphysics immigrates into micrology. Micrology is the place where metaphysics finds a haven from totality.81

Rejection of metaphysics by Lyotard is seen in his discussion of postmodern philosophy of science as the metaphysical concepts are merged into science. Rational objectivity was a paradigm invigorated by the enlightenment perspective of science. Finally, when commenting on Nietzsche’s nihilism Lyotard says:

76 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, xxiii. 77 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, xxiv. 78 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 18. 79 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition,18. 80 However he admits that scientific knowledge is “indirectly a component of it, because it developed into a professionPro andpe r givesty o f rise C h tor i institutions,st Unive andrsi t iny . modern societies language game consolidate themselves in the form of institutions run by qualified partners (the professional class).” Use it for faSeeir Lyotard,purpo sThee. PostmodernGive cre dConditionit to th, 25.e a uthor by citing properly, if your are using it. 81 Lyotard, Differend, 87.

The prevailing idea (from Plato to Schopenhauer and Wagner) that the primary task for mankind is to seek the foundation enabling it to speak truth and to behave in accordance with justice and goodness. The main idea of Nietzsche's philosophy is that there is nothing like an “according to,” nothing like a first or initial principle… All discourses, the scientific and philosophical ones included, are only prospects, or Weltanschauungen.82

Lyotard argues for new ideas and possibilities for a fresh and new ideology or discovery. Therefore he never insists on the overarching method or grand narrative as mentioned earlier.83 Since the end of metanarrative leaves epistemology with no basis, Lyotard has argued for delegitimation of knowledge which I would discuss in the following section.

1.3.3. Delegitimation of Knowledge

In his work, Postmodern Condition, Lyotard analyses delegitimation of knowledge. Delegitimation is an act that separate knowledge from binary opposites. It deals with legitimation and argues that no legitimation of knowledge is possible in the developed society. He lays out two type of delegitimation. First, science leaves the metaphysical search for a first proven (transcendental) authority behind in reaction to the question: how does one prove the proof or who decides the condition for truth and recognize or establishes the conditions of truth by the rules of its own game. Secondly, in spite of all its appearances, science is unable to free itself from narrative, because it remains bound or subordinated to a wider quest for the socio-political delegitimation of knowledge beyond the realm of argumentation and proof.84 As mentioned above, this is exactly what Nietzsche argues in the dawn of ‘Death of God’ theory.85

82 Lyotard, “Re-Writing Modernity,” pp. 3-9. 83 For detailed description see Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 65, where he argues, “The pragmatics of science is centered on denotative utterances, which are the foundation upon which it builds institutions of learning (institutes, centers, universities, etc.). But its postmodern development brings a decisive “fact” to the fore: even discussions of denotative statements need to have rules. Rules are not denotative but prescriptive utterances, which we are better off calling metaprescriptive utterances to avoid confusion (they prescribe what the moves of language games must be in order to be admissible). The function of the differential or imaginative or paralogical activity of the current pragmatics of science is to point out these metaprescriptives (science’s “presuppositions”) and to petition the players to acceptPro differentperty oones.f C hTheri sonlyt U legitimationniversity .that can make this kind of request admissible is that it will generate ideas, in other words, new statements.” Use it for fair pur84p Lyotard,ose. G Theive Postmodern credit to Condition the au,t 29.ho r by citing properly, if your are using it. 85 Nietzsche, Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, s.v. “Preface,” § 3.

Lyotard proposes two main modern or grand narratives of delegitimation. a) the one that is political in nature – based on the dictum, ‘all people have a right to science;’ this is found in the enlightenment in relation to the concept of universal emancipation, and speculate a connection between the state controlled education, and the training for the progress of the state; b) speculative or philosophical narrative which involves a different relation between science, nation and the State.86 This narrative suggests that “knowledge first finds legitimacy within itself, and it is knowledge that is entitled to say what the State and the Society are.”87 Now with the emergence of modern science, the traditional concept of legitimation of knowledge is destroyed which I believe opposite is the case. Even this idea owes much to Nietzschean ‘Death of God’ theory, as it wants to free knowledge from all traditional (older) boundaries and to Nietzschean evolution of knowledge of metaphysics.

For Lyotard, however, “the grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation.”88 According to him, the main cause for the collapse of grand/meta-narrative was an effect of the blossoming of techniques and technologies that has moved its emphasis to its means rather from end of action.89 In other words, it points to the transformation of the nature of science. These fundamental changes in the nature and status of knowledge, there is no longer any unifying or universal identity for the society and this leads the individuals to develop conflicting moral and political codes and the social bond is fragmented.90 As, with the rise of the theory – ‘God is Dead,’ with the rise of science, knowledge is delegitimized. As the ‘Death of God’ theory promoted the end of reason, epistemology and of metaphysics, it also brought an idea of ‘The Death of Man” developed by Foucault which I would discuss in the following section.

86 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 31-32. 87 Lyotard, The PostmodernProperty Condition of Chr, 34.ist University. 88 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 37. Use it for fair pur89p Lyotard,ose. G Theive Postmodern credit to Condition the au,t 37.ho r by citing properly, if your are using it. 90 Malpas, Jean Francois Lyotard, 28-29.

1.3.4. Foucault’s ‘The Death of Man’

Foucault had a strong reaction against theological ideologies, especially against moral theology, and he was also a strong proponent of postmodern decconstructivism. Foucault asserts in the concluding statements of his work, The Order of Things, that “As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end.”91 The questions that rise here is when was man invented? The invention of man began when God died. Because, it was when God died man actually began to realise who he was and is as all the standard of judgment centred on him and nothing else. Foucault’s works especially, Discipline and Punish and The Will to Knowledge, heavily vow their indebtedness to Nietzsche. It is interesting to note that in his work, The Order of Things, referring to Nietzsche, Foucault states, he “marks the threshold beyond which contemporary philosophy can begin thinking again; and he will no doubt continue for a long while to dominate its advance.”92 This statement clearly shows how deeply Nietzsche’s ideology has influenced Foucault’s philosophy. Scholars like Allan Megil and Alan Sheridan, Charles Lemert and Garth Gillan do affirm that Nietzschean idea has a strong influence on Foucault.93 Nietzsche challenged the progress and the development of the Nineteenth Century, which praised rationality with his ‘Death of God’ argument. This gave a colossal opportunity for Foucault to challenge the truth or call in to question.

Foucault modelled a kind of Nietzschean style and proclaimed the Death of Man in his work, The Order of Things. Foucault himself admits Nietzschean influence on his writings: It is easy to see why Nietzsche’s thought should have had, and still has for us, such a disturbing power when it introduced in the form of an imminent event, the Promise-Threat, the notion that man would soon be no more – but would be replaced by the superman; in a philosophy of the Return, this meant that man had long since disappeared and would continue to disappear, and that our modern thought about man, our concern for him, our humanism, were all sleeping serenely over the threatening rumble of his non-existence.94

91 Foucault, The Order of Things, 387. 92 Foucault, The POrderrop ofer Thingsty of, 373.Ch rist University. 93 Downing, The Cambridge Introduction to Michel Foucault, 12. This issue has been Use it for fadiscussedir purp ino detailse. G ini theve writingscredit like, to tRobinson,he auth Nietzscheor by canditi nPostmodernismg properly, 44., if your are using it. 94 Foucault, The Order of Things, 351.

In response to Foucault’s statement Carrette rightly comments that in Foucault’s “work there was no need to demolish religious thinking. Rather his work builds on the assumptions of a deceased religious order. It assumes the death of God.”95 However we must be aware about the terms that Foucault uses in his writings. When Foucault says about the non-existence of man he is not denying the existence of human beings; rather, he uses ‘man’ in a metaphorical sense to explain the discourse which caused the emergence of present “description of ‘man’ as a product of socio-cultural factors and relations of power.”96 It is clear that in this context Foucault’s Death of Man, is similar to postmodern denial of the enlightenment idea of self. According to this, ‘man’ or ‘self’ is created by the use of language and therefore language becomes the foundation for knowledge. Likewise the concept of ‘Death of God’ also points to the death of the author – here the author’s speech is no longer his creation and the author is no longer the main subject at hand. As Foucault writes, “the author function is therefore characteristic of the mode of existence, circulation, and functioning of certain discourses within a society.”97 And interestingly, here, the author only turns into to be a subject “when he or she is ‘subjected’ to a system of differences and distinctions – in short, when subjugated to a language.”98 Thus, as ‘Death of God’ promoted, there is no metaphysical relation to man and there is no standard by which we measure morality.

Thus far I was exploring the Nietzschean basis for logic, metaphysics and epistemology and how they had influenced the prominent advocates of postmodern thought. Now I would like to see how Nietzsche has contributed to postmodern language and reason as it plays a major role in God-talk.

95 Carretee, Foucault and Religion, 55. 96 Michener, EngagingProp Deconstructiveerty of Chr Theologyist Un,i 85.ve rsity. 97 Foucault, “What Is An Author?” in The Foucault Reader, 108, cited in Michener, Engaging Use it for faDeconstructiveir purpose Theology. Give ,c 85.re dit to the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 98 Michener, Engaging Deconstructive Theology, 85.

1.4. NIETZSCHE’S CONTRIBUTION TO POSTMODERN LANGUAGE AND REASON

Understanding Nietzschean contribution to the postmodern philosophy of language, logical reasoning and God is very crucial in this research paper. The first two postmodern ideas are very essential in understanding the concept of God in postmodern philosophy. Because, in the postmodern philosophy, linguistic methods and the concept of non-fixed meaning serve as the guiding factors in the search of truth.

1.4.1. Postmodern Idea about Reason

For Nietzsche, ‘the illogical’ is necessary; for man he states, “One of those things that may drive a thinker into despair is the recognition of the fact that the illogical is necessary for man, and that out of the illogical comes much that is good.”99 Nietzsche thinks that logic is “the conceptual understandability of existence”100 In the following pages I will show that Nietzsche is not consistent with this statement.

Now logical is not that interesting for him; for Nietzsche thinks that “Logic they considered necessary – like bread and water – but similarly it would be a kind of prison meal if taken on its own with nothing added.”101 Logic does not have any primary value, and logic is treated as the last option: “one chooses logical argument only when one has no other means.”102 This is a self defeating statement since he presupposes the validity of logic in the statements itself. The ‘Death of God’ demands the freedom from logic, and he understands that ultimately he cannot get away from the laws of logic.

Nietzschean understanding of logic has heavily influenced in the postmodern thoughts and thus postmodern interpretation is anti-objectivist, the kind of individualized comprehension. If there is any objective method such as objective logic

99 Nietzsche, HumanPro Allpe trooty Human of C,h 31.ri s t University. 100 Nietzsche, Gay Science, §370. Use it for fair pur101po Nietzsche,se. Giv Thee c rGayed iSciencet to t,h §e82. a u t hor by citing properly, if your are using it. 102 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 6.

then Derrida’s deconstruction, Foucault’s subjective morality as a result of death of man and Lyotard’s end of metanarratives are all illegitimate. It is more of seeing more. It dismisses distinction between self and other, fact and values. And one can never make out what one intends by language because ultimately all textual meaning, all interpretation, is undecidable.103

Confidence in objective reasoning and rationality of modernism had begun to decay both in social studies and in our society by the rise of postmodern trends. Lyotard commends on the end of modern reason in his work Postmodern Condition: There is no reason to think that it would be possible to determine metaprescriptives common to all of these language games or that a revisable consensus like the one in force at a given moment in the scientific community could embrace the totality of metaprescriptions regulating the totality of statements circulating in the social collectivity. As a matter of fact, the contemporary decline of narratives of legitimation – be they traditional or "modern" (the emancipation of humanity, the realization of the Idea) – is tied to the abandonment of this belief.104

Postmodern thinkers conclude that although an individual may reflect on a topic; s/he employs reasoned arguments, and goes through the action of rationality evaluating evidence, and thus goes along with preference rather than privileged insight.105

There are several reasons why all postmodernists beginning from Nietzsche, to be sceptical about reason. Mainly because it assumes universalism, unifying integration, and the idea that applies everywhere. Reasoned argument is generally considered to be fundamentally the same irrespective of country, culture and even historical periods. But on the contrary, postmodern thinkers demand, apart from a special understanding on each situation as it has its own differences subjective logic would lead to total relativism. As Harland explains postmodern logic is “logic beyond any form of reason whatsoever,”106 postmodernism does not adhere to a universal reason. All archetypes, events, texts and narratives have their own logic and reason.

103 Derrida, WritingPr oandpe Differencerty of C, 292.hri st University. 104 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, 65. Use it for fair pur105po Rosenau,se. Gi vPoste c-Modernismredit to tandhe the au Socialthor Sciences by cit,i 128.ng properly, if your are using it. 106 Harland, Superstructuralism, 140.

1.4.2. Postmodernism and Language

I have already explained the Nietzschean influence on Derrida’s deconstruction which plays a major role in the postmodern philosophy of language. Nietzschean influence on the postmodern language, however, is not confined to deconstruction. Nietzsche is very critical about any understanding of the subject as a ‘self-directed entity representing itself’ through rational quality. In his work, Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes, “...our world of desires and passions is the only thing “given” as real, that we cannot get down or up to any “reality” except the reality of our drives…”107 Therefore, thoughts and ideas have to be understood as being produced from how these drives relate to one another. In Nietzschean thought, dissolving the subject as an independent entity can perhaps be recognized through his understanding of language. According to Nietzsche, we cannot know the world as it is in itself: Where there are linguistic affinities, then? because of the common philosophy of grammar (I mean: due to the unconscious domination and direction through similar grammatical functions), it is obvious that everything lies ready from the very start for a similar development and sequence of philosophical systems; on the other hand, the way seems as good as blocked for certain other possibilities of interpreting the world.108

It seems that according to Nietzsche, there are no assured connections between language and reality. Nietzsche is extremely critical about the capability of language to obtain the truth about reality or to portray how things really are.109 Elsewhere he says: A quantum of force is just such a quantum of drive, will, action, in fact it is nothing but this driving, willing and acting, and only the seduction of language (and the fundamental errors of reason petrified within it), which construes and misconstrues all actions as conditional upon an agency, a ‘subject’, can make it appear otherwise.110

Here, following things are obvious: firstly, it says how the subject has to be understood in terms of its relatively given conditions, secondly, how these conditions decide the subject’s ability to be recognized and relate to the world; to put it in other way, there is no pure subject of knowledge.111 The reason behind this assertion is nothing but his concept of ‘Death of God’ for elsewhere Nietzsche states, “I am afraid

107 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §35. 108 Nietzsche, BeyondPro pGooderty and of Evil Ch, §20.rist University. 109 Henriksen, The Reconstruction of Religion, 137. Use it for fair pur110po Nietzsche,se. Giv One c there dGenealogyit to th ofe aMoralityuthor, Essayby c I,it §13.ing properly, if your are using it. 111 Henriksen, The Reconstruction of Religion, 137.

we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.”112 Now it seems that Nietzschean philosophy of language tries to open up the possibility of deliberating thought from its limits of old age concepts. This Nietzschean forces against the limits of language; that is, logic of grammar forces the meaning to be confined, takes away the logic in grammar then we are free to impose any meaning into a word, this is how exactly how Derrida attempts to define in his deconstruction.113 Lyotard also follows the same course as Derrida does with Nietzsche; for he says, “we do not necessarily establish stable language combinations, and the properties of the ones we do establish are not necessarily communicable.”114 It is clear that this depiction of knowledge is the outcome of a plurality of local or small narratives. But Lyotard does not consider that an interpretation of science represents the totality of all true knowledge. He argues for a narrative understanding of knowledge, portraying it as a multiplicity of smaller stories that function well within the particular contexts where they apply.115 As a result of Nietzschean philosophy of language, (as against the traditional understanding of truth) almost all postmodern philosophers reject truth as a goal or ideal because for them it is the very epitome of modernity. For Derrida, “there is no such thing as a truth in itself. But only a surfeit of it! Even if it should be for me, about me, truth is plural.”116 Which means, there is no higher or universal language to which we can appeal that will resolve all differences and render everything finally clearer to us. Therefore we always have to interpret, from one language to another; there never has been an original language or an original text that paved the way for our endless work of translation.117 Since language produces and reproduces its own world and ideas without any references to reality, it is impossible to say anything certain for language is completely an artificial sign system and cannot assure truth.118 Therefore, according to postmodern philosophy, it is impossible for one to make any rational talk about God and faith in Him.

112 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 5. 113 Norris, Deconstruction, 56. 114 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, xxiv. 115 Norris, Deconstruction, 114. 116 Derrida, SpursP, r103.op erty of Christ University. 117 Hart, Postmodernism, 5. Use it for fair pur118po Murphy,se. Gi v “Computerization,e credit to th ePostmodern author b Epistemologyy citing p andro p Readingerly, i f in y theou r Postmodern are usin g it. Era.” 175-82. CHAPTER 2

ROLE OF FAITH AND REASON IN THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY

In the previous chapter I have expounded that Nietzsche worked as a precursor of postmodern philosophy especially of the postmodern philosophy of God. I have argued that it was Nietzschean philosophy that became a foundation for postmodern philosophy, like the end of meta-narrative, deconstruction, and death of man by subjectivizing morality. Then I also showed that postmodern understanding of language, reason and concept of God is not foundational, therefore, it is impossible to provide a rational justification for the belief in God. In this chapter I will explore how Aquinas’1 methodology, his views on reason and language and and his reasons to believe in God actually provide reasons for belief in God.

2.1. THOMISTIC CONCEPT OF FAITH AND REASON

In this section I will discuss Aquinas’ views on faith and reason; and also will examine how faith is related to reason. Finally I would show the uniqueness of Aquinas’ view.

1 St. Thomas Aquinas was considered as one of the great priests and the doctors of the Holy Roman Catholic Church. He was born in 1226 as the son of Landulph, Count of Aquino. When he became old enough to choose his future he decided to denounce the worldly pleasures and go for the service of the Lord by entering the Order of Preachers (Dominicans). He studied at Cologne under the famousSt. Albert the Great. Because he was a brilliant student, at the age of twenty two, he was appointed to teach in the city of Cologne where he began to publish his first work. Because of his amazing contribution at the age of thirty-one, he received his doctorate. He left the great memorial of his learning, the Summa Theologica, unfinished, as he was travelling to the second Council of Lyons, which was ordered there by Gregory X. In 1274, he fell sick and died at the Cistercian monastery of Fossa Nuova. His works are important in the fields of philosophy, political science, religion, ethics etc. Apart from his Summa Contra Gentiles and Summa Theologica some of the other major works are The Disputed Questions on Truth, On Charity, On Evil, On the Power of God, On the Virtues in General, On Spiritual CreaturesPrope, rQuestionsty of C onhr theist SoulUn, iandve rcommentarysity. on Aristotle’s metaphysics.

Use it for fair pur pose. G ive c redit t o the a uthor by cit ing pr operly , if you r a r e u 31sing it.

2.1.1. Use of Reason in Thomistic Philosophy

According to Aquinas, use of natural reason is mandatory to deal with belief in the supernatural. What can be “known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as … perfection supposes something that can be perfected.”2 One who had attained training in reason or in philosophy could profitably learn truths of theology. The primary work of philosophy is to reflect and clarify the truth that people normally fail to notice; for philosophy is made up of these truths3 One of the major uses of reason is to analyze the thoughts of philosophers so that one can explore the corresponding ideas in the science of the Sacred Doctrine namely theology.

For Aquinas, reasoning is a habit of knowing. It helps us to grasp principles and arguments leading to the right understanding of reality and it is very essential to an educated believer especially to a Christian believer. However, he also speaks of how wisdom or philosophy was eagerly sought by the Gentiles.

According to Aquinas, natural reason is common to all irrespective of whatever religious or ethnic background one may have. In response to attacks on Christian faith, Aquinas reasoned that we as believers, are unaware of the Gentile’s doctrines and the Gentiles too do not believe in the sacred Scriptures of the Christians. He further says, therefore, “It is necessary to have recourse to natural reason, which all are obliged to assent to.”4 Then he goes on to say elsewhere that reason resists any attacks on faith from logic.5 For Aquinas, whatever is true in natural reasoning is also true in the sacred theology and whatever is true in sacred theology is also true in natural reasoning.6 Aquinas maintains that reason can be used to establish natural theology which studies the existence and nature of one God, and also to demonstrate divine concepts like Holy Trinity are not contradictory to reason.

2 Aquinas, Suma Theologica, I, q.2, a.2. 3 McInerny, AquinasPro, p30.e rty of Christ University. 4 Aquinas, Suma Contra Gentile, I, 2. Use it for fair pur5p Aquinas,ose. G Sumaive cContraredit Gentile to th, eI, a9.u thor by citing properly, if your are using it. 6 Aquinas, Suma Contra Gentile, I, 7.

Aquinas asks people to accept two kinds of truth – the “one that can be attained by rational enquiry, another that transcends all the industry of reason.”7 Therefore, to make the rational enquiry, one must proceed through demonstrative argument as Aquinas puts it: But because such reasons are not forthcoming for truth …. our aim ought not to be to convince the adversary by reasons, but to refute his reasonings against the truth, …since natural reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith. …There are however some probable reasons available for the declaration of this truth, to the exercise and consolation of the faithful, but not to the convincing of opponents, because the mere insufficiency of such reasoning would rather confirm them in their error, they thinking that we assented to the truth of faith for reasons so weak.8

According to Aquinas first of all, the truth of the faith does not contradict natural reason or vice versa. Secondly, reason is so much evident in the natural realm. For him, existence of God is self-evident absolutely (in itself) but not relatively (to us).9 Therefore, eventually, one needs to accept those things that can be demonstrated through reason and also the things that go beyond reason. This concept is totally contradictory to the postmodern philosophy of reasoning; since it does not give any place for reasoned assumptions.

2.1.2. Relations of Faith to Reason

According to Aquinas, faith employs reason and reason cannot achieve truth without faith. Therefore, faith is interconnected with reason. For he says, Nothing may be asserted as true that is opposed to the truth of faith, to revealed dogma. But neither it is permissible to take whatever we hold as true and present it as an article of faith. For the truth of our faith becomes a matter of ridicule among the infidels, if any Catholic, not gifted with the necessary scientific learning, presents as a dogma what scientific examination shows to be false.10

However, Aquinas never thinks reason can produce faith.11 Some divine truths are achievable by human reason; for example, the notion that God exists and He is one. Aquinas states, “such truths about God have been proved demonstratively by the

7 Aquinas, Suma Contra Gentile, I, 9. 8 Aquinas, SumaP Contrarope Gentilerty of, I,C 9.h rist University. 9 Aquinas, Suma Contra Gentile, I, 10. Use it for fair pur10p D’Arcy,ose. G Aquinasive cr,e 30.di t to the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 11 Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, s.v. “faith and reason.”

philosophers, guided by the light of the natural reason.”12 Studying philosophy will help one in the study of theology. It means, “faith impels them to yield in our mind some understanding of the mysteries of God,”13 which are based upon the evidences of reason alone.

The first question Summa asks is also about the relation between philosophy (natural reason) and theology. The emphasis we find here is the relation “between faith, the source of theology, and reason, the source of philosophy.”14 Peter Kreeft explains the inter relation of faith and reason in the following way: Aquinas’s answer to this question is the foundation of the whole immense edifice of his authorship, whose “grand strategy” was to show the harmony, or marriage, of reason and faith, of philosophy and theology, of the Greek and the biblical traditions. Philosophy is a work of human reason alone. There is a kind of theology that is also the work of human reason alone.15

One thing is to be noted, that when Aquinas speaks about faith and reason that are always in harmony, he does not mean “the subjective, psychological acts of believing and reasoning but the objective truths known by them.”16 Which means, he does not take any psychological reason which can be relative; rather, he held on to the truth known by all which can be known objectively. However, knowledge is acquired by a person through two means first, the ones that are knowable by human reason without depending on divine Revelation and second, the ones that are knowable only by faith.17 Both the knowledge (that which acquired by natural reason and by faith) is in fact in harmony.

Now, Aquinas brings forth four major arguments to convince a believer that no proposition known by reason can ever contradict any proposition known by faith. (1) Since therefore falsehood alone is contrary to truth, it is impossible for the truth of faith to be contrary to principles known by natural reason. (2) Whatever is put into the disciple’s mind by the teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher, unless the teacher is teaching dishonestly, which would be a wicked thing to say of God. But the knowledge of principles naturally known is put into us by God, seeing that God Himself is the author of our nature. Therefore these principles also are contained in the Divine Wisdom. Whatever therefore is contrary to these principles is contrary to Divine Wisdom, and cannot be of God. (3) Contrary reasons fetter our intellect fast, so that it cannot proceed to the knowledge of the truth. If

12 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.2, a.2. 13 Maritan, “Aquinas.” [Online] 14 Kreeft, The PhilosophyProper ofty Aquinas of Ch, 10ri.s t University. 15 Kreeft, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 10. Use it for fair pur16p Kreeft,ose. G Theiv Philosophye credit tofo Aquinas the a,u 11.th or by citing properly, if your are using it. 17 Kreeft, The Philosophy of Aquinas, 11.

therefore contrary informations were sent us by God, our intellect would be thereby hindered from knowledge of the truth: but such hindrance cannot be of God. (4) What is natural cannot be changed while nature remains. But contrary opinions cannot be in the same mind at the same time: therefore no opinion or belief is sent to man from God contrary to natural knowledge.18

The argument here is that if what reason tells us is true and if what faith (Revelation) tells us is true, then no real contradictions can be found between faith and reason because no truth can contradict another truth. Generally we assume that truths that come from the same source cannot be contradictory. But the question is whether that assumption itself is right? Why a Divine source cannot contradict itself? According to postmodern philosophy, it is possible for a system to be inconsistent. But again this very postmodern philosophical method itself is not consistent enough to ask these questions. Now this forces us to think in order to make any judgment for something to be good or evil, right or wrong and then it must appeal to a higher standard that judges all others.

2.1.3. Reason as Support to Faith

Aquinas believes that reason can be used as support to faith. It is quite clear that Aquinas uses philosophy and strongly urges the students of theology to make use of philosophy: “those who use philosophical texts in sacred teaching, by subjugating them to faith, do not mix water with wine, but turn water into wine.”19 There are several meanings to the idea of “subjugating” philosophy to theology. First, it means that the theologian receives truth from the philosophers as from usurpers. Therefore the ground of philosophic truth is founded to be “the revealing God who is more fully and accurately described in theology.”20 This leads to the second meaning that theology works as a corrective to philosophy.

Philosophical dimension of the Summa cannot be reduced to the use of philosophy internally to faith alone, as it seems to aim at an analytical and argumentative clarification of its dogmatic statements; peculiarity of Thomistic

P r o p e r t y of Christ University. 18 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 7. Use it for fair pur19p Jordan,ose. G “Theologyive cre dandit Philosophy,”to the au t235.ho r by citing properly, if your are using it. 20 Jordan, “Theology and Philosophy,” 235.

philosophic knowledge is that it focuses on the intelligibility of being (ens et verum convertuntur).21 For Aquinas, philosophy is not just a tool of conceptual clarification but it aims at attaining understanding something which exists in consideration of its proper causes and principles; thus, just like speculative science of the truth, it works within the domain of theology.22 Human reason cannot understand theology without the aid of philosophy. Human reasons come to help a person to understand what transcends his intellectual powers. Now for Aquinas, faith must be reasonable. But with postmodern philosophical reasoning it is impossible for reason to support faith since postmodern philosophy concentrates on subjective feelings rather than looking for objective evidences.

2.1.4. Faith above Reason

Though Aquinas believes faith and human reason do play profound roles in our act of knowing, Aquinas thinks that faith goes beyond human reason. To explain this concept he says, the knowledge about God falls under two modes: Some things true of God are beyond all the competence of human reason, as that God is Three and One. Other things there are to which even human reason can attain, as the existence and unity of God, which philosophers have proved to a demonstration under the guidance of the light of natural reason.23

Here Aquinas states the first mode can be called faith and the later human reason. For Aquinas human reason has its own limitation. Aquinas lists five reasons why reason is not without limits. The first reason is the depth and subtlety of these objects of knowledge which are farthest removed from the senses. Hence, at the very beginning, man is not qualified to know them perfectly. The second reason is the weakness of human understanding when it begins to operate. The third is the number of things needed for a conclusive proof of these. And a man can learn them all only after a long time. The fourth reason is the disinclination for scientific investigation which some men have because they lack the proper temperament. The fifth is the need of engaging in other occupations to provide the necessities of life.24

When Aquinas lists out the limitations of human reasoning, he is not speaking of the human ability to understand natural science (though limitations of human reasoning

21 Velde, AquinasP onro Godper, t28.y o f Christ University. 22 Velde, Aquinas on God, 28-29. Use it for fair pur23p Aquinas,ose. G iSummave cr eContradit t oGentiles the a, I,u t3.h or by citing properly, if your are using it. 24 Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae de Veritate, q.14. a.10.

may fall into this area as well), but he is speaking on human efforts to understand the Divine Being through human reasoning. Some of the truths about the Divine Being, however, is beyond human power to grasp, for he says: The human understanding cannot go so far of its natural power as to grasp His substance, since under the conditions of the present life the knowledge of our understanding commences with sense; and therefore objects beyond sense cannot be grasped by human understanding except so far as knowledge is gathered of them through the senses. But things of sense cannot lead our understanding to read in them the essence of the Divine Substance, inasmuch as they are effects inadequate to the power that caused them. … There are, therefore, some points of intelligibility in God, accessible to human reason, and other points that altogether transcend the power of human reason.25

According to the quote above, faith becomes necessary because, there are things that go beyond the power of reason. But in no way it contradicts each other and is fully comprehensible. He further says, “Faith, however, is said to surpass reason, not because there is no act of reason in faith, but because reasoning about faith cannot lead to the sight of those things which are matters of faith.”26

For Aquinas, Revelation is necessary from the part of God, “for man’s salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God (revelatio) besides the philosophical studies explored by human reason (ratio).”27 There are two major reasons for this necessity of which the first is important here.28 By referring to the prophecy of Isaiah 66:4, Aquinas says that “ man is directed to God as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason.”29 Aquinas starts by stating “…the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end;”30 meaning, man is directed to God as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason. In the classical and medieval period this was a common presupposition that the human being reaches his/her ultimate perfection in becoming somehow united with the Divine.31 It is in this context Aquinas speaks in a strong sense of the God’s mystery who cannot be accessible by the natural faculty of human reason alone. However, at the same time

25 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 3. 26 Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae de Veritate, q.14. a.2, 9. 27 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.1, a.1. 28 The second reason is: “the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors.” (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.1, a.1). Property of Christ University. 29 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.1, a.I. Use it for fair pur30p Aquinas,ose. G iSummave cr eTheologicadit to th, I,e q.1, au a.I.th o r by citing properly, if your are using it. 31 Velde, Aquinas on God, 20.

man cannot live their lives ignoring the ultimate meaning of life. All man must have some foreknowledge of the ultimate end of life so that his/her desires and deeds may be directed to it.32 Thus it becomes “necessary for the salvation (ad salutem) of man that certain knowledge about God, which exceeds human reason, should be made known to him by divine revelation.”33Postmodern philosophy does also agree with Aquinas’ concept on the limitation of logical reasoning though both speak from different points of view. Aquinas speaks of the limitation of reason in terms of understanding mysteries of God whereas postmodernism applies the limitation of reason in all arenas.

2.2. THOMISTIC METHODOLOGY

Aquinas has very unique way of building philosophy. In this section I shall explore how he would develop his philosophy and why these methodologies are important.

2.2.1. Thomistic Concept of Reality

Aquinas held on to a philosophy that is essentially realist and concrete. Aquinas does not presuppose a concept from which reality is to be reduced but he strongly insists to start from the world, which already exists and searches what its being is, and what the condition of existence is.34 Aquinas’s thought focuses on the Supreme Being who does not merely posses existence, but is His own existence.

Aquinas rejects Plato’s idealism and affirms that philosophical ideas are not just ideas but are abstracted or derived from experience of the concrete.35 Then he goes on to say, “That which is known by the intellectual vision are the things themselves and not their images or effigies”36 for example a “stone which is understood, not the likeness (idea) of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only intelligible

32 Velde, Aquinas on God, 20. 33 Aquinas, SummaPr oTheologicaperty o, fI, Cq.1,h ra.I.is t University. 34 Copleston, Medieval Philosophy, 308. Use it for fair pur35p Copleston,ose. Giv Medievale cred iPhilosophyt to the , a307.uth or by citing properly, if your are using it. 36 Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae de Veritate, q.5, a.1.

species (ideas).”37 This is very essential in the Aquinas’ theory of knowledge which I shall explain in the following pages.

The uniqueness of Aquinas’ philosophy is that it is objective rather than subjective. The essence of material things play as the immediate object of human intellect or reasoning. From there, Aquinas builds his philosophy by reflecting on sense-experience.38 Copleston explains this point further in his work as follows: The philosopher starts from the world of experience and argues by reason to God in so far as He can be known by means of creatures, the theologian starts with God as He has revealed Himself, and the natural method in theology is to pass from God in Himself to creatures rather than to ascend from creatures to God, as the philosopher does and must do.39

One thing to be noted here is that the recognition of truth involves something which controls the statement, some absolute norm, which is reality, which plays an essential role in determining the thought as true or false.40

Since, in the Aquinas’ philosophy, “the object of knowing is neither a state of the subject nor created nor essentially modified by the subject,”41 Aquinas’ philosophy is realistic philosophy. Reality is in itself independent of the human thinking of it. Aquinas’ philosophy looks at objects (or being) “from the point of view of their universal properties and laws and principles.”42 It is here that postmodern concept of metaphysics is contrasted. In postmodern philosophy there is no place for objective reality for two reasons, first, objective reality is not a measure of judgement in the philosophy of postmodernism; second, objective reality will limit the scope of postmodern philosophy since it rarely values subjectivism.

2.2.2. Thomistic Concept of Knowledge

Now as a realist Aquinas maintained that “knowledge consists in the apprehension of what is, or better of, reality, since reality consists both of what exists and what is

37 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.76, a. 2. 38 Copleston, Medieval Philosophy, 309. 39 Copleston, MedievalProp Philosophyerty of C, 312.hri st University. 40 D’Arcy, Knowledge According to Aquinas, 177-202. Use it for fair pur41p Do’sArcy,e. G Knowledgeive cred Accordingit to the to a Aquinasuthor, 177by -202citi. ng properly, if your are using it. 42 Kreeft, Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 49.

possible.”43 According to Aquinas, we attain knowledge which is about reality and directly from the real life experiences. Conjunction of direct knowledge with a theory of correspondence or conformity is one of the essential aspects of Aquinas’s epistemology.44 According to Aquinas, in knowing, “there is a twofold action, one which remains in the agent, for instance, to see and to understand and another which passes into an external object, for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form.”45 Thus, as noticed earlier, that “the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily, but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness.”46 D’Arcy beautifully comments on this idea in the following way: First, that the species or form or likeness is not known primarily, but serves as a medium quo, or in quo the object is known. In so far as the direct act of knowledge is concerned, we are conscious only of the real object. It is in reflexion on our first act that we become aware of the medium which is the form. Secondly, St. Thomas distinguishes between transient and immanent actions. Sensation and knowledge for him belong to the latter class, and therefore they are completed within the act itself. Lastly, the word likeness is not to be taken too literally as is clear from other passages. Its meaning is dependent on our understanding already what knowledge is in the act of knowing, direct or reflex. … St. Thomas does not for a moment suppose that we are explaining some unknown event called knowledge by what is evident.47

Here, D’Arcy says that it is not the likeness that is primarily known, but it only senses as medium in quo the object of known. Sensation and knowledge is related to imminent acts and our knowledge is direct act of knowing. As noted in the Aquinas’ concept of reality, determining whether something to be true or false “involves something which controls the act of knowing, some absolute norm.”48 Peter Kreeft observes: If he were challenged to answer the critical question, Aquinas would probably say you can’t do epistemology without doing metaphysics, because what knowledge is depends on what IS. For instance, if only matter is real, only material knowing, sense knowing, is real knowing. I think he would also say that the modern question is logically unanswerable because it contains a built-in self-contradiction. Whatever act of reasoning we use to justify reason also needs to be justified; and the same thing will be true of that justification.49

43 D’Arcy, Knowledge According to Aquinas, 177-202. 44 D’Arcy, Knowledge According to Aquinas, 177-202. See also Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 22. 45 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.85 a. 2. 46 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.76, a. 2. 47 D'Arcy, Knowledge According to Aquinas, 177-202. 48 D'Arcy, KnowledgeProp Accordingerty of toC Aquinashrist U, 177ni-v202er.s ity. 49 Kreeft, Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 63. In Modern philosophy epistemology and Use it for fametaphysicsir purpo isse two. G deferentive cr esubjectsdit to all th together;e auth butor forby Aquinas, citing both pr oepistemologyperly, if y andou metaphysicsr are usin g it. goes together in fact there is no distinction.

He maintains that reason is derived from objective reality; not from our own ideas. One can distinguish three features in his epistemological realism: firstly, Aquinas does not start his philosophy by assuming nothing and trying to prove something by deducing something about objective reality from our ideas; secondly, Aquinas does not start his philosophy by defining an idea as the first object of our knowledge; thirdly, Aquinas does not agree with the claims that in all our thinking the ‘thinking subject’ forms and structures and determines the known object rather, vice versa.50 Aquinas “believes that from the beginning reason is open to reality and reality is open to reason. But he does not try to prove this, he assumes it, and he would argue that we have to assume that from the first moment we claim to know any truth at all.”51 This assumption is not derived from mere ideas but from the empirical world.

2.2.3. Thomistic Concept of Truth

In the discussions above, I have explored the Aquinas’ concept of knowledge that begins from world. Aquinas thinks that “truth is the conformity of the mind with reality”52 and “this conformity consists in the correspondence of the thought with the real object.”53 For example, ‘being and truth’ and ‘goodness and truth’ are not same, they are different. Aquinas argues that “the true and the good, however, are not interchangeable, for some things, such as fornication, are true but not good. The true, therefore, and being are not interchangeable. And so they are not the same.”54 According to Aquinas this idea is impossible to doubt because, it being obviously true when we think we are conscious of the world as it is and since truth is both possible and actual. For him these have indivisible meaning, if our mind can understand the truth then it must also know the reality.55

It is generally known that Aquinas starts his philosophical arguments for God’s existence with the question of self evident facts but according to him God is

50 Kreeft, Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 63. 51 Kreeft, Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 63. 52 Aquinas, QuestionesProp Disputataeerty of C deh Veritaterist U, n2.i versity. 53 D’Arcy, Knowledge According to Aquinas, 177-202. Use it for fair pur54p Aquinas,ose. G iQuestionesve cred iDisputataet to the deau Veritatethor ,b 1y. citing properly, if your are using it. 55 D'Arcy, Knowledge According to Aquinas, 177-202.

not self evident to our minds56 because the object of our intellectual cognition is not just ideas but it is the bodily reality that we experience and know every day of our life through our senses. The differences between sensory cognition of material objects and the intellectual cognition is that the particular object is always both particular and universal. Therefore our thinking of reality is different from the way reality come to our senses.57

Aquinas argues, if reality is not intelligible in itself, and if our intellectual knowledge does not proceed from the reality, from the logical point of view we cannot make any statements (affirmative/denial) about reality. Aquinas thinks that ideas cannot be the foundations for our knowledge because ideas change from person to person and his/her ideas also may change from moment to moment. This points to the relationship between the knower and the known. Thus, for Aquinas, truth is something that starts from the real world. However, for Aquinas, truth does not concern primarily reality but also intellect; for example we do not say ‘rain is true’ but whether our judgement or statements about it corresponds to reality. In other words the truth is, in the first place, is of the logical truth: the truth concerns the concept or judgement, and secondly, that “expresses always a relation of conformity between ‘a knower intellect’ and ‘a thing known.’”58 This concept refutes the postmodern concept of truth and meaning which I shall deal with in the third chapter. However, Aquinas thinks that the knowledge attained from the real world experience alone does not help a man to understand the mysteries of God or to have a deeper knowledge of God. The revelation from God plays a major role in helping us to know more about God and unto salvation.

2.2.4. Thomistic Concept of Revelation

Aquinas believed that certain truths can be known through reason and others through Divine Revelation. As mentioned earlier, from natural revelation the knowledge of God that can be attained by human reasoning which is available to all people. P r o p e r t y of Christ University. 56 Aquinas, Summa theologica, I, q.2, a.1. Use it for fair pur57p Blasi,ose. FulvioGive Di. cr “eThedit Concept to the Of a uTruththo Andr b yThe ci Objectting pOfr oHumanperl yKnowledge, if your.” a[Online]re usi ng it. 58 Blasi, The Concept Of Truth

However, this truth can be attained only through correct reasoning that is based on creation to the Creator.59 Aquinas’s five arguments for God’s existence is a very good example for natural theology; for he thinks, natural reason can in fact help a person to come to know about the truth that God exists. There is another kind of revelation which is called supernatural Revelation, which is sometimes called ‘special Revelation’ in Theology. Supernatural Revelation is “a fact independent of Reason, viz. the Revelation given by God to the human mind of truths superior to Reason, i.e. truths which unaided Reason would be unable to reach, or even understand once it possessed them, or consequently justify.”60 For Aquinas also thinks that there are things that are incomprehensible for human reason.

According to Summa Contra Gentiles, in order to know the existence of God, divine Revelation is not absolutely necessary but Revelation is morally inevitable because only few would be able to know God through natural reasoning: From this very many are hindered. Some are hindered by a constitutional unfitness, their natures being ill-disposed to the acquisition of knowledge. They could never arrive by study to the highest grade of human knowledge, which consists in the knowledge of God. Others are hindered by the needs of business and the ties of the management of property. There must be in human society some men devoted to temporal affairs. These could not possibly spend time enough in the learned lessons of speculative enquiry to arrive at the highest point of human enquiry, the knowledge of God. Some again are hindered by sloth. ... Indeed almost the entire study of philosophy is directed to the knowledge of God. Hence, of all parts of philosophy, that part stands over to be learnt last, which consists of metaphysics dealing with points of Divinity. Thus, only with great labour of study is it possible to arrive at the searching out of the aforesaid truth; and this labour few are willing to undergo for sheer love of knowledge.61

Here Aquinas explains the difficulty and limitation of attaining Divine knowledge (Revelation) by human efforts and emphasizes the need of God’s intervention by giving the Revelation by which man may come to Him.

God is a spiritual Being, but our knowledge is merely composed of intellect and body to reach as far as our senses allow. For instance, human reason can know about the existence of God and God’s attributes like One, True, Good, Powerful, Omniscient etc. However, “it is evident that a mere examination of sensory objects, which are the effects of God and therefore inferior to Him cannot bring us to a

P r o p e r t y of Christ University. 59 Vekathanam, Revelation – Reason – Faith, 125. Use it for fair pur60p Gilson,ose. G Theiv ePhilosophy credit tofo St. th Thomase aut hAquinasor by, 37.cit ing properly, if your are using it. 61 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 4.

knowledge of the Divine essence.”62 For example, mysteries of God’s inner life like Holy Trinity, Incarnation etc. cannot be known by human natural reason. Knowledge about these mysteries of God can be only attained trough special Revelation. For Aquinas, God, in certain situation, reveals these mysteries to human beings by His grace: We must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs Divine help, that the intellect may be moved by God to its act. But he does not need a new light added to his natural light, in order to know the truth in all things, but only in some that surpass his natural knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some by His grace in things that can be known by natural reason, even as He sometimes brings about miraculously what nature can do.63

For Aquinas, the ultimate meaning of human life is to attain the truth about God and to obtain salvation through that truth. But his task obviously goes beyond limits of human reason for it requires not just a knowledge about the Divine Being but one’s intention and actions in relation to the Divine Being. Therefore, the Divine Revelation becomes absolutely necessary for man’s salvation to which God has called them to experience.64 Aquinas argues that the special Revelation is coming through God’s revealed scripture and it equals to God’s Revelation in Jesus Christ, the God in flesh.65

2.3. THOMISTIC ARGUMENTS FOR RATIONALITY OF FAITH IN GOD

This section deals with Aquinas’ argument for the rationality of faith in God. Here I will explore how Aquinas builds his case for God. I shall argue that Aquinas’s arguments for God’s existence, which are generally known as the five ways to know God, are very much consistent with his methodology. These arguments flow very logically and are built in a logical order, which I will show in the following section. The implication and richness of Aquinas’ reason shall be evaluated in the third chapter.

62 Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 41. See also Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 3. Property of Christ University. 63 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1, q.109. Use it for fair pur64p Aquinas,ose. G iSummave cr eTheologicadit to th, Ie, q. a1,u a.th1.o r by citing properly, if your are using it. 65 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 1 and 3.

2.3.1. Argument from Change

According to Aquinas, “The first and most open way is presented by change or motion. It is evident to our senses and certain that in the world, some things are in motion.”66 It means that everyone in his/her walk of life experiences these changes, and hence it is evident to everyone. Then he goes on to say that whatever undergoes changes comes to achieve what it was not before. For example, as X travels from a place A to its destination E, it means that the X is not yet there at E and it signifies the change of place. At the same time when water is on the process of becoming ice it denotes the change of quality or state.67 Objects that are in the “process of change” indicates that they are not perfect to which they aimed to, “though they are able to have it”68 Though Aquinas agrees that some things are self changing, that is not the case with living beings, they cannot “be wholly self-moving.” If a cat wants to catch a rat, it naturally goes in for it; it is not wholly self caused because it must be empowered by its heart. That is why Aquinas says, “whatever is in motion is set in motion by another.”69

For Aquinas, this is not the end of the Argument. If A is changed by B then B must be changed by something else and that something else must be changed by something else and it goes on. But this process cannot go on infinitely; it must be stopped somewhere. He says: If that which sets in motion is itself in motion then it also must be set in motion by another and that in its turn by another again. But here we cannot proceed to infinity,' otherwise there would be no first mover, and consequently no other mover, seeing that subsequent movers do not initiate motion unless they be moved by a former mover, as stick by hand. Therefore we are bound to arrive at the first move set in motion by no other…70

Aquinas thinks that proving God’s existence is not that difficult. From the beginning we started to “to fix on the arguments of philosophers and theologians alike;”71 it is not even a new idea. For Aquinas this idea is prevalent “beginning with Aristotle who

66 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.1, a.3. 67 Davies, Aquinas, 48-49. 68 Davies, AquinasPr, o49.p erty of Christ University. 69 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.2, a.3. Use it for fair pur70p Aquinas,ose. G iSummave cr eTheologicadit to th, Ie, q.2, au a.3.tho r by citing properly, if your are using it. 71 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 13.

sets off from the concept of change.”72 Though there is nothing new in Aquinas’ argument, he has revived this old age argument as one of the irrefutable argument for the rationality of belief in God. Aristotle’s “argument takes two directions,” says Aquinas, first among them is: “Everything in a process of change is set in motion by another. Our senses tell us that things are in motion, the sun for instance. Therefore, they are set in motion by another.”73 Now Aquinas summarizes his argument in the following way: Now this setter-in-motion is either itself in motion or it is not. If not, then we have our conclusion, namely the necessity of inferring a motionless mover which we term God. But if it is itself in motion then it must be set in motion by another. Either we have an infinite series or we arrive at a changeless mover. But we cannot go back infinitely. Therefore we must infer a first changeless mover.74

There are two major presuppositions that Aquinas makes here, as he himself said, “First, that everything in motion is set in motion by another; second, that an infinite series of things setting and set in motion is impossible.”75 Aquinas maintains that change needs something to make it to be. Not everything that undergo changes can itself undergo change, since it leads to infinite regress, Aquinas holds that whatever is responsible for all changes must be the first mover of all motions but should not itself be moved by anything.

2.3.2. Argument from Causality

The second argument is from efficient causation. Efficient causes are ordered in series. Aquinas accepts that there are different material, formal, and final causes for different effects to the object we are dealing with. And apart from material, formal and final causes there is something called ‘effective causes.’ That is whenever we justify anything or try to give explanation to the activity of something, this is what we appeal to. When I say ‘compost keeps the tree grow’ according to Aquinas, it is the compost being an effective cause of the tree’s growth. Efficient causes depend on other efficient causes. But Aquinas says it is impossible for efficient causes to go on

72 Aquinas, SummaPr oContrapert Gentilesy of C, hI,r 13.ist University. 73 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 13. Use it for fair pur74p Aquinas,ose. G iSummave cr eContradit t oGentiles the a, Iu, t13.ho r by citing properly, if your are using it. 75 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 13.

infinitely and so there must be a first efficient cause that causes every other cause and we call this God. The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.76

Thus, on the basis of a series of efficient causes, Aquinas concludes that there must be an efficient cause which itself has no causes for its existence. Why infinite series of efficient causes is impossible? Aquinas answers: The intervening causes may be one or many, but the conclusion is not affected. If they be many, then they are all classed together as possessing the character of being intermediaries. Similarly it makes no difference whether they be limited in number or infinite, for so long as they are intermediate causes they never possess the character of a first cause. If efficient causes were imagined as stretching to infinity it would follow that all causes would be intermediate. For in general one is bound to say that all parts in any infinite system of magnitude or causality must be middle parts, otherwise one part would be first and another part last; both notions are irreconcilable with the infinite, which excludes every limit, either of beginning or of end.77

Aquinas continues elsewhere: An infinite series of efficient causes in essential subordination is impossible. Causes essentially required for the production of a determinate effect cannot consequently be infinitely multiplied, as if a block could be shifted by a crowbar, which in turn is levered by a hand, and so on to infinity. But an infinite series of causes in accidental sub-ordination is not reputed impossible, so long as all the causes thus multiplied are grouped as one cause and their multiplication is incidental to the causality at work. For instance a blacksmith may work with many hammers because one after another breaks in his hand, but that one particular hammer is used after another particular one is incidental. Similarly that in begetting a child a man was himself begotten by another man; for he is father as man, not as son. In a genealogy of efficient causes al men have the same status of particular generator. Hence, for such a line to stretch back to infinity is not unthinkable.78

If we take an example, the progenitor of A is B and progenitor of B is C and it goes endlessly and hence in this case it is impossible to find a beginning or it is impossible to prove that something (the world for example) had a beginning. Therefore, Aquinas’ second way does not demand a first cause, “first from chronological point of view” P r o p e r t y of Christ University. 76 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.2, a.3. Use it for fair pur77p Gilby,ose. GSt.i Thomasve cre Aquinasdit to Philosophicalthe autho rText by, 55.ci t ing properly, if your are using it. 78 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.46, a.2 ad 7.

but any infinite series “must actually now depend on a first cause which is not similarly dependent.”79 Without the first cause it is impossible to explain any event even the explanation would also be not a plausible one.

2.3.3. Argument from the Necessary Being

Argument from the Necessary Being is the third way of his five ways to know God. It is generally argued that things that come by generation perishes; everything that comes into existence perishes by the cause of something else; therefore, there must be something that does not come by generation; now arises a question- how does this ingenerated something come into being? “Something which exists of itself and is the cause of all things other than it which are neither generated nor perishable” is the answer Davies suggests.80

This argument starts by pointing to things that are ‘able to be or not to be.’ In other words, Aquinas thinks, this idea hails from the natural observation; for he says, “We observe in our environment how things are born and die away; they may or may not exist; to be or not to be — they are open to either alternative.”81 Now some might argue that we must distinguish between necessary and contingent beings in order to understand logical differences, which means, using the word ‘necessary’ points to ‘what has to be as a matter of logical necessity’ and the word ‘contingent’ as an adjective to express “what need not be the case, logically speaking.”82 But Aquinas does not take necessary being and contingent being in this sense. Rather he speaks of contingent being “to be something like human being who is born and eventually dies.”83 Can everything be contingent? Aquinas answers, “All things cannot be so contingent, for what is able not to be may be reckoned as once a non-being, and were

79 Davies, Aquinas, 54. The whole argument of Second way can be summarized as: 1. Everything in the world is the effect of previous causes → 2. These causes are the effects of earlier causes, and so on → 3. Causation must have a starting point → 4. There must be a first cause not caused by anything else → 5. God is the only being that is capable of being an uncaused cause → Conclusion: Therefore, God exists. See Gilliland, “Aquinas-Five Versions of the Cosmological Argument.” [Online] 80 Davies, AquinasPr, o57.p erty of Christ University. 81 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.2, a.3. Use it for fair pur82p Davies,ose. G Aquinasive cr, e54d-i55.t t o the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 83 Davies, Aquinas, 55.

everything like that, once there would have been nothing at all.”84 Elsewhere Aquinas explains this concept in detail: We see in the world some things which are possible to be and not to be. But everything that is possible to be has a cause: for seeing that of itself it is open to two alternatives, being and not being; if being is to be assigned to it, that must be from some cause. But we cannot proceed to infinity in a series of causes: therefore we must posit something that necessarily is. Now everything necessary either has the cause of its necessity from elsewhere, or not from elsewhere, but is of itself necessary. But we cannot proceed to infinity in the enumeration of things necessary that have the cause of their necessity from elsewhere: therefore we must come to some first thing necessary, that is of itself necessary; and that is God. Therefore God is eternal, since everything that is of itself necessary is eternal.85

The concept, everything is generated is unbelievable for Aquinas; for the simple reason that nothing that comes into being can depend on something else that has brought it about. He continues his argument saying “what can be said about what is not able to be or not to be, i.e. of what is necessary as opposed to contingent.”86 Aquinas’ basic argument goes as quoted above, anything not able to be or not to be ‘either has the cause of its necessity from elsewhere, or not from elsewhere but is of itself necessary.’ For Aquinas, “necessity is not a property which something might come to have, whether by its own agency or by that of something else.”87 A necessary being cannot depend on something else for its own existence; because, a necessary being is not generated, it cannot come to be as a result of a substantial change.88

2.3.4. Argument from Degree of Perfection to the Perfect Being

The argument from the degree of perfection is as follows: 1. We know that there are things that have degrees of perfection. 2. These things prompt as ask the question, how did it come into existence/being? 3. There must be some answers to this question 4. All the perfection that we find in the world must also contain whatever exist 5. And we may take it as ‘some’ of all perfection and all good and true proceeds from it.89 Aquinas wrote:

84 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.2, a.3. 85 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 15. 86 Davies, AquinasPr, o56.p erty of Christ University. 87 Davies, Aquinas, 56. Use it for fair pur88p Davies,ose. G Aquinasive cr, e56.d it to the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 89 Davies, Aquinas, 62.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being … Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.90

Aquinas says, if there is good, and better then there must be a best and that best must be God. But this argument, according to Aquinas, can only be preceded from what can very well be perceived as of God’s effects or something that God brought about. For Aquinas argues: It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire … when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being;…that subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self- subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly. Hence … whatever is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat.91

Now after beginning with the good, better and best argument, Aquinas says, there are something more good, more true, more noble and so on and also something more less, very bad, less noble etc. Then he also adds that these comparative terms signify different degrees of superlative terms, for example, water is ‘hotter and hotter the nearer they approach to what is hottest.’92 Aquinas further says: Every good thing, that is not its own goodness, is called good by participation. But what is called good by participation presupposes something else before itself, whence it has received the character of goodness. This process cannot go to infinity, as there is no processus in infinitum in a series of final causes: for the infinite is inconsistent with any end, while good bears the character of an end. We must therefore arrive at some first good thing, which is not good by participation in reference to anything else, but is good by its own essence; and that is God.93

How do I know the effect points to causes? It is very simple, because, when we keep a bowl of water in the burning stove we see the connection between the boiling water and the burning stove. And it explains me why water boils when we keep it on the burning stove. This understanding, Aquinas thinks, is scientia or proper knowledge

90 Aquinas, SummaPr oTheologicaperty o, fI, Cq.2,h ra.3.ist University. 91 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.44, a.1. Use it for fair pur92p Davies,ose. G Aquinasive cr, e59.d it to the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 93 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 1, 38.

of science. When Aquinas says ‘like their effects’ he suggests that by perceiving why effects spring from their efficient causes help us to see how the nature of the causes explains their effects. It means that when someone is drunk, he/she ‘cannot be described as looking like alcohol though he is surely showing ‘what alcohol is.’94 For Aquinas, the efficient causality is not just an issue of different objects merely having relations with each other but it happens as causes factions in objects other than themselves, and it takes place as causes reflect in something else.95

The next aspect is to show that there is a connection between truth and being. When X answer the truth to the question, what X is doing? X is telling ‘how things are.’ And when X says how things are, X is actually expressing the truth “but to know the truth is to know ‘what is the case’96 Now when X says X is a good singer, he might mean that there is a deep relation between goodness and being (object) for good singer can mean that one who sings in good voice in high pitch even without cracking his/her voice. This is what we mean to be good in some way; because if X is a good runner, it means that he is actually related with what he is. Therefore, it seems that a being has a deeper relation with truth.

2.3.5. Argument from Design or Purpose

In the fifth way, Aquinas concentrates on the meaning, he focuses on the why aspect than what and who, because he thinks that why is the answer expected from efficient causes, for it looks for that which is intended rather than that which is acting in order to bring forth some effects.97 The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer.98

94 Davies, Aquinas, 60. 95 Davies, AquinasPr, o61.p erty of Christ University. 96 Davies, Aquinas, 61. Use it for fair pur97p Davies,ose. G Aquinasive cr, e63.d it to the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 98 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 1, 13.

We find this, every day in our life and he argues that it cannot be by chance; for he says: “We observe that things without consciousness, such as physical bodies, operate with a purpose, as appears from their co-operating invariably, or almost so, in the same way in order to obtain the best result. Clearly then they reach this end by intention and not by chance.”99 We all act with an intention because we all have specific reason to act the way we act. He says, “Things lacking knowledge move towards an end only when directed by someone who knows and understands, as an arrow by an archer. There is consequently an intelligent being who directs all natural things to their ends; and this being we call God.”100 Thus Aquinas thinks this is one of the powerful evidences for the existence of God.

To explain the concepts, A has gone to the market; on the way there he met B; A’s aim was not to meet B but by chance both of them happened to meet each other in the mobbed area. On the contrary, when A goes to meet B he has an intention in his mind. Aquinas puts his argument in the following words: When diverse things are co-ordinated the scheme depends on their directed unification, as the order of battle of a whole army hangs on the plan of the commander-in-chief. The arrangement of diverse things cannot be dictated by their own private and divergent natures; of themselves they are diverse and exhibit no tendency to make a pattern. It follows that the order of many among themselves is either a matter of chance or it must be resolved into one first planner who has a purpose in mind. What comes about always, or in the great majority of cases, is not the result of accident. Therefore the whole of this world has but one planner or governor.101

Non-living objects cannot think or act by itself; therefore, they are unable to creatively or thoughtfully direct themselves towards “the end to which they naturally incline.”102 This is where the value of argument from design plays a big role; as noted earlier, Aquinas says things that do not have knowledge, do not strive for a goal unless a knowledgeable and intelligent being, whom we call God, directs them.

99 Aquinas, SummaPr oTheologicaperty o, fI, Cq.2,h ra.3.ist University. 100 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.2, a.3. Use it for fair pur101po Aquinas,se. Gi vSummae cre Contradit to Gentiles, the au 1,t h42.o r by citing properly, if your are using it. 102 Davies, Aquinas, 62.

2.4. THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE IN GOD-TALK

This section is going to deal with how the concept of God is compatible with human language. Here I will briefly describe what the alternative language theories are and why Aquinas accepts one and rejects the other. And I will explore Aquinas’ reason to reject equivocal and univocal language in God-Talk and finally I will also look in Aquinas’ analogous language in God-talk in a detailed way.

2.4.1. Equivocal and Univocal Language in God-talk

The use of analogy is one of the most important and a very fundamental linguistic resource for God-talk. What it actually does is that “it permits an extension of meaning or logical grammar beyond that of everyday uses of language, while retaining everyday language as its vehicle or vocabulary-stock.”103 There are three alternatives; namely, ‘equivocal,’ which means totally different from the way God actually is, ‘univocal,’ which means totally same as God actually is, and ‘analogous,’ which means similar to the way God actually is. 104 Aquinas rejects the former two and accepts the latter as the alternative for God-talk which I am going to discuss below.

Thomistic Rejection of Univocal Language: Univocal language allows only one meaning or interpretation to the given word/sentences. There are two major important reasons for Aquinas to reject univocal language for God-talk. First, it is impossible for human mind to have one to one understanding of the infinite mind of God. Second, we know something about what God is not, for instance God is not finite, implies that it is necessary to accept, “that there is a negative aspect in our understanding about God.”105 In Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas lists out his arguments against univocal language use for God-talk. He further argues, the “effects that does not receive form specifically like the form whereby the agent acts, is

P r o p e r t y of Christ University. 103 Thiselton, A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion, s.v. “Analogy.” Use it for fair pur104po Geisler,se. G Systematicive cred Theologyit to th, e137. au thor by citing properly, if your are using it. 105 Geisler, Systematic Theology, 143.

incapable of receiving in synonymous predication the name taken from that form.”106 But the problem is, “of the things whereof God is cause, the forms do not attain to the species of the divine efficacy, since they receive piecemeal and in particular what is found in God simply and universally.”107 Aquinas also argues: Everything that is predicated of several things synonymously, is either genus species, differentia, accidens, or proprium. But nothing is predicated of God as genus, and in like manner neither as differentia; nor again as species, which is made up of genus and differentia; nor can any accident attach to Him, and thus nothing is predicated of God either as accident or as proprium, for proprium is of the class of accidents.108

Geisler explains this as: “Since one thing in common is always simpler than the many things having it in common, any univocal prediction of God and others would have to be simpler than God, which is impossible.”109 Next reason is that God does not involve in anything; rather, all things are involved in Him. He further explains, “If there were a common univocal prediction in which God participated, then this something would be more ultimate than God.”110 Finally, Aquinas argues, “Now nothing is predicated of God and of other beings as though they stood in the same rank, but it is implied that one precedes, and the other is consequent and dependent. Of God, all predicates are predicated essentially.”111 It is because God “is called ‘being’ to denote that He is essence itself; and ‘good,’ to denote that He is goodness itself.”112 Nevertheless, “of other beings predications are made to denote participation. Thus Socrates is called ‘a man,’ not that he is humanity itself, but one having humanity. It is impossible therefore for any predicate to be applied synonymously and in the same sense to God and other beings.”113 In essence what Aquinas wants to say is that the Creator and the created are distinct. For example, God is the sustainer and everything depends on Him. God is goodness in itself and all other are not goodness by itself. The essence and nature of God differ from the created beings. Therefore, it is impossible to use univocal language in God-talk.

106 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 32. 107 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 32. 108 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 32. 109 Geisler, Systematic Theology, 143. 110 Geisler, SystematicProp Theologyerty of, 143.Ch rist University. 111 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 32. Use it for fair pur112po Aquinas,se. Gi vSummae cre Contradit to Gentiles the a,u I,t 32.ho r by citing properly, if your are using it. 113 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 32.

Thomistic Rejection of Equivocal Language: Equivocal Language is a language that allows multiple meaning or interpretation to the particular word/sentences. Aquinas argues first, “Where there is a mere accidental identity of name, there is no order or respect implied of one thing to another, but quite by accident one name is applied to several different things. But this is not the case with the names applied to God and to creatures: for in such a community of names we have to give regard to the order of cause and effect.”114 Second, he argues, “Moreover, there is some manner of likeness of creatures to God.”115 The great example of this is found in Genesis 1:27 “God created them in His likeness.” Third, he argues, “When there is no more than a mere identity of name between several things, we cannot be led from one of them to the knowledge of another; but from the attributes found in creatures we are led to a knowledge of the attributes of God..”116 Fourth, he argues, “There is no use predicating any name of anything unless by the name we come to understand something about the thing.”117 Fifth, he argues, “if names are predicated of God and creatures by a mere coincidence of sound, we understand by those names nothing whatever about God, seeing that the significations of those names are known to us only inasmuch as they apply to creatures: there would at that rate be no use in saying or proving of God that God is a good being, or anything else of the sort.”118 Finally he argues, “If it is said that by such names we only know of God what He is not — in that, e.g., He is called ‘living’ as not being of the genus of inanimate things — at least it must be allowed that the predicate ‘living,’ applied to God and to creatures, agrees in the negation of the inanimate, and thus will be something more than a bare coincidence of name.”119 As a conclusion of all the arguments presented, Aquinas says, equivocal language is not possible, “Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all… Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an

114 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 33. 115 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 33. 116 Aquinas, SummaPro Contraperty Gentiles of Ch, I,r i33.st University. 117 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 33. Use it for fair pur118po Aquinas,se. Gi vSummae cre Contradit to Gentiles the a,u I,t 33.ho r by citing properly, if your are using it. 119 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 33.

analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.”120 In the coming section I will deal with Aquinas’ possible alternative-analogous language or prediction.

2.4.2. God and Analogous Language

In the previous section I have explored the problem of religious language that Aquinas encountered in his time. After rejecting univocal and equivocal language in God-talk, Aquinas finds that analogous language is the possible alternative in God- talk. In his acclaimed work – Summa Theologica Aquinas says, This name ‘God’ in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses.121

Therefore Aquinas argues, “it is manifestly said analogically.” When we name God we can do that only from creatures; therefore, as its principle cause, whatever we say about God can come from our (creature’s) relation to God, “wherein all the perfection pre-exists excellently.”122 Further he argues, Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.123

God is called good because He is the one who causes all good. Since the cause is Good God when He causes goodness on something, it actually “communicates of what it is to what its creature has by created participation.”124 Because all the perfection what we posses is acquired from the Creator, the causal relation between us and the Creator cannot be totally different from the Creator.125 But on the other hand, Aquinas firmly rejects any suggestion, as noted in the earlier pages, that every day words or language can be applied to God with exact meaning. For he writes:

120 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.13, a.1. 121 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.13, a.10. 122 Aquinas, SummaPro Theologicaperty o,f I, C q.h13,ri sa.t10. U niversity. 123 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.13, a.5. Use it for fair pur124po Geisler,se. G Systematicive cred Theologyit to th, e147. au thor by citing properly, if your are using it. 125 Geisler, Systematic Theology, 147.

“Our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God viz. the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.126

Principle of Analogy maintains a true knowledge of God because it is basically very much rooted in the very nature of God’s self-expression. It is true that God can only reveal himself to his creatures rather than to himself. Therefore, God’s Revelation in the nature is limited while God Himself is unlimited. Thus, the principle of analogy proceeds “from the very nature of the process of God’s self-Revelation.”127 Geisler provides two major reasons why statements about God on the basis of general or natural revelation are merely analogues;128 first, “the arguments for God’s existence are arguments from effect to the efficient causes of their being, since the effects get their actuality from God (who is pure actuality) they must be similar, for actuality communicates and produces actuality.”129 Second, God cannot create pure actuality (God), for pure actuality is uncreated; therefore it is impossible to create an uncreated pure actuality. Then pure actuality can create actuality with potentiality; therefore, all created being must be a combination of both actuality with potentiality. Now they have existence in actuality, at the same time they have potential not to exist. Anything that comes into being (existence) can pass out of existence. Thus when we make statements about God, based on the natural revelation (reasoning), “there is a big proviso: God is not like His creation in their potentialities but only in their actuality”130 Therefore, analogous language alone is the possible alternative to equivocal and univocal language about God.

126 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.13, a.3. 127 Geisler, BakerP Encyclopediaroperty o fof C Christianhrist U Apologeticsniversi,t ys.v.. “Analogy, Principle of.” 128 Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, s.v. “Analogy, Principle of.” Use it for fair pur129po Geisler,se. G Bakerive c Encyclopediaredit to th ofe Christianauthor Apologetics, by citing s.v. p r“oAnalogy,perly ,Principle if you of.”r ar e using it. 130 Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, s.v. “Analogy, Principle of.”

CHAPTER 3

THOMISTIC METHOD AS A CORRECTIVE TO POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

In the first chapter I have argued that Nietzschean philosophy became the cornerstone of postmodern philosophy of God. I had also shown how Nietzschean philosophy attracted Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida in building their case against the traditionally understood philosophy of God and the rationality of theism. In the second chapter I have explained Aquinas’ view about reason, the relation of faith to reason, Aquinas’s methodology in God talk, Aquinas’ five ways to argue for the existence of God and thereby providing rationality of faith in God and how one can use language rationally in God talk. In this chapter I am going to compare and contrast these two methods of reasoning and I shall argue that Aquinas’ philosophy can be used as a corrective to postmodern philosophy.

3.1. THOMISTIC CRITIQUE ON POSTMODERN REASON, LOGIC, AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Aquinas held very different views about reason, logic and epistemology than the postmodern thoughts. Philosophers like Nietzsche and others, I think, did not consider the arguments that Aquinas was proposing, from the time of middle age. Aquinas’ arguments seem to be just opposite to postmodern arguments especially Nietzschean arguments against reason, reality, knowledge, revelation and the existence of God. In the following section I am going to show how and why Aquinas’ arguments can be used as a corrective to postmodern thoughts.

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Use it for fair purpose. Give credit to the author by citing properly, if your are using it.

3.1.1. Universal Law of Logic/Reasoning

According to Aquinas, logic and reasoning are universally valid. For Nietzsche, as mentioned earlier, “logic applies only to fictitious entities that we have created;”1 meaning, this is not applicable to real entities. Again, elsewhere he says, “Logic is merely slavery in the bonds of language.”2 It means, in the pretext of language, logic makes people slaves. He thinks that “logic, by its nature, is optimism.”3 These statements show that Nietzsche not only disbelieved the universality of logical reasoning but he did not take its implication seriously. There could be some reasons for him to reject the universal reasoning. He says, “The impurity of the judgment lies first in the way the material is present (that is very incompletely), second, in the way it is assessed, and third, in the fact that every separate part of the material again results, as is absolutely necessary, from impure knowledge.”4 Three assumptions are derived from this: firstly, the material present is incomplete, secondly, the method of assessing is problematic, and thirdly, the impure knowledge; these would be analyzed in details in the following paragraphs.

In his view, human experiences cannot “be so complete that we would have a logical right to evaluate him in toto (as a total or whole).”5 Therefore our evaluation about things would be premature. Then Nietzsche says, “The gauge by which we measure, our own nature, is no unchangeable quantity; we have moods and vacillations; yet we would have to know ourselves to be a fixed gauge if we were to evaluate fairly the relationship of any one thing to ourselves.”6 Because he takes a different stand on logical reasoning, his epistemology also could be based on his very understanding of logical reasoning; since logic and epistemology are interlinked strongly. Nietzsche thinks that all rational efforts to get knowledge are completely arbitrary or relative. Aquinas on the other hand explains what is meant by universal in the following words:

1 Nietzsche, Will to Power, §512. 2 Nietzsche, Writings from the Early Notebooks, 177. 3 Nietzsche, HumanPro Allp etoort yHuman of C, h§6.r i st University. 4 Nietzsche, Human All too Human, §32. Use it for fair pur5p Nietzsche,ose. Gi Humanve cre Alldi toot to Human the ,a §u32.th or by citing properly, if your are using it. 6 Nietzsche, Human All too Human, §32.

That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time.7

Primarily, universal means, according to Aquinas, that which is present everywhere and always, independent of time and space. Aquinas’ explanation is very simple and comprehensible. Nietzsche may not have objection against this explanation but he questions the application or materialization of this concept. For he says the physical body or material before us is not complete. Aquinas might ask, how did he get the idea of ‘complete?’ Or in other words, it is impossible for one to come to an affirmation or denial of something without assuming the opposite. Therefore, whether Nietzsche likes it or not, he cannot get away from the universality of reasoning and logic.

Even if we grant Nietzschean demand, still we have a problem. Does the incomplete knowledge prevent people to have a general understanding of the object or material? Not at all! A material or object may be incomplete but knowing that the object or material is incomplete is a universal knowledge derived from the universal reasoning for everyone can observe its nature objectively.

Secondly, Nietzsche says, ‘in the way it is assessed.’ This is an important aspect. I think it is true that if we have a wrong method of assessing something or wrong assumption we are likely to come to a wrong conclusion. What could be in Nietzsche’s mind when he said ‘in the way it is assessed?’ There are two options: firstly, different methods; secondly, the way people perceive things. To comment on the first option, I would argue that any method we use to know the truth could be beneficial as long as we use it consistently. To respond to second, every one may not perceive things in the same way. That does not hinder a person from having a universal reasoning. In our transaction, language, and in all the practical aspects knowingly or unknowingly we implement universal logical reasoning. For example Mr. X is inquiring theP wayrop etor thospitaly of Ch Hr ifromst U na ipointvers iP;ty and. Mrs. Y explains the way,

Use it for fa i r p u r p o s e . G i v e c r e d i t t o the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 7 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.16, a.7.

“Go towards east – turn to third left from here and then on the fourth block you shall find the hospital H.” When Mrs. Y explains the way to hospital H from point P, she expects Mr. X to know exactly what she says and Mr. X makes sure that he understands unerringly what Mrs. Y is trying to say. In practical philosophy, it is essential that people have a universal understanding and it is not impossible.

Thirdly, Nietzsche asserts, “in the fact that every separate part of the material again results, as is absolutely necessary, from impure knowledge.”8 Here, I think, Nietzsche has failed to recognize impure knowledge and necessary or essential knowledge. What do I need to know to have acquainted with an object? First one must attain a general knowledge which may not be perfect knowledge about the object. Aquinas rightly answers Nietzschean objections in the following way: “For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect.”9 Therefore, imperfect knowledge is not a problem but it only gives options for further philosophical investigation.

Finally, Nietzsche says that our judgment or cognitive ability to know things are changeable and therefore, it is not possible to have a universal logical reasoning. It is true that our cognitive ability to know things is changeable. However, that could not be a reason to deny universal logical reasoning. Ability to think can vary and change but logical reasoning never changes, only people later identify or reject certain new knowledge or renounce erroneous logical reasoning. Now, the foundation for this logical reasoning is universal reasoning. Universal logical reasoning requires a universal truth.

8 Nietzsche, Human All too Human, §32 9 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 14 a. 6. He further says, “That multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which theyPro communicate.perty of C Forhr ithest diversityUnive rofs icolorsty. is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity Use it for faofir the p ulinesrpo iss ecaused. Giv bye ctheirred differentit to th position.e auth Henceor b yit cisi tthating this pr kindope ofrl ydiversity, if yo andur amultitudere usin g it. cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way.”

3.1.2. Basis for Universal Logic

The basis for universal logical reasoning is one of the important aspects in Aquinas’ philosophy as it affirms its validity and its denial is essential in postmodern thinking because its affirmation would be the denial of its foundations. Since postmodern philosophy does not assert universal logical reasoning, it is obvious that no basis for universal logical reasoning can be traced. And in the previous section I have already explained the reasons why Nietzsche denies the universal logical reasoning. Whereas, in the case of Thomistic philosophy, since it bases its corner stone in the natural logical reasoning, one can look into its validity.

Aquinas derives basis for universal reasoning from the natural world. His five arguments for God’s existence are good examples for this. Aquinas’ reasoning is based on concrete, real and existent world. As noted in the second chapter, Aquinas rejected Platonic idealism but held critical realism. For him, a philosophical reasoning begins from universal empirical experience which would be the immediate cause for human reasoning.10 And from the natural reasoning, Aquinas shows, one can attain a basic knowledge about God. In his article, How Do We Know God? A Radio Conversation between Karl Barth and Thomas Aquinas Richard Dickinson in this imaginary conversation leads to the basics of Aquinas’ argument that God has made us to know about Him though nature. Every human person begins his/her thinking with senses and “ends in judgment;” likewise, “in natural man there are qualities which would make it possible for him to apprehend God partially.”11 What actually Aquinas says is that human beings have an ability to judge and have, at least, an objective knowledge of things. For Aquinas, the ultimate source for this universal logical reasoning is God; because, if God causes the material world; and if our logical reasoning starts from the empirical world, then it follows that God is the source of all universal reasoning.

Nietzsche has a different opinion on this concept. For Nietzsche, God who is the source of all universalProp reasoning,erty of C horr itruth,st U nisi vdead;ersi ttherefore,y. there is no universal

Use it for fair pur10p Copleston,ose. Giv Medievale cred iPhilosophyt to the , a309.uth or by citing properly, if your are using it. 11 Dickinson, “How Do We Know God?” 38-43.

logical reasoning. In the following section I will evaluate Nietzschean arguments for the non-existence of God. But the question here is that, have all values eradicated even after Nietzschean ‘Death of God’ proclamation? I do not think so! Because, Nietzsche himself did consider that any ideology that oppose his view would be false; most of his writings against Christianity are the powerful examples of this. This means Nietzsche, unknowingly appeal to the logical reasoning that goes beyond his criticism; and he cannot avoid universal logic in reasoning. It is necessary to search for his reason behind his assertion. He could be moved with some motives behind this assertion; for it is not necessary that people should always have philosophical reason to make such statements. In the works of Nietzsche it is clear that he never considers that Christian morality brings good to the society, but only brings divisions in the society.12 Stephen C. Evans comments, His critique reveals the way that true religion so quickly becomes pharisaism, in which religion is used to separate people into categories of “us” (the good, the righteous, those favoured by God) and “them” (the evil ones, the sinners, those destined for judgement), in order to elevate ourselves, both in our own eyes and in the eyes of other people.13

I don’t think this to be a philosophical reason to take away the universal logical reasoning, against objective moral law, and against the existence of God, rather, since Nietzsche has his personal grudge against Christian faith; his motive is to nullify all the religious influence on the people by denying the universal reasoning and moral law. After all, our agenda has no value in philosophy.

As Aquinas says, this reasoning is pointing God as the source of all reasoning. Thomistic philosophy seems to be not only foundational but also so relevant to both believers and philosophers than that of Nietzschean philosophy. If Nietzsche or his followers wants to object to the assertion made by Aquinas, then they must first affirm what they deny or they must bring back the God to life whom they have killed.

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Use it for fair pur12p Nietzsche,ose. Giv One cthere Genealogydit to th ofe Moralityautho,r s.v. by “ Prefaceciting,” p§ 6r.o perly, if your are using it. 13 Evans, Philosophy of Religion, 155.

3.1.3. Commonsense Philosophy

Aquinas thinks that a man does not need any sophisticated ideology to rationally know whether there is a God or not; but needs only common sense which is known as common sense philosophy. What is common sense according to Aquinas? In the words of Aquinas, it says, “The interior sense is called “common” not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses.”14 Aquinas further says, “Because the higher faculty or habit regards the object in its more universal formality, as the object of the “common sense” is whatever affects the senses, including … whatever is visible or audible.” Thus common sense “extends to all the objects of the five senses.”15 This common sense is not the commonsense that we generally use. This is the interior sense together with memory, imagination and estimative sense, which collects all the data from different senses to make a judgement.

The source of all material knowledge is knowledge of real and existent world. The role of common sense is to judge the things which senses perceive.16 It seems that, from the writings of Nietzsche that he does not pay any attention to how commonly people perceive and understand things. Rather he takes very sceptical attitude towards common sense. As noted earlier Nietzsche says, “We simply lack any organ for knowledge, for ‘truth.’”17 Here, Nietzsche seems to make a self defeating statement; because, it is impossible to attain any knowledge without any organ for knowledge.

However, one needs to find out what he really means by organ for knowledge. Whether he is referring to any human faculty of intellect or to a standard by which one may arrive at a conclusion! There is no reason to assume whether he is speaking about human faculty of knowledge because the statement itself refutes this assumption. The only option left with us is whether any universal standard is available to us for attaining wisdom. I think this is what Nietzsche refers to; because, this kind

14 Aquinas, SummaPr oTheologicaperty o, fI, Cq.78,hr ia.4.st U niversity. 15 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.1, a.3. Use it for fair pur16p Aquinas,ose. G iQuestionesve cred iDisputataet to the deau Veritatethor ,b q.15,y ci a.1.tin g properly, if your are using it. 17 Nietzsche, Gay Science, §354.

of reasoning is so obvious throughout his writings.18 Still, I think, there is a logical problem! For Nietzsche begs the question that how does he know there are no organs for knowledge. Therefore, Nietzsche’s assumption is not logically valid.

On the contrary, Aquinas makes very powerful arguments known as the five ways to know God and which is one of the best examples for his common sense philosophy. The arguments are based on knowledge we attain from sense data. For example, a student learns from school, from home and from other life experiences and all that knowledge are gained through one or more senses. The basis for all the common sensual knowledge is the world around us in which we live. Such knowledge is not confined to any particular group, people or geographical area; it is common to all and can be accessed by all. Aquinas’ commonsense philosophy plays a significant role in defending the rationality of belief in God; and it also challenges the postmodern thoughts almost in every aspect.

3.1.4. Corrective to Postmodern Epistemology

Thomistic philosophy becomes a powerful force against the postmodern anti- foundationalism. Nietzschean epistemology, what we call epistemic perspectivism, is confused with ontological perspectivism. Epistemic perspectivism explains how reality is acknowledged and ontological perspectivism explains the reality that is acknowledged. Thus he held on to epistemic relativism which says, that there is no unique reality to be known.19 To explain this concept; suppose there is a chair on the floor, when it is observed by different people from different sides, people may come up with different observations; however, no one would doubt the existence of the chair on the floor. It is true that Nietzsche does not reject the existence of the real world, but his problem is that he confused with “ontological subjective experience with epistemic objectivity.”20 Here he failed to understand that plurality of ideas within a given domain can equally affirm objective reality. In other words, if one

P r o p e r t y of Christ University. 18 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” 46-47. Use it for fair pur19p Samuelose. G, “iNietzscheve cred andit t Godo th (Parte a uII)t”h [Online]or by citing properly, if your are using it. 20 Samuel, “Nietzsche and God (Part II)” [Online]

finds different true corresponding thoughts (in the case of chair on the floor, for example) in the given context then it must be metaphysical objective.21

Aquinas has some corrective methods to offer as an alternative to Postmodern Epistemology. His epistemology starts with the real world, for he understands that “knowledge consists in the apprehension of what is, or better of, reality, since reality consists both of what exists and what is possible.”22 Apprehension of reality, epistemic act, or in other words it is nothing but to get hold or seize or grasp the nature of reality with intellect.

Unlike Nietzsche, Aquinas offers a point of reference that is the experiences that one might have from the real existent world as the objective reality, from which we make our judgment about what we perceive. The objective reality itself provides us with scope for logical reasoning. Our knowledge of the material world is direct and of reality. To determine something to be true or false “it involves something which controls the act of knowing, some absolute norm.”23 In other words, there are absolute norms which controls our act of knowing; for example, a student learns from his teacher that 2+5 = 7. Though it is an abstract idea in our mind, when the teacher explain to his pupil by taking two pens from one yellow box and five pens from red box and put it together into an empty white box then the white box has seven pens. Now, these absolute norms are found in the nature, created by God, and through which the Creator reveals his existence. One may come to know the truth by correct reasoning that is purely based on creation to the creator.24

Knowledge of God comes to us in two ways, as noted in the second chapter, first is through the nature and through special revelation. Since Nietzschean epistemology is driven by the ‘Death of God’ concept, there is no place for revelation from God in Nietzschean philosophy and consequently in postmodern philosophy. For Aquinas, certainty of truth can be attained through reason and through divine revelation. Certain divine truths, like the doctrine of Incarnation and Holy Trinity are

21 Samuel, “NietzscheProp ander tGody o (Partf Ch II).ri”s [Online]t Univ ersity. 22 D’Arcy, “Knowledge According to Aquinas,” 177-202. Use it for fair pur23p Do’sArcy,e. G “iKnowledgeve credi tAccording to the atou Aquinasthor b,”y 177 ci-t202in.g properly, if your are using it. 24 Vekathanam, Revelation – Reason – Faith, 125.

not attainable by reason but they are not contradictory to reason.25 According to Aquinas, the ultimate meaning of human life is to obtain the knowledge of truth about God and all must receive salvation through the knowledge of truth. To attain this knowledge about the truth is impossible by the faculty of human reasoning alone. Therefore divine revelation is necessary in order for man to obtain his salvation; for every idea has its own consequences. For example, every man can receive knowledge about God through the natural revelation; and thus every man has opportunity to accept or reject the knowledge that comes through the revelation of God. This revelation provides every man with transcendental moral obligation to both God and man. Now, when a man fulfils his moral obligations, its consequence (whether good or bad) does not confine to the worldly realm alone, because when a transcendental moral law is obeyed or disobeyed, it has transcendental consequences. However, God wants people to choose Him freely and come to Him for salvation by knowing who God is and His purpose for all humanity.26

3.2. THOMISTIC CRITIQUE ON POSTMODERN CONCEPT OF GOD

Both Nietzsche and Lyotard argued against metaphysical concept of God while Derrida used his deconstruction to deny the possibility of any metaphysical truth about the existence of God.27 In this section I will argue that postmodern metaphysical concept is anti-foundational by which a rational believer cannot make sense of his/her faith in God. Finally I will propose Thomistic philosophy as a better alternative for a rational believer to be assured of the coherence of his faith in God.

25 Doctrine of Incarnation is the doctrine that says that God took human flesh and Holy Trinity is the teaching that One God eternally exists in three persons. 26 But his does not apply to people who are incapable of using even their minimal ability to reason. 27 Derrida, considers that “God, as usual, contradicts himself, Dieu, comme d’habitude, se contredit.” See, Derrida, ActsPro ofp eReligion,rty of 28.Ch Elsewhererist Un heiv states,ersit y“there. can’t be no unique name, “not even the name ‘difference,’ which is not a name, which is not a pure nominal unity, and continually Use it for fabreaksir pu uprp ino sae chain. Gi vofe differentcredit substitutionsto the au.”t hSee,or Derrida,by citi Speechng pr oandpe Phenomenarly, if yo, u159.r a rCitede u sinin g it. McCance, Derrida on Religion, 29.

3.2.1. Metaphysical Concept of God: Nietzsche versus Aquinas

As noted in the first chapter, Nietzsche called himself as “a godless anti- metaphysician.”28 The apparent world is eternal; it has no beginning or end. Nietzschean metaphysical concept seems to be have been evolved during the span of his life. In The History of an Error, Nietzsche asserts that the true world is attainable for people ‘who is wise, pious, virtuous’ – who lived in it (which he thinks relatively coherent and convincing). Second he says, ‘the true world’ is unattainable for now but promised to the man who is wise, pious, virtuous, in other sense, it may be attainable in the life to come. This concept is harder for him to accept, for he thinks this concept is more subtle and less comprehensible. Finally, from there he takes an entirely different position that the metaphysical world is of no use because it is obliterated along with the real world.29 It is important to know what do Nietzschean terms mean, like ‘true world’ and ‘apparent world.’ For Nietzsche, true world is not the physical world but of intellectual, ideas and of concepts. In this writing, he actually meant to say that the world from Plato to Kant was ‘true world.’ To these philosophers this true world was unchanging and perfect and developed a certain degree of unity and absoluteness.30

28 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, § 344 29 Nietzsche, Twilight of Idols, The detailed explanation of Nietzsche’s The History of an Error as follows: 1. The true world attainable for a man who is wise, pious, virtuous, — he lives in it, he is it. (Oldest form of the idea, relatively coherent, simple, convincing. Paraphrase of the proposition 'I, Plato, am the truth.') 2. The true world, unattainable for now, but promised to the man who is wise, pious, virtuous (`to the sinner who repents'). (Progress of the idea: it gets trickier, more subtle, less comprehensible, — it becomes female, it becomes Christian . . .) 3. The true world, unattainable, unprovable, unpromisable, but the very thought of it a consolation, an obligation, an imperative. (Basically the old sun but through fog and scepticism; the idea become elusive, pale, Nordic, Konigs-bergian.') 4. The true world—unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And as unattained also unknown. Consequently not consoling, redeeming, obligating either: how could we have obligations to something unknown? . . . (Gray morning. First yawn of reason. Cockcrow of positivism.) 5. The 'true world'—an idea that is of no further use, not even as an obligation, — now an obsolete, superfluous idea, consequently a refuted idea: let's get rid of it! (Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens' and cheerfulness; Plato blushes in shame; pandemonium of all free spirits.) 6. The true world is gone:Pr owhichper tworldy of isC left?hri sThet U illusoryniver one,sity perhaps?. But no! We got rid of the illusory world along with the true one! (Noon; moment of shortest shadow; end of longest error; Use it for fair phighur ppointose of. Ghumanity;ive cr eINCIPITdit to ZARAT-HUSTRA.')the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 30 Nietzsche Part I: “Attack of the True world.” [Online]

The apparent world is the world we live and carry out our day to day activities. The sharp distinction between the true world and apparent world is that the true world is purely intellectual and apparent world is known by subjective feelings. It keeps on changing. Now, Nietzsche speaks of the true world as attainable to the pious and virtuous people who disliked the apparent or physical world because it is ever- changing.31 Then he goes on to say that when people try to pretend to be religious, leaving primary idea of the true world,32 then they assert that it is not for now but for the world to come. Finally he says, the true world which became illusory, is not only unattainable but has become useless and obliterated along with the true world. For Nietzsche, there began a new era in the history of knowledge. But the problem lies in this description is as follows: The ‘true world’ refers to the purely intellectual or world of ideas The ‘true world is obliterated or abolished Therefore, the world of ideas and pure intellectual is obliterated This implication of conclusion may not be true with Nietzsche’s intention for it is impossible to make these claims without ideas.33 Therefore, one might conclude that we are left with the apparent world. Still there arises a problem because Nietzsche says that the ‘true world’ is obliterated along with the apparent world. However, this could also be reasoned in a way that Nietzsche could be saying that we must change the way how we look into both the true world and apparent world. The problem rise again that Nietzsche could only leave us with subjective idealism which cannot be compared or judged by any external objectivism.

Aquinas takes a different stand on this issue. As I have explored in the second chapter, Aquinas’ arguments are realistic and reasonable than the ones proposed by Nietzsche. Nietzschean reasons seem that it is not logically viable for the obliteration of the metaphysical world; since Nietzschean basis for this obliteration of metaphysical world was based on the ‘Death of God’ which in itself is contradictory.

31 Nietzsche Part I: “AttackProp ofer thety Trueof C world.”hrist [Online]Unive rsity. 32 There was a time, embracing Religious ideas especially Christian faith was considered as wise Use it for faandir beneficial.purpose . Give credit to the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 33 Nietzsche Part I: “Attack of the True world.” [Online]

Aquinas thinks that there must be reasonable arguments for the belief in God. For Aquinas, the argument for metaphysical concept of God starts from the experience of the material world. It does not evolve from just an abstract idea; but from the real world of experience. That very fact itself adds a significant feature to Aquinas’ philosophy of religion because it is accessible to any common man in the street. However, one must not overlook the fact that accessibility and acceptance; for both are two different things. Accessibility does not necessarily demand acceptance. Philosophically speaking, a case is not established on the basis of popular acceptance. What actually Aquinas wants to say here is that since the real world of experience is open wide, anyone can access it and make their choices.

In fact Aquinas argues that one can know preliminary facts about God through reason unaided by revelation. He himself elsewhere argues, as pointed out in the second chapter, that natural reason is mandatory to deal with things that are supernatural. In the Nietzschean concept of metaphysics we do not find any argument starting from the real world; for one cannot clarify or reflect on the truth unless he is able to cognitively comprehend the real world.

Aquinas considers reason to be an ally of true faith; therefore, true faith does not need to fear true reason. Unlike Nietzsche, who propagated more of subjective philosophy, Aquinas held on to the objective philosophy by which he argued for the existence of God. When Aquinas acknowledges the power of reason, he does not consider reason to be the ultimate standard for knowing the truth. It is obvious from the writings of Aquinas that he has given due respect to reason and acknowledge its place and importance in knowing God. Nietzschean concept of reason, however, is a total rejection of logical reasoning. The irony is that he thinks his writings are so reasonable to accept. If metaphysics is denied on the basis of Nietzschean reason, the same can be affirmed by his own reason.

It is always better to give reasons for accepting or rejecting a system of belief than not giving any reasonProp eforrt yaccepting of Chr iorst rejectingUniver sanyity .particular ideology. Aquinas always had reasons to affirm his positions or to reject any position. Though Nietzsche Use it for fair purpose. Give credit to the author by citing properly, if your are using it. brings his own reasons for rejecting the metaphysical concept of God, I find his

reasons are not sufficient enough to establish his case. There are three major reasons that he proposed to reject the metaphysical concept of God. 1) Self caused being is an impossible concept; 2) The existence of a good God is actually contradicting with the existence of evil in the world; 3) People believe in God for psychological reasons.34 For Nietzsche, “what does not kill, makes” him “stronger.”35 Rather than the literal sense, this means that the concept of God does not affect him or the society in any way. Whereas, the whole philosophy is developed by Aquinas will be crumbled on the ground if the concept of metaphysical God is not realistically or logically sound.

3.2.2. End of Metaphysics: Lyotard versus Aquinas

As mentioned earlier, Lyotard is known for his definition of postmodernism. According to him it was the increase of knowledge that paved the way for the rise of postmodern philosophy. The Lyotardean distinction of modernism and postmodernism is: the act of modernism is to legitimate knowledge with reference to meta-discourse and the condition of knowledge in the developed society is called ‘postmodern.’

His definition of postmodernism “incredulity toward metaphysics” actually is a strong claim. Metaphysical concept is not the product of modernism; it sprang from the ancient philosophy fully developed during the medieval philosophical period. Lyotard thinks the increase of knowledge, especially in the fields of science and technology coupled with the break of modern society that are systematized, structured, reasoned and possessor of objective idea ended all the metaphysics.

It was Aquinas who reaffirmed Aristotelian reason and developed it further in integrating faith and reason. Chandrankunnel comments: “Aquinas preferred Aristotelian geocentric cosmology and its derived metaphysics of unmoved mover in order to interpret the Christian Trinitarian concept of the One, the Good and the True, God. Thus Aristotelian geocentrism is integrated and identified with Aquinian Property of Christ University.

Use it for fair pur34p Nietzsche,ose. Giv Beyonde cre dGoodit t oand th Evile a, u§23.th o r by citing properly, if your are using it. 35 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, §8.

theology.”36 The purpose of science is to explain the changes and to “formulate its laws.”37 Aquinas, realizing the power of reason, borrowed scientific method from Aristotle. Chandrankunnel writes, “Aristotelian science sought the causes of each thing, and to find causes is the goal of the questioning inquiry in the S.T [Summa Theologica].”38 Aquinas’ acceptance of reason lead to the development of science without denying the ultimate source i.e. God. Chundrakunnel elsewhere says, “In an atmosphere of dialogue and research Aquinas’ theology proceeds from the general to the specific, from unity to diversity, from the reality towards its symbolic representation, from the activities towards its original nature and from the world of natures to the being and activity of God, revealed in Jesus Christ participated by human beings.”39 For Aquinas, since the knowledge starts from the real world, attaining knowledge about the world helps a person to understand the ultimate purpose of his life which leads to metaphysical concept of God; for example his argument from Perfect Being and argument from motion/changes. Therefore, knowledge about the real world only strengthens the belief in the metaphysical concept of God, heaven, angels, etc. It is true that in the unstructured, unsystematic, and unreasoned society, objective ideas are not possible and therefore, it is also impossible to reason toward any metaphysical concept of God. For it is necessary to have a basic reasoned and structured knowledge about the reality to argue for the things above the material realm. Realizing the mathematical foundations for science Aquinas thinks mathematical rules are not imported by mind rather it is derived from the reality of nature.40 Increase in the knowledge of science and technology cannot end the metanarratives. Because science and technology deals with the material objects, the primary task of science and technology is to know the validity/invalidity or reliability/ unreliability of our knowledge about the world around and it does not dismiss the possibility of metaphysical concepts. Chandrankunnel explains, “The help that mathematics give to the physics was conceived by Aquinas as being of two kinds. One functions at the level of hypothesis to suggest possible physical reasoning to give

36 Chandrankunnel, Ascent to Truth: The Physics, Philosophy and Religion of Galileo Galilei, 39. 37 Chandrankunnel, AscentP toro Truth:pert yThe o fPhysics, Chri sPhilosophyt Unive andrsi tReligiony. of Galileo Galilei, 45. 38 Chandrankunnel, Ascent to Truth: The Physics, Philosophy and Religion of Galileo Galilei, 46. Use it for fa39i rChandrankunnel, purpose. G Ascentive c rtoe Truth:dit to The th Physics,e auth Philosophyor by ci andtin gReligion prop ofe rGalileoly, if Galileiyour , a46.re using it. 40 Chandrankunnel, Ascent to Truth: The Physics, Philosophy and Religion of Galileo Galilei, 48.

conclusive explanation or proof.”41 Thus Aquinas concept of reason does not and will not eradicate the possibility of development of science. The development of science does not wipe out the possibility of metaphysics.

3.2.3. Deconstruction: Derrida versus Aquinas

Derrida followed the ‘Death of God’ principle by deconstructing all the meaning, and concepts of the traditional philosophy. As noted above deconstruction analyses a text to find the assumptions and contradictions within it. Like Nietzsche, Derrida argued against the limits of language. Derridaen concept of God is purely atheistic.

As noted in the first chapter, Derridaen deconstruction is influenced by Nietzschean philosophy. The problem with Derrida and other deconstructivists is that, rather than using a language that refers to reality (objects other than language) they tried to avoid the objective meaning that the authors had given to the texts and emphasized the importance of meanings that are proposed by the readers.42 Such an attempt fails to acknowledge the objective, and non-linguistic meaning of words; rather they insist on the free play of words.43

Derrida rejects the logo-centrism which argues for the order of truth, logic, meaning and reason that exist independently of knower. On the contrary Aquinas does not believe in the subjectivization of meaning. Derridaen deconstruction cannot help us to distinguish something as true or false because it is based on anti-foundational philosophy. Since deconstruction does not accept any foundation for knowledge or meaning, any attempt to understand or express the underlying facts about the reality becomes futile. Here comes the uniqueness of Aquinas’ philosophy as he bases his philosophy purely from God who created the objective universe and laws from which one starts all meaningful talk.

41 Chandrankunnel,Pr oAscentpert toy Truth:of C hTheri sPhysics,t Uni vPhilosophyersity. and Religion of Galileo Galilei, 48. Use it for fair pur42p Erickson,ose. Gi Christianve cred Theologyit to th, 54.e a uthor by citing properly, if your are using it. 43 Erickson, Christian Theology, 54.

3.2.4. A Corrective to Postmodern Metaphysics of God

Metaphysics is not possible with the ‘Death of God’ theology. According to Thomistic philosophy, the right understanding about the real world would give an explanation of metaphysical world namely about the universe with God, heaven, angles, etc. In the previous sections I have listed Nietzsche’s reasons for rejecting metaphysical concept of God where he says, a self-caused being is impossible. Aquinas speaks about a God who exists eternally without the beginning or end. Nietzsche was confused with the eternal God and self-caused God. I argue that there is no cause for the existence of God! If God is caused by any other cause, then God cannot be God because it follows that God needs some other cause for His existence. Aquinas’ argument from changes seems to be more logical and plausible answer to Nietzsche’s objection.

Second reason Nietzsche proposed for the denial of metaphysical concept of God is that the concept of a good God is incompatible with the existence of evil. It is true that his argument has much emotional value but has no philosophical value. A theist may respond to Nietzschean argument in the following way: 1. God is all good and desires to defeat evil. 2. God is all powerful and is able to defeat evil. 3. Evil is not yet defeated. 4. Therefore, it will one day be defeated.44

Though it is true that Aquinas argues, “God permits some evil in order to bring greater good out of evil,” that does not contradict the idea that one day God will take away all evil or will defeat evil. Since Nietzsche drafted his philosophical attacks particularly on Christian faith, a believer would argue that when God restores everything into its fullness with the coming of Christ Jesus, there should not be any more sorrow: “And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain ... Behold, I make all things new.”45 Every Christian believer is waiting with this hope Property of Christ University.

Use it for fair pur44p Geisler,ose. G Bakerive cEnrecyclopediadit to t hofe Christian autho rApologetics by citin, s.v.g p “Evil,rope Problemrly, if of.”yo u r are using it. 45 Book of Revelation 21:4-5.

that one day God will bring an end to all the pain and suffering. Generally, people take evil as the argument against God but the fact of the matter is evil and suffering cries out for God rather than against Him. As mentioned above, God has promised to defeat all evil in the end. Now Nietzsche’s second objection is valid only if God wills evil to exist in the world. But Aquinas argues that God does not will evil;46 God permits some evil for greater good. One needs to distinguish between God’s permissive will and perfect will.

Here Nietzsche speaks about the contradiction. But he does not explain how he derived the concept of contradiction for he cannot assess contradiction unless he has an idea of consistency. ‘Death of God’ eliminates possibility of such judgment therefore Nietzsche himself contradicts his own criterion. Again Nietzsche says people believe in God for psychological reasons. This is a fallacy called psychogenical fallacy. Psychogenical fallacy is a logical fallacy that rejects arguments by citing some psychological reasons. Recent researches carried out in the field of philosophy of religion points to religious experiences as the valid reason47 for believing in the supernatural. However, I do admit that one who takes religious experience just as a feeling, then it does not profit him/her; but when a religious experience provides a conceptual foundation for one’s belief in the Supernatural, then it becomes a valid reason for him/her to believe in God. For example, one might experience the supernatural when s/he enjoys the sunset or dawn or the beauty of the universe (see Book of Psalms Chapter 19:1) and also through visions and dreams. 48

Development of scientific knowledge in no way destroys the foundation of the metaphysical concept. Recent developments in science only strengthened the curiosity of the believers for the existence of God. For example, second law of thermodynamics, big bang theory, and intelligent design, etc. Now Aquinas’ reasoning becomes so relevant and reliable in this most advanced scientific era than Lyotardean postmodern reasoning. Because, recent scientific discoveries like big bang theory, second law of thermodynamics imply the beginning of the universe.

46 Aquinas, SummaPr oTheologicaperty o, fI, Cq.19,hr ia.9.st University. 47 In Peterson and Hasker, eds. Reason and Religious Belief, 29-31, lists out different types of Use it for fareligiousir pur experiencespose. Gi vase the cr proofedit how to tsomehe acomeuth too rknow by caboutitin Supernaturalg proper lBeing.y, if y our are using it. 48 Peterson and Hasker, eds. Reason and Religious Belief, 38-40.

Therefore, universe began to exist. Now according to scientific principle there must be some cause behind the emergence of the universe. We could call this cause as the Supreme Cause of all that was created. This is how Aquinas argues from the principles of the real world to the Metaphysical concept of God! Scientists start their arguments/reasoning from the real/material world around them and argue for the cause for whatever they might claim about physical or metaphysical world. Therefore, in the developed society with the advancement of science and technology, the concept of metaphysics could be strengthened and it does not come to its end. In other words, it only sharpens the idea that faith in God is reasonable. Aquinas’ philosophy assumes or infuses meaning and truth in the words, experiences and basic principles. For him all these are interconnected and he presupposes the truth in it. That is the reason why he could build his philosophy so reasonably that anyone who has the basic understanding of the first principle of the natural world can reach to the ultimate end with the help of Divine revelation. Therefore, it is not the deconstruction of postmodernism that is needed but the pure reason that starts from the world to God who created the universe which in turn displays the Divine revelation in itself.

3.3. THOMISTIC CRITIQUE ON POSTMODERN MORALITY

Postmodernism rejects any legitimation of knowledge especially of morality; rather it promotes delegitimation of morality. This is a serious challenge to Aquinas’ moral philosophy. Though Aquinas does not strictly insists on the legitimation of morality, he does provide the basis or reason for being moral rather than being evil. At the same time, Aquinas rejects any form of delegitimating morality. Human beings have freedom to delegitimate morality but have no reason to do so. In the following sections I will deal with Aquinas’ idea of both Legitimating and Delegitimating morality.

3.3.1. Legitimation of Morality: A Thomistic View Property of Christ University. Postmodern morality is not based on reason, epistemology or metaphysics, but all the Use it for fair purpose. Give credit to the author by citing properly, if your are using it. moral laws are either culturally or individually created. Therefore, no one is

responsible to anyone. Postmodern ethics, as noted earlier, is ego-centric and according to it no one has the right to legitimate any law or impose on others. It rejects any absolute moral law available to human beings.

Aquinas’ ethics starts with the mission and goal of human life; with the question, “what is the meaning of life?”49 The ultimate end of man is ultimate happiness. Aquinas believes that happiness is our end for three major reasons: 1) everyone wants to be happy, 2) as an end, everyone wants happiness, 3) people search for happiness by “means of everything.”50 However, this happiness, Aquinas warns, is not mere happiness or contentment but it is true and real blessedness. It is more than emotional contentment and it is not subjective but objective.51 Aquinas insists that it is this happiness that makes a person to do what he does for there is only one final end.52

For Aquinas, human happiness is fundamentally based on contemplation of God.53 Aquinas considers man, in the first place, as natural man54 who is governed by the natural law. In order to understand the natural law we need to understand the Aquinas’ concept of law. Aquinas’ definition of law is ‘a precept of reason promulgated by one who is in authority’. According to his understanding, law is “a rule or measure of human acts, whereby a person is induced to act or is restrained from acting.”55 In other words, law is the guiding factor for man to judge his/her actions. When Aquinas speaks about the beatitudes, he speaks about the natural beatitudes, which is “attainment of the supreme Good,” and this is available to all natural man without the help of the Divine revelation.56 To become a perfect human being, one needs Divine revelation because the judgement about human acts can be made only on the basis of principles that transcend human standards.

49 Kreeft, Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 71. 50 Kreeft, Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 71. 51 Kreeft, Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 71. 52 Kreeft, Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 71. 53 Copleston, MedievalProp Philosophyerty of C, 393.hri s t University. 54 Copleston, Medieval Philosophy, 400. Use it for fair pur55p Aquinas,ose. G iSummave cr eTheologicadit to th, I,e q.90, aut a.1.ho r by citing properly, if your are using it. 56 Copleston, Medieval Philosophy, 400.

Aquinas considers that breaking of law is “contradictory to reason”57 and every evil/bad act of man is offences against God – or in other words, any act that does not go in line with the right reason is an offence to God.58 According to Aquinas, any norms that control human deeds – whether good or bad are measured in the light of reason.59 For he thinks that the laws or norms are very much connected or derived from the eternal law that “refers to God’s providential ordering of all created things to their proper end.”60 Meaning, ultimately all the acts or deeds of human beings are compared and contrasted with the Divine law which are not contradictory to natural reason.

3.3.2. Deconstructing Morality: A Thomistic View

In this section I shall look into how Aquinas might view deconstruction of morality. Aquinas would think that deconstruction of morality as an attack on reason. Deconstructing morality is taking apart the concept of right and wrong and suspecting or being sceptical about all roots of moral philosophy. For example, in deconstructing morality one has to assume that there is no such thing as right and wrong.

For Aquinas, reason “belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command … Therefore law is something pertaining to reason.”61 When postmodern philosophers deconstruct the reason which is very much interconnected with Aquinas’ morality, it leads to moral relativism. When there is no place for reason, morality will be without basis, leading to chaos. Aquinas writes, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for “lex” [law] is derived from “ligare” [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts … since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action.62

Thus according to Aquinas, 1) Law is a rule 2) Law measures acts, 3) Law binds one to acts 4) law belongs to the reason to direct to the end.

57 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.71, a.6, a.5. 58 Copleston, Aquinas, 199. 59 Aquinas, SummaPr oTheologicaperty o, fI, Cq.90hr, ia.s1t. University. 60 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.93, a.3. Use it for fair pur61p Aquinas,ose. G iSummave cr eTheologicadit to th, I,e q.90, aut a.1.ho r by citing properly, if your are using it. 62 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.90, a.1.

When deconstructionist deconstructs the law, then there will be no rule, no standard to measure human conduct. This would make social harmony impossible since there is nothing to regulate diverse human behaviours which may go against others’ wishes and needs. The third point Aquinas makes is that when we apply deconstruction to morality, then it takes away the opportunity for social bonds with one another; for if there is no law (that is transcendent) which regulate social bond, then human being are, self centred beings, as Nietzsche’s morality promotes. Human beings can act as they wish. Thus in the end, deconstruction takes away the meaning and purpose of life. As mentioned above, the first principle of ethics is that ‘good is to be done and evil is to be shunned’ which is based on reason. Without the rational basis, deconstructing morality will destroy these entire foundations of morality and that will lead us to total chaos.

3.3.3. A Corrective to Postmodern Moral Philosophy

Postmodern morality leads to moral relativism and moral inclusivism. Postmodern moral relativism and moral inclusivism are direct descendents of ‘Death of God’ theology. Both of these postmodern products are not logically sustainable. Aquinas’s moral philosophy refutes postmodern theory of morality, because, it neither stands against reason nor against the real world that Aquinas speaks about.

Postmodern morality leads one into moral relativism according to which there is no objective moral law by which human beings can lead a moral life. Moral law is derived and designed by the culture and society. This postmodern moral philosophy has influenced people and now it is a swiftly growing philosophy in both eastern and the western countries and is much popular in the universities and colleges. The fundamental assumption that moral relativism upholds is that there is no metanarrative and there is constant change in things and some even have gone little further and proclaimed, “Nothing is constant but change.”63 As a result, it leaves us with no objective truth on which we can make judgment on whether something is right or wrong. Property of Christ University. Use it for fa i r p u r p o s e . G i v e c r e d i t t o the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 63 Geisler and Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy, 399-400.

Moral relativists profess that the beliefs of a person are true for himself, and not necessarily for anyone else. They believe that “No truth is objectively true or false. This means that one person’s ‘truth’, which really amounts to his opinion, can directly conflict with another person’s ‘truth’ and still be valid.”64 However, relativism cannot stand against the scrutiny of its own logic; for example, when a relativist says ‘no truth is objectively true or false’ he means that the statement is objectively true, but in turn he made a self-defeating statement. Because, relativism also falls into the category of logical fallacy of the law of non contradiction as is clear from the following syllogism. Truth is always relative This statement implies that truth is objective Therefore, truth is not always relative. Relativism has not only logical problems but morally it is untenable. Norman Geisler observes, “Relativism is an impossible position to hold in ethics. You can’t say, ‘Relativism is true,’ or even, ‘Relativism is better than absolutism’, because these statements assume an absolute value that contradicts relativism.”65 C. S. Lewis also explains: The moment you say that one set of moral ideas can be better than another, you are, in fact, measuring them both by a standard, saying that one of them conforms to that standard more nearly than the other. But the standard that measures the two things is something different from either. . . . You are, in fact, comparing them both with some Real Morality, admitting that there is such a thing as real Right, independent of what people think, and that some people’s ideas get nearer to that real Right than others.66

When someone tries to compare a thing/concept with another she/he judges with a standard; and this standard goes beyond what people think. In essence, the standard becomes objective. Relativism, thus, knowingly or unknowingly bases its argument on absolutism; for relativism claims to be absolutely true not just for a proponent, but also for everyone who listens to it; which contradicts its own ideology. Therefore, relativism is false, and it must be rejected. Just because there are differences, it does not mean that relativism is true.67 Again, relativists may criticize the absolutists saying that there is no absolute truth and absolutists are intolerant people. An

64 Strobel, The CasePro forpe thert yReal of Jesus Chr, 233.ist U niversity. 65 Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, s.v. “Reincarnation” Use it for fair pur66p Lewis,ose. G Theiv Abolitione credi oft tMano th, 25.e a uthor by citing properly, if your are using it. 67 Copan, Is Everything Really Relative? 56-57.

absolutist may respond, to the ‘the statement ‘there is no absolute truth’ that it is also an absolute statement/position’ and thus the relativist is also being intolerant in his/her response to the absolutist. If a relativist is true to his/her relativistic idea, he/she should appreciate the absolutists’ idea of truth being objective. Moral relativism is neither logically consistent nor practically possible. It does not have any right to condemn any deeds what an objectivist would call as immoral.

Moral inclusivism is a belief that one must include all belief systems into his/her system of belief68 which may include moral theory, religious belief and political etc. One needs to distinguish this concept from pluralism, a view that reality is plural and it holds on to different views. Whereas, inclusivism, as the name itself implies, includes all concepts under one umbrella. It is opposite to the exclusivists’ claim and asserts that only inclusivism is true and all exclusivism is false. There are few justifications for this theory. The first justification is that the barriers to explanation in human matters are practical rather than principled.69 This means they look at more of practicality than the logical principles. Secondly, “in the case of human subjects, understanding is not only the goal of inquiry in the human sciences but must also be the method of inquiry.”70 Thirdly, “all discussions of human interest and intentions are fundamentally interpretive and that, virtually by definition, human interests and intentions pervade all human activity.”71 Moral inclusivism also suffers the same logical problems as does relativism. Inclusivism, as the word implies, accepts every worldview and all moral theories (including contradictory ones) in their essences as equal. The intention is not to offend anyone. So come to the conclusion that everyone’s views are correct and there is no right and wrong. For inclusivism all truth claims are a matter of “both-and,” rather than “either-or.” By this reasoning there could be square circles, wise fools, married bachelors and educated illiterates.72

68 Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, s.v. “Neopaganism.” 69 Lawson, and McCauley,Propert Rethinkingy of Ch rReligionist Un, 18.ive rsity. 70 Lawson, and McCauley, Rethinking Religion, 18. Use it for fair pur71p Lawson,ose. G andive McCauley, credit t oRethinking the au Religionthor b,19y .c iting properly, if your are using it. 72 Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, s.v. “Pluralism, Religious.”

According to the objective logic, mutually exclusive propositions cannot both be true.73 For example, when Hitler wanted to eliminate all the people who were insignificant and low race, Mother Theresa wanted to give significance to insignificant by serving them. How can a postmodern philosopher who holds on to Nietzschean philosophy make any distinction between them both morally and logically? The truth of the matter is postmodernism cannot make any rational judgement. However, if a person chooses to carefully study and make a judgement he/she may conclude that belief in God is rational and not merely based on feeling or sentiments but on faith that could be rationally explained.

Property of Christ University.

Use it for fa i r p u r p o s e . G i v e c r e d i t t o the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 73 Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, s.v. “Pluralism, Metaphysical.” CONCLUSION

Nietzsche and postmodern philosophy holds that logic is made by human and it is applicable to fictitious entities. On the contrary, Aquinas believed that logic is derived from the world which is created by God in a logical order and therefore, the ultimate source of logic is God himself and man discovered this logical order from the nature. Aquinas held logic as real and Nietzsche accepted existence of logic not as a real but as illusionary or apparent. Aquinas thinks that logic starts from the real world and it can be used for all knowledge, including our God-talk. While Nietzsche thinks that logic is an illusion and the law of contradiction is dangerous to the world, Aquinas believes that logic plays a major role in the destiny of human beings because every idea has its consequence.

When Nietzsche thinks that logic is a fictitious entity, Aquinas thinks that it is not only essential to understand the real world but also to deal with faith in the super natural. Faith in the supernatural presupposes the natural reason. If logic is an illusion as Nietzsche thinks, then any rational discussion on supernatural would be impossible. It follows that if logic is an illusion then our knowing is also an illusion – and thus real knowledge is impossible. Aquinas, on the other hand, thinks that logical reasoning is a natural habit of knowing. When Nietzsche says logic is just an assumption and does not correspond to reality, it defeats itself. Because when Nietzsche says, logic is an assumption that does not relate to the real world, he assumes that this assumed logical statement relates to the world in which he lives. Thus, if this assumption is logically reasoned from the real world, then it logically speaks of the reality of logical reasoning.

Now natural logical reasoning is common to all. It is true with both the believers and non believers. Therefore, Aquinas thinks that it would be easy for one to convince a man about truth in the supernatural. I think it is a plausible argument than what Nietzsche wanted to say. Nietzsche failed to explain that logic is not objective Property of Christ University. for the reasons that fictitious entity created by man could only be relative. Even Use it for fair purpose. Give credit to the author by citing properly, if your are using it.

Nietzsche wanted to convince his readers about the matters he writes in his books, he needs to either show or assume a common ground with his readers.

I have also explained that Nietzschean attitude towards laws of logic is dangerous to the world. When Nietzsche attacks and rejects all traditional understanding of logical reasoning, claiming that they are the worst error and illusion ever committed in the history of philosophy, Aquinas thinks that the use of logic (Science of systematic thinking) is a natural process of knowledge and understanding. Hence, it is impossible for man to deny the laws of logic without affirming it.

Postmodernists borrowed the Nietzschean concept and methodology. Postmodern philosophy rejects objective meaning and possibility of objective knowledge. It tries to break boundaries and tries to open the sea of knowledge. Postmodern philosophy hopes that this can be done through deconstruction. Aquinas, however, thinks that every argument must start from the real things and from our experience of the real things. For example, we take two objects and keep in the left hand side and three other objects of the same kind on the right hand side; and then if we put these objects together, we get five objects in total; which means two objects plus three objects is equal to five objects. All the basic laws of logic, though it is abstract, derive from our experiences of the real world. Therefore, logic is not illusion but a real concept. Postmodern ideology cannot reject reason; if they do so then all their argument crumbles down on the ground. But in principle they reject all the sort of reasoning that fixes meaning.

Aquinas thinks that faith in God is very much related to reason. Though Aquinas contends that reason cannot produce faith, some supernatural mysteries/truth can be achieved by human reason. Postmodern philosophy, on the other hand, has no consistent stand on this regard. Since they reject any fixed reasoning.74 The rejection of fixed reasoning leads to relativism. One may, however, think we need to accept relativism with some reservation, so that it can open the ocean of knowledge since the aim of postmodernismPr o isp toer t openy of doorChr i ofst U knowledgeniversit y without. any limit. There is a

Use it for fair pur74p Nietzscheanose. Give rejection credi tof t olaws th ofe nonaut contradictionhor by ci tandin gother pr olawspe rofly logic, if yiso anu rexample are u forsin g it. this.

problem when we apply this reservation, because it becomes a law against itself i.e., because postmodernism rejects any reservation in opening up of meaning.75

Reason that is discovered from nature can be used to affirm one’s belief in the supernatural; especially it rationally justifies one’s faith in God. In fact Aquinas urges one to study philosophy or get acquainted with natural reason before he/she begins his/her studies in Theology. If Aquinas never considers the natural reasoning as the essential one in developing human knowledge, he wouldn’t make any distinction between the two. He maintains that faith in God and reason are never contradictory but they always work together. In fact Aquinas affirms that it is difficult to learn theology or study of supernatural without the aid of philosophy or natural reason.

Aquinas never depends on the absoluteness of reason; in other words he does not take reason to be the only criterion for knowing truth. He is convinced that faith and reason cannot go against each other at any level. For him this idea is not a sophisticated or difficult to understand. Because he says, as I explored earlier, there are some divine truths that go beyond human reasoning. In other words, though reason may go beyond the comprehension of human reason, it cannot contradict to any truth about the Divine.

In a way Aquinas is agreeing with postmodernists when he says reasoning alone is not the absolute standard for finding the truth. At the same time, postmodernists must not forget that reason plays a greater role in establishing faith in God which postmodernism cannot afford to accept. Postmodernism has no place in faith or belief for it considers all faith and belief systems as assumptions and tries to tear the assumptions apart by the method of deconstruction. The goal of disintegrating all assumption is to find all the possible meanings that are hidden in a system. Even in the effort of finding all possible meanings, one needs to apply logic/systematic reason or else everything will become meaningless. Therefore, postmodernists’ position on reason/logic is not coherent and practical; and therefore must be rejected. On the other hand, Aquinas uses reasonProp fromerty theof Cmorehri spracticalt Unive aspectrsity. and in a more coherent way. Therefore Aquinas’ use of reason could be used to satisfy a believer’s rational quest. Use it for fa i r p u r p o s e . G i v e c r e d i t t o the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 75 It applies not only to meaning of the text but also to other practical elements like morality.

Besides, Nietzsche often makes contradictory statements.76 Nietzsche says “we lack any organ for knowledge”77 and later he says, “Knowledge is sweeter than honey.”78 Generally speaking, Aquinas does not separate epistemology and metaphysics as the modern philosophers have done, rather he considers both of these branches of philosophy go together. In other words, Aquinas maintains that knowledge is derived from our apprehension of reality or what really is. On the other hand, Nietzsche takes a different track on knowledge and argues that knowledge is reducing some strange idea into something familiar. But the question arises here is: what is familiar to man? It must be the real world or what is! This would be something that can be accessible to all man; which means Nietzsche cannot get away from the real reasoning process proposed by Aquinas. But this proclamation implies that knowledge must start from the real world which is familiar to all. In the light of Nietzschean statements as I have cited in the first chapter, Nietzsche do not concede to this conclusion. Therefore, Nietzsche’s arguments are not convincing.

Both Aquinas and Nietzsche take different approaches on the effects and source of knowledge. For Aquinas, the ultimate source of knowledge is God; and every true knowledge leads to the knowledge of God. On the contrary, as mentioned earlier, Nietzschean purpose of getting knowledge is power, to believe in oneself, to make one feel superior to all. Therefore, Nietzschean knowledge is human centred and Aquinas’ knowledge is God centred. The point one need to remember is that Nietzschean epistemology depends on man and therefore it can be arbitrary, which finally leads to relativism. Aquinas thinks that even the epistemology determines something to be false or true with absolute norms. This means that Aquinas’ epistemology assumes transcendent and absolute norms that are higher than human standards.

Therefore, I think, Aquinas balances both rationality and faith. He never considers rationalism to be the ultimate standard for finding the meaning/truth and at the same time, he never advocates a faith that has nothing to do with reason.

P r o p e r t y of Christ University. 76 See chapter one, section 1.2.2. Use it for fair pur77p Nietzsche,ose. Giv Gaye c Scienceredit ,t §o354. th e author by citing properly, if your are using it. 78 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, §292.

Postmodernism failed in this integration. Therefore, for a reasoning theist postmodern philosophy is not an option rather he/she must come back to Thomistic philosophy as it can meet his/her spiritual and rational dimensions.

As I have investigated in the first chapter, Nietzsche was a self-proclaimed nihilist. He calls himself as ‘a godless anti-metaphysician.’ Nietzsche thinks that this empirical world is not created by anyone. If this world is not created or emerged from somewhere, then it must be eternal. Nietzsche claims that there is no epistemological justification for making any inference. Therefore, it is impossible to make any argument for God’s existence. He never examines whether there are any evidence for God’s existence; but on the other hand, Aquinas shows that there are sufficient reasons to believe in God.

From the writings of Nietzsche it is so clear that by his ‘Death of God’ theory no evidence is possible – no meaning is possible. Nietzsche never deals with any evidence for the existence of God. On the contrary, Aquinas lists out his evidences for the existence of God. All his arguments for the rationality of belief in God is inferred from the objective reality/evidences that we may find in the real world around us which are self-evident. Often presuppositions play great roles in establishing the rationality of faith in the supernatural but this is not the only criterion Aquinas applied to it.

As I have quoted in the previous chapters, Nietzsche states, “I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.” This argument can be made syllogistic in the following way: Logical order in grammar presupposes God Logical order in grammar does not exist Therefore, God does not exist

Both Nietzsche and theists accept the first premise. Second premise is in question when it is presented to theists; for the opposite of the second premise is true. The very logical order of the P premise/statementsroperty of Chri s presentedt Unive r heresity . itself is an example for it. Use it for faTherefore,ir purpo sa etheist. Giv mighte cre dreviseit to theth esyllogism author inby the ci tfollowinging prop way:erly , if your are using it.

Logical order in grammar presupposes the existence of God Logical order is found in grammar Therefore God exists.

Aquinas’ argument are, though, built on assumptions, I have argued that his assumptions are based on reasonable ones. He argued reasonably from the common phenomena available to all; and that allows people to search, analyse and arrive at a conclusion either as rejecting or accepting Aquinas’ contention. This method of argumentation is not agreeable to adherents of postmodern philosophy. For, in principle, postmodern philosophy does not consider something to be better than the other things.

Postmodernism gives equal importance to all events, ideas and texts. I do not think this can be as practical as Aquinas’ philosophy is. For example, no postmodernist considers that concepts opposite to postmodern ideologies are equally important as postmodern concepts. For example, no postmodernist would say that the concept that God exists is equal to the concept that God does not exist. Hence there is no scope for even comparing or prioritizing any idea, concept, events, etc.

The challenge that postmodern philosophy brings against belief in metaphysical concept of God is deconstruction. I have discussed what deconstruction is and what it does in the previous chapters. It plays a critical approach so that it could expose unquestioned metaphysical assumptions in philosophy and literary language; in other words, as to show how meaning overflows its limit. But in no way explains any metaphysical notion of God. That is the reason why Lyotard’s famous definition of postmodernism is “incredulity towards meta-narrative.”79 Therefore, according to postmodernism, the possibility of God-talk becomes nonsense or fictitious. Derridean deconstruction and Lyotard’s end of metaphysics tries to put an end to God-talk. Aquinas’ philosophy still speaks more powerfully for use of language in God-talk than any of the postmodern philosophy.

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Use it for fa i r p u r p o s e . G i v e c r e d i t t o the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 79 Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, Xxiv.

Use of univocal language is rejected by postmodernism in all respects whereas Aquinas rejected the use of univocal language in God-talk. The reason for rejecting univocal language in God talk is so much philosophical80 than postmodern ideologies that are anti-foundational. The other method of language suggested in God-talk is equivocal language which allows multiple meaning and interpretation. This linguistic methodology may be acceptable to postmodern philosophy but not in God-talk. The main reason for rejecting this linguistic method is that if we consider the name as the predicate of God by just unexpected sound, these names speak nothing of God. Therefore, unlike postmodernism, Aquinas rejects the equivocal language in God-talk on a reasonable ground. Finally Aquinas suggests that the only possible language for the God-talk is analogous language. Though there is no perfect language to speak of God, one can speak of God only in a similar way (analogous way). When postmodernism does not have a place to talk about God, Aquinas argued for the possibility of God talk through a rigorous philosophical analysis.

Therefore, Aquinas’ philosophy seems to be more reasonable than the postmodern philosophy. First of all, Thomistic philosophy is successful in integrating faith and reason in a balanced way so as to meet the needs of rational-spiritual man. Secondly, by holding on to reasonable presuppositions, he gives sufficient consideration to all the evidences that are available to us in the world. Thirdly, when postmodern philosophy does not have any coherent methodology in logic, epistemology, metaphysics and in linguistic philosophy, Aquinas’ philosophical methods in these areas are more practical, experientially relevant and logically coherent than postmodern deconstruction. Thus Thomistic philosophy satisfies the rational quest and spiritual needs of believer by providing reasonable presupposition and undeniable evidences which ultimately points that belief in God is reasonable.

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Use it for fa i r p u r p o s e . G i v e c r e d i t t o the author by citing properly, if your are using it. 80 See Chapter three, section 2.4.1.

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