A Contemporary Perspective Between Nietzsche, Sartre, & Nancy
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The Meaning(s) of Life: A Contemporary Perspective Between Nietzsche, Sartre, & Nancy by Darryl Wardle Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Magister Artium (MA) (Philosophy) in the Department of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities University of Pretoria Supervisor: Professor Benda Hofmeyr September 2016 © University of Pretoria TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i ABSTRACT iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS iv CHAPTER I: Introduction(s) to the Meaning(s) of Life 1 1.1. Meaning as a Philosophical Concept 2 1.1.1. Semantic, Semiotic, & Existential Meaning 2 1.1.2. Philosophical Approaches to the Meaning of Life 5 1.1.3. The Dimensions & Implications of Existential Meaning 6 1.2. The Meaning of Life in Context 8 1.2.1. The Meaning(s) of Ancient to Modern Life 9 1.2.2. The Meaning(s) of 19th Century Life 10 1.2.3. Contemplating the Contemporary Meaning(s) of Life 14 1.2.4. Contemporary Secular Thought on Existential Meaning 17 1.3. Outline & Objectives of the Study 20 CHAPTER II: Nietzsche & the Problem of Nihilism 23 2.1 Nietzsche in Context 24 2.2 Schopenhauer’s Pessimism 26 2.3 The Historical Development of Nihilism 32 2.4 Trans-valuation & the Will to Power 37 2.5 Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Future 45 2.6 Critical Evaluation of a Nietzschean Means-to-Meaning(s) 51 2.7 Conclusion: Existential Meaning(s) Beyond Nihilism (?) 55 CHAPTER III: Sartre’s Individualism of Existential Meaning 57 3.1. Sartre in Context 58 3.1.1. Sartre in the Wake of the Death of God 59 3.1.2. Sartre’s Atheism 64 3.2. Sartre’s Phenomenology of Meaning 68 3.2.1. The Meaning(s) of the Sartrean Self 72 3.2.2. The Meaningful Transcendence of the For-itself 76 © University of Pretoria 3.2.3. Fundamental Ontological Freedom 80 3.2.4. Existential Anguish & ‘Bad Faith’ 83 3.2.5. The Pursuit of the Human God: The In-itself-For-itself 88 3.3. The Affirmation of Being-for-itself 90 3.3.1. Interrogating Sartre: Transcendence, Value, & Meaning 91 3.3.2. Two Existential Dispositions: Seriousness & Play 95 3.3.3. Sartre on Authenticity & Death 98 3.3.4. The Temporal Dimension(s) of Existential Meaning 101 3.3.5. The (Latent) Possibility of Existential Affirmation in Sartre’s Ontology 103 3.3.6. Existential Meaning Beyond Sartre’s Ontology 107 3.3.7. Critical Appraisal of a Sartrean Means-to-Meaning(s) 111 3.4. Existential Meaning & the Sartrean ‘Other’ 116 3.4.1. Sartrean Subjectivism 117 3.4.2. Sartre on the Social Dimension of Existential Meaning 119 3.4.3. Meaning in Conflict: ‘The Look’ of the Other 120 3.4.4. The Meaning(s) of ‘We’ 122 3.4.5. Inter-Subjective Meaning Beyond Sartre’s Ontology 125 3.5. Conclusion: Existential Meaning(s) Beyond Individualism (?) 129 CHAPTER IV: Nancy’s Contemporary Sense of Existence 132 4.1. Nancy in Context 133 4.2. Meaning(s) in (and of) our Historical Past 134 4.2.1. Meaning qua Signification 134 4.2.2. Meaning after the Death of God 139 4.2.3. The Ever-Elusive ‘Return’ to Meaning 143 4.3. Existential Meaning as ‘Sense’ 147 4.3.1. Meaning qua Sense versus Meaning qua Signification 147 4.3.2. The Trans-Immanence of Sense 153 4.3.3. Entailments of Sense: Surprise, Infinite Finitude, & Exposure 156 4.3.4. Between the Absolute & the Abyss 159 4.3.5. The Nietzschean Nancy: Sense as Life-Affirmation 163 4.4. Existential Meaning in Nancy’s Ontology 167 4.4.1. Meaning as the Sharing of Being 168 4.4.2. Meaning Singular Plural 172 © University of Pretoria 4.5. Nancy & Sartre 176 4.5.1. Sartre’s Individualism versus Nancy’s Pluralism 177 4.5.2. Deconstructing Sartre 179 4.5.3. Nancy Beyond Sartre 188 4.6. Critical Engagement with Nancy’s (Finite) Thinking 193 4.6.1. The Ethical Impracticability of Sense 193 4.6.2. The Mineness of Meaning 197 4.6.3. Being Singular as well as Plural 201 4.7. Conclusion: A Contemporary Sense of Existentialism 205 CHAPTER V: Conclusion(s) on the Meaning(s) of Life 208 5.1. Tracing the Movement(s) of Meaning from Nietzsche to Sartre to Nancy 209 5.2. Meaning(s) Between Nietzsche, Sartre, & Nancy 214 5.3. The Meaning(s) to(ward) Life 219 BIBLIOGRAPHY 221 © University of Pretoria ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Writing this philosophical dissertation on the meaning(s) of life has itself been a most meaningful experience. Along with Jean-Luc Nancy, I acknowledge that such meaning is neither made nor experienced in isolation alone, since one is always already implicated in a meaningful existence with others, to whom one owes so much more than a mere page or two outlining one’s sentiments. In this singular plural spirit of acknowledgement, I herewith wish to recognize and give thanks to those who have, in one way or another, contributed to the meaning(s) of my life. Firstly, I acknowledge my wondrous significant other, or perhaps I should say that singular plural being who is my foremost partner in existence, Leandré le Roux, who, through her most wondrous manner of being-in-the-world, has led me towards an existence more manifestly meaningful and bountifully beautiful than ever before. Perhaps more than any other being, she has inspired me to affirm my existence in this world here and now, often in idiosyncratic and creative ways that I might not otherwise have thought possible. She revealed to me a means-to-meaning that can only be made manifest upon a firm foundation of shared love, whose finitude is indeed infinite. Secondly, I wish to acknowledge my parents and my sisters, from whom I have drawn influence, both personal and philosophical, throughout my existence. My parents accorded me a life that was purpose-driven and meaningful from its very inception. They did so by granting me the personal freedom of self-expression and independent thought that I have always felt that I require for a meaningful existence. They further inculcated in me, either through their parentage or through their own lives, an unequivocal reverence for life and love, kindness and friendship, compassion and hope. To my mother I owe an especial mention in this regard, since her personal existential engagement with the question of the possible meaning(s) of life has served as one of the principal inspirations for my own concern with this theme. To both my parents I further offer a most sincere vote of gratitude for providing me with the material means to pursue my philosophical interests, and the individual freedom within which to do so. It is often said that one cannot choose one’s family. However, in the spirit of Sartrean freedom, I would assert that one always has a choice of one’s existence, and given this freedom of choice, I would always choose the family into which I was contingently born. Thirdly, I acknowledge my friends, all of whom have taught me the true value of a life whose meaning must be shared. I thank my friend Mark Kourie, with whom I shared a number of late- night conversations concerning Jean-Luc Nancy and the insightfulness of his thought. If there is one person in whom Nancy’s admirable value of openness is most manifest, it would be Mark. I also acknowledge and thank my good friend Helgard Jordaan, with whom I have shared many meaningful moments appreciating our shared love of that beautiful noise that we dare call music. i © University of Pretoria To all of my friends in the philosophy department at the University of Pretoria I offer thanks for those countless occasions when we shared our meaning(s) with one another across seminar room tables, and especially over drinks, which, some might argue, truly turned us into philosophers in a different, though no less valid, sense of the term. I wish also to acknowledge our philosophical society, Footnotes to Plato, where over the years a steady stream of meaning(s) has flowed between open-minded individuals, and I must further thank those who first introduced me to this society in 2011, Stéf Smit and Mark Kourie, through and with whom I discovered my passion for meaningful philosophical thought. Fourthly, and by no means least importantly, I recognize and thank my colleagues in philosophy. This includes first and foremost my research supervisor, Benda Hofmeyr, to whom I undoubtedly owe an appreciable academic debt for often offering me such astute and insightful advice on my argumentative pitfalls and shortcomings, and for always evincing a firm belief in my abilities as a thinker, and for allowing me my own space within which to further flourish as an academic and philosopher. Benda has demonstrated to me in innumerable ways that academia itself can be a meaningful pursuit. To all other colleagues and friends in the philosophy department, especially Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem and Amanda Oelefse, I offer a special vote of thanks for the support and kind words that you have bestowed upon me throughout the years. To write as I have above is to say that such relationships have meant a great deal to me over the years. After all, I cannot deny that they have made my life all the more meaningful without thereby ironically undermining my own philosophical arguments in favour of a meaningful human life in the pages that follow hereafter. To all of those who have played a meaningful role in my life, I offer the following words from Nancy that so appositely articulate my sentiments above: ‘There is no meaning if meaning is not shared… because meaning is itself the sharing of Being.’1 1 Nancy 2000:2.