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The Political Implications of Thomas Aquinas's Theory of Conscience

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Louisiana State University LSU Digital Commons LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 2013 Thinking Together about the Common Good: The Political Implications of Thomas Aquinas's Theory of Conscience Angela Concetta Miceli Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Miceli, Angela Concetta, "Thinking Together about the Common Good: The oP litical Implications of Thomas Aquinas's Theory of Conscience" (2013). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 252. https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/252 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please [email protected]. THINKING TOGETHER ABOUT THE COMMON GOOD: THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THOMAS AQUINAS’S THEORY OF CONSCIENCE A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in The Department of Political Science by Angela Concetta Miceli B.A., Thomas More College of Liberal Arts, 2005 M.A., Louisiana State University, 2010 May 2013 © Copyright 2013 Angela Concetta Miceli All rights reserved ii Acknowledgements I have written a dissertation in which I have reflected on how human beings depend upon one another for all the essential things in life. Writing a dissertation, while perhaps not an essential thing in life is such a task that indeed cannot be done in isolation, and I have depended upon the goodness and love of many to complete this project. First, I must acknowledge my debt of greatest gratitude to my parents, Louis and Virginia, who sacrificed much so that I could be educated and could pursue every happiness, opportunity, and success. They continue to love, encourage, and support me in all that I undertake, and I am most grateful for the embodiment of sacrificial and unconditional love they have always given to me and my siblings, Theresa, Joseph, and Regina. It is to them that I dedicate this dissertation. I thank my advisor, Dr. Ellis Sandoz, who has shown me the true meaning of pursuing the truth in freedom and who has always encouraged me to speak that truth with courage. I am so grateful to him for his gentle encouragement, his teaching, and his understanding. To the members of my committee: Dr. James Stoner, whose mentorship, guidance, and example have inspired my work as a scholar in ways that I hope will continue to animate my career. Dr. Cecil Eubanks, whose profound care for students, advice, and wisdom has shown me in many ways how to be a teacher. His respect, attention, and care for me and to all of his students extend beyond the classroom, and I am so grateful for the opportunity to work with him. Dr. Leonard Ray and to Dr. Mark Gasiorowski, I thank them both for their kindness, patience, flexibility and advice throughout my time at Louisiana State University. Each member of my committee has given me an example of integrity and intellectual honesty that I hope to give to my students. To Tara Montelaro and Lezlie Haynes for always helping me and answering all of my questions. To Wanda Ashley or ‘Miss Wanda,’ who attended to my many needs as a student. To my teachers at the Thomas More College of Liberal Arts who formed within my heart a love of learning and study: Dr. Peter Sampo, Dr. Mary Mumbach, Dr. Paul Connell, Mr. Brian Shea, Ms. Deborah Enos, Miss Mary Bonifield, and Mr. Karl Cooper. To the H.B. Earhart Foundation, who generously funded my years in graduate school at Louisiana State University. This opportunity to study would not have been possible without their support. To the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, whose conferences I attended throughout graduate school, which allowed me to forge lasting friendships with some of the most wonderful people I have ever met and with colleagues that I will always cherish. iii To the members of the University of Notre Dame community, most especially to Dr. Mary M. Keys. She invited to me sit in on a class on Aquinas in the spring semester of 2011, and then helped me to find a welcoming community of friends at Notre Dame. Dr. Keys did everything that she could to facilitate and encourage me in my writing process. I must thank both the Jacques Maritain Center and the Center for Ethics and Culture at the University of Notre Dame for their support of my writing and research. Dr. John O’Callaghan and Mrs. Alice Osberger gave me not just resources, study space, but more importantly conversation, support, and friendship. Because of their support, I was not only able to write this dissertation, but I also was able to write and publish my first article and book chapter. Through the Jacques Maritain Center, I also met Dr. Peter Koritansky, who not only helped me translate some particularly difficult passages from Aquinas’s Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, but has also extended his generous friendship and counsel. The Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture generously supported me in my last semester with the Inaugural Edith Stein fellowship, providing me with the time, resources, and financial support I needed to finish writing this dissertation. To O. Carter Snead, Angela Engelsen, Tracy Westlake, and Stephen Freddoso, thank you. I could not have completed this without the provision that you facilitated. To others at the University of Notre Dame who helped me in as many ways that they could: Steve Reifenberg and my colleagues that the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Heather Denton in the department of Political Science, and Charlene Bollman at the Office of Research. To those with whom I had a brief but powerful conversation about my dissertation, Professor Zachary Calo, Professor Rémi Brague, Professor Alasdair MacIntyre, Rev. Richard Hyde. Your answers to my questions impacted me so profoundly and very often helped me to discover new and exciting insights. To all my family members and dear friends who supported and encouraged me, conversed with me, prayed for me, and have always shown me understanding: Joseph Miceli, Theresa Miceli, Regina Miceli, Pam and Randy Stout, Heidi Stout Tretheway, Holly Stout, Ashleen Kelly, Veronica Roberts, Randy and Tamara Smith, Esther Terry, Craig Iffland, Omer Shaukat, Karen Duker, Joan Burkardt, Amy Triche, Rocky Thompson, Margaret Perry, Elise Italiano, Gail Alcarez O’Donnell, Flora Arzanipour, Kate Fairbairn, Mary Dustin, Heather Le, and Maureen Noonan. In a special way, I would also like to thank my neighbors, the Nagy family, who always shower with me affection and whose children have taught me by their love both a practical application of my dissertation and that there is much more to life than writing a dissertation. To my students at Louisiana State University, Purdue University-Calumet, Indiana University- South Bend, Holy Cross College, and the University of Notre Dame: thank you for your questions, your joy, and your passion. You kept me encouraged, and it is for you especially that I write this dissertation. iv I profoundly thank my loving fiancé, Alan N. Stout for his constant encouragement, joy, faith, love, and support of me in this process. To the many that I have not named here, know that I am grateful for every way that you aided me in this process. Finally and most importantly, I acknowledge my deepest gratitude to Almighty God, who in His Goodness, has shown me ever new His faithfulness and love in His constant provision and providential way of unfolding His plan. May I be ever aware of and trusting in His holy and loving Providence. v Table of Contents Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iii Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... vii Chapter I: The Crisis of Conscience in the Modern World ............................................................ 1 I. A Crisis of Conscience ............................................................................................................ 1 II. What is Conscience?: A Theoretical Background ............................................................... 16 III. Why Aquinas? ..................................................................................................................... 23 IV. Aquinas and Contemporary Politics ................................................................................... 28 V. Chapter Descriptions ............................................................................................................ 50 Chapter II: Theoretical and Historical Foundations of Conscience .............................................. 52 I. Theoretical and Historical Background ................................................................................. 54 A. Classical Sources .............................................................................................................. 54 B. Aristotle and Conscience .................................................................................................. 61 II. Theoretical and Historical Background ..............................................................................
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