The Role of Human Function in Defining Happiness

Universal Journal of Psychology 2(7): 218-223, 2014 http://www.hrpub.org DOI: 10.13189/ujp.2014.020702

Leria Ileana Boroş

University of Bucharest, Romania *Corresponding Author: [email protected]

Abstract In this paper I argue that the Aristotelian first book of Nicomachean Ethics that eudaimonia is the concept of “human function” is at the heart of understanding highest good1 and that to explain what happiness is one must the moral concept of “happiness” (ε δαιμονία). There are show what the human function (to ergon tou anthropou) is2. many controversies related to Aristotle’s account on The account on eudaimonia and ergon has given rise to happiness. My statement is that we canὐ gain a better insight many controversies caused by the ambiguous text of Book I on happiness by reference to “human function” (τ ργον of Nicomachean Ethics, as well as by some inconsistencies το νθρ που), provided that we understand what the between this book and Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of Book X, which philosopher meant by this latter concept. Accordingὸ ἔ to some authors even think were erroneously included in Aristotle,ῦ ἀ ώhappiness is the highest good for humans and the Aristotle’s work. In any case, Aristotle is assigned too many human good is a proper exercise of the human function. Thus, flaws and illogical statements or invalid judgments. The text the understanding of happiness relies on the understanding of should be understood, however, in the context of the human function, because human good and perfection depend, Aristotelian logic, not in the logic of each commentator. in Aristotle’s account, on the proper exercise of this function. I will further analyze the content of Chapter 7 of Book I of Aristotle gives a complex account on reason, but in the tenth Nicomachean Ethics, also calling at the Greek philosopher’s book of Nicomachean Ethics he seems to support an various works and I will argue that there is enough coherence intellectualist view on happiness, i.e. a view which only in his writings in order to understand what Aristotle’s makes reference to the activity in accordance with the virtue message about happiness was. I will not give a broad appropriate to the most elevated part of our soul. In other interpretation of eudaimonia, but I will limit myself to words, contemplation would equal happiness. However, explain the concept in the text of Chapter 7 of Book I of such a narrow view would contradict Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and by reference to the concept of comprehensivist approach in the first book of Nicomachean function (ergon), which is actually at the heart of Ethics. An intellectualist account would be in contradiction understanding the meaning of happiness. I will endeavor to with Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia from the first book show, through the analysis of Chapter 7 of the first book of of Nicomachean Ethics. Contemplation alone is not Nicomachean Ethics, that there is consistency between this happiness, but it is a special type of happy life. However, book and the tenth book, to this coherence also contributing happiness comprises other “goods” as well, since the human various passages from De Anima, Topics and Metaphysics. function refers to the complex part of the soul which is It is of utmost importance to keep in mind what Aristotle reason. tells us about happiness in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics in order not to err on a wrong path of argumentation. Keywords Happiness, Function, Reason, Aristotle has a peculiar technical vocabulary and thus we Comprehensivist Approach, Intellectualist View, have to pay attention to all the concepts he is using. We must Contemplation not forget that for Aristotle happiness (eudaimonia) is a type of good (agathon). Aristotle tells us that any activity, art, science and so on is done for the sake of a peculiar good (agathon). Thus, the 1. Introduction good is the end towards which all are aiming; in other words, the good is the final cause and for the sake of it is The seventh chapter of the first book of Aristotle’s everything done. There is no higher end, because it would Nicomachean Ethics is deemed to be a difficult text, because be absurd to go on a search so indefinitely. Achieving this it contains several ambiguities. These ambiguities are supreme good is of great importance to man and therefore primarily related to the way we understand happiness its knowledge is important. It is the subject of science. The (eudaimonia), which is the supreme good, and its relation to 1 The highest good is David Ross’ translation of the greek word ἄριστον human function, which is the specific activity of a human that appears in Aristotle’s text. Roger Crisp translates it by chief good. being. Aristotle himself tells us in the seventh chapter of the 2 Roger Crisp translates τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου by “the characteristic activity of a human being” and David Ross by “the function of man”. Universal Journal of Psychology 2(7): 218-223, 2014 219

knowledge of the good is the task of politics for it is eudaimonia and respectively ergon are in a very close responsible for determining the best activities in the state. connection and in a very profound mutual support. Instead, Other sciences, such as strategy, economics, rhetoric are for the comprehensivists, eudaimonia and ergon are simply subordinate to politics, but the latter is the most important amounts of other elements. According to the science because it deals with the peace of the city, whose comprehensivist view, happiness is a sum of elements such achievement is superior to the achievement of the individual as health, honors, financial security, satisfying relationships good. etc. Aristotle thinks that everybody agrees that the supreme There are some passages that seem to support this good is happiness (eudaimonia). However, when it comes to comprehensivist interpretation, but there are also others explain what happiness is, there is no agreement. People which seem rather to favor authors who interpret the conceive eudaimonia by their lifestyle and there are three concepts of eudaimonia and ergon in an intellectualist main ways to live life: to enjoy pleasure, to live a political manner. These latter rely mainly on excerpts from the tenth life, or to dedicate oneself to a contemplative life (theoretiké). book of Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle comes back at But eudaimonia has to be defined by reference to human the idea of eudaimonia as an activity of the soul in function, for the human being’s good is the good exercise of accordance with the most perfect virtue – sophia, the his/her function (ergon), i.e. an optimal activity (energéia). intellectual wisdom, this activity being a contemplative The human function is the reason, because reason is the (theoretiké) one and belonging to the intellect (nous), which humans’ specific activity. Thus, happiness is the good is the highest element within us and whose objects are also exercise of activity? It is activity (exercise of function) the highest among the objects of knowledge. Under this according to the virtues of the rational part of the soul, since approach, human function is an activity of the intellect the human being’s function is the rational life. (nous) alone. Contemplation is happiness for it is a perfect end, it is not chosen for the sake of something else. But this approach, though seemingly favoured by Aristotle in the 2. The Main Approaches in Interpreting tenth book of Nicomachean Ethics, is not coherent with the Happiness and the Human Function philosopher’s account on the happy life as a life which implies ethical virtue, friends, honors, family, health and so The main interpretations resulting from the difficulties on. posed by Book I and Book X of Nicomachean Ethics can be Disputes between the two orientations – inclusivist and grouped into two main orientations: the inclusivist and the comprehensivist – originate as well in the difficulties raised intellectualist or monistic. There is a more radical in translating the Greek text. For instance, Aristotle tells us orientation, which considers that publishers have wrongly that happiness is teleion (Nicomachean Ethics 1097b20). introduced chapters 6, 7 and 8 in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Some authors translate teleion by “final” and others by Ethics. Timothy D. Roche contradicts those who support “complete”. Translation differences arise again in a passage this idea, arguing that the three chapters are prefigured even where we meet teleiotaten as an attribute of virtue, in Book I of the treaty (Roche, 1988). He also challenges translated by “the most complete” (Nicomachean Ethics the approaches of reviewers who claim that Aristotle 1098a15-17). In these circumstances differences in proposed a selfish version of happiness. This reviewer interpretation are unavoidable. The inclusivists will prefer believes that Aristotle was only interested in the intellectual the translation of “teleion” as "complete" for both the activity as a key of happiness. Roche (1988) is also attributes of eudaimonia and of virtue, while intellectualists criticizing other authors who have argued something more will opt for "perfect". absurd namely that according to the intellectualist vision of Most commentators have insisted on some alleged eudaimonia there are allowed even immoral actions if they incompatibility between Book I, in particular the seventh serve the philosophical activity. We cannot accept such an chapter, and Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of Book X, ignoring the interpretation since Aristotle pays so much attention to very close connection between the first chapters of Book X ethics. Even the name of his work – Nicomachen Ethics – is and those considered problematic. Gary M. Gürtler wrote an a proof that Aristotle deemed ethics to be very precious for article which aims to show that these chapters are intimately human beings. Moreover, the philosopher talks about two related, and the whole discussion about pleasure is not types of virtues: moral virtues (aretai etikai) and intellectual random or wrong placed in Aristotle’s treaty on ethics by virtues (aretai dianoetikai). Aristotle dedicated a lot of space the editors. The situation is the same with the discussion on to describe moral virtues and to explain their importance for eudaimonia as a contemplative activity (Gürtler, 2003). the citizen of a polis (Greek city-state), so it is difficult to believe that ethics would be of no interest when trying to find out what happiness is. 3. End, Final End and the Most Final The followers of the inclusivist interpretation of the End concepts eudaimonia and ergon argue that for Aristotle happiness and human function are actually some Aristotle distinguishes between several species of good compounds. For inclusivists the elements composing ( γαθ ν). In medicine, for instance, health is the good and it

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is the end, the goal (τ λος) for which all actions (πρ ξει) are wonder now if happiness is indeed the sum of some done (Nicomachean Ethics 1097a15-21). Actions are done components like the goods enumerated above or if it has a for an end, but amongέ the ends there are some whichά serve to narrower meaning and some of those goods do not even fulfill other ends. There is a final end (τ λει ν) for which all matter in order to be happy (ε δαιμον). When reading actions are done, and the supreme good ( ριστον) is such a chapter 6 – 8 from Book X we may be tempted to favor the final end (Nicomachean Ethics 1097a25έ-29).ό But if there are intellectualist interpretation of happinessὔ and to think that several final ends, the supreme good willἄ be the most final humans are happy when they have an activity of the soul in (τελει τατον) among the ends (Nicomachean Ethics accordance with a singular virtue: the virtue of the highest 1097a30). For Aristotle, eudaimonia is a final end in an element within us, i.e. the intellect (nous). This virtue is absoluteό manner (Nicomachean Ethics 1097a32-1097b5), i.e. sophia, the intellectual wisdom, which is different from there is not higher good for the human being than happiness. sophrosyné, the practical wisdom. However, we should not Being desired for itself and not for some other end, go too far from what Aristotle’s texts communicate us and happiness has the attribute of self-sufficiency (α ταρκες), we should not search interpretations of eudaimonia but this is self-sufficiency in the context of family life and of independently of the human function, because the life in the city as well, and it is not the sufficiencyὔ of the philosopher himself announces in Nicomachean Ethics Book solitary human being (Nicomachean Ethics 1097b9-11). This 1 Chapter 7 that we can understand happiness if we account on self-sufficiency is important, because it shows understand the human function. that Aristotle did not mean by happiness only the theoretical In Book I Aristotle summarizes the attributes of happiness: or contemplative activity. Aristotle states in the tenth book of it is final (τ λειον), self-sufficient (α ταρκες) and it is the the Nicomachean Ethics that the theoretical (θεωρητική) end of action (Nicomachean Ethics 1097b20-21). Aristotle activity has, in the most obvious way, the feature of deems howeverέ that acknowledgingὔ eudaimonia as the self-sufficiency that we find in happiness. Still we cannot supreme good is not enough for defining happiness. accept the theoretical activity alone as defining eudaimonia, Opinions about eudaimonia differ, and in order to overcome because happiness requires, according to Aristotle, a life in these disagreements and to explain the meaning of happiness family and in the city, while contemplation can take place in we need to understand what the human function is. As the solitude (Nicomachean Ethics 1177a 12-33). Moreover, flutist has a function – that of playing the flute – and his good Aristotle does not state in Book X that happiness is nothing and perfection (τ γαθ ν κα τ ε ) lie in ( ν ε ναι) this else but contemplation. Only commentators interpreted it as function, in the sense that they depend on the proper exercise such. It is true that honors, for instance, are a desirable good of his function3, inἀ the ὸsame ὶwayὸ theὖ man hasἐ a functionἶ of in itself and a candidate for the human happiness, but it is not his own. His good and perfection will depend on the good self-sufficient, as contemplation is, because honors is exercise of this function. thought to depend on others. Still, it is not clear that Aristotle So what is the human function? And once we answer what claims the theoretical activity to be the human happiness. We the human function is, how do we define happiness? are only told that among all activities contemplation is Aristotle's answer is as follows: “the characteristic activity of self-sufficient, as happiness also is, and it is self-sufficient to a human being is an activity of the soul in accordance with the highest degree. reason or at least not entirely lacking it” (Nicomachean We also have to consider what Aristotle tells us in the fifth Ethics 1098a9). Thus, Aristotle tells us what is essential for chapter of the first book of Rhetoric. The philosopher states the human being since the function indicates the activity that that the end of the individual and people in general is makes something to be what it is. So the human being is a eudaimonia and its constituents. These constituents are: rational being, his/her function is reason. How did Aristotle internal goods (of the body and of the soul), external goods (a come to state this? By elimination. In the first place, Aristotle good birth, friends, money and honors) and luck. Aristotle writes that a life based on nutrition and growth (τ ν τε then explains what each of these components means. So far θρεπτικ ν κα τ ν α ξητικ ν ζω ν) is not what we are everything seems to favor the comprehensivist and perhaps searching in order to define the human functionή the inclusivist interpretation too. In Nicomachean Ethics (Nicomacheanὴ ὶ Ethicsὴ ὐ 1098a1).ὴ ήA life of perception Book I Chapter 8 we have a hierarchy of goods, the most (α σθητικ ) is common to (κοιν ) all living beings important and the highest being the goods of the soul and, (Nicomachean Ethics 1098a1-2), therefore is has to be moreover, Aristotle claims, eudaimonia is not something eliminatedἰ ή as well. The vegetative andὴ the sensorial life are that depends on chance or luck. While the passage from not proper for the human being, whereas the rational life is Rhetoric seemed to favor an account on eudaimonia as a proper for the human being that is the human being is the compound made up of several goods, there are also some only being who can lead a rational life. In Topics Book I other aspects which raise some doubts regarding the validity Chapter 5 Aristotle states that a property (τ διον) is of the comprehensivist approach of happiness: the ranking of something that does not indicate the essence of a thing, that is the goods, the definition of eudaimonia in Nicomachean the property is not its definition, but yet belongs toὸ thatἴ thing Ethics Book I, Chapter 7 and Chapters 7 and 8 from Book X. Aristotle already had stated that eudaimonia is an activity 3 The good of the flutist is to play well the flute; this good is accomplished of the soul in accordance with the highest virtue. We may through a good exercise of the function of playing the flute. Therefore, in order to be a good flutist one must exercise well his/her function. Universal Journal of Psychology 2(7): 218-223, 2014 221

alone. The property is also predicated convertibly of that Nicomachean Ethics Book I Chapter 7 is a complete virtue, thing. Thus, if we say that it is proper to the human being to i.e. a generic virtue corresponding to human function. The learn grammar, then we also have to admit that if someone soul has an irrational ( λογον) part and a rational (λ γον) can learn grammar that someone is a human being. But one. The irrational part comprises two elements. The first is learning grammar is not the essence of the human being, it is the vegetative/nourishingἄ faculty (δυν μις), whichό is just some feature among other features proper to humans. widespread, therefore we must exclude it from the list of For the human being it is proper to live a certain type of candidates for the human function (Nicomacheanά Ethics life characterized by activity of the soul and actions in 1102b1-2, De anima 415a24-25). The latter element of the accordance with reason (ψυχ ς ν ργειαν κα πρ ξεις μετ irrational part of the soul is the appetitive ( πιθυμητικ ν) or λ γου). The good human being lives this kind of life in a desiring ( ρεκτικ ν) component, but it also has a connection good and beautiful manner ῆfromἐ έ a moral ὶpointά of viewὰ with the rational (λ γον) part of the soul in ἐthe sense thatὸ the (Nicomacheanό Ethics 1098a15). A good action is that which desiring elementὀ obeysὸ less or more the rational element. The is made in accordance with the appropriate virtue (ο κε αν desiring part of the όsoul is common to all living beings which ρετ ν). The human being’s good ( νθρ πινον γαθ ν) is have a sensitive faculty. Of course, these beings are the therefore the activity of the soul (ψυχ ς ν ργεια)ἰ ί in animals and the human beings, therefore we cannot find the ἀaccordanceὴ with virtue and if there areἀ moreώ virtues,ἀ thenὸ it is human function in the activity of the soul related to the activity in accordance with the best and the mostῆ ἐ coέ mplete of sensitive faculty. The human function (ergon) has to be a the virtues (Nicomachean Ethics 1098a15-17). Translation distinctive activity of the human being. of teleiotaten (τελειοτ την) is problematic. Some authors One may notice that in De anima Aristotle refers to propose translating teleiotaten by “perfect” and then use this faculties of the soul whereas in Nicomachean Ethics he talks translation as a groundά to justify a monist (intellectualist) about functions. In De anima Aristotle had not aimed as interpretation of happiness. Others claim that teleiotaten subject the human function and its connection to eudaimonia. must be translated by “complete” and they ground a In De anima the philosopher describes the soul and nothing comprehensivist interpretation on this translation. We must more; that is why he does not need to give an account on pay attention not to confuse the best and most complete human function. In Nicomachean Ethics it was not enough to virtue that Aristotle deals with in the first book of remind the structure of the soul, it was necessary to reveal Nicomachean Ethics with the highest virtue (κρατίστην) what is the activity of the soul which makes human life to from the tenth book. What happy life from Book I Chapter 7 have something proper to it, unmet in the life of other living and respectively from Book X Chapter 7 have in common is beings. This is the reason why De anima sheds light on not the complete or the perfect virtue, but their contents: both faculties/potentialities, while in Nicomachean Ethics comprise goods of the soul. Aristotle is very clear about it in Aristotle brings into attention the problem of the activities Book I for he says that the happy life is an activity of the corresponding to these faculties. Therefore we can talk about rational part of the soul in accordance with the virtue of this a nourishing function and respectively the function of part of the soul. This is a complex, comprehensive virtue, the nourishing, a sensorial faculty and respectively of perception most comprehensive, it is autarkic. Eudaimonia is autarkic as as a function and so on. The faculties of the soul in De anima well, for it comprises all that is necessary for us to be happy. are: nourishing, desiring, sensitive, of movement and In book X Aristotle brings into attention the activity in thinking (De anima 414a30-32). The manner in which a accordance with the virtue appropriate to the highest part of faculty/potentiality (δυν μις) becomes actual is to be in a ourselves i.e. the intellect (νο ς). Aristotle deems justice in a state of functioning/activity ( ν- ργ-εια). Besides, Aristotle generic way to be a complete virtue (τελεία ρετή) as well. distinguishes in Metaphysicsά as well between activity However, we cannot claim thatῦ the philosopher meant to say ( ν ργεια) and faculty (δυν μις)ἐ έ(Metaphysics 1048b5). that the activity of the soul in the case of eudaimoniaἀ was in In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle does not broadly accordance with justice as a virtue. In Book V Aristotle talks debateἐ έ the possible humanά functions, but he only removes about justice as a perfect virtue in the sense that under its the functions that can be also predicated about other living u4mbrella we can find all the ethical virtues. In the case of beings and about plants. After Aristotle removes these happiness we deal with a complete virtue of the entire common functions he reaches the human function that is the rational part of the soul and with eudaimonia as activity in one that cannot be predicated convertibly. For Aristotle is accordance with this complete virtue over a complete life important to frame the most important concepts of his (β τελε ). philosophy in the patterns established in his writings on logics. The predications that may be made related to these ίῳ ίῳ 4. The Human Function and Its Proper concepts are very important. This is the reason why the monolithic interpretation of Thomas Nagel goes too far. Virtue Nagel claims that the functions do not have any meaning if The structure of the human soul, as it is conceived by they are separated and explained each separately and that Aristotle, helps us in understanding that the virtue from they do not give any account on what is really proper to human beings unless we conceive them as coherently organized in a monolithic, conjugated manner. If we would

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judge them in the manner in which some do – united in a activity in accordance with nous. But Aristotle does not collection that constitutes the human function, without a forget that people live in society, that they are not gods and hierarchy of the under-functions – it would be difficult to therefore they need to exercise ethical virtues as well, not distinguish if a good digestion for instance is a component of intellectual virtues alone. Humans need also external goods eudaimonia or if it just contributes to it. Nagel deems more to a lesser extent than they need ethical virtues, but still need plausible the monolithic interpretation in which the function them. Only contemplation is independent of such things, but is a compound in which we do not have to pay higher status after all it would not be possible either without satisfying the to intellectual activities, but put them in the same place with other necessary conditions for an entirely happy life, that is the theoretical and practical activities, because they are in the absence of other goods of the soul. supporting each other. Nagel states that this is the appropriate approach for happiness as well (Nagel, 1980). However, since Aristotle himself makes a hierarchy of 5. Conclusions functions and activities and if he does not seem to conceive the functions in the conjugated manner that Nagel ascribes In conclusion, we may say that in Nicomachean Ethics him to do, then we have no reason to embrace this monolithic Book I Chaper 7 Aristotle gives a comprehensivist account interpretation. If Aristotle would have advanced a monolithic on eudaimonia. This account on happiness as activity, on the conception why would have he strived to distinguish the human good depending on the good exercise of the defining faculties, the functions, the activities and to reveal what is function of humans – reason – is compatible with the account proper to human beings? Only as a pure logical exercise? on contemplation as a type of happy life in Nicomachean This is unlikely, especially as eudaimonia or the human good Ethics Book X Chapter 7 and 8. In Book I Aristotle explains is the object of politics and the political science has a very that happiness is the good life of the citizen, it is an pragmatic role. accomplished life, the supreme goal aimed at, a goal desired One cause of so many controversies and interpretations is for its own sake and for the sake of which everything is done. the misunderstanding of the concept of human “function” Aristotle offers a lot of explanations in the first book of (ergon). The definition of happiness revolves around the Nicomachean Ethics which prevent us to believe that he function, but ergon is a concept that has generated a lot of suddenly changes the definition of happiness in the tenth debate, mainly because of the content of the tenth book of the book where he seems to identify eudaimonia with the Nicomachean Ethics. Some authors interpret Chapters 7 and theoretical life. We have no more reasons to believe that the 8 from Book X as a proof that Aristotle deems contemplation editors of Aristotle’s works have wrongly introduced some – the activity in accordance with the highest (κρατίστην) chapters in Nicomachean Ethics. The account on happiness virtue of the intellect (νο ς) – to be the perfect happiness in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics prefigures the (τελεία ε δαιμονία). However, we must not forget that the account in the tenth book. Aristotle simply reserved some human function and happinessῦ are inseparable in Aristotle’s space, at the end of the treaty on ethics, for describing a thinking. ὐ Therefore, we should go deeper into the special type of happy life: the theoretical, contemplative life, understanding of the concept of ergon. i.e. an activity in accordance with the highest virtue (Sophia) In Metaphysics Book III Chapter 4 Aristotle tells us that of the highest part of our soul – the intellect. After he showed the function a thing accomplishes is its final cause. Both the in the first book what eudaimonia was and how it was related final cause and the function of eyes is seeing. The final cause with the human function and then he gave an account, in the is in the same time an essential end, its absence would make following books, on ethical and intellectual virtues, Aristotle the eye to stop being what it is. Briefly, the functional finally shows, in the tenth book of Nicomachean Ethics, how definition of the eye is the following: the eye is an organ of do the features of a happy life apply to the contemplative life. the body (genus) responsible for the function of seeing There is no proof in the tenth book that Aristotle deems the (differentia) (Mureşan, 2006). The human being has a contemplative life to be the end beyond which there is no functional definition as well: humans are rational beings. other end. There is no proof either that everything that leads The function of humans is the rational life and their good lies to eudaimonia, including actions optimized by all the in their function ( ν τ ργ … ε ναι) (Nicomachean Ethics intellectual virtues, would not be an end in itself. These 1097b26), i.e. the function is a necessary condition for the things and action are ends in themselves, but they are also good, but the goodἐ ῷis ἔnotῳ a necessaryἶ condition for the desired for the final end, even if they can be put in a function, the good is just proper to the function. Happiness as hierarchy where contemplation is at the top. contemplative activity is also proper to human function, but is not the only proper of human function. In a hierarchy, contemplation is at the top and it has a lot in common with eudaimonia. However, contemplation is not the complete eudaimonia from Book I, it just shares the same genus with REFERENCES eudaimonia: it is a good that lies in the human function. [1] Aristotle (2011). De anima. Translated by Mark Shiffman. Aristotle explains that the intellect (νο ς) is superior to Focus Publishing. other parts of the soul and consequently the same is the ῦ [2] Aristotle (2007). Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. 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[4] Aristotle (2004). Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Roger [8] Nagel, T. (1980). “Aristotle on Eudaimonia”, in Amélie Crisp. Cambridge University Press. Oksenberg Rorty (editor), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, University of California Press, 1980, 7–14. [5] Aristotle (2007). Topics. Translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge. Digital edition of University of [9] Roche, T. D. (1988). Ergon and Eudaimonia. Nicomachean Adelaide. Ethics I: Reconsidering the Intellectualist Interpretation. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 26, 175–194. [6] Gürtler, G. M. (2003). The Activity of Happiness in