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The Role of Human Function in Defining Happiness Universal Journal of Psychology 2(7): 218-223, 2014 http://www.hrpub.org DOI: 10.13189/ujp.2014.020702 The Role of Human Function in Defining Happiness Leria Ileana Boroş University of Bucharest, Romania *Corresponding Author: [email protected] Copyright © 2014 Horizon Research Publishing All rights reserved. Abstract In this paper I argue that the Aristotelian first book of Nicomachean Ethics that eudaimonia is the concept of “human function” is at the heart of understanding highest good1 and that to explain what happiness is one must the moral concept of “happiness” (ε δαιμονία). There are show what the human function (to ergon tou anthropou) is2. many controversies related to Aristotle’s account on The account on eudaimonia and ergon has given rise to happiness. My statement is that we canὐ gain a better insight many controversies caused by the ambiguous text of Book I on happiness by reference to “human function” (τ ργον of Nicomachean Ethics, as well as by some inconsistencies το νθρ που), provided that we understand what the between this book and Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of Book X, which philosopher meant by this latter concept. Accordingὸ ἔ to some authors even think were erroneously included in Aristotle,ῦ ἀ ώhappiness is the highest good for humans and the Aristotle’s work. In any case, Aristotle is assigned too many human good is a proper exercise of the human function. Thus, flaws and illogical statements or invalid judgments. The text the understanding of happiness relies on the understanding of should be understood, however, in the context of the human function, because human good and perfection depend, Aristotelian logic, not in the logic of each commentator. in Aristotle’s account, on the proper exercise of this function. I will further analyze the content of Chapter 7 of Book I of Aristotle gives a complex account on reason, but in the tenth Nicomachean Ethics, also calling at the Greek philosopher’s book of Nicomachean Ethics he seems to support an various works and I will argue that there is enough coherence intellectualist view on happiness, i.e. a view which only in his writings in order to understand what Aristotle’s makes reference to the activity in accordance with the virtue message about happiness was. I will not give a broad appropriate to the most elevated part of our soul. In other interpretation of eudaimonia, but I will limit myself to words, contemplation would equal happiness. However, explain the concept in the text of Chapter 7 of Book I of such a narrow view would contradict Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and by reference to the concept of comprehensivist approach in the first book of Nicomachean function (ergon), which is actually at the heart of Ethics. An intellectualist account would be in contradiction understanding the meaning of happiness. I will endeavor to with Aristotle’s definition of eudaimonia from the first book show, through the analysis of Chapter 7 of the first book of of Nicomachean Ethics. Contemplation alone is not Nicomachean Ethics, that there is consistency between this happiness, but it is a special type of happy life. However, book and the tenth book, to this coherence also contributing happiness comprises other “goods” as well, since the human various passages from De Anima, Topics and Metaphysics. function refers to the complex part of the soul which is It is of utmost importance to keep in mind what Aristotle reason. tells us about happiness in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics in order not to err on a wrong path of argumentation. Keywords Happiness, Function, Reason, Aristotle has a peculiar technical vocabulary and thus we Comprehensivist Approach, Intellectualist View, have to pay attention to all the concepts he is using. We must Contemplation not forget that for Aristotle happiness (eudaimonia) is a type of good (agathon). Aristotle tells us that any activity, art, science and so on is done for the sake of a peculiar good (agathon). Thus, the 1. Introduction good is the end towards which all are aiming; in other words, the good is the final cause and for the sake of it is The seventh chapter of the first book of Aristotle’s everything done. There is no higher end, because it would Nicomachean Ethics is deemed to be a difficult text, because be absurd to go on a search so indefinitely. Achieving this it contains several ambiguities. These ambiguities are supreme good is of great importance to man and therefore primarily related to the way we understand happiness its knowledge is important. It is the subject of science. The (eudaimonia), which is the supreme good, and its relation to 1 The highest good is David Ross’ translation of the greek word ἄριστον human function, which is the specific activity of a human that appears in Aristotle’s text. Roger Crisp translates it by chief good. being. Aristotle himself tells us in the seventh chapter of the 2 Roger Crisp translates τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου by “the characteristic activity of a human being” and David Ross by “the function of man”. Universal Journal of Psychology 2(7): 218-223, 2014 219 knowledge of the good is the task of politics for it is eudaimonia and respectively ergon are in a very close responsible for determining the best activities in the state. connection and in a very profound mutual support. Instead, Other sciences, such as strategy, economics, rhetoric are for the comprehensivists, eudaimonia and ergon are simply subordinate to politics, but the latter is the most important amounts of other elements. According to the science because it deals with the peace of the city, whose comprehensivist view, happiness is a sum of elements such achievement is superior to the achievement of the individual as health, honors, financial security, satisfying relationships good. etc. Aristotle thinks that everybody agrees that the supreme There are some passages that seem to support this good is happiness (eudaimonia). However, when it comes to comprehensivist interpretation, but there are also others explain what happiness is, there is no agreement. People which seem rather to favor authors who interpret the conceive eudaimonia by their lifestyle and there are three concepts of eudaimonia and ergon in an intellectualist main ways to live life: to enjoy pleasure, to live a political manner. These latter rely mainly on excerpts from the tenth life, or to dedicate oneself to a contemplative life (theoretiké). book of Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle comes back at But eudaimonia has to be defined by reference to human the idea of eudaimonia as an activity of the soul in function, for the human being’s good is the good exercise of accordance with the most perfect virtue – sophia, the his/her function (ergon), i.e. an optimal activity (energéia). intellectual wisdom, this activity being a contemplative The human function is the reason, because reason is the (theoretiké) one and belonging to the intellect (nous), which humans’ specific activity. Thus, happiness is the good is the highest element within us and whose objects are also exercise of activity? It is activity (exercise of function) the highest among the objects of knowledge. Under this according to the virtues of the rational part of the soul, since approach, human function is an activity of the intellect the human being’s function is the rational life. (nous) alone. Contemplation is happiness for it is a perfect end, it is not chosen for the sake of something else. But this approach, though seemingly favoured by Aristotle in the 2. The Main Approaches in Interpreting tenth book of Nicomachean Ethics, is not coherent with the Happiness and the Human Function philosopher’s account on the happy life as a life which implies ethical virtue, friends, honors, family, health and so The main interpretations resulting from the difficulties on. posed by Book I and Book X of Nicomachean Ethics can be Disputes between the two orientations – inclusivist and grouped into two main orientations: the inclusivist and the comprehensivist – originate as well in the difficulties raised intellectualist or monistic. There is a more radical in translating the Greek text. For instance, Aristotle tells us orientation, which considers that publishers have wrongly that happiness is teleion (Nicomachean Ethics 1097b20). introduced chapters 6, 7 and 8 in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Some authors translate teleion by “final” and others by Ethics. Timothy D. Roche contradicts those who support “complete”. Translation differences arise again in a passage this idea, arguing that the three chapters are prefigured even where we meet teleiotaten as an attribute of virtue, in Book I of the treaty (Roche, 1988). He also challenges translated by “the most complete” (Nicomachean Ethics the approaches of reviewers who claim that Aristotle 1098a15-17). In these circumstances differences in proposed a selfish version of happiness. This reviewer interpretation are unavoidable. The inclusivists will prefer believes that Aristotle was only interested in the intellectual the translation of “teleion” as "complete" for both the activity as a key of happiness. Roche (1988) is also attributes of eudaimonia and of virtue, while intellectualists criticizing other authors who have argued something more will opt for "perfect". absurd namely that according to the intellectualist vision of Most commentators have insisted on some alleged eudaimonia there are allowed even immoral actions if they incompatibility between Book I, in particular the seventh serve the philosophical activity. We cannot accept such an chapter, and Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of Book X, ignoring the interpretation since Aristotle pays so much attention to very close connection between the first chapters of Book X ethics. Even the name of his work – Nicomachen Ethics – is and those considered problematic.
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