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The Freedom of the Good: a Study of Plato's Ethical Conception of Freedom

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The Freedom of the Good: a Study of Plato's Ethical Conception of Freedom University of New Mexico UNM Digital Repository Philosophy ETDs Electronic Theses and Dissertations 7-5-2012 The rF eedom of the Good: A Study of Plato's Ethical Conception of Freedom Siobhán McLoughlin Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/phil_etds Recommended Citation McLoughlin, Siobhán. "The rF eedom of the Good: A Study of Plato's Ethical Conception of Freedom." (2012). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/phil_etds/15 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy ETDs by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. i Siobhán McLoughlin Candidate Philosophy Department This dissertation is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication: Approved by the Dissertation Committee: Dr. John Bussanich , Chairperson Dr. Paul Livingston Dr. Lorenzo Garcia Dr. Russell Goodman Dr. Andrew Burgess Dr. Warren Smith ii THE FREEDOM OF THE GOOD: A STUDY OF PLATO‟S ETHICAL CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM by SIOBHÁN MCLOUGHLIN B.A. (Hons.), Philosophy, University of Toronto, 2000 M.A., Philosophy, University of Ottawa, 2003 DISSERTATION Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Philosophy The University of New Mexico Albuquerque, New Mexico May, 2012 iii DEDICATION To my father, Stephen, for support from above. To my mother, Ingrid, for her support here below. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation is the result of many years of work that would not have been possible without the help of many people. Thank you to my Committee Chair, John Bussanich, for seeing my project through to completion. All of your time spent reading and commenting on drafts of this manuscript is much appreciated and helped to make this a markedly better dissertation. I wish to thank my other committee members, Andrew Burgess, Russell Goodman, Paul Livingston, Warren Smith, and Lorenzo Garcia. Your various perspectives, insights and suggestions have enriched my thinking on this topic. Any errors or omissions that may remain are my own. I am grateful for the comments that I received from the audiences who heard portions of my work at the Society for Ancient Philosophy and International Society of Neoplatonic Study meetings. The remarks of the anonymous reviewer of my paper published in Conversations Platonic and Neoplatonic helped to guide parts of this project, as well. Thank you to my good friend Kathleen McIntyre for editing assistance, advice, and encouragement. I was first introduced to Plato and his myths by Asli Gocer as an undergraduate at the University of Toronto. Thank you for setting me on this path of discovery. Thank you to my father for being the first one to embrace my idea of getting a philosophy Ph.D. enthusiastically, as you did with all of my endeavours. My mother, Ingrid, and my sister, Sinéad, have been my constant champions over the years. Thank you for your love and support. A special thank you to my husband, Ahmad, for weathering the ups and downs of the dissertation-writing process with me. I could not have done this without you. v THE FREEDOM OF THE GOOD: A STUDY OF PLATO‟S ETHICAL CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM by Siobhán McLoughlin B.A. (Hons.) University of Toronto M.A. University of Ottawa Ph.D. University of New Mexico ABSTRACT My dissertation argues that Plato has a concept of individual metaphysical freedom, making him a key figure in the emergence of the free will debate in the history of Western philosophy. A philosophy of freedom can be seen throughout his works, particularly in the Republic, the Laws, and the Phaedrus. I show that underlying Platonic moral psychology is the notion that an individual is free if her reasoning element rules her soul in line with the Good. This makes Platonic freedom a thoroughly ethical concept. In my first chapter, I examine Plato‘s critique of three competing notions of freedom drawn from conventional notions of virtue, democracy, and tyranny. Plato‘s own notion of freedom emerges from his criticisms of these alternative definitions of freedom. He redefines freedom from a conception of unconstrained choice towards a notion of reasoned choice in line with virtue. Thus, Platonic freedom is a normative concept. My next chapter provides a detailed analysis of Platonic freedom by examining its metaphysical foundation as described in the Republic. This work reveals the philosopher as the authentically free person. The myth of Er engages notions of freedom, responsibility and choice. In this myth, Plato emphasizes individual responsibility even in cases of diminished psychological freedom. The myth of the Cave underscores the idea vi that philosophical freedom is not liberty to pursue desires uninhibited. Rather, freedom is the ability to pursue reason‘s desires as informed by the Good. My final chapter examines the concept of freedom within the tripartite psychology. The Phaedrus myth provides further detail about the interaction between the parts of the soul and the struggle for freedom. It emphasizes the natural position of reason as ruler of the soul. The image of the golden cord in the Laws outlines the soul‘s ideal relationship to reason. The freedom of the philosopher is moderate, self-controlled, and predictable. vii Table of Contents 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 a. The Historical Freedom and Determinism Debate ............................................................ 2 b. Freedom and Platonic Myth ............................................................................................. 7 c. Previous Scholarship on Plato and Free Will .................................................................... 8 d. Outline of my Study ...................................................................................................... 13 2. Varieties of False Freedom ................................................................................................ 16 a. Freedom Understood Through Conventional Notions of Virtue ...................................... 16 i. The Freedom of Conventional Virtue ......................................................................... 16 ii. Restraint of Appetite .................................................................................................. 17 iii. Concern for Others ..................................................................................................... 18 iv. Lack of Knowledge ................................................................................................... 19 v. The Analogy of Political Freedom ............................................................................. 20 b. ‗The Unmixed Wine of Freedom‘: Plato‘s Critique of Democratic Freedom in the Republic ............................................................................................................................... 23 i. The Democratic Soul ................................................................................................. 23 ii. Freedom in the Democratic City ................................................................................ 25 iii. The Dangers of Democratic Equality ........................................................................... 27 iv. Wine as a Symbol of Freedom ................................................................................... 29 v. Anarchy and Amorality.............................................................................................. 31 c. The Tyrant‘s Freedom ................................................................................................... 36 i. Callicles‘ Tyranny in the Gorgias .............................................................................. 36 ii. Tyranny in the Republic ............................................................................................. 38 iii. Thrasymachus ............................................................................................................ 39 iv. Glaucon and Gyges .................................................................................................... 41 v. Political Tyranny ....................................................................................................... 43 vi. The Psychology of a Tyrant ....................................................................................... 46 3. ―Virtue Knows no Master‖: Ethical Freedom in the Myth of Er ..................................... 51 a. The Tyrant‘s ‗Luck‘ ...................................................................................................... 53 b. Odysseus‘ Choice .......................................................................................................... 58 c. Reward, Punishment and Responsibility ........................................................................ 63 d. Immortality and the Tripartite Soul ................................................................................ 67 viii e. Freedom and Virtue ....................................................................................................... 68 f. The Moral of the Myth .................................................................................................. 70 g. Choice ..........................................................................................................................
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