A FIIM QUARTERTY OF I}IEORY CRITICISM AND PRACTICE $6.m voL It, No. I
.T.:ff:ffi-W"-t ffi potterns Neglect: Rituols of Reception, of
ond its Postwor RePresentqtion
By Williom Uricchio its lntroduction corFx)ratc compctition, the government extended 'coordinating' function, evident in new politico-eco- nomic formrrlati()ns of socially sanitized monopoly On March 22nd,1935, Reichssendeleiter Eugen capitalist pnrduction, such as the Volkswagen and iladamovskY declared, Volkst'mfacngcr, to tclevision and in so doing, mapped thc r()utc to prosprcrity for the mapr electronics conc€rns. Today National Socialist broadcasting, working logethn with the Reich Post and German industry, begins as the first The clcctronics industry fully expected purchases of broadcasting system in the world with regular teleaision homc televisic;n receivers to parallel the levels already programming. Orc of man's boldest dreams has bezn expcricnccrd by radio. 1n1937, Germans held over 8 ralizzd. " .1 million radios-by far the heaviest concentration on the this was merely the mid-point of a But other nations were still dreaming- RCA's annual Contincnt----and "a radio in every Cerman house."3 report of the same year called regular public transmis- campaign to place 200 home television sets had been sold. sions "impractical," and despite early technological Yet by 1939, only leads, public American broadcasting was delayed until intensive research, product development and 1939 (and even then on an experimental license). British Despite failure to efforts were not so tardy, beginning in 19%, but lasting state cultivation of television, broadcasting's complex and only until the war's start in 1939.2 attract a significant public reveals a overdetermined moment in the relation of technology, industry and politics. The multinational dimensions of Yet the Cermans, sharing Patents with England's Baird the context International Television Company and the Radio this moment and its implications both within develop- Corporation of America, caPitalized uPon an early start of national conflict and supravening economic of the history and continued broadcasting and expanding transmission ment, complicate received views period's services throughout the war. When their transmission and suggest new persPectives. towers were bombed in1943, they simply switched over between to thc cable system that had been in development since The paradoxes pervading the German situation for, 1936. And when the towers were spared, as was the case 1935 and 19214 extend to, and perhaps help account of with the Eiffel Tower, the Cermans continued to broad- the peculiar nature of postwar characterizations Socialist epoch. Anglo- cast until military collapse. television in the National American historians have tended simply to ignore itself, By pointing to the shared mission of government and Cerman television, and until recently in Germany national industry, Hadamovsky's address accurately with a few notable excePtions, the television of the 1950s Given the located the dynamic which propelled Cerman broadcast- and 1950s has dominated historical efforts.a with ing into the forefront of international activity. While popular interest in National Socialism, together history, the some very real benefits emerged from this conjunction, it recent scholarly attention to broadcast in this also resulted in fundamental contradictions particularly marginalization of Germany's developments explana- for the German electronics industry. period appears surprising. While a variety of tory factors will be addressed in the following Pages, one the histori- Rapid advances in cabie technology, in the live transmis- factor looms large because of its relevance to sion of images (used in the 1935 Olympics), and in ographic contours and tendencies of the film/television studies discipline. Virtually no intact television pro- receiver technology, wer€ Promoted and heavily marketed in the annual public broadcast exhibitions to grams remain from the period under study.s Conse- of reading both domestic and foreign markets. Each of the mairr quently, textual analysis and the extrapolation to a reception electronics companies developed a wide variety of home positions with possible access theorized of and histori- reccivers and displayed them with appropriate hype to a base lay largely outside the realm critical kinds of questions 49 market ready for the future. Despite initial inter- cal encounters with the pcriod. The ml suSgests implications and our This momcnt in broadcast history raised about early Gcrman tclcvision' of the that can be which revcrberatc not only through the particulars to it, must of nccessity depcnd evidence-based access a;;r" situation, but through the larger pattern of the rich institutional and tcchnological discoursc ,po" tt intcrnational industriaiization of communications' " it. of surrounding i'r.,i.rto.ty given Cermany's early institutionalization coi,munications tcchnologies' its,development texts obrriously complicatc-r any The absence of television "-"rgingr..,rii.u u, altcrnativc or counterPoint to the evolution to anaiyz-e German television as an historical distribution ;;;;pi wc Int,,.gunirution of tclcvision's production' Yet evcn lacking tcxtual.cvidcncc' and .n"alJ ,y.t"*- ur,i as cxpcricnccd in the United States some headway by explonng thc rclationships anlnderly- -u, nuin S.iarin."xiiui,ion Thc Ccrman situation foregrounds industry and politics at a particular develop- ;;;,:;*h"ology, ins continuitY of tcchnological and industrial wittiur''t, urging a conccption of ;;;;"i. R"y-Ina *lnt in thc rolc piaycd by multinational that moves beyond that of merc trans- communicati'on "rid"ni Thus, d espitc the st ructural: as both ..r1r.rtu,-rt lT,tl:t]crt"' mission apParatus, stressed its imP()rtancc and organizational produced bYand as anuansof divergences aPPearlng 'produclion within a broader amonB American, British social framcwork'6 The and German systems, all kinds of evidence we have share a rclatcd set of cco- available with Cerman nomic and tcchnological television, the exPiicitness of assumptions- And all are its homologies with other further comPlicated bY mcdia sYstcms and the tangi- patterns of license bility of its relations with the sharing agreements and more general Productive inter-corPorate and forccs of monoPolY caPital- international investment' of ism even in a Period From this PersPective, national conflict, mark it as a the marginalized status sitc of contradictions around of Cerman develoPments Williams' concerns broad discrepan- which in broadcast history, together with the foregrounded' are them- appear cies in its characteiiz-ation when discussed' interest' postwar sclves of historiographic Finally, the issue of early German tcicvision's marginalization *q"'f: ,ffi"ntution and configuration of German television' then' Some of these^tl9:ificance rssues The cultural -particular as part of a broader set of issucs' historical development' as division and entails a look at a as structural concerns (e'g' archival of its representa- roi*. well as an examination of the contours others as interpretative (e'g' ideologically ;:G;, and both within the pcriod and into our Present' of tire nature of Cerman.fascism tion inscribed formulations "textless" in a traditional sensc' the many to post-war socro- Rttlrorgt and particularly its relationship Cerman telcvision's national emcr- .on,.ua"ictions pervad ing forces). Still other issucs rclatc to thc with the and multinational developmcnt together ".ont*i. and function of nationalizcd dis- a.*i"ation of its historical trcatment' suggest its relevance """.n. of intcrnational pcrspcc- oatterns :o;.;, often to the exclusion I;;;;i, i"-t, allowing us to problematize-aspects of medium so pervasively multi-national in twes, in a television's broader cultu ral config'uration'' i".tr"of"gy and development' But tn 1ny,t""ltn1,^,,..- contoursof German television,s hi storica l rCPrCSCntatlon and idcological reflect back uPon our cultural prciudices contradictions in a revealing manner' 50
B*Ewreffitpq?.4flffiF' "One of Mans'Boldest Dreams. . .,,: The nr,r n( I.rt ('(l tr,lt.vision,s Problematic technical standardization. But the Intersection of Technology, l)r.P;r11;111,1.1 In du stry Minrstry, with its much closer affiliation and Politics thr'NSI)AI), to asscrted a distinct developmcnt olan sr1;g.sting autlicncc homologies ,on."*hut cioser to film As notcd, the German electronics (t'crr industry, cxtrapolating t ra I i zccl, publi c screen ing) than rad io (decentralized, {rom its experience with radio, had cvcry'rcason privaro listcning). to Thc propagand_a theory then in vogue, bcliovc that it would expericncc massrvc strongly tclcvision rrlcs. supportcd by Hadamovsky lGermanr/s Although it became incrcasinglv clcar that Ccrmany,s D-irtr:tor of Broadcastingl and Coebt"tr, faro.fu- tn" industry-wide standardizatioii would effcctivcncss limit profit of group rcccption. And so initially, margins-and the competitivc to the distribution of capital, most of thc corporate community, public Iargc industrics 9,:TrV television had already cxpcricnccd thc benefits halls seating between 40 of and 400 p""pt" emergla as the state rcgulation and consequcnt rcduction of inter_ primary rcccption forum (an uppiou.f, not diiimilar corporate competition during thc First World War. from that uscd in the Sovict Uni,on at the time). Moreover, at least within thc clcctronics ind ustry, The development stock ownership patterns of this conflicting strategy_ and board of director mcm_ preparation berships demonstrated for a strong home receivcr widcspread integration of market on the part of industry ownership and control, vs. the government's push for facilitati n g intcr-corporate a mass viewing environ_ coopcration. But while the ment---€merges from Eovcrnmcnt encouraged a numbcr of changing this devclopment, its rolc factors. Thcsc include was not without contradic_ the tion- aforementioncrl pnrpa- ganda thmries; the earlv "socialist" Covcrnmcnt tendencies oi regulation and coo rd ination facilitated technological.development and norms, (su p po rt i n but it quickly ran s pubr ic vi e w i n, :'l:llli[l',T", counter to industry expectations. Elements to the "ili within the f9JlqUte masses); changing technical standards"r_ go_vernment, and particularly those with (1 80 lines rhrough NSDAp 1937 , and +at lir,", in t93g aid after); affiliations, appear to have had a vcry distinct vision of and the shifting role of multinational corporations television's form and in social function. Tcnsions between political policy throughout the duration the two dominant of ,h. R"i"h; views of television, i.e., industrl/s and together with the initiating mission the Party's, of Cerman television played themselves out most explicitly in broadcasting. Again, I{ad"amovsky: ministcrial disputes. The govcrnmcnt rcgulatcd televi_ rough severat channell including the Now, in this hour, broadcasting is called Post3:1, ] ll".tid'o,^th upon to futfill its Ministry [ Reichsposrministcrium (RpM)], biggest and most the Reich sacred mission: to plant ihe tmige of rrroad_castrng a r the Corporation IReichsrundfunkgesellschaft Fuehrer indelibly in all Cermnn hearts.B IIRCfj the-Propaganda Ministry controlled "Broadcasting Chamber I Reichsrundfunkkam mer (RRK )] and ulti_ While thc business community seems to have mately Coebbels' had no Ministry for Enlightenment and rcservations about this mission, its implementation Propaganda [Reichsministerium fucr Volksaufklarung poscd substantial problems. By the laie 1930s, as the und Propaganda (RMVP)]. The post Ministry, technical Iong situation finally stabiiized around u q.qt_tin" allied with the electronics industry, acted in i *unn". norm, industry together with the post fr4in-irfi consistent with its counterparts in Britian and the US and ahcad with plans for consumer sector ^o.r"a reccivers. But i 51 .t...:-,:tili.ij ..i:J{s*ffiffiffi'
Thanks to the interest of the Post Ministry and particu- larly Hans Bredow between 1925 and 1934, the government provided heavy subsidies for television's technical developmcnt (together with the related technologies of cable, telephone, wired and wireless image transmission, and amplifier development).1 o These subsidies reflectcd the Ministry's longstanding concern with and structural involve- ment in communications technolo- gies, a level of involvement evident before the turn of the century and one frequently articulated in terms of potential military applications. Patents such as Paul Nipkords 1884 'electronic telescope' and Dieckmann's 1906 facsimile transmission device- both directly rclated io early televion systems-manifested a dimension of tclcvisual commu nication consistent with and of rclcvancc to supravcning national concerns.i 1
ironically, just as mass Based on Post Ministry corrcspondence production orders for television receivers were issued, with Finance Ministry I Reichsfinanzmin- the shift to a war economy together with the restrictive istcrium (RFM)l during the Weimar Republic, national broadcast laws of 1939 precluded the mass production security seems to have been a motivating factor in the and marketing plans so evident in the corporate record government's expenditures on the development of and at the Berlin television exhibitions.e related technologies. Among the assertions which emerged, two dominate subsequent discourse. First, As prcviously suggested, Hadamovsk/s inaugurating assumptions regarding hard information transfer spccch accurately located the dynamic which propelled fundamentally unify the sense of these technologies, Ccrman tclcvision broadcasting by pointing to the their national security potential, and their consequent "sharcd mission" of the government and national character, coordination and control through governmen- industry. The exact naturc of that mission, howcver, tal agencies (ultimately the RPM). Second, governmental rcmained unclear. Expressions of solidarity, protection subsidy of the massive research and development costs and mutual support bound governmental and corporate for these technologies in domestic firms, and the subse- intcrests together; however, equally distinct tensions quent privatization of the results at thc point of commer- beirvccn the government and the private sector, apparent cial application, suggests the special nature of the in thc national coloration of multinational trade con- government's relation to private corporations.t2 This cerns, inter-ministerial policy struggles, and the percep- type of supportive integration for the mutual benefit of tion of and lobbying for various models of television's industry and the state set the pace for subsequent organization, aiso pervade the period. developments including continued governmental 52 t"b:,-1,:r, regulations, a nd ultimately, coord ination wirh other countries the NSDAP agenda. as well, tended to nationalize fully multi nat ional technology, and therefore profiis. The intrusion of a set of somewhat more economically The apparent tension autonomous players complicated post between multinational develop- thc Ministry,s ments (the inroads necessity of patent sharing, attempts into selected portions of the domcstic electronics to rntcgrate new markets, and so on) industry. From 1921 through the and national interest early 1930s (with a emcrged in several particular flurry of activitytrought ways. The world economic crisis of on by thc stabiliza_ the late tion of the 1920s certainly encouraged multinational Mark through the Dawes ptan in 1924), United tnvestment, as did an States-based multinational .,r.po.ations pi;;;; r, awareness of the international important realitics of technologies such as the telephone role in the Cerman at large. German and "..rro.ny telegraph (lT&T's investment behavior businesses floated over 9g26 million in Uonir? is instructiverT). tn" growi ng evidence indicates United States, and many American firms pr.ciased Y.,l:.r:: th"; ;.ly all National Socialist economic policy or parts of Cerman companics, entcring was receptive to into partner_ development, driven ships or cstablishing subsidiarics, ir.t.fr;nq more by attempts ,o .Jrior" 6o* business confidence with promise, Lhemlcal, l-ord, Ceneral Motors, I.E. Dupo"nt Jf _oa"^ilation and and financial security than Ceneral Electric.I3 The by ihreats of foreign war. Llte multinational patent base of autobahn many technologies construction and car productio"n, develop- also. encouraged a b.oad pattem of license ments in tclevision provided a propaganda and patent shanng agrcements, evident in coup for the government while bolstering the confidence technology with companies such of the :*:,r:." as Baird, domcstic business communily (electronics l(CA, Farnsworth and Intcrnational Tclcphone in -twoand particular).r8 The state Telegraph.r a Fernseh saw exports as critical to eco_ A.C.,_one o f Co..,.rJnf , largest nomic television survival, and thus structurally encouraxcd companies, was founded in partiy Baird national expressions (and sales) International Televisio n (i n ofthe new tecinology pa rtnersh i p wi t hi foUert through subsidies Bosch, Zciss Ikon and and tax incentives, *i"., D.S. Locwe) anj shared patents depcndcnt ".run with Farnsworth.rs upon others, patents.le Other television .ompani"i had equally complicated relations: Lorenz (una it, related The Post M.inistry conglomerate, Standard sponsored elaborate marketing Elektrizitaets Gesellschaft ISEGI) was opportunities- through the annuar broadcast a wholly owned IT&T subsidiary, and Telefunken exhibitions a1A pubticized tetevising companies, Siemans and lflneavily of the r936 Olym_ I*i.lr5.ful"nt aECl was tiea pics.2o Foreign press received into RCA's liccnse system. specia"l conslderation, and great care went into providing state_of_the_art communi_ facilities. Perhaps Dcspite this fabric of moie importantty, the Rost multinational interconnections, the MlnrstryI|]i:rt of cncouragcd competition among the various llauguration regular public broadcasting in March ryJr appcared elcctronrcs hrms and multinational Iiceniing in a nationalistic light. Although receiv_ affiliates, effcctivcly holding out l generally unavailablc, thc pize of national"conversion to and attho"ugh service tne wlnner's ;111yaineaDcgan on an standard. Thus, the Olympics served alrcady obsolcte standard ft g0 linc-s), the as a government bat tlegro u nd fo r Fernsch / Fa.n r*r.t h initiated broadcasting spccifically u"a f U to beat the RCA, all the while demonstrating ,,German,, "l.frrnt"n British for reasons of both ,,nation"al i.,t"."ri,l'r.,a tel,evision to "Cerman-exports.-r6 the world-2r ln sharp contrast to the The commercialization potential public policy of of l a new tcchnology which vciled parallcl British ind sometimes brought with it the possibilitv for 1**.y Am€rrcan devclopments, Germany seemd rapid expansion absent in more traditional ,".t'orr, to take the and initiative, positioning itself to leapahead an establishcd interest group eagerly into th" awaited an rnternattonal market. opportunity to profit by it. As international trade and popular prcss rcception indicates, not only Germany, r but Thc start of war in 1939 substantially complicated the I picturc, cnhancing the protective coioration of multina- 53 i tionals. Structural constraints such as the British, tion (a struggle which ultimatcly caused the collapse of Cerman and American "trading with the enemy acts," the Reich Chamber of Radio ).2'5 Even on the petty level the American "frer.lzing acts," and the roles playcd by of rent paymcnts for the telcvision halls, disputes various offices of alien property custodians resulted in emerged between the Post Ministry and the NSDAP, the curious contradictions.22 Licensing agrccmcnts and latter re fusing to pay for the few halls it controlled. An patent exchanges between German electronics corPora- extreme, though telling, emption among several minis- iions and American firms such as IT&T continued after tries followed Hiltler's awarding of overall control of (a 1941, and IT&T retained controi of its subsidiarics television to Reich Air Minister Coering in July 1935 (including 28.3vo of the Focke-Wulf military applications transfer of power carefully kept from the press).26 The of television technology) after 1939. Such activity Post Ministry and Propaganda Ministry both protested constitutes a peculiar chapter in thc history of multina- vigorously;27 and, despite Coebbels'attemPts to strike a tionals and suggests the complexity and scnsitivity of the sidedeal with War Minister Blomberg, by December, a situation in the post-war period.23 The explicit shift to ncw directive divided responsibility among all the military applications of players.2s The Post television technology aft er Ministry was given 1939 might seem to have responsibility for inhibited multi-national technical develop- corporate activities. But, ment and transmis- given the previously sion; the Propaganda mentioned long standing Ministry, program- and close relationship of ming; and the Air the electronics and Ministry [Reich telecommunications indus- Luftministerium tries to national securitY (RLM)I, defense interests, such develop- applications.2e Addi- ments came as no surPrisc tional parallel and to the multinationals. The often overlapping contradictions that jurisdictions were emergd in this period constitute a repressed chapter in established by the Nazi Party INSDAP] through the Gau the history of multinationals, helping to account for the system, and the division of power was further compli complexity and sensitivity of thc situation in the post- cated by the organizational affiliations of various labor war period.2a SrouPs.
Within Germany, a complex set of overlapping iurisdic- One of the clearcst tensions to emerge in this matrix of tional claims and disputes characterized the govern- overlapping jurisdictions and interests regarded the ment's involvement with television after 1933. The Post exhibition of television, and involved the Post and Ministry, for example, encountcrcd television through its Propaganda Ministries. Although involved in an own matrix of intra-ministerial agencies including the ongoing series of disputes over incorne and cost sharing, Deutsches Reichspost tDRPI, the Reichs-Postzentralamt their struggle masked a dcepcr division. Staffed by lRPZl, the Forschungsanstalt der DRP IRFPI, and career specialists with long-standing relationships with through its role in the Reich Broadcasting Corporation the industrial sector, the postal authorities coordinated tRRGl. Inter-ministry relations held more potential for technical developments and, until 1933, controlled all serious conflict. From its inception in 1933, the Propa- broadcast fees. By contrast, recently empowered Party ganda Ministry was embroilcd in a chronic fight w'ith the members dominated the Propaganda Ministry and cut Post Ministry over shares of radio license income and into the Post's turf and fecs with their Party-specific 54 ultimately control over the Reich Broadcasting Corpora- agenda. Coebbcls and Reich Director of Broadcasting, ,t
Hadamovsky, I typified the latter.3o Moreover, as Ger- li many's lcading propaganda theorists, both concurred I that mass reception of propaganda was most effertive; and Hadamovsky consequently encouraged the public character of tclevision's reception. The eiectronics industry, and with it the post (ever dependant on license fce revcnues), pressed for the widespread proliferation of l individual home receivers, consistent wittrthat of radio,s devclopment.
The organizational complexity and contradiction pcrvading national and multinational industrial inter_ ests, gov€rnmental agencies, and rapidly shifting technical standards, together with the pressures of the world cconomy, suggests a number of possible interpre_ tations for the Cerman situation. Seriols disputes on any onc of these lcvels might have been suffiiient to delay tclevision's standardization and deployment; convcrscly, appropriate pressure kom one sector or anothcr may have been able to consolidate interests.
Closure, when it came, was marked by the emergence of a tcchnical standard, and the convergence of the major electronics firms. Cermany initially ficed a choice , betwcen two systems; the Fernseh (Farnsworth/Baird tl,;l patents) and Telefunken (RCA) systems, which was the (excluding the Olympics) reached six and a half hours in technical grounds for the delay in receivers production. the early 1940s (including one and a half hours live). The situation was complicated by a nationliitic tenacity Access to receivers remained limited largely to function- regarding mechanical systems (the Nipkow disk) and its aries, with many of the available private seis being status as 'purely German,.3r Nevertheless, Zworykin,s diverted to use in military hospitils and recreation emergd as the superior technology and in 1.^o:ot::P" centers. Television viewing rooms remained the pre_ 7937, 441 lines formally appeared as the Cerriin dominant public vcnuc, and research continued in the standard.32 Through the coordinating function of the area of large bcam video projectors and highdefinition RPZ and the RRG, all of the compcting electronics manu_ systems of 7029 and cven 2000 Iines.33 facturers, despite their previous ind o-ngoing corporate and license agreements, converted, tt uicleaiingihe way Signi fican tly, post-l 939 rcsearch for the cooperative and development mass producion of receivers] stressed explicitly Approval military application. Reconnaissance of designs for the low-cost Fernseh_ tclevision guided missilcs, bombs and torpedoes (hcnce, l Volksempfanger [the "peoples, television receiver,,] were the interest in high definition), as well as ipin_offs such heldup until late in 1938, a delay which would seem to as heat-secking missilcs and related technologies under_ have cost the electronics industry dearly. As noted, soon went rapid development, and closely parallel,ed develop_ after the RPM issued its first large ordei, war began and ments in the United States. Based on a preliminary il production of consumer receiveis slowed to a near stop. analysis, both the production Ievels and profit margins Yct despite apparent stasis, research, of planning and pro_ the Cerman elcctronics industr/s involvement gramming continued to develop rapidly. with the Work on a military greatly cxceeded thcir cfforts (and nation-wide cable system continued, perhaps and the pro6ram potcntials) in the civilian scctor. day, which had averaged 3 hours a day until i93g 55 t J'fil.",.
that fits all suggest a set of common denominators Re-Framing the Issue within received accounts of the period ' "*t#i"afy in the shift to the far more profitable military in Germany Vor"o.r.., Even a gloss of television's development of television technology' and in-thc mainte- iomplicating the roles corPorate reveals a matrix of contradictions "ppfi*,i"".a.." of at least some explicit multinationai of technological research' national and throughout the ;;J;;;;;.hips connections involving *uupottt systems devel'opment and state coordi- view .r,rf,l.tu,io.,ul industrial war, substantial contiadictions of the received senses a testament to the remarkably nation. ln some emer8e. and often conflicting appeals and interests Ji',r".r. but the Third ieich' television stands as to account for ;.;;;;;;; by Although a wide range of factors aPPcars in the field of corporate and state configura- one of many instances C".rnuXy', development of television' cultural development' While.useful as a in broadcast Irf,i"u*a technological tions further complicate the nation's status alternative and better documented between ."*pu.u,r"" modelio ii.,ory. Of particular interest is the relationship the extremity of the German situation media systems, reception and conscquent historical rePresenta- and tensions oerioi uiro t"*"u to highlight relationships of the available record' and the interna- [ion. Ttre diversity in the br*oader scheme of television's historical questions and p*r"r,, *fnoi"" Process whereby that rccord as tional develoPment' methods hame particular strands of re.realih. broadly hcgemonic inscription of distinctive both because of retevant, Thc German model appears an obiect of study and as a cultural entity' medium as a telension as the NSDAP's attcmPts to dominate the agitation (most evident in the ...i" J pr.,y-rp".ifi. many possible expressions.by which thc process and because of Of the uollri,iu, of ti" i.opagaida Ministry)' oiC"t*u" i"ievision's concrete historical represcntation of privatc and public sccto.r thc public the explicit coordination can be traced, a start can be made through and promotion o[ tclcvlslon iheir efforts in the introduction rn."pri." of several constituencies distinguished by Post Ministry). As such, it mteft aPPear thc ap- (through the relationship to the medium' By sketching German television' together it u, at? social productionof p*u.n", tit"n by the domestic and foreign popular a means of production within that their with television as 'press, the trade press and the industry through a nignty specific and nationally social framework, shares ,"po.it and circulated opinions' one dimen- Ce*ainly this perspective iublished ci."r*rcriU"d set of referentsl contours and nuances of the situation of a lior, of the bisic possibilities, particularlyin the light an of]"., ,tuzuf appears in comparative light' Of course'.such of Germany's pre-1939 economic policy' orientation ,e.or,sid"ratiln utp.ou.t at besl suggests the general public particularity of the Cerman case' in necessity in" laioty".ratic oi [t inrtitrtion miting the utterance' and of be seen as motivaiing the period's marginali- " the conse- turn, could misses the fuller range of social forces and historical discourse' have I zation in subsequent ouent plurality of diicourses (many of which il^ mentioned)' But as an indication of public however' cio-ser investigation ;l*r;; ln contrast to this position, this approach provides at lcast thc broad unities binding the Cerman fositloning, l of the underlying itructural lontor.s oT.n.optiott, whill constituting the type of devclopments in other national cxoericncc to paiallel to whiih subsequent generations of historians ,! the United States and Creat Britain for of tclevlslon mlrkCI- "ria"n."have had ready access' Thus' the view of a broader technologi- inriu.t."-- permits the contours to the gcneral public through ncwspapers' to multinational oresented cal-economic system to aPPear' The tride and professionals through their development' the Ii" character of television's reiearch and "t".tt"ni.s corporations through rePorts will be (fi:"* sharing iournals, and to the ;il technological transmissior tt",.hed in order to reveal one set of television's ;;;; il the of early i-"i.ti" and licensing agreemtrits;, its place f*:rc For reasons of expediency' German and with the explicit il;i;;;""rs. .ur,,"./.Jonomic growth, t1"P]tq 'a-"ri.un 1935 witl be used to maP out ioit on' reception during involvement-of RCA' IT&T' AEG' and so il industrial the sPectrum of resPonses' *l 56 1l 1 ffitl&ri,ir,,,,,., ,,',
The heavily publicized start of public broadcasring 1935 may in by lhc rcp JI I I hF,a ffi J ':dffi *ffi; among multinationals' the German profcs- of war' dutifully cooperation nrcqq At lcast until dcclarations p-'ni'd" a rich evidence basc until their both from the perspective ri..Lf The i;;;;',*a.,i.rii""o"utions i".*ir,atior,"ra"t *ittt ttt" start of "total war" in 1941' agrccments' and from that American oi'pr,".t, and licensc sharing trades differed from their British and Thc of the Royal A;;; of new manufacturing tcchn"iqics lournal only in the spcrificitv tl':i':::i:ionallv devoted substantial space ;;;i;.p";' "f Teleuision Society, for example, discourse, particularly evidcnt tn thc of thc annual nationaiized una a"Uua" to d.tailed dcsiriptions of ieveiopmental issucs' Thus' for carefully comPar- ;;;;;;i";ig,.unding broadcasting exhibitions in Cermany' of thc promincnt placc o{ P'rul and siudio technique' and ;;;,;;5ir.r*ion-' ins available rcccivers modcls Manfred von Ardenne in tclcvision's penchant for secrecy' Niftl*'r"a i"'"r"",f, lamcnting the British their continuing role in thc mcdirrm's de- report:d crn of and io cn si nccrs "'ril.rti,rn, only in the Ccrman context' ;;;; ;";;ui " 1, !:lt craft' velopment, appcared cngi nlcri n g' respcct f or Ccrtnan"or ^d :."th l:l:g^ical their (initial)ictention of mcchanical clcctronics lriair*uy ab'out Reflecting the interests of thc multinational systcms and Programming'ao u^Ji"f".i^*unications industry' corPoratc di^scoursc bccausc of thc prcscnts serious research difficulties German trade press' and particularly Ncvcrtheless' For its part, the senerallY private nature of its cxprcssions' A'C''s technicai iournals' Telefunken and Fernseh 3"i".t"a of the rccord aPPcar in governmcnt details of the iatest Patent acquisitions "L-ents to stockholders' ilrr".nir,rt"a the ni.r, .o.po.ote officers' memoirs' rePorts British affiliates' while address- a' from their Amcrican or Iitigation records and so on Rcmaining A rcvealing source for the close ;.;;-*"; 58 ing thcir own progrcss' within.our sample year, 193'.36, American industry generally viewed Germany in tcrms of its technical I ff;:i?1,ilJ#;1,: achievements. British efforts receiv"a .#,::;ilr :ttrjj iTff j"Tl". .r.i .lor". studies, while il Jttcntion bcrausc the. explicitly problematzing ti" ltationship among tcchnology, rccci vc r m arketi n6,il industry and politifs. &:::,#:ifj:f i""?Iil [*o plans.{2 Cerman t.:l:un programming, in addition to thc differences The post-war representation of Cerman emerging from n"s avowll'political television runctron, reflects the range of material was Iinguistically marginalized. constraints, srich as arctrival access, and perhaps more importantly, ideological David constraints upon which Sarnof f,s1935 Report to the Federal our current ;ni"rp..tu.tionr."rt. Communica- Th ree d tions Commission ,Tie evelop men ts ty pi fy t on Future naaloinoted l; #il; Ti, f; rropo,, "...other that, dominant historical representations: " nations are accepting the standards"f 1) immJiate post_ anA meth_ occupation intelligence od.s of RCA engineers anb arI apptyinf reportE 2) scholarship emerging if,"* to tf," Plopaganda solution of their own television Ministry ur.r,ivu, in it aRO, p.oir"ilr.;;ii-Sarnoff s I:aT I ana reports to IlCA,s J,r scnotarshrp based upon the post Ministry stockholders, ho*"r"., were more archives in explicit, with Although inpart related statements of annual puron, i.,"J_" :1" ?DR . to pr"_ia. o.ganiza- reaching ogica I tension, lcvels of g20,i 5G,545.05 (*i^rr, jl.^:i,,i::^' the d ir;".s";;, amon g ..ru*u fo, rnese three approachesl""t patcnts of $1 1,503,333 .79, or problematize maiy of the 98,663,217.27) in 1934.{a assumptions Within the United evident in current research. States, at least, television,s competitive implications for radio *T"q to occupy a sizeaUte part One source of information of the available 1935 record. fr4*n*i1i",lna"rr.y on the immediate post_war state of Cerman executivcs and technicians carefully a.."^"^t*a televisiory and with it, a closl overview d.11,,"n1"1,s of its-brief hisrory, app_ears in Engrand, G.".-"r,'y, in the Americrn naf ff,i"la and the i";;,IL.g"ntir," Soviet Union, pursuing rnart"t op"ningr }|::]]l g",r*:. lsenry'Technt"ar u"irio. t, n.,iirn slos remaining rnA IDnusn IntetI|gence Obf:rj"-": fully abreast of techirologicat tir.oio.mutio., Subcommitteel and joint and American and British CIoS application. Marked by Federj Communl.ations [Combi""d i;;;il;;"." ,,wai[ Objectives Subcommirteel Commissioner Sykes, and *"-.pp..".f" reports. W*Ii.6'firg"ly i" afr" the service of industry, industry seemed to monitor C".rrruny,'[i. gngfuna, both as u,""r;;;;rrln, *r, u, u booty, and as testing ground for the early battles a base ior patcnt infringement litigatiory iu.n.*o".rt ,na these RCA technology. "i studies from extensive interviews rnvestigations "I:.g"a and held as closely as possible,o uO*f military seizure Even from this brief sketch of enemy property. Employed of television,s popular, trade Department by the US and.industrial reception during of Commerce and the British Board 1935, television,s cultural Trade of coffi gurat ion, co FIAT/BIOS/CIOS int"*i"*".ri""a"a m pl ica ted Uy it," .nut.i, of lr,i"..stlng a U" civilian specialists temoo_rarily stru:lufal reasons previously suggesred, on leave fro* .o*p"ni* t*r, in often zuch as RCA conflicting terms. yet lf nothinglise and ITCT. In *uny ,no*. air.rJrion of that the interviewers "rr.r,i"".*-o".a Germa ny's d evelopments at were well acquainted *iaf, lea"st pnr,"rraoJ,f* popula_ German ,f," tions addressed by engineers and technicians they these various journatr. Civen ttris r*"...*",* sort through pre-war contact. of public presencg how can ;u u";;n;;oirt Their i.,"Jl*, ..if1.* tt war porr_ directions of technical marginalization of developments pre-l945 " activity, as well ,, f"".i, " in production for cerman television? wt at ,ang" the German television i.a"rif. "f o;iil;;#;ns have the post-1941 Ci"* been made of this record termination of many C".rnu., t.,ua. ttog"t"l.,u. *iiiii"".ir"n r,rrru. publicationq evidence base available)? this evidence is of vital importance. Wiile a aetaitJansie. ties example, For beyond the_lscope of this BIOS Report No. g67 reported'that ,, article, an analysis of ,t u pora f..nr"t war re-configuration Otertannwald fac'ilities emptoyed of discourse ,ugg"rt, the broad eSO u.a contours that Telefunken,s factories were "*fl.yL, of a response. Moreover, tli""pr*"r, of producing up to 3m mini-cameras for missle installation p...?",.f.r i,i,f, 59 ,,. ,::. ,::,'..,1'.,; ::l bifurcation of West and East both the scale idcological and physical semi-skilled female laborers, suggesting in part from the latc in C".*u"y Structuial constraints emerge and orientation of television-relatcd production the conscqucnt division of Gcrmany's archives, with the war. Prtroasanda Ministry's filcs for the most part located in files in the DDR' Civen igation cmcrgcs in th"'gnb, and thc I'oit Ministry's A distinct of compx'titivt' inv^t'st and con- Pattern ()lten note thc previously discusscd divergent interests the 8106, itat, ana CIOS filcs BIOS rcports stituencies of both ministries, the implications of this been removcd by thc Americans that equipment had For heuristic purposes' the thc function of CIOS was division arc profound. pi..,t tireir investigation, and to the broad that each knew or discussions ihat follow attcmPt Portray iarg"ty to coordinate and make sure West and contours of thc scholarship which has typified to what the other was doing' Civen the f,u[ u.."tt block approachcs to German television until the last the commerciai intcrcsts both FIAT East competitive nature of focal point, various-scholars' in scizcd decadc- By comparing, as a ,"a hfOS served, and thc profit pott'ntials in accounts of Ccrmanys failure to develop a market technologies, this tension aPPears hardly 'surPnslnS' consumer sector television receivers, we can quickly with a vcnccr of nationalism While cJryorate interests differentiate their appear throughout the methods. EmPhasizing reports, all three note the common thrust of that their Soviet various researchers counterparts PlaYed necessarilY sacrifices the game more important distinctions, seriously. For but at the same time, example, the Soviets clarifies their historiogra- are reported not only phic implications indicat- to have dismantled ing how available and shipPed east a evidence, combined with Blaupunkt factory supravening ideological involved in television contexts, shaPes historical receiver manfacture, interpretation. but to have shiPPed the entire staff as "Das First, the West: Gerhard Goebel's 1953 study' well.as stands as Fernsehen in Deutschland bis zum Jahrel'945," early cxample of an attempt to synthesize the emerged systcmatically failed to a rare The reports which but"s of both ministries'46 Despite a or multi-national patent archival addreJs organizational issues ".rid"n.n much DDR on fabric of references that overlaps with agreements, focusing in'stead exclusivcly sharing ,.frnfr.tttip, however, Goebel uses the material primarily techniial iss'"s' Consistent with their charge' these or for technoiogical data rather than organizational studies isolated technology from either politics implications in a manner common to many other western development' But the very naturc of the industrial of the period. Based upon close investigation of together with their closc corrclation to the ..finto., investigations, trade purnals,technicalreports and and rccruiters' spcak the patent .n.oid, efforts of.o'po'i" intelligence ]ob evolution of Cerman while cxplicitly interviews, Coebel traces the clearly to the underlying issuc' Thus' includes lost television technology- Although his overview a valuable documentation of otherwise proviilng scheduling and analysis, and suggests the the FIAT / BIOS I CIOS program iechnolo[ical development, his orientation symbiosis of L.oio^i. contours of the industry, rePorts implicitly tesiify to thc continuing of the complex'' senerallv coincidcs with the technical interests what Eisenhower calted thc 'military industrial Fort f..'tinistry without recourse to their archives or grounded in its the internal pupo.wotk, and as such, remains 60 Post-war approaches to eariy tclcvision reflect public rcception. Thus, as a measure of the post Min- istr/s legitimate realm of concerns, Cocbcl's work suggests the centrality of tech nological evolution-invention, modification and refinement---as the factor primarily responsible for Germany's delay in mass producing receivers. Heinz Pohle's 1955 study and Winfried Lerg's 7957 analysis both tend to rely on periodical and public record, like Goebel, with minimal reference to archival sources.az Thus, for example, both misread the events sur- rounding the 1935 jurisdictional disputes which resulted in the Air Ministq/s temporary control of television. Perhaps more significantly, by relying on periodical literature, they replicate the perspective of the Propaganda Ministry. By putting the hyperbolic tone of the propaganda Ministry together with the realities of television,s technical development, they essentially argue that the delay in home receivers emerges from the industry's premature start-up in 1935. By moving ahead too soon at the behest of the propaganda Ministry, industry actually set itself baik, never to rccover. Both authors hint propaganda at the work heavily Ministrl/s de facto subversion of capitalist interests, based on the Post Ministry but neither cites specific evidence. archives, with resuits dramatically at odds with those of the West. Through the post Ministry, The archival record now available in the West tends to Hempel has access to the day-to-day workings of state confirm this perspective. The Propaganda Ministry files and corporate interrelations, thus permitting a focus on deal most tangibly with television, but given the division the history of multinational investment, inter-industry of responsibility for television, and the evident conflicts battles, and the process of industrial-state coordination. of interest established by 1935, this perspective provides Hempel accounts for early Cerman television,s failure to but one piece of a comp'licated matiix oi attract a public by documenting the infighting between Fortunately for some western "on"u..,r.propaganda historians, the Telefunken and Fernseh (and their respcctive multina_ Ministry's records indicate ,,persuasion,, a concern with tional backers), compounded by both companies, rapid in programming that reinforces the notion of a,,seizure,, abandonment of low cost television developments for of power. Although evidence is certainly available in much higher profit military production. Thus, the western archives to counter this (copies position of maintenance of full scale television research and devel_ selected Post Ministry correspondence to the Finance oPment (despite dropping the consumer market), Office or Chancellory, for instance), post the Ministq,zs togethcr with the rapid tcchnological expansion to "corporate" perspective and sensitivity remains only tcchnologies, appear in terms of corporate profit. marginally represented. ::lu,:d Like his westcrn countcrparts, Hcmpel is fortunate in having acccss to an archival base which supports his By contrast, efforts emerging from the DDR as exempli- idcological oricntation, in this case, the linkage of fascism 5L fied by the work of Manfred Hempel have produced .. fr a\ ':.Nt forccs within individual ministrics' coupled - would be Competing with monoPoly capital- The samc argument *itf,'ir,t"."^inisterial disputos, all ovcrlaid by the often only to the Propaganda difficult to mount with access contradictory interests of thc Party and individual simultane- Ministry files. national and mrlti-r,ational corporations' has ously produced a highly divcrsified and complex f . +,ffiEqlstrt j4,!rir! :i.jl :, iir.'.i.: 1 division of the archives along ministerial lines, particu- larly given tclevision's development pattern in Gcrmany, understand the process by which research and historical 'limits accounts for the character of the rescarch effort. The are sct: how does the social construction of division, of course, seems fortunate for ideologues on tclcvision's cultural configuration, both emerge from and both sidcs of the Wall, confirming visions of the National construct, our own cultural consciousness? Stepping Socialist epoch as anti-capitalist, over-regulated, propa- back from the process and exploring the contours of gandistically driven a distatorship in the West, and as a economic and technological development, together with monopoly rTW i1.'lIiL: i{?4w$ffi Schacht's public works and expenditures programs (mapped or.rt by Strasser in 1932), growth of the export sector was critical. In April 2oThe broadcasting exhibitions reported annual admissions of ovcr 300,000. Olympic television appeared in up to 25 Berlin tcievision halls, plus one in Postdam and two in Leipzig (including one seating close to 400 people). programming was increased from the usual 3 hours per day to over 8 hours, and attcndance was put at162,228. 2lAlthough the 1936 Olympics served as a public testing ground for both RCA and Farnsworth systems, the post Mhishy Amcrican ard Cerman television w€apor.) patcnt development apparently perceived the RCA system as superior, and after this blackout suggests that information flou, continued. supported nationai crcnversion to the RCA standard before 2(On actual coverage of the games. ihe surface at least, close parallels exist betwcen Teie- funkcn and RCA's developments of television survcillance z'?United Kingdom Trading with the Enemy Act, 1939; United planes, television guided and heat-seeking missiles. and so on. States Trading with the Enemy Act, 1917, amended lg41,lg4l, Their correpondences mark an area of ongoing research. etc.; Executive Order No. 8389 of April 10,1940; etc. See Martin IT&T's involvemcnt with war-related technologies and f)omke, Trading uith tht Enerry in WorM War Ii (New york: industrics is morc fuJly documentd. Central Book Company, 1943). 2sDocumented in the Bundesarchv RFM files, M/4903. zrDcspite Trading with the Enemy legislation, multinational 2512 corporations were uniquely positioned to maintain their July 1935, ReichsgesetzbbttT. l#88 s. 1059. investments. IT&T provides an unusually well documented zTReich case. Its CEO, S. Behn, cultivated close relations with the Reich Chancellory papers, Bundesarchiv, R4Zll / 267 a. and IT&T was one of the first foreigr companies to be declared rr1 "German," and thus exempt from the Reictr Custodian of Alien 1 December 7935, Reichsgestezblatt T. 7 # 136 s. 1429-30. Property. Although a series of investigations were begun by 2tiven the Departmcnt of Justice and the FBI, by the start of the cold the awareness of military applications evident even in war, IT&T's complicity with the Gernran state was re-fr4med. the fax transmissions of the late 1920s, this latter allocation is Day-to-day conkol of its German operations was seen as not surprising. By the early 1940s, development of television outside of IT&T's direct control. Nevertheless, testimony by guided missiles, torpedoes, unmanned surveillance planes, and IT&T's German directors Westrick and Schroeder confliits with related technologies such as radar and hcat-sccking missiles post-war corporate testimony on this issue. See, for example, were under military directive. See Conrbined lnteliigence Shroeder interrogations, National Ardrive, NI-234, November Obiectives Subcommittee [CIO6] Report 328-41, #1-1, fil-g; 75,"1945 and NI-25, Movember 16,1945. British Intelligcnce Objectives Subcommittce [l]106l Report #862 Public Ilecords Office (London) AIR MIN flles 4O'/165G, Regarding patent exchanges, German trade journals regularly 40/2Am. reported on the patent developments of and license agreements ,,totai 39See, with their American affiliates such as RCA until war,, for example, I-Iadamovsky's Der Rundfunk im Dienste iler caused the suspension of their publication. Close parallels in Volksfiiehrung and Propaganila und natiorulz Macht. 55