1902 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 12 APRIL, 1951

actions which resulted amounted to pure under enemy control. Our object, therefore, slaughter. The enemy, caught completely on was to hold Meiktila, acting as offensively as the wrong foot, was engaged by aircraft, tanks possible, while 7 Indian Division kept open and infantry and thrown into utter confusion. the bridgehead area and enabled 5 Indian Here again, -the " Cab Rank " method proved Division to pass through. most efficacious. 111. As already stated (paragraph 109), the 109. To say -that our capture of Meiktila enemy commander at Yenangyaung had been came as a surprise to the enemy Command ordered to seize our bridgehead at Nyaungu, would be an understatement. Not only was thus cutting our L. of C. to Meiktila. Yama- the blow utterly unexpected, but their Intelli- moto's plan was to make a converging attack gence was for some time completely baffled from the west, on the right bank, and from as to what troops had inflicted it. The general the south and east on the left bank. This counter-offensive plans for early March had to offensive, however, was uncoordinated. The to put aside, as, until Meiktila was recaptured I.N.A. Division attempted an assault from the and our forces south of Mandalay destroyed, east against 114 Brigade in the bridgehead, but no major attacks could be launched north its attacks were half-hearted and were driven and west of the Irrawaddy. On the other back with heavy casualties. To the south, a hand, failure to recapture Meiktila could result Japanese force, assembling for an attack near in disaster for practically the whole of the Singu four miles north-east of Chauk, was Burma Area Army. Although captured orders caught and routed by 89 Brigade. The attack show that Kimura realised this, yet, curiously on the bridgehead from the west was pre- enough, other documents show that he still vented from developing by 28 (East African) intended to prosecute what he called "The Brigade, which successfully repulsed a series of decisive battle of 'the Irrawaddy Shore." The attacks. Thus ended the threat to our com- result was that he adopted half-measures. He munications at Nyaungu. countermanded the moves directed against 112. 28 (East African) Brigade deserves 33 Corps (vide paragraph 95) and diverted some remarks. Besides 11 (East African) Divi- these formations on to Meiktila, stressing, in sion, the original East African contingent in- his orders, the vital necessity for speed. He cluded two independent brigades, the 22nd and also directed General Yamamoto in the west the 28th, which were originally allotted for (Yenangyaung area) to sever 4 Corps' commu- defence duties in Ceylon. Shortage of forma- nications by capturing their Pakokku bridge- tions, however, had resulted in both brigades head by an advance up both banks of the being sent to Burma, primarily to undertake Irrawaddy. But he gave no orders to his forces duties on the L. of C. The Commander, Four- who were about Mandalay or south of the teenth Army, soon -found himself forced, river to withdraw, evidently considering he through lack of sufficient troops, to employ could restore the situation about Meiktila while 28 (East African) Brigade in the line, although continuing ithe battle in the north. Here, as the formation had not really reached a suffi- so often before, the Japanese under-estimation ciently advanced state of training to be pitted of their enemy was to prove fatal to them. against the enemy. It will be remembered 110. The forces which Kimura concentrated that a reverse was suffered resulting in a with- to recover Meiktila were as follows: 18 drawal to the Letse area. Reinforced, how- Japanese Division (less 114 Regiment), brought ever, by an Indian battalion and some artil- south from {the Northern Combat Area Com- lery, the Brigade fought well, as shown above. mand's front: 119 Regiment (53 Japanese Divi- In accordance with the decisions reached at sion), from south of Mandalay; 214 Regiment a Conference with the G.O.C.-in-C, East (33 Japanese Division) from the Irrawaddy Africa, held in February, 28 (East African) front, opposite Pakokku; and 49 Japanese Brigade was flown out of Burma to Dohazari Division (less 153 Regiment) which had been in March and April, and broken up, as the first hurried north from Pegu. These forces were step in the reduction of -the East African forces, reinforced by Army Troops, including medium which, owing to the man-power situation, were artillery and some tanks. It was a formidable to be reduced to the one division by early 1946. concentration and it was being rapidly effected. 113. On the east flank of the Irrawaddy Our forces in Meiktila comprised 17 Indian battlefront, over a 100 miles up river, another Division and one tank brigade. The only re- great battle was raging. 19 Indian Division, inforcement available was 5 Indian Division, which had broken out of its bridgehead on the which moved forward from Jorhat (700 miles 20th February, had begun its drive down the distant) on the 5th March. Its forward con- east bank of the river, advancing with great centration was carried out with great speed and speed and determination. The two Japanese the whole Division (less its air-transportable divisions (the 15th and 53rd) opposing 19 brigade) had reached 7 Indian Division's Indian Division completely failed to stop it. bridgehead at Nyaungu 10 days later. The Strong positions were either assaulted, with fly-in of the remaining brigade from Palel to tank and air support, or were by-passed. In a Meiktila was completed on the 17th March, " leap-frogging " advance, 98 Brigade were the but I will refer to this again. It will be seen, first troops to reach the Chaungmagyi, estab- therefore, that the enemy was concentrating the lishing a bridgehead on the 5th March; while, equivalent of six brigades, plus Army units, further north, 64 Brigade was still mopping up against our four infantry brigades and one in the Pinlein area and 62 Brigade was fighting tank brigade. There was nothing perturbing at Yenatha, which they captured on the 6th. about this, but it must be remembered that our The result of this method of advance was that communications were vulnerable; our forward we reached and passed through Madaya before airfields were exposed to attack, as, also, was the enemy had time to retire to the strongly the road back via Taungtha, while the road prepared positions covering the two water west, via Kyaukpadaung, was of course still barriers north of the town. This spectacular