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Myanmar Issue Brief No CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE KACHIN CONFLICT GREAT POWERS AND THE CHANGING MYANMAR ISSUE BRIEF NO. 2 JANUARY 2014 [UPDATED] China, the United States and the Kachin Conflict By Yun Sun This issue brief examines the development of the Kachin conflict in northern Myanmar’s Kachin and Shan states, the negotiations between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the Myan- mar government, and the roles China and the United States have played in the conflict. KEY FINDINGS: 1 The prolonged Kachin conflict is a 3 The disagreements on terms have 5 Promoting national peace and major obstacle to Myanmar’s national hindered a formal cease-fire. In ad- reconciliation is a pillar of the US reconciliation and a challenging test dition, the existing economic inter- policy toward Myanmar. However, the for the democratization process. est groups profiting from the armed United States is being very careful not conflict have further undermined the to impose itself into the peace process prospect for progress. itself, including Kachin talks, given 2 The KIO and the Myanmar the government’s sensitivity that the government differ on the priority process remains an internal affair of between the cease-fire and the political 4 China intervened in the Kachin ne- the country. dialogue. Without addressing this gotiations in 2013 to protect its national difference, the nationwide peace interests. A crucial motivation was a accord proposed by the government concern about the “internationaliza- will most likely lack the KIO’s tion” of the Kachin issue and the poten- participation. tial US role along the Chinese border. This is the second of a series of four issue briefs on the changes and challenges that Myanmar faces in its domestic and foreign policies since the beginning of democratization in the nation in 2011. These briefs will explore how external factors and forces influence and shape various aspects of Myanmar’s internal develop- ment, including economic growth, ethnic conflicts and national reconciliation. This brief examines the development of the ongoing Kachin conflict, the obstacles to the peace negotiations and how the process affects the political reform. In addition, it discusses the vested interests of the US and China in the issue and the roles they have played. The third and the fourth briefs will explore the US-China dynamism in Myanmar and Myanmar and the ASEAN. YUN SUN STIMSON CENTER 1 94 96 98 J 100 102 ° ° Indian ° i ° ° 28 n ° Line s Xichang Chinese h a MYANMAR Line J MYANMAR i a n Tinsukia g BHUTAN Putao Lijiang aputra Jorhat Shingbwiyang M hm e ra k Dukou B KACHIN o Guwahati Makaw n 26 26 g ° ° INDI STATE A n Shillong Lumding i w d Dali in Myitkyina h Kunming C Baoshan Imphal Hopin Tengchong BANGLADE SH IN A Bhamo C H 24° 24° SAGAING Dhaka Katha Lincang Mawlaik L Namhkam a n DIVISION c Y a uan Gejiu Kalemya n (R Falam g ed I ) Barisal r ( r Lashio M a S e w k a o a Hakha l n Shwebo w d g d e ) Chittagong y e n 22 22 Monywa ° ° CHIN Maymyo Jinghong NAM Sagaing Mandalay VIET STATE SHAN STATE Pongsali Pakokku Myingyan Ta-kaw- Kengtung MANDALAY Muang Xai Chauk Meiktila MAGWAY Taunggyi DIVISION Möng-Pan PEOPLE'S Minbu Magway Houayxay LAO 20° 20° Sittwe (Akyab) Taungdwingyi DEMOCRATIC DIVISION y d EPUBLIC RAKHINE d R Ramree I. a Naypyitaw Loikaw w a KAYAH STATE r r Cheduba I. I Prome (Pye) STATE e Bay Chiang Mai M kong of Bengal Vientiane Sandoway (Viangchan) BAGO Lampang 18 18° ° DIVISION M a e Henzada N Bago a m YANGON P i f n n o aThaton Pathein g DIVISION f b l a u t Pa-an r G a A M Khon Kaen YEYARWARDY YangonBilugyin I. KAYIN ATE 16 16 DIVISION Mawlamyine ST ° ° Pyapon Amherst AI L AN D M TH o ut dy MON hs o wad Nakhon f the Irra STATE Sawan Nakhon Preparis Island Ratchasima (MYANMAR) Ye Coco Islands 92 (MYANMAR) 94 Bangkok 14° 14° ° ° Dawei (Krung Thep) National capital Launglon Bok Islands Division or state capital Andaman Sea CAMBODIA Town, village TANINTHARYI Major airport DIVISION Mergui International boundary 12° Division or state boundary 12° Main road Mergui n d Secondary road Archipelago G u l f o f T h a i l a Railroad 0 100 200 300 km Chumphon The boundaries and names shown and the designations Kawthuang 10 used on this map do not imply official endorsement or ° acceptance by the United Nations. 10 0 100 200 mi ° 96° 98° 100° 102° Map No. 4168 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support June 2012 Cartographic Section CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE KACHIN CONFLICT 94 96 98 J 100 102 ° ° Indian ° i ° ° 28 n ° Line s Xichang Chinese h a MYANMAR Line J MYANMAR i a n Tinsukia g BHUTAN Putao Overview Lijiang M Since 2011, Myanmar has made substantial progress in its political democratization. The aputra Jorhat Shingbwiyang hm e The Kachin conflict ra k Dukou B KACHIN o reconciliation with the democratic opposition — especially with Aung San Suu Kyi and Guwahati Makaw n 26 has been a policy chal- 26 g ° ° INDI STATE the National League for Democracy under her leadership — has won Myanmar applause lenge for both China A n from the international community. As a result, Western countries have lifted most of Shillong Lumding i and the United States. w d Dali in Myitkyina their financial sanctions. Among the remaining uncertainties, the peace process with the h Kunming C Baoshan country’s ethnic minorities has arisen as a crucial challenge. Currently, among all ethnic Imphal Hopin Tengchong BANGLADE groups, only the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is engaged in ongoing armed conflict SH IN A Bhamo C H 24° with the Tatmadaw (the government military) and has yet to reach a cease-fire agree- 24° SAGAING Dhaka Katha Lincang ment. The Kachin conflict, therefore, has been a key obstacle in the peace process.1 Mawlaik L Namhkam a n DIVISION c Y a uan Gejiu More than a dozen rounds of dialogue have taken place since 2011 but have failed to Kalemya n (R Falam g ed I ) Barisal r ( r Lashio M lead to a formal cease-fire. The underlying reasons for the failure lie in the inability of a S e w k a o a Hakha l n the two sides to reach a compromise on power-sharing and profit-sharing, the long- Shwebo w d g d e ) Chittagong y e n 22 term mutual distrust and hostility as well as the existence of vested interests. Most 22 Monywa ° ° CHIN Maymyo Jinghong NAM Sagaing Mandalay VIET immediately, the Kachin Independence Organization and the Myanmar government STATE SHAN STATE Pongsali Pakokku Myingyan have disagreed on the sequence between a cease-fire agreement and a political so- Ta-kaw- Kengtung MANDALAY lution. While the government sees a cease-fire agreement as the precondition for Muang Xai Chauk Meiktila substantive political negotiation, the Kachin worry that a cease-fire will be the end of MAGWAY Taunggyi DIVISION Möng-Pan PEOPLE'S any dialogue. For the Kachin, a cease-fire agreement will generate more conflicts if it Minbu Magway Houayxay LAO 20° 20° Sittwe (Akyab) Taungdwingyi DEMOCRATIC does not address their political and economic grievances. In addition, the momen- DIVISION y d EPUBLIC tum of the conflict is reinforced by vested interest groups from both sides that engage RAKHINE d R Ramree I. a Naypyitaw Loikaw w in illegal trade of jade and timber from the Kachin state to China. a KAYAH STATE r r Cheduba I. I Prome (Pye) STATE e Bay Chiang Mai M kong The Kachin conflict has been a policy challenge for both China and the United States. of Bengal Vientiane Sandoway (Viangchan) BAGO Lampang 18 For China, border tranquility, the protection of Chinese investments and the preven- 18° ° DIVISION M tion of expanding US influence are the top three considerations for all border regions. a e Henzada N The Kachin conflict has disrupted China’s border security and jeopardized its econom- Bago a m YANGON P ic investments in the region. More important, Beijing’s strategic concern centers on i f n n o aThaton Pathein g DIVISION f b l a u t Pa-an r its assessment of Washington’s interest and potential role in the issue. This made the G a AYEYARW M Khon Kaen ARDY YangonBilugyin I. KAYIN so-called “internationalization of the Kachin conflict” China’s gravest policy concern in ATE 16 16 DIVISION Mawlamyine ST ° ° Pyapon Amherst AI L AN D Myanmar in 2013. Washington recognizes that success in achieving nationwide peace M TH o ut dy MON hs o wad Nakhon and reconciliation is the defining challenge of Myanmar’s transformation. Promoting f the Irra STATE Sawan Nakhon Preparis Island Ratchasima national peace and reconciliation is therefore a pillar of US policy toward Myanmar. Ye (MYANMAR) Despite pressures on the US government from human rights groups, Capitol Hill and Coco Islands others to become more directly involved, however, it is clear that the Myanmar govern- 92 (MYANMAR) 94 Bangkok 14° 14° ° ° ment and military object to a formal US role in the cease-fire/peace talks between the Dawei (Krung Thep) National capital Launglon Bok central authorities and the Kachin. And in the absence of agreement from both sides Islands Division or state capital on a US role, let alone a clear definition of what that role would be, the US government Andaman Sea TANINTHARYI CAMBODIA Town, village has not considered the question.
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