ISSUE BRIEF Beyond the War: The History of French-Libyan Relations

APRIL 2021 FARAH RASMI

n February 23, 2011, French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared to the world his revulsion at the brutalities taking place in Libya: “The international community cannot remain a spectator to all the massive violations of Ohuman rights,” he said.1 Much had changed in the relationship between Sarkozy The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative honors the legacy and Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi since the latter’s visit to France in 2007. Much of Brent Scowcroft and his tireless efforts has also changed in Libya and the rest of the world since these declarations were to build a new security architecture for the uttered and the ensuing intervention by NATO began. Yet France’s role in the region. Our work in this area addresses Libyan conflict remains pivotal. To understand French interests and interventions the full range of security threats and in modern day Libya, it is imperative to understand the two countries’ combined challenges including the danger of interstate warfare, the role of terrorist history beyond the fall of Qaddafi and the current civil war. The history of the French- groups and other nonstate actors, and Libyan relationship is dynamic and multifaceted: Its roots date back to French the underlying security threats facing colonialism, it became complex during the Sarkozy-Qaddafi era, and it culminates countries in the region. Through all of the today with President Emmanuel Macron’s involvement in the contemporary Libyan Council’s Middle East programming, we conflict. This piece aims to give an overview of the diverse circumstances that led work with allies and partners in Europe and the wider Middle East to protect US to France’s contemporary role in Libya in order to explain the seemingly drastically interests, build peace and security, and different stances that French leaders have taken in the conflict. unlock the human potential of the region. You can read more about our programs HISTORY at www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/ Libya’s territory is divided into three main historical regions: Tripolitania in the middle-east-programs/. northwest, Cyrenaica in the east, and the Fezzan in the southwest. Under Ottoman The mission of Badr University in Cairo’s rule, the regions were recognized as separate provinces and were ruled accordingly. Center for Global Affairs is to present To strengthen local tribes and establish tribe-state relationships, “Ottoman rulers an unbiased, socially responsible body of research that fosters dialogue and contributes to decision and policy-making, both locally and globally. 1 Nicholas Watt and Patrick Wintour, “Libya No-Fly Zone Call by France Fails to Get David Cameron’s Backing,” The Guardian, February 23, 2011. ISSUE BRIEF BEYOND THE WAR: THE HISTORY OF FRENCH-LIBYAN RELATIONS

depended on influential tribal leaders, particularly in peripheral and rural areas such as the Fezzan, in order to collect taxes, enlist troops, and maintain trade routes.”2 In doing so, they established the foundation for the norms of future tribe- state relations. This system lasted until the Ottomans tried to modernize in the second half of the nineteenth century. Governance was from then on centralized within the northern part of the state, thus weakening and creating rifts between tribal leaders and initiating a long tradition of neglect in the Fezzan region.

As the Ottoman Empire weakened, it lost what came to be known as “Libya” to Italy in 1911. Italian colonialism was extremely ruthless toward the Libyan tribes, who fought relentlessly but eventually lost to Benito Mussolini’s army in the 1920s. Seen as “one of the most successful counterinsurgencies in Western history,” the so-called pacification of Libya, which began in 1922, entailed the death and encampment of thousands of Libyans in concentration camps.3 It was followed by a systemic process of Libya’s President Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi welcomes French colonialism, which created the “Quarta Sponda” and resulted in President Nicholas Sarkozy at the Bab Azizia Palace in Tripoli on the emigration of thousands of poor Italian workers to the new July 25, 2007. Source: Guibbaud Christophe/ABACA via Reuters. territory.4 This period saw further centralization within the north and neglect of the peripheral regions.

The French Empire had been expanding through the better to attack both French and Italian powers.6 While they were part of northern and western Africa since the early eighteenth eventually overpowered, the Fezzan region remained of interest century. Local tribes eventually fell completely under French to the French as tribal relations in the Fezzan affected much of rule in the second half of the nineteenth and the start of the their territory and presented a palpable threat to their rule. twentieth centuries. French rule in this region depended on a “divide and conquer” strategy that pitted local tribes and In 1943, during World War II, Italy lost Libya to France and the ethnic groups against each other and changed the social United Kingdom, with the former occupying the Fezzan and the structures and dynamics of the intra-tribal relations, creating latter occupying the Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. In 1951, Libya conflicts that have persisted in many cases to the present day.5 was granted its independence and, through British pressure, Despite consistent rebellion against French rule, the territories King Idris al-Senussi assumed rule over the Kingdom of Libya. remained under French control well into the twentieth century The Senussi leadership was known for its pro-Western and anti- due to the heavily weakened tribal leadership. Arab nationalism, which put both Tripolitania and the Fezzan at a disadvantage and fostered further discontent in the country.7 However, the neglect of the Fezzan region allowed for Tuareg tribal leaders to establish their own autonomy and strengthen In 1969, a coup d’état by a young Muammar al-Qaddafi their military anti-colonial efforts. Seeing as Tuareg tribes overthrew the monarchy and established a thoroughly anti- extended beyond the official Libyan borders, they were able Western, anti-imperialist leadership that endured until 2011.

2 Fransje Molenaar, Jonathan Tossell, Anna Schmauder, Rahmane Idrissa, and Rida Lyammouri, The Status Quo Defied: The Legitimacy of Traditional Authorities in Areas of Limited Statehood in Mali, Niger and Libya, Clingendael Institute, CRU Report No. 37, 2019. 3 Federica Saini Fasanotti, “Libyans Haven’t Forgotten History,” Brookings, January 18, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/01/18/libyans- havent-forgotten-history/. 4 George Joffe, “La Libye et L’Europe,”CERI Sciences Po, 2002, 3. Unless otherwise stated, all translations into English in this paper are the author’s. 5 Molenaar et al., “The Status Quo Defied,” 34. 6 Ibid., 37. 7 Ibid., 47.

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QADDAFI Muammar al-Qaddafi, who grew up under colonial rule, was To understand French interests and known for his intellectual curiosity from a very young age. By the time he reached his mid-twenties he had studied works interventions in modern day Libya, by the likes of Maximilien Robespierre, Napoleon Bonaparte, Karl Marx, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Mao Tse-Tung.8 it is imperative to understand the Above all, he was uniquely inspired by Egypt’s Gamal Abd El Nasser and his revolutionary pan-Arab ideologies9 and anti- two countries’ combined history colonial efforts—Qaddafi expressed his own anti-imperialist beyond the fall of Qaddafi and the sentiments to all who would listen. In 1963, he joined the military academy “not to become a professional soldier, but current civil war. to infiltrate the institution from the inside and prepare for the revolution.”10 On the night of August 31, 1969, Qaddafi and his men launched a coup d’état that overthrew King Idris I and put Qaddafi in power. In 1986, in response to many of these incidents and particularly the targeted attacks against US military officers Within a few years, Qaddafi had shut down foreign military around the world, the United States bombed several sites in bases, nationalized petroleum assets, and expelled foreign Libya, including Qaddafi’s home, which resulted in the death nationals (primarily Italians). He also established his own of his infant daughter but failed to overthrow the dictator.14 strict Islamic laws, outlawing alcohol consumption and President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing of France also attempted gambling, among other things. In 1973, he began to establish many indirect attacks that aimed to destabilize and overthrow his own version of socialist leadership, creating the “Libyan Qaddafi in response to his intervention in the Chadian war Jamahiriya” and introducing his Green Book, reminiscent of by using neighboring forces from Egypt, Morocco, and Saudi Mao’s Little Red Book.11 His philosophy heavily influenced his Arabia.15 However, none of these attempts was successful, ventures beyond Libya. and in 1981 President François Mitterrand dismissed his predecessor’s approach and opted for pursuing harsh In alignment with his national revolutionary ideology, the economic sanctions instead. rich dictator began financing and supporting various forms of revolutionary and insurgent movements abroad. His At home, Qaddafi ruled his country with an iron fist, and government was implicated in many violent incidents that maintained expansionist ambitions throughout his reign. He comprised high-profile assassinations and extremist attacks, had hoped to establish an Arab Federation with him at its as well as the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, helm, which proved futile as Arab nations veered in various Scotland, in 1988 and UTA Flight 772 over Niger in 1989.12 In political directions and many were implicated in their own 1976, Qaddafi’s military also intervened in the Chadian civil war, conflicts.16 His ambitions consequently turned southward as he funding and aiding insurgents in their fight against the French- proclaimed himself the “King of Kings” in Africa and attempted supported government.13 The annexation of the Aouzou Strip, to unite the African nations.17 Both attempts succeeded only in over which Libya laid claim based on old colonial discord, was further entrenching the international perception of him as an a red line for the French authorities, who then intervened in unruly and possibly unstable leader whose power needed to support of N’Djamena. be curtailed.

8 Europe 1, “Au Cœur de l’histoire: L’énigme Kadhafi (Franck Ferrand),” video via YouTube, 6:29, July 19, 2020,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ckRRMPXtjdI. 9 Europe 1, “Au Cœur de l’histoire,” 4:57. 10 Vincent Hugeux, “Il était une fois sa révolution,” Kadhafi (Paris: Éditions Perrin, 2017). 11 Ibid., “Le Livre vert à livre ouvert.” 12 Andrew Wedgwood and A. Walter Dorn, “NATO’s Libya Campaign 2011: Just or Unjust to What Degree?” Diplomacy & Statecraft 26, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 344. 13 Jalel Harchaoui, “La politique libyenne de la France et ses antécédents historiques,” Revue Internationale et Strategique 116, no. 4 (December 17, 2019): 38. 14 Wedgwood and Dorn, “NATO’s Libya Campaign 2011,” 348. 15 Harchaoui, “La politique libyenne de la France,” 38. 16 David Hirst, “Gaddafi’s Brotherly Censure - Archive, 17 April 1973,”The Guardian, April 17, 2020, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/17/gaddafis- brotherly-censure-archive-1973. 17 “Gaddafi: Africa’s ‘King of Kings,’” BBC News, August 29, 2008,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7588033.stm .

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In the late 1990s, Libya began a process of reestablishing its Incongruously, Sarkozy’s first great success as the new French image in the West, a move prompted by years of strict sanctions president was negotiating the release of five Bulgarian nurses that had been imposed by Western nations. The process of who had been unjustly held and tortured in Libyan prisons cleansing its reputation entailed handing over citizens who for years. Although negotiations were already underway with were implicated in the Pan Am flight bombing to be tried in the European Union representatives, it was claimed that it was Hague, denouncing terrorism, and turning over or destroying Sarkozy who guaranteed their release.22 In exchange, Sarkozy weapons of mass destruction that were believed to have made many promises, one of which was to extend an invitation been used in various attacks, namely in the Chadian war to the Libyan leader to visit France, a request Qaddafi had years before.18 In doing so, Libya was finally removed from the specifically made during the negotiations.23 Qaddafi received United States’s list of state sponsors of terrorism and formally “all he had asked for,” with the exception of one clause began its rehabilitation process on a larger scale.19 However, requesting that France come to the defence of Libya if it were Qaddafi’s Jamahiriya remained a dictatorship, and knowledge ever attacked by another country.24 Despite this one point of of his ruthlessness against dissidents and his own people was contention, the Libyan authorities finally relented and released pervasive. His oppressive reign endured, as it was not until the nurses. It was a French government airplane that brought 2005 that Qaddafi met the man who, many years later, would them home, escorted by the first lady of France.25 call for his demise. Portrayed as a testament to the changes taking place in Libya, QADDAFI AND SARKOZY the release of the nurses demonstrated a show of strength In 2005, Qaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam Qaddafi put his father for French foreign affairs under the new president. The next in contact with young and ambitious French Interior Minister day, Sarkozy was on his second official flight to Tripoli with an Nicolas Sarkozy.20 Sarkozy’s first visit to Tripoli on October 6, extremely lucrative arms deal on the agenda. For Libya, this trip 2005, was highly publicized due to discussions concerning was imperative, as the leader’s African ambitions could easily be future French-Libyan relations. Officially a visit to discuss impeded by French influence in the region. However, Sarkozy’s illegal migration and counterterrorism efforts, it veered mostly amicable behavior and the signing of over a dozen deals, toward a discussion about possible future cooperation. Yet a which included arms sales along with an elaborate internet private conversation between the interior minister and Qaddafi surveillance system, were thought to be more than sufficient to also took place that day, and by the end of it its participants stabilize the relationship between the two countries.26 expressed hopes of finally ending French-Libyan discord.21 Nonetheless, during a later discussion, Sarkozy attempted Sarkozy, who ran his presidential campaign on promises of to broach the topic of his Mediterranean Union dreams with fighting for human rights and making no compromises with Qaddafi. The Libyan leader was less than responsive as he corrupt dictators, announced to his voters at his inauguration insisted on changing the subject and asked what else France that his goal was to create a “Mediterranean Union” that would could sell to Libya.27 It became clear that the interests of the two link Europe and Africa. To achieve this goal, he needed a strong leaders were starting to diverge. While the French president had North African ally to rally neighboring countries. After receiving a dream of being the leader who accomplished the historical one of his first congratulatory calls from Qaddafi, it seemed that feat of uniting the Mediterranean, his Libyan counterpart still this ally might be Libya. had his eyes set on being the King of Kings in Africa.

18 Eben Kaplan, “How Libya Got off the List,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated October 16, 2007,https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-libya-got-list. 19 Ibid. 20 Investigations et Enquêtes, Sarkozy-Kadhafi: Soupçons de financement libyen - Le documentaire choc, video via YouTube, 4:44, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=eAXq_ZDxq1E. 21 Fabrice Arfi and Karl Laske,Avec les compliments du guide: Sarkozy-Kadhafi, l’histoire secrète (Paris: Fayard, 2020), chap. 1. 22 Ibid., chap. 16. 23 Investigations et Enquêtes, Sarkozy-Kadhafi, 20:30. 24 Ibid., 22:03. 25 Arfi and Laske, Avec les compliments du guide, chap. 16. 26 Ibid., chap. 12. 27 Investigations et Enquêtes, Sarkozy-Kadhafi, 31:30.

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A few months later, on the International Day of Human Rights, red carpets were rolled out for Muammar al-Qaddafi’s promised first official visit to a Western country. The contentious trip was to mark the peculiarity of the leaders’ relationship, ending their “honeymoon phase” and paving the way for their future fraught association. The day before Qaddafi’s arrival, a statement of the French government’s secretary of state for human rights appeared in the newspaper Le Parisien, which echoed many people’s aversions: “Colonel Qaddafi must understand that our country is not a doormat on which a leader, terrorist or not, can come to wipe the blood of his crimes off his feet,” she said.28 With his tent set up outside the Elysée Palace, at Hôtel de Marigny, the Libyan’s trip seemed ill-fated before it even started.

Business deals with the Libyan Jamahiriya were no small feat, and international diplomacy and financial gain were the main impetuses for the trip. The two governments signed many lucrative deals throughout the trip, including “contracts for Airbus planes, nuclear power and other deals which Paris said totaled more than 10 billion euros” along with “a memorandum of cooperation, with Libya committing itself to enter exclusive President Sarkozy shakes hands with President al-Qaddafi before negotiations with France to acquire equipment in the framework their meeting at the Elysee Palace in Paris on December 10, 2007. of state-to-state contract.”29 These deals amounted to billions Source: Abd Rabbo-Mousse/ABACA via Reuters. of euros and countless jobs for France.

Initially set to last three days as per French diplomatic customs, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in the trip was extended to a week.30 Qaddafi was excited to see Paris and accused Europeans of mistreating African immigrants. the many French sights he had read about in his youth, and the His speech, a response to countless critiques and accusations French government obliged by providing security detail and concerning his human rights record, attacked European nations organizing many trips around the capital that were met with for their hypocrisy, as he announced to African immigrants: furious protests, notably by the families of the victims of the “Either you live respected here in Europe and enjoy the same UTA flight that had been bombed years earlier. Sarkozy insisted rights and duties as Europeans or you return to Africa.”31 that, while diplomatic dealings and bringing lucrative contracts Qaddafi’s words angered his French hosts, pushing even the for France were quite indispensable, human rights were still Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner to speak against very much on the agenda, and he expressed as much to his the visit and the situation, which he deemed “pitiful.”32 Libyan counterpart. In response to the outrage he received from his people, With that reminder, the “honeymoon phase” met its end, and President Sarkozy insisted that he had spoken firmly to the was finally extinguished when, without telling the French Libyan leader on the subject of human rights. However, authorities, Qaddafi held a meeting at the United Nations assuming that the French president had betrayed him, Qaddafi

28 Christophe Schipoliansky, “Tents, Trumpets and Tantrums: Gaddafi’s Visit to Paris,” ABC News, December 12, 2007,https://abcnews.go.com/International/ story?id=3984020&page=1. 29 Francois Murphy and Kerstin Gehmlich, “Sarkozy Cuts Deals with Gaddafi,” Reuters, December 10, 2007,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-libya- idUSL1068990320071210. 30 Investigations et Enquêtes, Sarkozy-Kadhafi, 42:19. 31 Francois Murphy, “Gaddafi Accuses Europeans of Abusing Immigrants,” Reuters, December 11, 2007,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-libya- idUSL1153657420071211. 32 Arfi and Laske, Avec les compliments du guide, chap. 18.

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People wave Libyan flags during celebrations commemorating the tenth anniversary of the 2011 revolution in Tripoli on February 17, 2021. Source: Reuters/Hazem Ahmed. did not corroborate Sarkozy’s words, going so far as to deny exchanged between rebels and pro-Qaddafi forces. On that any such conversation even took place.33 The leaders February 22, Qaddafi took to the podium to deliver an angry were seen standing side-by-side “without even a glance at speech in which he called for an end to the uprising. The each other,” as their once promising relationship lay ruined.34 speech became infamous for its aggressive wording, furious threats, and call for the deaths of the “drugged protesters.”36 THE REVOLUTION On February 15, 2011, following the popular uprisings in Egypt Two days later, his French counterpart also took to the and Tunisia, the Libyan people of Benghazi took to the streets podium and became the first European leader to call for the to protest the arrest of the human rights lawyer Fethi Tarbel. fall of Qaddafi. On a trip to Turkey, Nicolas Sarkozy delivered The unpopularity of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s long reign, which a speech standing next to the Turkish leader in which he had been simmering for half a century, erupted into a full-blown proclaimed that “Mr. Qaddafi must leave.”37 On February 27, in rebellion within days. Protesting his long and oppressive rule, an address to his people, he stated that “in the face of what is “local revolts had snowballed into a revolution and become happening in Libya, the French have a duty to react.”38 While militarized” rapidly, as protesters increased their resistance Western countries considered ways to intervene, the French despite government forces moving in against them.35 The intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy was in Benghazi, meeting protests then took a bloody turn for the worse as fire was with the representatives of the rebel group, the heads of the

33 Murphy, “Gaddafi Accuses Europeans of Abusing Immigrants.” 34 Investigations et Enquêtes, Sarkozy-Kadhafi, 54:16. 35 Wolfram Lacher, Libya’s Fragmentation: Structure and Process in Violent Conflict (I.B. Tauris, 2020), 19. 36 SLOBoe, “Muammar Gaddafi Speech TRANSLATED,” video via YouTube, February 20, 2011,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69wBG6ULNzQ. 37 “Sarkozy juge que ‘Kadhafi doit partir,’”Le Point, February 25, 2011, https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/sarkozy- juge-que-kadhafi-doit-partir-25-02-2011-1299638_24. php. 38 Investigations et Enquêtes, Sarkozy-Kadhafi, 1:00:49.

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National Transitional Council (NTC) of Libya.39 He soon put the THE CIVIL WAR French president in contact with the heads of the NTC, who The NTC did not prove successful in its rule, and Islamist agreed to meet with them immediately. They flew to Paris and political groups and militias, along with tribal groups, soon met Sarkozy, who, after listening to them, publicly declared that took over the country. Violence in “both Tripoli and Benghazi they were now the official representatives of the Libyan cause amplified the rancor many Libyans felt for Islamist and and the Libyan people.40 revolutionary elites,” increasing fears that the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood would face a similar end as that of its counterpart Soon after, betrayed by Sarkozy and in a rage, Qaddafi in Egypt in 2013.45 The revolutionary elites thus set up new ordered the deployment of the military to the rebel enclaves, laws that would prevent officials from the Qaddafi era from an act that triggered decisive Western intervention. Sarkozy joining the government in any capacity for a number of years and United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister David Cameron, and fostered further fragmentation in the Libyan territory.46 working with American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, finally The Egyptian precedent nonetheless gave hope to General united their nations, and along with them the international Khalifa Haftar, a retired army general from the Qaddafi era community. United Nations Resolution 1973 was adopted on who was now exiled in the United States for his activities in March 11, 2011, supported by the Arab League and neighboring the Chadian war, of emulating the neighboring example in his states, “authorizing ‘all necessary measures’ short of foreign own country. occupation to protect civilians.”41 On March 19, the so-called Coalition of the Willing, spearheaded by France, the UK, and Since May 2014, Haftar, with the support of the United Arab the United States, began its airstrikes.42 The operation taken Emirates (UAE), France, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, has launched up by NATO soon after became the first official “Responsibility a series of attacks under the name of the Libyan National Army to Protect” action.43 Operation Unified Protector lasted about (LNA), leading to a takeover of the eastern parts of Libya.47 eight months and succeeded in toppling Qaddafi, leaving the His presence has polarized Libya and turned the previously country in the hands of its people. fragmented region into a largely east-versus-west contest, with the southern region aligned with either side depending The French role in the intervention was pivotal and, following on the tribes. Haftar’s campaign has thus far relied on a stance the brutal and bloody end of Qaddafi and his government, of anti-political Islam that leaves very little room for nuances Sarkozy went on his third trip to Tripoli. In the capital, he and opposing ideologies. Since 2014, his army and support announced the success of the revolution and the intervention. base have expanded with the help of outside actors. His He congratulated the Libyan people, and told the world that in advances in Cyrenaica have also secured him oil terminals and the twenty-first century “there will not be one place for [dictators] a headquarters and parliament in Benghazi.48 where they can remain certain of their impunity.”44 This was not, however, the end of the conflict. The Libyan revolution did not In 2016, the United Nations instated an internationally lead to a happy ending for the nation, but was instead the start recognized government under the name of the Government of a conflict that has continued to the present day. of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. After coming to power, the

39 Joshua Keating, “Libyan Intervention: Brought to You by Bernard-Henri Levy?” Foreign Policy (blog), March 28, 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/28/libyan- intervention-brought-to-you-by-bernard-henri-levy/. 40 Ibid. 41 Kjell Engelbrekt, Marcus Mohlin, and Charlotte Wagnsson, eds., The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign (London: Routledge, 2015), xvi. 42 Ibid., 22. 43 Ibid., 6. 44 Investigations et Enquêtes, Sarkozy-Kadhafi, 1:12:52. 45 Jalel Harchaoui and Mohamed-Essaïd Lazib, “Proxy War Dynamics in Libya” (Blacksburg, VA: Virginia Tech Publishing, July 23, 2019), 5. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., 4. 48 Lacher, Libya’s Fragmentation, 37.

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GNA had a number of militias to contend with. It was only with the help of militias native to Tripoli that they were able to secure their presence and push “out of the capital armed groups from other cities and armed groups associated with Political Islam.”49 The officials of the GNA have so far been working under the auspices of the surrounding militias with very little political influence in the region.

The division in the country, the fragmented militias, and the clashes between the LNA and the GNA have instigated many conflicts over the years—in addition to causing the forced displacement of people, the deaths of thousands, and the establishment of criminal rings of various kinds. The country has also become a fertile ground for proxy wars in which the proxies themselves are unreliable and often change camps unexpectedly.50 Several countries now have a stake in the ongoing civil war, with different French President Emmanuel Macron shakes hands with Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj at a press conference after the states supporting opposing sides and militias. international conference on Libya at the Elysee Palace in Paris on May 29, 2018. Source: Reuters The UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, Turkey, Qatar, Russia, Italy, and the United States are all involved in one way or another, supporting and jeopardizing different camps and in LNA camp, and has an active role in prolonging the conflict and many ways extending the conflict.51 Despite the embargo by working to instate Haftar as head of state.54 the United Nations, arms continue to circulate throughout the country. Furthermore, following Haftar’s unsuccessful and ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION miscalculated attack on Tripoli in 2019, he suffered a number of Some see the international intervention in Libya as a “just losses in what was until then a relatively successful move to the war”—that is to say a war in which the responsibility to protect West. His attack also exacerbated the situation as the Islamist was imperative. It has been continuously hailed as NATO’s militias that had been drawn out of Tripoli gained footing and most successful intervention, and remains an example of Turkey officially joined the conflict.52 successful international military cooperation. Many have wondered why France took such a leading role from the start, The conflict is ongoing, with the French government that initiated and why it continues to take part in the conflict. It has been the NATO intervention now supporting the Haftar camp and the called everything from “Sarkozy’s war” to a moral obligation, LNA. President Emmanuel Macron has hosted both Fayez Sarraj an economic venture, and an effort to curb cross-border crime of the GNA and General Haftar in Paris, further legitimizing the and terrorism.55 latter in an international context.53 Macron’s support for Haftar has generated countless questions. Yet France continues to Shortly before his bloody death, Qaddafi gave an interview in work diplomatically by providing advice and “training” to the which, in his usual mannerisms, he expressed his bewilderment

49 Harchaoui and Lazib, “Proxy War Dynamics in Libya,” 4. 50 Ibid., 13. 51 For detailed information on the parties involved in the conflict, the author highly recommends reading “Proxy War Dynamics in Libya” by Jalel Harchaoui and Mohamed-Essaid Lazib. 52 Sputnik France, “Guerre en Libye: ‘La France est clairement pro-Haftar, il n’y a pas de double jeu,’” video via YouTube, 13:41, June 17, 2020, https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=eVgne9Wr74w; “Libya Conflict: Turkey Sends Troops to Shore up UN-Backed Government,” BBC News, January 6, 2020, sec. Africa.https://www. bbc.com/news/world-africa-51003034. 53 Jihâd Gillon, “France-Libya: Marshal Haftar, the Controversial Friend of the Élysée,” The Africa Report, March 20, 2020, https://www.theafricareport.com/24823/ france-libya-marshal-haftar-the-controversial- friend-of-the-elysee/. 54 Nathalie Guibert, “La guerre secrète de la France en Libye,” Le Monde, February 24, 2016, https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2016/02/24/la-guerre- secrete-de-la-france-en- libye_4870603_3210.html. 55 Madelene Lindström and Kristina Zetterlund, Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya: Decisions Made and Their Implications for the EU and NATO (Stockholm: Department of Defence Analysis, Swedish Defence Research Agency [FOI], 2012), 20-24.

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at the French president’s stance, particularly since “it was me particularly along the borders of neighboring Niger and who got him to power.”56 This interview served as a catalyst Chad, affects France’s counterterrorism efforts in those for a prolonged investigation in which the former French regions. France has a long-vested interest in its former president was accused of corruption and implicated in a case colonies and continues to be an active presence within before French courts.57 It also fed accusations that the French them, with boots on the ground in ongoing attempts to intervention in Libya and the peculiarly fervent interest in the combat Islamist terrorism in western Africa.59 The situation in region were fuelled by a personal vendetta. Libya, the illicit trade routes for arms and human trafficking, the tribal conflicts such as the 2014 Ubari war, and the 2019 flooding in Ghat have all had ripple effects on the conflict in Put differently, France has Niger, and by extension in Mali and the neighboring states.60 As such, French interest in political affairs in the north is abandoned the idea of applying understandable, as the instability in the north certainly fuels liberal democracy in Libya and that in the south. has opted for supporting an Moreover, France has faced numerous Islamist terrorist attacks, notably in 2015 when the Islamic State of Iraq autocracy or even a dictatorship and al-Sham (ISIS) was at the height of its power. It also happened to be the time during which it had considerable if it could stabilize the region. influence and territories in Libya.61 Haftar, his army, the tribal leader, and the militias who support him had a considerable role in pushing ISIS out of Cyrenaica and taking over its While these accusations may be well founded, especially since strongholds.62 Haftar’s anti-political Islam stance has thus a number of investigations have testified to the likelihood that found a considerable echo in many other countries including corrupt Libyan funds were influential for Sarkozy, they endorse France, where the fight against political Islam and extremism a perspective that oversimplifies a complex situation. Sarkozy is ongoing. was going into an election year with dwindling popularity and he had come under fire when his minister of foreign affairs, France has also had a history of using neighboring countries Michele Alliot-Marie, offered to give the Tunisian president help or other Arab states in its involvement in Libya. Much like in suppressing the protests.58 His reaction to both the Tunisian d’Estaing in the previous century, Hollande and Macron have and Egyptian situations was controversial, and Libya may have taken advantage of the experiences and stances of Arab offered a chance at redemption. Reacting to the Libyan protests states in determining their own views. Strong ties with Egypt so ardently, especially in light of his former friendship with the and the UAE, a nation with an adamant and powerful stance colonel, was a chance to redeem France and his government, against political Islam, have greatly influenced the French and establish him as the human rights president once and for all. position in the conflict. Put differently, France has abandoned the idea of applying liberal democracy in Libya and has opted That said, France has always had a vested interest in the for supporting an autocracy or even a dictatorship if it could southern regions of Libya, as what occurs in the Fezzan, stabilize the region.63

56 Arfi and Laske, Avec les compliments du guide, chap. 25. 57 Investigative journalists from Médiapart launched a long investigation with the book Avec les compliments du guide by Fabrice Arfi and Karl Laske as the end product of their research. The investigation by the team at Médiapart instigated a prolonged government investigation over these allegations. “Nicolas Sarkozy à nouveau entendu dans l’enquête sur le financement libyen de sa campagne de 2007,”Le Monde, October 6, 2020, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/ article/2020/10/06/soupcons-de-financement-libyen- sarkozy-a-nouveau-entendu-par-la-justice_6054980_3224.html. 58 Samuel Laurent, “Voyage en Tunisie: La défense de Michèle Alliot-Marie s’effondre,”Le Monde, February 16, 2011, https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/ article/2011/02/16/voyage-en-tunisie-la-defense-de-michele-alliot-marie-s- effondre_1480787_823448.html. 59 Cyril Bensimon, “Au Sahel, deux guerres qui n’en font qu’une,” Le Monde, June 13, 2020, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/06/13/au-sahel-deux- guerres-qui-n-en-font-qu- une_6042729_3212.html. 60 Molenaar et al., “The Status Quo Defied,” 119, 135. 61 Farouk Chothia, “Islamic State Gains Libya Foothold,” BBC News, February 24, 2015, sec. Africa, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31518698. 62 Jalel Harchaoui, “La Libye depuis 2015: Entre morcellement et interférences,” Politique étrangère Hiver, no. 4 (December 4, 2018): 140. 63 Jalel Harchaoui, “AJ Balkans: The Situation in Libya and the Role Played by Arab and EU States,” video via YouTube, February 22, 2020, https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=x3Pglm1t00s.

9 ATLANTIC COUNCIL ISSUE BRIEF BEYOND THE WAR: THE HISTORY OF FRENCH-LIBYAN RELATIONS

Both the UAE and Egypt have a vested interest in ending the ABOUT THE AUTHOR Libyan conflict and the Egyptian example serves as a prototype Farah Rasmi is a non-resident researcher at Badr University for what may yet take place in Libya. French support for these in Cairo’s Center for Global Affairs and an editor at Arab Media two nations that have been fighting their own wars against & Society Journal at the American University in Cairo. She terrorism thus helps in advancing its own efforts in western graduated with a Master of Arts in European and Russian Affairs Africa, as well as in securing its own Mediterranean border. from the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs While Haftar himself is a questionable ally, one with his own and Public Policy. Rasmi has extensive research experience and agenda and a thirst for power, he appears the best option for previously interned at the United Nations High Commissioner the countries implicated in the conflict. for Refugees in West Africa, worked as a Research Assistant at the University of Toronto, and at the Political Capital Institute in For France, security, diplomacy, and subjective, personal Hungary. Her research focuses on European affairs as well as relations have all played roles in the conflict. Sarkozy remains the impact of political violence on civilian populations, namely under scrutiny and before the courts thanks to Qaddafi’s the study of extremism and radicalism. parting words. Emmanuel Macron has taken a clear stance on his foreign policy intentions, specifically with regard to Islamist ACKNOWLEDGMENT threats and extremism within France and beyond.64 In Libya, The author would like to acknowledge the contribution of the civil war continues, with many militias getting comfortable Katharine Petty as editor on this publication. in the country’s continuous state of anarchy and destruction, and the proxy wars remain as questionable as ever. The only losing party remains the citizens who had a dream of creating a better future for themselves.

64 Alexandre Lemarié and Olivier Faye, “Emmanuel Macron présente son plan contre ‘le séparatisme islamiste,’” Le Monde, October 2, 2020, https://www.lemonde. fr/politique/article/2020/10/02/emmanuel-macron- presente-son-plan-contre-le-separatisme-islamiste_6054517_823448.html.

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