REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AVIATION SECURITY AND TERRORISM "... a comprehensive study and appraisal of practices and policy options with respect to preventing terrorist acts involving aviation." Executive Order 12686 August 4, 1989 Report to the President By The PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION on Aviation Security and Terrorism May 15, 1990 Washington, D.C. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AVIATION CHAIRMAN SECURITY AND TERRORISM Ann McLaughlin 1825 K Street N.W., Suite 519 MEMBERS Washington, D.C. 20036 Sen. Frank R. Lautenberg (202) 254-3166 (D-NJ) Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-NY) Rep. James L. Oberstar (D-MN) Rep. John P. Hammerschmidt (R-AR) Mr. Edward Hidalgo Gen. Thomas C. Richards USAF (Ret.) May 15, 1990 Dear Mr. President: I am privileged to present the report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. Since the Commission began it work in November 1989, we have evaluated the existing aviation security system, options for handling terrorist threats and the treatment of families of victims of terrorist acts. The Commission interpreted your charge as requiring an independent and comprehensive review of these matters using the Pan Am 103 tragedy as a point of reference. This report presents a series of recommendations designed both to improve aviation security and the ability of the government to respond to a Pan Am 103. The nation must also act to deter and prevent the use of terrorism against civil aviation as a deadly tool of political policy. The Pan Am experience demands nothing less. The unyielding determination of the families of the victims of Pan Am 103, who sought this inquiry, provided the energy for our work. The sensitive and caring response of the people of Lockerbie, Scotland provided the passion. We trust this report reflects their determination and passion. We are confident that its recommendations can enhance the security of the traveling public. For this is surely our first and highest responsibility. Sincerely, /s/ Ann McLaughlin Chairman The President of the United States The White House Washington, D.C. 20500 In compliance with the Executive Order 12686 of August 4, 1989 the undersigned present the report of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. /s/ Honorable Ann McLaughlin Chairman, District of Columbia /s/ Honorable Alfonse M. D'Amato Member, New York /s/ Honorable John Paul Hammerschmidt Member, New York /s/ Honorable Edward Hidalgo Member, Virginia /s/ Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg Member, New Jersey /s/ Honorable James L. Oberstar Member, Minnesota /s/ General Thomas C. Richards, USAF (Ret.) Member, Texas TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 Pan Am Flight 103 Chapter 3 The Aviation Security System Chapter 4 Research and Development Chapter 5 Intelligence Chapter 6 Aviation Threat Notification - A National Standard Chapter 7 Treatment of the Families of Victims of Terrorism Chapter 8 National Will Final Thoughts Recommendations Commission Members Commission Staff Appendix A The Victims of Pan Am Flight 103 Appendix B Witnesses, Selected Interviews and Resources Appendix C Executive Orders Appendix D Review of Statistical Data with Respect to Pan American Flight 103 on December 21, 1988 Appendix E Acts of Aviation Sabotage Appendix F International Civil Aviation Organization Appendix G Organizational Charts Appendix H Selected Aviation Security Initiatives by the Department of Transportation Executive Summary National will and the moral courage to exercise it are the ultimate means for defeating terrorism. The President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism recommends a more vigorous U.S. policy that not only pursues and punishes terrorists but also makes state sponsors of terrorism pay a price for their actions. With other nations of the free world, the United States must work to isolate politically, diplomatically and militarily the handful of outlaw nations sponsoring terrorism. These more vigorous policies should include planning and training for preemptive or retaliatory military strides against known terrorist enclaves in nations that harbor them. Where such direct strikes are inappropriate, the Commission recommends a lesser option, including covert operations, to prevent, disrupt or respond to terrorist acts. Rhetoric is no substitute for strong, effective action. The Commission's inquiry also finds that the U.S. civil aviation security system is seriously flawed and has failed to provide the proper level of protection for the traveling public. This system needs major reform. The Commission found the Federal Aviation Administration to be a reactive agency - preoccupied with responses to events to the exclusion of adequate contingency planning in anticipation of future threats. The Commission recommends actions designed to change this focus at the FAA. Pan Am's apparent security lapses and FAA's failure to enforce its own regulations followed a pattern that existed for months prior to Flight 103, during the day of the tragedy, and -notably - for nine months thereafter. These are the major findings and conclusions of the Commission, which began its work in mid-November of 1989 and reports to the President on May 15, 1990. The destruction of Pan American World Airways Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988, was the reference point for the mission of this Commission. Pursuit of the full story of Flight 103 led the Commission also to a series of conclusions on counterterrorism policy in general, as detailed in the section on National Will at the end of the main body of this Report. The Commission also conducted a thorough examination of certain civil aviation security requirements, policies and procedures surrounding Flight 103. It is a disturbing story. The destruction of Flight 103 may well have been preventable. Stricter baggage reconciliation procedures could have stopped any unaccompanied checked bags from boarding the flight at Frankfurt. Requiring that all baggage containers be fully secured would have prevented any tampering that may have occurred with baggage left in a partially filled, unguarded baggage container that was later loaded on the flight at Heathrow. Stricter application of passenger screening procedures would have increased the likelihood of intercepting any unknowing "dupe" or saboteur from checking a bomb into the plane at either airport. The international criminal investigation has not yet determined precisely how the device was loaded onto the plane. Until that occurs and subject to the conclusions reached, the Commission cannot say with certainty that more rigid application of any particular procedure actually would have stopped the sabotage of the flight. This Report contains more than 60 detailed recommendations designed to improve the civil aviation security system to deter and prevent terrorist attacks. Before new laws are passed and more regulations are promulgated, existing ones must be fully enforced and properly carried out. The Commission emphasizes that no amount of governmental reorganization or technological developments can ever replace the need for well-trained, highly motivated people to make the security system work. The Commission salutes the thousands of men and women in the public and private sectors of the U.S. civil aviation security system. The recommendations in this report are designed to help them perform their jobs more effectively. The Commission urges management to face up to the security system failures disclosed by this investigation. A few facts can be stated with certainty about Pan Am 103. A terrorist element did succeed in having a bomb placed aboard the aircraft. That bomb blew the aircraft apart at 31,000 feet over Lockerbie, killing 259 persons on the airplane and 11 on the ground. The criminal investigation has indicated that the bomb was placed in a radio cassette player and packed in a suitcase loaded into the plane's baggage hold. The Commission, therefore, was able to concentrate its investigation on security procedures for checked baggage. Authorities also believe that the bomb was made of a very small quantity of semtex. a plastic explosive, and that it probably was placed aboard at Frankfurt, West Germany, where the flight began. At the end of an October 1988 inspection of Pan Am's security operations at Frankfurt, the FAA inspector was troubled by the lack of a tracking system for interline bags transferring from other airlines and the confused state of passenger screening procedures. Overall, the inspector wrote, "the system, trying adequately to control approximately 4,500 passengers and 28 flights per day, is being held together only by a very labor intensive operation and the tenuous threads of luck." Even so, the inspector concluded, "it appears the minimum [FAA] requirements can and are being met." Passenger/baggage reconciliation is the bedrock of any heightened civil air security system. Under current FAA requirements for international flights, implemented since Pan Am 103, every bag carried on an aircraft must belong to someone who is also on that flight. A key focus of the Commission's inquiry was the FAA written regulation in effect in December 1988 that unaccompanied baggage should be carried only if it was physically searched. When Pan Am Flight 103 pushed away from the gate at Frankfurt and again at Heathrow, on December 21, 1988, no one knew whether the plane was carrying an "extra" interline bag that had been checked through to Pan Am from another airline. Months before Pan Am stopped reconciling or searching interline baggage and began simply X-raying this luggage. Records examined by this Commission indicate that Pan Am Flight 103 might have carried one such interline bag that did not belong to a passenger on the flight. While this extra bag would have been X-rayed, the explosive semtex cannot be reliably detected by X-ray used at airports. Pan Am officials told the Commission that the FAA Director of Aviation Security had given the airline verbal approval to X-ray interline bags rather than searching or reconciling them with passengers.