Terrorist Threats to International Civil Aviation Submitted By

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Terrorist Threats to International Civil Aviation Submitted By Committee: Security Council Issue title: Terrorist Threats to International Civil Aviation Submitted by: Arife Yesilöz, President of SC Edited by: Kamilla Tóth, President of the General Assembly Introduction Although terrorism is a phenomenon deeply rooted in history, aviation terrorism is considerably new as it is associated with the fast-paced expansion of civil aviation in the second half of the twentieth century. From the outbreak of the jet age, terrorists have tried, tested and enhanced numerous techniques for attacking civil aviation. They inaugurated a wave of aviation terrorism with a course of aircraft hijackings in the 1960s, instigated a long period of airport and ground attacks in the 1970s, introduced a short but fatal mid-air sabotaging cycle in the 1980s, and initiated a phase of suicide missions in the 1990s, which culminated in the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks that massacred thousands of people with hijacked aircraft.1 Thereafter, the 9/11 attacks stiffened the will of the United Nations (UN) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Member States to combat aviation terrorism and to establish more efficient aviation security.2 For more than 50 years, the ICAO - with the help of other organizations - has promoted the establishment of the legal and regulatory framework (LRF) to stop the wave of criminal and terrorist assaults against aviation. Regardless of advances in security screening technology and the deployment of significant human and commercial resources over the years, the civil aviation sector still remains exposed to terrorist attacks. It is also important to include, that prevailing these threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as national levels.3 Definition of Key Terms Aircraft Hijacking: The unlawful act of seizure or the wrongful exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force or violence, or by any other form of intimidation, and with wrongful intent, of any aircraft. Aircraft Suicide Mission: An attack when an individual or a group of individuals intentionally commit suicide to destroy an aircraft or an aviation installation, with the objective of killing people. Aviation: The design, development, production, operation, and use of aircraft, especially heavier- than-air aircraft. Aviation Terrorism: Aviation terrorism is a political act against civil aviation carried out by non-state actors who systematically target civilians and intentionally use violence in order to create terror and coerce authorities, at times, by making demands. Cyber terrorism: Deliberately attacking or threatening targets by means of utilizing the internet as a common conduit by which computers and smart phones are intimately connected. GACID: Global Aviation Criminal Incidents Database Jet Age: A period in the history of aviation defined by the advent of aircraft powered by turbine engines, and by the social change this brought about. MO: Modus Operandi (Method of Operating). Sabotage: The deliberate destruction or damage of property and is typically carried out for military or political objectives. General Overview Despite the fact that the emergence of aviation brought great assistance to the independent and increasing movement of people and goods, it also generated several unanticipated issues. Aviation was originally developed on an extensive scale in a military context, however their military benefits were short-lived, as every nation eventually acquired its own air force. Civil aviation was subjected to similarly rapid improvements. In just over one hundred years, aviation has gone from tiny prototype airplanes to full-scale aircraft carrying approximately three billion passengers per year, generating a business activity estimated to US$ 2.4 trillion.4 Such data show that civil aviation has granted an unprecedented level of mobility, facilitating travel to the most remote territories within hours rather than months. However, this greater mobility displays a weakness. An aircraft is a compact vehicle filled with a lot of people, making it alarmingly susceptible to becoming a target of interest for terrorists. In these circumstances, managing such a fragile industry is a complex operation in which three main types of actors play a crucial role: (1) sovereign states, whose laws and regulations lay the foundations for the industry; (2) intergovernmental organizations (e.g., ICAO), administered by sovereign states to fulfill particular assignments in the development of civil aviation; and (3) airline organizations, such as the International Air Transport Association (IATA), which is the trade association for the world’s airlines.5 The history of terrorist attacks against civil aviation can be divided into three fundamental stages: 1931-1967, 1968-2002, and 2003-2011. The long terrorist campaign that began in 1968 started declining in 2003. From then on, the number of attacks remained below the mean level of 13 attacks per year. In fact, only 46 attacks were committed between 2003 and 2011 (an average of 5 attacks per year), the majority of them being ground attacks. (See Annex) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ The next segment will cover the main reasons why airport and aircraft attacks are ideal for terrorists and other criminals.䈊 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- • Air carriers are national symbols National airlines are remarkably visible symbols of a country, as are great corporations with brand names; these are, statistically, the two most cherished targets of terrorists.6 Aviation terrorism is an optimal way to embarrass the targeted nations, and to attack their national pride, which helps them to coerce the state authorities into conceding to specific demands. • Powerful economic consequences In addition to the loss of life and damage to the aircraft, an attack on aviation can have both direct and indirect fall-out effects on other industries and their economies as well. The 9/11 attacks embody the best modern example of the large-scale economic desolation succeeding terrorist attacks against civil aviation. The full cost of losses after the attack was an estimated $ 200 billion, not counting the costs of the psycho-economical domino effect that the physical destruction triggered worldwide.7 Turmoil in the transportation system following the attacks concluded in significant revenue losses not only for air carriers but also for several industries, most notably tourism. • High lethal potential In contrast to trains or ships, aircrafts are compact and maintain perfectly enclosed environments, resulting in extremely credible threats of destruction by crash or explosions that are feasible to cause large-scale casualties.8 In fact, having a large number of people concentrated in a relatively limited area, whether in the vehicle itself or in an airport terminal, is a sure way for a small group of terrorists to simply seize control over the environment they choose to attack. Acts of mid-air sabotage have justified to be especially lethal, considering that merely five attacks were accountable for 992 deaths (70 percent of all deaths associated with sabotage). These five acts of sabotage are: 䈊 䈊 (1) Gulf Air 771 on 23 September 1983 (112 killed), (2) Air India Flight 182 on 23 June 1985 (329 killed), 䈊 (3) Pan Am Flight 103 on 21 December 1988 (270 killed), 䈊 (4) UTA Flight 772 on 19 September 1989 (171 killed), and 䈊 (5) Avianca Flight 203 on 27 November 1989 (110 killed) (see Annex). 䈊 Terrorists take benefit from the fact that, once airborne, an aircraft becomes a place where passengers and crew members are without appropriate security. Moreover, since civil aviation brings together people from an extensive variety of different nationalities onboard an aircraft or airport, this has the supplementary benefit of formally impacting a great number of various governments. • The hesitation of authorities to confront terrorists Many terrorist groups have taken advantage of the hesitancy of certain governmental authorities to either engage them or to order a rescue operation to put an end to a terrorist attack. The hijacking of Egypt Air Flight 648 to Malta on 23 November 1985 was a stark notice of harsh prices paid by authorities when showing reluctance to abide quickly by terrorist demands. During a 20-hour long negotiation with the Maltese government six people were shot and thrown onto the runway by the hijackers to demonstrate their unyielding determination.9 This tragedy showed that, if not managed, a terrorist crisis can create havoc and shake the trust citizens have in their government. Arguing an exception to Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations allowing military intervention within the territorial integrity of another state, Israel made the decision to launch a military action to rescue hostages held at the Entebbe, Uganda airport on 4 July 1976. The Israeli intervention team rescued 106 passengers and the crew taken hostage during the hijacking of Air France Flight 139 a week before (27 June 1976).10 • Media exposure In the first part of the wave of aviation terrorism in the late 1960s, terrorists were confident that attacks against civil aviation did more than just create devastation—it also intrigued a lot of media attention to their cause. This vicious cycle of perpetrating more attacks to gain more media coverage escalated. Garnering attention and publicity is presented to be useful for the
Recommended publications
  • Strategies and Skills for Revitalizing Aviation March 31, 2003
    York College City University of New York CUNY Aviation Institute at York College Inaugural Conference: Strategies and Skills for Revitalizing Aviation March 31, 2003 Conference Proceedings N I N O S T I I T T A U I T V E A Y N E U G C E L L Y O O R K C Proceedings published by : CUNY Aviation Institute at York College York College CUNY 94-20 Guy R. Brewer Blvd • Jamaica NewYork 11451 718-262-2353 (p) 718-262-2352 (f) [email protected] • www.york.cuny.edu/aviation Conference Proceedings Strategies and Skills for Revitalizing Aviation March 31, 2003 N I N O S T I I T T A U I T V E A Y N E U G C E L L Y O O R K C Prepared by: Eric Tyrer CUNY Aviation Institute at York College Isabella Pierson NYU Wagner Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and Management Graphic design assistance: Joseph LoPinto York College - Publications ®2003 CUNY Aviation Institute at York College All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, me- chanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without prior permission of the publisher. The following papers have been reproduced by permission and are copyright- ed to their respective authors. AVIATION SECURITY: PROMISE OR REALITY? by Dr. Joseph Szyliowicz ®2003 THE CYCLICAL CRISIS IN COMMERCIAL AVIATION: CAUSES & POTENTIAL CURES Copyright © 2003 by Paul Stephen Dempsey The CUNY Aviation Institute at York College wishes to acknowledge the following organizations for their genoriosty.
    [Show full text]
  • Universidade Do Sul De Santa Catarina Diego Oliveira Marques De Araujo
    1 UNIVERSIDADE DO SUL DE SANTA CATARINA DIEGO OLIVEIRA MARQUES DE ARAUJO ESPIÕES E AVIÕES – UM VOO DE RECONHECIMENTO SOBRE A ATIVIDADE DE INTELIGÊNCIA A SERVIÇO DA AVIAÇÃO CIVIL BRASILEIRA Rio de Janeiro 2020 2 DIEGO OLIVEIRA MARQUES DE ARAUJO ESPIÕES E AVIÕES – UM VOO DE RECONHECIMENTO SOBRE A ATIVIDADE DE INTELIGÊNCIA A SERVIÇO DA AVIAÇÃO CIVIL BRASILEIRA Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso apresentado ao Curso de Especialização em Inteligência de Segurança da Universidade do Sul de Santa Catarina como requisito parcial à obtenção do título de Especialista em Inteligência de Segurança. Orientador: José Luiz Gonçalves da Silveira, Dr. Rio de Janeiro 2020 3 DIEGO OLIVEIRA MARQUES DE ARAUJO ESPIÕES E AVIÕES – UM VOO DE RECONHECIMENTO SOBRE A ATIVIDADE DE INTELIGÊNCIA A SERVIÇO DA AVIAÇÃO CIVIL BRASILEIRA Este Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso foi julgado adequado à obtenção do título de Especialista em Inteligência de Segurança e aprovado em sua forma final pelo Curso de Especialização em Inteligência de Segurança da Universidade do Sul de Santa Catarina. Rio de Janeiro, 22 de abril de 2020. ______________________________________________________ Professor e orientador José Luiz Gonçalves da Silveira, Dr. Universidade do Sul de Santa Catarina ______________________________________________________ Prof. Camel André de Godoy Farah, Dr. Universidade do Sul de Santa Catarina 4 Este trabalho é dedicado a todas as vítimas, in memoriam, e familiares de vítimas de atentados terroristas contra a aviação civil pelo mundo, em especial aos mais de 3 mil órfãos
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Department of State, 1991 Patterns of Global Terrorism
    Terrorism Resources Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991 Office of the Secretary of State Office of the Coordiantor for Couterterrorism Released April 1991 Table of Contents Introduction The Year in Review Africa Overview Asia Overview Western European Overview Latin America Overview Middle East Overview Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism Appendix A: Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1991 Appendix B: Background Information on Terrorist Groups Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991 The Year in Review The number of international terrorist incidents rose in 1991 as a result of the Persian Gulf war, when terrorists in many regions of the world attacked targets belonging to the international coalition opposed to Saddam Hussein. Most of these were minor incidents, resulting only in property damage. War-related attacks brought the total number of international terrorist incidents in 1991 to 557, up from 456 in 1990. Fully half of the incidents in 1991 occurred during January and February, while Operation Desert Storm was under way. After the war, however, the number of terrorist incidents dropped sharply and actually fell below 1990 levels. Several events in 1991 revealed the threat and extent of state-sponsored terrorism, particularly as practiced by Iraq, Libya, and Iran. In the months following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Iraq issued repeated exhortations to terrorists to strike at coalition targets worldwide. Terrorists of many stripes embraced Saddam Hussein and publicly vowed to launch attacks in the event of war. During Operation Desert Storm, we recorded 275 terrorist incidents. Most of these attacks, however, were sporadic, uncoordinated, and low-level incidents. Only a small percentage resulted in deaths, significant injuries, or property damage.
    [Show full text]
  • US Courts Orders Libya To
    US court orders Libya to pay $6bn A US court has ordered Libya and six Libyan officials to pay more than $6bn (£3bn) in damages over the bombing of a French aircraft over Niger in 1989. The award is payable to relatives of the seven US victims aboard UTA Flight 772, and the aircraft's American owner. Libya has already agreed to pay $1m compensation to the relatives of each of the 170 people on board the flight - but has denied any link to the bombing. It paid compensation over a similar attack over Lockerbie in Scotland. This award proves that the rule of law will always prevail over state- sponsored terrorism Stewart Newberger, victims' lawyer Lawyers for the US victims of UTA 772 say Libya has until 25 February to decide whether to appeal against the order. The huge award is made against Libya and six named officials. It represents: • the value of the aircraft • compensation for the pain and suffering of the victims • compensation for the pain and suffering of the victims' families • money the victims would have earned if they had lived • interest backdated to the day of the bombing. Under American law, awards against individuals, though not the Libyan state, are tripled because it is a terrorism case. "This award proves that the rule of law will always prevail over state-sponsored terrorism," said Stuart Newberger, a lawyer for the victims' families. The seven US victims included Bonnie Pugh, whose husband Robert was then the US ambassador to Chad. Sanctions lifted The Lockerbie compensation deal was part of a package negotiated in secret for months.
    [Show full text]
  • Fields Listed in Part I. Group (8)
    Chile Group (1) All fields listed in part I. Group (2) 28. Recognized Medical Specializations (including, but not limited to: Anesthesiology, AUdiology, Cardiography, Cardiology, Dermatology, Embryology, Epidemiology, Forensic Medicine, Gastroenterology, Hematology, Immunology, Internal Medicine, Neurological Surgery, Obstetrics and Gynecology, Oncology, Ophthalmology, Orthopedic Surgery, Otolaryngology, Pathology, Pediatrics, Pharmacology and Pharmaceutics, Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, Physiology, Plastic Surgery, Preventive Medicine, Proctology, Psychiatry and Neurology, Radiology, Speech Pathology, Sports Medicine, Surgery, Thoracic Surgery, Toxicology, Urology and Virology) 2C. Veterinary Medicine 2D. Emergency Medicine 2E. Nuclear Medicine 2F. Geriatrics 2G. Nursing (including, but not limited to registered nurses, practical nurses, physician's receptionists and medical records clerks) 21. Dentistry 2M. Medical Cybernetics 2N. All Therapies, Prosthetics and Healing (except Medicine, Osteopathy or Osteopathic Medicine, Nursing, Dentistry, Chiropractic and Optometry) 20. Medical Statistics and Documentation 2P. Cancer Research 20. Medical Photography 2R. Environmental Health Group (3) All fields listed in part I. Group (4) All fields listed in part I. Group (5) All fields listed in part I. Group (6) 6A. Sociology (except Economics and including Criminology) 68. Psychology (including, but not limited to Child Psychology, Psychometrics and Psychobiology) 6C. History (including Art History) 60. Philosophy (including Humanities)
    [Show full text]
  • The Case of Jhon Jairo Velasquez Vasquez – El Popeye
    DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY Narcoculture in Colombian Media: The Case of Jhon Jairo Velasquez Vasquez – El Popeye Katarina Milosevic Thesis submitted as partial requirement for the conferral of Master in International Studies Thesis Advisor: Marcelo Moriconi - Integrated Researcher CEI-IUL - Centre for International Studies (ESPP) - Professor Auxiliar Convidado ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa 2018 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS To my advisor Marcelo Moriconi, my parents and Christopher Wade Rosario. 2 ABSTRACT Jhon Jairo Velasquez Vasquez alias el Popeye, an ex-sicario and the last remaining member of the Medellin cartel, has been chosen as the object of study and he launched his own narconovela Alias JJ – Sobreviviendo a Pablo Escobar (2017), which became popular in Colombia and across the world and is analyzed in this research to determine how narcoculture ideals are spread by Popeye to wider audiences. The purpose of this research is to determine how Jhon Jairo, as a narco-figure, fits into the concept of narcoculture in Colombian media and whether he, as a figure, is the cause or the result of narcoculture, or both. Through the research and data gathered from academic works, polls, documentaries, narconovelas and interviews, El Popeye’s popularity is analyzed in order to determine why icons of narcoculture like himself are being followed and admired by large audiences in Colombia. It was concluded that although Jhon Jairo is a medium of narcoculture and uses media attention to spread his ideals, he is not the only to blame as without support, interest and fascination from the audiences, his narcoculture ideals would not gain any media attention.
    [Show full text]
  • Libya? Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A
    Who “Won” Libya? Who “Won” Libya? Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Whytock Implications for Theory and Policy Having promoted glo- bal radicalism and regional rejectionism, engaged in terrorism, and pursued weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for years, Libya has shifted away from its “rogue state” policies, most especially by settling the Pan Am 103 Lockerbie terrorism case and by abandoning its programs for the development of nu- clear, chemical, and biological weapons.1 The key policy changes started in 1999, when Libya surrendered two Lockerbie suspects for trial in The Hague, and culminated in 2003 with the settlement of the Lockerbie case that August and particularly Libya’s December 19 announcement that it had agreed to abandon its WMD programs and allow international inspections. The debate over who deserves credit for these important changes in Libyan policy is a lively one politically and a challenging one analytically.2 Among the questions that analysts have sought to answer are: To what extent was Libyan leader Muammar Qaddaª intimidated by the George W. Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq and the broader Bush doctrine of preemptive force? How important was diplomacy, especially the secret talks between Libya and the United States that started late in Bill Clinton’s administration and contin- ued into the Bush administration, with the British playing a signiªcant role? What other factors, including Libya’s internal politics and economy, came into play? And what are the lessons for dealing with other terrorism-supporting, WMD-seeking, and otherwise aggressive states? Positions in this debate have been sharply staked out.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Council Provisional Fifty-Third Year
    United Nations S/PV.3864 Security Council Provisional Fifty-third Year 3864th Meeting Friday, 20 March 1998, 10.30 a.m. New York President: Mr. Sedat Jobe .................................... (Gambia) Members: Bahrain ......................................... Mr.Buallay Brazil .......................................... Mr.Amorim China .......................................... Mr.QinHuasun Costa Rica ....................................... Mr.Berrocal Soto France .......................................... Mr.Dejammet Gabon .......................................... Mr.Dangue Réwaka Japan .......................................... Mr.Owada Kenya .......................................... Mr.Mahugu Portugal ........................................ Mr.Monteiro Russian Federation ................................. Mr.Lavrov Slovenia ........................................ Mr.Türk Sweden ......................................... Mr.Dahlgren United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ........ SirJohn Weston United States of America ............................ Mr.Richardson Agenda Letters dated 20 and 23 December 1991, from France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (S/23306, S/23307, S/23308, S/23309 and S/23317) 98-85136 (E) This record contains the original text of speeches delivered in English and interpretations of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to original
    [Show full text]
  • ROBERT L. PUGH, Et Al., Plaintiffs, V. SOCIALIST PEOPLE's LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA, Et Al., Defendants. UNITED STATES DISTRICT C
    Case 1:02-cv-02026-HHK Document 88 Filed 01/15/08 Page 1 of 104 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ROBERT L. PUGH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action 02-02026 (HHK) SOCIALIST PEOPLE’S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM This action is brought pursuant to the “terrorism exception” of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), arising from the September 19, 1989 bombing of Union des Transports Aeriens (“UTA”) Flight 772, over the Tenere Desert in the African country of Niger. The aircraft operating as UTA Flight 772, a DC-10-30 wide-body aircraft owned by Interlease, Inc. (“Interlease”), was en route to Paris, France from N’Djamena, Chad, when a suitcase bomb in the cargo hold exploded, killing all 170 passengers and crew on board. Seven of the passengers were citizens of the United States. The Estates of the seven American decedents, 44 of their immediate family members, and Interlease are the plaintiffs in this case. Defendants are the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Libyan External Security Organization (“LESO”) (collectively, the “Libyan State Defendants”), and six high-ranking Libyan government officials sued in their personal capacities, Abdallah Senoussi, Ahmed Abdallah Elazragh, Ibrahim Naeli, Abras Musbah, Issa Abdelsalam Shibani, and Abdelsalam Hammouda El Ageli (collectively, the “Individual Libyan Defendants”). All defendants are Case 1:02-cv-02026-HHK Document 88 Filed 01/15/08 Page 2 of 104 referred to collectively herein as “Libya” or “Defendants.” On May 11, 2006, this court granted summary judgment as to liability in favor of plaintiffs and on August 13, 2007, commenced a two and one-half day damages hearing.
    [Show full text]
  • Add-13 Chap8
    Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security The Council commends those Burundian parties, Burundian refugees and home to the Julius Nyerere Foundation, including the Government, that demonstrated their commitment which has provided outstanding support to the talks. to continue negotiations, calls upon those parties that remain The Council calls upon States of the region to ensure the outside the process to cease hostilities and calls for their full neutrality and civilian character of refugee camps and to prevent participation in Burundi’s inclusive peace process. the use of their territory by armed insurgents. It also calls upon The Council condemns the murder of United Nations the Government of Burundi to halt the policy of forced personnel in Burundi in October. It calls upon the Government regroupment and to allow the affected people to return to their to undertake and cooperate with investigations, and for the homes, with full and unhindered humanitarian access throughout perpetrators to be brought to justice. The Council urges all the process. It condemns the attacks by armed groups against parties to ensure the safe and unhindered access of humanitarian civilians and calls for an end to these unacceptable incidents. assistance to those in need in Burundi and to guarantee fully the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and The Council recognizes Burundi’s dire economic and humanitarian personnel. The Council recognizes the important social conditions and affirms the need for the donor community role of the States of the region, in particular the United Republic to expand assistance for Burundi.
    [Show full text]
  • Libya: Background and U.S. Relations
    Order Code RL33142 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Libya: Background and U.S. Relations November 4, 2005 Christopher M. Blanchard Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Libya: Background and U.S. Relations Summary The relationship between the United States and Libya has been strained and hostile for much of the last 35 years, but has recently shown signs of improvement. Following the Libyan government’s December 2003 decision to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and long range missile programs, a number of bilateral diplomatic exchanges have taken place, and the termination of U.S. economic sanctions on Libya has paved the way for a renewal of investment by U.S. oil, gas, and energy service firms in Libya’s under-capitalized energy sector. Several visits to Libya by Bush Administration officials and Members of Congress in 2004 and 2005 have raised expectations of a formal reestablishment of normal relations between the U.S. and Libya in the near future, including the removal of the last remaining sanctions associated with Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Bilateral intelligence and counter-terrorism cooperation has contributed to a gradual U.S.-Libyan re-engagement on security matters since late 2001. Continuing U.S. concerns about Libya’s relationship with some Palestinian terrorist groups and an alleged Libyan-sponsored assassination plot targeting Saudi monarch King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud thus far have delayed the recision of Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.
    [Show full text]
  • Uniting Against Terror (Index)
    Index Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), bombings and, 51 88–90, 93–95, 100 Bush administration and, 3 Ackerman, Gary, 149n19 countering hegemony and, Action Plan of the European Council, 247–250 191 failed governance and, 257 Action Plan for Freedom, Justice, and human rights and, 258 Security, 219–220 jihadist ideology and, 5–6, 240, Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism 243–244 (United Nations), 53 leader deaths of, 240 Afghanistan, 1, 21n23, 125, 239 Madrid bombings and, 187 Al-Qaida and, 129 military pressures on, 240–241 Bush administration and, 3 money laundering and, 160, failed governance and, 257 170–171 ideology and, 6 political grievances of, 244–246 Soviet invasion of, 248 reducing allies of, 264 UN sanctions and, 9 sanctions and, 41–42, 45–46, U.S. military and, 241 57–58, 61–62, 67, 241 Afghan war, 5, 84 social dynamics of, 250–252 African National Congress (ANC), strengthening of, 1 109 structure of, 2, 239–240 African Union (AU), 53 trained reserve of, 241–242 Ahern, Stephanie, 17–18, 187–236 understanding, 239–243 Air-Sol Moyenne Porté (ASMPs), weapons of mass destruction 136t5.4nf (WMD) and, 15–16, 124–131, Albania, 26 146, 244 Albright, Madeleine, 110 winning strategies for, 261–266 Allison, Graham, 130 Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Al-Meghrahi, Abdel Basset, 111 Committee (United Nations), 43, Al-Qaida, vii–ix, 237 45–46, 57–58, 61–62 Afghanistan and, 129 Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions anti-Americanism and, 245 Monitoring Team (United Nations), asset seizures and, 210–211 3, 13, 36 bargaining with, 264–265 Amman, 1 316 Index Analysis
    [Show full text]