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Psychology of Terrorism
Psychology of Terrorism EDITED BY Bruce Bongar Lisa M. Brown Larry E. Beutler James N. Breckenridge Philip C. Zimbardo OXFORD USIVERSITT PRESS War Versus Justice in Response to Terrorist Attacks Competing Frames and Their Implications Clark McCauley Often lost m d~scussionof the September 11, 2001, terrorism. "On September the 11th. entmies of attacks on the World Trad? Center (WTC) 1s the freedom committed an act of war against our coun- fact that a very nmllar attack, v;lth similar moti- t~.. Our war on terror begns with a1 Qaeda. but vation and related perpetrators. occurred eight it does not end there. It m~llnot end until evey years earlier On February 16. 1993, a truck bomb terrorist group of global reach has been found. in the basement parking garage of the WTC killed stopped and defeated" (Bush, 2001) SLX.injured hundreds, and damaged property to \Vithin the rhetonc of war., however. here has [he extent of half a billion dollars. The bomb was been frequent recourse to the rhetoric of cnminal designed to topple one of the towers into the other justice. "Whether we bring our enemes to lusuce or and to bring both tolvers down. The man behind justice to our enemies, justice will be done. .\Ye thls plan, Ramzi Yousef, noted regretfully that if he wdl come together to gve law enforc?ment the had had a little more funding his design would additional toois it needs to track dorm terror here have succeeded and killed tens of thousands (Krk. at home" (Bush, 2001; White House Press Office. -
Strategies and Skills for Revitalizing Aviation March 31, 2003
York College City University of New York CUNY Aviation Institute at York College Inaugural Conference: Strategies and Skills for Revitalizing Aviation March 31, 2003 Conference Proceedings N I N O S T I I T T A U I T V E A Y N E U G C E L L Y O O R K C Proceedings published by : CUNY Aviation Institute at York College York College CUNY 94-20 Guy R. Brewer Blvd • Jamaica NewYork 11451 718-262-2353 (p) 718-262-2352 (f) [email protected] • www.york.cuny.edu/aviation Conference Proceedings Strategies and Skills for Revitalizing Aviation March 31, 2003 N I N O S T I I T T A U I T V E A Y N E U G C E L L Y O O R K C Prepared by: Eric Tyrer CUNY Aviation Institute at York College Isabella Pierson NYU Wagner Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and Management Graphic design assistance: Joseph LoPinto York College - Publications ®2003 CUNY Aviation Institute at York College All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, me- chanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without prior permission of the publisher. The following papers have been reproduced by permission and are copyright- ed to their respective authors. AVIATION SECURITY: PROMISE OR REALITY? by Dr. Joseph Szyliowicz ®2003 THE CYCLICAL CRISIS IN COMMERCIAL AVIATION: CAUSES & POTENTIAL CURES Copyright © 2003 by Paul Stephen Dempsey The CUNY Aviation Institute at York College wishes to acknowledge the following organizations for their genoriosty. -
Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Order Code RL32223 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Foreign Terrorist Organizations February 6, 2004 Audrey Kurth Cronin Specialist in Terrorism Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Huda Aden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones Research Associates Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Foreign Terrorist Organizations Summary This report analyzes the status of many of the major foreign terrorist organizations that are a threat to the United States, placing special emphasis on issues of potential concern to Congress. The terrorist organizations included are those designated and listed by the Secretary of State as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” (For analysis of the operation and effectiveness of this list overall, see also The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, CRS Report RL32120.) The designated terrorist groups described in this report are: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Armed Islamic Group (GIA) ‘Asbat al-Ansar Aum Supreme Truth (Aum) Aum Shinrikyo, Aleph Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) Hizballah (Party of God) Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) Kahane Chai (Kach) Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, KADEK) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba -
Staff Statement No
Outline of the 9/11 Plot Staff Statement No. 16 Members of the Commission, your staff is prepared to report its preliminary findings regarding the conspiracy that produced the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States. We remain ready to revise our understanding of this subject as our work continues. Dietrich Snell, Rajesh De, Hyon Kim, Michael Jacobson, John Tamm, Marco Cordero, John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena Wille did most of the investigative work reflected in this statement. We are fortunate to have had access to the fruits of a massive investigative effort by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies, as well intelligence collection and analysis from the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. Much of the account in this statement reflects assertions reportedly made by various 9/11 conspirators and captured al Qaeda members while under interrogation. We have sought to corroborate this material as much as possible. Some of this material has been inconsistent. We have had to make judgment calls based on the weight and credibility of the evidence. Our information on statements attributed to such individuals comes from written reporting; we have not had direct access to any of them. Plot Overview Origins of the 9/11 Attacks The idea for the September 11 attacks appears to have originated with a veteran jihadist named Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). A Kuwaiti from the Baluchistan region of Pakistan, KSM grew up in a religious family and claims to have joined the Muslim Brotherhood at the age of 16. -
Universidade Do Sul De Santa Catarina Diego Oliveira Marques De Araujo
1 UNIVERSIDADE DO SUL DE SANTA CATARINA DIEGO OLIVEIRA MARQUES DE ARAUJO ESPIÕES E AVIÕES – UM VOO DE RECONHECIMENTO SOBRE A ATIVIDADE DE INTELIGÊNCIA A SERVIÇO DA AVIAÇÃO CIVIL BRASILEIRA Rio de Janeiro 2020 2 DIEGO OLIVEIRA MARQUES DE ARAUJO ESPIÕES E AVIÕES – UM VOO DE RECONHECIMENTO SOBRE A ATIVIDADE DE INTELIGÊNCIA A SERVIÇO DA AVIAÇÃO CIVIL BRASILEIRA Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso apresentado ao Curso de Especialização em Inteligência de Segurança da Universidade do Sul de Santa Catarina como requisito parcial à obtenção do título de Especialista em Inteligência de Segurança. Orientador: José Luiz Gonçalves da Silveira, Dr. Rio de Janeiro 2020 3 DIEGO OLIVEIRA MARQUES DE ARAUJO ESPIÕES E AVIÕES – UM VOO DE RECONHECIMENTO SOBRE A ATIVIDADE DE INTELIGÊNCIA A SERVIÇO DA AVIAÇÃO CIVIL BRASILEIRA Este Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso foi julgado adequado à obtenção do título de Especialista em Inteligência de Segurança e aprovado em sua forma final pelo Curso de Especialização em Inteligência de Segurança da Universidade do Sul de Santa Catarina. Rio de Janeiro, 22 de abril de 2020. ______________________________________________________ Professor e orientador José Luiz Gonçalves da Silveira, Dr. Universidade do Sul de Santa Catarina ______________________________________________________ Prof. Camel André de Godoy Farah, Dr. Universidade do Sul de Santa Catarina 4 Este trabalho é dedicado a todas as vítimas, in memoriam, e familiares de vítimas de atentados terroristas contra a aviação civil pelo mundo, em especial aos mais de 3 mil órfãos -
9/11 Report”), July 2, 2004, Pp
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page i THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page v CONTENTS List of Illustrations and Tables ix Member List xi Staff List xiii–xiv Preface xv 1. “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 1 1.1 Inside the Four Flights 1 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14 1.3 National Crisis Management 35 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992) 55 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71 3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing 71 3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation— ...in the Law Enforcement Community 73 3.3 . and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82 3.4 . and in the Intelligence Community 86 v Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page vi 3.5 . and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93 3.6 . and in the White House 98 3.7 . and in the Congress 102 4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108 4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108 4.2 Crisis:August 1998 115 4.3 Diplomacy 121 4.4 Covert Action 126 4.5 Searching for Fresh Options 134 5. -
True and False Confessions: the Efficacy of Torture and Brutal
Chapter 7 True and False Confessions The Efficacy of Torture and Brutal Interrogations Central to the debate on the use of “enhanced” interrogation techniques is the question of whether those techniques are effective in gaining intelligence. If the techniques are the only way to get actionable intelligence that prevents terrorist attacks, their use presents a moral dilemma for some. On the other hand, if brutality does not produce useful intelligence — that is, it is not better at getting information than other methods — the debate is moot. This chapter focuses on the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation technique program. There are far fewer people who defend brutal interrogations by the military. Most of the military’s mistreatment of captives was not authorized in detail at high levels, and some was entirely unauthorized. Many military captives were either foot soldiers or were entirely innocent, and had no valuable intelligence to reveal. Many of the perpetrators of abuse in the military were young interrogators with limited training and experience, or were not interrogators at all. The officials who authorized the CIA’s interrogation program have consistently maintained that it produced useful intelligence, led to the capture of terrorist suspects, disrupted terrorist attacks, and saved American lives. Vice President Dick Cheney, in a 2009 speech, stated that the enhanced interrogation of captives “prevented the violent death of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of innocent people.” President George W. Bush similarly stated in his memoirs that “[t]he CIA interrogation program saved lives,” and “helped break up plots to attack military and diplomatic facilities abroad, Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf in London, and multiple targets in the United States.” John Brennan, President Obama’s recent nominee for CIA director, said, of the CIA’s program in a televised interview in 2007, “[t]here [has] been a lot of information that has come out from these interrogation procedures. -
Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy
U N I T E D S T A T E S D I S T R I C T C O U R T S O U T H E R N DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Office of the District Court Executive COLLEEN MCMAHON EDWARD A. FRIEDLAND Chief Judge District Court Executive Hon. Kevin Thomas Duffy (1933 - 2020) The Court is saddened to note the passing of Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, our former colleague who served this Court for 44 years (1972-2016), making him the third longest serving judge in the Court’s 230 history. A young Kevin Duffy arrived at the federal courthouse at Foley Square 65 years ago as bailiff to Circuit Judge J. Edward Lumbard. He later served as an Assistant United States Attorney in this the SDNY and Regional Administrator for the SEC. He will be remembered for his acts of kindness and compassion towards others around him and for his smile and wry sense of humor. For his work on terrorism cases, Judge Duffy and his wife were under United States Marshal protection for 10 years. Judge Duffy presided over difficult and important trials, including the following: • Two trials of those involved in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, a terrorist act that resulted in 6 deaths and more than a thousand injured. The first trial last six months and the second three months. All tried defendants were convicted and the principal defendants received sentences of 140 years each. • The three-month Bojinka Plot trial in which defendant Ramzi Yousef was tried and convicted of conspiring to hijack and fly 12 US-bound planes on a coordinated schedule into the Pacific Ocean. -
Tests for Egyptian Journalists
Tests for Egyptian Journalists Reporting Truth, Fighting Censors, Earning a Wage, and Staying Alive in Times of Turmoil By Naomi Sakr n a classic essay in the Journal of Democracy in 2002, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” democratization analyst Thomas Carothers questioned the assump- Ition that elections are the be-all and end-all of democracy. His argument seems especially apt in Egypt’s case. One mistake, according to Carothers, is to believe that the political and economic effects of decades of dictatorship can be brushed aside. Another is to imagine that state institutions under dictatorship functioned sufficiently well that they can be merely modified and need not be entirely rebuilt. Political scien- tist Sheri Berman, writing in Foreign Affairs in 2013, made similar points about what she called the “pathologies of dictatorship.” These leave a poisonous aftermath of pent-up distrust and animosity, she said, bereft of political bodies capable of respond- ing to or even channeling popular grievances. In Egypt, media institutions, largely controlled by the state since soon after the country became a republic in 1952, are part of this problem, but they can also be part of a future solution. To the extent that news media contribute to framing public discussion, the closer they get to representing the full plurality of interests and viewpoints in society, and the more they report verified information rather than prejudice, rumors, and lies, the more likely it is that different social groups will understand each other and make policy choices that are collectively beneficial. How media pluralism is achieved depends on history. -
U.S. Department of State, 1991 Patterns of Global Terrorism
Terrorism Resources Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991 Office of the Secretary of State Office of the Coordiantor for Couterterrorism Released April 1991 Table of Contents Introduction The Year in Review Africa Overview Asia Overview Western European Overview Latin America Overview Middle East Overview Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism Appendix A: Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1991 Appendix B: Background Information on Terrorist Groups Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991 The Year in Review The number of international terrorist incidents rose in 1991 as a result of the Persian Gulf war, when terrorists in many regions of the world attacked targets belonging to the international coalition opposed to Saddam Hussein. Most of these were minor incidents, resulting only in property damage. War-related attacks brought the total number of international terrorist incidents in 1991 to 557, up from 456 in 1990. Fully half of the incidents in 1991 occurred during January and February, while Operation Desert Storm was under way. After the war, however, the number of terrorist incidents dropped sharply and actually fell below 1990 levels. Several events in 1991 revealed the threat and extent of state-sponsored terrorism, particularly as practiced by Iraq, Libya, and Iran. In the months following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Iraq issued repeated exhortations to terrorists to strike at coalition targets worldwide. Terrorists of many stripes embraced Saddam Hussein and publicly vowed to launch attacks in the event of war. During Operation Desert Storm, we recorded 275 terrorist incidents. Most of these attacks, however, were sporadic, uncoordinated, and low-level incidents. Only a small percentage resulted in deaths, significant injuries, or property damage. -
Department Ofdefense Office for the Administrative Review of The
UNCLASSIFIED Department of Defense Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 8 February2007 TO: PersonalRepresentative FROM CSRT ( 8 Feb 07) SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR COMBATANT REVIEW TRIBUNAL - AL - SHIB, RAMZI BIN Under the provisions of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum , dated 14 July 2006, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, a Tribunal has been appointed to determine ifthe detainee is an enemy combatant. 2. An enemy combatant has bee defined as an individualwho was part ofor supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associatedforces that are engaged inhostilitiesagainst the United States or its coalitionpartners. This includes any personwho committeda belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities inaid ofenemy armed forces.” 3. The followingfacts supportthe determinationthat the detaineeisan enemy combatant. a. On the morning of 11 September 2001, four airliners traveling over the United States were hijacked. The flights hijacked were American Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines Flight 77 and United Airlines Flight 93. At approximately 8:46 a.m., American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 10:25 a.m. At approximately 9:03 a.m., United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center, resulting in the collapse of the tower at approximately 9:55 a.m. At approximately 9:37 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the southwest side of the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. -
US Courts Orders Libya To
US court orders Libya to pay $6bn A US court has ordered Libya and six Libyan officials to pay more than $6bn (£3bn) in damages over the bombing of a French aircraft over Niger in 1989. The award is payable to relatives of the seven US victims aboard UTA Flight 772, and the aircraft's American owner. Libya has already agreed to pay $1m compensation to the relatives of each of the 170 people on board the flight - but has denied any link to the bombing. It paid compensation over a similar attack over Lockerbie in Scotland. This award proves that the rule of law will always prevail over state- sponsored terrorism Stewart Newberger, victims' lawyer Lawyers for the US victims of UTA 772 say Libya has until 25 February to decide whether to appeal against the order. The huge award is made against Libya and six named officials. It represents: • the value of the aircraft • compensation for the pain and suffering of the victims • compensation for the pain and suffering of the victims' families • money the victims would have earned if they had lived • interest backdated to the day of the bombing. Under American law, awards against individuals, though not the Libyan state, are tripled because it is a terrorism case. "This award proves that the rule of law will always prevail over state-sponsored terrorism," said Stuart Newberger, a lawyer for the victims' families. The seven US victims included Bonnie Pugh, whose husband Robert was then the US ambassador to Chad. Sanctions lifted The Lockerbie compensation deal was part of a package negotiated in secret for months.