Psychology of Terrorism
EDITED BY
Bruce Bongar Lisa M. Brown Larry E. Beutler James N. Breckenridge Philip C. Zimbardo
OXFORD USIVERSITT PRESS War Versus Justice in Response to Terrorist Attacks Competing Frames and Their Implications Clark McCauley
Often lost m d~scussionof the September 11, 2001, terrorism. "On September the 11th. entmies of attacks on the World Trad? Center (WTC) 1s the freedom committed an act of war against our coun- fact that a very nmllar attack, v;lth similar moti- t~.. . . Our war on terror begns with a1 Qaeda. but vation and related perpetrators. occurred eight it does not end there. It m~llnot end until evey years earlier On February 16. 1993, a truck bomb terrorist group of global reach has been found. in the basement parking garage of the WTC killed stopped and defeated" (Bush, 2001) SLX.injured hundreds, and damaged property to \Vithin the rhetonc of war., however. here has [he extent of half a billion dollars. The bomb was been frequent recourse to the rhetoric of cnminal designed to topple one of the towers into the other justice. "Whether we bring our enemes to lusuce or and to bring both tolvers down. The man behind justice to our enemies, justice will be done. . . .\Ye thls plan, Ramzi Yousef, noted regretfully that if he wdl come together to gve law enforc?ment the had had a little more funding his design would additional toois it needs to track dorm terror here have succeeded and killed tens of thousands (Krk. at home" (Bush, 2001; White House Press Office. 2902). The U S response to this attack was police 2003). work ar.d prosecution. After tnals and convictions, The rhetonc of &stice and the rhetoric of war SLY Arab men are in U.S. prisons, and a seventh may appear complementary, as in the often- person IS still being sought. debated qualifications of 'just war.' But closer On September 11. 2001, a second attack on inspection indicates that these two kinds of rhetoric the World Trade Center brought do~bnthe Twin instantiate two very different frames f~runder- Towers and caused nearly 3.000 deat'ns. The 9/11 standing the nature of the terronst threat and the perpetrators were similar in origns and moti- appropriate response to it. In thls chapter I e-rplore vation to the 1993 perpetrators: indeed one of the inconsistent and even contradictory impllsa- the planners of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Shaikh tions of these frames, and I suggest that more em- Mohammed. is hmzi Yousef s uncle. Despite the phasis on the criminal justice frame ~iferssome similarity of the attacks, the L.S. response was important advantages for what all of us agree ulll strikingly different. Rather than crimlnal justice be an extended U.S. effort to secure itself from proceedings. the U.S. response was a war on terronst attacks War Versus Justce ~nResponse to Terrorist Attacks 5 7
-. ... AG! ~~~mingand Human Judgment certainty to nsk xihen cornpanng gains bur pre- ferred nsk to certainty when cornpanng losses -1 ~h~ ~oxeri'f framing effects has been demon- These results opeced a gold rush of studies to ': grated in txvo decades of research in psycholog leam marc about vvhen and hoxv different frames and Pcrhaps the most fanous dernon- can affect human judgment in ways that are. stration is Tversky and Kahneman's ii98i'i '.hian statistically at least. mysterious or even irrational disease problem." Several hu~dredpeople \sere (Shafir CQ Le Boeuf. 2002). One indicat~onof the randoml>-dillded inro tn-o groups, so tha: :he txvo s~plficanceof this research is that Kahneman's groups would on a\-erage be veq sirnllar. Each work on framing effects nas cited in the alvard group n-as Sj-er. a different problem. of his Nobel Pn:e in economics in 2002 The de- mcnstrated polver of framing efiecrs is the foun- problem 1. Imagine that
One m~ghtargue abou: how the probabilltles September 13, 1993. The trial lasted 6 months, should change as we move from the Xslan dljease x:-ith the preseniation of 204 aitnesses and threat to the terronst threat, but the polnt sum\-es more than 1,000 pieces of r~idence.On hiarch 4: that framing the respoRse to terrorism in temi 1994, the jury convicted the four defendants- of sar-lng lives is Ilkeiy to fa-or cnrninal justice, hlohammed Salameh. Nidal A3ad: hlahmud n-hereas framing it ir, terms of lix-es lost is likely .qbouhallma, and Ahmad Ajaj--on all 38 counts to fa\-or n-ar. It is not difficult LO see how, im- agzlnst them. On hlay 25, 1994; a judge senter.ced mediately after 911 1. ~~7th3.17c)G deaihs fresh and each defendant to 210 years in pnson and a persona!i=ed In the tele~-~srdsuffering of relat~ves SZ5d;000 fine. and fnends of the dead. the predominant framing On Febnar). 7. 1995, authorities in Pakistar. was in terms of lives alre~dyiost and lives to be arrested Ramzi Yousef. who was then extradited lost in future terrorist attack; This rraming in turn to the United States. On November 12. 199:. far-ored n-ar as the response to the 9111 attacks. Yousef was found gcilty of masteminding the In contrast. the six deaths caused by the 1993 1993 bombing. and on January 8, 1998. he n-as at:ack on the \\TC did no: n;e out of the ever)-day sentenced to life in prison v-ithout parole. In a death toll of car accidents and hom~cides.As at- rrlated case? Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman. a bhnl tention to the 1993 dsaths n-as smali. the framing cleric who preached at mosques in Brookl!n and sf the response to terronsm \\-as 12.5 about lir-es Jersey Citi-, was sentenced to life impnsonment on lost ~ndmore about sa~ing11r-es by bringing the October 1, 1995, for conspiracy to bomb Se~i. terrorists to justice I-ork City landmarks (not specificall>-fcr the 1993 Thus research on framing can help explain LX-TC bombing, han!everI. why cnrninal justice n-as the predominant frame In contrast, the begnning of a n-ar is t)-pical:y for the C.S. response to the terrorist attack on the a declara~ionfrom one government to anether that \\TC In 1993, but war n-as the predominar,t frame a state of war exists between them. The casus bell: for the response to a 911 i terronst attack similar to does not usually requlre investigation or discoren. the one in 1993 in all but the death toll. Never- an attack or ultimatum is typ~callythe clear occa- theless: the rhetoric of bringing enemies to justice sion of war. In the case of al-Qaeda. the declaration remains al-ailable In public discourse in the United of war against the Unlted States is usually identi- States, m~xc.d with and sometimes submerged fied w
"violations and of particular indixiduals accused of theless. the rhetilric of xar calls on the idea! case ir.
'&je \riOlations. Even conspirac>-charges ha\-e to ~rhichthe enemy is a state and its pscpie -= be substa~~tiatsdb>- endence of some marenal lirk \\'hen enemy c~mbatantsrepresent a narional gp2- p2bemen the co~piratorand a cxmm2l iit. planned or ethnic grcup. that n-ho:e grmp is seen as tte . <~... ..<- ..<- or ,ccomplkhrd 111 contrait a dec1ar;tlon of u-ar er.2~1:- c.r at lza~t35 haling a tsndenc)- and po- d~lgnatesa group enem>--t)plcall!- z nation-ar.d tent121 to sene the eriemy. After the [kited States - _>A declared war on Japar.. Japanese clrilians could be ,&> more than one na:lcn joins the lkt ~lfeIlel:ues sy as alliances corns Into play. The ivar or, terrop.51~1s rounded up nlttout tnai and put in detention a-', $2 larger than a n-ar on ai-Qaeda anc ih~e\pars:on camps for >-2arj.Similar if issser actiens n-ers taken
%%.+-bl : of enemies IS npical after a de~laratic~of car. against Italian -4meri:ans after the Unirfd States .z.- >. .. ..:~.:.. ~n sum. those ivho n-ere sought far the 1933 declared war on Ital!- ic M'orid \\~ar11. In England. WC attack n-ere ind~:iiuzls. ttaie \l-ho n-ere \\.srld \\-ar I m~deit ex?ed~ectfor the royal fam:li- sough[ for :he 2L7111 \i-TC a;tack n-ere er. 111- to give up 1:s identit: as tAe House of H2r.o~fr defined goup of Arabs and Ilus11r.s-al-Qasda- t3 become the House of \\-~ndsor. and terror,st groups er-sy~i-b.ere. Thzre is s parallel in the n-ar on terronsp.. After iiieni:!i:atinn of the 9/11 attacifrs zs 4luslir. Arabs. a wal-e oi host1:ity ar.d ei-en occasionil Criminals Versus Combatants ~io:ensr \vas ~~sitzdon mzny in the Lynitrd Stat?; n-ho n-ere identified (In some cases inccrrectl>-- This differ:nce in s?ecificity lfadi ~mn~.sdia:ei~-to S~khs.for inhtance) a5 Arab or XI~jlim(.-lrab k~.er- another difference. the labeling of th? enfm>- The :can Institute. ZCL?;1. Kaplan. Zc?c?O!. This hostiiiry targetj of criminal justice are criminals. that is. contributed to the war on tsrronsm insi7far as ;I laiJ-breakeis. corm breakers. ~ndl~idualjn-ha are tel?ed su?port the roundup acd impriscnmen:. not gensral1:;- ieen aj tiplcal of the group the)- come nithout charges. hearing. or habeas cor?us. ci from The L-n~:zdStates has cnrr-inal garigs. in- nearly a thousard Arab and 4lusl1m noncitizens cluding those that are ~redominantl~;Itallan. pre- lning In the L-n~ted State :Parker 6- Fellrer. dominantly Colombian, precominantli- Russian. ZL?O+) In another \\:a)-, :?on-21-er. this group-led and predomir,antl>- Chinese. It is :me that some attribution of susp:cion and responsib1l:ty n-zs prejudiciai association betireen s~zhgaxgz and co~~nterprcduct~ve:It h~ndered U 5.jecunty forces their larger ethnic group is often mads in pub::c seeking infonna::on and assiitance againjt terror- images and occas~onallyfound ex-en in po:itiial 15:s from Arab and llushm ci:izens of the Ur.ited discourse. but In general the association is ~r-eak. States Americans do not ger.erall!- tee1 kati!it>. ton.ard Tnus the ciifferenct bs:w-is-isn crlmir.al azd or discriminate agairst Italiar.5 becznse there is 2 con1ba;ant 1s clear in th~sres?ec:: Cr:m:nzls are Cosa Ncstra. anplcal and soldiers are rzpreser.tzti\-e. Crimlnali In contrast. n-ar IS t>p~czllydechred on a state act in the11 onn Interest: so1d:zrs ac: for thelr na- that is seen to represent a people or a natiar.. ~hs' tion. It 15 an iron;: of the n-ai cn Lerronsm :hzt n.zr last war formall>- voted hy the l-S Congress n-as implies cornhatar.: staiuj for the tfrrorists and r2- against Gemany and Japan \\-hen it is not eesy to sponsibi1it~-for tzrrcrist acts tc? those the terrorists specif>-a nation-rspresenung state. ever? violence claim to re?reser.t. Understood zs criminals. ier- that looks 11ken-ar does net get a fomzl declaration ronsts represent on[>-themsel~~es. and those they of ivdr Thf U 5. millran- prswice in K3rt.a n-as claim to represznt can be askzd to hi.111 a?prehend f0mlly a 'po!~ce act~sn' unde; US auspices, the them Vlemam \\ar n-as properly the "\-iexam Co~flict'. insofar as :he C.5 Congress ne~-erdeclared n.ar, and the U.S. intfn-ention In Panama In 1399 was to Small Versus Large Enemy safeguard 35.0170 Amencar. iit~zznsrhere from a drug-traffichng t);ant, Gen. hlanuel Soriega The 'Along i\'th the difference bstvfen cnminal and war-mahng pon-er of the US.president as corn- combatant comes an imp1:iation about the 51-r mander ir chief no longfr rcq._ur?s a fxrtx?l of the enern>-. In n-ar. an enemy st212 usuaiiy declaration of war from the US Congress >;e\-er- represents millions of citi-ens and commands 60 The Psychology of Terrorism significant armed forces. Thus a declaration of \x-ar patriotism that is experienced as the exk.ilaraii1ig is a declarat~onagainst a wr)- large enem!-. The warmth of unlv, common values. commo~?ur- argumect for n-ar agalns: terronsm is that e\-en :a pose, and common sacriSce (Le\'~ne6- Campbell. small number oi terronsti czn use nlodem tech- 1972: pp 31-32] r.0iop-i-&-, (full>- fueled aircraft ~n the case of the 911 1 In contrasr. 172 criminal lustlce system has to attacks'l to infl;ct horrendous damage. \Vlthout compets nith many other public interests and den!ing this aryment. 1: is ir?porrant to note that p"or1t1es. Ewn if the public per~eivesthar crime is the \$-a: on terrorists can g:ve an exaggerated im- a major and escalating problem: ciiminsl justlcs press~onof the sue of ths terrorist enem>-. does not aut~maticall>-take first place in the allo- El-en if n-s think of 21-Qaeda as more a fran- cstior, of pu-lic resources. Political leaders often ch:se thai-. a state o: corpor~tlon.it probably does compete on the bzsis oi \\-hat they promlss to dc not amount to more :::an 5.i?L?i? peopls n-orldnide. about crire and cnmii-.als and n-hat resources Perhaps 18,i?i7c7 wen: through the al-Qaeda train- the cnnllnal jusrics system should have. Eon-e\.er. inp camps in .ifghanistan before these nsie de- the?- seldom c!a:n. at least in the Uni~ed5ta:es. stro~-ed.and perhaps one-quarter of these ars that crlme is the on!>- problem Ir 1s almost alc-a?. still alive. cocnected. and i~mmictsd:J xiolence linked tc problems i?f educat~or,.lobs. hocsinz. (Robs. 2004: i. netn-ork of j.L?QC~,vould be large and n-elfare po;ic!-. and thess Issues iempete nit:: for a cnn1:nal consplrac!- (xch as the Cosa Sostra the cnminal justice system for resources in re- n the Unlted Siates ?eri-,3ps\. but tin!- by the spo~dingto cnme. standards of n-zrtime enernlej. Declaring n-ar on It is difEculr in a democracy to mair.taln a stat? terronsm conduces t~?seeir,g [errofism as larger of n-ar ~r~dehnitely.Other p~oririesbe,. vn to rs- tnat? 11 actuallJ- is. This has plays w-ell for the assert rhemsel\-es: the mob~lizingadvs1;tage of n-ar ierror,sts, ra~singthe:r self-esree~nand thelr status sooner or later begins to fade This has bssn tie among those n-ho s!-mpathl;e nit5 the cause the!- fate, in the Unlted States. of ths .-n-aron pol-ert!-' cialm to advance. and the .'n.ar on dmgj.' Thus the war sr. terronsr. is ill adapted to a long-term strate3 against ter- ronsm. Lnfortucate1~-.there 1s ever.- reason to Competing Priorities Versus Survival belleve that terr~rismIS a long-term problsm. It 15 not a group or cause bct a rrates-, one ihzt has .A declarat~onof war is a declaratlor, of mortal thieat. been around for n~ilenr,!a (eg: rte Jenish slcani an announcer~entof the ut:nost danger that calls for of the first Elere the focus is on mihtan; expertise. Modem the cnm~naljustice tramlng ot response to terror- forces are composed of highly specia!?zed Ism po1nt.s to untappsd potentla In understanding componer.rs nith a ratio of tail to tooth that is rerronsn n7th ddra and theoq from cnm~nolog- t?n toone. that 1s. ter! people in logst~cc (LaFree &z Dugan, 2004) and coordiilat~onfor each one at risk in c~rrbat. Land, sea. an? alr forces depfnd on comple:i in- fornation systemst0 focus inrrlcate and poxerful Police Work Versus Combat: Values weapon systems z3ainst rhs er.em:.-. Tkse s;:sten-,s are essent~alin fightmg anothc: moderr? arm?-but Procedcrally, the criminal justice system has to deal re.atii,el>. :11 suited for fighting terror~sts n.ho expllclt1:- mrh the va!ues of -;irlvsc>-ad arll rlghij emerge from 2nd disappear beck into zixllicin ?op- Police and district attorneys can aln-2::s irnagne ukationj. The difficulties of ever? the best-trained how rhz~rn-ork n-ould be iorz:arded and public am;-in Eghtlng terronsn~2nd injargzniy sre exi- safety ~nprx-ed6)- changes in procedure or 1a~v dent in the C.S.es7er:snce In Afghani~tsnand ii-aq. that would gve them greatzr acres to citizens' fi- In borh placi. o\-esvhcim~ngrn~:itan- ?on-zr k.as nar.cial, he.?!th, reisphone, anc trevel records or ~:otvet bezn ible tn find and dejtro~-[he enemy. greater lera-a)- in interrogatior. and ~iseof the re- ~1ghrn.gierronsm effzcave1)- 1s more Ilke r;ollce sults al ~ntzrrcgarions.Defense a;tomsys can al- q.ork rhar. rilitzn- combar. Eifectii-e police irork i7;a;.s Inape hon- cllerts' r~ghtscan be cnlarged or requires understardlng a local culiure. hon:ng tlle protected agalnst the procedurzs 5ougb.t b>- pol~cr detal!s of scs~aland ~hysicalgeoga;hy in a lxa; and d~srnctatrome>-s. Judzes are rtqulred to ima- arsa. der-elop:ng lfirc,l relarionships. and cultn.a:;ng gine both sides. Perhaps thz most important aspect -' ' local s2u:ces of :r.fer~~ancn.This A-ir,d of es~ertise of the cnmlr.al justice system is :hat ~t brinss peapie is ver). different trorL integrated an3 kge- from the same training-law sclluol-to an In- scale logstlc It 1s no disgrace to a modern amlj- stitutlona!izcd com~eririon of p~bliiinterest in to reco33-tze that 1; 15 111 prepared fur police n-ork srcunt7- u~thpnl-z:e Ictersst in indi~~dcalright:. or the kind of economlc and commcn:;y develop- indeed. many lai~>.erjhave the op~ortcnity ro men: ncrk tkt can support effecuve police work. n-ork both sides cf thls cornpet~tisndunng the:r At a rnin~mur~.effective police work requlrss professional careers-;s prosecurlng attorney at speakmg he local langcage. but 1eam:ng forsip one tlc-ie and as defense attorney at ar,other tims. lanpages 15 noc t\yialiy a h~ghprionty in militan- In contrast. ths militan- has no prafessional trair.iqg e.xpenenze of balancing competing va!ues. The Ee)-dnd the iocal level. ths ston- 1s similar. Inter- m:litar)- hierarchy 1s consistsnt arid umdiaensional narlsr,al cooperation is crucial fcr fighting intema- \\'inning :s the onl!- vaice. FiacirL~.lfs Aless~gr t;onal ttmn5E. Purting together patterns or lndi- Ftor?: I/!Z For Em;, memoked h). even- \\..e;t Point !;dm1 bshaxi~rand nrty.\orks of contacts requires cadet. is parad~glat~c:.'From the Far East I seed shanng incz;llgence acrcss borders-somethmg at you one single thought. cne sole ~dea-itntten in least as dithc~llras shanng bet~veenthe FBI and the red ox ever?; beachhead from .4usrral1a tc? Toki-o- CL'I ixithln the Gnlted States. International police There 1s no substlrute for 11ctc.q-!' In ~11sUS. xill- coo?eratloL is a berter model of rhls kind of sharing 129, IL is a kind of cross-cultural eqxnence to arork than internanon31 nlilitar) cooperatian; police and ~xithacother branch of the zmed sen:ces: zrmy secu~iq-5enxec are more likely than the militan- to officers ix-orking i~ithalr force or na\T officers. fo: have usef~linformation about indinduzl tsrroris~ instance There 1s no para:lel ro the compcouon of and tenor:st groups. persp2ct:res that eists fcr attorneys. there is no It 1s 11-cr:h noting briefly that. alcng {nth the career pdh for officrrsto 5en-z first in figtring L' 5 dlfferelice in expertise of rhos? fightln;; cnme and ensmles and then to sen.e the enem\- fightmg ths those fighung xi-ar, there 1s also a d~lfsrenceIn Cnited Stares [he expertise of those studjing cnme and those The cnmlnal case agains: the perpetrators of the stud!ing ivar Researchers who focus oc cnme are 1993 \i,.TC bombing brought prosecuting dnd dr- genera:!! based In sociolog: and criminology. fense attol-neys to a conrest in xshlch both sides ivhereaj researchers xho stud!. war aI~emore oftsn came from the sTm? professional prsparation. and from polltlcal jaence and psycholo2 In part~cular. the contest ~ncludeda negotlat~onoi ~nd:x~dual 62 The Psychology of Terrorism nghts versus the public's right to security. The war and increased action for the cause the terronjtj against terronsm has no such balancing act; the claim to represent. A terrorist group IS only the apex officers who plan and cornnand and the soldiers of a py-ramld in which the base 15 all who agree n:th ~vhofollow are l~ttlepracticed In representing the the terronst aims even if they do not agree mth the perspective or rlghts of the enemy. This, in brief. attack on axilians that are the hallmark of re?- is the stor). of the ~iolatlonsof human rightj of ronsm (McCauley. 2002). For the Irish Republi~a~ prisoners at .ibu Ghraib and liksly of prisoners at Army, for instance, the base of the p!-ramid bas Gilantanamo as ivel: Pollce are required to practice been all those who agree with "Bnts out." .&- el-erl; cia)- the ngh:s of suspecu. soldier are not cend~ngIn the pj-ramid, numben decrease bu: slrn~larlypractice& it. the ngl-,ts of prisoners. commitment, risk taklng. and support for kil:;r,g Sor are soldlers dnlled in the nghts of non- ci~iliansIncrease. ccmba:ants. The distar-clng phrase for c11111an ca- The terronsts cannot sunive wthout the cover. sualties olr-ilitan carnpalps 1s "collateral damage." ~nfomat~on,money. and new recruits that cone Thr L-5, m~lltapin rifgharis~anwas. by modem frotr. tine pyramid. h)-rhing that cuLj off the srancards. unusually scczessful In avolding cinlian terrorists from the pyramid is a mor~alhest: cajualties Yet ~pprou~mately?.GOO cl~ilianswere anything that increases mob:lizatio~of the base of 1~:::zd !' in the U 5. caqalgn that defeaced and dis- the pyramid behlnd terrorist leadersh~p1s a suc- persed thc Tsliban and its al-Qaeda allies in Af- cess. Here IS where the straregy of jujitsu pol it:^^ ghanistan (Heraid. 2002. It 1s not only fire power enters the contest between tsrrorists and the state. thx kills cli~ilan,. Increassd mortalltj- associated The best scholars (Crenshaw, 2002) and the most \hjth the V 5.-lel embargo of Ira= between 1990 thoughtful terronsts iklanghella, 1370'. recopre and 1998 is estimated to have Included at least that a crucial terrorist goal is to provoke a state 10O.OOi) deaths ar.ong Irsqi childrer, under 5 years response that will mobliize the uncomrnitred of age (Garfield, 1939:. lode^-r war would be Im- among those who sympathiie \vitll the terronsts possible if kiliing noficombatants \\-ere st+ctly goals. .& ~~jltjuE the art of using [he opponent's proscribed and proseccted. strength against him, so jujitsu pol~tlcz1s the art In short. war bnngs a unidimensional scale of of provoking the enemy to a response that n~ll i.alue in which noihlng can compete wlth the value mobillze support agalnst them. cf \\inning, ayhereas criminal jl~stice brings an For terrorists, the promlse of a mlh~an-re- inst~tutlonalized and !yell-practiced competition sponse is that military values do not pve much of valuei, In time of war, talk about money cost attention to collateral damage, In Bo)r,l?ir,g :(? Ll.i,?. or opportunity cost or hnman-nghts cost 1s un- Robert Pape (1996) re~lems t\ventie:h-cent~7- Da:rlotic in [he cr,m~nallustlce s)~en~,these costs military thinking about using aena; bonb:ng ts can be countec In the balance of competing values dctroy the morale of enemy cnilians. jometimes and pnont~es this thinking goes as far as explicitly alp-ing for the mass killing of cliilians: sometimes it goes only so far as recognlzlng the imposs~Sil:t); oi a\.oii:r.g Judicial Error Versus killing them Such thinking has not disa?pea:el. 25 Collateral Damage mentioned earlier In relation to the cin!lan c3sils!- ties In Afghanistan. Such casualties csnti~ueas Terrorism is the warfare of the xveak, the strategy of the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan continues. 51- ihosc \vho cannot wn b?- con\-entional means and milarly the L1.S occupation of and war on terrcr- ivho see the:r cause as slnking toward extinction ism In Iraq cannot avoid civilian casualties TkAe (3lcCaulel;. 2OO2). Terroxsts havc many goals: Increase :n hostility toward the United Stztes In pc!ls publicity for their cause, a recovered sense of power in Islam~ilcountries prondes tne foundation for and agency agalnjt the poxver that is crushing them, increased support and more recruirs for al-Qa3d.l and revenge and jilstice against those who have In contrast, the criminal justlce response tc done terr~blethlngs to the11 fnends and their cause. the 1993 bombing brought five of SLY Indicted Less common!).;recognized is the terronst goal that perpetrators to trial but provided no warrant isr is essential for the suni1-a1 of a terronst group: punishing their friends and nelghbors. The cnm- mobilization of s)mpathiiers to increazed support inal justice system also makes mistakes. but these War Versus Justice in Response to Terrorist Attacks 63 :are more likely to lead to imprisoning the nTong strengths and n-eakresses of these two frames for people than to killing th? \%Tongpeople. '-1 cnmi- the L1.S response to a continuing terronit threat. inal justice response to terrorism offers terronsts \\'ar has a clear begnnlng and a clear and not- E; a much smalkr opening for jujitsu politics. too-distant end: criminal justice is a never-ending effort to control and ameliorate a problem that will g, not go away \\.ar targets a unified enemy group %$. g: justice Versus War: In the End a people or a nation; criminal justice targets in- 5::; 5::; 2.-. dimdual perpetrators of criminal acts. \Var recog- war has an official and esplicic begnning. so it nres the enemy as large and dangerous: cnminal .2;: -. ~ justice makes the enemy small and tawdry, LLTar *2..~*. should have an official and explicit end. There ; - is unconditional scrrender (LVorld \J'ar II'\ o: ne- puts even other public interest and value on the - ~. 2- gotiaced surrendei- <\\.orid \Var 1; or at least a truce back burner; crimical justice has to compete for LS: .2. resources year after year in tke national scale of :.:.- a,meement to mark the end of war. E\-en xars that - described as pollce actioRs or hunlanltarian in- pnorities. Lira: puts the militay in charge of re- . - ten.entior.. have an end. The Korean M-ar stalemate sponse: criminal just~ceputs layers and police in ' ended in atruce, and the \.~etnam\L-ar ended ~7tha charge . peace treaty, the \\l;hdran-al of L'S. troops. and the The differences between !egal and militaq- sub- fig leaf of an ir,:?rnational control commission to cultures bnng other important differences. I\lilitar)- - ensurs the peace. It :S noith noting that the I7ietnam professionals are focused on \$inning as th? single - \var nas the longest the United States has foughc: scale of value: pollce, prosecutors. defense attor- enduring from 1964 to 1373. riel-s, and judges are experienced in balancing the --- In contras:. the cnmlnal justice ~>-stemfaces a publics rlght to security against ~ndividualand problem nirhout end. So one expects that crime ciiil nghts. hlilitaq: mistakes often get people kil- 1x311 be exhausted or beaten or that :t nil1 surrender led, including enemy civ~lians: criminal justice soone expectj :hat crime \\dl sign a peace treaty or mlstakes put the wrong people behind bars but even a truce. There has fie!-er been a socist)- 113th- seldom put innocents into coffins, hlilitary mis- out rules or one ~irhoutsanctions for \loiation of takes mobilize terrorist slmpath~zersbehind ter- those rules \Yhat it lacks in mobilizing pon-er the ronst leadership: crim~naljustice mistakes are criminal justice system makes up in staling po- smaller and can be redressed with rstnal and wer. Pollce, prosecuting attorneys, defense attor- compensation. The collateral damages from mili- neys, judges, and pnsons together consti:uts a tar)- strikes and military occupation of foreign cnmlnal justice syswm that is expected to go on lands are z rich contribution to jujitsu politicj; indefinitely into the future. along nl~hthe criminal cnmlnal justice operations and mistakes offer less acts that they respond to. opportunity for advancing the tsrronst cause. The criminzl pstice response to the 1993 at- Despite its hmlwtions, n-ar offers unique ad- tack on ths \\-TCcontinues today One of the vantages over criminal justice as a responss to ter- sujpects. .4bdul Rahman Yasin, was inteniexved rorism. War produces the ~,armthand direction of shortly after the bombing, provided usef~linfor- nat~onalunit); behind nat~onalleaders. \\'ar bnngs mation. Jvas released. took flight to Iraq. and has resources against terrorism that are dlificult to not been seen since. He is still a wanted man. as justify or funnel through the cnmlnal justice sys- the criminal justice response to the 1993 attack tem. LVar brings at least the perception that ev- gnnds on. The n-ar on terrorism that began ~fter erythlng possible is being done to prevent future 9/11 also continues It remains to be seen hon terronst attacks. In general, n-ar has the status of a long this nar can be maintamed before competing heroic response to a mortal threat; criminal justice Interests and values undermine its ngor is government business as usual War can reach d~rectlyand quickly to foreign bases and foreign support for terrorism that cannot be reached-r Conclusion only slo~vlyreached-uith the forces of criminal justice. - It 15 time to SurnmarLe the implicat~onsof wzr ar?d Unfortunately, no one today predicts that the lustlc? nlth a \leu toxsard evaluating the relative war on terronsm vill end anytime soon The + 64 The Psychology of Terrorism command and control capacity of al-Qaeda has lfotassadeq \\-as sentenced to seven years In pnjsn been degraded as the leaderjhlp has been kllled. aj a member of a terronst organlzatlon And 1" ca?tured. or driven into dee? hlding places The pain, tuenty-four lfusllm men suspected of heir.; current and contlnulng danyrs of terrorist attack rrembers of A1 Qaeda u-ent on [rial ir. Xpnl 2205, are more a matter cf local f:arLchlse operations in a three of them accused of prov~dingsuppor: for the corporation that has lost its headquarters. Under 9/11 attacks. Pnson terms we:? handed doun ::! these condlt~ors.one of the advantages of the September 2005. though charges related to gill n-a; on terrorism have ber~r.to fade. The atrention mere not sustained. Zacanas Iloussaou:, the on>; and pnonty given to the n-ar on terronsm cannot person facing tnal In the United States in connec- last indefinitely, mlhtan occupations In for219 tion uith the 9/11 attacks. pleaded pity to ?art:- lands cannot be maintained lndehmtely. blank clpatlng in ar, a!-Qaeda conspirac>-. The penalr;: checks of su?port to foreign gcvern:nents for at- phase of hls tnal is going on as thls chap:er go25 rc tdcks on thelr onn ,'terrorists ' cannot be honored press In hfarch 2206 indefin~tel>-,and the go\-ernment s reach Into the It appears. then. that the cnnlnal jcstlie sys- 11ves of U i. ii:~zenscannJt dee?en indefinitely In tem. of \Yestern countries are capable of 2ngzgr.g xm. viar 1s not ar. effeca\-e response to a chronlc al-Qaeda's terrons:s Cnnlna1just;ce ma>-ie slower problem. than the war on terrorism, but ~t ma!- be scier in Tnls 1s a lesson that the Unlted States has had reachlng terrorlst perpetrators mult~pleopportunities to learn. Prenous efforts For many. ho\vever. the cnicial a.,-r@-l~.ezt tp harness the rhetonc and unit>- of n-ar against against a crlminal justice response ti? terronsm 1s chronic problems have been notably unsuccessful. that criminal justice failed miserably on 9/11 Pre- The L S n-ar on poverty nzver came to victon or mEe: Bnngng the 1993 per?etrators to tnal. cor- even truce, and the ga? between nch and poor liction. and incarceration did not save the Unired ma!- 21-en be gromng The U.S war on drugs u-ent States from the attacks of 9/11. Conclusion. The so far In mllitan styllstlcj as to appolnt a com- war on terromm 1s the stronger medls:r,e rs- mander In chief or czar. but drug trafficking and quired. The answer ro ths argument 1s stralghtfcr- drug abuse are not vanqu~stedand perhaps not ward. Cnminal justice has not failed wher, cnme 1s even weakened. not eilminated: ~t falk only when cnme: are no: Against a chronic threat of terronst attack, the sol\-ed and criminals are not put au-a)- Xo one ar- L S response mlght usefully give increased sal- gues that the war oc terromm has failed be~ause ience to the crimlnal Iujtlie frame. Criminal justice terrorlst alerrs continue. To a modem denl.i.crat~c does not glorify the terrorisE and thelr cause. Cn- state. terronst threat 1s not a mortal peril, not 11kz a mlnal justice does not stereot>~ean ethn~cor rr- severe acute respirator)- syndrome ISAR5' epldern~i llglous group as the enem)- and arolds loslng the but more l~kea recumng fl~.Criminal lustlie ccr. cooperation of the commun~r~esthe terrorists claim be the treatment of cholce for a chron~cterrorls: to represent Cnminal justlce does not undermine threat. the balance of public seccnty and cn1l rights In the Unlted States and thus presrn-2s a ci\d society Acknowledgments. 1 thank Gay LaF;ee fa; hls c3r2- a4 worth defending from terrorism (Hirshon, 2002) iul readlng cf thls chzpter and s.lgge5rlsr.s t,r !r;- $ Perhaps most Importan:, cnmlnal justice does not proling it I am grateful also icr research oppcrtar.i::zi i lead to the collateral damages and forelgn occu- prc'lded by Bpm I\.la\n College and the Sclcrncn .ixi- ! pations that are the lifeblood of terrorist mobili- Center for Study of Ethnopcllt~cal Car-fllct s: t!.r : zatlon against the l'nited Sta~es. University of Pennsl-lvanla Preparation of th.15 chzprsr Some movement In thls direction may be \I- \vas supported by :he Unlted Sti:es Departmsn: of ! slble, In Germany. Xfounir el Xlotassadeq was con- Homeland Securln- rhrcugh the Nztlor.al Consorrlc!~. ncted In 2003 of involvement In the 9/11 plot. but for the Study of Terronsm and Responses to Terronsm his verdlct was overturned when an appeals court (ST-ART). grant number Nc70ii0510629 Ho:ve\-sr. ti-? nlled that hls tnal was unfair because the Lrnlted o~~n~onsexpressed In th~schapter are those cf k.e States refused to produce testimony from terrorism author and do r.ot neiessanli- reflect \lei\-s cf the U S suspects~ni- S. custody Ir, Aug~15t 2005, el Department of Home!and Secun:? War Versus Justice in Response to Terrorist Attacks 65 ~~ferences LeI'ire, R A. 6. Campbell. D. T (19T2). Erh,coc?~- insn:. Theones 4 con?icr, ~;hfi;iiiii;ilidts, ar,d group mb Amenan Instltute (20P21 Healing the nation Ths belia~ior Sen- York \\':Is)-. Arab Amencan eqerence after ieptember i 1 A iizrighc:li, c i19:s' hhnimznual of :be ur'3an first snnn-ersa? re?ort by C:e .Ira5 Aner.can g-~erclla. 1:. C l\lang~:ella.Fcr- the !!l.ir~:;on qf ~nstituteKetnevec Sep:er,.ber 15.29131. from :lttp:" Brwi ((p~61-97: J. Burt 6- R. Stieed, Trans.). . : s; nT\7v 3ziuja.or;;?DF;%eahr.ggthe-r.am ~ii Ha\-ana: Iricon:ir.entzl. C. G. \V.;2L701! Addrssz to a jnint serslcn of hIcCauley. C. !2992). Psb~cholopcslissues m u~der- f~,: -~.. the Amsncar Congss and the i\mericzr pec- standlrg :erronsn: and the response ro terrorism. $; Retrieved September 15. 2013r. from h.;~? 1'1 1- C. Stout (Ed.'. T):z ps:.cholcg of trrroi;sn: L'cI. *.:;: ' i. a~~.w'ritetouse.go~/ne~.vi/re1ease~2~21/29: 3 T!:zcI-escai ~~!:dzrs;a!:dings ;id ~e!-specti,;er (pp. ,-~.~- 200!2322-S.h:r: 3-3c" LIrestporr. CT: Prieger -.- #,28c?5'Fre-idez: t;?r:nk C.5 rroi?-.s at ---- (213ii5; Teronsrr. and the state: Tb.e ;o@c . ,. \\'iejbad:n ;\XI) hrfield Base Retrieved .A.pni 2. of kil11r.g cinlians. In James J F. Fores! (Ed ). 2005, !;err. htr~i'n?~?\..\r-?.~teho~~se.gol;nens/ TFz wck~!:g qi j itrr~l2ji:Bi;!lti:mm;. rra1l:lr.g re122ses.'2$JS'172/2L1135322j-9 htm: cnd rcor iG:jZS. I*oir!~i??i;il!.ze CJUSZS ,:pp. - crenjhm. \I ,2Ji?2' Tie causes di rerronsrr. 1:. C. 238-2531 I'\'es:por:. Ch Praeger Sec,;nr)- ma.E :, o . ?Ip~ jS-115" 1n:ernarionzl Ken- 1.c-t~ Ye\:: York i-nivers~iyPress Pap?. R. A (1996) B~rnb~!:grc r::t i!~.pc':i!' a~d GarSeld. R. .!??S. Jul!-; l\Iorb~dircar.6 mor:alr)- air,ong ccer::otl ir, war I~~sca,\T Conlsll Ur.i~:srsit!- Iraqi ~i-:.ldrsn from 19911 r?.:ou" 1996 ,ks:smg Press. the i~;dit of ihe Gulii'i'ar and econzmic :znctic?rL Farker. & Fcllner. J. :2L10L). .\bcve the Ian-: Esec,~rivepon-er sker Oil 1 :n Lie in!!?? States --.-~~ Rstnf\-ec Septernser 15. 71101. from hrr;, f/\\?r-,.v casi org.~k~~cfo/garfie!&dr-parfdelclhtnl Retrieved September 15. 200;. from rhe Hurcan Heralc. 11 \I-. :2,1112:. .I dossier on ci\