In the United States 1997INSIDE
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Urban Terrorism: Strategies for Mitigating Terrorist Attacks Against the Domestic Urban Environment
Old Dominion University ODU Digital Commons Theses and Dissertations in Urban Services - Urban Management College of Business (Strome) Spring 2001 Urban Terrorism: Strategies for Mitigating Terrorist Attacks Against the Domestic Urban Environment John J. Kiefer Old Dominion University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/urbanservices_management_etds Part of the Public Administration Commons, Public Policy Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons Recommended Citation Kiefer, John J.. "Urban Terrorism: Strategies for Mitigating Terrorist Attacks Against the Domestic Urban Environment" (2001). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, , Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/ 0b83-mp91 https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/urbanservices_management_etds/29 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business (Strome) at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations in Urban Services - Urban Management by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. URBAN TERRORISM: STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATING TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE DOMESTIC URBAN ENVIRONMENT by John J. Kiefer B.B.A. August 1975, University of Mississippi M.S.A. August 1989, Central Michigan University M.U.S. May 1997, Old Dominion University A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY URBAN SERVICES OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY May 2001 Reviewed by: Approved by: Wol indur tfChair) College of Business and Public Administration Leonard I. Ruchelman (Member) Berhanu Mengistu^Ph.D. G. William Whitehurst (Member) Program Director Graduate Center for Urban Studies And Public Administration Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. -
Highlights of 1997 Accomplishments
Highlights of 1997 Accomplishments Making America Safe • Continued the Department’s firm policy for dealing with terror- ist acts, focusing on deterrence, quick and decisive investiga- tions and prosecutions, and international cooperation to vigor- ously pursue and prosecute terrorists, both domestic and for- eign. • Continued to prosecute the most violent criminal offenders under the Anti-Violent Crime Initiative, forging unprecedented working relationships with members of local communities, State and local prosecutors, and local law enforcement officials. • Focused enforcement operations on the seamless continuum of drug trafficking, using comprehensive investigative techniques to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy trafficking operations ema- nating from Mexico, Colombia, Asia, Africa, and other coun- tries. • Coordinated multijurisdictional and multiagency investigations to immobilize drug trafficking organizations by arresting their members, confiscating their drugs, and seizing their assets. • Continued to eliminate the many criminal enterprises of organized crime families, including the La Cosa Nostra fami- lies and their associates and nontraditional organized crime groups emanating from the former Soviet Bloc and Asia. • Chaired the High-Tech Subgroup of the P8 focusing on interna- tional trap-and-trace procedures and transborder searches, and represented the United States at the Council of Europe’s Com- mittee of Experts on Crime in Cyberspace, which is drafting an international convention on a wide range of high-tech issues. • Promulgated legislation enacted to effect BOP’s takeover of Lorton prison before 2001 and to transfer D.C. parole jurisdic- tion to the U.S. Parole Commission; further consideration and action are expected on a number of crime-related proposals during the second session of Congress. -
Psychology of Terrorism
Psychology of Terrorism EDITED BY Bruce Bongar Lisa M. Brown Larry E. Beutler James N. Breckenridge Philip C. Zimbardo OXFORD USIVERSITT PRESS War Versus Justice in Response to Terrorist Attacks Competing Frames and Their Implications Clark McCauley Often lost m d~scussionof the September 11, 2001, terrorism. "On September the 11th. entmies of attacks on the World Trad? Center (WTC) 1s the freedom committed an act of war against our coun- fact that a very nmllar attack, v;lth similar moti- t~.. Our war on terror begns with a1 Qaeda. but vation and related perpetrators. occurred eight it does not end there. It m~llnot end until evey years earlier On February 16. 1993, a truck bomb terrorist group of global reach has been found. in the basement parking garage of the WTC killed stopped and defeated" (Bush, 2001) SLX.injured hundreds, and damaged property to \Vithin the rhetonc of war., however. here has [he extent of half a billion dollars. The bomb was been frequent recourse to the rhetoric of cnminal designed to topple one of the towers into the other justice. "Whether we bring our enemes to lusuce or and to bring both tolvers down. The man behind justice to our enemies, justice will be done. .\Ye thls plan, Ramzi Yousef, noted regretfully that if he wdl come together to gve law enforc?ment the had had a little more funding his design would additional toois it needs to track dorm terror here have succeeded and killed tens of thousands (Krk. at home" (Bush, 2001; White House Press Office. -
Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Order Code RL32223 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Foreign Terrorist Organizations February 6, 2004 Audrey Kurth Cronin Specialist in Terrorism Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Huda Aden, Adam Frost, and Benjamin Jones Research Associates Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Foreign Terrorist Organizations Summary This report analyzes the status of many of the major foreign terrorist organizations that are a threat to the United States, placing special emphasis on issues of potential concern to Congress. The terrorist organizations included are those designated and listed by the Secretary of State as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” (For analysis of the operation and effectiveness of this list overall, see also The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, CRS Report RL32120.) The designated terrorist groups described in this report are: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Armed Islamic Group (GIA) ‘Asbat al-Ansar Aum Supreme Truth (Aum) Aum Shinrikyo, Aleph Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) Hizballah (Party of God) Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) Kahane Chai (Kach) Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, KADEK) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba -
FBI 1996 US Terrorism Report
TERRoRISM in the United States 1996 Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit National Security Division I N T R O DUCTION United States soil was the site of three terrorist incidents during 1996. The pipe bomb explosion during the Summer Olympic Games in Centennial Olympic Park that killed two and the robberies and bombings carried out in April and July 1996 by members of a group known as the Phineas Priesthood underscored the ever-present threat that exists from individuals determined to use violence to advance particular causes. The FBI successfully prevented five planned acts of domestic terrorism in 1996. These preventions thwarted attacks on law enforcement officials, prevented planned bombings of federal buildings, and halted plots to destroy domestic infrastructure. The explosion of TWA Flight 800 over the Atlantic Ocean near Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996, resulted in initial speculation that a terrorist attack may have been the cause and served to highlight the potential danger terrorists pose to U.S. civil aviation. The FBI, along with the National Transportation Safety Board, devoted significant resources to the criminal investigation throughout 1996. Evidence did not implicate a criminal or terrorist act by year’s-end. Threats from domestic terrorism continue to build as militia extremists, particularly those operating in the western United States, gain new adherents, stockpile weapons, and prepare for armed conflict with the federal government. The potential for domestic right-wing terrorism remains a threat. Special interest groups also endure as a threat that could surface at any time. International terrorists threaten the United States directly. -
Surprise, Intelligence Failure, and Mass Casualty Terrorism
SURPRISE, INTELLIGENCE FAILURE, AND MASS CASUALTY TERRORISM by Thomas E. Copeland B.A. Political Science, Geneva College, 1991 M.P.I.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1992 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The Graduate School of Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2006 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Thomas E. Copeland It was defended on April 12, 2006 and approved by Davis Bobrow, Ph.D. Donald Goldstein, Ph.D. Dennis Gormley Phil Williams, Ph.D. Dissertation Director ii © 2006 Thomas E. Copeland iii SURPRISE, INTELLIGENCE FAILURE, AND MASS CASUALTY TERRORISM Thomas E. Copeland, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2006 This study aims to evaluate whether surprise and intelligence failure leading to mass casualty terrorism are inevitable. It explores the extent to which four factors – failures of public policy leadership, analytical challenges, organizational obstacles, and the inherent problems of warning information – contribute to intelligence failure. This study applies existing theories of surprise and intelligence failure to case studies of five mass casualty terrorism incidents: World Trade Center 1993; Oklahoma City 1995; Khobar Towers 1996; East African Embassies 1998; and September 11, 2001. A structured, focused comparison of the cases is made using a set of thirteen probing questions based on the factors above. The study concludes that while all four factors were influential, failures of public policy leadership contributed directly to surprise. Psychological bias and poor threat assessments prohibited policy makers from anticipating or preventing attacks. Policy makers mistakenly continued to use a law enforcement approach to handling terrorism, and failed to provide adequate funding, guidance, and oversight of the intelligence community. -
Staff Statement No
Outline of the 9/11 Plot Staff Statement No. 16 Members of the Commission, your staff is prepared to report its preliminary findings regarding the conspiracy that produced the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States. We remain ready to revise our understanding of this subject as our work continues. Dietrich Snell, Rajesh De, Hyon Kim, Michael Jacobson, John Tamm, Marco Cordero, John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena Wille did most of the investigative work reflected in this statement. We are fortunate to have had access to the fruits of a massive investigative effort by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies, as well intelligence collection and analysis from the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. Much of the account in this statement reflects assertions reportedly made by various 9/11 conspirators and captured al Qaeda members while under interrogation. We have sought to corroborate this material as much as possible. Some of this material has been inconsistent. We have had to make judgment calls based on the weight and credibility of the evidence. Our information on statements attributed to such individuals comes from written reporting; we have not had direct access to any of them. Plot Overview Origins of the 9/11 Attacks The idea for the September 11 attacks appears to have originated with a veteran jihadist named Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). A Kuwaiti from the Baluchistan region of Pakistan, KSM grew up in a religious family and claims to have joined the Muslim Brotherhood at the age of 16. -
The Open Door How Militant Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained in the United States, 1993-2001 by Steven A
Center for Immigration Studies The Open Door How Militant Islamic Terrorists Entered and Remained in the United States, 1993-2001 By Steven A. Camarota Center for Immigration Studies Center for 1 Center Paper 21 Center for Immigration Studies About the Author Steven A. Camarota is Director of Research at the Center for Immigration Studies in Wash- ington, D.C. He holds a master’s degree in political science from the University of Pennsyl- vania and a Ph.D. in public policy analysis from the University of Virginia. Dr. Camarota has testified before Congress and has published widely on the political and economic ef- fects of immigration on the United States. His articles on the impact of immigration have appeared in both academic publications and the popular press including Social Science Quarterly, The Washington Post, The Chicago Tribune, Campaigns and Elections, and National Review. His most recent works published by the Center for Immigration Studies are: The New Ellis Islands: Examining Non-Traditional Areas of Immigrant Settlement in the 1990s, Immigration from Mexico: Assessing the Impact on the United States, The Slowing Progress of Immigrants: An Examination of Income, Home Ownership, and Citizenship, 1970-2000, Without Coverage: Immigration’s Impact on the Size and Growth of the Population Lacking Health Insurance, and Reconsidering Immigrant Entrepreneurship: An Examination of Self- Employment Among Natives and the Foreign-born. About the Center The Center for Immigration Studies, founded in 1985, is a non-profit, non-partisan re- search organization in Washington, D.C., that examines and critiques the impact of immi- gration on the United States. -
9/11 Report”), July 2, 2004, Pp
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page i THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page v CONTENTS List of Illustrations and Tables ix Member List xi Staff List xiii–xiv Preface xv 1. “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 1 1.1 Inside the Four Flights 1 1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14 1.3 National Crisis Management 35 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992) 55 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71 3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing 71 3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation— ...in the Law Enforcement Community 73 3.3 . and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82 3.4 . and in the Intelligence Community 86 v Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page vi 3.5 . and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93 3.6 . and in the White House 98 3.7 . and in the Congress 102 4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108 4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108 4.2 Crisis:August 1998 115 4.3 Diplomacy 121 4.4 Covert Action 126 4.5 Searching for Fresh Options 134 5. -
9-11 and Terrorist Travel- Full
AND TERRORIST TRAVEL Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States By Thomas R. Eldridge Susan Ginsburg Walter T. Hempel II Janice L. Kephart Kelly Moore and Joanne M. Accolla, Staff Assistant Alice Falk, Editor Note from the Executive Director The Commission staff organized its work around specialized studies, or monographs, prepared by each of the teams. We used some of the evolving draft material for these studies in preparing the seventeen staff statements delivered in conjunction with the Commission’s 2004 public hearings. We used more of this material in preparing draft sections of the Commission’s final report. Some of the specialized staff work, while not appropriate for inclusion in the report, nonetheless offered substantial information or analysis that was not well represented in the Commission’s report. In a few cases this supplemental work could be prepared to a publishable standard, either in an unclassified or classified form, before the Commission expired. This study is on immigration, border security and terrorist travel issues. It was prepared principally by Thomas Eldridge, Susan Ginsburg, Walter T. Hempel II, Janice Kephart, and Kelly Moore, with assistance from Joanne Accolla, and editing assistance from Alice Falk. As in all staff studies, they often relied on work done by their colleagues. This is a study by Commission staff. While the Commissioners have been briefed on the work and have had the opportunity to review earlier drafts of some of this work, they have not approved this text and it does not necessarily reflect their views. -
National Security Case Studies Special
National Security Case Studies Special Case-Management Challenges Robert Timothy Reagan Federal Judicial Center June 25, 2013 This Federal Judicial Center publication was undertaken in furtherance of the Center’s statutory mission to develop and conduct research and education programs for the judicial branch. While the Center regards the content as responsible and valuable, it does not reflect policy or recommendations of the Board of the Federal Judicial Center. Contents Table of Challenges .......................................................................................................... xi Table of Judges ............................................................................................................... xiii INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 2 TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS ..................................................................................... 3 First World Trade Center Bombing United States v. Salameh (Kevin Thomas Duffy) and United States v. Abdel Rahman (Michael B. Mukasey) (S.D.N.Y.) ....................................................................... 5 Challenge: Interpreters ............................................................................................. 24 Challenge: Court Security ......................................................................................... 24 Challenge: Pro Se Defendants ................................................................................. 24 Challenge: Jury -
Bombing for Justice: Urban Terrorism in New York City from the 1960S Through the 1980S
City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works Publications and Research John Jay College of Criminal Justice 2014 Bombing for Justice: Urban Terrorism in New York City from the 1960s through the 1980s Jeffrey A. Kroessler John Jay College of Criminal Justice How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/jj_pubs/38 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] Bombing for Justice: Urban Terrorism in New York City from the 1960s through to the 1980s Jeffrey A. Kroessler John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York ew York is no stranger to explosives. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Black Hand, forerunners of the Mafia, planted bombs at stores and residences belonging to successful NItalians as a tactic in extortion schemes. To combat this evil, the New York Police Department (NYPD) founded the Italian Squad under Lieutenant Joseph Petrosino, who enthusiastically pursued those gangsters. Petrosino was assassinated in Palermo, Sicily, while investigating the criminal back- ground of mobsters active in New York. The Italian Squad was the gen- esis of today’s Bomb Squad. In the early decades of the twentieth century, anarchists and labor radicals planted bombs, the most devastating the 63 64 Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement noontime explosion on Wall Street in 1920. That crime was never solved.1 The city has also had its share of lunatics.