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Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

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Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism Patterns of Conduct Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism Prepared for M. Cherif Bassiouni Chair, UNHRC Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in Libya By Corri Zoli, Sahar Azar, and Shani Ross1 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism 1 INTRODUCTION: Document Aim & Purpose This Report provides a brief history and outline of documented examples of Libyan support, funding, and involvement in acts of terrorism and related international humanitarian and human rights violations over the course of Colonel Mu’ammar al- Qadhafi’s forty years of leadership. The Report has three parts. After a brief overview of the Libyan regime’s longstanding disregard for international norms, we provide a short chronology of incidents that exemplify Qadhafi’s role in international terrorism and that reveal links to Libyan sponsors. We then discuss prevalent “patterns of conduct” over time and how these underscore Libyan noncompliance with international law and disregard for human life and for the consequences of acts of terrorism—a longstanding posture by the Qadhafi leadership that may very well frame current reported practices toward Libyan civilians, protestors, and rebels. Note: If readers prefer to skip directly to our concise chronological summary of incidents (abstracted from our more detailed and comprehensive Timeline, available in Appendix A), turn now to Section 2.0: Summary of Incidents. Also refer to Appendix B for our baseline definitions of terrorism, international terrorism, and international human rights violations (drawing from U.S. statute and international legal standards) that dictate selection of incidents. 1 Corri Zoli and Shani Ross are Research Fellows, Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT), College of Law/Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY; Sahar L. Azar is a Juris Doctor Candidate 2011, Syracuse University College of Law. 2 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism BACKGROUND: Libyan Regime Under Qadhafi Given modern Libyan history, few impartial observers would find surprising current reports of violations of international law, particularly humanitarian and human rights law—most notably, the right to life of Libyan citizens—or Colonel Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi‘s longstanding role in them. Libya, the Great Socialist People‘s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, has operated as an authoritarian regime since 1969, when Qadhafi overthrew the constitutional monarchy in a coup d‘état, and has since ruled 6.5 million Libyans from principles derived, not from a constitution or the rule of law, but from the Green Book (1976), Qadhafi‘s manifesto for everlasting revolution and popular rule, and periodic declarations enforced by government security forces. The longest ruling autocrat in the Middle East and North African region, who counts Idi Amin, Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh, Robert Mugabe and others as friends, Qadhafi exemplifies disregard for accepted national and international legal regimes and norms. In fact, this government‘s performance in domestic and foreign affairs runs parallel in its repression, bellicosity, and, most important for our purposes, its use of terrorism and unlawful political violence as a preferred policy instrument in both arenas. The U.S. State Department‘s Patterns of Global Terrorism (1985) documents how, from this government‘s inception, ―Qadhafi has made terrorism one of the primary instruments of his foreign policy.‖2 These annual reports among other sources provide historical perspective on how the Libyan regime has practiced and implemented this policy. Some of Qadhafi‘s main strategies include: (1.) providing material support, especially funds and arms, for radical and extremist groups that use terrorist tactics anywhere in the world; (2.) building and operating ―numerous training sites for foreign dissident groups that provide instruction in the use of explosive devices, hijacking, assassination, and various commando and guerrilla techniques,‖ as well as offering terrorist training programs outside country; (3.) ensuring safe-haven in Libya for terrorists, terrorist groups, networks, terrorist intelligence and activities; (4.) abusing diplomatic privilege in storing arms and explosives at diplomatic establishments and using embassies to plan and conduct terrorist acts; (5.) building and organizing mercenary militias for instigating or meddling in noninternational conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, and beyond; (6.) targeting for assassination and attack exiles, persona non grata, internationally protected persons, and regime opposition groups anywhere in the world. In addition to these prevalent strategies, many employed over the course of this government‘s entire tenure, Qadhafi is (7.) a master of ―spectacular‖ terrorist events that make the global news in their ability to shock ordinary sensibilities and inspire public fear: passenger aircraft bombings, hijackings and hostage-situations, assassination of diplomats, and strikes against maritime vessels. If Libya under Qadhafi has been emblematic of political violence, an opportunity for change in this narrative thus occurred in the aftermath of the 1992 and 1993 United Nations sanctions in response to Libya‘s role in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. After the political and economic isolation of Libya for much of the 1990s, which eroded its base of power in its refining capacity, by 1999, Libyan officials surrendered Libyan suspects for trial before a Scottish court in the Netherlands, and by 2003, Qadhafi accepted responsibility for the regime‘s role in these events and paid compensation to victims‘ families. In the aftermath, a period of engagement, even normalization of relations, occurred in which Qadhafi pursued closer economic and security ties with the West; renounced terrorism; cooperated with investigations of prior Libyan acts of state-sponsored terrorism and violence; paid additional victim compensation; and ended weapons of mass destruction programs. The United 2 U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1985 (October 1986), Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, p. 4 [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1985pogt.pdf]. 3 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism States even rescinded Libya‘s longstanding designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in 2006, and Libya was elected by the UN General Assembly to a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2008–2009 term.3 Yet, Qadhafi‘s repressive response to recent opposition movements across Libya—inspired by the Arab youth and prodemocracy uprisings throughout the Middle East and North Africa—has reversed the international community‘s nascent good opinion of Libya. Indeed, Qadhafi met what were initially nonviolent protests with familiar indiscriminate violence and, further, publicly defended his use of force against unarmed civilians as an unmitigated right of rule (against existing humanitarian and human rights norms).4 Perhaps accurately perceiving the civil unrest as an existential threat to his regime, Qadhafi rolled out land and air forces against Libyan citizens and used forbidden tactics on peaceful protestors in public squares, thus, making good on his threats to pursue dissenters to their deaths.5 Such actions have sparked international condemnation and prompted emergency diplomatic planning meetings and decisive actions across UN agencies, including the Security Council, as well as the Arab League and other multilateral regional organizations, on the part of NATO members, and by human rights advocacy and humanitarian aid groups. To protect civilians and prevent atrocities, the UN Security Council resolved to enforce a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace (17 March 2011), authorized ―all necessary measures‖ to ―protect civilians and civilian area‖ under threat of attack (excluding an occupation force), and allowed strikes against Libyan ground troops and warships (begun on 19 March 2011) under the auspices of NATO with French, British, and U.S. assets, among other supports.6 With this background in mind, we turn now to a concise chronology of Libyan regime support for and involvement in international terrorism and the regime‘s more general approach to international law, particularly humanitarian and human rights law. 3 See 71 Fed. Reg. 39,696 (13 Jul. 2006), ending Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism under three statutes: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §2405(j) (continued in effect by Executive Order No. 13,222 of 12 Aug. 2001); section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §2780; and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. §2371(c) (Supp. 4 2004). See also Presidential Determination No. 2006-14, Certification on Rescission of Libya’s Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, 71 Fed. Reg. 31,909 (1 Jun. 2006) and U.S. Library of Congress, “Libyan Claims Resolution Act” (4 Aug. 2008) providing for the restoration of Libya’s sovereign, diplomatic, and official immunities before U.S. courts, if the Secretary of State certifies receiving sufficient funds to resolve outstanding terrorism- related claims against Libya, [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:S.3370+. Also note that “Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara” was allowed by Qadhafi in Libya's portion of the Sahara Desert.
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