Patterns of Conduct Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

Prepared for M. Cherif Bassiouni Chair, UNHRC Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations in Libya

By Corri Zoli, Sahar Azar, and Shani Ross1 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

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INTRODUCTION: Document Aim & Purpose

This Report provides a brief history and outline of documented examples of Libyan support, funding, and involvement in acts of terrorism and related international humanitarian and human rights violations over the course of Colonel Mu’ammar al- Qadhafi’s forty years of leadership.

The Report has three parts. After a brief overview of the Libyan regime’s longstanding disregard for international norms, we provide a short chronology of incidents that exemplify Qadhafi’s role in international terrorism and that reveal links to Libyan sponsors. We then discuss prevalent “patterns of conduct” over time and how these underscore Libyan noncompliance with international law and disregard for human life and for the consequences of acts of terrorism—a longstanding posture by the Qadhafi leadership that may very well frame current reported practices toward Libyan civilians, protestors, and rebels.

Note: If readers prefer to skip directly to our concise chronological summary of incidents (abstracted from our more detailed and comprehensive Timeline, available in Appendix A), turn now to Section 2.0: Summary of Incidents. Also refer to Appendix B for our baseline definitions of terrorism, international terrorism, and international human rights violations (drawing from U.S. statute and international legal standards) that dictate selection of incidents.

1 Corri Zoli and Shani Ross are Research Fellows, Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT), College of Law/Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY; Sahar L. Azar is a Juris Doctor Candidate 2011, Syracuse University College of Law.

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BACKGROUND: Libyan Regime Under Qadhafi

Given modern Libyan history, few impartial observers would find surprising current reports of violations of international law, particularly humanitarian and human rights law—most notably, the right to life of Libyan citizens—or Colonel Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi‘s longstanding role in them.

Libya, the Great Socialist People‘s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, has operated as an authoritarian regime since 1969, when Qadhafi overthrew the constitutional monarchy in a coup d‘état, and has since ruled 6.5 million Libyans from principles derived, not from a constitution or the rule of law, but from the Green Book (1976), Qadhafi‘s manifesto for everlasting revolution and popular rule, and periodic declarations enforced by government security forces. The longest ruling autocrat in the Middle East and North African region, who counts Idi Amin, Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh, Robert Mugabe and others as friends, Qadhafi exemplifies disregard for accepted national and international legal regimes and norms. In fact, this government‘s performance in domestic and foreign affairs runs parallel in its repression, bellicosity, and, most important for our purposes, its use of terrorism and unlawful political violence as a preferred policy instrument in both arenas.

The U.S. State Department‘s Patterns of Global Terrorism (1985) documents how, from this government‘s inception, ―Qadhafi has made terrorism one of the primary instruments of his foreign policy.‖2 These annual reports among other sources provide historical perspective on how the Libyan regime has practiced and implemented this policy. Some of Qadhafi‘s main strategies include: (1.) providing material support, especially funds and arms, for radical and extremist groups that use terrorist tactics anywhere in the world; (2.) building and operating ―numerous training sites for foreign dissident groups that provide instruction in the use of explosive devices, hijacking, assassination, and various commando and guerrilla techniques,‖ as well as offering terrorist training programs outside country; (3.) ensuring safe-haven in Libya for terrorists, terrorist groups, networks, terrorist intelligence and activities; (4.) abusing diplomatic privilege in storing arms and explosives at diplomatic establishments and using embassies to plan and conduct terrorist acts; (5.) building and organizing mercenary militias for instigating or meddling in noninternational conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, and beyond; (6.) targeting for assassination and attack exiles, persona non grata, internationally protected persons, and regime opposition groups anywhere in the world. In addition to these prevalent strategies, many employed over the course of this government‘s entire tenure, Qadhafi is (7.) a master of ―spectacular‖ terrorist events that make the global news in their ability to shock ordinary sensibilities and inspire public fear: passenger aircraft bombings, hijackings and hostage-situations, assassination of diplomats, and strikes against maritime vessels.

If Libya under Qadhafi has been emblematic of political violence, an opportunity for change in this narrative thus occurred in the aftermath of the 1992 and 1993 United Nations sanctions in response to Libya‘s role in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. After the political and economic isolation of Libya for much of the 1990s, which eroded its base of power in its refining capacity, by 1999, Libyan officials surrendered Libyan suspects for trial before a Scottish court in the Netherlands, and by 2003, Qadhafi accepted responsibility for the regime‘s role in these events and paid compensation to victims‘ families. In the aftermath, a period of engagement, even normalization of relations, occurred in which Qadhafi pursued closer economic and security ties with the West; renounced terrorism; cooperated with investigations of prior Libyan acts of state-sponsored terrorism and violence; paid additional victim compensation; and ended weapons of mass destruction programs. The United

2 U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1985 (October 1986), Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, p. 4 [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1985pogt.pdf].

3 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

States even rescinded Libya‘s longstanding designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in 2006, and Libya was elected by the UN General Assembly to a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2008–2009 term.3

Yet, Qadhafi‘s repressive response to recent opposition movements across Libya—inspired by the Arab youth and prodemocracy uprisings throughout the Middle East and North Africa—has reversed the international community‘s nascent good opinion of Libya. Indeed, Qadhafi met what were initially nonviolent protests with familiar indiscriminate violence and, further, publicly defended his use of force against unarmed civilians as an unmitigated right of rule (against existing humanitarian and human rights norms).4 Perhaps accurately perceiving the civil unrest as an existential threat to his regime, Qadhafi rolled out land and air forces against Libyan citizens and used forbidden tactics on peaceful protestors in public squares, thus, making good on his threats to pursue dissenters to their deaths.5 Such actions have sparked international condemnation and prompted emergency diplomatic planning meetings and decisive actions across UN agencies, including the Security Council, as well as the Arab League and other multilateral regional organizations, on the part of NATO members, and by human rights advocacy and humanitarian aid groups. To protect civilians and prevent atrocities, the UN Security Council resolved to enforce a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace (17 March 2011), authorized ―all necessary measures‖ to ―protect civilians and civilian area‖ under threat of attack (excluding an occupation force), and allowed strikes against Libyan ground troops and warships (begun on 19 March 2011) under the auspices of NATO with French, British, and U.S. assets, among other supports.6

With this background in mind, we turn now to a concise chronology of Libyan regime support for and involvement in international terrorism and the regime‘s more general approach to international law, particularly humanitarian and human rights law.

3 See 71 Fed. Reg. 39,696 (13 Jul. 2006), ending Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism under three statutes: section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §2405(j) (continued in effect by Executive Order No. 13,222 of 12 Aug. 2001); section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §2780; and section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. §2371(c) (Supp. 4 2004). See also Presidential Determination No. 2006-14, Certification on Rescission of Libya’s Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, 71 Fed. Reg. 31,909 (1 Jun. 2006) and U.S. Library of Congress, “Libyan Claims Resolution Act” (4 Aug. 2008) providing for the restoration of Libya’s sovereign, diplomatic, and official immunities before U.S. courts, if the Secretary of State certifies receiving sufficient funds to resolve outstanding terrorism- related claims against Libya, [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:S.3370+. Also note that “Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara” was allowed by Qadhafi in Libya's portion of the Sahara Desert. 4 Qadhafi’s broadcasts statements of opposition members as “cockroaches,” a term familiar from genocidal discourse used in another African civil war. See “Gaddafi: 'I will not give up', 'we will chase the cockroaches,'” Times of Malta (22 Feb. 2011), [http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110222/local/gaddafi-in-fighting-speech-i-will-not-give-up.351487]. 5 Amnesty International (AI) has documented indiscriminate killings of civilians, extrajudicial executions, and other evidence of potential war crimes. See “Killing of Captives Points to War Crimes by Libyan Forces,” (11 April 2011); “Amnesty International Finds Evidence of Extrajudicial Executions Apparently by Colonel Gaddafi’s Forces near Ajdabiya,” (11 April 2011), *http://www.amnestyusa.org+. Also see Tom Kunz, “Libya’s Late, Great Rights Record,” The New York Times (5 March 2011), available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/weekinreview/06libya.html+, noting Libya’s recent suspension from the U.N. Human Rights Council and an earlier UNHRC draft report praising Libyan human rights progress. 6 See UN Security Council resolution 1970 (2011), [Peace and Security in Africa], 26 Feb. 2011, S/RES/1970 (2011), available at: http://www.UNhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d6ce9742.html; and UN Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) [on the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya], 17 Mar. 2011, S/RES/1973(2011), [http://www.UNhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d885fc42.html].

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SUMMARY OF INCIDENTS: Abbreviated Chronology of Libyan Role in International Terrorism

This chronology underscores the range and variety of incidents that define Libyan involvement in international terrorism and related violations of international law. While it is no small task to document these incidents and link them to the sponsor, given the often clandestine nature of terrorist planning and activities, we have selected examples according to two general guidelines: (1.) those that provide a comprehensive picture of the variegated ways in which Qadhafi mobilized terrorism, often as Libya‘s predominant foreign policy approach; and (2.) those that can be verified by at least one (but often more) reliable sources and where we could link the terrorist or terrorist-related activity to the sponsor, i.e., Libya or Libyan agents and assets. We have also used a range of diverse but reliable sources and have cross- checked them against each other where possible.7

These incidents are abstracted from the more detailed comprehensive Timeline (available in Appendix A), which readers may wish to consult.

1969 Military interventions into Chad begin—even prior to Qadhafi Libyan leadership.8

1970 Qadhafi expels all Libyan Italians (approximately 20,000 people) and the remaining Jewish community in October,9 and issues new laws confiscating all Jewish assets. Qadhafi justifies this act on the grounds that ―the alignment of the Jews with Israel, the Arab nations‘ enemy, has forfeited their right to compensation.‖10

1972 Islamic Legion formed: a Libyan-sponsored mercenary force to promote the Arabization of territories in North Africa and the Sahel region (Chad, Sudan) through the use of force.11 A hybrid of regular Libyan Army and African paramilitary, the Islamic Legion became a characteristic expeditionary force for instigating and intervening into noninternational conflicts and civil wars.

7 These sources include, but are not limited to, UN and U.S. government and official documents, academic scholarship and independent research, reports from human rights, humanitarian, and aid advocacy organizations (i.e., Amnesty International) and think tanks, reputable news media reports and analysis, among others. 8 See Kenneth Pollack (2002), Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (University of Nebraska Press): 375, for Qadhafi’s early involvement, and Mario Azevedo (1998), Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad (Routledge), for Libyan motives i.e., Qadhafi’s desire to re-Arabize North Africa and develop a pan-Arab militia (Islamic Legion) to defeat Western influence in the Arab and African worlds. 9 “Italians Plan to See Libya Once Again,” The New York Times (22 Oct. 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/21/world/europe/21iht-italy.html; “Libya, Italy ‘to sign compensation deal,’” Geopolitical Monitor (24 July 2008), http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/libya-italy-to-sign-compensation-deal-957/ 10 David A. Harris, In the Trenches: Selected Speeches and Writings of an American Jewish Activist, 1979-1999 (KTAV Publishing House, Inc. 2001). See Dick Vandewalle ed. (2008), Libya Since 1969: Qadhafi's Revolution Revisited (New York: Palgrave Macmillan): 9. Later, Qadhafi counseled, Idi Amin, President of Uganda, to expel Asians from Uganda, which Amin subsequently put into action (80,0000 were expelled by decree) on 4 August 1972 . See Idi Amin, Benoni Turyahikayo-Rugyema (1998), Idi Amin Speaks: An Annotated Selection of His Speeches, 43, and “1972: Asians Given 24 hours to Leave Uganda," BBC on this Day (7 Aug. 1972), [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/7/newsid_2492000/2492333.stm]. 11 Sam Nolutshunga (1995), Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad (University of Virginia Press): 220. Nolutshunga notes that the Islamic legion was not only designed to create by force “the Great Islamic State of the Sahel,” but to Arabize territories in especially northern Africa. Scholars also believe Qaddafi hostility to Chad’s President François Tombalbaye’s was due to his African and Christian background, and Gaddafi’s expelled the Toubou of Libya (though Muslims), considered 'black,' off Fezzan into Chad for similar race-based reasons. In Darfur, Gaddafi supported the Arab Gathering (Tajammu al-Arabi), which Gérard Prunier describes as "a militantly racist and pan-Arabist organization” stressing “the 'Arab' character of the province." See Gérard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (Cornell University Press, 2005) 45.

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Libya as training site for irregular forces – Qadhafi announces that armed groups may ―register at any Libyan embassy and will be given adequate training for combat,‖12makes paramilitary training available to all Arab volunteers for Palestinian revolutionary groups, and publicly states that he is already supplying weapons, money, and volunteers to Irish Revolutionaries.13

―Black September‖ September 5 – Hostage taking and massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games results in 12 deaths: 11 Israeli athletes and coaches and one German policeman. The attack, celebrated by Qadhafi, was planned by Black September operatives, Abu Daoud and Salah Khalaf, who recruited eight Palestinians trained in Libya a month prior to the attack.14 Three of the surviving attackers, Al-Gashey, Safady, and Al-Gashey, were ultimately released to Libya15 when Libya gave refuge to the Lufthansa airliner hijacked (29 October 1972) with the demand for their release.16 Libyan passports (as well as Iraqi and Algerian passports) were used by the operatives.17 1973 Irish Naval Service on March 28 intercepts the vessel Claudia in Irish territorial waters with five tons of arms and munitions on board, loaded in Libya.18 Libya invades Chad and occupies the Aouzou Strip in June—Qadhafi only withdraws troops (June 1994) due to a judgment by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), issued on 3 February 1994, in favor of Chad sovereignty.19 September 5 Attack of El-Al airliner at Rome airport–The attack was organized by the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) using Libyan missiles and averted after Italian authorities found two SA-7 missiles.20

December 17 Attack of Pan-Am Flight 110 airliner on Rome runway – Qadhafi-orders and finances the National Arab Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (NAYLP) attack, which kills 31

12 Brian Lee Davis, Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990): 182. 13 “Libya Leader Says IRA Given Arms,” The Washington Post, June 12, 1972, A8; Associated Press, “Premier Says Libya Aids ‘Revolutionaries’ in Ulster,” June 12, 1972, 1. 14 Simon Reeve (2000), One Day In September: The Full Story Of The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre (New York: Arcade Publishing); 43-44. 15 Reeve (2000): 186. The Lufthansa passenger jet was hijacked on 29-30 Oct. 1972 (en route from Damascus through Beirut to Frankfurt) by PFLP members who demanded the release of the 3 Black September hijackers held in German custody. When released, they flew directly to Tripoli. See Kay Schiller and Christopher Young (2010), The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press): 216-217. 16 Lock K. Johnson (2006), Strategic Intelligence: Vol. 1, Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (New York: Praeger Publishers): 66. 17 http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/TE/00254/all.pdf 18 Sean O’Riordan, “Ready to Call it a Day after 40 years A-Sailing with the Irish Naval Service,” Irish Examiner, 10 Nov. 2010, [http://irishexaminer.com/ireland/ready-to-call-it-a-day-after-40-years-a-sailing-with-the-irish-naval-service- 135942.html]; Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003): 10. 19 ICJ Case concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment of 3 Feb. 1994, [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=cd&case=83&code=dt&p3=4]. See also U.N. Security Council, resolution 914 (1994), Establishes U.N. Aouzou Strip Observer Group in the Aouzou Strip (Chad), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3373rd meeting, on 4 May 1994, S/RES/915 (1994), [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f1572c.html];and U.N. Security Council resolution 926 (1994), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3390th meeting, on 13 June 1994, S/RES/926 (1994), [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f12a74.html]. 20 Matt Schroeder, “Appendix 14.A. Global Efforts to Control MANPADS” in Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, (SIPRI Yearbook, 2007) 627.

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passengers and wounds 40; these operatives subsequently hijack a Lufthansa airliner, killing one person during a stopover in Athens.21

1974 September 8 bombing of TWA Flight 841 – National Arab Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (NAYLP) detonates an explosive on board TWA Flight 841, causing the airliner to crash into the Ionian Sea, killing all 88 persons on board.22

1975 Qadhafi orders the murder of Libyan dissidents living abroad.23

December 20 Vienna OPEC Conference hostage incident – Qadhafi directs, arms, and funds Venezuelan-born terrorist Ilich Ramirez Sanchez‘s (‗Carlos the Jackal‘) attack at the Vienna OPEC conference, where 3 are killed and 70 taken hostage.24 Hans-Joachim Klein, former member of the Revolutionary Cells, sentenced for his participation in the attack, testified that Qadhafi provided attackers with weapons, funding, and security information at the OPEC event.

1976 Qadhafi-backed attempted assassination of Chadian President General Felix Malloum in April.25

Qadhafi attempts assassination of Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiry.26

1977 U.S. discovers evidence that Libya is sponsoring an assassination attempt against U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Herman Frederick Eilts.27

1978 Qadhafi internationalizes the Uganda-Tanzania War and supplies President Idi Amin with 3,000 troops, arms, and equipment (including tanks, armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launcher vehicles, artillery, MiG-21 supersonic jet fighter, and a Tu-22 supersonic bomber).28

1979 December 2 attack and burning of the U.S. embassy in Tripoli—Libyan authorities sanction the attack,29 U.S. embassy staff are withdrawn from Tripoli, and the U.S. government declares Libya a ―state sponsor of terrorism‖ on 29 December 1979. 30

21 Cheatham (1973): 12; Robert D. Kumamoto, International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations, 1945-1976 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999) 172. 22 Brian Lee Davis, Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 13; http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR75-07.pdf; Brian M. Jenkins and Janera A. Johnson, “International Terrorism: A Chronology (1974 Supplement,” RAND (Feb 1975): 13, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2005/R1909-1.pdf] 23 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991 (April 1992), Appendix C: Libya’s Continuing Responsibility for Terrorism, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 69, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1991pogt.pdf]. 24 Toby Helm, “Friend of Fischer Jailed for Role in 1975 OPEC Killings,” The Telegraph, 16 Feb. 2001, [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/1322890/Friend-of-Fischer-jailed-for-role-in-1975-Opec-killings.html]; “Hess Pardons ‘Carlos the Jackal’ Comrade,” The Local, 8 Mar. 2009, [http://www.thelocal.de/national/20090308- 17883.html#+;“Carlos the Jackal to Face Trial for 1980s Attack,” CBC News, 4 May 2007, [http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2007/05/04/carlos-jackal.html]. 25 Brecher, Michael & Wilkenfeld, Jonathan (1997), A Study in Crisis (University of Michigan Press): 85. 26 Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins (2008), Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster (Markus Wiener Publishers): 152. 27 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991 (April 1992), Appendix C: Libya’s Continuing Responsibility for Terrorism, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, p. 69, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1991pogt.pdf]. 28 Kenneth M. Pollack (2002), Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–1991 (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press): 369-373; Joseph T. Stanik (2003), El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press). 29 Jon B. Alterman (2006), Libya and the U.S.: The Unique Libyan Case, Middle East Quarterly 21-29 (Winter 2006): 2, [http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060101_libyan_case.pdf].

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Summary of the 1970s: In the first decade of Qadhafi leadership, three trends emerge that will dominate Libyan foreign policy in the next decades: 1) Qadhafi‘s military intervention in and internationalization of regional noninternational conflicts, particularly in Africa (i.e., Chad, Sudan, Egypt). 2) Public and material support for terrorist and paramilitary groups that espouse the political use of violence (i.e., Provisional Irish Republican Army, U.S. Black Power movement, militant Palestinian splinter groups, guerilla movements based in the Philippines, Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen, Chad, Morocco, Tunisia, Thailand and Panama).31 Libyan patronage greatly contributes to this period‘s upsurge in transnational terrorism. 3) Contrary to other states in which terrorist acts are largely the unintended byproduct of the leader‘s activities,32 Qadhafi deliberately promotes terrorist violence as a strategy, via financial, logistical and technical support to extremist groups, to influence developments in affected states or territories. By the end of the decade, 29 December 1979, the U.S. government declares Libya a ―state sponsor of terrorism.‖33

1981 Qadhafi plans to assassinate U.S. diplomats in Paris and Rome; President Reagan expels Libyan diplomats from the U.S. and closes Libya‘s diplomatic mission in Washington, D.C. on May 6.34

August 19 Gulf of Sidra incident—Two Libyan SU-22 aircraft attack two U.S. F-14 aircraft participating in scheduled naval exercises over the Gulf of Sidra; U.S. fighters shoot them down in response.35 The U.S. had sent a carrier task force into the region to conduct ―Freedom of Navigation‖ and other naval operations in international waters in light of Qadhafi‘s claim to the

30 Libya was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism under the Export Administration Act on December 29, 1979: see Letter to the Speaker of the House and President of the Senate, Enclosure 2, pt. III, 2 Pub. Paper: JimmyCarter 2290, 2294 (Dec. 29, 1979); Revisions to Reflect Identification and Continuation of Foreign Policy Export Controls, 45 Fed. Reg. 1595, 1596 ( Jan. 8, 1980) (codified at 15 C.F.R. §385.4(d) (1980)). For the U.S. Department of State’s description of what this designation entails at the legal and policy level see, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, Chapter 3, “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” 5 August 2010 [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm]: The designation. . . carries with it four main sets of U.S. Government sanctions: (1.) A ban on arms-related exports and sales; (2.) Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30- day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country’s military capability or ability to support terrorism; (3.) Prohibitions on economic assistance; and (4.) Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including requiring the U.S. to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions; exception from the jurisdictional immunity in U.S. courts of state sponsor countries, and all former state sponsor countries (with the exception of Iraq), with respect to claims for money damages for personal injury or death caused by certain acts of terrorism, torture, or extrajudicial killing, or the provision of material support or resources for such acts; denial to companies and individuals tax credits for income earned in terrorist-list countries; denial of duty-free treatment of goods exported to the U.S.; authority to prohibit any U.S. citizen from engaging in a financial transaction with a terrorist-list government without a Treasury Department license; and prohibition of Defense Department contracts above US $ 100,000 with companies in which a state sponsor government owns or controls a significant interest. 31 Central Intelligence Agency, Research Study: International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis, April 1976: 20, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1976PoGT-Research-Study.pdf]. 32 CIA (1976): 20. 33 See supra note 30. 34 “Terrorist Attacks on Americans, 1979-1988: The Attacks, the Groups, and the U.S. Response,” Frontline, October 2001, [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html]. 35 Clyde R. Mark, Libya, Issue Brief for Congress, 23 May 2002: 6, [http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/10874.pdf];; Jon B. Alterman (2006), 2.

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entire Gulf territory i.e. an exclusive 62 nautical miles fishing zone in 1973, known as ―The Line of Death.‖36

1983 Brazil intercepts a falsely-labeled Libyan shipment of more than 80 tons of weapons and explosives bound for Managua, Nicaragua in April.37

Qadhafi is implicated in yet another plot to overthrow Sudanese President Nimeiri.38

1984 Nearly 30 terrorist attacks linked directly to Libyan agents or surrogates occur targeting Libyan exiles in Europe and the Middle East.39

April 17 Yvonne Fletcher incident – Automatic gunfire from the Libyan People‘s Bureau in central London results in the death of British police constable Fletcher and 10 others wounded.40 In 1999, Libya paid compensation for the death of Fletcher.41

Egypt is presumed to be the target of mines laid in the Red Sea near the entrance to the Suez Canal, most likely by a Libyan ship, which resulted in 18 damaged vessels registered to many nations in July.42

Libyan agents attempt to assassinate dissident refugees on pilgrimage in the holy city of Mecca; in August; the plot is thwarted by Saudi Arabian police.43

Egypt arrests four Libyan-hired mercenaries for plotting to kill a prominent Libyan exile in November; arrestees state that Libya‘s target list for assassinations includes President Mubarak.44

1985 December 27 Vienna and Rome airport attacks–Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) members launch simultaneous attacks on the El-Al ticket counter at Schwechat Airport, Vienna, and at the TWA and El-Al counters at the Leonardo da Vinci Airport, Rome. Libya provided passports to the ANO for the attack, as well as funding and support.45 Qadhafi praises the assaults as ―heroic operations carried out by the sons of the martyrs of Sabra and Shatila.‖46

36 See Yehuda Z. Blum, “The Gulf of Sidra Incident,” The American Journal of International Law 80(3), July 1986: 668- 677, p. 669, for a discussion of the Libyan claim, deemed “unacceptable” and “a violation of international law,” by the U.S. government. 37 Mark S. Steinitz, Middle East Terrorist Activity in Latin America, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Policy Papers on the Americas Volume XIV, Study 7 (July 2003): 4. 38 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1983 (Sept. 1984): 12, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1983PoGT.pdf]. 39 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1984 (Nov. 1985): 11, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1984PoGT.pdf]. 40 “1984: Libyan embassy shots kill policewoman,” BBC, 17 April, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/17/newsid_2488000/2488369.stm]. 41 “U.S. Department of State (2001), Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2000, 30 April 2011: 69, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/2000pogt.pdf]. 42 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1984: 11. 43 Brian Davis (1990), Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack On Libya (Praeger Publishers): 183. 44 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1984: 11. 45 Estate of John Buonocore III, et al. v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, et al., Complaint Case No. 1:06cv00727, (Distr. D.C. Apr. 21, 2006), [http://www.hnklaw.com/RomeFinalStampedComplaint.042106.pdf]. 46 Patrick Seale, (1992): 245.

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1986 April 5 Berlin LaBelle discothèque bombing—kills three people (two U.S. Army personnel) and wounds 200.47 Subsequent East German secret police/Stasi files demonstrate Libyan responsibility, and on 4 December 1992, German prosecutors identify two Libyan Embassy workers as having helped a Palestinian carry out the attack.48

Peru‘s Revolutionary Movement, Movement Túpac Amaru (MRTA), with Libyan assistance, bombs the residence of the U.S. ambassador in Lima.49

Libya arranges for the murder of three Western hostages in Lebanon, including American Peter Kilburn.50

Libyan government, on two separate occasions, is responsible for the shooting of a U.S. embassy communicator in Sudan and North Yemen.51

April 18 U.S. Officers Club attempted attack in Ankara, Turkey –Two Libyans are apprehended as they attempt to attack the U.S. Officers Club with grenades obtained from the Libyan People‘s Bureau there; operatives confess they were ordered to cause maximum casualties.52

September 5 Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking and attack in Karachi, Pakistan – Under the direction and support of Libya, the ANO conducts the hijacking and attack on Pan Am 73, killing 20 people and injuring over 100 others.53 Hijacker Jamal Saeed Abdul Rahim al-Fahid confirms the subsequent Sunday Times story that Qadhafi ―masterminded the attack‖ and that Fahid ―has taken the responsibility of executing the hijacking at the behest of Col. Gaddafi.‖54

1987 French authorities intercept the Eksund freighter off the coast of France and seize 150 tons of weapons and explosives destined for the PIRA from Libya 55

March 18 Attack at the café ―L’Historil‖ in Djibouti – Libya reportedly ordered a Palestinian group, the Popular Struggle Front, to conduct the attack, killing 11 and wounding 50.56

47 Clyde R. Mark, Libya, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 17 Mar. 2005: 8, [http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/46430.pdf]. 48 U.S. Department of State (1993), Patterns of Global Terrorism 1992, April 1993: 24, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1992P0GT.pdf]. U.S. President Reagan launches Operation El Dorado Canyon (15 Apr. 1986) from British bases targeting Tripoli and Benghazi, the revenge for which Qadhafi claims he sponsored the September 1986 hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan. 49 Mark S. Steinitz, Middle East Terrorist Activity in Latin America, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Policy Papers on the Americas Volume XIV, Study 7 (July 2003): 5. 50 U.S. Department of State (1992), Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991, April 1992: 69, Appendix C: Libya’s Continuing Responsibility for Terrorism, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1991pogt.pdf]. 51 Patterns of Global Terrorism (1992), 69. 52 Patterns of Global Terrorism (1992), 69. 53 Manjula Patel, et al. v. The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, et al., Civil Action No. 1:06-cv-00626 25-26, (Distr. D.C. April 24, 2006), [http://www.crowell.com/PDF/Pan-Am-Flight-73/panam73_Complaint.pdf]. 54 Jon Swain, “Revealed: Gadaffi’s Air Massacre Plot,” March 28, 2004, The Sunday Times, [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article1052614.ece]. Zayd Hassan Safarini was given three consecutive life sentences by a Washington court for murder, air piracy and hostage-taking after he struck an agreement with the court to escape a death sentence. 55 Patterns of Global Terrorism (1992), 70. 56 Patterns of Global Terrorism (1992), 70.

10 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

Libyan diplomats assist terrorists in bombing the World Vision office in Moudou, Chad in October.57

1988 Libya provides insurgency training, logistical, and funding to Foday Sankoh, co-founder (with Charles Taylor) of Sierra Leone rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF). After Sankoh leaves Libya for Liberia, he joins forces with Taylor and under RUF auspices commits atrocities against the Liberian population into the 1990s, backed by support and direction from Qadhafi, who routinely meets with them to review progress in their ―scorched-earth campaigns‖ (including mass rapes and amputations) and to supply weapons.58

Libya provides weapons for an ANO attack on a Greek cruise ship in July, killing 9 and wounding over 100 people.59

December 21 Pan Am Flight 103 bombing – A bomb hidden in stored luggage explodes, killing 259 people on board and 11 people on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland. After two years of investigations, the evidence implicates two Libyan government agents, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah. In November 1991 the U.S. and British government charge the agents, asking for their extradition. On 31 January 2001, Megrahi is found guilty of murder and sentenced to life in prison.60 Qadhafi admitted responsibility for the attack in 2003 and paid more than $2.7 billion to families of the victims.61

1989 September 19 UTA Flight 772, bound from Brazzaville, Congo, to Paris – explodes over the desert in southeastern Niger, killing all 171 passengers and crew members. Reports indicate Libyan planning, authorization, and support behind the bombing.62 According to the charges issued on 30 October 1991 by a French magistrate, Al-Azragh, the First Secretary at the Libyan People‘s Bureau in Brazzaville, Congo, recruited three Libyan-trained Congolese to plant the suitcase bomb and provided them with the device. The bomb was brought into Congo in the Libyan diplomatic pouch.63

January 4 Second Gulf of Sidra Incident—Two US F-14 Tomcats shoot down two Libyan MiG- 23 Flogger-Es which appeared to engage them. U.S. is concerned that Libya is building a chemical weapons plant near Rabta and so deploys the USS John F. Kennedy near the Libyan coast and a follow-on carrier.

57 Patterns of Global Terrorism (1992), 70. 58 Douglas Farah, Harvard for Tyrants: How Muammar al-Qaddafi Taught a Generation of Bad Guys, Foreign Policy, 4 March 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/04/harvard_for_tyrants; The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No. SCSL-03-I, The Prosecutor against Oday Saybana Sankoh (also known as Popay, Papa, Pa), Indictment, 7 Mar 2003, p. 2, 4; James Day, “Revealed: Colonel Gaddafi's School for Scoundrels,” Metro (15 Mar. 2011), excerpted from Foreignpolicy.com, [http://www.metro.co.uk/news/858166-revealed-colonel-gaddafis-school-for-scoundrels]. 59 Patterns of Global Terrorism (1992), 70. 60 Louis Kriesberg, “Assessing Past Strategies for Countering Terrorism, in Lebanon and by Libya,” Peace and Conflict Studies 13 no. 1 (2007): 12-15. 61 Felicity Barringer, “Libya Admits Culpability in Crash of Pan Am Plane,” The New York Times, 16 August 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/16/international/middleeast/16NATI.html]; United Nations Security Council, Security Council Lifts Sanctions Imposed on Libya After Terrorist Bombing of Pan Am 103, UTA 772, 4820th Meeting (Part II) (AM), [http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7868.doc.htm]. 62 U.S. Department of State, Libya’s Continuing Responsibility for Terrorism, 15 April 1992, [http://212.150.54.123/documents/documentdet.cfm?docid=2]. In 2008, Libya agreed to pay $1m compensation to relatives of each of the victims on board the flight, but denied any linkage to the bombing, “US court orders Libya to pay $6bn,” BBC News, 16 January 2008, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7191278.stm]. 63 National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City (MIPT), Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990: 35, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1990pogt.pdf].

11 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

Summary of the 1980s: In the second decade the Qadhafi regime support for international terrorism shifts to the following priorities: (1.) assassinations and attempted assassinations against diplomats, political officials, and dissident groups and (2.) hijackings and hostage-takings. Additionally, the regime increases its sophistication in (3.) its regional bellicosity and interventions and in (4.) establishing a formidable international reputation for sponsoring and executing terrorism. In these categories of conduct, Libya builds the international and domestic institutional architecture necessary for making international terrorism and related unlawful uses of force the centerpiece of Libyan domestic and foreign affairs. 1) Libyan assassination campaigns of the 1980s against dissidents living in Europe and terrorist attacks on diplomats in the Middle East are the most noteworthy examples of government-sponsored terrorism.64 Assassinations and attempts increased steadily since 1975, in 1980 resulting in almost twice as many incidents as in any previous year.65 This increase was due, in part, to well-planned campaigns by Libyan officials targeting expatriates in Europe and as a stated policy to silence Libyan students suspected of resistance activity.66 Evidence also suggests that such attacks were attributable, in part, to an increased use of military and intelligence services to carry out terrorist activities against foreign diplomats and Libyan exiles.67 One successful attempt even includes a Libyan student in the United States. 2) Libya steps-up its high-profile role with respect to international terrorism by sponsoring and executing high-visibility or spectacular terrorist acts that maximize heavy casualties—passenger aircraft hijackings and hostage-takings, among other tactics. 3) Libya‘s international reputation as a major sponsor of terrorist groups grew during this decade, and other states begin to engage Libya as a market and supplier in such affairs. During the 1980s, the Soviets sell large quantities of arms to Libya, knowing Libya is a major supporter of armed organizations.68 Likewise, Libya becomes the ―go to‖ state for terrorist aid available to most major international terrorist groups: i.e. the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA), Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of America (ASALA), the Japanese Red Army (JIRA), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and Movement of 19 April (M-19). 4) Libya builds a sophisticated international architecture for its terrorist support: from financing terrorist operations, weapons procurement and supply, the use of Libyan diplomatic facilities abroad as support bases for terrorist operations, safe havens for terrorists, to Libyan training camps and Libyan advisers for guerrilla training.69 In this last aspect, the World Revolutionary Center (WRC) near Benghazi becomes a notorious training center for a fraternity of brutal leaders in Africa and elsewhere, including: Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh, Idi Amin, Burkina Faso‘s Blaise Compaoré, Central African Republic‘s Jean-Bédel Bokassa, Chad‘s Idriss Déby, Sudan‘s Omar al-Bashir, Ethiopia‘s Mengistu Haile Mariam, among other leaders. Notably, however, Qadhafi begins to obscure Libyan involvement with terrorism and with subversive groups in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, creating and using front companies as conduits for his continued efforts to support more than 30 terrorist groups around the world.70

64 Central Intelligence Agency, Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, June 1981: iii, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1980PoGT.pdf]. 65 CIA (1981), 1. 66 CIA (1981), 1, 9. 67 Central Intelligence Agency, Patterns of International Terrorism 1981, July 1982: 11, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1981PoGT.pdf]. 68 CIA (1981), 9. 69 CIA (1981): 9. 70 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1989, April 1990: 47, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1989pogt.pdf].

12 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

1990 Qadhafi pays Haitian Liberation Organization $20,000 to attack the U.S. embassy in Port-au- Prince.71

Libyan diplomats are expelled from Ethiopia in March after a bomb explodes in the Hilton Hotel in Addis Ababa in an attempt to kill the Israeli Ambassador who was staying there.72

Czechoslovak President Havel‘s reveals that the former government had exported 1,000 tons of the plastic explosive Semtex to Libya.73

An aborted seaborne attack by the PLO on crowded Israeli beaches on May 30 was made possible by Libyan government support.74 In August, Greek authorities detained the ship Tiny Star which was used by Libyan-sponsored terrorists to launch the attack.75

1991 A cache of Provisional IRA guns and ammunition supplied by Libya and hidden in a farm north of Dublin is discovered. In July an Irish court sentenced Adrian Hopkins to eight years after he pleaded guilty to running 150 tons of Libyan weapons and explosives for the PIRA.76

1992 Libyan-orchestrated mob attacks occur on Venezuelan and Russian embassies in Tripoli.77

1993 Available evidence suggests Libya is behind the disappearance of the prominent Libyan dissident and human rights activist, Mansour Kikhia, from his hotel room in Egypt.78

1995 A Libyan official in London is expelled for threatening and surveilling Libyan exiles in the U.K.79

Libya supports armed groups using violence to oppose the Middle East peace process: the murder of Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leader Fathi Shaqaqi in Malta in October reveals that Libya facilitated his travel and sponsored meetings of Palestinian rejectionist groups in Tripoli.80

1996 The Libyan regime continues to provide support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Ahmed Jabril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC); the ANO‘s headquarters are in Libya, where the group's leader, Sabri al-Banna (a.k.a. Abu Nidal) resides.81

71 Mark S. Steinitz, (July 2003): 5. 72 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991: 70 [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1991pogt.pdf]. 73U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990: 8, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1990pogt.pdf]. 74 National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City (MIPT), Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, 1, 26, 35, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1990pogt.pdf]; U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991, April 1992, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State), 73, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1991pogt.pdf]. 75 National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City (MIPT), Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, 12, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1990pogt.pdf] 76 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991: 10. 77 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1992 (1993): 23-24. 78 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1994 (1995): 20. 79 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995, April 1996: 23, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1994pogt.pdf]. 80 Patterns of Global Terrorism. 1995: 26. 81 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996: 42.

13 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

1999 The Libyan government surrenders in April the two Libyan officials charged with the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, after a joint US-UK initiative enabled a Scottish court to sit in the Netherlands to try the accused.82

Libya expels ANO and distances itself from Palestinian rejectionists, announcing the Palestinian Authority is the only legitimate organization—but Qadhafi still retains ties to Palestinian groups that use violence to oppose the Middle East peace process, i.e., PIJ and PFLP–GC.83

Summary of the 1990s: The 1990s exhibit a growing tension between Qadhafi‘s increased direct engagement in terrorism and the inexorable effects of the U.S. and international community‘s isolation of Libya, particularly after the Pan Am 103 Flight and UTA Flight 772 bombings. This political and economic isolation for much of the 1990s erodes Libya‘s economic power and begins to bear fruit in decreased incidents of international terrorism. By the late 1990s, for instance, Libya has not been implicated in any international terrorist act in several years, though Tripoli has maintained residual relationships with terrorist organizations. Moreover, 1998 marks the seventh year of Libyan refusal to comply in full with the demands of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 731, 748, and 883, imposed due to Tripoli's involvement in the bombings of Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772.84 It takes the Libyan regime nearly a decade after initial charges in the Pan Am 103 case are brought for Libyan officials to surrender suspects (5 April 1999) and even longer to accept responsibility for these actions (2003) and to compensate victims‘ families. While terrorist incidents do decrease, acts of support do not: despite lip-service to international pressure, Libya continues, particularly in the first half of the decade, to conduct business as usual in supporting radical Palestinian groups (PLF, ANO, and PFLP-GC) and in allowing these groups‘ headquarters and facilities to remain in Libya. Libya also continues to support the New People‘s Army (NPA), the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA) in Peru, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PlRA), the Kurdish Worker‘s Party (PKK) in Turkey, and many others. Even though Libya expels the ANO and distances itself from the Palestinian rejectionists in 1999, the regime retains ties to Palestinian groups using violence to oppose the Middle East peace process, an important priority for Qadhafi. Lastly, despite ongoing sanctions for sponsorship of terrorism, Tripoli continues to threaten Libyan expatriate dissidents, remains the primary suspect in other past terrorist operations, and continues supporting various extremist groups.

2000 Libya plays a high-profile role in negotiating the release of a group of foreign hostages seized in the Philippines by the Abu Sayyaf Group, reportedly in exchange for a ransom payment, including money from European governments funneled through the Libyan government.85

82 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, April 2000: 58, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1999pogt.pdf]. 83 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999: 59. 84 UNSCR 731 was adopted following the indictments in November 1991 of two Libyan intelligence agents for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988. The resolution ordered Libya to turn over the two Libyan bombing suspects for trial in the United States or the United Kingdom, pay compensation, cooperate in the ongoing investigations into the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 bombings, and cease all support for terrorism. UNSCR 748 was adopted in April 1992 as a result of Libya's refusal to comply with UNSCR 731. UNSCR 748 imposed sanctions that embargoed Libya's civil aviation and military procurement efforts and required all states to reduce Libya's diplomatic presence. UNSCR 883, adopted in November 1993, imposed further sanctions against Libya for its continued refusal to comply with UN Security Council demands. UNSCR 883 included a limited assets freeze and an oil technology ban, and it also strengthened existing sanctions. 85 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 (April 2001), “Middle East Overview,” 58, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/2000pogt.pdf]; Larry Niksch, Aby Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti- Terrorism Cooperation, CRS Report for Congress, 25 January 2002: 3, [http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31265.pdf].

14 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

2001 October 10 German police arrest Libyan Lased Ben Henin—He is arrested near his Munich home in coordinated raids that include the arrest of two Tunisians in Italy. Ben Henin is suspected of links to al-Qaida‘s terrorist network and is extradited to Italy on 23 November.86

2002 Jordan works closely with U.S. officials to investigate the murder in late October of USAID officer Laurence Foley. In December, Jordanian authorities arrest two men, a Libyan and Jordanian, who later admit to carrying out the assassination after receiving money from al-Qaida leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.87

2003 The U.S. interdicts a shipment of WMD-related material destined for Libya‘s then-active nuclear weapons program, revealing an emerging WMD terrorism risk.88 Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan had developed a transnational nuclear proliferation network reaching from Southeast Asia to Europe and was making available sensitive technology and WMD-related materials to nations willing to pay.89

Libyan officials facilitate an assassination plot of then-Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. In August 2004, Abulrahman Alamoudi, an Eritrean born naturalized U.S. citizen, pled guilty to one count of unlicensed travel to and commerce with Libya from the U.S., stating he had been part of the plot to assassinate the Prince at the behest of Libyan officials.90

Casablanca May 16 Suicide bombers linked to the Libyan Islamic Fighting group—Several bombs are simultaneously detonated at restaurants, hotels, and a Jewish cultural center in the seaside city of Casablanca, killing 42 and wounding 100 others.91 Moroccan authorities identify the bombers as local adherents of the ―Salafi ya Jihadiya‖ movement and in the following months learn that many involved in orchestrating the attacks were Moroccan extremists trained in Afghanistan with links to North African extremist groups—mainly the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and al-Qaida.92

2005 The mutilated body of journalist Daif al-Ghazal is found near Benghazi, Libya, June 2, twelve days after he was arrested by two men who identified themselves as Libyan Internal Security Agency officials. The autopsy and circumstances of his death suggest extrajudicial execution for his writing in which he has denounced corruption and called for political reform.93

86 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 (May 2002), Europe Overview, 35, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/2001pogt.pdf]. 87 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 (April 2003), Middle East Overview, 57, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/2002pogt.pdf]. 88 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 (April 2008): 181, Publication Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 89 Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 April 2008 United States Department of State Publication Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Released April 2008: 181. 90 Department of Justice, Abdurahman Alamoudi Sentenced to Jail in Terrorism Financing Case, 15 October 2004, [http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/October/04_crm_698.htm]. 91 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (April 2004), “Middle East Overview,” 65, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/2003PoGT.pdf]. 92 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (April 2004), Middle East Overview, p. 65, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/2003PoGT.pdf]. 93 Amnesty International, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Briefing to the UN Human Rights Committee, AI Index: MDE 19/008/2007, [http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGMDE190082007&lang=e]; “Libya: Watchdog Condemns Journalist's Killing," Reporters Sans Frontières Press Release, Paris (June 7, 2005).

15 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

2007 Qadhafi‘s son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, concedes that acts of torture and excessive violence have taken place in Libyan prisons.94

Amnesty International receives reports of several hundred foreign nationals, including minors, held in detention centers in eastern Libya. Sources from inside allege that internal conditions do not meet international human rights standards, including reports of poor hygiene and a shortage of food and medical treatment.95

2008 Reports indicate that Mohammed Adel Abu Ali, an alleged member of the oppositionist ―al- Tabu‖ Front for the Liberation of Libya, was tortured in detention, after being returned to Libya and before dying in custody.96

Lawyers, journalists, and others try to register a new NGO, the Centre for Democracy, to work towards ―the dissemination of democratic values and human rights and the rule of law in Libya.‖ According to the founding committee chair, the Libyan authorities objected to many named as founders of the organization, and Dhow Al Mansouri, one of the group‘s founders, was abducted and assaulted in June 2008 by three unidentified assailants who warned him against trying to establish the NGO.97

2011 February15—Mass antigovernment protests begin throughout Libya, spreading to Tripoli, in which protestors seek to remove Qadhafi from office and end the four decades of repression. Libyan Air Force pilots defect to Malta, refusing, as reportedly ordered, to fire weapons on civilians.98 Diplomats, officials, representatives to the U.N., some police and security guard have also joined the revolution. March-April – Attacks by Libyan government forces endanger civilians and target protected areas, in this case, medical clinics, in violation of international law. Such assessments are beginning to emerge from journalists and interviewees, in this case, from two doctors still in Misrata and 17 wounded civilians recently evacuated from the city. Other reports indicate 257 people killed and 949 wounded and hospitalized since February 19. The wounded include 22 women and eight children.99 April 10 – Amnesty International provides evidence of extrajudicial executions committed by Qadhafi‘s forces in eastern Libya. Researchers came across the bodies of two opposition fighters

94 U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Libya, 25 February 2009, [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119121.htm]. 95 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Briefing to the UN Human Rights Committee, Amnesty International, [http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGMDE190082007&lang=e]. 96 U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Libya, 25 February 2009, [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119121.htm]. 97 Amnesty International, 2009 Annual Report for Human Rights in Libya, [http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2009&c=LBY] 98 John Hooper and Ian Black, “Libya Defectors: Pilots Told to Bomb Protestors Flee to Malta,” (21 February 2011), Guardian, [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/21/libya-pilots-flee-to-malta]. 99 Human Rights Watch, Libya: Government Attacks in Misrata Kill Civilians, 10 April 2011, [http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/10/libya-government-attacks-misrata-kill-civilians]. “Libyan attacks could be crime vs. humanity: ICC,” Reuters (28 Feb. 2011) [http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE71R0H820110228]; Edward Wyatt, “Security Council Calls for War Crimes Inquiry in Libya,” The New York Times (26 Feb. 2011), [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/world/africa/27nations.html?hp], the vote is only the second time in which the UN Security Council referring a member state to the International Criminal Court.

16 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

who had been shot in the back of the head after their hands had been bound behind their backs and another body of a man who had been shot dead while his hands and feet were bound.100 Reports grow of Qadhafi forces are using cluster-bombs and other indiscriminate weapons.101

Summary of the 2000s: In the 2000s, Libya took significant steps to cooperate with the international community in renouncing terrorism,102 sharing intelligence with Western services, and resolving matters related to its past support of terrorism, including accepting responsibility in the case of Pan Am 103 and agreeing to compensation packages.103 On 19 December 2003, Qadhafi announced that Libya would eliminate its WMD programs and MTCR-class missiles and took immediate steps to implement this commitment with U.S., U.K., and relevant international organization‘s assistance.104

Yet, with Qadhafi‘s public denunciation of terrorism came a renewed emphasis on gross human rights violations at home and a disregard for Libyan nationals‘ most basic human right, the right to life. If early in his tenure Qadhafi saw international legal norms and the international community more generally as obstacles to his goal of developing a wholly different pan-Arabic, revolutionary, international political and economic order, the twenty-first century has seen a return to deploying this early extremist ideology against Libyan citizens. Specific incidents, such as the death of journalist Daif al-Ghazal, reveal concerns about extrajudicial executions for political speech.105 Additionally, in recent clashes between rebels and pro-government forces, a range of humanitarian law violations are increasingly apparent: deliberate killing of captured fighters, use of human shields, attacks on noncombatants, rape and torture, use of prohibited weapons, etc.106 Many of these incidents not only flaunt humanitarian law but demonstrate total disregard for human life. Echoes of these concerns have been heard throughout this decade in cases of long-term incarceration and detention (e.g., lack of proper access to food, water, medical treatments).107

100 Amnesty International Press Release, Amnesty International Finds Evidence of Extrajudicial Executions Apparently by Colonel Gaddafi’s Forces Near Ajdabiya, 11 April 2011, [http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGUSA20110412001&lang=e]. 101 Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Cluster Munitions Strike Misrata: Human Rights Watch Witnesses Attack into Residential Area,” 15 April 2011 *http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/15/libya-cluster-munitions-strike-misrata]; Human Rights Watch, Libya: Indiscriminate Attacks Kill Civilians , 17 April 2011, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dad204c1e.html 102 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (April 2004): 85, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/2003PoGT.pdf]. 103 U.S. Department of State 2003 (2004): 85. On 10 August 2004, Libya agrees to pay $35 million in compensation to non-U.S. victims of the 1986 Berlin LaBelle discothèque bombing. Likewise, relatives of non-U.S. victims of the French UTA 772 airliner bombing accepted payment of $1million each from the Gaddafi International Foundation for Charity Associations. In October of 2008 Libya agreed to pay $1.5 billion into a U.S. compensation fund for relatives of victims of terror attacks blamed on Tripoli to settle remaining lawsuits in the U.S, a deal in which Libya did not accept responsibility for attacks but agreed to compensate victims. In exchange, President Bush has signed an executive order restoring the Libyan government's immunity from terror-related lawsuits and dismissing pending compensation cases in the U.S. (Executive Order 13477). See "Libya compensates terror victims," BBC News, 31 October 2008, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7703110.stm]. 104 U.S. Department of State 2003 (2004): 91. 105 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Briefing to the UN Human Rights Committee, Amnesty International, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGMDE190082007&lang=e. 106 “Amnesty International Finds Evidence of Extrajudicial Executions Apparently by Colonel Gaddafi’s Forces Near Ajdabiya,” Amnesty International, available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGUSA20110412001&lang=e. 107 “Libya: Government Attacks in Misrata Kill Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/10/libya-government-attacks-misrata-kill-civilians.

17 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

APPENDIX A: Comprehensive Timeline of Incidents

1969-1979

1969 Military interventions into neighboring Chad begin—even prior to Qadhafi Libyan leadership.108

1970 October – Qadhafi expels all Libya‘s Italians (approximately 20,000 people) and the remaining Jewish community,109 and the government issues new laws confiscating all assets of Libyan Jews and issuing in their stead 15-year bonds (which when matured were not paid). Qadhafi justifies this act on the grounds that ―the alignment of the Jews with Israel, the Arab nations‘ enemy, has forfeited their right to compensation.‖110 Such treatment of domestic minority populations—as representatives of international alliances that Qadhafi must crush—gives one of the first indications of Qadhafi‘s anti-West confrontationalist foreign policy approach.111

1972 Qadhafi offers public support to armed organizations (i.e. the Provisional Irish Republican Army, U.S. Black Power movement) and any group willing to attack Israel/and or the West.112 Islamic Legion formed: Qadhafi establishes a Libyan-sponsored mercenary group and united Arab military force to promote Arab unity, cultural supremacy, and the Arabization of certain territories in Africa (Chad, Sudan) through the use of force.113

108 See Kenneth Pollack (2002), Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (University of Nebraska Press): 375, for Qadhafi’s early involvement, and Mario Azevedo (1998), Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad (Routledge), for Libyan motives i.e., Qadhafi ideologically-driven approach to the re-Arabization of North Africa; annexing the Aouzou Strip in light of an unratified colonial-era treaty; expanding Libya’s operations into Central Africa; developing a pan-Arab militia (Islamic Legion) to defeat western involvement and influence in the Arab and African worlds. Four subsequent Qadhafi-sponsored military interventions occur into Chad in 1978, 1979, 1980–1981 and 1983–1987 in which Libya arms, supports, and trains certain factions in the civil war against its opponents, supported by the French, which attempted to save the existing Chadian government in 1978, 1983 and 1986. The United States supplies satellite intelligence to the Chadian National Forces (FANT) which gained the advantage in their attack at Maaten al-Sarra (5 Sept. 1987), taking Libyan forces by surprise, and prevailing in subduing Libyan interests in Chad and the Aouzou Strip more generally. See Sam Nolutshunga (1995), Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad (University of Virginia Press): 222. The Libyan defeat in Chad at the Battle of Maaten al-Sarra (5 Sept. 1987) during the so-called Toyota War is posited as one key event that motivates Qadhafi’s ire and retaliation toward France and the United States, which culminated in Libyan support for two notorious airliner bombings: U.S. Pan Am Flight 103 (from London to NY) over Lockerbie, Scotland (21 Dec. 1988) and French UTA Flight 772 (from Chad to Paris) over Niger (19 Sept. 1989). 109 “Italians Plan to See Libya Once Again,” The New York Times (22 Oct. 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/21/world/europe/21iht-italy.html; “Libya, Italy ‘to sign compensation deal,’” Geopolitical Monitor (24 July 2008), http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/libya-italy-to-sign-compensation-deal-957/ 110 David A. Harris, In the Trenches: Selected Speeches and Writings of an American Jewish Activist, 1979-1999 (KTAV Publishing House, Inc. 2001). 111 See Dick Vandewalle ed. (2008), Libya Since 1969: Qadhafi's Revolution Revisited (New York: Palgrave Macmillan): 9. Later, Qadhafi counseled, Idi Amin, President of Uganda, to expel Asians from Uganda, which Amin subsequently put into action (80,0000 were expelled by decree) on 4 August 1972 . See Idi Amin, Benoni Turyahikayo-Rugyema (1998), Idi Amin Speaks: An Annotated Selection of His Speeches, 43, and “1972: Asians Given 24 hours to Leave Uganda," BBC On This Day (7 Aug 1972), [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/7/newsid_2492000/2492333.stm]. 112 United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1991 (April 1992): 69-74. http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1991pogt.pdf 113 Sam Nolutshunga (1995), Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad (University of Virginia Press): 220. Nolutshunga notes that the Islamic legion was not only designed to create by force “the Great Islamic State of the Sahel,” but to Arabize territories in especially northern Africa. Scholars also believe Qaddafi hostility to Chad’s President François Tombalbaye’s was due to his African and Christian background, and Gaddafi’s expelled the Toubou of Libya (though Muslims), considered 'black,' off Fezzan into Chad for similar race-based reasons. In Darfur, Gaddafi supported the Arab Gathering (Tajammu al-Arabi), which Gérard Prunier describes as "a militantly racist and pan-Arabist organization” stressing “the 'Arab' character of the province." See Gérard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (Cornell University Press, 2005) 45.

18 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

June 11– Qadhafi announced his provision of military training to all Arab volunteers for Palestinian armed groups, and he publicly states that Libya is already supplying weapons, money, and volunteers to Irish Revolutionaries against the British.114 He is reported to have volunteered Libyan diplomatic establishments for such purposes, announcing that armed groups may ―register at any Libyan embassy and will be given adequate training for combat.‖115 ―Black September‖ Munich massacre, September 5 – Hostage taking and massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games which results in 12 deaths: 11 Israeli athletes and coaches and one German policeman. The attack, sanctioned by Arafat‘s Fatah organization and celebrated by Qadhafi, was planned by Black September operatives, Abu Daoud and Salah Khalaf, who recruited eight Palestinians specially trained in Libya a month prior to the attack.116 Three of the surviving attackers, Adnan Al-Gashey, Mohammed Safady, and Jamal Al-Gashey, were ultimately released to Libya,117 when Libya gave refuge to the Lufthansa airliner subsequently hijacked (29 October 1972) with the demand to release these remaining prisoners—once they arrived in Libya promptly broadcast their personal accounts in a press conference to the world.118 The bodies of the five who died in Germany during the attack were also buried in Libya, receiving full military honors,119 and Libyan passports (as well as Iraqi and Algerian passports) were used by the operatives.120 1973 March 28 – Irish Naval Service intercepts the vessel Claudia in Irish territorial waters. On board were chief-of-staff and overall military commander of the Provisional IRA Joe Cahill, IRA quartermaster general Denis McInerney (in charge of weapons department), and five tons of arms and munitions which had been loaded in Libya. The captured weapons included 250 Russian- made rifles, 240 other guns, anti-tank missiles and explosives.121 June – Libya invades Chad and occupies the Aouzou Strip in a conflict ended by ceasefire in 1987 and settled peacefully in June 1994, when Libya withdrew troops from Chad due to a judgment by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), issued on 3 February 1994, in favor of Chad sovereignty.122

114 “Libya Leader Says IRA Given Arms,” The Washington Post, June 12, 1972, A8; Associated Press, “Premier Says Libya Aids ‘Revolutionaries’ in Ulster,” June 12, 1972, 1. 115 Brian Lee Davis, Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990): 182. 116 Simon Reeve (2000), One Day In September: The Full Story Of The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre (New York: Arcade Publishing); 43-44. 117 Reeve (2000): 186. The Lufthansa passenger jet hijacked on 29-30 October 1972 (en route from Damascus through Beirut to Frankfurt) was hijacked by PFLP members who demanded the release of the 3 Black September hijackers held in German custody. These prisoners were released, and they flew directly to Tripoli, Libya. See Kay Schiller and Christopher Young (2010), The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany (Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press): 216-217. 118 Lock K. Johnson (2006), Strategic Intelligence: Vol. 1, Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (New York: Praeger Publishers): 66. 119 Simon Reeve (2000), One Day in September: The Full Story of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre (New York: Arcade Publishing) 147. 120 http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/nsa/documents/TE/00254/all.pdf 121 Sean O’Riordan, “Ready to Call it a Day after 40 years A-Sailing with the Irish Naval Service,” Irish Examiner, 10 November 2010, [http://irishexaminer.com/ireland/ready-to-call-it-a-day-after-40-years-a-sailing-with-the-irish-naval-service- 135942.html]; Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003): 10. 122 International Court of Justice, ICJ Case concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment of 3 February 1994, [http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=cd&case=83&code=dt&p3=4]. See also U.N. Security Council resolution 910 (1994), Exempts UN reconnaissance team from sanctions against Libya, Adopted by the Security Council at its 3363rd meeting, on 14 April 1994, S/RES/910 (1994), [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f1611f.html]; U.N. Security Council, resolution 914 (1994), Establishes U.N. Aouzou Strip Observer Group in the Aouzou Strip (Chad), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3373rd meeting, on 4 May 1994, S/RES/915 (1994), [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f1572c.html];U.N. Security Council resolution 926 (1994),

19 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

August 5 – Members of the Libyan-based and financed group, the National Arab Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (NAYLP), opens fire and throws grenades into a passenger lounge at Athens airport, killing 3 persons, including Americans.123

September 5 – An attack organized by the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) on an El-Al airliner at Rome airport using Libyan missiles was averted in Italy after Italian authorities find two SA-7 missiles.124 Qadhafi is believed to have ordered the attack.125

December 16 – NAYLP plans to assassinate U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Beirut, according to intelligence sources; the plan was thwarted when Lebanese authorities divert the plane to Rayak Air base. Libya reportedly ordered the attack.126

December 17 – NAYLP attacks a Pan-Am airliner on a runway in Rome, killing 31 passengers and wounding 40, before hijacking a Lufthansa airliner, killing one person during a stopover in Athens. NAYLP claimed Qadhafi ordered and financed the attacks.127

1974 September 8 – NAYLP detonates an explosive on board Trans World Airlines (TWA) flight 841, causing the plane to crash into the Ionian Sea, killing all 88 persons on board.128

1975 Qadhafi orders the murder of Libyan dissidents living abroad.129

August 4—Japanese Red Army terrorists seize adjoining U.S. and Swedish Embassy offices in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, holding over 50 hostages (including U.S. consul and Swedish chargé d‘affaires), to seek the release of five terrorists in Japanese custody. They succeed and were, along with newly freed compatriots, transported to Libya.130 Qadhafi indicates that he will continue to support the Red Army Faction, the Red Brigades, and the IRA so long as European governments support anti-Qadhafi Libyans.131

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3390th meeting, on 13 June 1994, S/RES/926 (1994), [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f12a74.html]. 123 Brian Lee Davis (1990), Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya (New York: Praeger Publishers): 13; “1973: Athens Attack Leaves Three Dead,” BBC News, August 5, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/5/newsid_4533000/4533763.stm 124 Matt Schroeder, “Appendix 14.A. Global Efforts to Control MANPADS” in Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, (SIPRI Yearbook, 2007) 627. 125 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991 (April 1992), Appendix C: Libya’s Continuing Responsibility for Terrorism, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 69, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1991pogt.pdf]. 126 Thomas Cheatham, “Kissinger Plot Revealed,” Ellensburg Daily, 26 December 1973, 12, [http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=4oJvMfeQlr8C&dat=19731226&printsec=frontpage&hl=en] 127 Cheatham (1973): 12; Robert D. Kumamoto, International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations, 1945-1976 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999) 172. 128 Brian Lee Davis, Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the U.S. Attack on Libya (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 13; http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR75-07.pdf; Brian M. Jenkins and Janera A. Johnson, “International Terrorism: A Chronology (1974 Supplement,” RAND (Feb 1975): 13, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2005/R1909-1.pdf] 129 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991 (April 1992), Appendix C: Libya’s Continuing Responsibility for Terrorism, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 69, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1991pogt.pdf]. 130 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Research Study: International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis, 1976 (becomes State Department’s annual Patterns of Global Terrorism in 1983), April 1976, 13, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1976PoGT-Research-Study.pdf]. 131 Ronald Bruce St. John, "Libyan Terrorism: The Case against Gaddafi,” Contemporary Review 261(1523) December, 1992: 294-298.

20 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

December 20 – Venezuelan-born terrorist Ilich Ramirez Sanchez (‗Carlos the Jackal‘) organizes an attack at a Vienna OPEC conference in which three people were killed and 70 taken hostage (later freed for a $50-million ransom paid by Saudi Arabia). Hans-Joachim Klein, a former member of the Revolutionary Cells, sentenced for his participation in the attack, testifies that Qadhafi was behind the operation and provided attackers with weapons, funding, and information on security at the OPEC conference.132

1976 August 8 – A bomb explodes in a bathroom at the Ministry of Interior in Tahrir Square, Cairo, injuring 14. Egyptian government‘s security authorities claim convincing evidence of Libyan sponsorship, and Egypt reportedly arrests two Egyptian citizens trained by Libyan intelligence to perform sabotage in Egypt.133

April – Qadhafi-backed attempted assassination of Chadian President General Felix Malloum.134

1977 The United States discovers evidence that Libya is sponsoring an assassination attempt against U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Herman Frederick Eilts. President Carter reportedly informs Qadhafi that he knew of the plot, after which the plan ceased.135

1978 Qadhafi internationalizes the Uganda-Tanzania War and supplies his ally President Uganda Idi Amin with at least 3,000 troops, arms, and equipment (including tanks, armored personnel carriers, multiple rocket launcher vehicles, artillery, MiG-21 supersonic jet fighter, and a Tu-22 supersonic bomber).136 Libyan forces are hybrid regular Army, militia, and sub-Saharan Africans in Qadhafi‘s characteristic use of the Islamic Legion for this type of expeditionary mission to instigate and engage in noninternational conflicts and civil wars.

1979 December 2 – A mob attacks and burns the U.S. embassy in Tripoli.137 U.S. embassy staff members are withdrawn from Tripoli, and the U.S. government declares Libya a ―state sponsor of terrorism‖ on 29 December 1979. It was reported that Libyan authorities sanctioned the attack.138

1980-1989

132 Toby Helm, “Friend of Fischer Jailed for Role in 1975 OPEC Killings,” The Telegraph, 16 February2001, [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/1322890/Friend-of-Fischer-jailed-for-role-in-1975-Opec-killings.html]; “Hess Pardons ‘Carlos the Jackal’ Comrade,” The Local, 8 March 2009, [http://www.thelocal.de/national/20090308- 17883.html#];“Carlos the Jackal to Face Trial for 1980s Attack,” CBC News, 4 May 2007, [http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2007/05/04/carlos-jackal.html]. 133 Hermann Eilts Correspondence (US Ambassador to Egypt) to Department of State, 9 August 1976, U.S. National Archives, Declassified/Released US Department of State, 4 May 2006, [http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=210121&dt=2082&dl=1345]; Hermann Eilts Correspondence (US Ambassador to Egypt) to Department of State, 11 August 1976, U.S. National Archives, Declassified/Released US Department of State, 4 May 2006, [http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=200567&dt=2082&dl=1345] 134 Brecher, Michael & Wilkenfeld, Jonathan (1997), A Study in Crisis (University of Michigan Press): 85. 135 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991 (April 1992), Appendix C: Libya’s Continuing Responsibility for Terrorism, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, p. 69, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1991pogt.pdf]. 136 Kenneth M. Pollack (2002), Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–1991 (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press): 369-373. Joseph T. Stanik (2003), El Dorado Canyon: Reagan's Undeclared War with Qaddafi (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press). Library of Congress, Country Study: Uganda (Dec. 1990), [http://memory.loc.gov/cgi- bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field%28DOCID+ug0140%29+ notes: “By mid-March 1979, about 2,000 Libyan troops and several hundred Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) fighters had joined in the fight to save Amin's regime.” 137 Jon B. Alterman (2006), Libya and the U.S.: The Unique Libyan Case, Middle East Quarterly 21-29 (Winter 2006): 2, [http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060101_libyan_case.pdf]. 138 Jon B. Alterman (2006), 2.

21 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

1981 May 6 – Reports indicate that Qadhafi plans to assassinate American diplomats in Paris and Rome. President Reagan expels Libyan diplomats from the United States and closes Libya‘s diplomatic mission in Washington, D.C. on May 6.139

August 19 – The Gulf of Sidra incident in which two Libyan SU-22 aircraft attack (and miss) two U.S. F-14 aircraft from the U.S. carrier Nimitz, which is participating in scheduled naval exercises over the Gulf of Sidra. U.S. fighters shoot them down in response.140 The United States had asserted the 12-nautical-mile limit to territorial waters rule and sent a carrier task force into the region to conduct ―Freedom of Navigation‖ and other naval operations in international waters in light of Qadhafi‘s claim to the entire Gulf territory i.e., an exclusive 62 nautical miles fishing zone in 1973, known as ―The Line of Death.‖141

October 25 – U.S. Ambassador to Italy Maxwell Rabb is withdrawn from his post after U.S. intelligence sources discover a Libyan plot to kidnap or assassinate the Ambassador.142

1983 April – Brazil intercepts a falsely-labeled Libyan shipment of more than 80 tons of weapons and explosives bound for Managua, Nicaragua.143

Qadhafi is implicated in a plot to overthrow Sudanese President Nimeiri.144

1984 Nearly 30 terrorist attacks—mostly against Libyan exiles in Europe and the Middle East—are linked directly to Libyan agents or surrogates.145

March 10—A major aircraft bombing is averted when the bomb in the baggage compartment of a French airliner explodes shortly after landing in Bangui, Central African Republic. Libyan involvement in attacking its French-backed adversaries in Chad, a policy focus of Qadhafi‘s, are suspected.146

139 “Terrorist Attacks on Americans, 1979-1988: The attacks, the groups, and the U.S. response,” Frontline, October 2001, [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html]. 140 Clyde R. Mark, Libya, Issue Brief for Congress, 23 May 2002: 6, [http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/10874.pdf];; Jon B. Alterman (2006), 2. 141 See Yehuda Z. Blum, “The Gulf of Sidra Incident,” The American Journal of International Law 80(3), July 1986: 668- 677, p. 669, for a discussion of the Libyan claim, sent in a note to the U.S. Department of State, 11 Oct. 1973, which prompted the U.S. response (11 Feb. 1974) that the claim was “unacceptable” and “a violation of international law,” and the “United States Government views the Libyan action as an attempt to appropriate a large area of the high seas by unilateral action, thereby encroaching upon the long-established principle of the freedom of the seas.” The Libyan note was provided to the UN Secretariat by the Permanent Mission of Libya to the UN in a Note Verbale of 19 October 1973, reproduced in National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea 26-27, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/18 (1976). For the US response, see 1974 Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 293-94. Steven Ratner (1984), “The Gulf of Sidra Incident of 1981: A Study of the Lawfulness of Peacetime Aerial Engagements,” Yale Journal of International Law, 7: 59-77, p. 61, notes that the “tacit acceptance” by international community of the US application of its aerial Rules of Engagement (ROE) in this case, “coupled with an apparent refusal to support the ROE demonstrated by the Libyans,” resulted in a “reinforcement of international normative expectations” about the use of force in peacetime encounters. 142 Clyde R. Mark, 23 May 2002: 6; “France: The Gaddafi Issue Grows,” Time, 23 Nov. 1981, [http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,922700,00.html]. 143 Mark S. Steinitz, Middle East Terrorist Activity in Latin America, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Policy Papers on the Americas Volume XIV, Study 7 (July 2003): 4. 144 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1983 (Sept. 1984): 12, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1983PoGT.pdf]. 145 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1984 (Nov. 1985): 11, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1984PoGT.pdf]. 146 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1984: 11.

22 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

April 17 – Automatic gunfire from the Libyan People‘s Bureau in central London results in the death of British police constable Yvonne Fletcher and 10 others wounded.147 In 1999, Libya paid compensation for the death of Fletcher.148 On 25 March 2011, the Guardian reports that Omar Ahmed Sodani, a prominent figure in Qadhafi‘s regime, has been arrested by rebel forces in Libya and is in custody. Sodani has long been linked with the incident, though he denies firing the shots.149

June, August—Qadhafi instructs Libyan agents to assassinate dissident refugees on pilgrimage in the holy city of Mecca; one plot in Mecca was thwarted by Saudi Arabian police.

July – Egypt is presumably the target of mines laid in the Red Sea near the entrance to the Suez Canal, most likely by a Libyan ship, which damaged 18 vessels registered to many nations.150

November – Egypt arrests four Libyan-hired mercenaries for plotting to kill a prominent Libyan exile; arrestees state that Libya‘s target list for assassinations includes President Mubarak.151

1985 December 27 – Members of the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) launch an armed attack on the El-Al ticket counter at Schwechat Airport, near Vienna, Austria. A simultaneous attack takes place at the Leonardo da Vinci Airport, Rome, Italy, at the TWA and El-Al check-in counters. Libya provides passports to the ANO for the attack,152 and both Libya and Syria are believed to have provided funding and support.153 Qadhafi praises the assaults as ―heroic operations carried out by the sons of the martyrs of Sabra and Shatila.‖154

1986 April 5 – A bomb in the LaBelle nightclub in Berlin kills three people (two U.S. Army personnel) and wounds 200 (60 U.S. citizens).155 President Reagan states that considerable evidence points to Libyan responsibility,156 and subsequent reports by German officials uncover evidence in East German secret police Stasi files demonstrating Libyan responsibility for the bombing.157 On 4

147 “1984: Libyan embassy shots kill policewoman,” BBC, 17 April, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/17/newsid_2488000/2488369.stm]. 148 “U.S. Department of State (2001), Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2000, 30 April 2011: 69, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/2000pogt.pdf]. court case? 149 Richard Pendlebury, “Face to face with the ‘killer’ of WPC Yvonne Fletcher: RICHARD PENDLEBURY confronts prime suspect in embassy killing,” Daily Mail, 25 March 2011, [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1369729/Libya-Gaddafi- zealot-Omar-Ahmed-Sodani-trial-WPC-Yvonne-Fletcher-embassy-killing.html]; Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 13-14. 150 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1984: 11. 151 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1984: 11. 152 Patrick Seale, Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire (Hutchinson, 1992): 245. 153 Estate of John Buonocore III, et al. v. Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, et al., Complaint Case No. 1:06cv00727, (Distr. D.C. Apr. 21, 2006), [http://www.hnklaw.com/RomeFinalStampedComplaint.042106.pdf]. 154 Patrick Seale, (1992): 245. ANO claimed responsibility in retaliation for Operation Wooden Leg (Israeli bombing of PLO headquarters in Tunis, 1 Oct. 1985), and sources say ANO head of the Intelligence Directorate's Committee for Special Missions, Dr. Ghassan al-Ali, organized the attacks. 155 Steven Erlanger, “Four Guilty in Fatal 1986 Berlin Disco Bombing Linked to Libya,” The New York Times (14 Nov 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/14/world/4-guilty-in-fatal-1986-berlin-disco-bombing-linked-to-libya.html; Nathalie Malinarich, “Flashback: The Berlin Disco Bombing,” BBC News Online , 13 Nov 2001, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1653848.stm]. 156 Clyde R. Mark, Libya, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 17 March 2005: 8, [http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/46430.pdf]. 157 Federation of American Scientists, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990: Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism, [http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_90/sponsored.html].

23 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

December 1992, German prosecutors identify two Libyan Embassy workers as having helped a Palestinian carry out the attack.158

April – Several days after the U.S. bombing of Tripoli (April 15) in response to Libya‘s role in the LaBelle discothèque attack, Peru‘s Revolutionary Movement, Movement Túpac Amaru (MRTA), with Libyan assistance, bombs the residence of the U.S. ambassador in Lima.159 April – Libya arranges for the murder of three Western hostages in Lebanon, including American Peter Kilburn.160 April 15 – Libyan government is responsible for the shooting a U.S. embassy communicator in Sudan.161 April 18 – Two Libyans are apprehended as they attempt to attack the U.S. Officers Club in Ankara, Turkey with grenades obtained from the Libyan People‘s Bureau there. The operatives confess they were ordered to cause maximum casualties.162 April 25 – Libyan government is responsible for the shooting of a U.S. embassy communicator in Saana, North Yemen.163 September 5 – Hijacking and attack on Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) Flight 73 by members of the Abul Nidal Organization (ANO) in Karachi, Pakistan, killing 20 people and injuring over 100 others. The attack was reportedly conducted with direction and material support from Libya, though Qadhafi subsequently rejects victims‘ compensation in this case.164 Pakistani media report that one of the hijackers in an Adiala jail, Jamal Saeed Abdul Rahim al-Fahid, confirmed a later Sunday Times story through his attorney: that Qadhafi ―masterminded the attack‖ and that ―he has taken the responsibility of executing the hijacking at the behest of Col. Gaddafi.‖165 Pakistani troops intervene while the plane was on the ground at Karachi airport, preventing a greater disaster, and all five terrorists were arrested and served (commuted) prison sentences in Pakistan.166

158 U.S. Department of State (1993), Patterns of Global Terrorism – 1992, April 1993: 24, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1992P0GT.pdf]. Citing U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) alleged interception of incriminatory messages from Libya to its embassy in East Berlin, President Reagan launched Operation El Dorado Canyon (15 April 1986) from British bases targeting Tripoli and Benghazi, which killed a Qadhafi family member, and whose death Qadhafi claimed to avenge by sponsoring the Sept 1986 hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan. 159 Mark S. Steinitz, Middle East Terrorist Activity in Latin America, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Policy Papers on the Americas Volume XIV, Study 7 (July 2003): 5. 160 U.S. Department of State (1992), Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991, April 1992: 69, Appendix C: Libya’s Continuing Responsibility for Terrorism, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1991pogt.pdf]. 161 U.S. Department of Justice (1992), 69. 162 U.S. Department of Justice (1992), 69. 163 U.S. Department of Justice (1992), 69. 164 Manjula Patel, et al. v. The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, et al., Civil Action No. 1:06-cv-00626 25-26, (Distr. D.C. April 24, 2006), [http://www.crowell.com/PDF/Pan-Am-Flight-73/panam73_Complaint.pdf]. 165 Jon Swain, “Revealed: Gadaffi’s Air Massacre Plot,” March 28, 2004, The Sunday Times, [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article1052614.ece]. Zayd Hassan Safarini was given three consecutive life sentences by a Washington court for murder, air piracy and hostage-taking after he struck an agreement with the court to escape a death sentence. 166 On 6 July 1988 in Pakistan, five men were convicted in the hijacking, sentenced to death (later commuted to life in prison), and later released (4 Jan. 2008): Mohammed Abdul Khalil Hussain, Daud Mohammed Hafiz, Mohammed Ahmed al- Munawar, and Jamal Saeed. Zayd Hassan Abd Al-Latif Masud Al Safarini was captured by the FBI in Bangkok (28 Sept. 2001) after he was released, and sentenced in the U.S. (13 May 2004) to a 160-year prison term in Colorado. The FBI in coordination with the U.S. State Department announced (3 Dec. 2009) a 5 million dollar reward for information leading to the capture of each of the four hijackers, released from prison, see Media Note, Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, Dec. 3, 2009,

24 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

1987 March 18 – A bomb explodes at the café ―L‘Historil‖ in Djibouti, killing 11 and wounding 50. Libya reportedly ordered a Palestinian group, the Popular Struggle Front, to conduct the attack or risk losing Tripoli‘s financial support.167

October – A bomb explodes in the office of World Vision in Moudou, Chad. Libyan diplomats based in Cotonou, Benin, assisted the terrorists who carried out the attack.168 October – French authorities intercept a freighter, the Eksund, off the coast of France and seize 150 tons of weapons and explosives destined for the PIRA from Libya.169 November 9 – The hijacking of the yacht Silco in international waters by members of the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) under the direction of the Libyan intelligence service. All hostages were eventually released by 1991.170

1988 Libyan regime provides insurgency training, logistical, and funding support to Foday Sankoh, leader and co-founder (with Charles Taylor) of Sierra Leone rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF), as part of Qadhafi‘s sponsoring of revolutionary movements throughout the world and interventions in Africa. After Sankoh leeaves Libya for Liberia, joining forces with Charles Taylor, and under RUF auspices, he commits documented atrocities against the Liberian population into the 1990s, backed by support and direction from Qadhafi, who routinely meets with Taylor and associates to review progress in their ―scorched-earth campaigns‖ (including mass rapes and amputations) and to supply weapons.171 Sankoh was indicted on 17 counts for various war crimes (use of child soldiers) and crimes against humanity (including extermination, enslavement, rape, and sexual slavery). July – ANO operatives attack a Greek cruise ship, The City of Poros, killing 9 and wounding over 100 people. Libya provides the weapons used in the attack.172 December 21 – A bomb hidden in stored luggage explodes on board Pan Am Flight 103, killing 259 people on board and 11 people on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland. After two years of investigations, the evidence implicates two Libyan government agents, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah. In November 1991 the U.S. and British government charge the agents, asking for their extradition. On 31 January 2001, Megrahi is found guilty of murder and sentenced to life in prison (his co-defendant was found not guilty and released).173 Qadhafi admitted responsibility for the attack in 2003 and paid more than $2.7 billion to families of the victims.174

“Rewards for Justice - Reward Offer for Pan Am Flight 73 Hijackers,” [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/dec/133102.htm]. Jamal Saeed Abdul Raheem was reportedly killed by US drone strike (9 Jan. 2010) in North Waziristan Agency, Pakistan. 167 U.S. Department of Justice (1992), 70. 168 U.S. Department of Justice (1992), 70. 169 U.S. Department of Justice (1992), 70. 170 U.S. Department of Justice (1992), 70. 171 Douglas Farah, Harvard for Tyrants: How Muammar al-Qaddafi Taught a Generation of Bad Guys, Foreign Policy, 4 March 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/04/harvard_for_tyrants; The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Case No. SCSL-03-I, The Prosecutor against Oday Saybana Sankoh (also known as Popay, Papa, Pa), Indictment, 7 Mar 2003, p. 2, 4; James Day, “Revealed: Colonel Gaddafi's School for Scoundrels,” Metro (15 Mar. 2011), excerpted from Foreignpolicy.com, [http://www.metro.co.uk/news/858166-revealed-colonel-gaddafis-school-for-scoundrels]. 172 U.S. Department of Justice (1992), 70. 173 Louis Kriesberg, “Assessing Past Strategies for Countering Terrorism, in Lebanon and by Libya,” Peace and Conflict Studies 13 no. 1 (2007): 12-15. 174 Felicity Barringer, “Libya Admits Culpability in Crash of Pan Am Plane,” The New York Times, 16 August 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/16/international/middleeast/16NATI.html]; United Nations Security Council, Security

25 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

1989 September 19 – UTA Flight 772, bound from Brazzaville, Congo, to Paris via Ndjamena, Chad, explodes over the desert in southeastern Niger, killing all 171 passengers and crew members, including 7 Americans and the wife of U.S. Ambassador to Chad. On 30 October 1991, a French magistrate issued international arrest warrants for four Libyan officials for their role in the bombing: Abdallah Sanussi (Qadhafi relative and second in command of Libya‘s intelligence services), Nayli Ibrahim, Abd Al-Azragh, and Abbas Musbah, and later issued lookout notices for Musa Kusa (head of the AIC and Deputy Foreign Minister) and Abd al-Salam Zadma. According to the charges, Al-Azragh, the First Secretary at the Libyan People‘s Bureau in Brazzaville, Congo, recruited three Libyan-trained Congolese to plant the suitcase bomb and provided them with the device.175 Reports indicate the bomb was brought into Congo in the Libyan diplomatic pouch.176 French officials on 29 January 1998 officially completed their investigation into the 1989 bombing of UTA 772 and concluded that the Libyan intelligence service was responsible, naming Qadhafi's brother-in-law, Muhammad al-Sanusi, as the mastermind of the attack.

January 4 – The second Gulf of Sidra Incident in which two US F-14 Tomcats shoot down two Libyan MiG-23 Flogger-Es which appeared to engage them, similar to the earlier Gulf of Sidra incident (1981). In addition to Qadhafi‘s claim to the entire Gulf territory, the U.S. had concerns that Libya is building a chemical weapons plant near Rabta—one reason for the deployment of the USS John F. Kennedy near the Libyan coast and a follow-on carrier.

1990-2000

1990 Qadhafi urges some leftist terrorist groups in Latin America to strike U.S. targets, including paying the Haitian Liberation Organization $20,000 to attack the U.S. embassy in Port-au-Prince (which failed to follow through on the mission).177 March – Libyan diplomats are expelled from Ethiopia after a bomb exploded in the Hilton Hotel in Addis Ababa in an apparent attempt to kill the Israeli Ambassador who was staying there.178

April – Czechoslovak President Havel‘s revealed that the former government had exported 1,000 tons of the plastic explosive Semtex to Libya.179

May 30 – An aborted seaborne attack by the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) on crowded Israeli beaches was made possible by Libyan government support for the training, provision, and transportation of the PLF terrorists.180 In August, Greek authorities detained the ship Tiny Star which was used by Libyan-sponsored terrorists to launch the attack.181

Council Lifts Sanctions Imposed on Libya After Terrorist Bombing of Pan Am 103, UTA 772, 4820th Meeting (Part II) (AM), [http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7868.doc.htm]. 175 U.S. Department of State, Libya’s Continuing Responsibility for Terrorism, 15 April 1992, [http://212.150.54.123/documents/documentdet.cfm?docid=2] (In 2008, Libya agreed to pay $1m compensation to relatives of each of the victims on board the flight, but denied any linkage to the bombing); “US court orders Libya to pay $6bn,” BBC News, 16 January 2008, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7191278.stm]. 176 National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City (MIPT), Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990: 35, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1990pogt.pdf]. 177 Mark S. Steinitz, (July 2003): 5. 178 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991): 70 [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1991pogt.pdf]. 179U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1990): 8, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1990pogt.pdf]. 180 National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City (MIPT), Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, 1, 26, 35, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1990pogt.pdf]; U.S. Department of State, Patterns of

26 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

1991 April—a cache of Provisional IRA (PIRA) guns and ammunition supplied by Libya and hidden in a farm north of Dublin are discovered. In July an Irish court sentences Adrian Hopkins to eight years after he pleaded guilty to running 150 tons of Libyan weapons and explosives for the PIRA.182

1992 April – The Libyan regime orchestrates mob attacks on the Venezuelan and Russian embassies in Tripoli; participants threw gasoline bombs and stones in retaliation for their support for UN sanctions against Libya.183

1993 December – Available evidence suggests Libya is behind the disappearance of prominent Libyan dissident and human rights activist Mansour Kikhia from his hotel room in Egypt.184

1995 The Libyan charge in London is expelled in 1995 for threatening and surveilling Libyan exiles in the United Kingdom.185

Qadhafi offers support for groups using violence to oppose the Middle East peace process, some of which engage in acts of international terrorism. The murder of Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leader Fathi Shaqaqi in Malta in October reveals that Libya frequently facilitated his travel and sponsored meetings of Palestinian rejectionist groups in Tripoli.186

1996 The Libyan regime continues to provide support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Ahmed Jabril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC); the ANO‘s headquarters are in Libya, where the group's leader, Sabri al-Banna (a.k.a. Abu Nidal) resides.187

1999 April 5—Libyan government surrenders two Libyans charged with the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, after a joint US-UK initiative enables a Scottish court to sit in the Netherlands to try the accused.188

Libya expels Abu Nidal organization and distances itself from the Palestinian rejectionists, announcing that the Palestinian Authority is the only legitimate address for Palestinian

Global Terrorism: 1991, April 1992, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State), 73, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1991pogt.pdf]. 181 National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City (MIPT), Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990, 12, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1990pogt.pdf] 182 U.S. Department of State (1993), Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991, April 1992: 10, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1991P0GT.pdf]. 183 U.S. Department of State (1993), Patterns of Global Terrorism – 1992, April 1993: 23-24, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1992P0GT.pdf]. 184 U.S. Department of State (1995), Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1994, April 1995: 20, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1994pogt.pdf]. 185 U.S. Department of State (1995), Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995, April 1996: 23, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1994pogt.pdf]. 186 U.S. Department of State (1995), Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995, April 1996: 26, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1995pogt.pdf]. 187 U.S. Department of State (1995), Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996, April 1997: 42, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1996pogt.pdf]. 188 U.S. Department of State (1995), Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, April 2000: 58, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1999pogt.pdf].

27 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

concerns—but Tripoli retains ties to some Palestinian groups that use violence to oppose the Middle East peace process, i.e., PIJ and PFLP–GC.189

2000-2011

2000 March –Jordan expels eight Libyans it suspects of having terrorist links, and in September refuses entry to the leader of Israel‘s Islamic Movement, Shaykh Ra'id Salah. The Israelis publicly claim that followers of Shaykh Salah have links to HAMAS and are involved in plans to conduct terrorist operations against Israeli interests earlier in the year.190

July – Libya plays a high-profile role in negotiating the release of a group of foreign hostages seized in the Philippines by the Abu Sayyaf Group, reportedly in exchange for a ransom payment, including money from European governments funneled through Tripoli. Estimates of the ransom range from $10-25 million, and hostages include citizens of France, Germany, Malaysia, South Africa, Finland, the Philippines, and Lebanon. The payment of ransom to kidnappers encourages additional hostage taking, and the Abu Sayyaf Group, emboldened by its success, seizes more hostages—including a U.S. citizen—later in the year.191

2001 October 10 – German police arrest a Libyan, Lased Ben Henin, near his Munich home in coordinated raids that include the arrest of two Tunisians in Italy. Ben Henin is suspected of links to al-Qaida‘s terrorist network and is extradited to Italy on 23 November.192

2002 October – Jordan works closely with U.S. officials to investigate the murder in late October of USAID office Laurence Foley. In December, Jordanian authorities arrest two men, a Libyan and Jordanian, who later admit to carrying out the assassination after receiving money from al-Qaida leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.193

2003 The United States and its international partners succeed in interdicting a shipment of WMD- related material destined for Libya‘s then-active nuclear weapons program. As facts emerged regarding the shipment and its origin, the U.S. gains insight into an emerging WMD terrorism risk. Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan had developed a transnational nuclear proliferation network reaching from Southeast Asia to Europe and was making available sensitive technology and WMD-related materials to nations willing to pay.194

March – Libyan officials facilitate an assassination plot of then-Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. In August 2004, Abulrahman Alamoudi, an Eritrean born but U.S. naturalized citizen, pled guilty to

189 U.S. Department of State (1995), Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, April 2000: 59, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/1999pogt.pdf]. 190 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 (April 2001), Middle East Overview, 58, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/2000pogt.pdf]. 191 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 (April 2001), Middle East Overview, 58, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/2000pogt.pdf]; Larry Niksch, Aby Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti- Terrorism Cooperation, CRS Report for Congress, 25 January 2002: 3, [http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31265.pdf]. 192 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 (May 2002), Europe Overview, 35, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/2001pogt.pdf]. 193 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 (April 2003), Middle East Overview, 57, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/2002pogt.pdf]. 194 Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 April 2008 United States Department of State Publication Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Released April 2008: 181.

28 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

one count of unlicensed travel to and commerce with Libya from the U.S., stating he had been part of the plot to assassinate the Prince at the behest of Libyan officials.195

May 16 – Suicide bombers simultaneously detonate bombs at restaurants, hotels, and a Jewish cultural center in the seaside city of Casablanca, killing 42—including many of the bombers— and wounding 100 others. Moroccan authorities identify the bombers as local adherents of the ―Salafi ya Jihadiya‖ movement and in the following months, investigators learn that many involved in orchestrating the attacks were Moroccan extremists trained in Afghanistan with links to North African extremist groups—mainly the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and al-Qaida.196

2005 June 2 – Journalist Daif al-Ghazal‘s mutilated body is found near Benghazi, Libya, 12 days after reports that he was arrested by two officials of the Libyan Internal Security Agency. The autopsy report indicates that he was shot in the head, and his body was covered in bruises and stab wounds, and most of his fingers severed. The circumstances of his death suggest extrajudicial execution for his writing in which he denounced corruption and called for political reform.197

2006 July 15 – Suicide bomber in Tripoli kills a dozen Christians inside a church; according to the police, the target was the priest.

2007 July 24 – Qadhafi‘s son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, concedes that acts of torture and excessive violence had taken place in Libyan prisons. Al-Qadhafi denies government culpability, however, arguing that the individuals responsible had acted on their own initiative and were being tried within the legal system. At year's end, no information had been released on the progress of trials.198

February-May—Amnesty International receives reports of several hundred foreign nationals, including minors, held in detention centers in eastern Libya. Sources from inside allege that internal conditions did not meet international human rights standards, with reports of poor hygiene and a shortage of food and medical treatment.199

November – al-Qa‘ida (AQ) leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announces the merger between AQ and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). In an audiotape, Zawahiri urged AQ fighters to topple the government of Libya, describing Qadhafi as an ―enemy of Islam‖ and criticizing the 2003 decision to renounce WMD and terrorism.200

195 Department of Justice, Abdurahman Alamoudi Sentenced to Jail in Terrorism Financing Case, 15 October 2004, [http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/October/04_crm_698.htm]. 196 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 (April 2004), Middle East Overview, p. 65, [http://www.higginsctc.org/patternsofglobalterrorism/2003PoGT.pdf]. 197 Amnesty International, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Briefing to the UN Human Rights Committee, AI Index: MDE 19/008/2007, [http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGMDE190082007&lang=e]; “Libya: Watchdog Condemns Journalist's Killing," Reporters Sans Frontières Press Release, Paris (June 7, 2005). 198 U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Libya, 25 February 2009, [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119121.htm]. 199 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Briefing to the UN Human Rights Committee, Amnesty International, [http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGMDE190082007&lang=e]. 200 U.S. Department of State, 2009 Human Rights Report: Libya, 25 February 2010, 135 [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119121.htm].

29 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

2008 May 29 – Mohammed Adel Abu Ali dies in custody after being returned to Libya after his asylum claim was denied in Europe. According to Human Rights Watch, he was tortured in detention. Abu Ali belonged to the oppositionist ―al-Tabu‖ Front for the Liberation of Libya.201

Lawyers, journalists, and others try to register a new NGO, the Centre for Democracy, to work towards ―the dissemination of democratic values and human rights and the rule of law in Libya.‖ According to the founding committee chair, the Libyan authorities objected to many founders of the organization, and Dhow Al Mansouri, one of the group‘s founders, was abducted and assaulted in June 2008 by three unidentified assailants who warned him against trying to establish the NGO.202

2009 October 12 – In Italy, a Libyan man, Mohamed Game, attempts to bring a bomb into a Carabinieri barracks in Milan but fails when he encounters guards at the entrance. Investigators stress they found nothing so far to connect Game to a plan foiled last year to bomb the barracks in southwest Milan.203

September—Six leading members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, held in the Abu Salim prison, issue a document renouncing violence and claiming to adhere to a more sound Islamic theology than that of AQ and other jihadist groups. Their declaration document, entitled ―Revisionist Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Verification, and Judgment of People,‖ is the product of a two-year reconciliation project between the Government of Libya and the LIFG, facilitated by the Qadhafi Development Foundation. The authors state that ―The lack of religious knowledge, whether it was a result of an absence of ‗ulama‘ (religious scholars) or the neglect of people in receiving it and attaining it, or due to the absence of its sources, is the biggest cause of errors and religious violations,‖ and they disavow ―anyone who we might have once had organizational or brotherly ties with.‖204

2011 February15—Mass antigovernment protests begin throughout Libya, spreading to Tripoli, in which protestors seek to remove Qadhafi from office and end the four decades of repression. Libyan Air Force pilots defect to Malta, refusing, as reportedly ordered, to fire weapons on civilians.205 Diplomats, officials, representatives to the U.N., some police and security guard have also joined the revolution. February-April – Attacks by Libyan government forces endanger civilians and target a medical clinic in violation of international law. The assessment is based on interviews with two doctors still in Misrata and 17 wounded civilians recently evacuated from the city. Reports indicate 257 people killed and 949 wounded and hospitalized since February 19, 2011. The wounded include 22 women and eight children.206

201 U.S. Department of State, 2008 Human Rights Report: Libya, 25 February 2009, [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119121.htm]. 202 Amnesty International, 2009 Annual Report for Human Rights in Libya, [http://www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr=2009&c=LBY] 203 “Libyan in Milan bomb attack,” ANSA, 12 October 2009, [http://www.ansa.it/web/notizie/rubriche/english/2009/10/12/visualizza_new.html_986845410.html]. 204 U.S. Department of State, 2009 Human Rights Report: Libya, 25 February 2010, 135 [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/nea/119121.htm]. 205 John Hooper and Ian Black, “Libya Defectors: Pilots Told to Bomb Protestors Flee to Malta,” (21 February 2011), Guardian, [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/21/libya-pilots-flee-to-malta]. 206 Human Rights Watch, Libya: Government Attacks in Misrata Kill Civilians, 10 April 2011, [http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/10/libya-government-attacks-misrata-kill-civilians].

30 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

April 10 – Amnesty International provides evidence of extrajudicial executions committed by Qadhafi‘s forces in eastern Libya. Researchers come across the bodies of two opposition fighters who had been shot in the back of the head after their hands had been bound behind their backs and another body of a man who had been shot dead while his hands and feet were bound.207 Reports grow of Qadhafi forces are using cluster-bombs and other indiscriminate weapons.208

APPENDIX B: A Word about Definitions

We use U.S. statutory and international guidelines to define baseline criteria for the inclusion of selected incidents.209 We define terrorism as: ―premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.‖210 In the absence of consensus in international law, we define international terrorism as: ―Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes. . ., whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.‖211 We also rely on the thirteen international conventions that define and criminalize various historical terrorist activities (i.e., aircraft hijacking, attacks or kidnapping of internationally protected persons), some of which were developed by the international community in direct response to Libyan regime tactics.212

207 Amnesty International Press Release, Amnesty International Finds Evidence of Extrajudicial Executions Apparently by Colonel Gaddafi’s Forces Near Ajdabiya, 11 April 2011, [http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGUSA20110412001&lang=e]. 208 Human Rights Watch, “Libya: Cluster Munitions Strike Misrata: Human Rights Watch Witnesses Attack into Residential Area,” 15 April 2011 *http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/15/libya-cluster-munitions-strike-misrata]; Human Rights Watch, Libya: Indiscriminate Attacks Kill Civilians , 17 April 2011, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dad204c1e.html 209 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is the bedrock of international human rights protections (adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, 10 Dec. 1948) and comprises 30 articles establishing civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights for all people. While non-binding, the UDHR is considered by some to have acquired the status of international customary law. See Olivia Ball and Paul Gready (2007), The No-Nonsense Guide to Human Rights (New Internationalist) and James Nickel, “Human Rights,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta ed., [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/rights-human/]. 210 22 U.S.C. § 38(d)(2). See Section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the United States Code more generally which defines: (1) the meaning of the term “international terrorism” as “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country”; (2) the term “terrorism” as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”; and (3) the term “terrorist group” as “any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.” See also “international terrorism” in the context of criminal acts and procedure in 80 U.S.C §2331(1) as “activities that…involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; [and] appear to be intended . . . to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; . . . to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or . . . to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and [which] occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.” 211 See UN Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism annex to UN GA resolution 49/60, "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism," 9 Dec 1994 (A/Res/60/49). Antonio Cassese (2002), International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 449, argues that this non-binding standard constitutes an acceptable definition of international terrorism. He also notes in A. Cassese (2006), “The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 4(5): 933-958, that though a definition of terrorism exists as an international crime in peace, controversy still surrounds its application to armed conflict. 212 See U.N. Treaty Collection, Text and Status of the United Nations Conventions on Terrorism, [http://treaties.UN.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml&menu=MTDSG]; U.N. General Assembly, 60th Session, Resolution 60/288 [On UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy] A/RES/60/288 (20 Sept. 2006) [http://daccess-dds-

31 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

APPENDIX C: Libyan Funding, Training, and Support Mechanisms for International Terrorism:

Training Camps: Principle facilities in and around Tripoli and smaller camps are dispersed throughout the country, including: Seven April, Sidi-Bilal Port facility, Bin Ghashir, Ras al Hilal, etc. Many Palestinian groups have received training at an Air Force base in the Aouzou region, as well as non-Palestinian groups i.e., the Ecuadorian Alfaro Vive, Carajo organization, Colombia‘s M-19, the Haitian Liberation Organization, the Chilean Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, and the Japanese Red Army. Trainees from Asia, Latin America, and Africa often go to Libya legally in the guise of students, among other methods: for example, radicals from Mauritius traveled to Tripoli in 1987 ostensibly to attend a youth conference but, instead, went to a terrorist training camp.213

It is also worth remembering that Qadhafi‘s regularly unlawful military involvement in Africa (i.e., Chad, Egypt, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, and Sudan) is often linked to his cohort, African rulers of his generation, many of whom were allies, close associates, and trained at the World Revolutionary Center (WRC). This fraternity of notorious African warlords, many responsible for a legacy of under- developed and unstable states, includes Liberia‘s Charles Taylor, Sierra Leone‘s Foday Sankoh, Central African Republic‘s Ange-Félix Patassé, Zimbabwe‘s Robert Mugabe, Democratic Republic of the Congo‘s Laurent Kabila, Burkina Faso‘s Blaise Compaoré, Chad‘s Idriss Deby, among others.214

Funding Mechanisms and Institutions: The Anti-Imperialism Center (AIC) or Mathaba is used to support ―liberation and revolutionary groups‖ and to identify and recruit revolutionaries for ideological and military training in Libya and to determine individuals selected for advanced training in weapons and explosives or indoctrination. The AIC is headed by Musa Kusa, Libya‘s Deputy Foreign Minister. With representatives in many Libyan embassies worldwide, the AIC runs its own independent clandestine operations and disburses payments to terrorist, insurgent, and subversive groups.215 Given the public exposure of Libyan People‘s Bureaus in international terrorism in the 1980s, Qadhafi has shifted terrorist support operations to a host of other venues and institutions, such as the Islamic Call Society, which functions both as a religious and front organization, student groups and friendship societies, businesses that provide cover capabilities (i.e., Exo-Commerce or the Benin-based Sarah Company which infiltrated arms and explosives into neighboring African countries for terrorist acts in the late 1980s). Well-known examples of companies that operate as surrogates for the Libyan intelligence service include Neutron International, run by Musbah Warfalli, the architect of dissident attacks in the 1980s, and the national Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA), which provides both passenger and cargo services and transports arms, explosives, and terrorists. An LAA flight was used in the August 1986 escape of six terrorists believed to ny.UN.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/504/88/PDF/N0550488.pdf?OpenElement]. The international community has generally adopted sector-specific counterterrorism conventions as part of an activity-focused approach to anti-terrorism measures i.e., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (1988); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), etc. For the strengths and limits of this approach see, M. Cherif Bassiouni (2002), Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment” Harvard International Law Journal 43(1): 83-103, 88-91. The UN General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee (established by Resolution 51/210 of 17 Dec. 1996 on Terrorism) and the UN General Assembly Sixth Committee (Legal) are currently negotiating a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, though discussions have stalled since 2000 on precisely the issue of defining terrorism. 213 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991, 69. 214 Douglas Farah, Harvard for Tyrants: How Muammar al-Qaddafi Taught a Generation of Bad Guys, Foreign Policy, 4 March 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/04/harvard_for_tyrants. 215 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991, 70.

32 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism be responsible for the August attack on the British base at Akrotiri, Cyprus, for instance, where the captain made false statements to airport authorities about crew size to disguise operatives‘ presence. The Libyan regime also uses travel agencies around the world to facilitate the movement of terrorists for advanced training, booking agents for travel through third countries so their ultimate destination in Libya goes undetected.216

216 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1991, 69.

33 Patterns of Conduct: Libyan Regime Support for and Involvement in Acts of Terrorism

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